No. 77 14 September 2015
Abkhazia
South Ossetia caucasus Adjara analytical digest
Nagorno- Karabakh
resourcesecurityinstitute.org www.laender-analysen.de www.css.ethz.ch/cad www.crrccenters.org
IDENTITY, NORMS AND BELIEFS IN FOREIGN POLICY
Special Editor: Kornely K. Kakachia
■■The Portrayal of “The Other” in Foreign Policy Discourse and Public Consciousness in Armenia (2008–present) 2 By Aram Terzyan and Narek Galstyan, Yerevan ■■Postcolonial Hybridity, Contingency, and the Mutual Embeddedness of Identity and Politics in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Some Initial Thoughts 7 By Murad Ismayilov, Cambridge, UK ■■Georgia: Foreign Policy Identity in the Domestic Arena as a Subject of Contestation 14 By Salome Minesashvili and Levan Kakhishvili, Tbilisi
Institute for European, Russian, Research Centre Center Caucasus Research German Association for and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies for Security Studies The George Washington Resource Centers East European Studies University of Bremen ETH Zurich University
The Caucasus Analytical Digest is supported by: CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 77, 14 September 2015 2
The Portrayal of “The Other” in Foreign Policy Discourse and Public Consciousness in Armenia (2008–present) By Aram Terzyan and Narek Galstyan, Yerevan Abstract: Conventional wisdom posits that the evocation of “the other” in a state’s foreign policy discourse is indica- tive of the core characteristics of its foreign policy identity. “The other” is largely deemed to be a symbol in the definition of who “we” are—our identity. A discourse analysis of Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan’s conceptions of “the other,” coupled with public opinion surveys, sheds light on major ups and downs that the convoluted relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey have undergone since 2008. Evidence indicates that Sargsyan’s determination to break the deadlock was not reciprocated by Azerbaijan and Turkey. The lat- ter stepped back from its commitment to establishing unconditional relations with Armenia coupled with Baku’s upgraded bellicose policy towards Armenia. All this led Armenia’s president to toughen his position toward them, which found vivid expression in Armenia’s foreign policy discourse. Moreover, the tough reso- nated with Armenian society and further cemented negative social attitudes towards Azerbaijan and Turkey.
The Portrayal of Turkey in Serzh Sargsyan’s found their expression in Sargsyan’s foreign policy dis- Foreign Policy Discourse course, which was characterized by a strong emphasis on The very outset of Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency coincided the notions of a united Caucasus and Armenian–Turk- with large-scale geopolitical exigencies in the South Cauca- ish rapprochement. sus given the deterioration of Russian–Georgian relations To bring these visions to fruition, Sargsyan made which ultimately escalated into a “five day” devastating a crucial step by inviting the Turkish president to visit war in August 2008. The unfreezing of “frozen” conflicts Armenia on September 6, 2008, to watch the World sent ripples of apprehension through Armenia regarding Cup qualifying match between Armenia and Turkey. the likelihood of instability “spill-over” into the country. Abdullah Gül’s historic visit to Yerevan coupled with To mitigate possible risks, Sargsyan expressed deter- President Sargysyan’s commitment to establishing dip- mination to move beyond deep-rooted hostilities and lomatic relations with Turkey without setting pre-con- identify an ingenious recipe for peaceful co-existence ditions seemed to challenge the status-quo profoundly. with Azerbaijan and Turkey. To this end, the presi- Regrettably, the optimistic rhetoric did not translate dent placed a special emphasis on redefining Arme- into reality. Shortly after signing the protocols on the estab- nia’s general and foreign policy identities, a process lishment and development of diplomatic relations between deemed to be absolutely essential to achieving a break- Armenia and Turkey, the latter stepped back from its com- through in regional cooperation: “We should formu- mitment to establishing relations with Armenia without late and define a new Armenian identity. An identity preconditions. Witnessing Ankara’s deficit of political will which should become our beacon in the new century to achieve a breakthrough, Sargsyan repeatedly expressed …”1 The call implicitly pointed to the necessity to resolve his deep disappointment. The disillusion inexorably led Armenian–Turkish disputes and turn the page on long- Armenia’s president to toughen his position vis-à-vis Tur- stalled thorny relations. The notions of “zero-problems key: “The policy of ‘zero problems’ with the neighbours with neighbours” and “rhythmic diplomacy” adopted yielded zero results. It is happening because Turkey is try- by Ankara seemed to reflect Turkey’s new take, par- ing to solve all problems with the neighbours at the expense ticularly on normalization of Armenian–Turkish rela- of the neighbours.”2 The glimmers of hope pinned on Tur- tions previously perceived as a “red line” issue. This ten- key’s fundamental transformation and launch of a new dency received further impetus from Ankara’s proposal policy toward Armenia rapidly vanished, recalling bitter (in 2008) on the establishment of a “Caucasus Stabil- memories about the Ottoman yoke. Turkey’s about face ity and Cooperation Platform.” The new developments had deep repercussions with Armenian society, reinforcing fears that Turkey’s imperial nature has in fact remained 1 Speech delivered by President Serzh Sargsyan in The United States at the official reception hosted by the Embassy of Armenia to the US, Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations 2 Statement by President Serzh Sargsyan at the Extended Meeting and leading Armenian–American Organizations, 24.09.2008, Held at the RA Ministry of Defense 15.01.2013,
unchanged. Sargsyan’s discourse expressed this idea clearly be the enemy of the Armenian people. We are capable when he branded Turkey’s regional policy a vivid mani- of respectfully resolving our disagreements and peace- festation of a “New Ottomanism.” fully co-existing as neighbours.”4 “To hell with ratification.” This crude phrase, which Sargsyan has fiercely criticized speculations about President Sargsyan delivered to Ankara at the 69th ses- the religious nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, sion of the UN General Assembly on September 24, asserting that any attempt to provide the dispute with 2014, is indicative of the ups and downs that his posi- a religious motivation is not constructive. tion towards Turkey has undergone throughout his ten- Interestingly, Sargsyan has tended to question Azer- ure. Unsurprisingly, on February 16, 2015, President baijan’s European identity. It follows that Azerbaijan Sargsyan sent an official letter to the Chairman of the has largely misperceived the essence of European inte- National Assembly Galust Sahakyan in order to recall gration, viewing Europe as merely a convenient market the Armenia–Turkey protocols from parliament.3 for selling oil and gas.5 This argument is supported by In essence, Sargsyan’s initial attempts at redefining Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s policies toward the blockade Armenia’s foreign policy identity to bring it in line with of Armenia, which in fact have nothing to do with the Armenian–Turkish rapprochement proved futile. Tur- core characteristics of European identity. key’s ambivalent policy towards Armenia inevitably led In Sargsyan’s view there are substantial divergences Sargsyan to rethink his initial optimistic takes on Arme- between the characteristics of “the other” and Euro- nian–Turkish rapprochement. Subsequently, the terms pean identity. The latter is unequivocally associated with “Ottoman,” “destructive,” “belligerent” and “unreliable” a peaceful, free and democratic path of development. became the core characteristics of Turkey in Sargsyan’s Unsurprisingly, in Sargsyan’s foreign policy discourse, foreign policy discourse. Azerbaijan is largely associated with the terms “non-dem- ocratic,” “belligerent,” “bellicose,” “destructive,” “Arme- The Evocation of Azerbaijan in Sargsyan’s neophobic”, etc (see Table 1). Foreign Policy Discourse From the very outset of his presidency, Sargsyan invari- Table 1: The Portrayal of “the Other” under Serzh ably stressed the necessity of displaying political will to Sargsyan’s Presidency (2008–Present) achieve a breakthrough in Armenia’s hostile relationship The Other Discourse with Azerbaijan. Sargsyan has consistently emphasized Azerbaijan Armenophobic; Bellicose; Belliger- that Azerbaijan’s anti-Armenian bellicose propaganda (elite) ent; Non-democratic; Destructive, coupled with the full-blown arms race doom the initia- (uncommitted to a negotiated out- tives of regional cooperation and conflict settlement to come to the conflict), Non-European failure. This disappointment particularly applies to the (misperceived the essence of Euro- EU’s peace-oriented Eastern Partnership. Sargsyan ques- pean identity) tioned outright the viability of its regional cooperation Turkey Unreliable; Imperial (referring to component, asserting that Azerbaijan’s resolve to extort (elite) New Ottomanism); Obstacle to unilateral concessions from Armenia render it meaning- Armenia’s European integration; Bel- less. In his view, there is no common ground between ligerent and destructive Armenia and Azerbaijan because of the latter’s belliger- ent and uncompromising policy. Nevertheless, unlike his predecessor, Sargsyan has The Image of the Enemy in Public utterly rejected the identity-based notions of ethnic Consciousness incompatibility between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Evidence indicates that the public perception of Turkey and He has made a clear distinction between the Azerbai- Azerbaijan does not differ considerably from the official jani state and society, expressing a hope that the people position: Armenians perceive both countries as the coun- of Azerbaijan, or a significant percent of them, do not endorse state-run Armeneophobic propaganda: “I am 4 Statement of Serzh Sargsyan the President of the Republic of confident that our peoples will have a better future than Armenia in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the one contemplated by some leaders who preach hatred 02.10.2013,
try’s main enemies. However, the public assessment of the in public perceptions: 1. the number of those who believe degree of “hostility” of Azerbaijan is higher than that of that Turks have a positive attitude towards Armenians Turkey. But given the possibility of multiple answers (“Inte- rose nearly twice, 2. the number of respondents who gration Barometer” (IB), “Barometr.am” (BAM)), “indexes believe that Turks are neutral to them increased about of hostility” for these countries are higher and closer, while 10%, and 3. the number who are convinced that Turks when respondents are allowed to choose only one answer hold negative attitudes towards Armenians decreased (“Caucasus Barometer” (CB)), the majority brands Azer- almost 20% (see Figure 2). baijan as the country’s main enemy. Figure 1, based on the CB survey (2011–2013), indicates that only Azerbaijan is Figure 2: The Turkish Population’s General Attitude considered by more than half of respondents as Armenia’s Towards Armenians (%) enemy. Results of IB (2014) show that with the possibil- ity of simultaneous multiple answers, Azerbaijan is again “ahead of” Turkey. However, in this case, the overwhelm- 17 Positive ing majority considers both countries as hostile to Armenia. 32 The BAM survey also shows that Azerbaijan is the most hostile country (first answer); the second position is occu- 15 pied by Turkey. Moreover, according to the study “Arme- Neutral nia–Turkey” (2014), 77% of respondents believe that Tur- 26 key pursues a hostile policy towards Armenia, and 82% of respondents believe that Turkey cannot be trusted. 62 Interestingly, Azerbaijan and Turkey are considered hos- Negative tile countries towards Armenia by an absolute majority (or 44 higher) of all age, education, gender, and settlement groups. However, a comparison of the results of CB (2010) 0 20 40 60 80 and “Armenia–Turkey” (2014) indicates certain changes CB 2010 Arm-Tr 2014
Figure 1: Which Country is Currently Armenia’s Main Source: The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. 2010 “Cauca- Enemy? (%) sus Barometer Armenia”. Retrieved through ODA
Figure 3: Approval of … (%)
100
50
0 YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO CB 2009 CB 2010 CB 2011 CB 2012 CB 2013 business with Turks 41 56 45 53 40 57 39 59 31 67 business with Azerbaijanis 34 63 34 64 32 64 32 66 22 76 woman marrying Turks 9 91 8 91 9 90 7 92 4 95 woman marrying Azerbaijanis 8 91 9 91 9 90 7 92 4 96
Source: The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. 2009–2013 “Caucasus Barometer Armenia”. Retrieved through ODA
Conclusion Yet, the public is somewhat more critical and straight- To sum up it is worth noting that President Sargsyan’s forward. All the examined quantitative studies clearly discourse vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey has undergone indicate the public considers both countries as Arme- considerable changes throughout his tenure. Huge dis- nia’s main enemies. These countries are perceived as hos- appointment in expectations for reconciling with Tur- tile to Armenia, and there is a deep and total mistrust key led Sargsyan to toughen his positions, which shifted of Turks and Azerbaijanis. This way of thinking has not from optimistic to critical. The latter was precipitated changed significantly during the last five years, even by Azerbaijan’s bellicose propaganda coupled with its throughout the process of Armenian–Turkish alleged belligerent policy towards Armenia, as well as Turkey’s rapprochement—often branded as “football diplomacy.” abrupt withdrawal from its commitment to uncondi- Moreover, the majority of the Armenian population cur- tionally establishing diplomatic relations. rently does not support the initiative for reconciliation. Public attitudes towards Turkey and Azerbaijan do not differ significantly from Armenia’s official position.
About the Authors Aram Terzyan, Ph.D. in Political Science, is Assistant Professor, and Chair of Political Institutions and Processes, in the Faculty of International Relations, Yerevan State University (Armenia). Narek Galstyan, Ph.D. in Political Sciences, is Associate Professor, and Chair of Political Institutions and Processes, in the Faculty of International Relations, Yerevan State University (Armenia).
Further Reading • Alla Mirzoyan, Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West: Between History and Geopolitics, Palgrave Mac- milan, 2010. • Asbed Kotchikian, The Dialectics of Smallness: State-Making in the South Caucasus, AIPRG Working Paper No. 06/13, 2006, pp. 1–21. • Asbed Kotchikian, The Dialectics of Small States—Foreign Policy Making in Armenia and Georgia, VDM Ver- lag Dr. Mueller e.K. 2008. • The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. 2009–2013 “Caucasus Barometer Armenia” & 2013 “Caucasus Barom- eter Regional Dataset”. Retrieved through ODA
Figure 5: Likely to Find a Solution to the Karabakh Conflict … (%)
through force (Azerbaijan) 29 23 13 20 15
through force (Armenia) 33 27 12 8 20
through peaceful negotiation (Azerbaijan) 22 17 20 35 7
through peaceful negotiation (Armenia) 16 15 26 28 15
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Very unlikely Rather unlikely Rather likely Very likely DK
Source: The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. 2013 “Caucasus Barometer Regional Dataset”. Retrieved through ODA