Center for International Exchange Vol. 2 No. 6 | October 2007

Japanese Foreign Policy under Prime Minister

Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

In the immediate aftermath of Prime Minister 1. What are some of the core ideas that will Shinzo Abe’s sudden resignation on September 12, provide the foundation for the new administra- 2007, it appeared as though Abe’s former foreign tion’s foreign policy? minister, Taro Aso, was certain to become Japan’s First, Prime Minister Fukuda believes that foreign new prime minister. Nevertheless, on September policy should be created through a process that 23, Yasuo Fukuda, a widely respected party elder involves joint consultations between popularly and son of former Prime Minister , elected politicians (necessarily policy-generalists) was elected president of the Liberal Democratic and experts in the professional foreign policy es- Party (LDP) and subsequently as prime minister tablishment. He is a strong advocate of a pragmatic of Japan. Fukuda was chosen largely because of his approach to foreign affairs and is unlikely to push a reputation as a moderate, his collaborative style, nationalistic or populist agenda. and the personal and political distance between Second, Prime Minister Fukuda has long held him and Abe. While an Aso administration would the conviction that Japan’s foreign policy should have signaled continuity in foreign policy, Fukuda not be thought of in zero-sum terms as a choice is likely to shift gears and adopt a more subtle ap- between regionalism and its alliance with the proach to foreign affairs. ­United States. Rather, he has expressed the belief Prime Minister Fukuda inherits a number of that proactive and constructive relations toward very serious foreign policy challenges that demand both the region and Japan’s most important ally the government’s immediate attention, ranging are not only in Japan’s national interest but can from the issue to the extension of also be mutually reinforcing: strong ties with the the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. The fol- United States facilitate regional economic growth lowing pages will address several questions about and security, while expanded links with East Asia Fukuda’s election and its implications for Japan’s would keep the United States engaged in the region foreign policy. and facilitate deeper bilateral and multilateral ties. 2. Where does Mr. Fukuda stand on visits to create an environment in which the two parties can and relations with and sit down to serious negotiations on such issues of , and what kind of approach to- concern for bilateral relations. As prime minister, ward the region can be expected from his ad- Fukuda will expand efforts to find a constructive ministration? resolution to the abductees issue and set the stage Prime Minister ’s repeated visits for Japan to make a more proactive contribution to Yasukuni Shrine damaged Japan’s political re- to the Six-Party Talks. lations with several East Asian countries, particu- Regarding Prime Minister Fukuda’s attitude to- larly China and South Korea. His successor, Prime ward East Asia, if speeches given during his cam- Minister Abe, surprised many pundits by making paign for the LDP presidency are any indication, improved relations with China and South Korea a his administration will place an increased focus clear priority during the first month of his admin- on regional community-building efforts. His basic istration. This behavior stood in stark contrast to view of Japan’s role in the region—which contin- the hard line his administration adopted vis-à-vis ues to be heavily influenced by his father’s famous North Korea. 1977 speech in Manila—is that while Japan has an Prime Minister Fukuda has always been some- important leadership role to play in East Asia, its thing of a realist when it comes to Japan’s relations leaders must be sure to fully acknowledge and re- with its neighbors. Throughout his tenure as for- spect its political, religious, and cultural diversity. mer Prime Minister Koizumi’s chief cabinet secre- Consequently, far from using values as a rubric for tary, Fukuda cautioned Koizumi about his visits to dividing states into ideological camps, Fukuda has Yasukuni Shrine given the negative impact he knew indicated that Japan’s interests would be best served these visits would have on Japan’s relationships with by adopting a low-key approach and proactively countries in the region. In contrast to Koizumi’s engaging the region as a whole in a process of in- successor, Shinzo Abe, who consistently refused to clusive multilateralism. Thus, while conceding that comment on the issue, Fukuda has already made a the spread of democratic values should be viewed number of public commitments that he will not go as a long-term goal for the region, the new admin- to Yasukuni Shrine while prime minister. istration will probably take care to avoid policies One of Prime Minister Fukuda’s main foreign or rhetoric that could be interpreted as attempting policy goals may be a kind of grand bargain with to impose such values upon its neighbors. China, not only concerning bilateral issues but also with regard to Japan and China’s respective roles in 3. What are the prospects for the Anti- the region, particularly in the field of community ­terrorism Special Measures Law under Prime building. In order to achieve this grand bargain, he Minister Fukuda? will avoid actions likely to provoke anti-Japanese The Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law is set to sentiment and instead focus on complementary automatically expire on November 1st, and oppo- interests. He can be expected to push for an expan- sition leader and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) sion of substantive dialogue and cooperation with President Ichiro Ozawa has vowed to derail any China on energy security and the environment, in LDP efforts to support an extension. For Prime addition to other issues of common concern. Minister Fukuda, the significance of the debate Regarding North Korea, in Japan “the North Ko- over extension of the law (or new legislation that rea issue” refers not only to international concerns either party may introduce to replace it) transcends about nuclear proliferation but also to the where- the issue of the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) role in abouts of a number of Japanese citizens who were the Indian Ocean. Rather, it serves as a litmus test abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s and of his administration’s ability to overcome the 1980s. Even prior to the election campaign, Fukuda challenge posed by the DPJ’s unprecedented ma- had long been critical of a hard-line stance, stating jority in the Upper House and successfully work on many occasions that Japan’s interests would be together with the opposition in the formulation of better served if it were to engage North Korea and policy, foreign or otherwise.

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS  Vol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007 These are largely uncharted waters for the LDP, is likely to push this initiative again, this time aim- which until the July 2007 election had successfully ing to enact a law that will receive widespread and steamrolled most post-9/11 foreign policy legisla- supra-partisan support. tion through the Diet. While the makeup of the While it is improbable that Prime Minister Lower House could change at any moment if the Fukuda, unlike his predecessor, will become an prime minister calls for a general election, the impassioned advocate of textual revision of the ruling coalition will continue to face a majority constitution in light of the current political cli- opposition in the Upper House at least until the mate, he will most likely support efforts to change next election in 2010. Although the LDP- the government’s official interpretation of the con- coalition’s overwhelming majority in the Lower stitution’s Article 9. This new interpretation would House means that it could technically force pas- aim to expand the SDF’s mandate to include par- sage of the extension even without Upper House ticipation in international operations that have re- sanction, Prime Minister Fukuda has made it clear ceived sanction from the United Nations Security that major policy initiatives will henceforth have Council. The fact that opposition leader Ichiro to garner at least minimal opposition support if Ozawa has called for the SDF to adopt a similar the government wishes to avoid three years of leg- role suggests that the prospects for such a reinter- islative gridlock. pretation are quite good. In light of these circumstances, the November 1st deadline for extension will likely pass and the 5. What is the long-term significance of the Special Measures Law will automatically expire. DPJ’s intense opposition to the extension of Fukuda’s most important task will be to clarify the the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law? rationale for the SDF dispatch to the Japanese peo- Does it indicate that US-Japan relations have ple and encourage public debate on the issue. Such once again become a fault line in Japan’s do- a process will ensure that future legislation receives mestic politics? widespread understanding and support. Developments in the wake of the DPJ’s acquisition of a majority in the Upper House this past July 4. Does Abe’s resignation, coupled with Aso’s have made it abundantly clear that from now on defeat in the LDP presidential election, signal the opposition will play an increasingly significant the end of Japan’s pursuit of status as a more role in the formulation of Japan’s foreign policy. “normal” nation? What is the significance of While the US-Japan alliance is unlikely to become these developments for Article 9? Is consti- a divisive issue in domestic politics to the extent tutional revision off the table for the foresee- that it did in the immediate post-war era, debate able future? over its substance will probably become a focal While Prime Ministers Fukuda and Abe may not point of intra-governmental deliberations over share an identical vision for Japan’s future, it would foreign policy for the foreseeable future. be a mistake to classify the new prime minister as While some overseas Japan watchers may be a dove or isolationist. In fact, he has repeatedly ex- tempted to frame the ongoing debate over exten- pressed a desire to more clearly define Japan’s role sion of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law and responsibilities in the international commu- in absolute terms as a question of “alliance with nity. For example, during his time as chief cabinet the United States: yes or no?” this, simply put, is secretary under former Prime Minister Koizumi, not accurate. The DPJ’s insistence on UN sanction Fukuda made an extensive effort to garner support as a prerequisite for SDF participation in overseas for a basic law concerning dispatch of the SDF.* He activities, as well as Japan’s growing support for * Distinct from ad-hoc legislation (e.g. the Anti-terrorism regionalism and community-building activities Special Measures Law), which is only valid for specific mis- in East Asia, far from signaling a declining inter- sions and automatically expires without periodic extension, est in the United States, are both part of a natural a basic law would permanently clarify the circumstances un- der which the government can and cannot dispatch the SDF evolution in Japan’s foreign policy in an increas- overseas. ingly multipolar and globalizing world. Japan is

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS  Vol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007 not alone in this regard, as changes in US foreign to ensure that the alliance remains strong, leaders policy during President Bush’s second term sug- must use these consultations to clarify misunder- gest that the United States is also in the midst of a standings, facilitate linkages between the United similar shift toward multilateralism. Foreign poli- States and East Asia, coordinate future participa- cy speeches by both Democratic and Republican tion in multilateral activities, and reaffirm the US- presidential candidates suggest that this shift will Japan alliance. continue for the foreseeable future. No matter how events play out in the com- ing weeks and months, it is absolutely clear that Hitoshi Tanaka is a Senior Fellow at JCIE, and he there will continue to be a need for extensive bi- ­previously served as Deputy Minister for Foreign Af- lateral consultations over foreign policy. In order fairs of Japan.

East Asia Insights East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building from a Japanese perspective. Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE Please direct any comments or questions to [email protected].

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EAST ASIA INSIGHTS  Vol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007 © 2007 Japan Center for International Exchange