Activesync, TCP/IP and 802.11B Wireless Vulnerabilities of Wince-Based Pdas
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ActiveSync, TCP/IP and 802.11b Wireless Vulnerabilities of WinCE-based PDAs Pascal Meunier, Sofie Nystrom, Seny Kamara, Scott Yost, Kyle Alexander, Dan Noland, Jared Crane Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance Security (CERIAS), 1315 Recitation Building, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1315; [email protected] Abstract Whereas normal computers may be locked in a trusted Researching the vulnerabilities and security concerns of area, portables may be carried into unsafe areas, and may WinCE-based Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in an also be whisked away by an attacker in a moment of 802.11 wireless environment resulted in identifying distraction or during a break and replaced after installing CAN-2001-{0158 to 0163}. The full understanding and a keylogger or other trojan program. Therefore, we demonstration of some vulnerabilities would have believe that physical attacks on portable devices are required reverse engineering ActiveSync, which was much more likely than against normal computers; in beyond the scope of this research. Moreover, the WinCE particular, we are concerned about the speed of the IP stack demonstrated unstabilities under a number of attacks which may enable “tainting” the portable device. attacks, one of which produced symptoms in hardware. ActiveSync was created to provide file The inaccessibility of the 802.11b standard synchronization capabilities for WinCE-based PDAs. It documentation was a source of delays in the research; provides both network-based and local (USB or serial) however, we created three proof-of-concept applications synchronization capabilities. The impersonation of a host to defeat 802.11b security. One collects valid MAC or PDA, as well as attacks on the host providing the addresses on the network, which defeats MAC-address- service were considered. However, ActiveSync based restrictions. Another builds a code book using specifications are proprietary (closed) and were known-plaintext attacks, and the third decrypts 802.11b unavailable to us. Therefore, we were limited to probing traffic on-the-fly using the code book. the outside of this black box without being able to Keywords:WinCE, WEP, ActiveSync, wireless, security, provide a comprehensive analysis. 802.11b, vulnerability In an 802.11b wireless environment, several measures and features are supposed to provide some measure of security. These are the SSID (Service Set Identifier), 1. Introduction MAC address restriction, and the wireless encryption protocol (WEP). Networks are identified and segregated Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) may be vulnerable by an SSID. The SSID can be broadcast using “beacon” to accidents during transport or attacks against the frames. So-called “closed” networks do not broadcast services and protocols used. Networked PDAs may be SSIDs, so the users have to know the name of the vulnerable to a number of TCP/IP attacks, especially network. However, finding valid SSIDs is trivial with resource exhaustion attacks due to the limited resources any network sniffer. Therefore, we focused on MAC provided by the PDA. Other attacks against networked address restriction, and the wireless encryption protocol PDAs would include malicious content downloaded (WEP). Our methods of attack have been found directly or through a service such as avantgo.com, hostile independently by other teams and announced first JavaScript, ActiveX and Java. An aspect particular to through unrefereed channels [1, 2], even though we had WinCE-based PDAs is the availability of independently identified those we used before their synchronization services through the ActiveSync announcements. However, we implemented these attacks protocol over a serial link, infrared or over TCP/IP; and found them effective and practical, contrary to claims therefore ActiveSync can also be attacked. The by the 802.11b chairperson [6]. We also found convenience of PDAs is enhanced by wireless access, implementation errors in 802.11b hardware. which makes them vulnerable to attacks against the wireless standard 802.11b. Proceedings of the Eleventh IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE’02) 1080-1383/02 $17.00 © 2002 IEEE coded factor after every failed connection attempt. 2. Materials and Methods The brute force program was a Visual Basic script that utilized a function called SendKeys(), which sends The initial testbed comprised 3 Aero 1550 Pocket PC keystrokes through the GUI interface. By sending key devices by Compaq, an Aironet card and 2 base stations strokes to the ActiveSync connection application on the AP340 by Cisco (gifts of Microsoft) as well as two PCs PC, it was possible to establish a connection, try three belonging to CERIAS. One PC ran Windows 2000 and passwords and reconect to try it again. Obviously, served as a synchronization host for the handhelds. anyone who understands the internals of ActiveSync can Another was able to boot in either Windows 2000 or directly brute force the 4 required digits in a fraction of Linux Red Hat 6.2; this PC had a PCMCIA card reader the time by avoiding the GUI entirely. The key to this and was used to sniff wireless traffic and as a source of vulnerability is the trust relationship between the PDA attacks against the synchronization host and the Cisco and the host PC. Because the PDA acts as the base station. It was found that the Aero 1550 devices authentication server, it should not be trusting the client were incapable of powering the Aironet card due to PC and the software running on it. The PDA should be incompatible voltages. We later received two PocketPC controlling the exponential backoff, and not the PC. iPaq devices by Compaq, two Ethernet cards and two more wireless cards (Orinoco WaveLan). The iPaqs b) ActiveSync synchronization over a Network were running WinCE 3.0.9348 (Build 9456). (DoS Attacks CAN-2001-0158, CAN-2001-0159) 3. ActiveSync ActiveSync listens on port 5679 of a host PC for a PDA attempting a network synchronization. If a PDA is a) Synchronization over a serial link synchronized through the cradle, port 5679 is closed. The availability of the network synchronization function The most direct ActiveSync connection may be can be enabled or disabled by the user through an option established by placing the device into a charging cradle in the file menu of the host. which is connected to the serial port of a PC. After the We were able to enact a denial of service (DoS) attack initial connection the user at the PC will be prompted to and remotely close the port by establishing a connection authenticate himself/herself if and only if the device is to it and feeding ActiveSync any line that was longer set to require authentication. Authentication for than seven characters. The port stayed closed until the ActiveSync comes in the form of a 4 decimal digit network synchronization option was locally re-enabled personal identification number (PIN) . Should a PDA be on the desktop machine. Anyone with TCP/IP left briefly unattended, it is possible to try to synchronize connectivity to the PC could shut down the service, it in the cradle of a hostile computer. which is potentially anyone on the internet. If the correct PIN is supplied then the device and the Once open, port 5679 stayed open even if network PC compare the files that are to be synchronized and synchronization was disabled. Another DoS attack was transfer them as necessary. If an incorrect PIN number that as long as a connection to port 5679 was established, is supplied, then an error message is displayed and the even if there were no authentication taking place (no user may guess twice more before the connection is traffic), ActiveSync would not allow any other device to broken. To re-establish a new connection, with three synchronize by network or by cradle. This lasted for more attempts, seemed at first to require removing and about 20 seconds at which point the connection was replacing the PDA in the cradle. However, we closed and became available once again. This could also discovered that the unit does not have to be removed be exploited remotely in order to prevent legitimate users physically from the cradle. The connection can be reset from synchronizing. By simply establishing a connection programatically and three more successive tries are to the port, closing it before the 20 seconds elapsed and granted. then re-establishing it again, we could keep the port We were successful in making a proof-of-concept continuously busy, thus making ActiveSync refuse all (unoptimized and slow) brute force attack in the cradle other synchronization requests. by resetting the connection every three password If the protocol specifications and the code had been attempts. We communicated our findings to Microsoft available to us, we would have been able to assess and suggested that an exponential delay be implemented, whether the vulnerabilities were protocol flaws or which would deny for a while new connection attempts implementation problems. to the PDA. The delay would be increased by a hard Proceedings of the Eleventh IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE’02) 1080-1383/02 $17.00 © 2002 IEEE 4. TCP/IP Vulnerabilities necessary to free the allocated memory. 5)No effect: No visible effects were found after a) Random IP packets and DoS attacks running ISIC. However, the effects were highly unreproducible, even In order to test the WinCE IP stack, we used a tool after resending the same sequence of packets, or a subset. named ISIC [4] that generates random IP packets. ISIC The longer we would try to test the iPaq (not necessarily is a suite of utilities to exercise the stability of an IP time but attempts), the less frequently we would observe Stack and its component stacks (TCP, UDP, ICMP et. problems. After much testing and grief, we found that al.).