The EU‟S Choice for a Stable Neighbor

Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Amsterdam

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations

The EU‟s choice for a stable neighbor

Explaining the EU’s foreign policy shift towards Belarus

Supervised by: mw. prof. dr. M.E. Glasius Second reader: dr. D. Bouris Research project: Authoritarianism in a global age Name: Roxanne Bucker Student number: 1119890 Date: August 31, 2016 Abstract

In an effort to democratize Belarus, the EU sanctioned Belarus for the past 12 years. However, in February 2016 the EU made the decision to suspend most of its restrictive measures in response to progress made by Belarus in the past year. This decision is notable as not all conditions that were attached to the restrictive measures have been met by Belarus. Therefore, this research aims to develop a better understanding of the EU‟s motivation for this decision. This research demonstrates that both Belarus and the EU, due to changes in their geopolitical interests, benefit from re-engagement. This seems to have led the EU to let go of democracy promotion through sanctions in favor of a better relation. Subsequently, this research argues that the Belarusian case should be understood in the broader context of the EU is shifting its foreign policy focus from the normative element to the strategic element which can be explained by the post-Cold War security trend and the insight that in its essence the EU is a security community.

Content

Abbreviations ...... 5 1. Introduction ...... 6 Methodology ...... 8 Research outline ...... 10 2. Literature review ...... 11 3. Hypotheses ...... 16 3.1 Lack of effectiveness restrictive measures ...... 16 3.2 Geopolitics shift EU interests ...... 16 3.3. A shift of Belarusian interests ...... 17 4. EU-Belarus relation during the period 2004-2016 ...... 19 4.1 2004-2006: introduction of restrictive measures...... 19 4.1.1 First restrictive measures ...... 19 4.1.2 EU stresses importance of free and fair elections ...... 21 4.1.3 A lack of free and fair elections ...... 21 4.2 2008-2010: suspension of restrictive measures...... 22 4.2.1 Signs of an improving relation between the EU and Belarus ...... 22 4.2.2 The EU maintains the suspension of travel restrictions ...... 23 4.2.3 The EU calls for democratic elections ...... 25 4.3 2011-2014: reintroducing restrictive measures ...... 26 4.3.1 The EU regrets election violence and re-imposes restrictive measures ...... 26 4.3.2 According to the EU the situation in Belarus is worsening ...... 27 4.3.3 Extension of restrictive measures ...... 29 4.3.4 EU again demands the release of political prisoners ...... 29 4.4 2015-2016: rapprochement between the EU and Belarus ...... 29 4.4.1 Release of political prisoners and peaceful elections ...... 30 4.4.2 The EU suspends most of its restrictive measures ...... 30 5. Analysis and findings ...... 33 5.1 Analysis Council conclusions ...... 33 5.2 Analysis hypotheses ...... 34 5.2.1 Explaining the ineffectiveness of restrictive measures ...... 35 5.2.2 Belarus is moving closer to the EU ...... 38

5.2.3 The EU‟s motives...... 39 5.3 Shift from normative to strategic foreign policy ...... 44 6. Conclusion ...... 47 Annex ...... 49 Interview Bogdan Zdrojewski ...... 49 Interview questions ...... 49 Interview Council secretariat official ...... 50 Interview questions ...... 51 Interview human rights defender ...... 52 List of interview topics ...... 52 Interview employee Office for Democratic Belarus ...... 52 Bibliography ...... 53

Abbreviations

CEC Central Election Commission CEU Council of the European Union ENP European Neighborhood Policy EOM Election observation mission EP European Parliament EaP Eastern Partnership EC European Commission EU European Union EEAS European Union External Action Service GDP Gross Domestic Product HRW Humans Rights Watch NGO Non-Governmental Organization ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement UN United Nations US Unites States of America

1. Introduction

The EU has traditionally seen itself as a promoter of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Manners, 2002). In regard to what the EU has achieved in Central and Eastern Europe, Bosse (2009: 215) argues that the EU has been successful in its goal of promoting democracy. Examples of these efforts are the 2004 and 2007 enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which provides an alternative to the EU‟s neighbors who do not have a membership perspective in the near future. However, there are outliers to the EU‟s success of converting countries to its democracy standard; one of them is Belarus. Belarus is a former Soviet state whose independence was recognized by the European Community (EC) in December 1991. Until 1994 the relation between the two was based on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) and in 1995 the EC and Belarus signed a Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Their relation worsened over the period 1995- 1997 due to President Lukashenko‟s attempt to extend his presidential mandate by changing the constitution through a referendum (Bosse, 2009: 219). In reaction the EC decided to suspend the process of ratification of the PCA. Over time the relation between the EU and Belarus kept worsening and in 2004 the EU decided to impose restrictive measures due to its concerns regarding the deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and the lack of free and fair elections in Belarus (CEU, 2004a). These restrictive measures were meant as a pressure tool to push Belarusian authorities to democratize and improve matters such as human rights and the rule of law. Although up to today the EU upholds restrictive measures against Belarus, recently the Council of the European Union (in short referred to as the Council) did take the decision to suspend a large part of these restrictive measures. Hence, in February 2016 the EU lifted travel bans and asset freeze for 170 individuals and three companies, while maintaining measures on four individuals involved in the disappearance of four opposition activists and the arms embargo. This decision could be perceived as remarkable because not all conditions that the Council attached to these restrictive measures have been met by Belarus. In the latest Council conclusion, issued in February 2016, the Council motivates its decision to suspend most of the restrictive measures by acknowledging the steps made by Belarus. With these steps the EU refers to the resumption of the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue which is a dialogue originating from 2009 between Belarus and the EU on issues

6 that concern human rights. This dialogue is regarded as important by the EU as this provides the possibility for constructive talks on the situation of human rights which is one of the EU‟s main concerns regarding Belarus. In addition, Belarus‟ more active role in the EaP is welcomed by the EU. Furthermore, the EU has expressed that it values the constructive role Belarus played in the region, referring to Belarus hosting the Kiev peace talks in Minsk. Another significant step forward by Belarus was the release of the political prisoners in August 2015. Since the detention of political prisoners after the presidential elections in 2010, the EU pressured Belarus to release these prisoners. Finally, the presidential elections in September 2015 were held in an environment free of violence. According to the Council these steps motivated its decision to suspend most of the restrictive measures against Belarus (CEU, 2016). From the foregoing the EU‟s decision to partially suspend restrictive measures against Belarus seems reasonable. After all, Belarus made progress in different areas the EU has been wishing to see progress in. However, this does not mean that all conditions that were attached to the restrictive measures were met. For example, the political prisoners have been released but not rehabilitated. Additionally, although the elections were held in a peaceful environment, an important side note is that Lukashenko warned the opposition not to protest (EuroActive, 2015). Furthermore, Belarusian authorities changed the punishment for protest against the regime from jail to a fine which is so high that a person and his or her family basically lose all that they own (interview, Council secretariat official, 10 May 2016). Hence, this suggests that the lack of protests may have a different reason than simply an improved electoral environment. An ongoing insufficient situation regarding some of the matters the EU initially sanctioned Belarus for is also stressed by different organizations. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2015) stated in a joint report on the elections that: “Belarus still has a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments for democratic elections”. Moreover, according to this report, the legal framework for the election in essence remained unchanged compared to the presidential elections in 2010. Amnesty International stated in a report on the release of political prisoners that the convictions of the six political prisoners were not quashed and that they are placed under considerable restrictions (Amnesty International, 2016). Furthermore, Miklós Haraszti, the United Nation‟s (UN) Special Rapporteur on Belarus, said that: “Unfortunately, the dismal state of human rights has remained unchanged in the country. The authorities have not ceased the systematic

7 harassment of those who attempt to practice their individual, civil, political, and other rights despite the partial suspension of EU and US sanctions decided in anticipation of further advancement of human rights. Neither has Belarus shown any willingness to reform the entrenched, highly oppressive legal system” (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2016). In addition, Human Rights Watch (2016) stated that the overall human rights situation in Belarus did not improve. It became clear that the EU in accordance with its role as democracy promoter sanctioned Belarus for issues related to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, from this perspective the EU‟s recent decision to suspend most restrictive measures is somewhat puzzling as Belarus did not fulfill all conditions linked to these restrictive measures. Moreover, the EU still voices its concerns regarding the issues that led them to sanction Belarus in the first place. Therefore, this research will concentrate on the following question: how should we understand the EU‟s recent decision to suspend restrictive measures against Belarus?

Methodology This research started with a literature review which dealt with the relevant secondary literature related to the topic of this research. The focus here was put on literature concerning EU foreign policy (Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Klaus Becher, Yaraslau Kryvoi, Andrew Wilson, and Kristi Raik), EU democracy promotion (Richard Youngs, Clara Portela, and Sonja Grimm), the use of restrictive measures by the EU (Clara Portela), and the relation between the EU and Belarus (Giselle Bosse and Elena Korosteleva). The aim here was to set out a framework of research already conducted so that it became clear how and why this research fits in. As the main focus of this research was to develop a better understanding of the EU‟s motives to suspend a large part of its restrictive measures against Belarus, one of the core primary sources of this research were the Council conclusions regarding the EU-Belarus relation between 2004-2016. Council conclusions are adopted during European Council meetings and are used to identify specific issues of concern and outline particular actions to take or goals to reach (CEU, 2016b). The reason that these Council conclusions were such an important source stems from the fact that these are the official documents in which the EU explains which measures it takes, for how long, what the conditions are, and what its motivation is. A close reading of the consecutive Council conclusions in chronological order

8 enabled this research to trace not just changes in EU measures, but also in the way the EU describes Belarus, and its relation with Belarus. Hence, these conclusions show how the EU describes a particular situation and how it reacts to it. This makes it possible to compare the different Council conclusions to each other and in relation to events in Belarus and the rest of the world. Even though the Council conclusions are a rich source it is important to note that they are written by the EU itself. As this research looks into the EU‟s motives, using just the Council conclusions will not be sufficient to understand the EU‟s full intention. Therefore, to ensure that the analysis is both accurate and comprehensive, this research made use of additional (primary) sources. The most important among these sources are reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the OSCE. These sources helped to provide a more detailed picture of both the situation in Belarus and the relation between Belarus and the EU. In the effort of providing an objective reflection on the period 2004-2016 an additional primary source was utilized. Hence, this research conducted interviews with four stakeholders who are all connected in different ways to the case. The fact that all four have a different background, work in a different field, and have different relations to both the EU and Belarus implies that they all have a different perspective from which they perceive the case. Hence, as can be seen in this research, it is interesting to note how on one hand these different perspectives sometimes lead to different opinions and on the other hand sometimes lead to agreement. Out of privacy reasons three of the four interviewees requested to be referred to not by name but by their work related function. The first interviewee is Bogdan Zdrojewski who is the Chair of the European Parliament (EP) Delegation to Belarus. The main task of the EP delegations is to keep contact with the national parliaments and to keep the EP informed. However, the Belarusian authorities do not permit the delegation to have contact with the Belarusian parliament. Therefore, this delegation works a bit differently as it has contact with other valuable contacts such as the opposition. The second interview was with a Belarusian human rights defender who works for a human rights organization outside Belarus as Belarus does not permit the registration of the organization in Belarus. This organization maintains contacts with the EU and they provide expertise on human rights issues. The third interview was with a Council secretariat official. The final interviewee works for the Democratic Office for Belarus. This is a non-governmental organization located in Brussels which opposes the current Belarusian government.

So, this research carried out an analysis on the role of democracy promotion in the relation between the EU and Belarus between 2004 and 2016. It is important to note that the findings and conclusions of this research were derived from different types of sources. Although combining different kind of sources contributed to the objectivity and value of the findings, it should be stressed that still there is a limitation regarding the accessibility of information due to the level of sensitivity of some of the information. It may not always be in a country‟s best interests to share or reveal all considerations and interests. Nonetheless, as stated before, by combing different analyses on different sources this research tried to give a broad unbiased description of events and attempted to develop a better understanding of the EU‟s motives for its recent decision to suspend restrictive measures it holds against Belarus.

Research outline The content of this thesis is the following: the second chapter will provide a literature review which will create a framework of the existing literature that is connected to this research. The third chapter consists of three hypotheses which in their turn consist of sub-hypotheses. These hypotheses will be used to inquire the EU‟s motives for its decision to suspend restrictive measures on Belarus. Subsequently, the fourth chapter will elaborate on the Council conclusions issued on Belarus between 2004 and 2016. The main aim is to develop a clear understanding of what has been said in these conclusions and how they evolved. Furthermore, this fourth chapter aims to give a better context of what the Council conclusions respond to by providing background on the situation in Belarus. The fifth chapter will analyze the hypotheses and the Council conclusions and the events and changes that matter in Belarus and those that influence the relation between the EU and Belarus. In this chapter it will be attempted to answer the research question and to put it in the framework as outlined in chapter two. The fifth chapter presents an overall conclusion on the findings regarding the research question.

2. Literature review

Before addressing the question of EU motives for its recent decision to suspend restrictive measures towards Belarus it is important to understand the relation between the EU and Belarus. Moreover, this part will elaborate on democracy promotion as part of the EU‟s foreign policy and linked to this the EU‟s use of sanctions. In 1991, the EU passed the Development Council Resolution the EU, which placed the promotion of democracy at the heart of its external relations (Youngs, 2001: 355). Moreover, with the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU committed itself to the spread of norms such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law by making it its primary foreign policy goal. By doing so, the EU gave itself a new special international profile (Olsen, 2000: 143). This step should be understood in the perspective of a globalizing world in which governments could no longer derive their international legitimacy from privileging the security and welfare of their own citizens within national borders but instead from recognizing and acting on their moral responsibilities towards all human beings within a borderless international society (Evans and Sahnoun 2002; Boulden, 2002). According to King (1999: 313), the EU initially developed a norm-based foreign policy, due to competing national interest (not all EU members have the exact same interests) and the absence of a clear homogenous European identity,. This was based on common values which all members agreed on, such as a representative democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.. However, EU foreign policy, and thus democracy promotion, has besides this normative component also a strategic component (White, 2004). Becher (2004) argues that due to the fact that the EU enhanced its profile in the security domains, strategic concerns are gradually replacing the original norm-based policy. Youngs (2004: 421) argues that post-Cold War securitization has presented issues such as the lack of human rights or democracy as security threat which leads to situations in which the advancement of human rights and political reform become of strategic interest to the EU. Therefore, the promotion of issues such as human rights and democracy should be understood from their indirect link to security (Portela, 2005). This connection between democracy, human rights, and security explains, for example, the EU‟s efforts to transform Central and Eastern Europe. Most notable was the 2004 enlargement which is seen as the single most effective foreign policy strategy of the EU‟s history (Prodi, 2002; Patten, 2003: 3; Solona, 2006: 2). Due to the fact that the EU‟s enlargement resulted in new neighbors the EU

11 launched the „wider Europe‟ initiative, better known as the ENP, which is an association of the EU‟s Eastern and Southern European neighbors. Lavenex (2005:681) explains that the ENP provided an alternative to the EU‟s new neighbors who in the near future will not be EU candidates, but who play an important role in maintaining security and stability in Europe. The ENP is an instance of EU external governance (Raik, 2006, Lavenex 2004) which means that the EU extends its norms to non-member states. Lavenex (2004:680) explains that the EU extends parts of its acquis communautaire beyond the circle of member states towards its direct neighbors as a means to manage its new interdependence in an altered geopolitical situation. Manners (2002) seems to agree with Lavenex, arguing that the wider Europe initiative should be understood as an attempt to expand the acceptance of common values as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Moreover, Lavenex (2004: 281) argues that this EU initiative should be understood from the perspective that the EU‟s fundamental identity is that of a security community. The foregoing shows that the EU‟s motivation for setting up the ENP is linked to the strategic element of its foreign policy. This idea of rule transfer, which the ENP is based on, worked with many Eastern European countries as they had a common interest in the EU. For most of these countries the EU is their main trading partner and their main source of Foreign Direct Investment (Korosteleva, 2009: 231). Hence, their prospect of economic development depends on preferential access to the EU Single Market. Furthermore, these Eastern European countries share a strong interest in the EU labor market as well as issues as border control, transportation, and environment (European Commission, 2003). For Belarus, however, this was different. Belarus‟ main trading partner was (and is) Russia and the Belarusian economy has always depended heavily on Russian subsidies. Hence, it seemed that EU conditionality did not affect Belarus. This is in line with Levitsky and Way (2006: 379) who argue that conditionality in general did not prove to have a consistent democratizing impact. According to them, the two main reasons for this are the existence of regional powers which can provide alternative sources of support and the existence of competing foreign policy objectives (Levitsky and Way, 2006: 383). Moreover, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011: 885) conclude that at EU level democracy promotion by means of conditionality, or as they say leverage, is tied to an EU membership perspective. Simultaneously they argue that the EU has, in addition to the old linkages and leverage democratization models, a new model: the governance model of democracy promotion which, due to its focus on cooperation, is also effective on states that lack a membership perspective.

When a state resists to comply with EU conditionality the EU may decide to exclude it from cooperation (Raik, 2006:90). This indeed seems to be the case for Belarus as in this case the EU utilized a politics of exclusion and containment due to Belarus‟ refusal to adhere to the EU conditions. Hence, it can be concluded that the ENP is not based on a partnership but on governance through conditionality (Raik, 2006; Lavenex, 2008; Bosse and Korosteleva 2009). That the EU utilized a politics of exclusion when it comes to Belarus becomes clear from the fact that the EU suspended the ratification of the PCA and sanctioned Belarus. The EU will impose sanctions to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to uphold the respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance (CEU, 2004d). In the case of Belarus, the EU has imposed sanctions in response to violations of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. After 12 years of restrictive measures it has become clear that these sanctions had no substantial impact on Belarus or Lukashenko (Youngs, 2009; Bosse, 2009). According to Stewards (2009), Perthes (2011), and Schumacher (2011) this is not unique for the Belarusian case. Instead, this should be understood at a more international level which exposes a lack of effectiveness of sanctions as a tool for democracy promotion. Grimm (2015) explains why democratization through restrictive measures is not effective. Firstly, incumbents learned to adapt to external democracy pressure. Secondly, restrictive measures are not effective due to the presence of external autocrats that undermine democracy promotion. This last point seems to be supported by Youngs (2008), who argues that attempts to democratic reform may have a declining impact as other powers, Russia in the case of Belarus, offer relations and benefits on the basis of an alternative system of norms. However, the relation between the EU and Belarus is more complicated than the fact that the EU wishes a democratic neighbor that respects its values regarding human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. As explained earlier, the EU is a security community and from that perspective Belarus is important to the EU. Kryvoi & Wilson (2015: 4) explain that Belarus provides security to the EU‟s eastern border by means of reducing the flow of arms, drugs, and immigrants through its territory to the EU. Furthermore, due to the fact that Belarus is both a neighbor to the EU and Russia, the EU perceives Belarus as a potential counterweight to an increasingly aggressive Russia (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015: 2). Hence, a more (as result of EU restrictive measures) isolated Belarus could become ensnared by Russia (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015: 2), which is not desired by the EU.

The EU in its turn is also (increasingly) important to Belarus. Currently the Belarusian economy is in recession and it suffers greatly from the low oil price (Bornukova, 2016). In addition, Belarus is struggling with the effects of a Russian economic downturn. The Belarusian economy is inefficient and maintained by state subsidies, most of these subsidies come from Russia (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015: 3). 70 % of the Foreign Direct Investment in Belarus comes from Russia which makes the Belarusian economy largely dependent on Moscow‟s subsidies and investments (Dugulin, 2016). Over the past years, Russia has been a big supporter of the regime by handing out subsidies, however, due to the fact that the Russian economy itself is suffering a recession, Russia‟s willingness to subsidize has been reduced drastically (Wilson, 2015b). Kryvoi and Wilson (2015: 6) state that the Belarusian economy will not recover unless Russian subsidies start flowing more freely again. A second reason why the EU is important to Belarus is the crisis in Ukraine. Belarus is concerned by Russian action in Ukraine (Wilson, 2015b). According to Lukashenko, the annexation of Crimea is not dangerous because it has become a part of Russia but because a bad precedent has been created (Reuters, 2014). Hence, it may be that Lukashenko fears Russian interference in Belarus which possible could endanger his own position. Following this argument it could be that Belarus is distancing itself from Russia, which could be the explanation for why Belarus did not recognize Russia‟s annexation of Crimea and why it might advance its relation with the EU. Research has been done on the strategic element of the EU‟s foreign policy, EU democracy promotion, sanctions imposed by the EU, and the relation between EU and Belarus. This research will, by combining these different strands of literature, attempt to explain the EU‟s recent decision of suspending restrictive measures it hold against Belarus by connecting these four elements. This will result in a better understanding of both the EU and Belarus relations and more general about the role of democracy promotion in EU foreign policy and thereby the use of external governance and the role of sanctions as democratization tool. Moreover, using the case of EU foreign policy towards Belarus, this research will test the theory that EU foreign policy is shifting from being normative to more strategic. Testing this theory is interesting as at this point there is not a clear consensus if this is the case. On the on hand Becher (2004) confirms this theory by stating that strategic concerns are replacing norm-based policy. This position seems to be confirmed by Grimm (2015: 76), who argues that democracy promotion should be understood “in the context of the broader foreign policy that is mostly dominated by security and economic interests”. On the other

14 hand, Youngs (2004) argues that the lack of human rights in a neighboring country of the EU poses a security threat to the EU. Herewith he directly links the matter human rights to state security which suggests that the normative element is always present in foreign policy. Moreover, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) argue that the EU utilized a new method of democracy promotion which also indicates the presence of the normative element.

3. Hypotheses

It has become clear that the EU recently changed its foreign policy towards Belarus. The EU made this decision even though there are no clear signs of substantial changes in Belarus regarding human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and free and fair elections, which have been conditions connected to the restrictive measures the EU hold against Belarus for the past 12 years. To develop a better understanding of this policy shift, this chapter will set out three hypotheses (the second and third consist of sub-hypothesis) that may yield an answer to the main question of this research: how should the motives that led the EU to lift most of its sanctions against Belarus in 2016 be understood?

3.1 Lack of effectiveness restrictive measures This first hypothesis states that the EU chose to suspend restrictive measures due the lack of effectiveness. Research on the EuroMaidan uprising in Belarus‟s neighbor Ukraine showed that the impact of the EU on domestic preconditions leading these protests was negligent to non-existing (Steward, 2009). The fact that that Belarus‟ rating by Freedom House, a NGO that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights, has not improved seems to indicate that EU‟s restrictive measures had little or no influence when it comes to matters as human rights and freedom of independent media. Hence, in line with research on different cases regarding the lack of effectiveness of restrictive measures used for democracy promotion aims this hypothesis argues a possible link between this lack of effectiveness and the EU decision to suspend restrictive measures.

3.2 Geopolitics shift EU interests The second hypothesis stresses the role of the strategic element, also referred to as geopolitics, within the EU‟s foreign policy. There are several matters regarding geopolitical interest and the geopolitical situation that could play a role in the EU‟s recent decision to change its foreign policy towards Belarus. Therefore, this hypothesis consists of two sub- hypotheses. This first sub-hypothesis is linked to the fact that Belarus provides security to the EU‟s eastern border by means of reducing the flow of arms, drugs, and immigrants through

16 its territory to the EU (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015: 4). Taking the current migrant issues into account, it is one of the EU‟s priorities to stop the high influx. One of the main means to achieve this is to ensure there are no routes smugglers can use to bring migrants into EU territory. Following this argumentation it could be a strategic step by the EU to re-engage with Belarus hoping that this will result in a better secured border. Something similar happened in 2010 when the EU made a deal with Gaddafi to stop the refugee flow from Libya to the EU (Vandvik, 2010). The second sub-hypothesis suggests the EU‟s need for a counterweight to Russia as Russia seems to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. Related to the idea of security is also the hypothesis that the EU, by suspending most of its restrictive measures, is seeking re- engagement with Belarus in the hope that it could function as a counterweight against Russia. Russian foreign policy has increasingly become aggressive which, for example, can be reflected in their annexation of Crimea. Such developments fuel the EU‟s wish or need for a stable partner in this region. Hence, the EU seems to see Belarus as part of the solution against Russia (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015: 2). Moreover, a more (as result of EU restrictive measures) isolated Belarus could become ensnared by Russia (Kryvoi & Wilson, 2015: 2), which is not desired by the EU. Hence, the foregoing could be an explanation for why the EU is trying, by suspending restrictive measures, to improve its relation with Belarus.

3.3. A shift of Belarusian interests The third hypothesis presumes that Belarus‟ geopolitical situation changed. It might be that due to this changed geopolitical situation Belarus‟ interests have shifted towards seeking rapprochement to the EU. Subsequently, it could be that Belarus‟ rapprochement to the EU provided the EU with the possibility to in its turn respond to this re-engagement by Belarus. Hence, this could provide a motivation for the EU to change its foreign policy towards Belarus. Next, two sub-hypotheses are discussed that show that Belarus‟ interests may have shifted towards rapprochement to the EU. The first sub-hypothesis comprises the idea that the economic problems in both Russia and Belarus and the fact that Russia is less willing to subsidize Belarus while Belarus is dependent on these Russian subsidies, especially now that they are suffering economic downturn, is a possible explanation for why Belarus seeks a closer relation with the EU. The second sub-hypothesis encompasses Lukashenko‟s fear regarding Russia‟s aggressive foreign policy. Hence, the fact that Belarus seems to seek rapprochement to the

EU is connected to the crisis in Ukraine. Belarus is concerned by Russian action in Ukraine (Wilson, 2015b). The EU shares concerns about Russia which may make future cooperation for the EU more attractive than isolating Belarus. This could explain why the EU seems to choose for a stable neighbor instead of a democratic neighbor. Lukashenko will not accept democratic reform in his country as this will endanger his own position (Kobzová, 2014). However, maybe it is exactly this fear that makes Lukashenko more willing to extend cooperation with the EU.

4. EU-Belarus relation during the period 2004-2016

The previous chapter presented several hypotheses which are possible explanations to the research question which tries to explain the motives of the EU to suspend most of its restrictive measures against Belarus. As the focus of this research is on the motives of the EU, the official EU documents regarding restrictive measures on Belarus are among the key empirical materials. The main EU official documents are Council conclusions which are the outcome of Council meetings. In order to gain a better insight into the content of these Council conclusions, this chapter will discuss their substance by paraphrasing parts of these Council conclusions. In the case of Belarus, which will become clear from this chapter, restrictive measures were introduced to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and free and fair elections. The first restrictive measures against Belarus were introduced in September 2004. Between September 2004 and February 2016 many adjustments were made to the initial Council conclusion. This chapter will give an overview of events and changes in Belarus that influence the relation between the EU and Belarus in the period 2004-2016.

4.1 2004-2006: introduction of restrictive measures Three year after Belarus gained independence its current president Alexander Lukashenko came into power. In 1996, he changed the constitution which led to a heavier concentration of power around the president. Consequently, the still fragile relation between Belarus and the EU worsened. In hindsight this turned out to be the beginning of a deteriorating relation between the two.

4.1.1 First restrictive measures In 2004 the EU imposed its first restrictive measures against Belarus. These measures were in response to the continued indistinctness of the disappearance of the four opposition activists Viktor Gonchar, Yury Zakharenko, Anatoly Krasovskii, and Dmitry Zavadskii between 1999 and 2000 (EEEAS, 2014: 3). According to the EU the fact that no independent, full, and credible investigation of this crime has been carried out shows a serious setback for the rule of law in Belarus (CEU, 2004). Moreover, the Belarusian government ignored continuous

19 calls by the EU to open such an independent investigation. The EU decided to implement targeted sanctions in the form of restrictions on admission against three Belarusian officials who were identified as key actors in the disappearance (CEU, 2004a). These officials were the current Prosecutor-General of Belarus and former Secretary of the Security Council Victor Sheyman, the Minister of Sports and Tourism of Belarus and former Minister of the Interior Yury Sivakov, and Colonel Dmitri Pavlichenko of a Special Forces unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Furthermore, the EU stated that it was concerned with the deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Belarus (CEU, 2004a). Hence, the EU clearly appeals to the normative element of democracy promoter as explanation for introducing restrictive measures. Subsequently, in December 2004 the Council issued a new conclusion in response to fraud during the October 2004 parliamentary elections and a referendum in Belarus. On invitation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, the OSCE observed the election which they assessed in terms of their compliance with the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document (OSCE, 2004: 1). Hereafter, the OSCE issued a report in which it concluded that the election fell significantly short of OSCE commitments and “Universal principles and constitutionally guaranteed rights of expression, association and assembly were seriously challenged, calling into question the Belarusian authorities‟ willingness to respect the concept of political competition on a basis of equal treatment” (OSCE, 2004: 1). In reaction to this the EU decided to extend the scope of its restrictive measures against two Belarusian officials, Lidia Yermoshina, Chairperson of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and Yuri Podobed, Commander Minsk OMON, who according to the EU were responsible for the fraudulent elections and human rights violations (CEU, 2004b). Furthermore, the Council called upon Lukashenko to democratic reforms and to bring the country closer to European common values (CEU, 2004b). In addition, the Council stated to remain open for dialogue with Belarus concerning bilateral relations, and to be willing to extend the cooperation with Belarus through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) on the condition that Belarus demonstrated to respect human rights, democratic values, and the rule of law (CEU, 2004b). Clearly the EU‟s main motivation to impose restrictive measures was the lack of democratic elections and its concern about the situation regarding human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.

4.1.2 EU stresses importance of free and fair elections In the 2005 Council conclusion the EU again expressed its deep concern on the deteriorating situation of human rights and political freedom in Belarus. In addition, the EU articulated its wish to see a stable, prosperous, and democratic Belarus which respects human rights and the rule of law (CEU, 2005). Furthermore, the Council stressed the importance of democratic presidential elections in 2006. Essential for these upcoming elections was that the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission (EOM) got invited and the insurance that all eligible candidates were allowed to run for president (CEU, 2005). As in 2004 the EU confirmed its willingness to have a closer and better relation with Belarus especially through the ENP and its willingness to promote shared democratic values and voiced its concerns and the need for human rights, rule of law, democracy, and free and fair elections.

4.1.3 A lack of free and fair elections In January 2006 the Council welcomed Belarus‟ invitation to the OSCE/OHIDR EOM which seemed a promising sign. Nonetheless, during the presidential elections of March 19 the Belarusian authorities used violence against demonstrators and arrested members of the opposition (OSCE, 2006). The OSCE declared that the elections “failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections” and that Lukashenko “permitted State authority to be used in a manner which did not allow citizens to freely and fairly express their will at the ballot box, and a pattern of intimidation and the suppression of independent voices was evident” (Belarus Digest, 2010). In reaction the Council demanded the immediate release of all political prisoners and it decided to impose additional restrictive measures in the form of visa bans, freezing of funds, and economic resources (CEU, 2006) (Lester & O‟Kane). These measures were targeted against Belarus‟ president Lukashenko and 30 Belarusian officials, such as ministers and members of the CEC, who were responsible for the violation of international election standards, the violation of international human rights law, and the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition (CEU, 2006b). As previous years, the Council expressed to be open to develop its bilateral relations with Belarus in the form of the ENP provided that Belarusian authorities respect human rights, the rule of law, democratic values, and initiate democratic reform (CEU, 2006b). Hence, the Council conclusion of April 2006 showed that the EU reacted to an impairment regarding its main conditions of improvement of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights and free and fair elections with

21 additional restrictive measures. In 2007 no changes in the situation or in the Council approach to Belarus occurred.

4.2 2008-2010: suspension of restrictive measures During the period 2008-2010 the relation between Belarus and the EU seemingly improved. The EU noticed positive developments such as progress regarding human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in Belarus to which it responded by suspending travel restrictions. Nonetheless, during this same period the EU also kept concerns and thus extended the other restrictive measures.

4.2.1 Signs of an improving relation between the EU and Belarus In September 2008 the Council announced that it welcomed the release of all political prisoners. According to Human Rights Watch (2016b) Belarus did indeed release its political prisoners “but at least 10 activists continue to serve "restricted freedom" sentences that permit them only to be at home or at work”. Nonetheless, the Council said it perceived the release as a significant step in the improvement of the fundamental value of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, which was a precondition for the EU to lift its restrictive measures (CEU, 2008a). Furthermore, the Council emphasized the opportunity for Belarus to show further improvement with the upcoming parliamentary elections later that month. As in earlier Council conclusions, the Council stressed the importance of complying with OSCE elections standard and the importance of respecting the rights of the opposition, the monitoring commission, and the media (CEU, 2008a). The Council concluded its statement by saying that it will evaluate the situation in Belarus again after the parliamentary elections later that year and that it is prepared to review the restrictive measurers it holds against Belarusian leaders. In addition the Council stated to be willing to re-engage with Belarus through the ENP (CEU, 2008a). It is noteworthy that the Council expressed to welcome the positive step of releasing the political prisoners, but at the same time announced that it wanted to see free and fair elections before it took the decision of adapting the restrictive measures. Subsequently, in October 2008 the Council issued a new conclusion in which it stated that it will suspend travel restrictions on 27 leading figures which were all people on the list except for the three earlier named officials that were involved in the disappearances during

1999-2000 and the President of the CEC. The Council decided on a six month suspension due to improvements such as broader access for the opposition to the media, the release of political prisoners, and the fact that the opposition was able to demonstrate peacefully at the parliamentary elections (CEU, 2008b). The extent to which these improvements were equivalent to real improvements was questionable as it might be that the opposition had better access to the media but at the same time the Belarusian authorities approved a new law that will further restrict the media (HRW, 2016b). Moreover, in reaction to a report issued by the OSCE (2008:1) stating that “the elections fell short of OSCE commitments for democratic elections”, the EU decided to extend the rest of the restrictive measures, which was a freeze of assets and economic resources of 31 Belarusian officials, for one year (CEU, 2006b). In addition, the Council reiterated that it remained willing to deepen its relation with Belarus, and that it hoped for re-engagement which is why the EU said to be ready to develop a dialogue with Belarusian authorities to aim at progress towards strengthening democracy and human rights. In spite of the elections not being conform OSCE standard and the EU expressing its wish to develop dialogue and cooperation for the first time, the EU suspended travel restrictions. This indicates a change in the relation between the EU and Belarus. The war between Georgia and Russia earlier that year could possibly explain the EU‟s milder approach towards Belarus as this created more instability in the region which made the stability of Belarus a more pressing issue to the EU.

4.2.2 The EU maintains the suspension of travel restrictions In March 2009 the Council stated in its conclusion that it welcomed the increased high-level EU-Belarus dialogue and that it encouraged Belarus‟ cooperation with OSCE/ODIHR regarding election legislation (CEU, 2009a). In reaction to these positive developments the EU announced that it maintained the suspension of the travel restriction imposed in 2008 on President Lukashenko and 30 officials (HRW, 2016c). This EU decision was partially based on the release of all political prisoners in 2008; however, it should be noted that in 2009 at least four activists were arrested and imprisoned on politically motivated charges (HRW, 2016c). The EU said to be ready to deepen its relation with Belarus on the condition of progress made by the Belarusian authorities regarding the fundamental values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and that it looked forward to launching a Human Rights Dialogue which aimed at enabling constructive talks between the EU and Belarus regarding

23 human rights issues (CEU, 2009a). Altogether one can notice a much more positive tone in this Council conclusion, while progress by Belarus remained only limited. This positive tone seems to continue in the November 2009 Council conclusion in which the Council welcomed the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue and the intensified Belarusian participation in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (CEU, 2009b). In August 2009 the EU inaugurated the EaP, which is an EU initiative to govern its relation with the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. According to an EU summit draft declaration, promotion of human rights and rule of law in former Soviet states formed the core of the EU's new Eastern Partnership policy (Rettman, 2009). Besides values this declaration stated that the promotion of human rights and the rule of law is of strategic importance and that the EU has an interest in developing a closer relation with these six countries. According to Rettman (2009) “The inclusion of Belarus prompts the question whether values or geopolitics are paramount in the initiative”. In addition, he stated that the EU feared that Russia will strengthen its grip on Minsk if it is left out of the EaP. The importance of the influence of Russia in the region was also showed in a draft by the Commission of the EU (2008: 3) which stated that the EaP should be pursued in parallel with EU-Russia relations. However, at the same time the Council recalled its earlier statements on the need for progress towards reform of the Election Code to bring them up to the international standard of democracy, the freedom of expression, media, assembly, and political association. In addition the Council said it regretted the recent lack of significant progress in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the crackdown on peaceful actions. Moreover, for the first time the Council commented on the fact that Belarus still has not abolished the death sentence and urged Belarus to do so (CEU, 2009b). In reaction to the lack of progress the Council decided not to lift the asset freeze on 31 officials, instead it decided to extend these restrictive measures for one additional year (CEU, 2009b). Nonetheless, the Council did extend the 2008 suspension of the travel restrictions against 27 Belarusian officials to encourage progress. Furthermore, the Council invited the European Commission to prepare recommendations concerning negotiations on visa facilitation (CEU, 2009b). According to a Council secretariat official (interview, 10-5-2016), visa facilitations are important to enhance people to people-to-people contacts which they believe will spark change in Belarus from within. As in previous years the EU stressed its willingness to deepen its relation with Belarus on the condition of improvement of the fundamental values democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. On the one hand, the EU decided to prolong

24 restrictive measures because of the lack of progress on many of its main concerns. On the other hand, the EU extended the travel restriction suspension. Moreover, the EU voiced its will to start visa negotiations to encourage progress, and it vocalized to be pleased with the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Belarus. Hence, the suspension and the latter show a continued trend of the EU being more willing to improve its relation with Belarus.

4.2.3 The EU calls for democratic elections According to a report by Human Rights Watch (2016d), the situation for the independent media and the civil society remained dismal as Belarusian authorities continued to pressure and threat both prior to the presidential elections December 2010. Moreover, the EU stated to remain concerned with the democracy and human rights situation and regretted the lack of progress regarding the reform of the Electoral Code, the freedom of expression, media, assembly, and political association (CEU, 2010). Based on the previous, despite Belarus‟ more active participation in the EaP, the EU decided not to suspend additional restrictive measures (CEU, 2010). However, the EU did decide to suspend travel restrictions for 27 officials – again. Presumably the EU hoped that by doing so it encouraged Belarus to reform as the EU expressed to look forward to further Rounds of Human Rights dialogue. Like previous years, the EU clearly stated its discontent over the fact that Belarus has not abolished the death penalty. In March 2010, Belarusian authorities executed Andrej Zhuk and Vasilii Yuzepchuk for murder, even though their cases were pending for the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRW, 2016d). Furthermore, the Council stated that it will take note of the upcoming presidential elections in December 2010. It called on the Belarusian authorities to ensure democratic elections that are in line with the international and OSCE/ODIHR standard. The Council ended its conclusion by announcing the close monitoring of the elections later that year and said that visible progress will give new input to the EU‟s engagement policy towards Belarus (CEU, 2010). On the election night of December 19, 2010 tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of the capital Minsk protesting what they felt was another stolen election (HRW, 2016e). Belarusian authorities reacted with a brutal crackdown on these mass demonstration, followed by 700 protesters being detained and more than 40 sent to jail (Shraibman, 2015). The next day, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton commented on the Belarusian presidential elections by saying that Belarus still has a considerable way to go to meet the OSCE commitments. She also said that the beating and detention of several opposition

25 leaders including presidential candidates on election night was unacceptable, which is why Ashton urged the Belarusian authorities to engage in dialogue with the OSCE/OHDIR (Ashton, 2010).

4.3 2011-2014: reintroducing restrictive measures The period of better relations between the EU and Belarus came to an end due to the violent aftermath of the 2010 presidential elections. In response, the EU imposed additional restrictive measures, which in the years that followed were prolonged and extended by the EU with additional sanctions and more individuals that are put on the list. Nonetheless, the EU kept repeating that it will continue its policy of critical engagement on the condition of progress regarding human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.

4.3.1 The EU regrets election violence and re-imposes restrictive measures In January 2011, the Council stated in its conclusion that it deeply regretted the violent aftermath of the 2010 presidential elections. The OSCE found the elections to be “flawed, crushing hopes for democratic progress in Belarus” (HRW, 2016e). In the months that followed Belarusian authorities unleashed a harassment campaign, targeting human rights defenders, political activists, journalists, and lawyers (HRW, 2016e). In August 2011, well- known human rights defender Ales Bialiatski was arrested on politically motivated charges of tax evasion (Amnesty International, 2011). In response, the Council decided to impose travel restrictions and asset freeze for 175 people and/or entities responsible for the election fraud and the violent crackdown (CEU, 2011a). Among these 175 were many government officials, judges, people working for election commissions, and other high ranked officials (CEU, 2011b). Furthermore, the Council underlined in its conclusion the need for the immediate release of all political prisoners and their rehabilitation (CEU, 2011a). In June 2011, the Council, again, expressed its deep concern for the situation of deteriorating human rights, democracy, and rule of law situation in Belarus. It called for the immediate release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners (CEU, 2011b). Moreover, the EU stated to remain determined to address the human rights situation, through international fora such as the UN and the OSCE. The Council announced that in the light of recent developments it decided to extend and expand a visa ban and asset freeze against individuals linked to the regime which brings the total of people at 208. The Council also decided to

26 impose an embargo on export of arms to Belarus and a ban on materials that could be used for internal repression (CEU, 2011b). Furthermore, the EU froze the assets of: Beltechexport (weapons exporter), Sport-Pari (operator of the Republican Lottery company), and Private Unitary enterprise BT Telecommunications, controlled by Vladimir Peftiev, Chairman of the Board of Director of Beltechexport, closely associated with President Lukashenko and his family, and a key sponsor of the Lukashenko regime (Korosteleva, 2012: 7). The Council said that it had agreed that the extension of the European Investment Bank (EIB) operations should only proceed if Belarus meets conditions regarding the human rights and rule of law situation (CEU, 2011b). In addition, the Council said it took positive note of the ongoing work regarding visa and it welcomed the Commissions invitation to Belarus to start visa facilitation negotiations. Consistent with all previous times, the Council concluded by stating that the EU will continue its critical engagement including dialogue and the EaP on the condition of progress regarding for the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. It seems that the EU could not ignore what happened at the 2010 elections, however, different than in previous years of the restrictive measures, it still seems to emphasize, by stressing the critical engagement and the EaP, its wish for some form of re-engagement

4.3.2 According to the EU the situation in Belarus is worsening In March 2012 the Council announced to extend and expand its restrictive measures. Additionally, people, among who are leading businessmen who are claimed to be closely linked to the ruling elite that are responsible for human rights violations and repression, were put under travel restrictions which brings the total of individuals under restrictive measures at 235 (CEU, 2012a). Furthermore, the Council imposed additional asset freezes on 29 entities and businessmen including Yuri Chyzh and Anatoly Ternavski, two key businessmen closely associated with the ruling political elite (Korosteleva, 2012: 7-11). In a reaction EU High Representative Catherine Ashton (2012) said: "Our decision today comes in response to the negative developments we have seen in Belarus. The situation is getting worse and the authorities are tightening their grip on civil society. Instead of increasing repression, Belarus must release and rehabilitate all political prisoners and roll back its repressive policies". In reaction to the execution of two men March 2012 Thorbjørn Jaglan, the secretary general of the Council of Europe said "With its disrespect of basic human rights and democratic standards, the government of Belarus is increasingly isolating its country and its people from the rest of the world" (Harding, 2012). Again the EU announced its readiness to launch visa

27 facilitation negotiations; however, it regretted that the Belarusian authorities have not responded to this invitation. Also the Council said it welcomed the EU launching a European Dialogue on Modernization, which is supposed to help lay the foundation for a successful transition of an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy and market economy (Plaschinsky, 2012) herewith aiming at improving the Belarus-EU relation. The conclusion ends with the Council stating that it is committed to a policy of critical engagement through dialogue and the EaP on the condition of progress towards respect by Belarus for the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (CEU, 2012a). After the parliamentary elections in September 2012 the Council released a new conclusion which starts with the EU noting the importance it attached to Belarus as being a neighbor to the EU. This is a remarkable comment as in none of the previous Council conclusions such a comment had been made, and therefore could be a sign of changing relations between the two. Hence, it seems to confirm the earlier noted trend of EU‟s willingness to improve its relation with Belarus. Nonetheless, the Council said to regret the past elections which took place against a background of repression (CEU, 2012b). According to a report issued by Human Rights Watch (2016f): “Parliamentary elections took place in September against a backdrop of stifled civil and political freedoms, and were marked by a lack of competitiveness and a low level of public confidence”. According to the OSCE, which on invitation of the Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM), many OSCE commitments, as for example the rights to associate, to stand as candidate, and to express themselves freely, were not respected. The OSCE concluded that despite some improvements the legal framework does not guarantee elections that are conducted in line with OSCE commitments and international standards (OSCE, 2012: 1).Therefore, the EU called on Belarus to address recommendations made by the OSCE/OHIDR. According to a report by Human Rights Watch (2016f) there are at least twelve political prisoners in Belarus. In this same report (HRW, 2016f) it is said that: “The Belarusian government continues to severely curtail freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, and the right to fair trial”. The foregoing made the Council decide to prolong and expand the existing restrictive measures to 32 entities and 243 individuals (CEU, 2012c) Moreover, the Council expressed its support for the European Dialogue on Modernization and its readiness to launch negotiations for visa facilitation and readmission agreements; however, they regret the absence of response from the Belarusian authorities. The conclusion ends with the Council stating that it still commits to a policy of critical engagement including

28 dialogue and the participation in the EaP on conditionality of progress regarding democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (CEU, 2012b).

4.3.3 Extension of restrictive measures In October 2013 the Council decided to extend restrictive measures against Belarus with one year for the reason that there were still eight political prisoners and no released prisoner was rehabilitated which means they continued to face restrictions as travel limitations. Moreover, two people were executed, and the situation of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles had not improved (HRW, 2016g) (CEU, 2013). After the EU updated the list of people under restrictive measures 232 persons and 25 entities remain subject of EU restrictive measures in the form of a travel ban and/or asset freeze (Lester & O‟Kane). Furthermore, the EU stated that it maintained a policy of critical engagement and that it intended to promote respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (CEU, 2013).

4.3.4 EU again demands the release of political prisoners In October 2014 the Council extended and updated the restrictive measures it held against Belarus for one year (CEU, 2014). At that moment the restrictive measures comprised an arms embargo, an embargo on equipment for internal repression, and asset freezes and/or travel bans against persons responsible for human rights violations. The Council stated that it had based its decision on the fact that not all political prisoners had been released and rehabilitated and because of a lack of improvement regarding the respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles (CEU, 2014). According to Human Rights Watch (2016h) there are at least 33 former political prisoners who still faced restrictions and harassment by authorities. Moreover, due to the fact that the situation in Belarus had not changed the EU maintained its policy of critical engagement through which it intended to promote the respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic principles.

4.4 2015-2016: rapprochement between the EU and Belarus According to the EU, Belarus made progress which the EU perceived as an important step in the improvement of the relation between the two. Therefore, the EU decided to suspend a large part of the restrictive measures it held against Belarus. They hoped that this decision

29 encouraged future positive developments in Belarus. After all, the EU still has concerns, for example, when it comes to the human rights situation in Belarus.

4.4.1 Release of political prisoners and peaceful elections In October 2015 the Council decided to prolong the restrictive measures for four months until February 2016, however, at the same time it suspended the asset freeze and travel ban for 170 individuals including Lukashenko and ten companies among which are three defense companies that go by the names: Beltech Holding, Beltechexport, and Spetspriborservice (CEU, 2015) (Lester, 2016). This meant that the EU decided to extend the arms embargo and asset freezes and travel bans against four people, all of whom are believed to be involved in the unresolved disappearances of two opposition members, a businessman, and a journalist (Lester, 2016). These four people are: Vladimir Naumov, Former Minister of Interior and former Head of the President‟s Security Service, Dmitri Pavlichenko, Former Head of the Special Response Group at the Ministry of Interior, Viktor Sheiman, Head of the Management Department of the President‟s Administration and former Secretary of the Security Council, and Iury Sivakov, Former Minister of Interior, Minister of Tourism and Sports, and former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration (lester & O‟Kane). The Council took the decision of suspension in light of the release of all remaining political prisoners in August 2015 and in response to the fact that the presidential elections earlier that month were held in a peaceful environment. The EU‟s High Representative Mogherini (2015a) responded to the release saying that: “Today's releases represent important progress in the efforts towards the improvement of relations between the EU and Belarus”. In reaction to the elections the EU‟s High Representative Mogherini (2015b) said to take note of the OSCE/ODIHR report in which it is stated that Belarus still has a considerable way to go towards fulfilling its OSCE commitments for democratic elections and she added that ahead of the parliamentary elections of 2016 these recommendations should be implemented. Moreover, according to the EU it took the decision to a four month suspension in the hope that it encouraged further positive development in Belarus (CEU, 2015).

4.4.2 The EU suspends most of its restrictive measures The February 2016 Council conclusion started by the Council highlighting the importance it attached to relations with Belarus and its people (CEU, 2016a). Furthermore, the EU voiced its concern on the human rights situation in the country and said that the EU-Belarus relation

30 should be based on common values, with which is meant respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy (CEU, 2016a). Nonetheless, the Council said it acknowledged the steps made by Belarus that resulted in a better relation between the two countries. “Ministers agreed that the situation in the country is showing a positive trend that we want to encourage” (Barigazzi, 2016). EU High Representative Federica Mogherini (2016) stated that “This is clearly not a rosy or a perfect picture, far from that, that was the general assessment of all the Ministers, but we agreed on a critical engagement”, with which she seems to explain the Council‟s decision on suspension despite the present concerns towards Belarus. With „steps‟ the Council referred to the resumption of the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue, Belarus‟ more active role in the EaP, and the start of visa negotiations (CEU, 2016a). In addition, the Council stated that it valued “Belarus‟ constructive role in the region”, with which they refer to Belarus hosting the Kiev peace talks in spring 2015 (CEU, 2016a). In August 2015 Belarus finally released its last political prisoners, something the EU has been demanding for a long time. This combined with the fact that the presidential elections in September 2015 were held in “an environment free of violence” and the overall progress made in the EU-Belarus relation which made the Council in October 2015 agree on a four-month suspension of asset freeze and travel ban for 170 individuals and three companies (CEU, 2016a) (CEU, 2015). In February 2016 the Council decided, “taking in consideration the overall state of EU-Belarus relations”, not to extend the restrictive measures against 170 individuals and three companies which were suspended for four months in October 2015 (CEU, 2016a). Nonetheless, the arms embargo, travel bans, and asset freezes for four individuals did get extended for one year. According to the Council there was an opportunity for EU-Belarus relations to develop and it states that progress in different fields can be achieved through better communication (CEU, 2016a). This could be considered as a remarkable comment as it clearly shows a change in EU attitude to Belarus. The past years the EU tried to change Belarus by using restrictive measures as a pressure tool. This sentence on progress through communication showed that now the EU aimed at progress not only through restrictive measures but through better communication. The foregoing seems to suggest, which is confirmed by the Council‟s decision to suspend most restrictive measures, that the EU changed its foreign policy to Belarus. With respect to the parliamentary elections in September 2016 the Council urged Belarus to adopt the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. The EU‟s High Representative Federica Mogherini responded to the remaining concerns about human and political rights by stating that: “We are not recognizing a situation that turns from black to pink overnight. We

31 have agreed on the fact that we have seen over the last couple of years some steps that are encouraging and that we want to try to support and encourage further” (Casert, 2016). Furthermore, the Council repeated its call for the rehabilitation of the released political prisoners and emphasizes the need of freedom of association and assembly. In addition they urged Belarus to remove obstacles that hinder independent media. Nevertheless, the Council did stated to welcomes the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue and encouraged Belarus to take positive steps. Furthermore, the Council reaffirmed good neighborly relations and regional cooperation as important elements in enhancing the EU-Belarus cooperation. The Council ended its conclusion by stressing that it is open to further develop its relation with Belarus and to take additional steps to improve its political relation, however, progress towards democracy, human rights, and the rule of law will remain essential for the EU to shape its future foreign policy towards Belarus. These comments are quite notable. The EU stressed time and again its wish to deepen its relation with Belarus and once before the EU explicitly referred to Belarus as being its neighbor. Nonetheless, this is the first time the Council directly linked neighbor and good relations to each other. The 2015 and 2016 Council conclusions clearly show a change in the EU‟s attitude to Belarus. Hence, it is true that Belarus took some positive steps, however, the fact the core conditions present in all Council conclusions are not met indicates that there is more to this decision that just progress made on behalf of Belarus.

5. Analysis and findings

This chapter will start by analyzing the Council conclusions discussed in chapter four and the hypothesis drafted in chapter three. Subsequently, by combining the two analyses it will be attempted to answer the research question: how should we understand the EU‟s recent decision to suspend restrictive measures against Belarus? The emphasis will be on developing a better understanding of the normative and strategic element of democracy promotion as part of the EU‟s foreign policy.

5.1 Analysis Council conclusions When the EU imposed restrictive measures on Belarus, it attached conditions to these restrictive measures. By imposing restrictive measures the EU was hoping to push Belarus to change. Hence, the EU pushed for more and better democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and free and fair elections. Up to today most conditions have not been met. Nonetheless, the EU did suspend a large part of the restrictive measures it holds against Belarus. As became clear in chapter four, the Council seemed to motivate this decision by referring to the „positive‟ steps taken by Belarus. Next, a more elaborate illustration will show that indeed not all conditions that followed from the Council conclusions have been met. The first restrictive measures were introduced by the EU in 2004. The EU explained that its motive for sanctioning Belarus were the fraudulent elections that fell short of OSCE commitments, violations of human rights, and concerns about the rule of law. These concerns regarding human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and free and fair elections can be found in each following conclusion up to the latest of February 2016. Moreover, the EU again stressed the need for Belarus to commit to OSCE election standards and need for freedom of independent media, expression, assembly, and political association. In the period 2008-2010 the EU recognized some positive steps made by Belarus, such as the release of political prisoners, more dialogue, and, although limited, cooperation with the OSCE. In response to these improvements and as a sign of encouragement the EU suspended travel restrictions. Nonetheless, the EU kept addressing its concerns and the lack of progress regarding human rights, election standards, democracy, and the freedom of expression, media, assembly, and political association. In response to the violent crackdown of protests during the 2010 presidential elections the EU re-introduced these travel restrictions and decided upon

33 additional restrictive measures. In 2015 there were some positive steps made by Belarus, such as the release of political prisoners, the peaceful environment during the last elections, and Belarus‟ constructive role in the region to which the EU responded by suspending a large part of the restrictive measures it held against Belarus. Nonetheless, as in all previous years since the introduction of measures in 2004, the EU still stated the need for progress regarding the situation of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. In addition, the EU again emphasized the need for Belarus to commit to OSCE standards as well as the need for the freedom of assembly, political association, and independent media. Hence, the fact that the original conditions have not been met and are still a concern to the EU makes the EU‟s recent decision on suspension odd from a normative perspective. By analyzing the Council conclusions it has become clear that although not all conditions are met, the EU has slowly become more willing to engage with Belarus while keeping restrictive measures. In 2004 the EU introduced the restrictive measures and it clearly outlined its reasoning and the conditions attached. In 2008 the EU mentioned for the first time its hope for re-engagement; a step which could be influenced by Russia‟s invasion in Georgia which affected stability in the region and showed Russia‟s willingness for an aggressive foreign policy. Subsequently, in 2009 the EU voiced its wish for a closer relation with Belarus through the EaP. Moreover, the EU explained that such a relation is of strategic importance and that it feared for a tighter grip of Moscow on Minsk if Belarus would be left out the EaP. Here the EU literally articulated that its willingness for a closer relation to Belarus is linked to geological concerns over stability and Russian influence in the region. After the violent crackdown of protests the EU had to react with additional restrictive measures; noticeable is the fact that in the Council conclusion following these events the EU still clearly stressed its wish for cooperation through the EaP. In 2012, the EU emphasized for the first time the importance of Belarus as a neighbor, which seems to confirm the trend of increasing willingness from the EU to engage with Belarus. This becomes even more apparent in 2015 and 2016, when the EU decided to permanently suspend a large part of the restrictive measures in reaction to by the EU called positive changes.

5.2 Analysis hypotheses Below, with the help of the hypotheses drafted in chapter three, an attempt is made to understand the EU‟s motives to change its foreign policy towards Belarus. The main aim here

34 is to reveal whether and if so, to what extend the EU‟s recent decision to suspend restrictive measures on Belarus can be explained by the strategic element of the EU‟s foreign policy.

5.2.1 Explaining the ineffectiveness of restrictive measures In accordance with the hypothesis that a lack of effectiveness of the EU‟s restrictive measures in Belarus led the EU decide to suspend a large part of the restrictive measures this following part will show that there are several causes that affected the effectiveness of the restrictive measures. From chapter three it appears that there are two main causes: firstly that Lukashenko is able to resist EU democratization efforts and secondly, the existence of Russia as negative external factor. Next, both causes will be discussed in more detail.

Lukashenko resists EU democratization efforts According to Carothers (2009) “newly self-confident authoritarian regimes are pushing back against Western democracy promotion”. For example, they crack down on domestic opposition like NGO‟s and popular uprising (Burnell and Schumberger, 2010; Allen and Gershman, 2006). According to Gerschewski (2013) and Köllner and Kailitz (2013) autocrats are better prepared to respond to domestic and external threats of democratization. They succeed in counterweighing these internal and external democracy promotion efforts (Grimm, 2015: 78). Møller and Skaaning (2009) explain that this results from the end of the Cold War which resulted in a spread of minimal democracies. Köllner and Kailitz (2013: 7) state that “minimum standards in terms of democracy, good governance, and human rights became a precondition for receiving economic aid and other forms of international assistance”. Hence, both international and domestic legitimation of ruling regimes increasingly relied upon democratic credentials. Regimes responded by presenting at least the semblance of democratic credentials, for example by holding national elections, however, in many cases these elections turned out not to be free or fair (Köllner and Kailitz, 2013: 7). More examples of the techniques used to push back Western democracy promotion are tightening election legislation, limiting access to mass media for opponents, and imprisoning of opponents (Grimm, 2015: 77). It seems from the Council conclusions and OSCE reports that these practices are in line with techniques used by Lukashenko. For example, the Council made clear its demand of the immediate release and rehabilitation of political prisoners and one of the Council‟s conditions that is frequently repeated is the freedom of independent media. Furthermore,

Belarus has a complex NGO registration legislation which makes it difficult to register NGO‟s. Herewith, the authorities can easily control the NGO‟s which forms an obstacle for citizens who try to create an independent third sector (Murphy, 2009: 211). Moreover, in addition to putting foreign funding for local NGO‟s under state control as of 2003 “Lukashenko banned foreign funding of any political or educational activities in the country” (Carothers, 2006). Another technique of coping with democratization efforts is to hold domestic elections. Practice showed that many of such elections succeeded in creating stability and legitimacy for authoritarian rule (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). This also seems to be the case for Lukashenko, who was chosen for his fifth consecutive term in October 2015 In order to ensure a win, autocrats use election management techniques, in other words election fraud. This clearly is the case for Belarus where there may be elections but these are far from being free and fair and far from complying with the international and OSCE election standard. OSCE reports show that Lukashenko indeed makes use of such techniques. Examples are not accepting or hindering international EOM and appointing a counter observation mission. Hence, from the foregoing it seems that a possible explanation for the failure of the EU to democratize Belarus through restrictive measures is the fact that the regime, or more specifically Lukashenko, has learned to cope with both internal and external threats of democratization. Whether the fact that Lukashenko has proven able to cope with European democratization efforts yields an explanation to the question why the EU decided to suspend a large part of its restrictive measures in February 2016 is doubtful. As explained above autocrats are pushing back against democratization efforts since the end of the Cold War already. One way of doing this is the semblance of democratic credentials, for example, by holding national elections. OSCE reports on all elections in Belarus since 2004 state that the elections fell short of OSCE and international elections standards. Moreover, the fact that Lukashenko was elected in October 2015 for his fifth successive term as president of Belarus shows indeed that he has been using such techniques to cope with external democratization efforts for many years. For that reason it could be argued that Lukashenko‟s coping ability is very likely to have affected the effectives of the EU‟s restrictive measures. However, it seems less likely that this has been the determining factor in the EU‟s recent decision on suspension as his efforts continuously have been present.

Democracy promotion jeopardized by Russia as negative external actor As described above, one possible explanation for the fact that the restrictive measures had no measurable impact is that Lukashenko and his regime have learned to cope with internal and external democratization pressure. Another possible explanation is that the restrictive measures had little or no impact due to “the existence of negative external actors interested in promoting autocracy and undermining democratic transition” (Grimm, 2015: 73). According to Grimm (2015) democratization efforts can be hampered by the emergence of authoritarian powers that reduce the leverage of EU democracy promotion by supporting the diffusion of authoritarianism. This is the case when these authoritarian powers provide alternative sources of economy, military, and/or diplomatic support (Levitsky and Way, 2006). For example, they provide critical financial support to neighboring autocracies thereby mitigating the impact of western influence (Grimm, 2015: 78). One country that in academic research is associated with such practices is Russia. Tolstrup (2009) and Jackson (2010) argue that Russia is interested in promoting authoritarianism in authoritarian ruled allies and impeding further democratization in transition countries. This line of argumentation seems to fit with the Belarusian case. Bogdan Zdrojewski (interview, 19 April 2016), Chair of the EP Parliament Delegation to Belarus, argues that the EU‟s restrictive measures have not been effective for the reason that Belarus did not need the EU as Belarus had Russia‟s support. In line with Grimm‟s argumentation on financial support Belarus receives critical financial support from Russia. The Belarusian economy has always been heavily dependent on Russian subsidies. It is estimated that Belarus earned twenty percent of its GDP through subsidies (Wilson, 2015). According to Bogdan Zdrojewski (interview, 19 April 2016) Russia used to be, and still is, the most important partner of Belarus and the donor of help and cash. In addition, the Russian economy used to import over 50 percent of Belarus‟ exports. Another example that shows Russia‟s efforts to support authoritarianism comes from Tolstrup (2015) who researched Russia support for the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. He concluded that indeed Russia played a significant role in Lukashenko‟s victory. The foregoing shows that the failing of the EU to democratize Belarus through restrictive measures at least partially can be explained from the fact that these measures had no leverage on Belarus due to the existence of Russia. However, important to note is that during all the years the EU‟s restrictive measures were in place Russia played the part of negative external actor by supporting Belarus and its president Lukashenko. Therefore, Russian attempts to jeopardize EU democratization efforts could not be considered as an

37 explanation for the EU‟s decision to suspend restrictive measures in February 2016. Moreover, recent events show that Belarus is re-engaging with the EU which partially is motivated by Lukashenko‟s fear of Russia, demonstrating that Russia is losing its influence as negative external factor.

5.2.2 Belarus is moving closer to the EU A different hypothesis drafted in chapter three is that Belarus is seeking a closer relation with the EU. Belarus seems to do this by making some – but far from substantial – changes herewith giving the EU a reason to suspend restrictive measures and thereby enabling a closer relation between the two. Next, it will be demonstrated that Belarus‟ geopolitical interest shifted which explain Belarus seeking rapprochement to the EU. The two causes that will be discussed are Belarus‟ economic problems and the effects of Russia‟s aggressive foreign policy on Belarus.

Russia less willing to support Belarus After several years of slow growth, 2015 became the first year of true recession in twenty years for Belarus and it is estimated that 2016 will not be different (Bornukova, 2016). One cause of this recession is the current low oil price which results in Belarus losing one of its major income sources: oil refining (Smok, 2016). Despite the fact that Belarus has no oil itself, it briefly was one of the world‟s top ten net oil exporters due to the possession of refineries that process cheap Russian crude which Belarus can sell with a large margin (Wilson, 2015). However, the Russian economy is also suffering economic recession. One of the consequences of the Russian recession is that Russia depreciated its currency – the rouble. This resulted in Belarusian exporters losing a great share of their Russian market (Bornukova, 2016). In addition, Russia is less willing to subsidies Belarus (Wilson, 2015) which is causing Belarus substantive economic problems. According to Bogdan Zdrojewski (interview, 19 April 2016) now that the Russian economy is worsening “Putin is more eager to give Lukashenko another medal than to give money”. The fact that Belarus receives less support from Russia appears a logical explanation for the recent rapprochement of Belarus to the EU. This seems to be confirmed by Bogdan Zdrojewski (interview, 19 April 2016) who said that he thinks the recent openness of Belarusian authorities is not unconditional, but motivated by the economic situation of Belarus. A Council secretariat official (interview, 10 May 2016) seems to agree by stating that we should understand Belarus‟ attempt to move closer to the

EU as it seeking an alternative to Russia. The foregoing strongly suggests that Belarus recent rapprochement to the EU is motivated by economic reasons. This economic motivated rapprochement shows that Belarus interests have shifted. This new situation could be part of the answer why the EU made the decision to suspend restrictive measures. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Russia’s aggressive foreign policy frightens Belarus A second issue that seems to explain why Belarus is moving closer to the EU is Russia‟s aggressive foreign policy, particularly towards Ukraine. Anishchanka (2015) says that: “The speed with which the Kremlin has become hostile towards its neighbor Ukraine has left many in Belarus fearful of Russian aggression, or even an incursion across their own border”. These fears are enhanced by articles in Russian media that claim that three of Belarus‟ six regions were received as a gift from Soviet Russia; a similar claim has been made about Crimea just before its annexation (Anishchanka, 2015). The annexation of Crimea led to cracks in the relation between Russia and Belarus; Lukashenko warned that he will defend the country‟s autonomy (Tyrkalov, 2015). An important aspect to remember is that “For Lukashenko, challenges to Belarus and its sovereignty are also challenges to his own rule” (Wilson, 2015). A Belarusian human rights defender (interview 25 April 2016) stated that indeed Lukashenko perceives Russia as a personal threat. It seems that in response to this all, Lukashenko started strengthening his ties with the EU, for example, by sending envoys to European capitals and welcoming embassies from the EU. Furthermore, Lukashenko hosted two summits on Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 with which he gained considerable international credit (Wilson, 2015). Hence, the foregoing shows that it is presumable that Lukashenko‟s fear for Russia pushed him to seek closer relations with the EU. Below it will be explained if and why the fact that Belarus seeks rapprochement to the EU has influenced the EU‟s decision to suspend restrictive measures.

5.2.3 The EU’s motives From the previous it became clear that the restrictive measures for a large part have not been effective due to the presence of Russia as negative external factor, who contrary to the EU tries to strengthen and diffuse autocracy, and who was able to accommodate implications for Belarus following from the EU‟s restrictive measures. In addition, it became clear that Belarus, due to economic problems and fear of Russia, is seeking rapprochement to the EU.

Nonetheless, this still leaves the question if and how this influenced the EU‟s recent decision to suspend restrictive measures. The following part will show that the EU‟s wish for a better relation with Belarus, as result of changed geopolitical interests, explains the EU‟s decision to suspend restrictive measures. From that point of view it is presumable that Belarus‟ rapprochement to the EU was beneficial for the EU. Hence, in order to achieve this better relation with the EU Belarus made some progress, for example, by releasing the political prisoners. This in its turn provided the EU with a pretext – Belarus is making progress – to change its foreign policy by suspending restrictive measures.

Democracy promotion as a lower ranked policy goal One explanation for the EU to move closer to Belarus, which appears from the wording used in the Council conclusion of 2016 and its decision to suspend restrictive measures, is that it is changing its democratization policy due to the existence of hidden agendas which are led by geopolitical interests. According to Grimm (2015: 76) democracy promotion should be understood “in the context of the broader foreign policy that is mostly dominated by security and economic interests”. Democracy promotion often is treated as a lower ranked policy goal after guarantee of external security and access to markets, regardless whether these are markets in a democratic or an authoritarian system (Grimm, 2015: 76). Levitsky and Way (2006) argue that democracy promotion is just a poor cover for higher-ranked foreign policy issues such as security concerns. The foregoing seems to confirm that the strategic element in the EU‟s foreign policy is gaining importance. Here this is explained by the existence of hidden agendas led by geopolitical interests at the expense of democracy promotion. This leads to the conclusion that a change in the EU‟s geopolitical interests could explain a change of the EU‟s foreign policy and thus democracy promotion. Next, it will be showed that this indeed seems to be true for the Belarusian case as discussed in this research. Regarding security concerns it could indeed be argued that there has been a change in the EU‟s geopolitical interest. Like Belarus also the EU is worried about Russia‟s increasing aggressive foreign policy, especially towards its region. Hence, “Russia transformed itself from Europe‟s problematic „strategic partner‟ into a serious strategic problem” (ECFR.eu, 2015: 20). A Belarusian human rights defender (interview, 25 April 2016) also states that the EU‟s geopolitical interests changed, “now they need to preserve peace in the region”. Furthermore, according to the European Council for Foreign Relations (2015: 22) the EU

40 needs to protect its neighbors‟ freedom of choice, anticipating Russia‟s actions such as the annexation of Crimea. Following from this it seems that the EU, by suspending restrictive measures, is seeking re-engagement with Belarus in the hope that Belarus could function as a counterweight to Russia. Hence, as stated in the third chapter, the EU seems to perceive Belarus as part of the solution to the situation with Russia. Moreover, restrictive measures isolate Belarus, thereby putting them in a position which makes them more vulnerable to Russian influence. Therefore, from the EU‟s perspective, cooperation with Belarus at this moment is more attractive than pushing Belarus to reform through restrictive measures and thereby isolating them. This could explain why the EU appears to respond to Belarus‟ rapprochement efforts. It seems that the EU used Belarus‟ progress as pretext to explain the suspension of part of the restrictive measures it holds against Belarus herewith aiming at improving its relation with Belarus by cooperating instead of isolating it. A Belarusian human rights defender (interview, 25 April 2016) argues that Lukashenko is willing to provide this stability as long as the EU keeps him pleased. From this point of view it could be argued that Belarus‟ rapprochement to the EU was favorable for the EU as this provided an excuse for the EU to improve its relation with Belarus. Therefore, the EU could suspend restrictive measures against Belarus herewith improving its relation with Lukashenko under the pretext that Belarus is making progress, however, suspending restrictive measures while there is no or limited progress is a sign to Lukashenko that he was right all along (Interview human rights defender, 25 April 2016). Hence, the EU “helps prop up dictatorship in Belarus” (Wilson, 2015) which clearly is not in line with democracy promotion. This shows that the EU chose stability instead of democracy. Therefore, it seems that the EU prioritizes geopolitical interests over value promotion. In addition to the fear of Russia‟s aggressive foreign policy there is another matter that is affecting the EU‟s geopolitical interest; the current migrant issue the EU is dealing with. Bogdan Zdrojewski (interview, 19 April 2016), Chair of the EP Delegation to Belarus, noticed that last year there have been many negative changes for the EU to deal with among which is the large influx of migrants. In addition, he explained that his delegation tries to pressure Belarus when it comes to better border management (interview Zdrojewski, 19 April 2016). This makes sense when considering the fact that in 2015 the Belarusian border committee has reported a twofold increase in illegal migration through the EU-Belarus border (Smok, 2016). It seems quite straightforward that Lukashenko is more willing to improve border management issues when his relation with the EU is smooth. Hence, the pressure of

41 the large migrant influx could have contributed to the EU‟s decision to improve its relation with Belarus by suspending restrictive measures. Moreover, this shows that in relation to the Belarusian case Youngs theory does not fit. According to his theory, human rights situations in neighboring countries became, as result of the post-Cold War securitization trend, part of the EU‟s foreign policy. Although recently the situation regarding human rights did not improve, the EU did decide to suspend sanction. Since these sanctions were introduced to improve these human rights, this isnot a logical step according to Youngs theory. It seems logical that as a result from the post-Cold War securitization the EU enhanced its profile in the security domain, however, contrary to Youngs theory this case showed that this does not mean (anymore) it goes hand in hand with the promotion of issues such as democracy and human rights. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) argue that democracy promotion through conditionality does not lead to the intended changes. However, according to them this is not due to democracy promotion being a lower ranked policy goal but due to this model. Hence, they argue that, besides the old and not effective leverage and linkages model, there is a new model which they refer to as the governance model of democracy promotion. Although it sounds promising, this research showed that this new method does not explain the EU‟s recent decision. In the case of Belarus, the EU did switch from sanctions (leverage) to rapprochement which by first sight may be interpreted as the governance model of democracy promotion. However, the EU‟s choice to seek rapprochement to Belarus does not seem to be a result of an altered method of democracy promotion but instead by changed security interest. This observation downplays the by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011) argued effect of the governance model.

Prioritizing geopolitics: the rule not an exception In order to show that the prioritization of geopolitical interests is not a one-time occurrence or coincidence, this research also looked into the previous time that the EU suspended restrictive measures for Belarus. During the period 2008-2010 the Council suspended travel restrictions for Belarusian officials, with the aim of encouraging progress. The EU took this decision on the basis of progress in the form of broader access for the opposition to the media and the fact that the opposition was able to demonstrate peacefully at the parliamentary elections (CEU, 2008b). However, it is important to note that in this period it was only the travel restrictions that were suspended while in 2016 all restrictive measures except for three persons and the

42 arms embargo are lifted. The reason the EU extended the rest of its measures during the period 2008-2010 was mainly due to the lack of progress regarding human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The reason for the EU to reintroduce and increase restrictive measures in 2011 was the brutal crackdown following the 2010 elections which resulted in 700 protesters being detained and more than 40 sent to jail. The Council imposed travel restrictions and asset freeze for 175 people and/or entities responsible for the election fraud and the violent crackdown (CEU, 2011a). Furthermore, the Council underlined in its conclusion the need for the immediate release of all political prisoners and their rehabilitation (CEU, 2011a). Knowing that far from all EU conditions were met, the question is if there are other external factors, related to the EU‟s geopolitical interests, which can explain the EU‟s choice to suspend some of its restrictive measures during the period 2008-2010. Notable when considering Belarusian GDP growth rates is the sharp fall in 2009 (see figure 1). In the same year Russia also experienced a sharp fall of its GDP (see figure 2). Since the Belarusian economy is heavily dependent on Russian subsidies, this fall in GDP may create an opening for the EU to improve its relation with Belarus. Portela (2011) seems to agree with this as she argues that the rapprochement between Belarus and the EU was facilitated by the deteriorating relation between Russia and Belarus and the worsening Belarusian economic situation. A different argument comes from Shraibman (2015) who argues that in the period 2008-2010 Russia scared its neighbors by intervening in Georgia which resulted in the Belarusian government distancing itself from the Kremlin. Interesting to note is that the circumstance under which the EU suspended restrictive measures in the period 2008-2010 appears much the same as the current situation. In both cases there is a worsening relation between Russia and Belarus resulting from both countries suffering economic down turn and Lukashenko fears Russia‟s aggressive foreign policy reflected in Russia‟s intervention in Georgia in 2008 and their annexation of Crimea in 2014. So, from the foregoing it indeed seems that the EU prioritizes its geopolitical interests over democracy promotion.

Figure 1: GDP growth rates in Belarus, 2006-2016 (Belarus Digest, 2016).

Figure 2: GDP growth rate Russia, 1999-2013 (Richter, 2013).

5.3 Shift from normative to strategic foreign policy Earlier it was explained that the EU started with a foreign policy which focused on issues all member states agreed on, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights (King, 1999). As a result of globalization the EU has been pushed to pursue an international moral responsibility (Evans and Sahnoun 2002; Boulden, 2002). However, according to Becher (2004) through the years the EU‟s foreign policy became increasingly based on the strategic element. This thesis researched if the theory that the EU foreign policy is shifting from normative to strategic could be true by looking into the recent developments in the EU- Belarus relation.

The fact that the EU chose to suspend restrictive measures while there have been no signs of substantial changes, keeping in mind what happened in the period 2008-2010 in which at first it seemed that Belarus was making progress but what turned out to be a big fail, and the changes in geopolitical interests of both the EU and Belarus it is beyond doubt that this EU decision is mainly based on the strategic element of its foreign policy and not on its normative element. The fact that these restrictive measures where aimed at improving matters as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and the fact that they are as it were pushed aside in favor of stability and security does confirm that in this case the EU‟s foreign policy is becoming more focused on the strategic element. Interesting is that the hypotheses in this research suggest that motives for the EU to change its foreign policy – suspending restrictive measures – are linked to the strategic element of its foreign policy. Hence, this decision seems to have been made in the context of changed geopolitical interest: the migration issues Europe is dealing with, the increasing aggressive foreign policy by Russia, and Belarus‟ rapprochement to the EU. Remarkable is that the EU seems to explain its decision of suspending restrictive measures by acknowledging steps made by Belarus such as the release of the political prisoners. However, such an explanation seems to be legitimized with the normative element of democracy promotion rather than the strategic element. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the EU does not refer to its changed geopolitical interests as explanation for it changing its foreign policy vis-à-vis Belarus but rather to the so called positive steps taken by Belarus. The foregoing seems to suggest that the EU „sells‟ its strategic motivated foreign policy changes by utilizing a normative influenced rhetoric. This research showed that the motives for the EU to decide to suspend restrictive measures can be attributed to the strategic element of the EU‟s foreign policy which focuses on ensuring stability and security. This confirms Grimm‟s (2004) stance that democracy promotion should be understood in the context of the broader foreign policy that is mostly dominated by security and economic interests, and Lavenex (2004) point that the EU in its essence is a security community. Hence, due to changed geopolitical interests, the EU increasingly benefits from a good or at least better relation with its neighbor Belarus. However, this research also showed that this EU decision seems somewhat contradictory to the EU‟s initially stance towards Belarus. Namely, that it had to adapt to EU values and rules related to matters as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law before there could be cooperation between the two. Taking this into account, it seems possible that the EU used a normative rhetoric, by emphasizing the progress

45 made by Belarus, to sell its policy shift which in practice is motivated more by the strategic element of democracy promotion than its normative element.

6. Conclusion

This research aimed to understand the EU‟s motive for its recent decision to suspend a large part of the restrictive measures it holds against Belarus. The motivation for this research came from the paradoxically of this EU decision. The EU sanctioned Belarus in reaction to concerns over the deteriorating situation of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. In the Council conclusions one can read that the EU motivates its decision by positive steps taken on behalf of Belarus. However, in these same Council conclusions the EU still voices concerns on the same matters: human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Moreover, several international organizations and NGO‟s such as the UN, the OSCE, and Human Rights Watch also state that there have not been (substantial) changes or progress in Belarus regarding these matters. In order to develop an answer to the question: “how should we understand the EU‟s recent decision to suspend restrictive measures against Belarus?” this research developed three hypotheses. These hypotheses show that both Belarus and the EU had an interest in a better relation due to changed geopolitical interests. For the EU this can mainly be explained by its need for stability in the region, especially now that Russia is showing a more aggressive foreign policy. Ideal for the EU would be if Belarus could function as a counterweight to Russia. For Belarus its economic problems which are worsened by Russia‟s unwillingness to pay subsidies and also its fear for Russia are the two most important factors explaining its attempt to seek rapprochement to the EU. From the literature review it became clear that Becher (2004) argues that strategic concerns are gradually replacing the original norm-based policy. Although this is not the point made by Lavenex (2004), it does seem to fit her idea that the EU‟s fundamental identity is that of a security community. The same is true for Grimm who argues that democracy promotion should be understood broader foreign policy that is mostly dominated by security and economic interests. This research made an attempt, using the case of EU foreign policy towards Belarus, to test the theory that EU foreign policy is shifting from being normative to more strategic. Such a shift can partially be seen in the Council conclusions. For example, in 2008 the EU expressed its hope for re-engagement. In 2009 the EU says that cooperation with Belarus through the EaP is of strategic importance as it fears that leaving Belarus outside the

EaP will enable Moscow to tighten its grip on Minsk. In 2010 the EU referred to the importance it attaches to Belarus being a neighbor to the EU. In the context of the EU‟s wish for Belarus as counterweight to Russia and stability in the region, for example fed by the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, these statements could be interpreted as first signs of the EU gradually changing its attitude and thereby policy towards re-engagement in favor of its own strategic interests. The foregoing does seem to confirm that the EU gradually is shifting its foreign policy from being more norm-based to more strategic. Moreover, this research showed that it seems that the EU is explaining this shift with normative arguments. It will be interesting to see if this is a strategy more often used by the EU. In addition, it is important to note that this research looked into only one case. Therefore, it would be interesting to see if different cases yield a same conclusion on the question if the EU is shifting the focus of its foreign policy. Furthermore, this research showed that there are some problems with Youngs securitization theory as this theory cannot explain the EU‟s decision to improve its relation with Belarus from a security perspective at the expense of the promotion of human rights, which for Youngs is inextricably linked to a state‟s security. Moreover, this research demonstrated some problems with Lavenex and Schimmelfennig‟s governance model. This model seems to explain the EU‟s current decision as example for democracy promotion through the governance model, whereas this research demonstrated that it is motivated by security interest rather than considerations connected to democracy promotion. Nonetheless, this change in EU policy may have an unintended positive effect on the promotion of democracy. In regard to the research question about the motives of the EU to decide to suspend restrictive measures, it is clear that this is mainly motivated by changed geopolitical interest making a better relation with Belarus valuable. In first instance it seems that by suspending sanctions the EU pushes democracy promotion to the side, however, this research showed that the restrictive measures had limited effect on Lukashenko and his regime due to the existence of Russia and because Lukashenko has no interest in democratizing as this will jeopardize his own position. Although the latter remains a problem in EU‟s efforts to change Belarus, the fact that Belarus‟ relation with Russia has worsened and that they become more dependent on the EU may yield some room for EU democracy promotion. After all, EU democracy promotion in other eastern European countries has been rather successful, which at that time different than Belarus had an interest in a closer relation to the EU as maybe Belarus has now.

Annex

Interview Bogdan Zdrojewski

This interview took place 19 April 2016 at Bogdan Zdrojewski‟s office at the European Parliament in Brussels. Due to the fact that Zdrojewski is not comfortable speaking English there was an interpreter who translated his answers in English. The fact that we had to work with an interpreter did make the interview more static as it was not possible to interrupt, for example, to ask for clarification. Originally there was 30 minutes scheduled for the interview but mister Zdrojewski was kind enough to extend this to 45 minutes. What made this interview interesting is that Zdrojewski clearly voiced his opinion on the matter and explained that in his opinion the Councils decision to suspend most of its sanction came too early. Below are the interview questions as prepared in advance, naturally during the interview additional questions were asked in reaction to answers by the interviewee.

Interview questions 1. Could you explain to me the task of your delegation? What are its objectives? What tools does it have? 2. Do you have specific goals you would like to reach with the delegation? Examples of subjects you are working on? 3. What role did the delegation play in the recent suspension of restrictive measures? 4. Both you and the EU (Council and EP) in general speak about a critical engagement. What is meant by this?

5. You stated that in …: “It is in our own common interest to seek the way of normalization of EU-Belarus relations”. -> What do you mean or refer to when saying common interests? 6. June 2015 the delegation visit Minsk. During this visit you met representatives of the opposition, journalist and relatives of political prisoners. How do they see the relation with the EU? Did you talk about the restrictive measures?

7. Would you say that the restrictive measures have been successful?  If no, could this be a reason for suspension?  EU changes its approach? (in general or just to Belarus) why?  EU moving away from its role as value promoter? Why?  EU chose to move to soft power approach? (Aggressive Russia)

8. Belarus made some progress (release political prisoners, hosting peace talks Kiev, peaceful elections). Could we speak substantial change?

o Yes: what about OSCE, rehabilitation and human rights? o No: then why have the sanctions been lifted?

9. Chance of a repeat of 2010? Why?

10. Other issues that have played a role in the Councils decision?  Securing energy sector  Illegal migration  Stable counterweight to Russia  Encourage Belarus rapprochement EU - Belarus and Russia in recession - Belarus fears aggressive Russia (Ukraine crisis)

11. Considering the fact that Belarus has a dictatorship based on one person, Lukashenko, whose main objective is to stay in power, how do you estimate the chances for fundamental change? Hence, do you think it is possible for Belarus to become a real democracy?

12. What is the future for Belarus-EU relations?  Belarus parliamentary elections 2016

Interview Council secretariat official

This interview took place 10 May 2016 at the European Council in Brussels. In accordance with the policy of the European Council the interviewee will be kept anonymous and referred to as Council secretariat official. This interview went smoothly as the interviewee clearly understood the purpose of the interview and was well prepared for the interview which was showed by the fact that the interviewee printed council conclusions related to the topic. Although the official request was a 30 minute interview, the interview lasted for 70 minutes. This interview yielded much in depth information about the working of the Council. However, it was also clear that the answers were, especially compared to the other interviews, very diplomatic which made some of the information not so new as it was in line with official EU documents. Below are the interview questions as prepared in advance, naturally during the interview additional questions were asked in reaction to answers by the interviewee.

Interview questions 1. Could you tell me about your work and especially about your involvement with the Belarusian case? 2. Have you been involved in the decision of the Council to suspend the sanctions? -> how 3. When I was reading the different council conclusions I noticed that in 2012 for the first time Belarus is referred to as neighbor. I believe the wording of such an important document have been chosen really carefully and I was wondering if you could explain to me why this time they decided to use the reference neighbor of the EU? 4. Likewise I noticed that in the 2016 council conclusion they talked about progress through communication and the importance of good neighborly relations and regional cooperation. Could you tell me why they included these specific elements? 5. What would you say has been the effect of the restrictive measures over the last years? 6. The EU says that it decided to lift sanctions in reaction to the progress made by Belarus, herewith they refer to release of political prisoners, human rights dialogue, hosting mink peace talks, and violent free elections, however not all conditions are met, as for example the rehabilitation of the political prisoners, free and fair elections, OSCE commitments, international election standard and the situation of human rights, rule of law. Why did they not wait until all conditions were met? 7. Wrong sign to Lukashenko? Lost all leverage? 8. The initial reason for the EU to impose sanctions was to improve the situation regarding human rights, rule of law and they demand free and fair elections. It are these conditions that have not been met. Still the EU decided to suspend most sanctions, does this show a policy change? 9. What changed? Why? 10. I talked to different people who said it would have been better to postpone this decision until the next elections after this year, so that we are sure Lukashenko continues the progress/substantial change. Do you agree? Why? 11. Is there a chance of a repeat of 2008-2010? 12. The EU stated that its decision on suspending the sanctions was based on the progress made in/by Belarus. Would you say this is true or are they using this as a pretext for different interests? - Counterweight Russia - Migrant crisis - Using Belarus rapprochement o Economic situation Belarus and Russia o Crisis Ukraine 13. What future do you see for EU-Belarus Relation?

Interview human rights defender

This interview took place 25 April 2016 via Skype as the interviewee works and lives in Lithuania. On request of the interviewee this person‟s identity will kept anonymous. As the interviewee is a human rights defender this research will referred to the interviewee as „human rights defender‟. This interview was especially helpful as it confirmed a lot of findings from newspaper articles concerning the situation in Belarus and certain incidents such as surrounding the presidential elections in October 2015. Moreover, it was clear that there were certain issues the interviewee wanted to address which shows that people sometimes have their own agenda which should not be overlooked when interpreting the information. Below a list of topics that were discussed during the interview.

List of interview topics 1. Effectiveness sanctions 2. EU decision to suspend sanctions 3. upcoming elections 4. a repeat of 2008-2010 5. Ban on protests during recent elections 6. EU strengthening the civil society of Belarus 7. Geopolitical situation. 8. EU more interested in geopolitics than human rights in Belarus 9. Economic situation in Belarus 10. Russia propaganda in Belarus 11. What future do you see for EU-Belarus Relation

Interview employee Office for Democratic Belarus

This interview took place 6 May 2016 via Skype as the interviewee was at that moment in Belarus. On request of the interviewee this person‟s identity will be kept anonymous. As the interviewee works for the Office for a Democratic Belarus (ODB) this research will referred to the interviewee as „ODB employee‟. This interview went different than anticipated as it turned out that the interviewee prepared a 30 minute overview on the case that the interviewee wanted to share instead of a question based conversation. Even though this interview was very different from expected it was still helpful due to the very detailed explanation of the case. Nonetheless, from all interviews this interviewee most clearly had a certain view on the case which the interviewee wanted to share.

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