COMMENTARY THE NAME DISPUTE: A FEW DRIVERS AND SPOILERS OF SUCCESS

The Macedonia Name Dispute: A Few Drivers and Spoilers of Success

CVETE KONESKA*

ABSTRACT In June 2018, after 27 years of negotiations, the govern- ments of Macedonia and signed an agreement to resolve the so-called ‘name dispute’ over the use of the term ‘Macedonia.’ The agreement put an end to one of the longest regional disputes and is expected to unblock Macedonia’s integration into NATO and the EU, where Greece had vetoed its membership since 2008. However, the full success of the agreement is still uncertain, with persistent domestic resistance in both countries and a challenging regional and geopolitical context.

Introduction The government agreed to change the name of the country hen in June 2018, the to ‘’ –a major con- prime ministers of Mace- cession, and for many Wdonia and Greece signed a move indicating that Greece had an agreement aimed at resolving the ‘won’ the dispute. The new name is long-standing ‘name dispute’ be- both for international and domestic tween the two countries, reactions uses, including in forums and in bi- among the domestic and interna- lateral relations with countries that tional public ranged from disbelief have already recognized Macedo- to rejection, to congratulations. Put- nia as the ‘ of Macedonia.’ ting an end to a bilateral dispute that The Greek government committed had dominated Macedonia’s foreign to revoke its vetoes in NATO and policy since –and has the EU and supporting Macedonia’s * St Antony's College, come to define its relationship with membership in these organizations. University of key international partners such as It also accepted the use of ‘Macedo- Oxford, UK NATO and the EU– entailed some nian’ to designate the nationality and Insight difficult decisions on behalf of both language of Macedonia. In addition, Vol. 21 / No. 2 / governments. both parties committed to improv- 2019, pp. 51-61

DOI: 10.25253/99.2019212.04 2019 Sprıng 51 COMMENTARY CVETE KONESKA

donia, the declining power of the EU Although the appeal and in the Western and its wan- ing appeal to the populations, and the influence of the EU have been evolving geopolitical environment in steadily declining over the the Balkans. The ultimate success of past decade, EU integration the Agreement to create a last- ing solution to the dispute between remains the only credible the two countries depends on these alternative to nationalist domestic and external factors, even after both parliaments have ratified political ideologies the document itself. Therefore in the rest of this paper, I address these is- sues, looking at the state of Macedo- ing mutual relations and working nian democracy and its reform pro- together to eradicate irredentist and cesses, the EU’s role in encouraging hate speech aimed at the other.1 domestic reforms, as well as some of the wider regional and geopolitical Whether the long-term effects of implications. the agreement will be those that the Macedonian government desired The evidence suggests that although –unblocking the EU and NATO in- the appeal and influence of the EU tegration– remains to be seen. The have been steadily declining over country has yet to start EU accession the past decade, the EU integration talks because the EU postponed the remains the only credible alternative decision to open negotiations talks to nationalist political ideologies. to June 2019. Progress with NATO However, the EU’s declining appeal membership was quicker. Once the means that domestic political elites agreement was ratified by both parlia- are less willing to comply with the EU ments in February 2019, the requirements for reforms, and more issued an invitation for membership. inclined to negotiate and bargain for Nonetheless, opposition to the agree- the rewards given by the EU. As a re- ment, now referred to as the Prespa sult, political and democratic reforms Agreement after the lake on the Mace- have not accelerated, including in donian-Greek border where it was key areas for the EU accession such signed, is still strong in both coun- as fighting corruption and improving tries. The government had proceeded the rule of law. to implement the agreement even after a referendum on it in Macedo- Regionally, the EU remains the most nia in September 2018 had failed and dominant foreign actor. Despite the many public concerns remain. increasing influence of other regional actors, such as and , all Moreover, the has states in the Balkans continue to pri- opened several questions about the oritize relations with the EU and the domestic political divisions in Mace- U.S. However, the rising influence of

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Workers cover the name Republic of Macedonia with alternative regional actors has con- name to ‘North Macedonia’ was seen a sign reading tributed to the growing complexity as too great a concession to Greece. Republic of North of foreign policies in these countries, Especially since the reward was rather Macedonia on a and a more nuanced domestic dis- small and not immediate: Greece road sign at the Greece-Macedonia cussion about the role the country would remove its veto in NATO and Bogorodica should play in regional and interna- the EU, but there was no guarantee border crossing tional politics. for starting the EU accession talks or on February 13, NATO membership. 2019. Stringer / AA Photo Domestic Obstacles to Moreover, since 1992, the dispute Compromise had evolved beyond the initial Greek objection to the name ‘Macedonia.’ In Internationally, the signing of the both countries, the dispute was linked Prespa Agreement was largely seen to deeper social and identity con- as a positive development in Bal- cerns, which have been exacerbated kan politics. Yet the compromise by economic hardship over the past enshrined in it was not widely wel- decade.2 Therefore, while the Prespa comed among the domestic public Agreement provides a solution to the in Macedonia. Although most of the formal dispute over the name, the population in principle supports in- deeper identity and social concerns tegration in NATO and the EU, and have not been fully addressed. They many wished to see the dispute with continue to drive resistance in both Greece resolved, the change of the countries.

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need for a proper public discussion For the solution to be on the agreement with Greece, which sustainable and lasting, so far has been lacking. the government needs to The public discussion would be po- address the public’s qualms litically prudent too, since the main opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, and concerns about it. It will was not the main driver for boycot- probably not be enough to ting the referendum. DPMNE was not united in opposing the deal with just wait for the benefits of Greece, even though many of its key the EU and NATO integration members were public about their re- to convince Macedonians jection of the agreement. However, the new party leader, Hristijan Mick- that the compromise was oski, never openly called on mem- worthwhile bers and party supporters to boycott or to vote against in the referendum. Those who stayed at home on the day of the referendum thus did not nec- As a result, the public is deeply divided essarily follow the opposition’s line. over the Prespa Agreement.3 How the Rather, it seems there was a genuine government deals with these divisions grassroot resistance to the deal with can potentially determine the success Greece, based on the perception of an of the agreement. Nonetheless, so unjust compromise. Engaging with far the government has done little to the public’s arguments and concerns address domestic resistance. Perhaps would give the government a lead because it was in a rush to fulfill its rather than a reactive role regard- obligations under the agreement, ing the issue, setting the parameters it proceeded with a referendum on of domestic political debate on the it, despite the obvious lack of public topic. Without such engagement, the consensus. In the run-up to the Sep- ‘name issue’ is unlikely to disappear tember poll, as it became clearer that from Macedonian domestic politics. there was no overwhelming majority in favor of the agreement, the govern- Whether a reformed VMRO-DPMNE ment declared the referendum to be under new leadership will return to of ‘consultative’ rather than ‘binding’ its nationalist ideology and seek to nature. This technically relieved the capitalize on public discontent with government from the legal obliga- the government’s compromise with tion to comply with the referendum Greece remains to be seen. However, outcome, especially given the 50 per- for the solution to be sustainable and cent turnout requirement for a refer- lasting, the government needs to ad- endum to be considered successful. dress the public’s qualms and con- However, once the referendum failed, cerns about it. It will probably not be it became clear that there is a pressing enough to just wait for the benefits

54 Insight Turkey THE MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE: A FEW DRIVERS AND SPOILERS OF SUCCESS

of the EU and NATO integration to quickly dissipate and will not result convince Macedonians that the com- in the desired outcomes –quick prog- promise was worthwhile. Not only ress with EU accession.4 The needed because these benefits may be slow to reforms are a major task, given the come and will only arrive gradually, long legacies of corruption and polit- but because such an important issue icization of the state administration –an issue that has virtually defined and the . This problem is not Macedonia’s position in the inter- unique to Macedonia; all the coun- national arena since independence– tries in the are facing similar needs to be openly discussed, both challenges. However, given the addi- at a political and popular level. The tional costs of implementing an un- government needs to make a con- popular compromise with Greece, vincing case that the compromises in the government needs to take swift the Prespa Agreement were justified, action. Seeking to avoid the costs of even if the agreement is far from what painful domestic reforms will only Macedonians would have wanted in a render the compromise with Greece best-case scenario. less worthwhile.

Otherwise, there is a serious risk that However, despite promises to prior- the agreement will be undermined itize corruption investigations and and that it will lead to further po- other criminal allegations against larization in Macedonian politics. former government and political fig- In Macedonian society, which is al- ures, as revealed in the leaked wire- ready divided along ethnic, party taps from 2015, the government since political, and socio-economic lines, 2016 has been slow to tackle corrup- further polarization can only lead to tion. Although the Special Prosecu- more antagonistic politics and stalled tion, which was established to inves- reforms, ultimately preventing the tigate the allegations from the wire- country from overcoming the obsta- tapping scandal, has completed sev- cles that have kept it relatively poor eral investigations against high-rank- and isolated over the past almost ing politicians, the courts have been three decades. slow to rule and then enforce the rel- atively lenient verdicts. Most notably, Failing to reach a domestic consensus the former prime minister and party over the Prespa Agreement is not the leader of VMRO-DPMNE, only issue that could derail the agree- Gruevski, who led the government ment and Macedonia’s bid for the EU between 2006 and 2016, escaped in and NATO membership. The qual- November 2018 to claim political ity and pace of domestic reform are asylum in , after being sen- equally important, especially tack- tenced to two years in prison in a cor- ling corruption and weak rule of law. ruption trial. Many saw Gruevski’s es- Without serious progress in these ar- cape as part of a prior agreement with eas, the goodwill from having solved the SDSM-led government. Although the name dispute with Greece will there is no publicly available evidence

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The Prespa Agreement is expected to pave to suggest that this was the case, the tion either for corruption or for the the way to the incident further undermines public violence in parliament in April 2016. integration of trust in the judiciary and the rule of Again, these are merely perceptions North Macedonia into the European law, which seems not to apply to in- among the wider public, which has Union. fluential politicians. been accustomed to being governed KONSTANTINOS by politicians with limited respect for TSAKALIDIS / In addition, the two issues –tackling the rule of law and anti-corruption Bloomberg via corruption and resolving the name norms. But these perceptions have Getty Images dispute with Greece– have not re- the potential to determine the out- mained separate. Recent events in the come not only of the next elections Macedonian parliament have pointed but of longer-term policymaking too, to potential links between them. Spe- including potentially undermining cifically, the preparedness of several Macedonia’s integration into NATO opposition deputies to vote in fa- and the EU. A population that feels vor of the proposed constitutional its concerns are being ignored by amendments to change the country’s the government is unlikely to vote to name was seen as part of another support its survival and its policies. deal between the two parties to re- duce or drop charges against those opposition deputies who supported The EU’s Declining Appeal the Prespa Agreement in parliament. Among the eight opposition deputies It is tempting to see the resolution of who supported the vote in parlia- the name dispute between Macedonia ment, several were under investiga- and Greece in terms of the transfor-

56 Insight Turkey THE MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE: A FEW DRIVERS AND SPOILERS OF SUCCESS

mative power of the EU, i.e. interpret- ing the decision as a bilateral dispute The Greek, Spanish, and that was resolved because the pros- pect of the EU membership made do- Portuguese debt crises, along mestic elites willing to compromise with similar problems in and abandon nationalist positions for and , revealed that the benefit of joining the bloc. How- ever, although that was the narrative the EU was economically that many international media and weaker and more vulnerable commentators used to describe the events, that would be a simplistic and than many among the an incomplete account.5 candidate countries expected

Indeed, Macedonia’s progress with EU accession has been blocked since this period. As a result of the global 2009 (and NATO membership since financial crisis and the prolonged Eu- 2008) because of Greek vetoes in ropean economic downturn, the EU both organizations. Once Greece struggled with internal problems and used a veto, no subsequent govern- divisions, which did not go unnoticed ment, regardless of political orienta- among the candidate countries in the tion, revoked it until a breakthrough Balkans. The Greek, Spanish, and Por- in the negotiations with Macedonia tuguese debt crises, along with similar could be achieved. However, for al- problems in Italy and Slovenia, re- most a decade, the repeated Greek vealed that the EU was economically vetoes in the EU and NATO did not weaker and more vulnerable than make the government in Macedonia many among the candidate countries more inclined to make concessions. expected. The related disagreements Instead, it took Greece to the Inter- and divisions between member states national Court of Justice for breaking over the right monetary policy course the Interim Accords from 1995 in ve- in the Eurozone further demon- toing Macedonia’s membership in in- strated that the EU members, much ternational organizations. Although like candidate states, did not always Macedonia won that case in 2010, agree with EU requests and some did the verdict was not enforceable, so not fully comply with EU rules. the status quo remained and Greece continued to veto the start of mem- As a result of these developments, bership talks with the EU. the EU’s credibility in the region de- clined and the attitude toward the EU In the decade since the first Greek among the political elites of Western veto in NATO in 2008, Macedonia Balkans states gradually evolved to made no progress with the EU and become more critical and ambiva- NATO integration. However, both lent. When the EU demanded painful NATO and especially the EU went reforms in candidate states, these re- through substantial changes during quests were contrasted to the lack of

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DPMNE-led governments in Mace- Russia’s influence in the donia since 2006. Although each gov- ernment nominally remained com- region does not stem from mitted to the EU integration, there its investments but is rather was an obvious lack of effort to find from its status as a symbolic a solution to the name dispute with Greece to remove the main obstacle to alternative to the dominant the EU membership. In addition, re- and liberal , and its lations with other neighbors, such as , also deteriorated because of appeal to pan-Slavic and various nationalist remarks and ges- pan-Orthodox solidarity tures in mutual relations, leading to Bulgaria also vetoing Macedonia’s ac- cession talks in 2012. The government agreement among EU member states faced very limited repercussions for about the key EU reforms. Therefore, such policies –it kept being re-elected Western Balkans elites became less until 2016, despite its obvious failures likely to prioritize and comply with on foreign policy and EU integration EU requirements. In the Macedo- issues. This suggests that for the pub- nian case, this was amplified by the lic too, the appeal of EU membership knowledge that a Greek veto in the had faded since the peak of pro-EU EU would mean no rewards, even attitudes in the mid-2000s.6 if the government proceeded with EU-mandated reforms. Therefore, to credit the EU with the resolution of the name dispute with Consequently, the likelihood that Greece would not fully capture the the Macedonian and Greek govern- effect of regional and domestic de- ments would solve the name dispute velopments over the past decade. because of the appeal of EU member- Rather, it would be more appropriate ship to Macedonian elites had been to argue that Macedonia and Greece declining since 2008. The perceived solved the bilateral dispute not be- value of the reward –accession talks– cause, but despite of the EU. Despite has been steadily decreasing, making the EU’s growing reluctance to fur- any concessions by the Macedonian ther enlarge, and despite its growing side seem increasingly costly. This internal problems and divisions, de- view was compounded by fears about spite growing doubts about its power the future of the EU enlargements, as to ensure lasting democratic reforms growing reluctance to further expand in new members, it has remained the bloc has been taking root among the only credible alternative to the existing member states. nationalist and socially conservative ideology of the VMRO-DPMNE The change in stance toward the EU governments since 2006. So, when has been visible in the rhetoric and the center-left Social Democratic policies of the conservative VMRO- Union (SDSM) sought to challenge

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its dominance in 2015-2016, the EU Western Balkans, filling in the void and NATO membership were still left by the increasingly reluctant EU. the only credible alternatives to the regional isolation that resulted from In particular, Russia and China are the VMRO-DPMNE’s policies. seen as the two key challengers to the EU’s dominance in the region. Both Thus, although the EU cannot be countries have become diplomati- fully credited with resolving the cally and commercially more active name issue, due to its own inter- in the region, including Macedonia, nal challenges, it still played a role. over the past decade. Although the Moreover, the EU actively supported majority of foreign investments still Greece and Macedonia to solve the tend to come from West European name dispute. EU officials were keen countries, local politicians and pop- to put an end to a dispute that had ulations are open to more Chinese led a member state to repeatedly investments, especially for large in- veto the accession of a candidate. Its frastructure projects such as motor- solution is good news for the EU –it ways or energy production, for which signals that it still wields substantial governments in the region have been influence in the region. However, if struggling to raise sufficient funds the EU fails to deliver on its promise for decades.7 Russian investment in for membership, it will not be only its Macedonia is significantly lower than credibility that will suffer –the Prespa that of West European states, but that Agreement, and other regional dis- is no obstacle to its growing influ- putes closed as a result of EU media- ence. Russia’s influence in the region tion, may re-open again. does not stem from its investments but is rather from its status as a sym- bolic alternative to the dominant and Regional Trends liberal West, and its appeal to pan- Slavic and pan-Orthodox solidarity. Although around a decade ago the Western Balkans region was seen as Given the growing complexity in rela- firmly anchored in the EU and NATO tions between the EU and Russia and regional structures, certainty over China at the global level, their rivalry its integration within Euro-Atlantic in the Western Balkans is unlikely to structures has gradually declined. This subside soon. Rather, they will con- is largely a result of the weakening ap- tinue to be present and seek to in- peal and declining credibility of the crease their influence in this region, EU and NATO, as discussed above, which will inevitably affect the foreign but partly also a consequence of the policies of Western Balkans countries, changing geopolitical environment including Macedonia. Russia was not in the broader region. With the EU’s in favor of the resolution of the name turn toward internal problems and dispute between Macedonia and challenges, other regional and global Greece made the negotiation process actors have become more active in the more difficult and empowered spoil-

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breakthrough in the ‘name dispute’ The alternative –nationalism between Macedonia and Greece. Af- ter more than 25 years of negotiations and isolation– appears to under UN auspices and a persistent be even less appealing, but deadlock over the past decade, the the Macedonian elites and governments of the two countries reached a compromise on the issue. population will be the ultimate Resolving the dispute has the poten- decision-makers on this tial to transform Macedonia’s foreign policy. It can unblock its accession to the EU and NATO, which have been the country’s top foreign pol- ers in both countries. Whether Rus- icy priorities since independence. sian opposition to the deal could de- Moreover, relations with neighboring rail its implementation is still unclear, Greece can improve once the ‘name but it is certainly something that the issue’ is not on the agenda, which can governments in both countries need lead to greater cooperation and more to seriously consider. political and economic ties between the two countries. Solving bilateral disputes has rarely been a process that only involves However, although primarily a for- the two parties. In the long-standing eign policy issue, the success of the Macedonia-Greece dispute this was Prespa Agreement is largely depen- never going to be the case. With early dent on domestic factors in Mace- UN involvement, and the inevitable donia. As the above discussion though indirect EU and NATO influ- demonstrates, there is still significant ence on the actions of both countries, opposition to the deal with Greece the dispute was hardly bilateral. How- among the Macedonian public. The ever, as more global actors acquire an failed referendum in September 2018 interest in the region, they will seek showed that there are deep divisions to gain a stake in these disputes as a inside Macedonian society, which means of boosting their influence on the government needs to address if governments in the region. Finally it wants a sustainable solution to the solving the name dispute would, name dispute. Otherwise, the discon- therefore, mean one less lever that tent will continue to grow and can external actors can pull to affect the ultimately undermine the agreement decisions and policies of the Macedo- and its implementation. nian government. In addition, the implementation of the Prespa Agreement will not be suf- What Comes Next? ficient to fully unblock Macedonia’s bid to join the EU. Better progress Without doubt, the Prespa Agree- in fighting corruption and strength- ment from June 2018 was a major ening the rule of law will remain key

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requirements for further progress 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Part- nership between the Parties,” (June 13, 2018), with the EU accession. This is where retrieved from https://vmacedonia.com/politics/ the government needs to focus most macedonia-greece-agreement.html. in coming months, especially given 2. See for example, Persefoni Zeri, Charalambos growing public doubts about the gov- Tsekeris, and Theodore Tsekeris, “Investigating ernment’s commitment to investigat- the in the Twitter Era: Implications for the Greek Identity Crisis,” Hellenic ing high-ranking politicians. Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Eu- rope, No. 127, (London: European Institute, Lon- Externally, the environment is not as don School of Economics and Political Science, 2018); Zhidas Daskalovski, “Clashing Historical favorable to EU integration as it was Narratives and the Macedonian Name Dispute: a decade ago. The EU’s internal prob- Solving the Unsolvable,” Trames: A Journal of lems, including the impending exit of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 21, No. 4 the UK and the deepening disagree- (2017), pp. 327-343. ments over migration policy among 3. Opinion polls from after the signing of the Prespa Agreement and before the referendum member states, demonstrate a less showed sharp divisions among the population. appealing and attractive destination See, for example, International Republican Insti- for Western Balkans states. The im- tute’s poll from 29, 2018, retrieved from age of the EU as the bastion of liberal https://www.iri.org/resource/macedonia-poll- high-levels-support-eu--ahead-referendum. democracy and economic prosperity 4. See, “Key Findings of the 2018 Report on the For- has been tarnished. Moreover, other mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” European global powers, such as Russia and Commission, (April 17, 2018), retrieved from http:// China, have become more active in europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3405_ the Western Balkans, challenging the en.htm. EU’s dominance in the region. As a 5. For example, “Macedonia Agrees to New Name After 27-year Dispute with Greece,” The Guard- result of all these factors, domestic ian, (June 12, 2018), retrieved from https://www. politicians will have a harder task theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/12/mace- when convincing the population that donia-agrees-to-new-name-after-27-year-dis- pute-with-greece; “Macedonia and Greece Sign the EU and NATO memberships are Historic Deal on Name Change,” The New York still in the best interest of the country Times, (June 17, 2018), retrieved from https:// and are worthwhile despite the com- www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/world/europe/ promises and painful reforms that greece-macedonia-name-dispute.html. precede them. The alternative –na- 6. Polls by the International Republican Institute in- dicate that support for EU membership dropped tionalism and isolation– appears to be from around 96 percent in 2008 to around 71 per- even less appealing, but the Macedo- cent in 2017. See, https://www.mkd.mk/make- nian elites and population will be the donija/politika/anketa-na-iri-pagja-poddrshkata- ultimate decision makers on this. za-chlenstvo-vo-eu-i-nato (in Macedonian). 7. The Financial Times reported that the five West- ern Balkans states have received around $4.9 bil- lion in Chinese investments, which is more than Endnotes half of the total Chinese investment in Central and 1. “Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Eastern . See, “China’s Balkan Investment Differences as Described in the United Pledges Stoke EU Concern,” Financial Times, (July Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 1, 2018), retrieved from https://www.ft.com/con- (1993), The Termination of the Interim Accord of tent/6c646a3e-7d29-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.

2019 Sprıng 61 islamophobiaeurope.com COMMENTARY CVETE KONESKA EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2017

By ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds.)

The third annual European Islamophobia Report (EIR) scrutinizes the developments of Islamophobia in 33 European countries for 2017

Read the Report online: setav.org 62 Insight Turkey