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Home , Anomalous monism, Class (philosophy), Definite description, Identity (philosophy), Intentionality, Mental event

Chapter20 Mental Events DonaldDavidson

Mental events such as perceivings, rememberings, decisions, and actions resist capture 1 in the nomological net of physical theory. How can this fad be reconciledwith the causalrole of mental events in the physical world? Reconciling heedom with causal is a special case of the problem if we suppose that causaldeterminism entails capture in, and heedom requires escapeHorn , the nomological net. But the broader issue can remain alive even for someonewho a corred analysis of &ee action revealsno conflid with determinism. Autonomy( &eedom, self-rule) mayor may not clashwith determinism; anomaly( failure to fall under a law) is, it would seem, another . I start Horn the assumptionthat both the causaldependence , and the anomalousness, of mental events are undeniable fads. My aim is therefore to explain, in the face of apparentdifficulties , how this can be. I am in sympathy with Kant when he says, it is as impossiblefor the subtlest as for the commonestreasoning to argueheedom away. Philosophy must thereforeassume that no true contradiction will be found between heedom and natural necessityin the samehuman actions, for it cannot give up the of any more than that of heedom. Henceeven if we should never be able to conceive how &eedom is possible, at least this apparent contradiction must be convincingly eradicated. For if the of heedom contradids itself or nature . . . it would have to be surrenderedin competition 2 with natural necessity. Generalizehuman actions to mental events, substitute anomaly for &eedom, and this is a description of my problem. And of course the connection is closer, since Kant believed &eedom entails . anomaly " " Now let me try to formulate a little more carefully the apparent contradiction about mental events that I want to discussand finally dissipate. It may be seen as stemmingHorn three . The first assertsthat at least some mental events interad causally with physical events. ( Wecould call this the Principle of CausalInteraction .) Thus for example if someone sank the Bismarck, then various mental events such as perceivings, notings, calculations, judgments, decisions, intentional actions and changesof played a causalrole in the sinking of the Bismarck. In , I would urge that the fad that someone sank the Bismarckentails that he moved his body in a way that was causedby mental events of certain sorts, and that this bodily movement in turn 3 causedthe Bismarckto sink. illustrates how may run Horn the physical to the mental: if a man perceives that a ship is approaching, then a ship approaching must have causedhim to come to believe that a ship is approaching. ( dependson acceptingthese as examples of causalinteraction .) Though perception and action provide the most obvious caseswhere mental and physical events interad causally, I think reasonscould be given for the view that all 138 Donald Davidson mental events ultimately, perhaps through causalrelations with mental events, have causalintercourse with physical events. But if there are mental events that have no physicalevents as causesor effects, the argumentwill not touch them. The second principle is that where there is causality, there must be a law: events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. ( We may term this the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality.) This principle, like the first, will be treated here as an , I shall of 4- assumption though say something by way interpret aHon . The third principle is that there are no strict deterministiclaws on the basisof which mental eventscan be predictedand explained( the Anomalism of the Mental). The I wish to discussarises for someonewho is inclined to accept these three assumptionsor principles, and who thinks they are inconsistentwith one another. The inconsistencyis not, of course, formal unlessmore premisesare added. Nevertheless it is natural to reasonthat the first two principles, that of causalinteraction , and that of the nomological characterof causality, together imply that at least some mental events can be predicted and explained on the basis of laws, while the principle of the anomalismof the mental deniesthis . Many philosophershave accepted, with or without argument, the view that the three principles do lead to a contradiction. It seemsto me, however, that all three principles are true, so that what must be done is to explain away the appearanceof contradiction; essentiallythe Kantian line. The rest of this paper falls into three parts. The first part describesa version of the theory of the mental and the physical that shows how the three principles may be reconciled. The secondpart arguesthat there cannot be strict psychophysicallaws ; this is not quite the principle of the anomalismof the mental, but on reasonableassumptions entails it. The last part tries to show that from the that there can be no strict psychophysicallaws , and our other two principles, we can infer the of a version of the identity theory, that is, a theory that identifies at least some mental events with " ' physical events. It is clear that this proof of the identity theory will be at best conditional, since two of its premisesare unsupported, and the argument for the third may be found less than conclusive. But even someoneunpersuaded of the truth of the premisesmay be interestedto learn how they may be reconciledand that they serve to establisha version of the of the mental. ' identity theory Finally, if the argument is a good one, it should lay to rest the view, common to many friends and some foes of identity theories, that support for such theories can come only from the discovery of psychophysicallaws .

I

The three principleswill be shown consistentwith one another by desaibing a view of the mental and the physical that contains no inner contradiction and that entails the three principles. According to this view, mental events are identical with physical events. Events are taken to be unrepeatable, dated individuals such as the particular eruption of a volcano, the (6rst) birth or death of a , the of the 1968 " playing World Series, or the historic utterance of the words You fire " , may when ready, Gridley. We can easily &ame identity statementsabout individual eventsi examples (true or false) might be: The death of Scott = the death of the author of Waverleyi The assassinationof the Archduke Ferdinand= the that started the First World Wari = The eruption of Vesuviusin AiD. 79 the causeof the destructionof Pompeii. Mental Events 139

The theory under discussionis silent about process es, states, and attributes if these differ Horn individual events. What does it mean to say that an event is mental or physical? One natural answeris that an event is physical if it is describablein a purely physical vocabulary, mental if describablein mental terms. But if this is taken to suggestthat an event is physical, say, if some is true of it, then there is the . Assumethat physical' ' following difficulty the x took at Noosa Heads to the ; then so predicate place' belongs physical' vocabulary also must the x did not take at Noosa Heads to the predicate ' place belong ' physical vocabulary. But the predicate x did or did not take place at Noosa Heads is true of ' every event, whether mental or physical. We might rule out predicatesthat are tauto- true of every event, but this will not sinceevery event is truly describable logically ' ' help' ' either by x took placeat Noosa Heads or by x did not take place at Noosa Heads. A 6 different approachis needed. We may call those verbs mental that expresspropositional attitudes like believing, intending, desiring, hoping, knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so on. Such verbs are characterizedby the fact that they sometimes feature in sentences with subjectsthat refer to , and are completedby embeddedsentences in which the usualrules of substitution appearto break down. This criterion is not precise, sinceI do not want to include these verbs when occur in contexts that are extensional ' they ' fully (' He knows Paris, ' He perceives the moon may be cases), nor exclude them whenever they are not followed by embeddedsentences . An alternative characteriza- tion of the desiredclass of mental verbs might be that they are psychologicalverbs as usedwhen create nonextensionalcontexts . they apparently ' ' Let us call a of the form the event that is M or an sentenceof the ' description open form event x is M' a mental or a mental sentenceif and if the ' ' description open only expressionthat replacesM containsat leastone mental verb essentially. (Essentially, so as to rule out caseswhere the description or open sentenceis logically equivalent to one not containing mental vocabulary.) Now we may say that an event is mental if and only if it has a mental description, or (the description operator not primitive) if there is a mental open sentencetrue of that event alone. Physical events are those picked out by descriptionsor open sentencesthat contain only the physical vocabulary essentially. It is lessimportant to characterizea physical vocabulary becauserelative to the mental it is, so to speak, recessivein determining whether a description is mental or physical. (Therewill be some commentspresently on the nature of a physical vocabulary , but thesecomments will fall far short of providing a criterion.) On the proposed test of the mental, the distinguishing feature of the mental is not that it is private, subjective, or immaterial, but that it exhibits what Brentano called . Thus intentional actions are clearly included in the realm of the mental along with , hopes, and regrets (or the events tied to these). What may seem doubtful is whether the criterion will include events that have often been considered paradigmaticof the mental. Is it obvious, for example, that feeling a or seeingan afterimagewill count as mental? Sentencesthat report suchevents seemhee Horn taint of non extension ality , and the sameshould be true of reports of raw feels, sensedata , and other uninterpretedsensations , if there are any. However, the criterion actually coversnot only the of and , havings pains afterimages' but much more besides. Take someevent one would intuitively acceptas physical, let s say the collision of two starsin distant . There must be a ' ' space purely physical predicate px true of this collision, and of others, but true of only this one at the it occurred. This particulartime , though, may be pinpointed as the sametime that Jonesnotices that a pencil starts to roll acrosshis desk. The distant stellar collision is thus the event x such 140 DonaldDavidson ' that P%' and %' is simultaneouswith Jonesnoticing that a pendl starts to roll acrosshis desk. The collision has now been picked out by a mental description and must be countedas a . This strategy will probably work to show every event to be mental; we have obviously failed to capturethe intuitive conceptof the mental. It would be instructive to try to mend this trouble, but it is not necessaryfor present purposes. We can afford Spinozisticextravagance with the mental sinceacddental inclusionscan only strengthen the hypothesisthat all mental events are identical with physical events. What would matter would be failure to include bona fide mental events, but of this there seems to be no danger. I want to describe, and presently to argue for, a version of the identity theory that denies that there can be strict laws connecting the mental and the physical. The very possibility of such a theory is easily obscuredby the way in which identity theories are commonly defendedand attacked. Charles , for , with " Taylor" example agrees protagonists of identity theories that the sole ground for accepting such theories is the supposition that correlations or laws can be established events described as ' linking mental with events describedas physical. He says, it is easy to see why this is so: unlessa giv' enmental event is invariably accompaniedby a given, say, brain process, " 7 there is no ground for even mooting a general identity between the two. Taylor goes on (correctly, I think) to allow that there may be identity without correlating laws, but my present interest is in the invitation to confusion in the " notidng " just quoted. What can a given mental event mean here? Not a particular, dated, event, for it would not make senseto of an individual event " - " speak being invariably accom panled by another. Taylor is evidently thinking of events of a given kind. But if the only identities are of kinds of events, the identity theory presupposescorrelating laws. One finds the sametendency to build laws into the statementof the identity theory in thesetypical remarks: When I say that a sensationis a brain or that is an electrical ' ' process lightning discharge, I am using is in the senseof strict identity . . . there are not two things: a flash of lightning and an electrical discharge. There is one thing, a flash of lightning, which is describedsdentifica Uy as an electrical dischargeto the earth from a cloud of ionized water molecules.8

The last sentenceof this quotation is perhapsto be understoodas saying that for every lightning flash there exists an electrical dischargeto the earth from a cloud of ionized water moleculeswith which it is identical. Here we have a honest of individual events and can make literal senseof identity. We can also seehow there could be identities without correlating laws. It is possible, however, to have an ontology of events with the conditions of individuation in such a that spedfied way" any identity implies a correlating law. Kim, for example, suggeststhat Faand Gb describeor refer to " = the sameevent if and only if a b and the of being F = the property of 9 being G. The identity of the properties in turn entails that (%') (F%' ++ c.r). No wonder Kim says: If pain is identical with brain state B, there must be a concomitancebetween occurrencesof pain and occurrencesof brain state B. . . . Thus, a necessarycondition of the -brain state B is that the two ' in ' pain ' identity expressions being pain and ' beingin brain state B have the sameextension . . . . There is no conceivable observation that would CO Mnn or refute the identity but not the assodated correlation.lo Mental Events 141

It may make the situation clearer to give a fourfold classificationof theories of the relation between mental and physical events that emphasizesthe independenceof claims about laws and claims of identity. On the one hand there are those who assert, and those who deny, the existenceof psychophysicallaws ; on the other hand there are those who say mental events are identical with physical and those who deny this. Theories are thus divided into four sorts: Nomologicalmonism , which affirms that there are correlating laws and that the events correlated are one (materialistsbelong in this category); nomologicaldualism , which comprises various forms of parallelism, inter~ actionism, and ; anomalousdualism , which combines onto logical dualism with the general failure of laws correlating the mental and the physical (Cartesianism). And finally there is anomalousmonism , which classifiesthe position ll I wish to occupy. \ Anomalous resemblesmaterialism in its claim that all events are physical, but rejects the thesis, usually consideredessential to , that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explanations. shows an on- to logical bias only in that it allows the possibility that not all events are mental, while that all events are . Sucha bland monism, unbuttressed insisting physical " by correlating" laws or economies, does not seemto merit the term reductionism ; in conceptual " any caseit is not to the -but reflex ( the Art of the Fuguewas apt inspire nothing" Conceiving nothing but a complex neural event, and so forth). Although the position I describedenies there are psychophysicallaws , it is consistent with the view that mental characteristicsare in somesense dependent , or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such superveniencemight be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respectsbut differing in some mental respect, or that an cannot alter in some mental respectwithout altering in some physical respect. Dependenceor supervenienc~ of this kind does not entail reducibility through law or : if it did, we could reduce moral properties to descriptive, and this there is good reasonto believecannot be done; and we might be able to reducetruth in a formal systemto syntacticalproperties , and this we knowcannot in generalbe done. This last exampleis in useful analogy with the sort of lawlessmonism under consideration . Think of the physical vocabulary as the entire vocabulary of some languageL with resources to a certain amount of , and its own ' adequate express ' ' " " syntax. L is L With the truth true-in-L, which is mental. In L (and ' augmented predicate hence L) it is possible to pick out, with a or open , each sentencein the extension of the truth , but if L is consistent there exists no " " predicate of (of the ), no matter how , that predicate syntax physical vocabulary " complex " applies to all and the true sentencesof L. There can be no law in the only ' psychophysical' ' ' form of a biconditional, (x) (x is true-inLif and if x is ) where, ; is a " " only ; replacedby physical predicate (a predicate of L). Similarly, we can pick out each mental event using the physical vocabulary alone, but no purely physical predicate, no matter how complex, has, as a matter of law, the sameextension as a mental predicate. It should now be evident how anomalous monism reconciles the three original principles. Causality and identity are between individual events no matter how described. But laws are linguistic; and so events can instantiatelaws , and hencebe explainedor predicted in the light of laws, only as those events are describedin one or another way. The principle of causalinteraction deals with events in extension and is thereforeblind to the mental-physicaldichotomy . The principle of the anornalismof the mental concernsevents describedas mental, for events are mental only as described. The principle of the nomological characterof causality must be read carefully: it says 142 Donald Davidson that when events are related as cause and effect, they have descrip Hons that instan Hate 12 a law . It does not say that every true singular statement of causality instan Hates a law .

II

The analogy just bruited, between the place of the mental amid the physical, and the placeof the semanticalin a world of syntax, should not be strained. T arski proved that a consistent cannot (under somenatural ) contain an sentence ' ' assumptions open P.r true of an and only the true sentencesof that . If our were , language analogy ' ' pressed then we would expect a proof that there canbe no physical open sentenceP .r true of all and only the events having some mental property. In fact, however, nothing I can say about the irreducibility of the mental deservesto be called a proof; and the kind of irreducibility is different. For if anomalousmonism is correct, not only can every mental event be uniquely singled out using only physical , but since the number of events that falls under eachmental predicatemay , for all we know, beAnite, there may well exist a physical open sentenceco extensive with eachmental predicate, though to it might involve the tedium of a lengthy and uninstructive alternation. Indeed , even if Anitude is not assumed, there seemsno compelling reason to deny that there could be co extensive predicates, one mental and one physical. The thesis is rather that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true generalstatements relating the mental and the physical, statementsthat have the logical fonD of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chancewe were to stumble on a nonstochastictrue psychophysical generalization, we would have no reasonto believe it more than roughly true. Do we, by declaring that there are no (strict) psychophysicallaws , poach on the - empirical preservesof science a fonD of hubrisagainst which philosophersare often warned? Of course, to judge a statement lawlike or illegal is not to decide its truth outright; relative to the acceptanceof a general statement on the basis of instances, ruling it lawlike must be a priori. But such relative apriorism does not in itself justify philosophy, for in general the grounds for deciding to trust a statementon the basis of its instanceswill in turn be governed by theoreticaland empirical concernsnot to be distinguishedfrom those of science. If the caseof supposedlaws linking the mental and the physical is different, it can only be becauseto allow the possibility of such laws would amount to changing the . By changing the subject I mean here: deciding not to acceptthe criterion of the mental in terms of the vocabulary of the propositional attitudes. This short answercannot prevent further ramificationsof the problem, however , for there is no clear line between changing the subject and changing what one sayson an old subject, which is to admit, in the presentcontext at least, that there is no clear line between philosophy and science. Where there are no fixed boundariesonly the timid never risk trespass. It will sharpen our appreciation of the anomological characterof mental-physical generalizationsto considera relatedmatter , the failure of de Anitional . Why are we willing (as I assumewe are) to abandonthe attempt to give explicit de Anitions of mental conceptsin terms of behavioralones ? Not, surely, just becauseall actual tries are conspicuouslyinadequate . Ratherit is becausewe are persuaded, aswe are in the caseof so many other fonD Sof definitional reductionism( naturalismin , instrumentalism and operationalismin the sciences, the causaltheory of , , and - ' so on the catalogue of philosophy s defeats), that there is system in the failures. Supposewe try to say, not using any mental concepts, what it is for a man to believe there is life on Mars. One line we could take is this: when a certain sound is producedin Mental Events 143

' ' ' " " the man s presence ( is there life on Mars T ) he produces another ( Yes ). But of course this shows he believes there is life on Mars only if he understands English, his production of the sound was intentional , and was a response to the sounds as meaning something in English; and so on. For each discovered deficiency , we add a new proviso . Yet no matter how we patch and fit the nonmental conditions , we always find the need for an additional condition (provided he notices, understands, etc.) that is mental in character .13 A striking feature of attempts at definitional reduction is how little seems to hinge on the question of synonymy between definiens and definiendum . Of course, by imagining counterexamples we do discredit claims of synonymy . But the of failure - prompts a stronger conclusion : if we were to find an open sentence couched inbehav - Loral terms and exactly co extensive with some mental predicate, nothing could reason ably persuade us that we had found it . We know too much about thought and behavior to trust exact and statements linking them. Beliefs and desires issue in behavior only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings , without limit . Oearly this holism of the mental realm is a clue both to the autonomy and to the anomalous character of the mental . These remarks apropos definitional behaviorism provide at best hints of why we should not expect nomological connections between the mental and the physical . The central case invites further consideration . Lawlike statements are general statements that support counterfactual and subjunctive - claims, and are supported by their instances. There is (in my view ) no nonquestion begging criterion of the lawlike , which is not to say there are no reasons in particular cases for a judgment . Lawlikeness is a matter of degree, which is not tc? deny that there may be casesbeyond debate. And within limits by the conditions of communication , there is room for much variation between individuals in the pattern of statements to - which various degrees of nomologicality are assigned. In all these respects, nomolog icality is much like analyticity , as one might expect since both are linked to meaning . ' ' ' All emeralds are green is lawlike in that its instances confirm it, but all emeralds are ' ' ' ' ' grue is not , for grue means observed before time t and green, otherwise blue, and if our observations were all made before t and uniformly revealed green emeralds, this would not be a reason to other emeralds to be blue. has expect ' ' suggested that this shows that some predicates, grue for example, are unsuited to laws (and thus a criterion of suitable could lead to a criterion of the lawlike ). But it predicates ' ' seems to me the anomalous character of All emeralds are grue shows only that the ' ' ' ' predicates is an emerald and is grue are not suited to one another : grueness is not an inductive property of emeralds. Grueness is however an inductive property of entities of other sorts, for instance of emerires. ( is an emerire if it is examined before Something ' ' t and is an emerald, and otherwise is a .) Not only is All emerires are grue sapphire ' ' ' entailed by the conjunction of the lawlike statements All emeralds are green and All ' sapphires are blue, but there is no reason, as far as I can see, to reject the deliverance 14 of , that it is itself lawlike . Nomological statements bring together predicates that we know a are made for each other - know , that is, of priori independently' ' ' knowing whether the evidence supports a connection between them . ' Blue, red, and ' ' ' ' ' ' ' green are made for emeralds, sapphires, and roses; grue, ' bieen, and gred are made for sapphalds, emerires, and emeroses. The direction in which the discussion seems headed is this: mental and physical are not made for one another . In point of lawlikeness, psychophysical statements predicates ' ' ' ' are more like All emeralds are grue than like All emeralds are green. 144 Donald Davidson

Before this claim is plausible, it must be seriously modified. The fact that emeralds examinedbefore t are groe not only is no reasonto believe all emeraldsare groe; it is not even a reason (if we know the time) to believe any unobserved emeralds are groe. But if an event of a certain mental sort hasusually been accompaniedby an event of a certain physical sort, this often is a good reasonto expect other casesto follow suit roughly in proportion. The generalizationsthat embody such practical wisdom are assumedto be only roughly true, or they are explicitly stated in probabilistic terms, or they are insulatedfrom counterexampleby generousescape clauses . Their importance lies mainly in the support they lend singular causalclaims and related explanationsof particularevents . The support derivesfrom the fact that sucha generalization, however aude and vague, may provide good reason to believe that underlying the .particular casethere is a regularity that could be formulated sharply and without caveat. In our daily traffic with events and actions that must be foreseenor understood, we perforce make use of the sketchy summarygeneralization , for we do not know a more accuratelaw , or if we do, we lack a description of the particular events in which we are interestedthat would show the relevanceof the law. But there is an important distinction to be made within the category of the rude rule of thumb. On the one hand, there are generalizationswhose positive instancesgive us reason to believe the generaliza- tion itself could be improved by adding further provisos and conditions stated in the samegeneral vocabulary as the original generalization. Sucha generalizationpoints to the form and vocabulary of the finished law: we may say that it is a homonomicgeneral - ization. On the other hand there are which . generalizations when instantiatedmay give us reasonto believe there is a preciselaw at work, but one that can be stated only by shifting to a different vocabulary. We may call suchgeneralizations heteronomic . I supposemost of our practical lore (and science) is heteronomic. This is becausea law can hope to be precise, explicit, and as exceptionlessas possibleonly if it draws its conceptsfrom a comprehensiveclosed theory. This ideal theory mayor may not be detenninistic, but it is if any true theory is. Within the physical scienceswe do find homonomic generalizations, generalizationssuch that if the evidence supports them, we then have reasonto believe they may be sharpenedindefinitely by drawing upon further physical concepts: there is a theoretical asymptote of perfect coherencewith all the evidence, perfect predictability (under the terms of the system), total explanation (again under the terms of the system). Or perhapsthe ultimate theory is probabilistic, and the asymptote is less than perfection; but in that casethere will be no better to be had. Con Adencethat a statement is homonomic, correctible within its own conceptual domain, demands that it draw its concepts from a theory with strong constitutive elements. Here is the simplest possibleillustration ; if the lessoncarries , it will be obvious that the simplification could be mended. The measurementof length, weight, temperature, or time depends (among many other things, of course) on the existencein each caseof a two-place relation that is transitive and asymmetric: warmer than, later than, heavier than, and so forth. Let us take the relation longerthan as our example. The law or postulate of transitivity is this:

(L) L(X, y) and L(y, z) -+ L(X, z) Unless this law (or some sophisticatedvariant ) holds, we cannot easily make senseof the of length. There will be no way of assigningnumbers to register even so much as ranking in length, let alone the more powerful demandsof measurementon a ratio scale. And this remark goes not only for any three items directly involved in an Mental Events 145 intransitivity : it is easy to show (given a few more assumptionsessential to measurement of length) that there is no consistentassignment of a ranking to any item unless (L) holds in full . generality ' (L) alone cannot exhaustthe of than- otherwise it would not Clearly ' ' import' longer differ from warmer than or later than. We must suppose there is some empirical content, however difficult to formulate in the available , that es ' vocabulary distinguish longer than from the other two-placetransitive predicatesof measurementand on the basis of which we may assert that one is than another. this thing longer' ' Imagine" content to be the 0 (x, ) . So we have this empirical" partly given by predicate V meaning postulate : (M) o (x, y) -+ o (x, y) that partly interprets (L). But now (L) and (M) together yield an empirical theory of great , for entail that there do not exist three objects a, b, and c strength together they ' suchthat o (a, b), o (b, c), and o(c, a). Yet what is to prevent this happeningif o (x, y) is a predicatewe can ever, with con Adence, apply? Supposewe think we observean intransitive triad; what do we say? We could count (L) false, but then we would have no application for the concept of length. We could say (M) gives a wrong test for length; but then it is unclear what we thought was the contentof the idea of one thing being longer than another. Or we could say that the objects under observationare not, as the theory requires, rigid objects. It is a mistaketo think we are forced to acceptsome one of theseanswers . Conceptssuch as that of length are sustainedin equilibrium by a number of conceptualpressures , and theories of fundamentalmeasurement are distorted if we force the decision, among suchprinciples as (L) and (M): analytic or synthetic. It is better to say the whole set of axioms, laws, or postulatesfor the measurementof length is partly constitutive of the idea of a system of macroscopic, rigid, physical objects. I suggest that the existenceof lawlike statementsin physical sciencedepends upon the existenceof constitutive (or synthetic a priori) laws like those of the measurementof length within the sameconceptual domain . Just as we cannot intelligibly assigna length to any object unlessa comprehensive theory holds of objects of that sort, we cannot intelligibly attribute any to an agent except within the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires, , and decisions. There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis of his verbal behavior, his , or other local signsno matter how plain and evident, for we make senseof particular beliefs only as they cohere with other beliefs, with preferences, with intentions, hopes, fears, expectations, and the rest. It is not merely, as with the measurementof length, that eachcase tests a theory and dependsupon it, but that the content of a propositional attitude derivesfrom its placein the pattern. Crediting people with a large degreeof consistencycannot be counted mere charity: it is unavoidableif we are to be in a position to accusethem meaningfully of error and some degree of irrationality. Global confusion, like universal mistake, is unthinkable, not becauseimagination boggles, but becausetoo much confusion leavesnothing to be confusedabout and massiveerror erodes the background of true belief against which alone failure can be construed. To appreciate the limits to the ~ d and amount of blunder and bad thinking we can intelligibly pin on others is to see once more the inseparabilityof the questionwhat conceptsa personcommands and the questionwhat he does with those conceptsin the way of belief, desire, and . To the extent that we fail to discover a coherent and plausiblepattern in the attitudes and actions of others we simply forego the chanceof treating them as persons. 146 Donald Davidson

The is not but center to problem bypassed given 'stage by appeal explicit speech behavior. For we could not begin to decodea mans sayings if we could not make out his attitudes towards his sentences, such as holding, wishing, or wanting them to be true. Beginningfrom theseattitudes , we must work out a theory of what he means, thus simultaneouslygiving content to his attitudes and to his words. In our need to make him make sense, we will try for a theory that finds him consistent, a believer of , and a lover of the good (all by our own lights, it goes without saying). Life being what it is, there will be no simple theory that fully meetsthese demands . Many theorieswill effect a more or lessacceptable compromise , and between thesetheories there may be no objective grounds for . The heteronomiccharacter of generalstatements linking the mental and the physical traces back to this central role of translation in the description of all propositional ls attitudes, and to the indetenninacy of translation. There are no strict psychophysical laws becauseof the disparatecommitments of the mental and physical schemes. It is a featureof physical that physical changecan be explainedby laws that connectit with other changesand conditions physically described. It is a featureof the mental that the attribution of mental phenomenamust be responsibleto the backgroundof reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the individual. There cannot be tight connectionsbetween the realmsif eachis to retain allegianceto its proper sourceof evidence. The nomological irreducibility of the mental does not derive merely from the seamlessnature of the world of thought, preferenceand intention, for such interdependenceis common to physical theory, and is compatiblewith there being a single right way of interpreting a mansattitudes without relativization to a schemeof translation. Nor is the irreducibility due simply to the possibility of many equally eligible schemes, for this is compatible with an arbitrary choice of one schemerelative to which assignmentsof mental traits are made. The point is rather that when we use the conceptsof belief, desire and the rest, we must stand prepared, as the evidenceaccumulates , to adjust our theory in the light of considerationsof overall cogency: the constitutive ideal of rationality partly controls eachphase in the evolution of what must be an evolving theory. An arbitrary choice of translation schemewould preclude such opportunistic tempering of theory; put differently, a right arbitrary choice of a translation manual would be of a manual acceptablein the light of all possibleevidence , and this is a choicewe cannot make. We must conclude, I think, that nomological slack between the mental and the physical is essentialas long as we conceiveof man as a rational animal. ill

The gist of the foregoing discussion, as well as its conclusion, will be familiar. That there is a categorialdifference between the mental and the physical is a commonplace. It may seemodd that I say nothing of the supposedprivacy of the mental, or the special authority an agent has with respectto his own propositional attitudes, but this appearance of novelty would fade if we were to investigate in more detail the grounds for acceptinga schemeof translation. The step from the categorialdifference between the mental and the physical to the impossibility of strict laws relating them is lesscommon , but certainly not new. If there is a surprise, then, it will be to find the lawlessnessof the mental serving to help establishthe identity of the mental with that of the lawlike, the physical. The reasoningis this. Weare assuming, under the Principle of the CausalDependence of the Mental, that some mental events at least are causesor effects of physical events; the argument applies only to these. A second Principle (of the Nomological Mental Events 147

Characterof Causality) saysthat eachtrue singularcausal statement is backedby a strict law connecting events of kinds to which the events men Honed as causeand effect belong. Where there are rough, but homonomic, laws, there are laws drawing on conceptsfrom the sameconceptual domain and upon which there is no improving in point of precision and comprehensiveness. We urged in the last sec Hon that such laws occur in the physical sciences. Physical theory promises to provide a comprehensive closedsystem guaranteedto yield a standardized, unique descrip Hon of every physical event couchedin a vocabulary amenableto law. It is not plausible that mental conceptsalone can provide such a framework, simply becausethe mental does not, by our first principle, constitute a closed system. Too much happensto affect the mental that is not itself a system aHc part of the mental. But if we combine this observa Hon with the conclusion that no psychophysicalstatement is, or can be built into, a strict law, we have the Principle of the Anornalism of the Mental: there are no strict laws at all on the basisof which we can predict and explain mental phenomena. The demonstra Hon of iden Hty follows easily. Supposem , a mental event, causedp , a physical event; then under some descrip Hon m and p instan Hate a strict law. This law can only be physical, according to the previous paragraph. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a physical descrip Hon; which is to say it is a physical event. An analogous argument works when a physical event causesa mental event. So every mental event that is causallyrelated to a physical event is a physical event. In order to establishanomalous monism in full generality it would be sufficient to show that every mental event is causeor effect of somephysical event; I shall not attempt this. If one event causesanother , there is a strict law which those events instan Hatewhen properly described. But it is possible( and typical) to know of the singularcausal rela Hon without knowing the law or the relevant descrip Hons. Knowledge requires reasons, but these are available in the form of rough heteronomic generaliza Hons, which are lawlike in that instancesmake it reasonableto expect other instancesto follow suit without being lawlike in the senseof being indefinitely refinable. Applying these to knowledge of iden HHes , we see that it is possible to know that a mental event is identical with some physical event without knowing which one (in the senseof being able to give it a unique physical descrip Hon that brings it under a relevant law). Even if someoneknew the en Hre physical history of the world, and every mental event were identical with a physical, it would not follow that he could predict or explain a single mental event (so described, of course). Two featuresof mental events in their rela Hon to the physical- causaldependence and nomological independence- combine, then, to dissolve what has often seemeda paradox, the efficacy of thought and purpose in the material world, and their freedom from law. When we portray events as perceivings, rememberings, decisionsand actions , we necessarilylocate them amid physicalhappenings through the rela Hon of cause and effect; but that samemode of portrayal insulatesmental events, as long as we do not changethe idiom, from the strict laws that can in principle be calledupon to explain and predict physicalphenomena . Mental events as a classcannot be explained by physical science; particular mental events can when we know particular iden HHes . But the explana Honsof mental events in which we are interested relate them to other mental events and condi Hons. typically' We explain a mans free acHons, for example, by appeal to his desires, habits, knowledge and percep Hons. Such accountsof intentional behavior operate in a removed from the direct reachof physical law by describingboth causeand effect, reasonand acHon, as aspectsof a portrait of a human agent. The anomalismof 148 Donald Davidson the mental is thus a necessarycondition for viewing action as autonomous, I conclude with a secondpassage & om Kant: It is an indispensableproblem of speculativephilosophy to show that its illusion respectingthe contradiction restson this, that we think of man in a different sense and relation when we call him &ee, and when we regard him as subject to the laws of nature, , " It must therefore show that not only can both of these very well co-exist, but that both must be thought as necessarilyunited in the same ' 16 sub Ject " " Mental Events 149

" " statementslike AU emeriresare . I canoot see, 00wev8' , that he meetsthe of " " gnae point my Emeroses OtherN8mes , 1111oumal PI Ii , LXID(1966 ), . 778- 780. by ' ] of ~ ~ pp The in Suenceof w . V. QWnes doctrineof the irdetenninacyof tr8ns1atioo, .. in dIap. 1. of Word. - ( MITPress : , ., 1960), is, I , obvious. In 45 QWne theconnedim Objld Calnblidge hope " develops' betwe8\ tr8ns1ationand the attitudes, n remarb that Brentanol thesisof the propositional " irreducibilityof intentionalidicxns is of a piecewith the thesisof i - *tenninacy of tnn Alati Olt (p.1.1.1). 16. Op. at., p. 76.