The US Intelligence Community After September 11 Final

Masaryk University Faculty of Social Studies Department of International Relations and European Studies

The U.S. intelligence community after September 11

Bachelor thesis Juraj Nosál

Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D. UČO: 359910 Field of study: International Relations – Security and Strategic Studies Matriculation year: 2009 Brno, 2012

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own independent scholarly work. All references contained within it have been correctly cited and the original authors acknowledged. No material other than that listed has been used.

Brno, December 2nd 2012 Juraj Nosál

……………………………

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank PhDr. Petr Suchý Ph.D., the head of Department of International Relations and European Studies, for his assistance, guidance, and valuable comments throughout work on this text. I am also very grateful to my family and friends for their support and assistance during my studies.

Content

Introduction ...... 4 1. Theoretical background ...... 7 2. The intelligence community prior to September 11 ...... 10 3. Criticism after September 11 ...... 13 4. The intelligence community reform...... 16 4.1 Legislative background ...... 16 4.2 Management of the intelligence community ...... 17 4.3 Joint intelligence ...... 23 4.4 Information sharing ...... 26 4.5 Intelligence community oversight ...... 28 4.6 Intelligence community members ...... 28 5. The limits of intelligence reform ...... 31 Conclusion ...... 37 List of abbreviations and acronyms ...... 40 References ...... 41 Primary sources ...... 41 Secondary sources ...... 43

Introduction The tragic events of September 11 have become a symbolic milestone in the development of the post-Cold War security environment. Although they were a surprise to many people, security experts as well as the United States' intelligence agencies had been warning about possible threats posed by terrorism since the late 90s (see e.g. Todd and Bloch 2003: 90-91; Lowenthal 2008: 227; Zegart 2005: 82-83). Yet the U.S. intelligence community (IC), the most robust, the most influential and world's premier intelligence establishment, was not capable of stopping it.

A result was the greatest strategic surprise on American soil since the attacks on Pearl Harbor. The September 11 terrorist attacks were quickly labeled an intelligence failure 1. Some suggested that the IC was still operating on a Cold War mindset with too much attention and resources focused on threats from nation states. Others argued that intelligence agencies were resistant to change and unwilling to work together (Clapper 2011). In fact, many experts as well as people within the intelligence establishment had been emphasizing a need to reform the IC to face new post-Cold War security threats long before hijacked airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon 2. There were even two unsuccessful attempts by Congress to pass major reforms of the IC (see Best 2004: 29-34). But the progress was too slow or almost non-existent. The IC was functioning basically in the same manner as it had been since its creation a half century ago.

After September 11 it was clear, however, that this time a reform will be inevitable. As the strategic surprise of Pearl Harbor led to the creation of the IC after World War II (Lowenthal 2008: 226), the strategic surprise of September 11 provided the major impetus for its reform 3. In 2004, intelligence issues were even put in a very unusual position – at the center of closely contested presidential debate. As one of the experts on intelligence, R. K. Betts, pointed out, this created both an opportunity and a danger. The opportunity stemmed from the consensus that a major reform is necessary, the danger from the gap between the

1 However, some senior intelligence officials resist the accusations that September 11 represents an intelligence failure (Zegart 2005: 81; comp. Pillar 2012). 2 See e.g. Treverton 2001: 1-19; Hedley 1996; Council on Foreign Relations 1996; Zegart 2005: 85-87. 3 The need for reform was also further strengthened by the IC failure in regard to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction prior to U.S.-led invasion in 2003 (Sarkesian, Williams, Cimbala 2008: 145; Lowenthal 2009: 27). It should be mentioned that the following investigation by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction also led to the implementation of some new improvements in the intelligence work. But these improvements focused on intelligence analysis, not on the IC as a whole. Therefore they will be not mentioned in this text.

4 urge to do something and the uncertainty about what that something should be (Betts 2004: 2).

Nevertheless, initial changes were only partial and did not bring any significant shift in terms of organizational structure or functioning. The breakthrough came not before the end of 2004 (i.e. more than three years later) with the publication of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (commonly known as 09/11 Commission) final report. The legislative response in a form of the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004” (IRTPA) has brought the biggest changes in the IC since its inception. At least it seems so at first glance. However, concerning a previous inability of this community to reform (see Zegart 2006), tortuous negotiations around the passage of this bill (see Fessenden 2005: 108-112) as well as entrenched institutional interests that usually block any radical change, it is questionable whether this process has brought a real transformation as it is often presented by some governmental officials (see e.g. Clapper 2011) or is just another unsuccessful attempt as many before.

The purpose of this thesis is therefore to examine the IC reform after September 11. Our analysis will attempt to answer several following questions. First, what shortcomings and problems were identified in the IC after the terrorist attacks? Here the emphasis will be put on findings of the 09/11 Commission as it offered independent and comprehensive review of circumstances surrounding these events. Second, what changes and innovations were brought by the following intelligence reform? The text will analyze mainly legislation that was adopted as a response to the criticism of the IC after the attacks but also other initiatives aimed at improving intelligence work. Third, to what extent do these changes and innovations address the shortcomings of the IC that were criticized? Here the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission will be compared with the actual legislative changes. And finally, were the shortcomings identified in the IC solved by the reform or do they persist? The implications of the reform for the IC structure and functioning will be discussed.

The text is divided into five chapters. The first offers a short theoretical insight into the concept of intelligence as it may have different meanings in various contexts. Its clarification is thus necessary for understanding the issues discussed here. The second chapter describes the IC structure prior to September 11 and its main characteristics. In the next part, the criticism of the IC after the September 11 terrorist attacks is presented. The fourth and

5 largest part focuses on the main subject of this thesis, the intelligence reform itself. The crucial issues of the reform are identified and legislative changes in respective areas are compared with original recommendations and proposals of the 9/11 Commission. Finally, the last chapter discusses the implications of these legislative changes for the shortcomings identified in the IC after September 11 as well as the reform's possible limits and weaknesses in a broader context.

Regarding the focus of this work, the text is designed as a single case study. It is based on empirical and analytical approach. Its goal is to explore objectively the process of intelligence reform after September 11 and offer an in-depth look at this important issue which is discussed only at superficial level in many texts. Because of limited space and availability of relevant sources the main variable in this work is the IC as a whole rather than its particular agencies. The text is working with both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are mainly represented by intelligence legislation as well as relevant governmental documents and reports. Secondary sources are monographs and scholar articles focusing on this topic.

1. Theoretical background Before we start to examine the main issues of this thesis, it is necessary to introduce the concept of intelligence as it may have different meanings in various contexts. Regarding the focus of this work 4 most scholars agree on three different categories which intelligence can refer to. These include certain kinds of information, activities and organizations 5 (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002: 1; Lowenthal 2009: 8). This three-dimensional meaning is apparent also from the official Department of Defense's definition for instance 6.

Intelligence as an information is different from everyday information. Generally speaking, all intelligence is information but not all information is intelligence. The difference lies in its nature (character) in relation to the policy and decision-making. Intelligence refers to such information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs 7 (Lowenthal 2009: 1). In other words, it must be relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its interests and to deal with threats. But intelligence information typically includes not only the “raw data” collected by means of espionage or otherwise but also analyses and assessments based on it (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002: 2). Regarding the focus or origin of the intelligence information we may then distinguish various categories such as scientific and technical intelligence, military intelligence, political intelligence or economic and social intelligence (Ibid: 53-57).

As an activity, intelligence involves four different parts often referred to as “the elements of intelligence”: collection, analysis, covert action and counterintelligence (Ibid: 9).

Collection refers to the gathering of raw data through different means. The various collection methods can be broadly characterized as (1) collection from human sources (usually called also “espionage” or “human intelligence collection” – HUMINT), (2)

4 In English, intelligence has also the second meaning that refers to the mental ability to learn, understand and make judgments or have opinions that are based on reason (Cambridge Dictionary 2008). 5 But various authors sometimes use slightly different terms for describing the same thing. For instance Lowenthal (2009: 8) prefers process instead of activity and product instead of information. Another theorist, Johnson (2009: 3-4), talks about four perspectives of intelligence, when he distinguishes two categories: process (i.e. intelligence cycle) and missions, instead of one (activity). 6 The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2010: 156). 7 One of the earliest theorists in the field, Sherman Kent, uses in this sense the term “knowledge” instead of information (Warner 2002).

7 collection by technical means (technical intelligence – TECHINT) and (3) noncovert collection via diplomatic contacts or generally available sources such as newspapers, Websites and other Internet-based resources, and radio and television broadcasting, i.e. open- source intelligence – OSINT (Ibid: 11). In the case of TECHINT we can differentiate other categories according to the kind of technology that is used for the collection. These include photographic or imagery intelligence – PHOTINT/IMINT 8, signals intelligence – SIGINT, communications intelligence – COMINT, telemetry intelligence – TELINT, electronics intelligence – ELINT, and measurements and signatures intelligence – MASINT (Richelson 2009: 105-114; Shulsky and Schmitt 2002: 22-33).

No matter how good the collected information is, however, it almost always requires some analysis if it is to be useful. In the vast majority of cases, the collected information is fragmentary, ambiguous, and susceptible to widely divergent interpretations. Analysis is the process of transforming these bits and pieces of information into something that is usable by policy makers or military commanders. Methods used in analysis include different techniques and there are no standard categories. The result, “intelligence product”, can take many different forms as well such as memorandums, reports, briefings, etc. (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002: 41).

The third element of intelligence activities, covert action, refers to the attempt by one government to pursue its foreign policy objectives by conducting some clandestine activity to influence the behavior of a foreign entity or political, military, economic, or societal events and circumstances in a foreign country (Ibid: 75). In the current U.S. law, covert action is defined as “an activity or activities of the U.S. Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” (Best 2011a: 1). These actions cover a wide spectrum of activities running from propaganda (e.g. influencing public opinion through media) to political action (e.g. financial support of certain political forces), or paramilitary (e.g. training of insurgents) and information warfare operations (e.g. destroying hardware or software by virus) 9 (Daugherty 2009: 281-283; comp. Lowenthal 2009: 169-172).

8 However, some authors already prefer a new term for this category, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), instead of IMINT (e.g. Lowenthal 2009: 82). 9 There is no standard typology of covert actions recognized by scholars or intelligence organizations. Nevertheless, in many books we can find attempts to develop such categorization.

The last element, counterintelligence, is probably the hardest to define. In the most general terms it could be defined as the process of countering the hostile intelligence activities of other states or foreign entities (Taylor 2009: 237). In a narrower sense, however, as Shulsky and Schmitt (2002: 99) stress, counterintelligence often refers specifically to preventing an adversary from gaining knowledge that would give him an advantage. This is done through different measures such as classification of information, programs of security, counterespionage or deception operations. While Shulsky and Schmitt (2002: 99) distinguish active and passive measures, Lowenthal (2009: 151) differentiates directly three types of counterintelligence: (1) collection – gaining information about an opponent's intelligence collection capabilities that may be aimed at one's own country, (2) defensive – thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate one's service, and (3) offensive – having identified an opponent's efforts against one's own system, trying to manipulate these attacks either by turning the opponent's agents into double agents or by feeding them false information.

Finally, the term intelligence can also refer to an organization that carries out these activities. Probably the most notable characteristic of such organizations is the secrecy with which their activities must be conducted. Many of their methods, such as strict rules concerning access to information or using undercover agents, derive from this requirement (Shulsky, Schmitt 2002: 2).

2. The intelligence community prior to September 11 The IC was born in the National Security Act of 1947. However, for the first time it was publicly specified in President Ford's Executive Order (EO) on Intelligence 11905 from February 1976 (Federation of American Scientists [FAS] 1996a). This community was developing gradually with the biggest boom in the first decades of the Cold War during 1950s and 1960s. As Lowenthal (2009: 11) points out, the IC grew out of a set of evolving demands and without a master plan. It is highly functional and yet sometimes dysfunctional.

The duties of the IC were specified for the first time in Ronald Reagan's EO 12333. It charged the IC with six primary objectives: (1) collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other executive branch officials; (2) production and dissemination of intelligence; (3) collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against intelligence activities directed against the U.S., international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents; (4) special activities; (5) administrative and support activities within the U.S. and abroad necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and (6) such other intelligence activities as the President may direct from time to time.

Prior to September 11, the IC consisted of 14 agencies and services 10 :

1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – independent executive body responsible for producing all-source national intelligence; primary collector of HUMINT but engages also in the TECHINT. The CIA is the only agency with authority to carry out covert actions 11 .

2) The Department of Defense agencies:

• The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) – producer of all-source military intelligence; • The National Security Agency (NSA) – cryptologic organization with responsibility for protecting U.S. national security information systems and collecting and disseminating foreign SIGINT; • The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) – with mission to develop, to acquire, and to launch space systems for intelligence collection;

10 The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the structure of the IC more generally, not to provide detailed description of particular agencies. Therefore the roles of concrete agencies are discussed only briefly. 11 However, it is important to point out that covert actions are not routine mission of the CIA. Rather it is very much an element of American presidential statecraft (Daugherty 2009: 279).

• The National Imagery and Mapping Agency 12 (NIMA) – providing IMINT collection and analysis; • Intelligence organizations of military services (Office of Naval Intelligence; Army Intelligence and Security Command; Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency; Marine Corp Intelligence Activity; Coast Guard Intelligence) – responsible for collecting information and providing analysis regarding the weapons systems, tactics, and capabilities of foreign counterpart forces;

3) The Department of Justice – The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with jurisdiction to investigate all federal crimes 13 and threats to national security, government's primary counterintelligence organization;

4) The Department of State – The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) responsible for providing the Secretary of State and senior policymakers with expert intelligence analysis, for developing intelligence policy for Department of State and harmonizing all agencies' intelligence activities abroad with U.S. policy;

5) The Department of Treasury – The Office of Intelligence Support – provider of specialized analyses to the Secretary and his/her staff on international economic, financial and security affairs, and participant in national estimates on these topics;

6) The Department of Energy – The Office of Intelligence - collector of information and producer of classified and unclassified analyses on foreign energy and technology developments, particularly those concerning nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. (FAS 1996b; Carlisle 2005a, b)

Generally speaking, the IC before September 11 could be understood as being divided along two axes. The first axis was the CIA/Department of Defense divide. The CIA – doing HUMINT and all-source analysis – was an independent entity, while agencies performing SIGINT were located within the Department of Defense. The second axis was the foreign/domestic divide. The National Security Act of 1947 forbade the CIA from performing internal security functions. At the same time, the FBI protected its role as the premier domestic intelligence and law enforcement agency (Lederman 2005: 70).

12 Originally Central Imagery Office, in 1996 renamed to NIMA and since 2003 National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). 13 Not exclusively assigned to another federal agency.

The head of the IC was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Under the National Security Act, the DCI served three principal functions: the principal intelligence adviser to the President, the head of the IC and the head of the CIA. Although the DCI was charged with directing and coordinating the national foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, he exercised direct line authority only over the CIA and the staff organizations which supported him in his non-CIA functions. Those were the National Intelligence Council that prepared National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)14 ; and the Community Management Staff, that assisted the DCI in his Community functions such as a preparation of the annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program, evaluation of the Community's performance, development of long-term plans, and coordination of Community-wide programs. In addition, the DCI chaired two advisory boards, composed of representatives of IC agencies: the National Foreign Intelligence Board 15 and the IC Executive Committee 16 . (FAS 1996b)

14 NIE is the IC's most authoritative written judgments on national security issues. It usually provides information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for the U.S. policymakers (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009: 36; comp. Joint Chiefs of Staff 2010: 216). 15 The board was responsible for approving all NIEs, coordinating interagency intelligence exchanges and bilateral relationships with foreign nations, and developing policy for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. 16 It served as the DCI's principal senior advisory group.

3. Criticism after September 11 Efforts to reform the IC had been present in U.S. politics long before the tragic events of September 11. Perceived shortcomings in the IC's structure, management, role and mission have been examined by numerous independent commissions, individual experts and legislative initiatives since 1948 (see e.g. Best 2004; Warner and McDonald 2005).

For instance, in the post-Cold War period between 1992 and 1996, Congress twice attempted, but ultimately failed, to pass major reform of the IC. During the same period, twelve public reports issued by blue-ribbon commissions, governmental reviews, and think tank task forces discussed shortcomings in the IC and U.S. counterterrorism efforts more broadly. Although the reports covered a variety of issues, they all identified four major problems within the IC. First was its lack of coherence or “corporateness” resulting from the fact that it consisted of fourteen major agencies and no one in charge of them all. Technically, the DCI was supposed to play this role but in reality the DCI lacked sufficiently strong institutional authority to do so as will be discussed below. Second, intelligence officials and policymakers did not devote enough attention to setting intelligence priorities as a robust mechanism for establishing and updating such priorities had never developed during the Cold War. A third finding was the need to revitalize HUMINT capabilities. And finally, the IC suffered from personnel issues such as lack of employees with requisite skills and institutional bridges (Zegart 2005: 100-103).

For the purpose of this text however, inquiries after the September 11 attacks are crucial as they established basics for the following reform. Two such inquiries offered comprehensive reviews of the IC's performance and received widespread attention.

The first one was Congress' “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” that published its final report in December 2002. It presented a series of findings and conclusions that were divided into three categories: factual findings (i.e. those related to the chronology of events leading to attacks), systematic findings (i.e. the systematic points of failure) and other findings (a variety of relevant but indirectly related facts). Although the commission identified the gaps and shortcomings in the IC, it did not offer any comprehensive series of recommendations.

Therefore the second “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States” (commonly known as 09/11 Commission) is more important for the purpose of this

13 text. The 09/11 Commission was created as an independent, bipartisan commission on November 27 2002 in order to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding September 11 terrorist attacks as well as to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. It is important to note that the 09/11 Commissioners and staff built upon the findings of an earlier congressional investigation (Warner and McDonald 2005: 37). The final report was released on July 22 2004 and offers truly comprehensive insight into the topic from the detailed description of the preparation and execution of these attacks to the broader discussion about reasons behind the U.S. security apparatus' failure.

Regarding the structure and organization of the IC, the Commission identified six problems. The first one was the existence of structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work . As the report notes, the national intelligence was still organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. Integration was needed and as an example the commission used the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 that reorganized the Department of Defense and created, among others, joint commands for operations. Second, lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide were identified. Another weakness was divided management of national intelligence capabilities . The CIA and the DCI particularly, had been less able to influence the use of the nation's imagery and signals intelligence capabilities in three national agencies housed within the Department of Defense after the Cold War. This was an unintended consequence of military transformation which resulted in far greater demand made by Defense on technical systems leaving the DCI less able to influence how these resources are allocated and used. The fourth problem was weak capacity to set priorities and move resources . The agencies were mainly organized around what they collected or the way they collected it, but the priorities for collection were national. The DCI however lacked the power to reach across agencies and reallocate effort. The commission also concluded that there were too many jobs for the DCI and no recent DCI had been able to do all three effectively. Finally, the report notes that the agencies and the rules surrounding the IC had accumulated over decades to a depth that practically defies public comprehension and became too complex and secret (The 09/11 Commission 2004: 408-410).

The report further focused on the weak institutional authority of the DCI to manage the IC. As it stated, the DCI lacked the three authorities critical for any agency head or chief executive officer. First of all, the DCI lacked the control over purse strings. The only budget power of the DCI over agencies other than the CIA lay in coordinating the budget requests of

14 the various intelligence agencies into a single program for submission to Congress. In addition, the DCI also lacked hire-and-fire authority over most of the IC's senior officials. In the case of their nominations, the DCI basically acted only in a consultative role 17 and regarding their firing, the DCI had no authority at all. Finally, the DCI lacked the ability to set standards for the information infrastructure and personnel (Ibid: 410).

Besides these structural and organizational weaknesses of the IC the commission paid attention also to the issue of information sharing within the Government (Ibid: 417-419). Here it concluded that the system of information sharing was still based on the Cold War's need-to-know 18 culture with security requirements that nurtured overclassification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Referring to the September 11 experience the report noted there were two cases: either information was available and could be accessed but someone had to ask for it (and no one did) or someone asked for the information but it could not be shared.

As a result of these findings, the Commission proposed a series of recommendations to improve intelligence work. The following reform was supposed to deal with the shortcomings and problems that caused the failure of the IC to detect the terrorist threat. But did the reform really address the criticism of the 9/11 Commission? And to what extent were the commission's particular recommendations reflected?

17 Secretary of Defense was supposed to seek DCI's concurrence in the case of nominations of directors for national intelligence agencies but it was possible to submit such recommendation to the President even without it. 18 A criterion used in security procedures that requires the custodians of classified information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the intended recipient must have access to the information to perform his/her official duties (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2010: 222).

4. The intelligence community reform

4.1 Legislative background The first major legislative response to the September 11 attacks was the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001” (commonly known as the Patriot Act). This bill has provided law enforcement agencies as well as intelligence agencies with some new competencies especially in regards to the collection and sharing of information related to terrorism 19 but did not bring any significant change to the organizational structure or functioning of the IC as a whole.

Organizational changes occurred the following year. The “Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002” created the position of the National Counterintelligence Executive as a new head of the national counterintelligence and security for the U.S. Government, and the “Homeland Security Act of 2002” has created a new Department of Homeland Security with its own intelligence element that became a new member of the IC. But the real structural reorganization was triggered by the publication of the 09/11 Commission report in July 2004. The first legislative reaction came shortly afterwards, when President Bush adopted four EOs on intelligence and related issues of which the EO 13355 “Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community” was probably the most important 20 as it gave the DCI marginally more authority than he had ever held. The EO emphasized the director’s duty to provide intelligence against all threats to the U.S. (whether domestic or foreign), to ensure the integration of IC activities, and to create “national centers” to work on high-priority intelligence topics. In addition, the DCI received new authority to monitor the Defense Department’s spending on tactical intelligence and to concur in the appointments and tenure of the heads of other intelligence organizations.

However, the President was not the only one who reacted to the report. By early October 2004, the House and Senate had separately passed wholesale amendments to the National Security Act. Once both bills had received affirmative votes, the House and Senate appointed conferees to reconcile the many differences between them in a single text for final passage. Negotiations were intense and in some respects echoed the debates over the original

19 For a brief overview see e.g. Rosenbach and Peritz 2009: 92-95. 20 The other three EOs were EO 13353 “Establishing the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties”, EO 13354 “National Counterterrorism Center” and EO 13356 “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans”.

National Security Act in 1947 21 . A final text did not emerge until President Bush won reelection in early November. The Congress passed the new bill titled “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act” (IRTPA) on December 8 and President Bush signed it into law nine days later (Warner and McDonald 2005: 38-39).

4.2 Management of the intelligence community One of the 9/11 Commission's crucial recommendations was the unifying of the IC with a new National Intelligence Director. The IRTPA reflected this request by creating a new top intelligence manager, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who oversees all elements of the IC but is not directly connected to any of them. Interestingly, this idea is not completely new. The first proposal for creating the DNI appeared in a draft legislation of the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 22 (see Best 2004: 26).

According to the IRTPA (sec. 1011-102) the DNI is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. An individual serving in this position must not serve at the same time as the head of any other element of the IC. The Director has three principal responsibilities: (1) to serve as the head of the IC, (2) to act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC) for intelligence matters related to the national security, and finally (3) to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (see below). The principal role of the DNI is consistent with the Commission's proposals. But specific critical responsibilities and competences provided by the Act in order to grant the Director sufficient authority to manage the IC are key issue here. To what extent do they reflect Commission's proposals? Due to many competences that are included in the IRTPA and because of greater clarity we could divide these responsibilities into four general categories.

The first one could be called the management of intelligence budgets and funds . For better understanding it is necessary to note that the U.S. intelligence activities are conducted under two separate programs (components) of which the intelligence budget consists: the National Intelligence Program 23 (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) 24 . The NIP comprises programs that either transcend the bounds of an agency or are

21 See e.g. Fessenden 2005: 108-112. 22 However, the bill was strongly criticized and never passed into law. 23 The NIP was formerly known as National Foreign Intelligence Program. 24 The MIP was established in 2005. Before that the JMIP and TIRA represented two separated components of the intelligence budget (see e.g. FAS 1996b).

17 nondefense in nature while the MIP consists of defense and service intelligence programs. The latter has also two other subcomponents, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIRA) (see Lowenthal 2009: 50-51).

The crucial authority in this area is the DNI's competences regarding the intelligence budgets. According to the IRTPA, the Director develops and determines the annual NIP budget proposal submitted to the President for approval. It is important to note that this proposal must be based on proposals provided by the heads of agencies and organizations within the NIP. Nevertheless, the DNI provides guidance for their development that is based on intelligence priorities set by the President. In the case of MIP, however, the Director has only participatory role. Development and management of this part of intelligence budget has remained in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. The Act also further specifies the particular responsibilities with regards to monitoring the implementation and execution of the NIP and managing appropriations. (IRTPA, sec. 1011-102A: c)

Secondly, it is the DNI's role in transfer and reprogramming funds. No funds made available under the NIP may be transferred or reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director. The Director has competence to carry out such transfer or reprogramming of funds as well although the Act specifies the conditions under which he can do so 25 . In the case of the MIP, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director only transfer or reprogramming of funds made available under the JMIP (Ibid: d). In addition, the DNI has wide acquisition authorities, especially with regards to the acquisition of major systems 26 when he/she serves as exclusive milestone decision authority. But again, in the case of Department of Defense programs the DNI serves as decision authority jointly with the Secretary. (Ibid: n)

Comparing budget competencies of the DNI granted by the IRTPA with 9/11 Commission's proposals we can see important disparity. While the commission proposed that the DNI should submit the unified budget for national intelligence (9/11 Commission 2004: 412), the Act has granted Director full authority only over one of its part, the NIP. In the case of the second one, the MIP, crucial competencies have remained in the hands of the Secretary of Defense with the DNI playing only participatory role. The commission's proposal that the

25 For instance the DNI may reprogram or transfer funds up to $150 million or not more than 5 % of any NIP funds for an agency. 26 For a definition of “major acquisition” see section 4(9) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.

DNI should have authority to reprogram funds among the national intelligence agencies to meet any new priority has been also reflected only partially, when the Act constrained it in several ways mentioned above.

The second category of the DNI's competencies is personnel management . Here the Director has received strengthened authority to select senior officials. The Secretary of Defense must seek the Director's concurrence before submitting a recommendation to the President for the directors of the NSA, NGA, and NRO as under the prior law. But newly the Secretary may not forward such a recommendation if the Director objects. The same applies for the selection of other senior officials 27 across the IC with the respective department heads (IRTPA, sec. 1014). In the case of the Director of CIA (DCIA), the DNI should recommend to the President an individual for nomination. The Director has also authority to transfer personnel authorized for an element of the IC to another such element for a period of not more than two years. However, such transfers are possible only after developing procedures for them with relevant department heads 28 (IRTPA, sec. 1011-102A: e). Hypothetically then, if the head of respective department objects, he/she can stall this transfer.

In addition, the DNI has some other competences in this area as well. For instance, the Director prescribes personnel policies and programs applicable to the IC. He/she also prescribes mechanisms 29 to facilitate the rotation of personnel through various elements of the IC in the course of their careers in order to facilitate the widest possible understanding of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, users and capabilities. However, these mechanisms do not apply to uniformed members of the IC. Finally, the Director can provide incentives 30 for personnel of the IC to serve on the staff of the DNI or national intelligence centers (Ibid: l).

The competencies of the DNI in this area reflect the 9/11 Commission proposals again only partially (see 9/11 Commission 2004: 412). The DNI appoints directly only some of the senior officials, while the others such as the directors of the DIA 31 or FBI are out of his/her control. In the case of the DCIA, the DNI only recommends individual for nomination. It

27 Such as the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis, the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence of FBI etc. 28 Plus there are also some more formal requirements for a transfer of personnel. 29 They may include the establishment of special occupational categories, the provision of rewards or requirements for education, training, service and evaluation for service. 30 Incentives may include financial incentives, bonuses and other awards or incentives as the DNI considers appropriate. 31 The Secretary of Defense must consult this nomination with the DNI though.

19 should be also noted that according to the commission it was supposed to be the DNI who submits nominations for senior intelligence officials directly to the President, not the respective department heads. Interestingly, neither the IRTPA nor the commission in its recommendations paid attention to firing authority for the DNI regarding senior intelligence officials despite commission's previous criticism of this matter in the case of DCI. Finally, the DNI's authority to transfer personnel is also constrained in several ways.

The third category represents intelligence information authorities . The DNI has access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to the national security which is collected by any federal department, agency or other entity. The Director is responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies of executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, and to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof (IRTPA, sec. 1011-102A: a, b). In addition, the DNI has been granted the principal authority over intelligence information sharing within the IC and establishes policies and procedures to resolve conflicts between the need-to-share and need-to-know culture (Ibid: g). Finally, the Director also has responsibility for the protection of intelligence. He/she establishes and implements guidelines for the IC for classification of information, access to and dissemination of intelligence, and preparation of intelligence products. Moreover, the DNI establishes uniform standards and procedures for the granting of access to sensitive compartmentalized information and ensures that security clearances granted by individual elements of the IC are recognized by all elements of the IC. (Ibid: i, j)

The authorities in this area are essential for the DNI's role as a top intelligence manager and the principal adviser to the President, NCS and HSC. Although the 9/11 Commission's report did not propose any specific authorities for the DNI in the area of information protection, the competences granted by the Act to the Director can be seen as a response to the criticism of a lack of common standards and practices across the foreign- domestic divide.

Finally, the fourth category is tasking authorities . It is clear that here the IRTPA tried to reflect the commission's criticism of a weak capacity to set priorities and move resources. According to the Act, the DNI establishes objectives, priorities, and guidance for the IC to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of national intelligence as well as requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence

20 information to be collected. In addition, the Director oversees the National Counterterrorism Center and may establish such other national intelligence centers he/she determines necessary (see following subchapter). He/she also oversees the coordination of the relationships between elements of the IC and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations (Ibid: f).

To sum up, in regard to the DNI's authorities we could say that the IRTPA reflected, although with many exceptions, the 9/11 Commission's proposals. But the greatest contradiction is in the designation and composition of the Director's Office. The IRTPA establishes the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as an independent executive body while the commission suggested it should be a part of the President's Executive Office. According to the Act (sec. 1011-103) the staff of the ODNI consists of these elements:

• Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence assists the DNI in carrying out his/her duties and responsibilities. In the case of absence, vacancy or disability of the DNI the Principal Deputy acts for, and exercises the powers of, the Director. There are the same conditions for appointment of Principal Deputy as for the DNI 32 (IRTPA, sec. 1011-103A: a). • Deputy Directors of National Intelligence have such duties, responsibilities and authorities as the DNI may assign or are specified by law. The Director can appoint not more than four Deputy Directors 33 . Currently there are Deputy Directors for Policy, Plans and Requirements; for Collection; for Analysis; and for Future Capabilities (ODNI 2009b: 1-2). • The General Counsel is chief legal officer of the ODNI 34 . • The Civil Liberties Protection Officer ensures the protection of civil liberties and privacy and oversees compliance by the Office and the Director with requirements under the Constitution and all laws 35 . • The Director of Science and Technology acts as the chief representative of the DNI for science and technology.

32 It should be noted that according to the Act not more than one of the individuals serving in the positions of DNI or Principal Deputy DNI may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status. 33 For details see IRTPA, sec. 1011-103A: b. 34 For details see IRTPA, sec. 1011-103C. 35 For details see IRTPA, sec. 1011-103D.

• The National Intelligence Council produces national intelligence estimates for the Government and evaluates community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the IC including their requirements and resources 36 . • The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) serves as the head of national counterintelligence for the Government. • Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the DNI. As a result, the ODNI currently includes several other functional mission support activities such as National Counterterrorism Center, National Counter Proliferation Center , the Special Security Center , the National Intelligence University, the Mission Support Center etc. (see ODNI 2009b: 5-6).

But according to the commission the DNI should have three deputies, each of whom would also hold a key position in one of the component agencies for foreign intelligence (the head of the CIA), defense intelligence (the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) and homeland intelligence (the FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence or Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection).

Finally, we should also pay at least a brief attention to the ODNI priorities in its managing role as they might influence future development. The crucial documents here are “National Intelligence Strategy: Transformation through Integration and Innovation” adopted by the George W. Bush's administration in 2005 and “National Intelligence Strategy” adopted by the Barack Obama's administration in 2009. The former identified 15 strategic objectives which are divided into 5 mission objectives and 10 enterprise objectives. The latter set four strategic goals that are supported by 6 mission objectives and 7 enterprise objectives. Comparing both documents it is clear that the top priority areas for future reforms are: (1) further integration of the IC; (2) mission driven approach in the mechanism of establishing and updating intelligence priorities; (3) information-sharing based on “responsibility to provide” culture rather than “need-to-know” culture; (4) more business approach aimed at efficiency and effectiveness of the IC programs; and (5) enhancement of intelligence workforce requirements.

36 For details see IRTPA, sec. 1011-103B.

4.3 Joint intelligence Another subject of criticism in the 9/11 Commission Report was the existence of structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work. The main recommendation was the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), built on a foundation of the existing CIA's Terrorist Threat Integration Center. This NCTC would be a center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies (9/11 Commission 2004: 403).

The IRTPA reflected this proposal more broadly when it introduced a completely new element in the IC to address intelligence priorities – national intelligence centers. An authority to establish (or terminate) such center lies in the hands of the DNI, and they can be based on a regional or functional basis. The mission of national intelligence centers in the area of their assigned intelligence responsibilities is to provide all-source analysis of intelligence gathered both domestically and abroad as well as to identify and propose to the DNI intelligence collection, analysis, and production requirements (IRTPA, sec. 1023-119B). The IRTPA has codified the establishment of two such centers: the NCTC 37 and National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC).

The main mission of the NCTC is first of all to serve as the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. However, the foreign-domestic divide is partially still present here as the Act excluded intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism that has remained a domain of the FBI 38 . In addition, the NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities and assigns roles and responsibilities to lead departments or agencies for counterterrorism activities. However, the center itself must not direct the execution of any resulting operations. The NCTC also ensures that agencies have access to and receive all-source intelligence support as needed, and finally serves as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups. Although the center is officially overseen by the DNI and organizationally belongs to the DNI's office, it has its own director who is appointed by the President and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The NCTC is structured into two

37 The NCTC was established by President Bush's EO 13354 in August 2004, i.e. before the IRTPA ratification. 38 But the center may receive, retain and disseminate such intelligence according to the Act.

23 directorates: Directorate of Intelligence that is responsible for analysis, and Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning that provides strategic operational planes 39 (Ibid, sec. 1021).

The second national intelligence center codified by the IRTPA, the NCPC, was formally established by the ODNI on November 21, 2005. It represents the primary organization within the Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. pertaining to proliferation. The center conducts net assessments and warnings, and coordinates counter proliferation plans and activities of the various departments and agencies. It also conducts strategic operational counter proliferation planning and disseminates proliferation information to the President, appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate committees of Congress. Finally, the center establishes a central repository on known and suspected proliferation activities and ensures that appropriate agencies have full access to and receive all-source intelligence support needed to execute their counter proliferation plans or activities. (Ibid, sec. 1022)

The second new element established by the IRTPA regarding the joint intelligence is the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC). It is chaired by the DNI and other members include attorney general, the secretaries of state, treasury, defense, homeland security and energy, and such other officers of the Government as the President may designate from time to time. The council should assist the DNI in developing and implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort. It has two main responsibilities in this regard. First, to advise the Director on establishing requirements, developing budgets, financial management, monitoring and evaluating the performance of the IC and on such other matters as the Director may request. Second, the council should ensure the timely execution of programs, policies, and directives established and developed by the Director. (Ibid, sec. 1031)

However it should be noted that under the DNI McConnell (2007-2009) the JICC had been by-passed in favor of the Executive Committee which he created. This committee consisted of the DNI and the heads of the intelligence components, plus senior policy makers, usually at the undersecretary level. McConnell's stated goal was to bring together policy customers and senior intelligence officers at the highest level to ensure that the IC is

39 Strategic operational planning shall include the mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the assignment of roles and responsibilities.

24 providing the support that is needed. Interestingly, a similar committee existed during the tenure of DCI Robert Gates between 1991 and 1993 (Lowenthal 2009: 37).

Finally, the IRTPA has brought a new revised definition of “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to national security” which now “refers to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the U.S.” (IRTPA, sec. 1012). This is an important shift in the perception of intelligence issues as the National Security Act originally understood the term intelligence only in two distinct meanings as foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Now all intelligence is defined as national intelligence that has three subcomponents: foreign, domestic and homeland security (Lowenthal 2009: 4-5).

However, there were steps to improve the joint intelligence after September 11 and before the IRTPA that also deserve our attention. In particular it is the establishment of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) as a new head of the national counterintelligence and security, and Department of Homeland Security's intelligence element, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).

Officially, the NCIX mission is to exploit and defeat adversarial intelligence activities directed against U.S. interests; protect the integrity of the U.S. intelligence system; provide intelligence to decision-makers at all levels; protect vital national assets from adversarial intelligence activities; and neutralize and exploit adversarial intelligence activities targeting the armed forces (ODNI 2009b: 2). But if we look closer at the authority granted to the NCIX by the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (sec. 904: d), it is clear that it mainly plays a coordinating role. Most importantly, the NCIX regularly produces national counterintelligence strategy 40 for all elements of the IC and strategic planning assessments of the counterintelligence requirements; coordinates the development of budgets and resource allocation plans for counterintelligence programs and activities; develops priorities for counterintelligence collection, investigations, or operations; and carries out surveys of the vulnerability of the Government to intelligence threats. But the NCIX must neither carry out its own investigations or operations nor establish its own contacts and carry out its own activities with foreign services.

40 So far three National Counterintelligence Strategies have been published. For more details see Office of the NCIX 2005, 2007, 2009.

The I&A has been a new member of the IC since 2002. It is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the U.S. The I&A provides actionable intelligence to support national and decision- makers from Department of Homeland Security while working closely with state, local, tribal and private sector partners 41 . It focuses on threats related to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues (to include explosives and infectious diseases); critical infrastructure protection; extremists within the U.S.; and travelers entering the U.S. The I&A has a unique mandate within the IC and the Federal Government lead for sharing intelligence with state, local, tribal and territorial governments and the private sector 42 (ODNI 2009b: 15). However, it is open to discussion to what extent another agency within an overtly complex IC can really contribute to the joint intelligence effort. It is also clear that the I&A's performance will partially depend on the willingness of other members within the IC to share intelligence with it, since it plays more of a coordination and redistribution, rather than collection, role.

4.4 Information sharing The issue of information sharing was identified as another weakness of the IC in the 9/11 Commission's report. The commission therefore requested that information procedures must provide incentives for sharing to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge (9/11 Commission 2004: 417).

The IRTPA brought in this regard two important changes that applied not only to the IC but to all federal departments and agencies. The first one was the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) which the Act defines as an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and may include any methods determined necessary and appropriate. The responsibility for the creation and designation of the ISE was assigned to the President who, among others, appoints a program manager whose duty is to oversee and manage the ISE. (IRTPA, sec. 1016: b)

41 For more details about responsibilities of the I&A see Homeland Security Act of 2002, sec. 201: d. 42 There have been established “fusion centers” for this purpose which serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the Federal Government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners (ODNI 2011: 26).

The second innovation was the establishment of an Information Sharing Council 43 (ISC) that has an advisory and coordination role with regards to the ISE creation, implementation and maintenance (Ibid: g). The ISC should, among others, recommend solutions to address any gaps between existing programs and systems used by federal entities to share information as well as means by which the ISE can be extended to allow interchange between federal entities and appropriate authorities of state and local governments. The council should also recommend whether or not, and by which means, the ISE should be expanded so as to allow future expansion encompassing other relevant categories of information.

It is very important to note that according to the Act, the head of each department or agency that either possesses or uses intelligence or terrorism information, or participates in the ISE must ensure full compliance with information sharing policies, guidelines, rules etc. The heads of respective entities must also ensure provision of adequate resources for supporting their participation in the ISE and full cooperation with the other elements of the ISE (Ibid: i). As we can see, the sharing of information related to terrorism has been significantly strengthened and incentives for sharing created. On the other hand, the sharing of non-terrorism information (that might be equally important in the future) has not really improved and this issue has remained a topic for future discussion.

As for the information sharing solely within the IC, this has become a responsibility of the DNI as mentioned before. But do the Director's steps in this area reflect the 9/11 Commission recommendations? The crucial document of the ODNI in this regard is an Information Sharing Strategy from February 2008. Most importantly it presents a “new information sharing model” that varies from previous “legacy information sharing model” in different conception of key areas such as information sharing vision, data usage, collaboration type, enterprise scope etc. This strategy was followed by the Policy Directive 501 “Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the IC” adopted in January 2009. According to this directive, the IC elements must treat information collected and analysis produced as national assets and, as such, must act as stewards of information who have predominant “responsibility to provide”. This responsibility must be fulfilled by making all intelligence and intelligence-related information discoverable by automated means

43 The ISC was created from Information Systems Council that was established by President Bush's EO 13356 as a reaction to criticism of information sharing in the 9/11 Commission report.

27 by authorized IC personnel. Furthermore, authorized IC personnel have a “responsibility to discover” relevant information and “responsibility to request” it.

4.5 Intelligence community oversight In addition to the problems mentioned above, the 9/11 Commission also paid attention to the question of congressional oversight of intelligence which was, in the commission's words, dysfunctional. The commission therefore proposed the creation of either a new joint committee on the model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or new single committees in each house of Congress with authorizing and appropriating authority. Moreover, new intelligence committee(s) should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the budget (9/11 Commission 2004: 420-421). The commission also requested that the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret (Ibid: 416).

Virtually none of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations in this area have been reflected in the IRTPA. The Act paid attention only to the issue of privacy and civil liberties when it strengthened their protection by establishing a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board within the President's Executive Office (IRTPA, sec. 1061). Furthermore, the Act requires that each executive department or agency with law enforcement or antiterrorism functions should designate a privacy and civil liberties officer (Ibid, sec. 1062). Although the intelligence budget still does not have to be made public according to a law, there has been some progress recently. In 2007 the DNI decided to disclose the total NIP budget for the first time in almost a decade 44 and in 2010 the total MIP budget was disclosed together with a subsequent data for years 2007-2009 as well. Eventually, last year the NIP budget request for the following fiscal year was published for the first time ever (FAS 2012).

4.6 Intelligence community members As for the particular IC members, the 9/11 Commission as well as the IRTPA focused more closely on two of them, the CIA and FBI. How did the legislative changes correspond with the original commission's recommendations in this area?

Since the DNI replaced the DCI, the IRTPA had to redefine the responsibilities of a new Director of the CIA (DCIA). As the head of the CIA, the director has three crucial

44 The NIP budget had been made public only twice before – in 1997 and 1998.

28 responsibilities: (1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, (2) correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence related to national security, and (3) provide overall direction for and coordination of the HUMINT outside the U.S. by all IC elements. DCIA also shares with the DNI a responsibility for coordinating the relations with intelligence elements and secret services of foreign governments. The Act further specified the DCIA's role in the transformation of the CIA. The director shall enhance the analytic, HUMINT, and other capabilities of the Agency, develop and maintain an effective language program, emphasize the hiring of personnel with diverse background, and establish and maintain effective relationship between HUMINT and SIGINT within the Agency at the operational level. (IRTPA, sec. 1011-104A)

Looking at the commission's recommendations for the DCIA and CIA we can say that the IRTPA reflected them to a large degree, especially in defining the priority areas of the CIA's transformation (9/11 Commission 2004: 415). There is only a slight rhetorical difference between the commission's and the Act's language without any serious implications. But there is one recommendation that has been ignored. The commission proposed to shift lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, to the Department of Defense 45 . However, the IRTPA (sec. 1013) has brought only strengthening of coordination and de-confliction in this area, when it granted the DNI responsibility to develop, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and DCIA, joint procedures for operations that involve elements of both the armed forces and the CIA.

In the case of the FBI, the 9/11 Commission stated that the FBI made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities and focused its recommendations 46 only on developing a specialized and integrated national security workforce (9/11 Commission 2004: 425-427). This was reflected by the IRTPA when it granted the director of the FBI responsibility to develop and maintain National Intelligence Workforce whose attributes fully correspond with the commission's proposals (IRTPA, sec. 2001). The Act also brought one more change when it redesigned the Office of Intelligence into a new Directorate of Intelligence that supervises all of the FBI's national intelligence programs, projects and activities including field intelligence operations, collection coordination, strategic analysis etc. (IRTPA, sec. 2002).

45 The rest of covert and clandestine operations such as propaganda, renditions and nonmilitary disruption would remain the domain of the CIA. 46 Interestingly, the commission was considering proposing creation of a new domestic intelligence agency but eventually recommended against it (see 9/11 Commission 2004: 423-424).

The reforms within the FBI included several initiatives for improving its domestic intelligence capabilities. First there was a significant widening of Joint Terrorism Task Forces shortly after the attacks which must now be established within all FBI field offices. Their role is to bring local, state, and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies together to share information and conduct operations. Each FBI field office also has Field Intelligence Group that is composed of special agents, intelligence analysts and other FBI specialists. Moreover, the FBI hired hundreds of counterterrorism analysts and linguists, and re-tasked more than 700 personnel from criminal investigations to counterterrorism and counterintelligence duties. Finally, in 2005 the Bureau merged its intelligence, counterintelligence and counterterrorism divisions into a unified National Security Branch and launched Domain Management Initiative whose goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats relevant to each field office's region (Rosenbach, Peritz 2009: 45; comp. Jordan et al. 2009: 161-162).

There were two more minor changes in the IC's structure that should be mentioned here at least briefly. First, the Coast Guard including its intelligence office was relocated to the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Second, the Drug Enforcement Agency's Office of National Security Intelligence has become a new member of the IC in 2006 which brings a total number of agencies within the IC to sixteen. Its role is to provide drug-related information responsive to IC requirements (ODNI 2007: 14; ODNI 2009b: 13).

5. The limits of intelligence reform As we have seen, the intelligence reform has introduced many new elements to address shortcomings in the IC identified after the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, the 9/11 commission's particular recommendations for fixing these problems were reflected only partially and many changes were rather moderate. The purpose of this last chapter is therefore to discuss the implications of this fact for the reform's success as well as its other possible limits and weaknesses, and provide an answer to the question of whether the shortcomings and problems identified after September 11 persist, or if they have been solved.

Perhaps the crucial issue of the whole reform was the management of more than dozen separate agencies within the IC. According to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation, the IRTPA addressed this problem by creating a new head of the IC, the DNI, with wide authorities in the areas of intelligence budgets and funds, personnel issues, intelligence information, and tasking. But many of these competences are ambiguous and there are two important disparities from the commission's original proposals that might significantly weaken the director's capability to manage the IC effectively.

First, there are obstacles in regard to the DNI's budget and funds authorities. The Act has granted the Director control only over one part of the intelligence budget, the NIP (even though this control is also not complete as the Director must reflect the proposals of particular components and his/her authority to reprogram funds is constrained in several ways), while its military part, the MIP, has remained fully in the hands of the Secretary of Defense. Moreover, the agencies that are part of the Department of Defense vastly outnumber the components of the NIP under the DNI's authority, in terms of both people and dollars. According to Lowenthal (2009: 33), the Secretary of Defense controls some 75-80 percent of the IC on a day-to-day basis. Also some of the personnel policies do not apply to the uniformed members of the IC, such as mechanisms for rotations for instance. Nor are the nominations of heads for the DIA and intelligence elements of the armed forces under the Director's control. As a result, the management of the Defense's intelligence elements has remained to a large degree in the hands of the Secretary of Defense, respectively the Undersecretary for Defense Intelligence 47 .

47 Much of the responsibility for intelligence within the Department of Defense is delegated to this new office that was created in 2002 (Lowenthal 2009: 33).

The second problem might be the location and composition of the ODNI. The fact that the ODNI has not become the part of the President's Executive Office complicates a producer-consumer relationship, i.e. the Director's access to, and relation with, the commander-in-chief. This can be of course viewed in both positive and negative way. But as Betts (2004) points out, the typical problem at the highest levels of government is less often misuse of intelligence than non-use. All the objective information in the world will not matter if the President and his inner circle do not pay attention to it, and they will not do so if they do not interact frequently and have rapport with the leadership of the IC. Also other authors stress that the trust and confidence between the DNI and the President remain critical for the overall effectiveness of the IC (Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala 2008: 159; comp. Jordan et al. 2009: 153). From this perspective then, the ODNI's establishment outside the President's Executive Office might complicate the leadership position of the DNI. But the different designation of the DNI's deputy secretaries is perhaps even more problematic for the Director's leadership role. If the IRTPA followed the 9/11 Commission proposal and created deputies with key positions in the CIA, FBI and Department of Defense, the ODNI would very likely have a much stronger position and influence within the IC. But the current deputy secretaries have amorphous responsibilities covering a broad range of services (collection, analysis, IC management, customer relations) rather than responsibility over a specific agency, mission, or branch of intelligence, and they all hold lower executive-branch ranks than the intelligence chiefs they are supposedly overseeing (Fessenden 2005).

In addition to the differences between the 9/11 Commission's proposals and the IRTPA, several other important questions remain. For example, neither the commission's proposals nor the Act dealt with the firing authority of the DNI. While the Director has key authority over hiring senior intelligence officials (however with few exceptions), he/she has no authority to remove an appointed individual. Furthermore, the IRTPA did not actually bring any drastic change in the IC structure and despite the DNI's new authorities in many areas the sixteen intelligence agencies have still remained quite independent. As Negroponte and Wittenstein (2010: 389) point out, the IRTPA stopped far short of creating a position akin to a secretary of intelligence. The agencies remained in their respective departments, reporting to the same superiors with the added stipulation that they now were jointly accountable to the DNI for certain functions. The Director thus plays rather coordinate role and his/her real influence on a day-to-day run of particular agencies is very questionable. Last but not least, the 9/11 Commission's remark that there were too many jobs for the DCI could

32 prove just as a valid for the DNI as well. Although the directorship of the CIA has been removed from the DNI's job portfolio as recommended, the volume of the Director's responsibilities remains still quite robust and it is doubtful if any DNI will be able to fulfill all of them effectively. The fact that there have been five DNIs 48 since 2005 is quite telling in this context.

As Fessenden noted, there was growing concern among many that the ODNI is simply another layer of bureaucracy over all agencies rather than a force that can push through necessary structural changes to streamline the IC and foster accountability (Fessenden 2005). An indication that these worries are not only hypothetical was for instance the ODNI Inspector General's 2008 report publicly released in early 2009 that faulted the ODNI for failing to achieve its longstanding goals of integrating the IC and information-sharing. In addition, two years ago, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board issued a report which concluded that there are ambiguities in the IRTPA and different approaches by the three DNIs have fueled “turf wars” that wasted valuable time, expertise and energy. The board reportedly recommended that the ODNI be downsized but strengthened (Best 2010: 9). Also the very first DNI, John Negroponte, wrote in 2010 that the IC under the DNI leadership structure is still struggling to overcome entrenched bureaucratic mindsets, enforce vague authorities, demonstrate added value, and rapidly adapt to the diffuse threat environment. The IRTPA granted the DNI ambiguous control over IC elements and it still remains a question if the DNI with these authorities is capable of changing how the IC works (Negroponte and Wittenstein 2010: 382, 392).

The second issue of the intelligence reform was the question of joint intelligence. The establishment of the NCIX and the Department of Homeland security's I&A in 2002 as well as two new elements brought by the IRTPA, national intelligence centers and JICC, have undoubtedly strengthened this area and created incentives for joint intelligence and operational planning. On the other hand, their role is limited as their main task is coordination and they must not conduct their own operations or investigations. Moreover, in the case of the NCTC the foreign/domestic divide has not been completely removed as intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism has remained a domain of the FBI. The former DNI Mike McConnell acknowledged in 2007 that coordinating domestic and foreign intelligence continues to be a challenge (McConnell

48 John D. Negroponte (2005-2007), John M. McConnell (2007-2009), Dennis C. Blair (2009-2010), David C. Gompert (2010), James R. Clapper (2010-present).

2007). This was proven by a failed Christmas bombing attack over Detroit in December 2009 plotted by al-Qaeda that raised a number of questions about the effectiveness of the IC's counterterrorism efforts and the whole post-9/11 intelligence reform (see Negroponte, Wittenstein 2010; Best 2011b: 17). The following investigation by the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence revealed systematic failures across the IC. Specifically the NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill its mission and technology across the IC was not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts. The committee identified 14 specific points of failure that included a series of human errors, technical problems, systematic obstacles, analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities (Select Committee on Intelligence 2010: 2); all of this almost nine years after September 11.

As for the information sharing, there is widespread agreement that coordination in this area has improved since the attacks (Fessenden 2005). But thanks to the years of entrenched independence of the individual agencies and a long tradition of information hoarding, major shortcomings remain. On the one hand, the IRTPA has provided strong incentives for terrorism information sharing by the creation of the ISE. On the other hand, according to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report from February 2011 the government still does not have a fully-functioning ISE in place and implementation of information sharing programs has been uneven across agencies. The report cited continued bureaucratic resistance in some agencies 49 and called for developing a vision and roadmap for future information sharing (GAO 2011a: 96-98, see also GAO 2011b). In addition, significant technological barriers remain as well. A multitude of databases still exist, various law enforcement and intelligence computer systems cannot communicate, and there are a plethora of e-mail systems (Freedman 2010: 13). As mentioned above, these technological barriers also significantly contributed to the IC's failure to detect the 2009 Christmas bombing plot.

As a result, we can see a contradiction in theory and practice. If the reform is supposed to bring a real and a long-term major shift in information sharing, it will definitely require the change of the cultural mindset that has been based on “need-to-know” principle for several decades. The fact that the IRTPA prioritizes only one area of intelligence information (terrorism) while de facto ignores the others undermines this effort. The vision set up in the 2008 Information Sharing Strategy is undoubtedly a step in the right direction but whether it will be successfully implemented is very questionable. For instance, a team of

49 For example also Freedman points out in this regard the resistance to share information especially with non- federal entities (Freedman 2010: 12).

34 researchers from Columbia University concluded in their recent report that the “need-to- know” mindset still pervades the IC's culture. The cause is “stove-piping” of intelligence which largely restricts by its nature the flow of information and obstructs a culture of integration (Columbia University 2012). Also the fact that it took six years after September 11 for the DNI to establish Information sharing dispute resolution process and eight years to create a policy directive regarding information sharing for the IC (Freedman 2010: 9-11) is a reason for skepticism.

Another point of criticism, which was virtually ignored by the reform, was the IC oversight. According to Fessenden (2005) the failure of congressional reorganization has three serious implications. First, it keeps intact the unusual degree of control over the intelligence budget by appropriators (who write the checks in the end) rather than authorizers. Second, the continuation of the status quo makes it more difficult for the DNI to count on a unified budget process, since it forces the DNI to deal with multiple actors rather than a few individuals. And third, the decision to keep the intelligence budget split up among separate, classified accounts means that appropriations themselves cannot transfer money among their respective subcommittees even if they decide that such a transfer reflects an important priority. As a result, coordination of the intelligence budget remains as unwieldy as it was before. Also the fact that the overall intelligence budget has been made public recently does not change anything as it reveals only total spending without any further details about budgets of IC components.

Finally, with regard to the IC's particular members, the reform focused on the two premier agencies, the CIA and FBI. Although it is true that the IRTPA reflected the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in this area, many doubts remain. Despite the commission's praise for the FBI's progress, there are concerns about overall effectiveness of the Bureau's reforms and its ability to transform itself into the premier domestic intelligence agency (Best 2011b: 22; comp. Rosenbach and Peritz 2009: 45). As for the CIA, the intelligence reform is having a significant effect on its work. Some suggest that the CIA has lost stature when the reform placed the DNI between the DCIA and the President. But others argue that without the burden of interagency coordination, the DCIA is better positioned to emphasize analytical and HUMINT collection activities (Best 2011b: 21). Nonetheless, the most problematic issue here is the DCIA's competences that appear to overlap if not conflict with the DNI's authorities in two areas: the oversight of foreign intelligence relationships and covert action. In the case of the former, the IRTPA granted both directors responsibility to

35 coordinate the relations with intelligence elements and secret services of foreign governments. In the case of the latter, the Act is unclear about whether DNI's covert action authorities are limited only to approving budgets or extended to the conduct of operations as well (Negroponte and Wittenstein 2010: 391). Again the leadership position of the DNI might be questioned.

Last but not least, the fact that the reform has not brought any significant change in the IC structure and that all member agencies have remained in their respective departments will continue to influence any future progress. The “stove-piping” of intelligence which naturally results from this organizational structure remains present and as mentioned above, this will always restrict by its nature the flow of information and obstruct a culture of integration. The youngest and sixteenth member of the IC, the DEA's intelligence office, will probably only strengthen this reality although the former DNI McConell argued that it helps to put down a wall between foreign intelligence and law enforcement (McConell 2007: 52).

Conclusion The September 11 terrorist attacks and following inquiry by the 9/11 Commission have triggered the most significant legislative reform of the IC since its inception. The IC was criticized for the divided management of national intelligence capabilities, the structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work, a lack of common standards and practices, weak capacity to set priorities and move resources, insufficient information sharing, and overall complexity and secrecy.

The following intelligence reform embodied mainly in the IRTPA has introduced many new elements to address these shortcomings. Most importantly, a new head of the IC, the Director of National Intelligence, has been created with wide authorities in the areas of budgets and funds, personnel policies, intelligence information and tasking. Reform also established new national intelligence centers, the Joint Intelligence Community Council and the National Counterintelligence Executive in order to strengthen joint intelligence and capacity to set priorities. As for the information sharing a new “responsibility to provide” model has been introduced and implemented. In the case of information related to terrorism, its sharing has been further strengthened by establishment of the Information Sharing Environment and the Information Sharing Council. In addition, the reform has brought two new intelligence agencies, one from the Department of Homeland Security and one from the Drug Enforcement Administration, to the IC. And last but not least, the CIA and FBI launched a number of initiatives to improve its intelligence work and capabilities.

However, when we look more closely at the particular issues of this reform, it is clear that many legislative innovations are rather moderate and do not bring about a radical change in practice. Negroponte and Wittenstein (2010: 387) noted that like most legislation, the IRTPA struck an awkward balance between the political and substantive interests of the affected parties. This is especially apparent when we compare concrete legislative changes with the original recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. As we have shown in chapter four, the IRTPA corresponded with the commission's proposals only partially. We can thus say that the result is a compromise that has brought certain progress but has definitely not solved the problems that were identified as the main reasons for the failure of the IC to detect September 11. Most of these problems still persist to a larger or lesser degree as was argued in the last chapter and shown by several governmental reports as well as failed Christmas bombing plot in 2009.

We can therefore conclude that much of the criticism by the 9/11 Commission remains valid and shortcomings persist. First of all, management of national intelligence capabilities has remained divided although the DNI has much stronger authority than the DCI ever held. The Secretary of Defense has maintained a very strong position and DNI's managing authority is often either ambiguous or constrained. Secondly, the structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work still persist. All new elements only have a limited authority and play a coordinate role. Particular IC agencies have remained in five different departments and have been still quite independent of the ODNI. Continuous divided management and structural barriers to performing joint intelligence will consequently also influence the effort to reduce lack of common standards and practices. As for a capacity to set priorities and move resources this has been improved. But with the DNI's limited authorities to reprogram funds and personnel the progress will probably always remain limited. Information sharing has been improved as well but, again, many problems remain as was discussed above. And last but not least, basically nothing has been done to solve the problem of complexity and secrecy of the IC. In addition, it is clear from our analysis that all the issues of the intelligence reform are closely interconnected. Divided management of intelligence capabilities restricts the integration of the IC which consequently influences efforts to improve joint intelligence work and information sharing.

Nevertheless, despite all the criticism we should bear in mind that no reform is able to remove all the shortcomings. Firstly, a practical reason is that a reform is always retroactive and reacts to failures and problems that happened in the past. As Negroponte and Wittenstein (2010: 415) pointed out, the IC must avoid overcompensating for the failures of the past because since September 11 it has suffered from a narrow-minded focus on correcting previous mistakes without considering future threats lurking on the horizon. The second reason is more theoretical and stems from the nature of the intelligence work itself in which intelligence failures are always inevitable (see Betts 1978). Therefore, it is still uncertain whether the IC would have been able to prevent September 11 if it had been more integrated.

The issues that were at the center of the intelligence reform after the September 11 terrorist attacks are definitely not ones that can be changed within a few days – probably not even within a few years. It is still too early to assess a real impact of all the changes, which were adopted as a reaction to September 11, on the U.S. intelligence. But persisting problems indicate that additional changes might be necessary in the future if the U.S. security establishment wants to have a really integrated and unified IC. Nevertheless, quoting the

38 classic theorist in the field, Richard K. Betts (2004: 2), at the end of the day, the strongest defense against intelligence mistakes will come less from any structural or procedural tweak, but rather from the good sense, good character, and good mental habits of senior officials. How to assure a steady supply of those, unfortunately, has never been clear.

List of abbreviations and acronyms

CIA Central Intelligence Agency COMINT communication intelligence DCI Director of Central Intelligence DCIA Director of Central Intelligence Agency DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DNI Director of National Intelligence ELINT electronic intelligence EO executive order FAS Federation of American Scientists FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation GAO Government Accountability Office HCS Homeland Security Council HUMINT human intelligence I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis IC intelligence community IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ISC Information Sharing Council ISE Information Sharing Environment JICC Joint Intelligence Community Council JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program MASINT measurements and signatures intelligence MIP Military Intelligence Program NCIX National Counterintelligence Executive NCPC National Counter Proliferation Center NCTC National Counter Terrorism Center NGA National Geospatial Agency NIE National Intelligence Estimate NIP National Intelligence Program NRO National Reconnaissance Office NSA National Security Agency NSC National Security Council ODNI Office of Director of National Intelligence OSINT open source intelligence PHOTINT/IMINT photographic/imagery intelligence SIGINT signals intelligence TECHINT technical intelligence TELINT telemetry intelligence TIRA Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities U.S. United States of America

References Note: all the sources available on-line were last accessed on 2. 12. 2012.

Primary sources • Bush, George W. (27 August 2004): Executive Order 13353 “Establishing the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties” , available at (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827- 3.html ). • Bush, George W. (27 August 2004): Executive Order 13354 “National Counterterrorism Center” , available at (http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html ). • Bush, George W. (27 August 2004): Executive Order 13355 “Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community” , available at (http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-6.html ). • Bush, George W. (27 August 2004): Executive Order 13356 “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans” , available at (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827- 4.html ). • General Accountability Office (2011a): High-Risk Series: An Update , available at (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11278.pdf ). • General Accountability Office (2011b): Information Sharing Environment: Better Road Map Needed to Guide Implementation and Investments , available at (http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321672.pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2005): The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America: Transformation through Integration and Innovation , available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nis.pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2007): An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community , available at (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/061222_D NIHandbook_Final.pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2008): Information Sharing Strategy , available at (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/IC_Inform ation_Sharing_Strategy.pdf ).

• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2009a): The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America , available at (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2009_NIS. pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2009b): An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111 th Congress , available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/overview.pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2009c): Intelligence Community Directive 501 “Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the IC” , available at (http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_501.pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2011): U.S. National Intelligence: An overview 2011 , available at (http://www.whs.mil/library/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf ). • Office of the Director of National Intelligence – Office of the Inspector General (2008): Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges , available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/04/odni-ig-1108.pdf ). • Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (2005): The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States , available at (http://www.ncix.gov/publications/strategy/docs/FinalCIStrategyforWebMarch21.pdf ) • Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (2007): The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America , available at (https://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/cistrategy2007.pdf ). • Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (2009): The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America , available at (http://www.ncix.gov/publications/strategy/docs/NatlCIStrategy2009.pdf ). • Reagan, Ronald (4 December 1981): Executive Order 12333 “United States Intelligence Activities” , available at (http://www.tscm.com/EO12333.html ). • United States of America: Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 , Public Law 107-306, 116 STAT. 2383 (2002). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, available at (http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/ic-legal-reference- book-2012/ref-book-ci-act-of-2002 ).

• United States of America: Homeland Security Act of 2002 . Public Law 107-296, 116 STAT. 2135 (2002). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, available at (http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf). • United States of America: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 . Public Law 108-458, 118 STAT. 3638 (2004). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, available at (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW- 108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf ). • U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (2002): Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, available at (https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf ). • U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2010): Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, available at (http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/111199.pdf ). • The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004): 09/11 Commission Report . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, available at (http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf ).

Secondary sources • Best, Richard A. (2004): Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004 . Congressional Research Service Report, available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf ). • Best, Richard A. (2010): Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) . Congressional Research Service Report, available at (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41295.pdf ). • Best, Richard A. (2011a): Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions . Congressional Research Service Report, available at (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf ). • Best, Richard A. (2011b): Intelligence Issues for Congress . Congressional Research Service Report, available at (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf ). • Betts, Richard K. (2004): “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 83, Issue 3, pp. 2-8.

• Betts, Richard K. (1978): “Analysis, War and Decisions: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable” World Politics , Vol. 31, pp. 61-89. • Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary . 3rd ed. 2008. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. • Carlisle, Rodney P. (ed. 2005a): Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Volume One . New York: Golson Books, Ltd. • Carlisle, Rodney P. (ed. 2005b): Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: Volume Two . New York: Golson Books, Ltd. • Clapper, James R. (2011): “How 9/11 Transformed the Intelligence Community” The Wall Street Journal , September 7, on-line text (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904537404576554430822300352.h tml ). • Columbia University Capstone Team (2012): Information Sharing in the 21 st Century: The Way Forward . New York: School of International & Public Affairs, available at (http://sipa.columbia.edu/academics/workshops/documents/FORPUBLICATION_The MarkleFoundation.pdf ). • Council on Foreign Relations (1996): Making intelligence smarter , available at (http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/making-intelligence-smarter/p127 ). • Daugherty, William J. (2009): “The role of covert action” In: Johnson, Loch K. (ed.): Handbook of intelligence studies . New York: Routledge, pp. 279-288. • Federation of American Scientists (1996a): The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community - An Historical Overview , on-line text (http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html ). • Federation of American Scientists (1996b): An Overview of the Intelligence Community , on-line text (http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int023.html ). • Federation of American Scientists (2012): Intelligence Budget Data , on-line text (http://www.fas.org/irp/budget/index.html ). • Fessenden, Helen (2005): “The Limits of Intelligence Reform” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 84, No. 6, pp. 106-120. • Freedman, Heather (2010): Assessing the Effectiveness of Post-9/11 Intelligence Information Sharing . Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, available at (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519879 ).

• Hedley, John H. (1996): “The Intelligence Community: Is it broken? How to fix it?” Studies in Intelligence , Vol. 39, No. 5, available at (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi- studies/studies/96unclass/hedley.htm ). • Johnson, Loch K. (2009): “Introduction” In: Johnson, Loch K. (ed.): Handbook of intelligence studies . New York: Routledge, pp. 1-14. • Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010): Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms , available at (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf ). • Jordan, Amos A. (et al. 2009): American National Security. 6th ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. • Lederman, Gordon N. (2005): “Restructuring the Intelligence Community” In: Berkowitz, P. (ed.): The Future of American Intelligence . Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 65-102. • Lowenthal, Mark M. (2008): “Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 11 and Iraq” In George, Roger Z. and Bruce, James B. (eds.): Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations . Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, pp. 226-237. • Lowenthal, Mark M. (2009): Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy . 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. • McConnell, Mike (2007): “Overhauling Intelligence” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 49-58. • Negroponte, John D. and Wittenstein, Edward M. (2010): “Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004” Yale Law & Policy Review , Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 379-417. • Rosenbach, Eric and Peritz, Aki (2009): Confrontation or Collaboration?: Congress and the Intelligence Community . Cambridge MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, available at (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IC-book- finalasof12JUNE.pdf ). • Pillar, Paul R. (2012): “Think again: Intelligence” Foreign Policy , on-line text (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/intelligence ). • Richelson, J. T. (2009): “The technical collection of intelligence” In: Johnson, Loch K. (ed.): Handbook of intelligence studies . New York: Routledge, pp. 105-117.

• Sarkesian, Sam C.; Williams John A. and Cimbala, Stephen J. (2008): US national security: policymakers, processes & politics . 4th ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. • Shulsky, Abraham N. and Schmitt, Gary J. (2002): Silent Warfare: Understanding the world of intelligence . 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc. • Todd, Paul and Bloch, Jonathan (2003): Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today . London: Zed Books. • Treverton, Gregory F. (2001): Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information , 1 st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. • Warner, Michael and McDonald, Kenneth J. (2005): US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947 . Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, available at (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/books-and- monographs/US%20Intelligence%20Community%20Reform%20Studies%20Since% 201947.pdf ). • Warner, Michael (2002): “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence” Studies in Intelligence , Vol. 45, No. 3, available at (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the- study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html ). • Zegart, Amy B. (2005): “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies” International Security , Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 78-111. • Zegart, Amy B. (2006): “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11” Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 121, No. 1, pp. 33-60.