N° 85, 2020 diciembre - mayo https://doi.org/10.18800/derechopucp.202002.012 pp. 413-469

Holding the Line on Human Rights Accountability: Explaining the Unlikely Judicial Overturn of the Pardon and Immunity Granted to Human Rights Violator Alberto Fujimori*/** En defensa de la justicia: explicando la improbable inaplicación judicial del indulto y derecho de gracia del condenado por graves violaciones a los derechos humanos Alberto Fujimori JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS*** University College London (United Kingdom)

—Vladimiro Montesinos (chief of intelligence service): «President Fujimori wins in 2000… What happens if we lose control of the Judicial Branch and the Public Ministry and have an opposing Judicial Council?». —Luz Salgado (congressperson): «They kill us!».—Montesinos: «[…] There cannot be another coup. That is why we are working for the judicial reform to last indefinitely. It is the only way for the Government to keep control».

Lugar de la memoria, la tolerancia y la inclusión social (2016)

Abstract: Alberto Fujimori, Peruvian ex-president and perpetrator of human rights violations, was released from prison due to a presidential pardon in 2017. He was also granted immunity from prosecution. Although the political branches and the majority of the population supported these measures, as shown by public opinion polls, within months domestic courts overturned them completely relying on standards set by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This is the most unlikely result comparatively. The article examines what could explain this pro human rights accountability behaviour in the judiciary. It argues that the outcome could be the product of two processes initialised during the Peruvian transition: judicial empowerment (independence and power gains) and legal culture shift from positivism to neo-constitutionalism. Both are defined and analysed with reference to transitional justice and socio-legal studies scholarship. The article further

* Based on the dissertation submitted in part-fulfilment of the Master Course in Human Rights at the Department of Political Science, School of Public Policy, University College London, September 2019. ** To my parents Isabel and Javier, example of a lifelong commitment with a fairer Peru. I thank my supervisor Tom Pegram for the interesting discussions and helpful feedback. I am grateful and have benefited from observations by Kate Cronin-Furman, Diego García-Sayán, Samuel Abad, Walter Albán, Úrsula Indacochea, David Lovatón and two anonymous reviewers. *** Independent researcher. Lima, Peru. Lawyer (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú), Master of Laws (King’s College London) and Master of Arts in Human Rights (University College London). ORCID number: 0000-0002-5345-8010. E-mail: [email protected] JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 414 ENFORCEMENT JUDGE OVERTURNS THE PARDON.- IV. EXPLAINING THE THE PARDON.- III.2.3. BARRIOS ALTOS AND LA CANTUTA MASSACRES’ RIGHTS PREPARES THE GROUND FOR THE DOMESTIC OVERTURN OF OF THE IMMUNITY.- III.2.2. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN THE PATIVILCA MASSACRE’S COURT AND THE FIRST BLOW: THE OVERTURN III.2. THE VICTIM’S CHALLENGES AND THE COURTS’ DECISIONS.- III.2.1. FUJIMORISMO AFTER FUJIMORI.- III.1.3. THE PARDON AND IMMUNITY.- III.1. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT.- III.1.1. FUJIMORI.- III.1.2. FUJIMORI PARDON DESPITE AND A IMMUNITY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT.- III. THE FAILED PACT WITH THE DEVIL: PERUVIAN COURTS OVERTURN SHIFT.- II.2.1. JUDICIAL EMPOWERMENT.- II.2.2. LEGAL CULTURE SHIFT.- LEADERSHIP.- II.2. JUDICIAL EMPOWERMENT AND LEGAL CULTURE II.1.2. VETO PLAYERS.- II.1.3. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE.- II.1.4. JUDICIAL AND CHALLENGES TO JUSTICE BARRIERS.- II.1.1. DEMAND.- CIVIL SOCIETY AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY.- II.1. NORM ANTI-IMPUNITY CONTENT: I. II. INTRODUCTION.- EXPLAINING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE Jurídica; justiciatransicional empoderamiento judicial; independenciajudicialización;cultura Fujimori; derechoshumanos;CorteInteramericanadeDerechosHumanos; Palabras clave: un impactodecisivo. las cualeselcontroldeconvencionalidadinteramericanopuedellegaratener Adicionalmente, elartículobuscacontribuiraidentificarlascondicionesbajo destacada deloscamposlajusticiatransicionalyestudiossociojurídicos. Ambos procesossondefinidosyanalizadosconreferenciaadoctrina y uncambioenlaculturaljurídicadelpositivismoalneoconstitucionalismo. empoderamiento judicial(aumentodeindependenciaypodereslosjueces) responder adosprocesosiniciadosenlatransicióndemocráticadelaño2000: peruanos queparticiparonenestasdecisiones.Argumentaéstepodría el comportamientoresueltoafavordelosderechoshumanosjueces este resultadoessingular. Elartículobuscaentenderquépodríaexplicar Humanos. Fujimori fuearrestadoydevueltoalacárcel.Comparativamente, basándose enlosestándaresfijadosporlaCorteInteramericanadeDerechos la época.Noobstante,enpocosmeses,elPoder Judicialperuanolasinaplicó político yapoyopopularmayoritario,segúnlasencuestasdeopiniónpública respecto aotrosprocesosencurso.Estasmedidascontaronconrespaldo indulto presidencialenelaño2017.También seleotorgóelderechodegracia crímenes contralosderechoshumanos,fueliberadodeprisiónmedianteun Resumen: independency; judicialization;legalculture;transitionaljustice Inter-American CourtofHumanRights;judicialempowerment; Keywords: Accountability; conventionalitycontrol;Fujimori; humanrights; Control Doctrinecouldhaveastrongdomesticimpact. seeks toidentifytheconditionsunderwhichInter-American Conventionality El expresidente peruanoAlbertoFujimori, condenadoporgraves Rendición de cuentas; control de convencionalidad; Rendición decuentas;control de convencionalidad; Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN:

the anti-impunitynormthathassincegovernedregion thatset Human Rights(IACtHR) —describedasa«game-changer»—, A casesubjectofalandmarkdecisionbytheInter-American Courtof led tohisconvictionwasnoneotherthantheBarriosAltos massacre. Furthermore, oneofthecriminalcasesbroughtagainstFujimori that p. 1;Root,2012,121-124). officials (Burt,2009,p.397,401;2018,13;Ambos,2011;Skaar, 2011, of circumstantialevidence,andassessmenttheresponsibilityhigh highlights ofthedecisionwereitsuseinternationallaw, evaluation soundness, andcontributiontothefieldofhumanrights.Some around theworldforitsfairness,transparency, thoroughness,analytical widely praisedbyhumanrightsorganisations,observers,andscholars his owncountryforcrimesagainsthumanity(Table 1).Therulingwas democratically electedformerheadofstatetriedandcondemnedin Fujimori wasnotanordinaryinmate.In2009hebecamethefirst 2017). (Resolución SupremaN°281-2017-JUS, him immunity(derecho degracia)fromprosecutioninongoingtrials of a25-yearsentenceforhumanrightscrimes(Table 1).Italsogranted released himfromprisonwithimmediateeffectafterserving12years health problems(PresidenciadelaRepública,2017).Themeasure a «humanitarian» pardon to former dictator Alberto Fujimori citing Kuczynski announcedthrougha brief press release that he hadgranted many, unwantedpresentfromthegovernment. President Pedro Pablo On ChristmasEve2017,Peruvians receivedanunexpected and,for Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: 1 Costa); a damning Ombudsperson report was released; and domestic Costa); adamningOmbudsperson reportwasreleased;anddomestic from Kuczynski’s party benches(congresspersonsDeBelaunde,Zevallos, their posts(notably, ministersBasombrío,Nieto,andDel Solar)andalso to thestreetsinfivedaysofprotests;governmentofficials resignedfrom of victims’familieswasaccompaniedbythousandsPeruvians taking Not surprisinglythen,thepardoncausedgreatcontroversy. Theoutcry Root, 2012,p.169-170;Burt,2018,89). Convention onHumanRights(ACHR) (BarriosAltosv. Peru , 2001; amnesties forgravehumanrightsabusesascontraryto theAmerican CONCLUSION.- CONTROL IN PERU.- DOCTRINE IV.2. LEGAL CULTURE SHIFT IN PERU.- V. GAINS AND POWERS EXPANSION IN PERU.- IV.1.1. CONVENTIONALITY REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY.- IV.1. INDEPENDENCE OUTCOME: JUDICIAL EMPOWERMENT AND LEGAL CULTURE SHIFT IN PERU I. INTRODUCTION Engle (2016). canbefound (2017).summary inGurmendi For a more in-depthanalysis, see: Mallinder(2016) and It isbeyondto review thescopeofthisarticle theevolution ofIACtHR’s doctrine. amnesty A good 1 , deeming , deeming 415 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 416 to their connection to my inquiry’s main question.Inparticular,to theirconnectionmy inquiry’s my Fujimori. Otherdimensions willalsofactorintomyanalysisaccording measure that prevented and undermined criminal trials in relation to article focusesonjusticeand, particularly, thechallengetoanimpunity violations (Burt,2018,p.vii; Abrão&Torelly, 2012,p.153)—,this non-judicial measuresimplementedtodealwithpastgrave humanrights Of thevariousdimensionsoftransitionaljustice—the judicialand for pasthumanrightsviolations? pardon and,arguably, apolitical climateunfavourabletoseekingjustice boldly infaceofthelegalobstacleposedbyFujimori’s immunityand challenge. WhydidthePeruvian courtsheldtheanti-impunity lineso This articleseekstoexplain thesuccessfuloutcomeofvictims’ cell inLima(ElComercio,2019). 2019, aftera long stay in a private clinic, Fujimori wassittingagaininhis thus abletocircumventpoliticsandoverturnthedecision. ByJanuary Fujimori Thejudiciarywas wereunconstitutionalandviolatedACHR. different domesticcourtsruledthattheimmunityandpardonofAlberto of histerm.Whathappened?Following thevictims’challenges,two Fujimori wasorderedtoreturnprisonandservetheremainingyears Furthermore, inOctober2018,lessthanninemonthsafterthepardon, charges ofhumanrightsviolationsinthecasePativilca massacre. months afterthepardon,Fujimori wasorderedtostandtrialfornew for thepardonwereenoughtosustainit.InFebruary 2018,nearlytwo However, neithertheforceofpoliticalbranchesnorpopularsupport 73 ofthe130seats(PrensaLibre,2008). by Fujimori’s offspringto,amongothergoals,fightforhisfreedom,held control oftheunicameralCongress.Fuerza Popular thepartyfounded El Comercio,2018a;Burt,2011b).Moreover, Fujimorismo waslargelyin contrast to earlier measurements closer to his conviction (IPSOS, 2017; in attributable inparttotheperceptionthathewasseriouslysick, had beenconsistentintheyearspriortodecision,whichisarguably 2017; DATUM, 2018).Publicpreferenceforseeing Fujimori’s release (IPSOS, 2018).Similarsupportwasrecordedbyotherpollsters(GFK, the announcement,56%ofpublicwasinfavourand40%against 65% of Peruvians was in favourand 31% was against the pardon; after deserved ahumanitarianpardon.Amonthbeforeitsannouncement, and afterthedecisionshowedthatmostPeruvians believedthatFujimori Yet, thepardonhadrobustsupport.Publicopinionpollstaken before 2017b, 2017c,2017d,2017e,2017f, 2017g, 2017h,2017i,2018g). 2018; J. A.DeBelaunde,2018;DiarioUno,2017; La República,2017a, American CommissiononHumanRights,2017;DefensoríadelPueblo, and internationalhumanrightsorganisationslabelledasimpunity(Inter- Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: have astrongdomesticimpact. helps identifysomeoftheconditions underwhichthisdoctrinecould para. 26). The article p. 1169-1174; Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, p. 93-99;Dulitzky, 2015a,p.100,2015b,50-54;Contesse,2018, Arellano etalv. Chile , par. 124;Binder, 2012,p.307-311; Ferrer, 2015, compliance andthefirstline ofdefencethestandards(Almonacid- it totheconcretecase.Itseeksturnnationaljudges into partnersof judgesshouldnotapply other words,thatwhenanormviolatesACHR, conflict withdomesticnorms,ACHR shouldbegivenpreference.Or, in and advisoryopinions.Moreover, itstatesthatincasesofunavoidable asinterpretedbyIACtHRlaws inconformitywithACHR, rulings created byIACtHR in2006requiresdomesticjudgestoapplynational of theimmunityandpardon.Thisambitiousjurisprudential device Doctrine (control deconvencionalidad ) wasinstrumentalintheoverturn As itwillbeshown,theInter-American ConventionalityControl empowerment ofsomejudgesandashiftintheirlegalculture. 2019, p.4-8).InthecaseofPeru, thiseffectmanifesteditselfinthe to producepositivehumanrightsoutcomesintheregion(Engstrom, the «impactbeyondcompliance»effectofsystemanditscapacity with theInter-American SystemofHumanRights,thisarticleanalyses by offeringacloserexamination oftheinteractionJudicialBranch environments andplayakey roleinhumanrightsaccountability. Also, which conditionsdomesticjudiciariescanassertthemselvesinhostile case ofFujimori’s immunityandpardoncouldbeindicativeunder our understandingoncertainhumanrightsissues.Specifically, the transitional justiceexperience isinmanywaysuniquebutcaninform The «relativelyunderstudied»(Burt,2018,p.3-4)Peruvian vulnerable toshiftsinthepoliticalwinds»(Burt,2011a,p.309). and pardonchallengestheclaimthat«accountabilityagendais and publicopinion.To acertaindegree,theoverturningofimmunity p. 6),wasabletosuccessfullydefytheotherbranchesofgovernment considered non-responsiveandthe«weakest branch»(Finkel, 2008, & Pereira, 2012,p.117).Finally, itisintriguingthatajudiciary, long the pardonofJorgeRafaelVidela granted byCarlosMenem(Engstrom of months,inArgentinaittookcourtsmorethan15yearstoquash speed oftheprocessissingular. WhilstPeru wassuccessfulinamatter past amnestiesremainineffect»(Mallinder, 2016,p.673).Also,the Payne, Pereira &Reiter, 2014b,p.117),where«thevastmajorityof comparatively (Payne, Lessa&Pereira, 2015,p.737;Lessa,Olsen, to justicewascompletelyoverturned.Thisisthemostunlikely scenario The caseofFujimori’s immunityandpardonisofinterest,asabarrier actors inchallengingimpunity. analysis emphasisesempowered,receptive,andwillingjudgesasthekey Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: 417 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 418 further discussesconventionalitycontroldoctrine.SectionVconcludes. practices strengthentheauthorityofIACtHR inPeru. Thissection 2000 transitiontodemocracyandhowconstitutionalframework Section IVexplainsin Peruhow theseprocessesdeveloped the since discussing thepardon,victims’challenge,andcourts’rulings. starts withanoverviewofFujimori’s governmentandFujimorismo before contextual andlegalanalysisofthecourt’s decisions. For thispurpose,it SectionIIIprovidesa shift frompositivismtoneo-constitutionalism. empowerment (independenceandpowergains)legalculture studies.Twojustice andsocio-legal processesarehighlighted:judicial with referencetoleadingscholarshipinthefieldsoftransitional framework toexplain judicialbehaviourintheageofaccountability The argumentproceedsasfollows.SectionIIsetsatheoretical 2016, p.18-43). Payne, 2015,p.439-444; Burt,2011a,p.286-288,2018,3;Engle, 2012,p.19-41;Payne p. 918-936,982;Sikkink, etal,2015, p.729-730; 2001,p.2-6,14-18;Laplante, 2009, transitional justice(Lutz&Sikkink, (justice) asopposingtruthand peace,andmadeitanintegralpartof its furtherdiffusion.Ittransformedtheperceptionofcriminal liability the RomeStatute)signalnorm’s firmestablishment,warranting and thecreationofpermanentInternationalCriminal Courtby point ofthisperiod,andeventsin1998(like Pinochet’s arrestinLondon jurisdiction. The decade of the 1990s is often considered as the starting to thecreationofinternationalcriminalcourtsandnotions ofuniversal (including newdefinitionsofcrimesandcriminalresponsibility) gaverise and justice.Similarly, concurrent progressininternationalcriminallaw of the scope of rights, or the development of «victims’ rights» to truth prosecute orextradite forthemostseriouscrimes,newinterpretations the fieldofinternationalhumanrightslaw, like theadoption ofdutiesto (2001). Thisphenomenoncanbeexplained byglobaldevelopmentsin or accountabilitynorm,generatingLutz&Sikkink«justicecascade» past humanrightsabusesfollowingtheemergenceofananti-impunity have spreadaroundtheworldtoholdperpetratorscriminallyliablefor «The ageofhumanrightsaccountability»isaperiodduringwhichtrials II.1. II.

EXPLAINING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY Barriers andChallengesto Norm JusticeAnti-Impunity Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: «Accused Fujimori, I rule here! Order!» Order!» here! rule I Fujimori, «Accused P —Judge César San Martín —Judge CésarSanMartín rensa

l ibre (2007) international pressure, and judicial leadership. They are all considered international pressure,and judicial leadership.Theyareallconsidered factors havebeenidentified: demandfromcivilsociety, vetoplayers, failure (validation)ofthechallenges toimpunitymeasures.Four key Specifically, thefactorsgoverning thesuccess(removalorerosion) their scopeorannulthem incourts,ballotboxes, andparliaments. legal challengestotheobstacles, namely, theattemptstoreduce circumstances inwhichtrialsarepossible.Theyhave analysedthe Transitional justicescholarshavefocused on understanding the p. xxvi-xvii; Slye,2012,p.310-312;Skaar etal,2016b,p.42-44). (Payne, 2015,p.453; Payne etal,2015,p.730-738,742;Méndez,2012, these measuressucceedinblockingjustice;sometimes theydonot prosecute abuses(«latejustice»or«delayedaccountability»). Sometimes and stability, thus providing time toacquire theresources necessary to transitioning fromconflictorauthoritarianruleasaguarantee forpeace impunity measuresmaintaincontinuousappealforfragile democracies (Freeman’s «necessaryevils»). Finally, stillotherscholarsarguethat repressive leaderstostepdownfrompowerandpreventfurtherviolence for bringingwarringpartiestothenegotiationtableorforcing see thatimpunitymeasuresarenecessaryineverypoliticaltoolbox «cascadeparadox»). Others higher riskofprosecution(Mallinder’s or increasedtheincentivesforprotectingperpetratorsinfrontofa Some considerthatthe«cascading»oftrials might havemaintained This phenomenonhasgenerateddifferentexplanations intheliterature. gross violations(Lessaetal,2014b,p.110). few (16%)compliedwithhumanrightsstandardsthatprohibitthemfor of thesemeasuresin34transitionalcountries,scholarsfoundthatvery p. 90-92;Lessaetal,2014b,106-109).Moreover, afteranalysing63 (Payne etal,2015,p.745;Olsenal,2012,344-347;Mallinder, 2012, are stillimposedaroundtheworldandwieldsignificantstayingpower Despite theageofaccountability, researchhasshownthatsuchbarriers rule oflaw(Freeman &Pensky, 2012,p.42). seen asanaffronttovictimsandweakening legalinstitutionsandthe international humanrightslaw(Engle,2016,p.15).Overall,theyare are consideredduties; and state failure to fulfil them, a violationof prosecuted, and punished (Payne they contradicttheexpectation thatviolationswillbeinvestigated, form, scope,andlegaleffects(Mallinder, 2012,p.76-78),but,ingeneral, atrocities, theypromote«turningthepage».Theyvaryintheircauses, and reduceoreliminatetheirsanctions.Insteadofreckoning withpast Collins, 2016a,p.6).Thesebarrierslegallyshieldthemfromprosecution perpetrators ofserioushumanrightsviolations(Skaar, & García-Godos are consideredtheantithesisofaccountabilitywhenadoptedtobenefit Under this vision, measures like amnesties, pardons, andimmunities Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: et al, 2015, p. 730). Those expectations 419 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 420 barriers meritexplanation. The fourkey factorsthatexplain thesuccessofchallengestoimpunity inexorable trajectory(2012,p.211). runs contrarytoClark’s interpretationofthejusticecascadeasalinear, Argentina demonstratedallpossiblescenarios(2012, p. 349),which prosecutions resumed.Olsenetalpositthatfrom 1983 to2006, and pardonsformorethantwentyyears,afterwhich unrestricted the possibilityfortrialsincountrywasforeclosed with amnesties Pereira (2012)intheircasestudyofArgentina.Aninitialopening accountability forgravehumanrightsviolationsbyEngstromand This hasaptlybeendescribedasthe«ebbandflow»ofprocess accountability arenoteasy, linearorinexorable» (2012,p.356). (Skaar different times,progressingtowardorregressingfromfullaccountability have occupieddifferentpositionsontheaccountabilitycontinuumat reversals orprogression.Inthatvein,thesamestatewouldmostlikely The acquisitionofrelevantcharacteristicsovertimeaccountsfor 2016c, p.276-285). (Lessa experienced fullaccountability, duetobarriersjusticebeingannulled secured manytrialsthroughcreativecircumvention.AndArgentina no trialsinBrazil.SomehavesurfacedElSalvador. Chilehas The regiondisplaysthisvariation.Aperduringamnestyhasproduced Skaar p. 347;Lessaetal,2014a,83-84,95;Payne etal,2015,p.743-745; and (iv)fullimpunity, wherethereisnoroomfortrials(Olsenetal,2012, trials areeffectivelyblocked andjusticeislimitedtosomeexceptions; degrees ofaccountability;(iii)anaccountabilityimpasse,wheremost accountability; (ii) creative circumvention of barriers permitting high in atheoreticalcontinuum:(i)totalremovalofbarriersallowingfull combination betweenthemwouldexplain thedifferentoutcomes The relativestrength or weakness of each factor and the dynamic et al,2014a,p.76,2014b,111). to beimportantbutnotsufficient(Payne etal,2015,p.738,743;Lessa capacity toresonatedomestically, which inturnhingesontheresources challenging barrierstojustice. Victims’ strengthisproportionate totheir conditions forattainingjustice bypressingfortrials,claimingrights,and activists, lawyers,etc.Civilsociety demandcreatessomeofthenecessary actors like NGOs,press,unions,student organisations,individual This referstothemobilisationforjusticebyvictimsand othersocietal II.1.1. Civil Society Demand Civil Society , 2016b, p. 33-43). et al,2016b,p.33-43). et al,2014a,p.86-92;Lessa2014b,117-125;Skaar etal, , 2016b, p. 36-38). As Olsen et al put it «the pathways to et al,2016b,p.36-38).AsOlsenputit«thepathwaysto Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Low, 2019,p.25-28). their governments(Keck &Sikkink«boomerangpattern»;Engstrom as blocked, thesegroupshavesoughttobringinternationalpressureon (Vanhala, 2018,p.384).But,whendomesticopportunitiesareperceived affordable costs)areavailable,thereisanincentiveforlegalmobilisation precedents, etc.)andaccesstocourts(rulesoflegalstanding and claimsthatcanbemadeaccordingtothebodyoflaw, standards, likelihood ofgroupstomobilisethelaw. Whenlegalstock(arguments The conceptoflegalopportunitystructureoffershypothesesonthe pushing theprocessforward. opportunities (p.66-67,105).Together withNGOs,arecredited focus oftheirdemandschangeaccordingtoshiftingcircumstancesand important elementofthetransitionaljusticeprocess»,noticingthat Some scholars,like Burt (2018), consider victims as «the single-most 2012, p.120). et al,2015,p.746;Lessaal,2014a,77-78;Engstrom&Pereira, for mobilisation,itsframing, andthestrategiesoftheircampaigns(Payne Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: incorporation of humanrightstreatiesin the1994Constitutionwith in Argentinawiththelegalchallenges toimpunitymeasures,wherethe opportunity structure»)(2005, p.265-266,269-271).Thiswasthecase this aspect incentivises NGOs and victim groups to action(a «political legal space(Lessaetal,2014a, p.82).Sikkink(2005)considersthat where legalobligationsembed humanrightsstandardsinthedomestic The effectofinternationalpressurewillbemoredirect andstronger to theirdecisions(p.318,323). where internalresistanceispresent,bygivingmoraland legalauthority that internationalcourtscan«facilitate»theworkofnational authorities p. 739,747;Lessaetal,2014a,81-83).Binder(2012) hasobserved amplify, support,andsustainthedomesticdemand(Payne etal,2015, and legitimisethedomesticuseofhumanrightsstandards, aswellto international humanrightsorganisations,NGOsandcourts toadvocate accountability. Mostrelevantto international pressureisthecapacity of International pressureweakens barriers from the outsideandpromotes Pressure II.1.3. International 747-748; Lessaetal,2014a,p.78-80). channels, whetherholdingpublicofficeornot(Payne etal,2015,p.739, further advancement of transitionaljustice through formal or informal depends onthecapacitytogenerateimpunitypoliciesorcontain forces. Theirstrength regime, theirsupporters,and/orthesecurity strong individedsocieties.Theseactorsareoftenmembersoftheold Actors thatopposeandresisttransitionaljusticeareexpected tobe Players II.1.2. Veto 421 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 422 in LatinAmerica(Lessaetal,2014b,p.112-113,128). eight countriesthatsuccessfullyoverturnedorcircumventedthem,are Ninety percent of the challenges to impunity barriers, and seven of the the individualcomplaintsproceduretoIACtHR foradjudication. regarding concretesituations.Furthermore, IACHR referscasesfrom promoting humanrights,bycelebrating, orexpressing concern human rightsorganofthesystem,whichconstantlyissuesstatements theother The fulfilmentofthesestandardsisoverseenbyIACHR, rights guaranteesenshrinedintheACHR» (Binder, 2012,p.309). human in theIntroduction—made«nationaljudgesguardiansof creation oftheconventionalitycontroldoctrinebyIACtHR —defined effect») (p. 314-324). Furthermore,ACHR high rank («spill-over the those thatwerenotpartytothedisputehadconstitutionsgrant proceedings anddirectlyboundtocomplywiththejudgment,butover amnesty doctrinehadanimpactnotonlyoverthestatespartyto Skaar standards thatcouldbeuseddomestically(Mallinder, 2016,p.658-660; rights. Itframedtransitionaljusticeintermsofhumanrightsandset significant, andleadingroleoftheInter-American systemofhuman regions inthesuccessofchallengingimpunitybarriersisactive, One ofthemaindifferencesLatinAmericaincomparisontoother Pereira, 2012,p.109). «turned courtsintokey arenasforhumanrightspolitics»(Engstrom& in broadeningthelegalscopeforjudicialaction»(Skaar, 2011,p.76),it constitutional hierarchyisdeemedasthe«singlemostimportantevent capacity to overcome impunity and promote accountability is in the capacity toovercomeimpunity andpromoteaccountabilityisinthe (Hillebrecht, 2012,p.284). Ithasbeennotedthat«ultimatelythe to becomethemostimportant partnersforhumanrightscompliance on decisionsbythecourts»(p. 119).Assuch,courtshavethepotential O’Donnell (1998a) considers that «their ultimate effectiveness depends Although otherstateagencies fulfilhorizontalaccountabilityroles, p. 114,117-119;1998b,7-8,13-14,20;Glopenetal, 2004, p.1). Part ofthosechecksincludescriminalresponsibility (O’Donnell, 1998a, democracy, crossthelimitsof their powers,orneglectfunctions. checks onrelevantpartieswhentheyviolaterights, compromise answerability ofinstitutions,agencies,andofficials, byimposing fulfil indemocraciesbyensuringtransparency, byguaranteeingthe to thehorizontalaccountabilityfunctionthatcourtsare expected to annulling impunitybarriers(Lessaetal,2014a,p.80-81).Itrelates through theirdecisionsbycircumventing, deemingvoidofeffects,or for justice.Theextent thatjudgesadvancethepossibilityofprosecutions This factorreferstotheresponsivenessofdomesticcourtsdemand leadership II.1.4. Judicial et al,2016a,p.12-14).Binder(2012)explains thatIACtHR’s Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: perpetrators accountable represents another aspect of the judicialization perpetrators accountablerepresents anotheraspectofthejudicialization Providing checksonpower andeliminatingbarrierstoholding 2011, p.253-256,261-262). (Sieder framed asconstitutionalissues, broughttocourts,anddecidedbyjudges legislature, andsocial forces («political questions») are increasingly occurs whenaspectsthatusedtobeaddressedbytheexecutive branch, contribute to the phenomenon of «judicialization of politics». This scholarshavefoundthatindependentandstrongcourts Socio-legal judicial empowermentandshiftsoflegalculture. that leadtostrongindependentjudgeswillingchallengeimpunityare and differentfactorscouldbeatplay. Two plausiblecommonconditions Scholars havecautionedthatexplaining judicialbehaviourisdifficult «necessary factorclosetobesufficient»(Lessaetal,2014b,p.126). for pastwrongs»(Skaar, 2011,p.11-12).Courts,therefore,representa rather thanpoliticianshavetaken theleadinquesttoobtainjustice hands ofthejudiciary»(Payne etal,2015,p.747).Whereoften«judges Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Blass, 2017,p.299-311): p. 22-24;Helmke 2011,p.6-10,15,18;Brinks& &Ríos-Figueroa, Landau, 2010,p.321-325,338;Hirschl,2011,263-271;Skaar, 2011, consideration whenmeasuringjudicialpowers(Finkel, 2008,p.4-5; Literature highlightsthatthefollowingfactorsmustbetaken into (Brinks &Blass,2017,p.297). courts getsreducedandtheabilityoftoaffectpoliticsisexpanded and tools to decide cases.In other words, that the influence of politics on Helmke 2011,p.22).Itimpliesthatjudgeshavespace &Ríos-Figueroa, and expansion ofitslegalpowers(Hirschl,2004;Finkel, 2008,p.5; independence Judicial empowerment refers togainsin the judiciary’s Empowerment II.2.1. Judicial II.2. • • Judicial Empowerment andLegal Culture Shift capacity tointervenedecisivelyinabroadrangeofissues. human rights,grantjudicialreview, and, ingeneral,markthe cover alargenumberoftopics,containbillrights, embed courts, effectsofrulings,and«thickconstitutions»,this isthat Factors thatdefineCourtsstrength: rulesofstandingandaccessto procedures thatdeterminethecareerofjudges. guarantees andlimitstopoliticalbranchesinfluenceinall Attention focusesontheintroductionofdueprocesslaw and promotion;economicresources;lengthoftenure. Factors thataffectindependence:rulesofappointment,discipline, et al,2005,p.1-6;Hilbink&Woods, 2009,p.746;Hirschl, 423 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 424 in accountability(Siederetal , 2005,p.12-13;Finkel, 2008,p.6-8; principles andhumanrights, andanactiveinterpretativeroleofcourts refers to a legal culture that privileges strong readings of constitutional and restrainedcourts,mostly deferenttopoliticalpower. The latter attached totheprinciplesoflegality andsovereignty, literalinterpretation, The formerisdefinedasa formalistic,conservativeculturestrongly dismantle legalpositivismandreplaceitwithneo-constitutionalism. More specifictohumanrightsaccountability, ashiftinlegalcultureshould 2016,p.183). quickly» (González-Ocantos, be «gearedtoreproduceroutinesthat[allow]them disposecases Ocantos, 2016,p.26-33;Torelly, 2019,p.134).Otherwise,judgeswill process becauselegalculturemediatesjudicialoutcomes (González- Effective changesinlegalcultureareespeciallyimportant forthejustice concrete scenariosmustbeacquired(p.6-21,27-36,269-276, 288-289). action and,importantly, abilitytooperationalisethemin thejudiciary’s must beseenasvalid,legitimate,professional,preferablecoursesof embedded inthelegalcultureofjusticeoperators.Thesedevelopments have been empowered through judicial reforms. Developments must be level, thatthereisafavourablepoliticalenvironment,orjudiciaries is notenoughthatananti-impunitynormhasrisenintheinternational processofhumanrightsaccountability, establishment ofalarge-scale it (2016)posits that,forthe trials inLatinAmerica,González-Ocantos p. 746;Pásara,2014,88).Inhiscompellingstudyofhumanrights discourses, androutinesofthelegalsphere(Hilbink&Woods, 2009, Legal cultureencompassestheideas,theories,values,knowledge, II.2.2. p. 338,346). in tofulfilthatrole(Landau,2010, constitutionalism havehadtostep executive Newcourtsand todominatepolicymakingwithoutcheck. institutions donotworkwell.Dysfunctionalparliamentsleavethe the actionsofexecutive orparliament.Moreover, political (Hirschl, 2004),becausenostrongconstitutionalculturepermeates Democracies inLatinAmericaarefertilegroundfor«juristocracy» in politicallysalientcases»(Hilbink&Woods, 2009,p.747). constrain political outcomes unless judgesareabletoassertthemselves in place» (Burt, 2018, p. 90), and that «courts cannot shape, influence, or waytoguaranteethatimpunitysystemsremain institutions isasure-fire of politics.Scholarsarguethat«theabsenceindependentlegal Legal Culture Shift P ar Law andtheinterests andnormativepreferences ofits

E ngstrom practitioners cannot be simply reduced to politics practitioners cannotbesimplyreduced topolitics Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: & G abrie l P ereira (2012, p . 120) (Pegram, 2014,p.611). which theoreticalframeworksontheageofaccountabilitytendtolack plausible explanations ofnorminternalisation(atleastinthejudiciary), Additionally, ananalyticalfocusonshiftsinlegalculturecanfacilitate (Skaar, 2016,p.30-32,272-274). 2011,p.26;González-Ocantos, underestimates thepotentialoflawtoproduceitsowndynamics sectors, rendersthejudiciaryalmostinvisibleand and pro-impunity pressure, andshiftingbalancesofpowerbetweenpro-accountability Alternatively, placingtoomuchemphasisoncivilsociety, international into theanalysisisthatjudgesandprosecutorsaretaken seriously. The advantageofbringingjudicialempowermentandlegalculture 2016). 2012, p.331)andMexico (González-Ocantos, 169, 172-177).SimilarcultureshavebeenobservedinSpain(Aguilar, culture thatgivescontinuitytothe«authoritarianlegality»(p.165-166, it asimpunityandoblivion—,istheproductofaconservativejudicial Brazilian judicialinterpretationoftheamnestylaw—thatunderstands for morethan15years(p.145).Abrão&Torelly (2012)arguethatthe judiciaryasplayingadefiningroleinupholdingimpunity in Uruguay’s Lessa (2012)describesthelackoftrainingandexpertise inhumanrights p. 5-7,40-54). 2016, 2014, p.88-104;Huneeus,2016,180-187;González-Ocantos, Helmke 2011,p.1-2,17;Skaar, &Ríos-Figueroa, 2011,p.34;Pásara, Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: in1992,shutting downparliamentand performed a«self-coup» Democratically electedin 1990,healliedwiththemilitaryand abuses prefertocallitadictatorship. authoritarianism» (Carrión, 2006b,p.299-313).Butthevictimsofits authoritarianism» (Levitsky &Way, 2002,p.52-54),and«electoral (Crabtree, 1998,p.22),«hybrid»2001), «competitive «delegative democracy»(O’Donnell, 1998a,p.120),«neo-populist» political scientistsas«autocraticdemocracy»(Maucery, 1997), Alberto Fujimori’s regime(1990-2000)hasbeen characterisedby III.1.1. Fujimori III.1. III. Vile actsunfortunatelyform partofpoliticallifeinalmostallnations,butthere are not THE FAILED PACT WITH THE DEVIL: PERUVIAN COURTS DESPITE A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT OVERTURN FUJIMORI’S PARDON AND IMMUNITY Historical andPoliticalHistorical Context many cases in which a ruler has perpetrated so many in such a short time many casesinwhicharulerhasperpetratedsosuchshorttime M ario V argas L l osa (2017) 425 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 426 on powerandreleasedhim from accountability. «permanent coup»(Conaghan, 2005),whichfastenedFujimori’s hold 2000; Dargent,2005,p.141-147). Thissettingproducedastateof unconstitutional term(J. DeBelaunde,1997,2008;Gonzales, had ruledagainstalawgranting Fujimori thepossibilityforathird 1997 impeachmentofthree ConstitutionalCourtjudgesthat removal. Anotoriouscaseagainstjudicialindependency wasthe to ensuretheirallegiancethegovernment’s willor their easy Branch andPublicMinistrywereintentionallykept un-termed accountability powersovertheexecutive. Magistrates attheJudicial the electoralsystem,CNM, AMAG, andalmostallinstitutionswith informal channels(bribesandthreats),Fujimori neutralised orcaptured Through parliament—recomposedwithaFujimorista majority—and reform expected. (O’Donnell, 1998a,p.120).Heinitiated judicialreform,butnotthe his «naturalskillfordisruptinghorizontalaccountability networks» byasubstantialmajoritysetfree 32-36, 112-117).His1995re-election interest inimplementingstrongerchecks(Finkel, 2008,p.12-14, theexecutive;parliamentary authorityvis-à-vis Fujimori hadno anddiminishing to sellpublicgoods,obtainingtherightre-election, international pressurewiththenewconstitution,achievingpower failure dependslargelyonthelatter(2008,p.2).After appeasing process: initiationandimplementation.Thereform’s successor reform. But,asFinkel explains, judicialreformimplies atwo-step Following thejustificationforcoup,Fujimori launchedajudicial 1998, p.179,190;Dargent,2005,141). relevant gainsinjudicialindependenceandpowers(J. De Belaunde, la Magistratura-CNM)andConstitutionalCourtsecuredonpaper Branch, PublicMinistry, theJudicialCouncil(ConsejoNacionalde Magistratura -AMAG). Moreover, revampedprovisionsfortheJudicial rights ombudspersonandtheJudiciarySchool(Academia dela institutional innovations(Abad,2006).Amongthemwereahuman toPeruThe Constitutionintroducedneo-liberalism and included (Abad &Garcés,1993). assembly, resultinginthe1993Constitution,whichisstill in effect project. Internationalpressureforcedhimtocallforaconstitutional However, hisrealmotivationwastosetinmotionanauthoritarian and terrorist-allied (Moura,2012). judiciaryjustifiedtheself-coup claimed thatan«obstructionist»parliamentand a corrupt, partisan, 80% composedofprovisionaljudges(Ledesma,1999,p.35).Fujimori sacked andreplaced byun-termedjustices,leavingtheJudicialBranch General, SupremeCourt,andhundredsofjudgesprosecutorswere concentrating power(Crabtree,2001,p.290-291).TheAttorney- Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: TV-channel under control was key for Fujimori’s 2000 judges. Keeping theConstitutionalCourtneutralisedandIvcher’s Baruch IvcherandthecasesofimpeachedConstitutional Court withdrawing fromIACtHR wastopreventitfromdecidingthecase of MRTA by faceless militarycourts.Nevertheless, the real drive behind questioned Peru’s anti-terroristlegislationandthetrialof4members The governmentjustifiedtheactbycriticisinganIACtHR’s rulingthat ignored IACtHR (IvcherBronstein v. Peru , 1999,paras.39-55). allowing forthatpossibility—,therestofperiod government as inadmissible—onthebasisthatthereisnoprovisioninACHR IACtHR’s jurisdiction.AlthoughIACtHR dismissedthewithdrawal In 1999Fujimori attemptedtoretractPeru’s recognitionof p. 387,397-398). &Reátegui,2016,p. 233;Burt,2009, Vílchez, 2016;García-Godos 2014, p.226-240;Laplante,2009,949-953;Gonzales,2011; professor (LaCantuta)(ComisióndelaVerdad yReconciliación, a child(BarriosAltos),aswellninestudentsanduniversity two operations,Colinaexecuted ordisappeared15peopleincluding responsibility fortheBarriosAltosandLaCantutamassacres.Inthese In 1995,twobroadamnestylawsprotectedColinafromcriminal kidnapping, torturing, executing, anddisappearingaround50people. Colina Group.Between1991and1993,wasresponsiblefor insurgency strategy, called hisregimecreatedamilitarydeath-squad the stronghandedgovernance.Inparalleltoofficialcounter- la Verdad yReconciliación,2014)—,andFujimori championed the stateandsociety, ultimatelyleaving69,280dead(Comisiónde the GuevaristTupac AmaruRevolutionaryMovement)confronted during whichtwoterroristorganisations(theMaoistShiningPath and The countrystillfacedtheinternalarmedconflict(1980-2000)— p. 136fn31). monthly bribes(IvcherBronstein v. Peru, 2001;J. DeBelaunde,2008, judiciary. Thesupportoftheremainingchannelwassecuredthrough seized controloffiveoutsixprivateTVchannelsthroughthe Godos &Reátegui,2016,p.229).For instance,thegovernment both tocurbpoliticaloppositionandasatoolofrepression»(García- Courts werenotonlyneutralisedforimpunity, they«wereopenlyused Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: resigned inNovember2000. Hisgovernmentisconsideredamongst la Tolerancia ylaInclusiónSocial, 2019). Fujimori fledtoJapanand authorities, businesspersons, andotherofficials(LugardelaMemoria, Fujimori’s righthand, bribingcongresspeople,judges,electoral collapsed amidstacorruption scandal.Videos surfacedofMontesinos, After winningthethirdtermindubious elections,theregime plans (Soley&Steininger, 2018, p. 244-248). re-re-election

427 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 428 crimes (LaRepública,2011). seven ofhisformerassociateshavealsobeensentencedfordifferent crimes againsthumanity(Gamarra,2009).At least,twohundredand international crimes,theCourtthattriedhimqualifiedhisactionsas power structureunderhiscontrol.Although,Peru didnotregulate the context ofhumanrightsviolations,carriedoutthrougha him guiltyofaggravatedkidnapping, assault,andhomicidewithin massacres bearsthelongestsentence:25years.Theverdictfound crimes (Table 1).HisconvictionfortheBarriosAltosandLaCantura date, hehasreceived4convictionsforcorruptionandhumanrights the onehehadleft(Burt2009,p.395-396;Vílchez,2016).To this and hereturnedhandcuffedtofaceadifferentjusticesystemthan and 4.5%ofGDP(p.450).In2007Peru extradited himfromChile, corruption ofthe1990saccountedfor50%publicexpenditures the most corrupt in Peruvian history. Quiroz (2008) estimates that the than S/.51000(around£12331902)(La República,2018k).Victims have beenrepairedbytheState. * Fujimori hasnotpaidthereparationsheowestostate.With legalinterests,hisoutstandingdebtismore (25 years). * Peruvian prison sentences do notaccumulate.Currently the only pending term is for thehumanrights cases Source: J. A.deBelaunde (2012). 2 3 1 4 massacre, LaCantuta seizure ofdocuments, massacre, Gorritiand Congressional bribes, illegal mediafunding payment infavourof the houseofMonte boxes andsuitsfrom illegal phonetaping Diversion ofpublic Dyer kidnappings. funds forirregular Illegal searchand of oppositionand . for re-re-election Barrios Altos Montesinos. sinos’ wife. Cases - Table 1.AlbertoFujimori Convictions i. Abuseofpower. iv. Aggravated kidnapping. humanity). (qualified ascrimesagainst iii. Aggravatedassault humanity). (qualified ascrimesagainst ii. Aggravatedhomicide of communications. vii. Violation ofthesecrecy officials. vi. Corruptionofpublic v. Embezzlement. ix. Ideologicalfalsehood. viii. Embezzlementand Crimes Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Conviction 6 months 25 years 7 years, 6 years 6 years S/ 400000,00 S/ 300800,00 S/ 27060216,00 S/ 3000000,00 Owed tothe Reparation State p. 147-150,172). the judiciarycontinuedto deliver humanrightsconvictions(2016, Ocantos showedinhisstudythat,despitethehostile environment, in thistimewereeventuallydefeated(Table 2).Furthermore, González- the policiesofthoseyears.Nevertheless,mostmeasures adopted Some pessimisticpredictionsfortransitionaljusticeinPeru werebased on p. 149,163;Root,2012,116). This setthetoneforadministration(Burt2011a, p.308,2014, in humanrightsabusesfromGarcía’s firstterminoffice(1985-1990). LuisGiampietriwereseriouslyimplicated García andhisvice-president environment foraccountabilityafterFujimori’s regime. PresidentAlan represented areorganisationofimpunityforcesandthe firsthostile the rulingpartyAPRA.From ahumanrightsperspective,thisperiod Between 2006and2011,Fujimorismo enteredaninformalcoalitionwith and 73in2016(Tuesta, 2019). parliament inthelastthreegeneralelections:132006,372011, APRA partypreviouslyheld.Thiswasreflectedintheseatsobtained has becomethemostorganisedparty, having taken the place that the Peruvian partysystem(Cornejoetal,2019,p.330-331),Fuerza Popular in themedia,andclientelistpractices.For alltheweaknessesof membership, structure,capacityformobilisation,constantpresence crime (AssociatedPress,2016;TheGuardian,2018)—hasproduced which has prompted investigations of money laundering and organized apparentlackofeconomicconstraints—anobservation, The party’s Evangelical churches(J. A.DeBelaunde,2019). party totheagendaofmostreactionarysectorsCatholicand Fujimorismo ingredients,Keiko addedmoralconservatismbylinkingthe (Prensa Libre,2008;Vílchez,2016;Zapata,2016).To thesetraditional transitional justice—,economicneoliberalism,andclientelism authoritarianism —withastrongstanceagainsthumanrightsand his policies.Itembracesaright-wing ideologythatcombinespolitical for thefreedomofFujimori, reclaimhislegacy, andgivecontinuityto Kenji, whofoundedFuerza Popular. Thepartywasformedtofight Imprisoned, hispoliticalcapitalpassedtochildren,Keiko and Godos, 2019,p.332-333). chaos andtheinternalarmedconflict(Cornejo,Pérez-León&García- Root, 2012,p.95-96).Heiswidelycreditedwithendingeconomic Fujimori’s regimecollapsed,butheremainedpopular(Carrión,2006a; III.1.2. Fujimorismo Fujimori after Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: 429 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 430 free legaldefenceto security forcesper to BuildaMemory or retired,accused Legislative Decree 2010 «Amnestyin 2006 «Anti-NGO N° 022-2008-DE- sonnel, inactivity 2009 Rejectionof Executive Decree 2008 Provisionof German Funding of humanrights Law N°28925 Measure violations disguise» Museum N° 1097 Law» SG - Table 2.ImpunityCoalitionMeasuresStatus mental organisations. rights andenviron- targets werehuman regime. Themain through adisciplinary funding andactivities powers overNGOs Extend executive disseminated. of theconflicttoget mission interpretation Reconciliation Com- Prevent theTruth and against humanity. limitations forcrimes bility ofstatutes tion ofnon-applica tion oftheConven- Prevent theapplica- terms ofprocedure. the excess offormal rights trialsbasedon Shelve mosthuman sed groups). historically marginali- families (mostlyfrom for victimsortheir usually notavailable A typeoflegalaid private legalcounsels. providing themwith perpetrators by Benefit humanrights Intended Effect - Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Court. Constitutional of thelawat constitutionality challenged the Domestic NGO’s project. and acceptthe García reverse made president a protestthat spearheaded Vargas Llosa Writer Mario Court. Constitutional of thelawat constitutionality challenged the congresspeople Opposition statements. it through condemned organisations human rights NGOs and international Domestic and Public protests. Reaction the NGO’s challenge. ding tothetermsof interpretation, accor «amended» through remaining partwas titutional andthe partially uncons Court heldthelaw The Constitutional Annulled in2007. tion since2015. built andisinopera- The museumwas Reversed in2009. Still ineffect. standards in2011. IACtHR caselaw Court basedon by theConstitutional red unconstitutional Furthermore, decla - congress in2010. reversed. Repealedby The government Status - - Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: of suchvoteindefiancethe partylinewouldbesolvedtwodayslater. Kenji Fujimori abstainedfromvoting(ElComercio,2017d).The mystery required. Ten Fuerza Popular congresspeople underthecommandof Kuczynski savedhisheadmomentarily. Itobtained 79votesofthe87 motion failedtobesupportedwiththerequiredsupermajority and company Odebrecht(ElComercio,2017e).At theeleventhhour, the for allegedlyreceivingmoneyfromthecorruptBrazilian construction a motionimpeachingKuczynski for«permanentmoralincapacity» The finalshowdownoccurredinDecember2017.Fujimorismo filed Cornejo prerogatives (J. A.DeBelaunde,2017,2019;2018; an abusiveand,sometimes,unconstitutionaluseof congressional the governmentusingitsparliamentarymajority. Thisexpressed in Fujimorism embarked onapoliticalwartoobstruct,ifnotoverthrow, party finishedthirdwith18seats(Tuesta, 2019).From dayone, control oftheparliamentwithamajority of 73/130. The President’s as parliamentaryelectionsoccurinthefirstround,Fujimorismo obtained the electiontoPedro Pablo Kuczynski by0.24%(42,597votes).However, In 2016,afterrunningwithaconsiderableadvantage,Keiko Fujimori lost De Belaunde,2017). v. Peru, 2012;Rivera,2013;BocanegraChávez v. Poder Judicial 2014; 2009, Burt, 2009; BBC, N° 022-2008-DE-SG; (Crabtree,2006;SirumbalRamosv.Source: Self-elaboration. Congreso delaRepública reduced thetermsof Barrios Altosmassa- applying thestatute cre, thatacquitted Ruling onMonte of limitationsand Court Chamber’s Court Chamber’s 4 perpetratorsby sinos andColina 2012 JavierVilla Massacre Ruling 2013 ElFrontón STC N°01969- Stein Supreme Group forthe 2011-PHC the others. et al,2019,p.332). - decisions onthecase. IACtHR previous tri. Thiscontradicted García, andGiampie presumably benefit against humanityto case wasnotacrime Declare thatthe terrorists. that thevictimswere humanity, andstated not acrimeagainst cre acommoncrime, Barrios Altosmassa- ruling considered his conviction.The him atooltoquestion Fujimori byproviding nity. Indirectlybenefit and infavourofimpu tation againstjustice mework ofinterpre Offer anewfra- - - Congresistasv. 2012; BarriosAltos Roots, DL1097,2011; - rights NGOs. domestic human of Justiceand by theMinistry (subsanación a correctionbrief Challenged with the IACtHR. request briefat a supervision nisations through man rightsorga- victims andhu- the familiesof internationally by Challenged ce Ministry. filed bytheJusti an amparoclaim domestically by Challenged , 2013, 2016; González-Ocantos, 2016;J., 2013,2016;González-Ocantos, A. ) filed ) - ruling. partially annulledthe a newconformation, tutional Court,with In 2016,theConsti standards. with inter-American 2013 thatcomplied new judgmentin 2012 andissueda its owndecisionin preme Courtannulled theSu- of IACtHR, Following theruling generate impunity. not corrected,would ted itscaselawand,if the rulingcontradic- IACtHR foundthat , 2007;DecretoSupremo - 431 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 432 Nevertheless, aftersalutingthe freedomofFujimori, Fujimorismo refused integrate itandworkona commonagenda(ElComercio,2017b). cabinet», hopingthatmembers ofFuerza Popular wouldagreeto 2018d). Andevenreshuffled thecabinet,namingit«reconciliation January toemphasizepardon, unity, andreconciliation(ElComercio, documents (La República,2018j). Also, itused the visit of thePope in national dialogueandreconciliation»,alabeltobeincluded inallofficial Following acuriousPeruvian tradition,itnamed2018 «theyearof The governmentstartedacampaigntoquietquestioning voices. were reunitedinthefestivities(Harada,2017). He finishedbywishingallamerryChristmasandhoping thatfamilies country, andworktogetherforthefuturedefeat of poverty». the past […]». He continued, «Let usturn the page, don’t paralyse our he pleaded «nottobe carried awaybynegative emotions and hate from bicentenary [2021]unitedinpeaceandprosperity».Of «young voters» ourselves toaseriouseffortforreconciliation,wemustreachthe in termsofreconciliation:«openwoundscanonlyhealifwecommit alternative ofahousearrestbill.Moreover, heframedthemeasure Fujimori, butthatparliamentsubsequentlyrejectedhisproposed acknowledged thathehadpromisedinhiscampaignnottopardon contributed tonationalprogress.Addressing protestors,Kuczynski Peruvians shouldnotforgetthathetookofficeunderadirecrisisand that, althoughFujimori committed«mistakes andseriousexcesses», «democrats shouldpreventFujimori fromdyingimprisoned».Hesaid Constitution, Kuczynski saidthat«justicewasnotvengeance»and that and stressingthathisdecisionwaswithinthepowersgrantedby unusual setting of a religiousimageinthebackground,repeating justification forhisactthroughareadtelevisedstatement.With the The next day, promptedbyprotests,Kuczynski providedfurther recognises hisrightstodignity, life,andhealth. imply anacceptanceorvalidationofhisacts,andthattheConstitution Fujimori wasnolongeramenacetosociety, thatthedecisiondoesnot to grantpardonsandimmunities,thedecisiondeclaresthat79year-old constitutional andlegalnormsthatrecognisethepowerofpresident personal doctor since1997 (Ojo Público, 2017).After restatingthe for thedecision,includingonebyamedicalboardheadedFujimori’s that theprisonposedtohim.Itrefersfoursecretreportsasbasis disease» fromwhichFujimori suffered,aswelltheallegedseriousrisk justified bythe«gravenon-terminal,advanced,progressive,incurable 2017).Thedecisionwas (Resolución SupremaN°281-2017-JUS, presidentialdecisionpublishedonthenightof24December two-page The humanitarianpardonandimmunitycameintheformofa III.1.3. The Pardon andImmunity Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: history. Itdidnottake thatlongforhisactionstobechecked. When addressingthenation,Kuczynski submittedtothe«courts»of El Comercio,2018f). to enterintoanagreementwiththeGovernment(Fuerza Popular, 2018; Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: stand trial(ResoluciónN°09, 2018).Inathorough103-pagedecision Massacre’s Courtcircumvented theimmunityandorderedFujimori to After 37daysofitsgranting, and withKuczynski stillinpower, thePativilca 2018, p.18-20). replied witharequestforconventionality control(ResoluciónN°09, and exclude Fujimori fromtrialduetohisnew immunity. Thevictims of thecase(SalaPenal Nacional)toabidethepowersofpresident Kuczynski’s decision,Fujimori’s lawyer demandedtheCourtincharge a similargroundthanBarriosAltosandLaCantuta. Shortlyafter persons wereexecuted inthenorthofLima.Fujimori isaccusedon The Pativilca massacre wasaColinaoperation.InJanuary1992,six III.2.1. NGOs andmembers of lawyers ofIDLandAPRODEH, twoofthemostprominentPeruvian against impunityindomesticandinternationallegalforums.Backed by The victimsofBarriosAltosandLaCantutawereexperienced infighting overturning.that leadtothepardonandimmunity’s were invain.Within days, thevictimssetinmotionlegalchallenges down by the results of [his] government» (Fujimori, 2016). These efforts asking «forforgivenessfromthebottomof[his]heart»those«let society (Burt,2007,p.189-211).Fujimori himselfproducedavideo mimicking anold«politicsoffear»usedinthe1990stodemobilisecivil when refused,labelledthemasleftistextremists (LaRepública,2018a), them newreparations(ElComercio,2017a,2018b,2018c).Then, mobilised opposition,thegovernmentrecalledthem.First, itoffered (El Comercio,2017c,2018c).Onlyafterthedecision,andwhenfacing a meetingwhenrumoursstartedtospreadmonthsbeforethedecision pardon andtheimmunity. Previously, ithadignoredtheirrequestsfor The governmentneglectedthevictimswhentakingdecisionof III.2. The Victims’ ChallengesandtheCourts’ Decisions the regionalsysteminhumanrightsdefence(Burt,2009, p.386). p. 90;Bernardi,2019,224),whichspeaksofthecapacity toengage of casesdecidedatIACtHR andpetitionsfiledatIACHR (Burt,2018, to theimmunity, andthentothepardon.Peru hasthehighestnumber able toformulatesophisticatedlegalstrategiesandstrongchallengesfirst (Youngers, 2006;Engstrom&Low, 2019,p.36-41),thevictimswere Immunity The Pativilca Massacre’s andtheFirst Court ofthe Blow: The Overturn Coordinadora NacionaldeDerechos Humanos

433 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 434 the governmenttoinformon theprogressonissue. the pardon(paras.65,69).It setadateinOctober2018forvictimsand control andprovidedalist of «seriousquestionings»onthevalidity reminded Peruvian courtsoftheirduty tocarryouttheconventionality And announceditwouldoversee theoutcome(paras.59-64).Itfurther deemed thatsuchevaluationshouldbedonefirstbydomestic courts. (paras. 45-57,68).ConsideringsomePeruvian precedents,IACtHR special attentiontolessintrusivemeansthanreleasing the perpetrator All thesefactorsshouldbeconsideredinaproportionality testthatpays perpetrator regardingreparations,remorse,andcollaboration withtruth. the victims’rights,gravityofcrimes,and conduct ofthe health oftheprisonerorconditionstheirincarceration, butalso that decisionsofthistypeshouldtake intoaccountnotonlythe victims’ rightofaccesstojustice(para.30).Inthisregard, itconsidered its interpretationofpunishmentandenforcementas pertainingto prohibiting impunityforgravehumanrightsviolationsandreiterated strong tooltopetitionthePeruvian courts.IACtHR restateditscaselaw not annulthepardondirectly. Nevertheless,itprovidedthemwitha Altos yLaCantutavs.Perú, 2018).To thevictimsdisappointment,itdid In June2018,IACtHR delivereditsawaitedsupervisiondecision(Barrios obligation topunishperpetrators. 2006). ThevictimspresentedthepardonasaninfringementofPeru’s procedure of compliance (Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001; punish thoseresponsibleforthemassacresandleftopenmonitoring previously chargedPeru withtheobligationtoinvestigate,prosecute,and a supervisionhearingforBarriosAltosandLaCantuta.IACtHR had Just adayafterthepardon,victimsinformedIACtHR andrequested III.2.2. 3.5). Currently, Fujimori continuestobetriedforthePativilca massacre. the Constitutionandprotectrights»(ResoluciónN°46,2019,para. constitutionality andconventionalityofdiscretionalacts,sotodefend the immunity, stressingthat«itisajudicialdutytoevaluatethe the argumentationofPativilca Massacre’sCourttocircumvent The decisionwasupheldonappealbytheSupremeCourt.Itratified dismiss theimmunity(Table 3). 18 differentIACtHR decisionstoapplyhumanrightsstandardsand Furthermore, itexplicitly carriedoutaconventionality controlandused used 21differentConstitutionalCourtrulingstoarguethedecision. and punishthoseresponsibleforgravehumanrightscrimes.TheCourt and thatitwasincompatiblewiththedutytoinvestigate,prosecute, Court ruledthatthejustificationgiventoimmunitywasinsufficient largely groundedonhumanrightsandconstitutionalprinciples,the IACtHR Prepares ofthePardon theGround for Overturn theDomestic Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: La Cantuta v. Peru, (La República,2017g). theyproceeded «new» complaintssuccessfullyfileddirectlytoIACtHR, Victims wereawareoftheriskand, relying onpreviousknowledgeof would havetaken severalyears,increasingtheriskofasecondrunaway. to IACHR and, (ii)waitforIACHR Allthis toreferitIACtHR. obligation to(i)exhaust domesticremediesbeforefilingapetition Assuch,thevictimswereunder the previouscasesatIACtHR. the pardonwasanovelact,differingfromactionsthatgenerated commenting inmedia,Fujimori’s defence,andevenstaterepresentatives, sophistication ofthelegaldefenceavailableto the victims.For lawyers The decisiontotake thepardondirectlytoIACtHR demonstratesthe Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: N° 793-2018,2019).Fujimori basedhisappealonformalgrounds, The decisionwasupheldon appealbyaSupremeCourtPanel (Nulidad to humanrightsandnotvice versa»(para.88). unconventional intoconventional; thatis,democracymustbesubject support, he stated that «the will of the people cannot transform the (Table 3). Mindful that he was running against popular and political Constitutional Courtandanimpressive63differentIACtHR decisions decision issoundlyarguedwithreferenceto18different rulingsofthe formal questioningofhiscompetence(paras.12,198). His222-page out theconventionalitycontrol(paras.86-113)inresponse toFujimori’s 36-58) andwenttogreatlengthsdefendhisauthority incarrying 90). HecarefullysummarisedIACtHR supervisiondecision(paras. appeared comfortablewith his role «as an Inter-American judge»(para. humanity. ItisbasedheavilyonIACtHR standards,andthejudge enforcement ofthepunishmentperpetrators crimes against unduly affectedtherightofvictimstoaccessjustice throughthe warrant (ResoluciónN°10,2018).Thedecisionfoundthepardon La Cantuta,GorritiandDyer(humanrightscases),issuinganarrest regarding theimplementationofFujimori’s sentenceforBarriosAltos, the pardonaformofimpunityandruleditwasdevoideffects Supremo deInvestigaciónPreparatoria delaCorteSuprema) considered In October2018,theSupremeCourtEnforcementJudge(Juzgado 2018c, 2018d). requested aconventionalitycontroltoquashthepardon(LaRepública, they wentdirectlytotheSupremeCourtthatconvictedFujimori and claim, butsuchclaimstake 3-5yearstoreachafinaldecision.Instead, domestic courts.Theclearlegaloptionforthevictimswasanamparo of Fujimori’s pardon»(Cornejoetal,2019,p.340),itleftthedecisionto again. Although«manifestlysupportedadeclarationofincompatibility IACtHR rulingputthelegalcreativityofvictims’lawyersintowork III.2.3.

Overturns thePardonOverturns AltosBarrios andLaCantuta Massacres’ Enforcement Judge 435 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 436 review powersofallthejudgesrepublic(p.32-36). however, consideredthecontroltobeincludedwithin thejudicial the judgetocarryoutconventionalitycontrol(p.7-14).TheCourt, repeating theargumentoflackcompetenceandlegalbasisfor rights considered Ratio decidendi Table 3.ThePeruvian CourtsDecisionsontheImmunityandPardon Constitutional and Human Decision orders arisingfromthistrial). Fujimori wasnot under restraining for morethan24monthsand nities (thetrialhasnotextended mestic limitsestablishedforimmu Additionally, itisagainstthedo rights crimes. those responsibleforgravehuman investigate, prosecuteandpunish it isincompatiblewiththedutyto and unconventional.Concretely, fication andisunconstitutional The immunitylacksproperjusti- will continuetobeprosecuted. not beexcluded fromthecaseand this trial.Therefore,Fujimori will The immunitylackslegaleffectsin in humanrightscases). and qualifiedjustificationneeded ve remedy, dueprocess(adequate Truth, equalitybeforelaw, effecti- Pativilca Massacre’sCourt (Sala Penal Nacional) Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: - - Barrios AltosandLaCantuta Investigación Preparatoriade protect Fujimori’s health. intrusive alternativemeasuresto the victim’s rightsandpossible less test thattakes inconsideration failure toperformaproportionality with justice,nullrepentance)and of reparation,nullcollaboration crimes perpetrated,nullpayment consideration ofthegravity medical attentionavailable;lackof prison conditionsandcontinuous health diagnosisandtheexcellent and itsrelationshipwiththe lack ofjustificationthemeasure tion: contradictorymedicalreports, of adequateandqualifiedmotiva steps werefulfilledin13days;lack extreme celerity:allmandatory general practitionersince1997; named: inclusionofFujimori’s law (partialityofmedicalcouncil procedure breacheddueprocessof humanity). Additionally, the to perpetratorsofcrimesagainst ment ofthepunishmentimposed justice (intheformofenforce the rightofvictimstoaccess tional. Concretely, itundulyaffects unconstitutional andunconven a formofimpunity, thereforeis The pardongrantedconstitutes was issued. rest oftheterm.Anarrestwarrant Therefore, Fujimori shallservethe Cantuta andSIEbasementscases. sentence fortheBarriosAltos,La regarding thefulfilmentof The pardonlackslegaleffects health. in crimesagainsthumanity cases), and qualifiedjustification needed (procedure regulation,adequate of decisions),dueprocesslaw law, accesstojustice(enforcement Effective remedy, equalitybefore Judge (JuzgadoSupremode Massacres’ Enforcement la CorteSuprema) - - - Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Conventionality mentioned and Court Caselaw Constitutional trine expressly Control Doc nal principles Constitutio carried out? applied cited? - - obligations, proportionality. ness ofinternationalhumanrights tional statusanddirecteffective guarantee humanrights,constitu constitutionality control,dutyto riness, constitutionalsupremacy, balances, prohibitionofarbitra- Separation ofpowers,checkand Yes (pp.58,70,74-87). STC N°03891-2011-PA STC N°03660-2010-HC STC N°00012-2010-PI STC N°05923-2009-PA STC N°05377-2009-HC STC N°05350-2009-PI STC N°03509-2009-HC STC N°02047-2009-HC STC N°04053-2007-HC STC N°00010-2007-PI STC N°00009-2007-PI STC N°00005-2007-PI STC N°06204-2006-HC STC N°03285-2006-PA STC N°08125-2005-HC STC N°05854-2005-PA STC N°00294-2005-PA STC N°02798-2004-HC STC N°00023-2003-AI STC N°01230-2002-HC STC N°02488-2002-HC review. were subjecttoconstitutional held thatimmunitiesandpardons were theConstitutionalCourt para andCrousillatLopezTorres) referencing twocases(JalilieAwa- dered bythedecision.Moreover, the rightsandprinciplesconsi Yes, 21differentrulingsregarding - - - ty, proportionality. guarantee humanrights,impartiali prohibition ofarbitrariness,dutyto obligations, separationofpowers, of internationalhumanrights status anddirecteffectiveness check andbalances,constitutional control, constitutionalsupremacy, Rule oflaw, constitutionality 141-148, 152-197,282-288,299). Yes (paras. 86-113,128,130-131, STC N°01460-2016-HC STC N°04579-2012-PA STC N°04123-2011-PA STC N°02775-2011-HC STC N°03660-2010-HC STC N°00197-2010-PA STC N°00024-2010-PI STC N°00012-2010-PI STC N°04053-2007-HC STC N°08495-2006-PA STC N°05514-2005-PA STC N°00763-2005-AA STC N°00294-2005-PA STC N°00091-2005-PA STC N°03778-2004-AA STC N°00090-2004-PA STC N°00030-2004-AI STC N°00010-2002-AI (01460-2016-HC). crimes asagainsthumanity the CourtconsideredFujimori against humanity, andacasewere pardons wereprohibitedforcrimes to constitutionalreviewandthat munities andpardonsweresubject Constitutional Courtheldthatim and 00012-2010-PI)werethe Awapara, CrousillatLopezTorres referencing threecases(Jalilie dered bythedecision.Moreover, the rightsandprinciplesconsi Yes, 18differentrulingsregarding - - - 437 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 438 Caselaw andAd- visory Opinions IACtHR cited? Tenorio Rocav. Peru. 2015 SantaBarbarav. Peru, 2016 2014 Tarazona Arrietav. Peru, El MozoteMassacrev. ElSalvador, Altos v. Peru (supervision),2012 treras v. ElSalvador, 2012Barrios Gelman v. Uruguay, 2011Con 2006 LaCantutav. Peru, 2011 Almonacid Arellanov. Chile, 2006 BaldeonGarciav. Peru, 2006 2005 GutierrezSolerv. Colombia, Serrano Cruzsistersv. ElSalvador, 2005 HuilcaTecse v. Peru, 2005 Moiwana Communityv. Suriname, 2001 BarriosAltosv. Peru, 2005 Durand andUgartev. Peru, Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, 2000 Honduras, 1999 1988 Velásquez Rodríguezv. barriers: the unconventionalityofimpunity violations ofhumanrights,and prosecute andpunishserious decision, thedutytoinvestigate, human rightsconsideredbythe Yes, 18differentrulingsregarding Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: - Gelman v. Uruguay, and D’Amico v. Argentina,2011 v. Venezuela, 2011Fontevecchia v. Colombia,2011LopezMendoza Ecuador, 2011Operation Genesis cron v. Venezuela, 2011 Idovov. v. Brazil,2011ChocronCho Loor v. Panama, 2010Gomez Lund Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia,2010Velez Mexico, 2010IbsenCardenasand v. Mexico, 2010RosendoCantuv. Paraguay, 2010Fernando Ortega Kasel IndigenousCommunityv. Vargas v. Colombia,2010Xamok Flores v. Mexico, 2010Cepeda Cabrera GarciaandMontiel Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, 2010 Portugal v. Panama, 2009Rosendo (supervisión), 2008Heliodoro 2007 MyrnaMackv. Guatemala 2007 Boyceetalv. Barbados, Rochela Massacrev. Colombia, 2006 LaCantutav. Peru, 2007 2006 AlmonacidArellanov. Chile, Congressional Employeesv. Peru, v. Honduras,2006Dismissed v. Colombia,2006LopezAlvarez El Salvador, 2005GutierrezSoler Peru, 2005SerranoCruzsistersv. v. Suriname,2005HuilcaTecse v. v. Peru, 2005MoiwanaCommunity Colombia, 2005GomezPalomino Guatemala, 200419Merchantsv. 2004 PlandeSanchezMassacrev. Molina Theissenv. Guatemala, Paquiyauri brothersv. Peru, 2004 Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004Gomez Myrna Mackv. Guatemala,2004 2001 BarriosAltosv. Peru, 2003 Baena Ricardoetalv. Panama, ca Velasquez v. Guatemala,2001 Morales v. Argentina,2000Bama Tamayo v. Peru, 1998Paniagua dríguez v. Honduras,1997Loayza emergency], 1988Velásquez Ro [judicial guanteesduringstateof 1987 Advisory OpinionOC-9/87 entry intoforceoftheACHR], [reservations andtheeffectof 1982 Advisory OpinionOC-2/82 impunity barriers: and theunconventionalityof rights andcrimesagainsthumanity, punish seriousviolationsofhuman duty toinvestigate,prosecuteand the conventionalitycontrol, decision, thedutytocarryout human rightsconsideredbythe Yes, 63differentrulingsregarding - - - Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: (ResoluciónN°09,2018;Resolución10,2018) Source: self-elaboration law, decisionsor rences included tional lawrefe Other interna- (treaties, soft- reports) - Algeria (1995and2007). Committee ReportsonArgentinaand Humanitarian Law, UN Human Rights Serious Violations ofInternational International HumanRightsLawand for Victims ofGrossViolations of Right toaRemedyandReparation Basic PrinciplesandGuidelinesonthe Enforced Disappearance,2005UN the ProtectionofAllPersons from 2007 InternationalConventionfor of theInternationalCriminalCourt, rance ofPersons, 1998RomeStatute Convention onTheForced Disappea- Punish Torture, 1994Inter-American American ConventiontoPreventand Treatment orPunishment,1985Inter- Other Cruel,InhumanorDegrading Convention againstTorture and Declaration ofHumanRights,1984 Crime ofGenocide,1948Universal Prevention andPunishmentofthe Nations, 1948Conventiononthe of Treaties, 1945CharteroftheUnited 1969 Vienna ConventionontheLaw 1932 ExtraditionTreaty Peru-Chile, Yes: 13. v. Peru (supervision), al v. Nicaragua,2018BarriosAltos Workers v. Brazil,2017Acosta et 2016 HaciendaBrazilVerde 2014 Advisory OpinionOC-21/14, the Palace ofJustice)v. Colombia, Vera et al(TheDisappearedfrom derz v. ElSalvador, 2014Rodriguez al v. Chile,2014RochacHernan Republic, 2014NorinCatrimanet nicans andHaitiansv. Dominican me, 2014CaseofExpelledDomi 2014 Liakat AliAlibuxv. Surina- Gutierrez andfamilyv. Argentina, v. Mexico, 2013J. v. Peru, 2013 2013 GarciaCruzandSanchez Gelman v. Uruguay(supervision), Mendoza etalv. Argentina,2013 go Massacrev. Colombia,2013 v. Guatemala,2012SantoDomin v. El Salvador, 2012Gudiel Alvarez temala, 2012ElMozoteMassacre 2012 RioNegroMassacresv. Gua- Barrios Altosv. Peru (supervisión), 2012 Furlan v. Argentina,2012 2012 Atala Riffoanddaughters, v. Turkey, Yaman v. Turkey, 2012ECtHREski Criminal Court,2011Abdülsamet Rome StatuteoftheInternational ECtHR Hornsbyv. Greece,1998 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,1997 Tribunal forRwanda,1996ICTY tute oftheInternationalCriminal Yugoslavia (ICTY),1994UNSta Criminal Tribunal fortheFormer UN StatuteoftheInternational 1992 IACHR Report28/92,1993 vention ontheLawofTreaties, Human Rights,1969Vienna Con- 1948 UniversalDeclarationof Yes, 10 - - - - 439 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 440 Burt, 2009,p.388-389,2014, p.151). 150 cases (Ministerio deJusticia, 2000; Laplante, 2009, p. 957-958; the organsofInter-American HumanRightsSystemformorethan international responsibility and enteredintofriendlysettlementswith —futurepresident of IACtHR— Diego García-Sayán recognized its Likewise,of IACtHR. theState,underMinistryofJustice measures wasthefullrestorationofStateunder jurisdiction as ademocracybydistinguishingitselffromFujimori. Amongthefirst The governmentsoughttolegitimizeitselfandrestorePeru’s credibility 2000). beginning asagoal(DecretoSupremoN°014-2000-JUS, Compliance withthejudgementsofIACtHR wasraisedfromthe p.145-146). p. 6-12,84;Root,2012,159-161;González-Ocantos, Commission (Laplante2009,p.944,976;Burt, 392-394, 2018, of Justice, Interior, Foreign Relations, and the Truth and Reconciliation and theystaffeddifferentkey governmentalposts,like intheMinistries (2001-2006), NGOsweregrantedunparalleledaccesstopolicymaking, to acertaindegree,thesubsequentgovernmentofAlejandroToledo would preventautocracyfromreoccurring. Duringthetransitionand, of lawanddemocracy. Itworked towardslayinglegalfoundationsthat The Paniagua administration(2000-2001)wascommittedtotherule of areformedjudiciary»(Burt2014,p.154). the judicial system had «an institutional desire to promote anew image discredited (Burt,2018,p.7,101-102;Root,2012,66-68).Likewise, notorious judges)wereliterallyontherun,andmilitarywasdeeply regimes (Burt,2018,p.76).Fujimorismo anditscronies(including provide moreleewaytoadoptpoliciesinsharprupturefromprevious Transitions followingregimecollapseinsteadofnegotiatedsuccessions of theFujimori regimeintheyear2000. Constitutional LawprofessorValentin Paniagua followingthecollapse that beganduringthetransitionalgovernmentofhighlyregarded accountability inPeru areongoing, incomplete,unevenprocesses Judicial empowermentandlegalcultureshiftregardinghumanrights IV. A sentimentofhopeisaliveinthespiritsnationandillusionmovesallPeruvians […] these feelingsare bornfrom adeepconviction: theneedtoraise,affirm,andconsolidate

WHAT EXPLAINS THE OUTCOME? JUDICIAL REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY EMPOWERMENT AND LEGAL CULTURE SHIFT IN PERU A neweraisborn.periodofPeruvian historycloses,andanotheropenstoday. Constitution as the law that governs our daily life Constitution asthelawthatgovernsourdailylife Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: V a l entín P aniagua (2000) (Bernardi, 2019,p.230-233). the Constitutionthroughitsbroadbindinginterpretationpowers Constitutional Courtassumedleadershipindeepeninganddeveloping inPeru. Inparticular,for theaffirmationofneo-constitutionalism the to internationalhumanrightslawandconstitutionallimitswascrucial national levelaskingfortheirreinstatement.Theiracquiredsensitivity the judiciary. Manyofthemlitigatedinvainforseveralyearsatthe culturein judicial independence,andthelackofarights-respecting first-handed theperniciouseffectofauthoritarianism,dearth agencies tofollow(p.122-123).Thesacked judgesexperienced public figuressetanexample andencourageotherindividuals that actaccordingtoruleoflawinjunctions. By doingso,these O’Donnell (1998a)highlightstheimportanceofinfluentialindividuals p. 62-63). (Burt,2009,p.388;Root, 2012, opposed Fujimori’s re-re-election Constitutional Courtmagistrates(Aguirre,Revoredo,andRey)that and prosecutorssacked underFujimori. Amongthemwerethethree American recommendationsanddecisions,Peru reinstatedthejudges key roleinjudicial empowermentandcultureshift.Following Inter- However, itisworthhighlightingadifferentaspect thatplayeda 2011,p.1842-1844). represented intheliterature(García-Sayán, and influencedthePeruvian transitionaljusticeprocessisthoroughly decision. ThedegreetowhichtheBarriosAltosruling(2001)framed compliancewithIACtHR provedtobeafar-reaching Re-stating Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: (Torelly, 2019,p.116)include: other relevantaspectsofthePeruvian «constitutionalarchitecture» 140-141). Alongsidethiskey improvementtojudicialindependence, were repealed(Dargent,2005,p.147;J. DeBelaunde,2008,p. mechanisms andactsofparliamentthathadsubordinated thejudiciary entered intoeffectwiththetransitionalgovernment.All Fujimori-era In practicalterms,institutionalinnovations of the 1993 Constitution IV.1. • Independence Gains andPowers Gains Independence Expansion experience, education, capacity, andethicalbehaviourexamined appointment topartyalliance orpoliticalfavoursbuttotheirown the statewithjudgesand prosecutors thatdidnotowetheir Belaunde, 2019b).For the firsttimeinhistory, CNMprovided civil societyprofessionalassociations, anduniversities(J. De or theexecutive, butbytheJudicialBranch,PublicMinistry, dismissal). CNM members were nolonger elected by parliament (appointment, promotion,ratificationeverysevenyears, and almost allaspectsofthecareerjudgesandprosecutors Regulation ofCNMasanindependentinstitutionincharge 441 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 442 The expansion ofjudicial powersinPeru wastheproductof: • • • • democratic rule of law and the republican form of government». democratic rule oflawandtherepublican formofgovernment». rights notenumerated«based onthedignityofpersons, fundamental rightsandan open clausethatincorporatesother A «thick»billofrights.TheConstitutionprovides alonglistof effects («abstract»or«concentrated» judicialreview). Constitutional Courtcanannul actsofparliamentwithgeneral «diffuse» or«decentralised»judicialreview).Additionally, the with theConstitutionforcasesintheirpurview(«concrete», authority todisregardnormstheyinterpretasincompatible A comprehensive system ofjudicialreview. Alljudgeshavethe 2012, p.102-104). jurisdiction oftheJudicialBranch(Abad,2006,p.37; Root, thepowerof Supreme Courttoassertthe re-established in humanrightsandterrorism-relatedcases.Itsimultaneously theConstitutional Courterodedtheirjurisdiction IACtHR, the armed forces. Throughsubsequentdecisions in linewith guaranteed impunitytohumanrightsperpetratorswithin Limitation ofmilitarycourts.Duringtheconflict,these reinstated justices. cited bythosedecisions,59.8%correspondstotheperiodof as interpretedbytheConstitutionalCourt.Oftotalcaselaw pardon andimmunityreliedheavilyuponconstitutionalprinciples As shown in Table 3, the two courts thatoverturned Fujimori’s p. 33-38; J. De Belaunde, 2008,p. 142-148; Dargent, 2009). and theprinciplesofjudiciarytocheckpolitics(Abad,2006, and Landa)issuedlandmarkdecisionsthatshapedthepowers three reinstatedmagistrates(andlaterotherslike Alva,García, the institutionswithhigherpublicacceptance.Inthisperiod, From 2000to2007,theConstitutionalCourtwasregularlyamong which madetheproposalofpartisancandidatesmoredifficult. Constitutional Courtappointedbyaparliamentarysupermajority, for manyyearstothesystem(J. DeBelaunde,2008,p.152). managed toprovideseveralcompetentandindependentjudges Nevertheless, CNMwasanimprovementfromthepastand (IDL-Reporteros 2017,2018a;Peru SupportGroup,2018). In 2018,CNMenteredreorganisationafteracorruptionscandal increasingly deterioratedbeginningin2013(Silva,2016,p.38). p. 72).Theinstitutionalbalancewasreasonablypositive,untilit and 21%inthePublicMinistryby2004(J. De Belaunde,2006, the numberofuntenuredjusticesto14%inJudicialBranch appointment procedures,CNMmanagedtodramaticallyreduce in a competitive, open application process. Through continuous Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: • • • international law» (p.316). understanding concerningthe relationshipbetweennationaland and direct effect.AsputbyBinder(2012), a«radicallymonist The incorporationofhumanrights treaties withConstitutional status precedents. it hastheunusualpowerfor acivillawcountrytosetbinding interpreting constitutionalrightsorprinciples.Furthermore, All judgesareobligedtofollowitsreiteratedstandards when The ConstitutionalCourt’s capacitytosetbindingprecedents. ° ° ° ° politics include: litigationandthejudicializationof claims drivingrights-based (Abad etal,2008,p.15-18).Themaintypeofconstitutional drafted byaprestigiouscommissionoflawprofessorsin2004 inspiration (CPConst.), anormofclearlyneo-constitutionalist was strengthenedbytheConstitutionalProceduralCode general waiveroflegalfees.TheprocessConstitutionalization Courts, Different types of claimsavailabletoenforce theConstitutionin truth (Villegas Namuchev. Poder Judicial,2004). This hasenabled,forinstance,theintegrationofrightto ° ° ° ° budget). institutions (e.g. Judicial BranchagainstExecutive onjudicial institutions thataffect,byactionorinaction,otherpublic Competence conflict,whichchallengesactsofpublic conflict. internal conflict,orincriminalproceedingsrelatedto the and pardons,inthesearchfordisappeared persons fromthe impact, forexample, in thecontrolofpresidentialimmunity is lessformalandoffersthird-partystanding. Ithashadan and relatedrights,worksinasimilarwaytoamparo,but Habeas corpus, which seeks to protect individual freedom before theviolation. or decisionandissuesordersfortherestitutionofsituation or disciplinecommissions).Afindinginfavourannulstheact from procedureslike impeachments,investigativecommittees, regarding thecareerofjudgesandParliamentary decisions rights (includingjudicialdecisions,administrativedecisions Amparo, whichchallengesalltypeofactionsthatviolate the OmbudspersonorLawyersBarAssociations. institutionslike congressional minoritiesandrights-defending a judgementwithgeneraleffects.Rules ofstandinginclude Unconstitutionality, whichreviewslegislationandproduces with differentrulesofstanding, effectsofdecisions,anda 443 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 444 of domestic judges; and (iii) its inability to generate a «dialogue» with of domesticjudges;and(iii) itsinabilitytogeneratea«dialogue»with Inter-American documents;(ii)itsintrusiveclaimtodefine thepowers grounds: (i)itsweakorinexistent foundationoninternationallawand (2015a; 2015b)andContesse (2018;2017)basetheircritiquesonthree Nevertheless, somescholars havequestionedthisdoctrine.Dulitzky consideration internationalhumanrightscaselaw. diffuse judicialreview, andtheobligation tointerpretrightstakinginto system, theconstitutionalstatusgrantedtohuman rights treaties, framework describedintheprevioussection.Specially with itsmonist Introduction— resonateswellwiththePeruvian constitutional The conventionalitycontroldoctrine—defined inthe IV.1.1. • • (García-Sayán, 2011,p.1843). (García-Sayán, had alreadybeenajurisprudentialcriterionsincethetransition IACtHR rulings’validity, effectiveness,andenforceability. This characterofIACtHRrulings.CPConst.affirmed The self-executing respectively (Table 3). 73 internationallawreferences(18and63toIACtHR caselaw), immunity andpardonlargelyexceed theaverage,with31 and that circumvented Fujimori’s decisions the that noticing scenario— comingfourth(2016,p.155,276).Itisworth Argentina —thecountrycreditedwithafullaccountability comparative databaseof12LatinAmericanhighcourts,with references to internationallaw. Thatranked Peru secondinhis rulings inPeru between2006and 2014, findingan average of15 rights analysed condemnatory human p. 40-42). González-Ocantos established thisjurisprudentialdoctrine(articleV)(Abadetal,2008, 2002). Later, thedraftersofCPConst.incorporatedandfirmly especially, IACtHR (Crespo Bragayracv. MinisteriodeDefensa, with theauthoritytointerprettreatiesratifiedbyPeru, also beconstrued in line with the standards set by the institutions thisprovisiontomeanthatrightsshould Court re-interpreted Final andTransitory Provision).ThereinstatedConstitutional Human RightsandinternationaltreatiesratifiedbyPeru (Fourth should be construed according to the Universal Declaration of in thefinalsectionofConstitution,whichsaysthatrights the Peruvian legalspace.Theoriginisaratherlaconicprovision case law.ThiswascrucialforembeddingIACtHR standardsin The obligationtointerpret constitutionalrightsaccording toIACtHR Conventionality Control inPeru Doctrine «Breaking free ofIACHRisreally important»— Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: ID L- R e p orteros Keiko Fujimori (2018 b ) It would be a mistake to focus compliance only in the actions (and It wouldbea mistake tofocus complianceonlyinthe actions(and it couldberelevanttodistinguish executive fromjudicialbehaviour. When evaluatingthereachof theconventionalitycontroldoctrinethen, for themselves. as theircolleaguesandpeers, entitledtothesamerespecttheydemand From thisdiscourse,the Peruvian judiciaryappearstoconsiderIACtHR (La República,2018b,2018i,2018h,2018f, 2018e;ElComercio,2018e). decisions, includingIACtHR «judges»,shouldbeabidedandenforced constitutional state,therearenounaccountableactsand thatalljudges and theConstitutionalCourtconstantlyremindedpublic that,ina During thecaseofpardon,bothpresidents Judicial Branch the SupremeCourtof2015(Abad,2019,p.181-182). recognized aspartofthediffusecontrolinajudicialplenary sessionof (2010, p.317).Subsequently, theconventionalitycontrolwas expressly networks ofjudgesandscholarswhotake constitutionallawseriously» back Landau’s annotationthatjudges«areembeddedintransnational (Resolución Administrativa N°254-2014-P-PJ, 2014).Thisseemsto the stateinrelationtocivilsocietyandinternationalcommunity» international imageofthejudiciaryandwillstrengthenaction The decreebelievedit«willcriticallyhelptoimprovethedomesticand it, andremindedthemthattheywere«obliged»toperformit. acknowledged theconventionalitycontroldoctrine,brieflysummarised jurisdiction thatrelatedwiththeInter-American system.Moreover, it the SupremeCourt.Itinvoked themtoprioritisecasesundertheir In 2014,Peruvian judgesreceivedaguidelinefromthepresidentof citing 18and63differentcases(Table 3). they largelyarguedtheirdecisionswithreferencetoIACtHR caselaw, it butseemedverycomfortableinapplyinganddefendingit.Moreover, conventionality controldoctrine.Thecourtsdidnotignoreorquestion immunity and pardon, rather, providesanexample of thesuccessof Notwithstanding theneedforfurtherstudies,casestudyofFujimori’s There isanempiricalgapintheexpectations theywouldproduce. Whilst raisinginterestingissues,thesecritiquesarelargelynormative. p. 424-429,433-434;Dulitzky, 2015a,p.106-107,2015b,80-86). version ofthesubsidiarityprinciple(Contesse,2016,p.141-144,2017, for conventionalitycontrolhavebeenadvocated,basedonastronger «strategic partnership»(Dulitzky, 2015b,p.83),alternativefoundations (Contesse, 2019,p.574),«genuinedialogue»(Dulitzky, 2015a,p.107),or control (Contesse,2018,p.1181-1183),«constraineddeference» public (2018,p.1169).Underthenamesof«bottom-up»conventionality could delegitimiseIACtHR intheeyesofgovernments,courts,and point alsoin:Torelly, 2019,p.136).Contessearguesthatalltheseaspects hierarchicalapproach(this states byaffirmingaproblematictop-down, Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: 445 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 446 law andinternationalhuman rights law. CPConst. further obliged all standards sparked thedemandforlegal educationinconstitutional the ConstitutionalCourtwith itsincreasingreferencetoIACtHR and recognisestateresponsibility) andthesalientroleplayedby 2000 (stemmingfromthe decision toreinstateIACtHR jurisdiction The waveofIACtHR rulingsonabusesduringtheperiodof1990 to conferences (p.166-167). include militaryofficialsamongthespeakers andbarracksasvenues for p. 189).Burt(2014)notesthattheywere,moreover, foolishenoughto 2016, the effortnorpresentprestigiousspeakers (González-Ocantos, The newnormhadtaken root,andthenewcoalitioncouldnotsustain mimicking NGOspedagogicalstrategieswerelargely unsuccessful. Ocantos, 2016,p.187-195).Theirattemptstoreverse theprocess, reached poweragainduringtheperiodof2006-2011 (González- NGOs servedasthe«first-movers» beforetheimpunitycoalition The legaleducationofjudgescanbeapointpoliticalcontention. p.179-180). judges’ formation(González-Ocantos, was notagenerallyavailablemoduleinlawschoolsandpartof gap inlegaleducation.Untilthe2000s,internationalhumanrightslaw 2016,p.179-184). Thisfilleda (Burt, 2018,p.92;González-Ocantos, training duringthewindowofopportunitythattransitionoffered providing prosecutorsandjudgeswithhumanrightsmaterials NGOs madeimportantcontributionstolegalcultureshiftinPeru by weakened theseefforts(p.8-9,20,34-35,56-61,67-70). their resignationorremoval.Thepoliticalenvironmentenhanced in thesejudges’evaluationsforratificationandpromotiontoachieve the targetsofnamingandshamingcampaigns.NGOsalsoparticipated (either forideologyorpreviousconnectionswithperpetrators)became templates). Aspartoftheirreplacementstrategies,recalcitrantjudges documents (the bureaucratic natureofjudicial decision-making requires were socialisedinthenewculturethroughworkshopsandaseriesof universities andhighlyrespectedfiguresofthelegalsphere,judges committed andindifferentjudgesinauthoritativetrainingefforts.Using culture change.Aspartoftheirpedagogicalstrategy, NGOsaddressed to engageinpedagogicalandreplacementstrategiesachievelegal (2016)observesthatitwasnecessaryforNGOs González-Ocantos IV.2. where complianceisnolongersolelyinhandsofpoliticians. been buildingbetweenIACtHR andcertaindomesticPeruvian courts, immunity andpardoncasestudysuggeststhatadynamicofitsownhas reactions) oftheexecutive (Huneeus,2011,p.511-514).TheFujimori’s Legal Culture Shift Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: a promotion and a ratification evaluation, each time enrolling in a promotion and aratificationevaluation, eachtimeenrollingin that overturnedtheimmunity, was appointedin2002andpassed Judge Miluska Cano,drafterofthePativilca MassacreCourt’s judgment decisions. archive of the judges who had the role of drafting the two key initial For thisresearch,Iaccessed thedetailedpublicrecordsatCNM’s socialised inhumanrightsstandardsandconstitutional principles. AMAG’s programmesto passCNM’sevaluationsand,therefore,were immunity grantedtoFujimori. Mostofthemhad beenenrolledin 4 differentcourtswereinfavourofoverturningthe pardon orthe In total,12judges—includingninefromtheSupreme Court—from (Academia delaMagistratura,2008,2009,2011,2014,2017,2019). constitutional interpretation,reasoning andarguing constitutional law, diffusejudicialreview, precedents,humanrights, AMAG has offered workshops, conferences, seminars, and modules on 24 additionaleventsonthistopictookplace.Furthermore, since2007, conventionality controldoctrine.Between2017and2019alone,atleast core programmeshaveincludedamoduleon IACtHR caselaw and law» (Academia de la Magistratura, 2008, p. 54). Since 2015 the domestic legislationanddecisionswithinternationalhumanrights which entails«upholdingrightsandcheckingthecompatibilityof effectively withhumanrightsobligationsassumedbyourcountry», designed «sothatjudges,prosecutorsandclerksareabletocomply legal formationthatAMAG provides.Part ofthecoursesarespecifically While initiatedbyNGOs,thiscultureshiftisnowpartoftheordinary inthePeruvian judiciary.culture shifttowardsneo-constitutionalism (2016)findingsonanongoingprocessoflegal González-Ocantos My analysisofAMAG’s curriculafortheperiodof2007-2019supports De Belaunde,2019a). weight intheevaluationsmadebyCNMitscompetitions(J. was not compulsory, but itended up having an important general others assistthoseseekingpromotion.Participation intheseprograms others focus on magistrates facing their ratification evaluation; and still geared towardlawyerswithambitionstobecomejudgesorprosecutors; AMAG offersdifferentacademicprogrammes.Someprogrammesare skills necessarytotheirspecialfunctions(SanMartín,1994,p.74). permanent anddecentralisedtrainingintheoreticalpractical improve judges’,prosecutors’,andclerks’legalknowledgebyproviding Branch standsout.AMAG wasconceivedofasamechanismto as anautonomouspermanentacademicinstitutionwithintheJudicial Among the1993constitutionalinnovations,creationofAMAG (Six Final Provision). educational institutionstoincludethesesubjectsintheircurricula Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: 447 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 448 a friendlysettlementbetweenIACHR 2006). andthestate(IACHR, dismissed fromthejudiciaryin2003,hewasreinstated2007following showed totheInter-American systemthat,afterbeingarbitrarily caselaw. Additionally, itseemsrelevanttothedeferencehisdecision standards andconstitutionalprinciplesand,specifically, onIACtHR workshops, andconferencesregardingtheapplicationofhumanrights AMAG’s programmes.Hisrecordalsoshowsattendancetocourses, a promotionandtworatificationevaluations,eachtimeenrollingin La Cantuta,GorritiandDyercase,wasappointedin1996.Hepassed pardon actingasaSupremeCourtEnforcementJudgeforBarriosAltos, Judge HugoNúñez,whoissuedthedecisionthatoverturnedFujimori’s Rights Violations ofthePeruvian ArmedConflict(1980-2002)»(2017). «Application of International Standards in the Prosecution of Human crimes againsthumanity. Interestingly, dissertation is titled hermaster’s on IACtHR caselawandtheArgentineexperience inprosecuting of humanrightsstandardsandconstitutionalprinciplesand,specifically, than 10courses,workshops,andconferencesregardingtheapplication AMAG’s programmes.Herrecordfurthershowsattendancetomore p. 953-955). investigations andthreats(Landa, 1996;Abad,2002;Laplante,2009, legal culturequashedherdecision. Retaliationfollowedwithformal divided betweenpuppet-judges and thosecomingfromapositivist material forjudicialreview. ACourtofAppealsandaSupreme Fujimorismo passedasecondbill«clarifying» thattheamnestywasnot this possible?Itwasnot.Theauthoritarianregimeimposed impunity. years beforeitadoptedtheconventionalitycontroldoctrine. Howwas occurred six yearsbeforeIACtHR set the anti-impunitynormandten This because itwasnotcompatiblewiththeConstitutionand ACHR. diffuse judicialreviewpowertodeclarethattheamnesty lacked effects, Saquicuray did not submit. In a pioneer and brave move, she used her investigation, prosecution,orconvictionforhumanrights violations. law benefitingallmembersofthesecurityforcesand civilians under Nevertheless, withindays,Fujimorismo passedasweepingamnesty Saquicuray who started investigations into Montesinos himself. Barrios Altosmassacre.ThecasewasacceptedbyjudgeAntonia members andhigh-rankingofficialsoftheintelligenceservicefor In 1995prosecutorAnaMagallanesbroughtchargesagainstColina V. CONCLUSION Politics canchangeovernight,whereas judicialculture andlegalprecedents maytakeyears Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: —even generations— to shift —even generations—toshift E l in

S kaar (2011, p . 93). be thecaseregardingsomeofthosechargedwithbringing justice. the processthathaveevensurvivedhostiletimes.At leastthatseemsto that transitionaljusticeadvocatesmanagedtosowsignificantaspectsof Contrary tosomepessimistaccountsofthePeruvian experience, itseems course ofaction. legitimate, andpreferable human rightsaccountabilitylookavalid, constitutional principlesandhumanrights,madeholdingthelineof inlegaleducation,withitsstrongreadingsof neo-constitutionalism international humanrightscaselaw).Likewise, theshifttowards power, andtheobligationtointerpretrightstakingintoconsideration rights treatieswithconstitutionalstatus,alljudgesjudicialreview with the Peruvian constitutional framework (monist system, human Conventionality ControlDoctrinewasinstrumentalasitresonateswell thepoliticalbranches.TheInter-Americanof legalpowersvis-à-vis independenceandexpansion to constitutionalgainsinjudiciary’s for thePeruvian courtstooverturnthepardonandimmunitydue initiated duringthedemocratictransition.Ultimately, itwaspossible two processes:judicialempowermentandchangeoflegalculture,both This articlehastriedtoexplain thisresultbydefiningandanalyzing were denied. of competenceforconventionalitycontrol)wereoutsyncand (deference to presidential powers, exhaustion of remedies and lack accountability despite a hostile environment. Formalistic arguments Fujimori, Peruvian courtswereableandwillingtoholdthelineof by grantingapardonandimmunitytohumanrightsviolatorAlberto on Christmas2017threatenedareturntopastnormsofimpunity same legaltexts hasbeenstarklydifferent.Whenpoliticiansinpower Twenty-three yearslater, thehistoryofsamecountrywith Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Dictámenes eÍndiceAnalítico(3raedición).Lima:Tribunal Constitucional. (2008). Abad, S. B., Danós,J., Eguiguren,F., GarcíaBelaunde, D., Monroy, J., &Oré, A. Abad, S. B. (2019).ManualdeDerecho Procesal Constitucional.Lima:Palestra. Constituci%C3%B3n%20peruana....pdf uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/19560/Un%20balance%20de%20la%20 Foro ConstitucionalIberoamericano, (12).Available athttps://e-archivo. Abad, S. B. (2006). Un Balance de la Constitución Peruana de 1993. pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoysociedad/article/view/16914 contra laimpunidad.Derecho &Sociedad,(18),43-59.Available athttp://revistas. Interamericana deDerechosHumanosylaDefensoríadelPueblo enlalucha Abad, S. B. (2002). ‘Autoamnistías’ vs.‘DerechosHumanos’.ElroldelaCorte REFERENCES Código Procesal Constitucional:Estudio Introductorio, ExposicióndeMotivos, 449 FUJIMORI HUMANOS ALBERTO LOS DERECHOS VIOLACIONES A POR GRAVES CONDENADO DE GRACIA DEL INDULTO DERECHO Y JUDICIAL DEL INAPLICACIÓN LA IMPROBABLE EXPLICANDO DE LA JUSTICIA: EN DEFENSA FUJIMORI VIOLATOR ALBERTO TO HUMAN RIGHTS GRANTED IMMUNITY THE PARDON AND OVERTURN OF UNLIKELY JUDICIAL EXPLAINING THE ACCOUNTABILITY: ON HUMAN RIGHTS LINE HOLDING THE 85

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JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS JAVIER A. DE BELAUNDE DE CÁRDENAS 464 jurisprudencia/2004/02488-2002-HC.html (Tribunal Constitucional, 18March).Available at:https://www.tc.gob.pe/ Villegas Namuchev. Poder Judicial.(2004).Sentencia,02488-2002-HC/TC jurisprudencia/2007/00009-2007-AI%2000010-2007-AI.html TC (Tribunal Constitucional,29August). Available at:https://www.tc.gob.pe/ Sirumbal Ramosv. Congreso delaRepública. (2007).Sentencia00009-2007-PI/ XXXIV, N°1433624.December24.pp.2-3. 2017-JUS”. (2017). “ResoluciónSupremaN°281- Resolución SupremaN°281-2017-JUS. nal.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=234f45804521c0029d48df01a4a5d4c4 RA+N+254-2014-P-PJ+Exortaci%C3%B3n+a+los+Jueces+a+nivel+nacio https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/234f45804521c0029d48df01a4a5d4c4/ N° 254-2014-P-PJ, CorteSupremadelaRepública.15August. Available at: Resolución Administrativa N°254-2014-P-PJ. (2014).Resolución Administrativa pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=5c89f90048d075c0a538e553388de097 connect/5c89f90048d075c0a538e553388de097/SPE-EXP-06-2001-FUJIMORI. Normas LegalesDiarioOficialElPeruano [extraordinary edition],Año Derecho PUCP, 2305-2546 N°85,2020/e-ISSN: Approved: 04/09/2020 Received: 31/05/2020