Joint Effects of Race and Confidence on Perceptions and Influence: Im Plications for Blacks in Decisio N-Making Po Sitions

JOINT EFFECTS OF RACE AND CONFIDENCE ON PERCEPTIONS AND INFLUENCE: IM PLICATIONS FOR BLACKS IN DECISIO N-MAKING PO SITIONS

AYSAN SEV'ER TUZLAK SCARBOROUGH COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO 1989

1 The research reported in this article was supported by a University of Toronto Research Grant (3-197-753-12) and by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of C anada (410-86-0013). I am grateful for the insightful comments of M artha Foschi, Julian Tanner and two anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of this paper. I thank my research assistants Lorraine M cNamara and Lisa Steven for their help. Requests for reprints may be sent to Aysan Sev'er Tuzlak, Department of Sociology, Scarborough College, U niversity of Toronto. 1265 M ilitary T rail, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada. M 1C 1A4 ABSTRACT This study addresses the joint effects of race and behavioural styles in decision-making groups. A 2x2x2 factorial design was employed through which influence and subjective perceptions were measured. Subjects were 189 first-year University of Toronto students. They read a civil injury case and suggested a compensation for the injured party. Then they watched a video-tape of two male jurors discussing the same case. One of the jurors was the target. His race (black/white), confidence (confident/unconfident) and the chosen compensation amount ($2,000/$14,000) formed the conditions. The change in subjects' judgments before and after exposure to the target was the measure of influence. Ratings of the target on 24-item semantic differential scales measured perceptions. Results showed significant effects of confidence on influence. Both race and confidence had independent as well as interactive effects on perceptions. The findings are discussed in relation to minority group members and the subtle forms of differential treatment they may suffer in decision-making situations. JOINT EFFECTS OF RACE AND CONFIDENCE ON PERCEPTIONS AND INFLUENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR BLACKS IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS Introduction

Since 1960's, there is an unprecedented emphasis on human rights and freedoms. The increased awareness is rapidly translating into legislation which disallows overt discrimination against members of traditionally oppressed groups (blacks, women, etc.). What is more noteworthy is the widening acceptability of affirmative action programs which aim to increase hiring or appointment of minority group members into decision-making positions in government and business. In Canada, both the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Act allow affirmative action (Smiley, 1981). Although the aforementioned developments protect individuals from overt discrimination, no macro intervention can eliminate more insidious forms of differential treatment. As Himelfarb and Richardson (1979) suggest, Canadians are "polite racists". Under the moral comfort that a multicultural, multiracial and multilingual society provides, they politely refuse all but very impersonal contacts with their fellow citizens. Blacks also receive polite refusals for jobs or promotions (Henry and Ginzberg, 1985). As one of the major Canadian newspapers recently pointed out "the face of discrim ination wears a smile" (Toronto Star, January 14, 1989, p.A 10). In the diametrically opposed existence of increased protection of minority rights and continuing discrimination, one can ask: what happens to blacks who find themselves in decision-making situations? Will they be given opportunities to influence major decisions on the basis of their portrayed confidence, regardless of their skin colour, or will they be treated as racial tokens? Although m acro theories of race relations rarely address the aforem entioned issues, two interpersonal theories of stratification can provide a starting point to understand more subtle forms of inequality in power, prestige and perceptions. Theories of interpersonal influence

The emergence of differential power and prestige among members of decision-making groups has long been known. Working with Harvard students who were homogeneous in terms of sex, race and education, Bales and his colleagues observed a ranking am ong mem bers of task groups (Bales, 1953, 1958; Bales et al., 1951; Heinicke and Bales, 1953; Slater, 1955). Since these early descriptions of inequality, it has been demonstrated that similar rankings also develop in heterogenous groups. M oreover, em erged intra-group differences m irror societal evaluations of ascribed status (Caudill, 1958; Strodtbeck, 1975; Strodtbeck, James and Haw kins, 1957; Strodtbeck and M ann, 1956; Torrance, 1954). More recent theories attribute intra-group rankings to two different sources: "Status Characteristics and Expectation States Theory"1 shows the link between ascribed characteristics and intra-group differentiations (Berger et al., 1966, 1972, 1977, 1980). The Behavioural Styles Theory

1 (Lee, 1979; Lee and Ofshe, 1981; Ofshe and Lee, 1981, 1983) asserts that behavioural styles of individuals will determine the power and prestige ranking, not their ascribed status. Expectation States Theory. Expectation States Theory assertions hold true in situations where people interact for the accomplishment of a goal (task-orientation scope). Interactants should also feel that it is both necessary and legitimate to take each other's opinions into account in arriving at decisions (collective-orientation scope, Berger et al., 1974; W ebster and D riskell, 1978). These requirements are fulfilled in almost every decision-making group at the political, social and economic arena as well as in jury deliberations. Within its scope requirements, the theory argues that a group member will form performance expectations (generalized anticipation about future perform ance in the given task) fo r him/herself in relation to each of the others. These dyadic expectations, in turn, will lead to power and prestige differences. T he higher the expectation held for the self, the higher the probability that the self will: 1. receive opportunities to initiate opinions and suggestions, 2. act on these initiatives and contribute to the task effort, 3. receive positive evaluations for his/her contributions and 4. exert influence. These four aspects are highly correlated and are called the observable power and prestige order of the group. Expectation States theorists, almost exclusively focus on influence (Berger et al., 1977). It is further argued that differentially evaluated states of diffuse2 status characteristics (such as black/white) carry general expectations for positive or negative overall ability. In heterogeneous groups, culturally evaluated beliefs are activated and lead to differential performance expectations. Activation occurs even when a characteristic (such as race) is not relevant in the situation (B erger et al., 1966; Freese and Cohen, 1973; M oore, 1968; W ebster and Entwisle, 1976). If being black is less positively evaluated, a black person will be perceived as less capable in the task and thus be accorded fewer opportunities to initiate acts, will actually contribute less, will receive fewer positive evaluations for his/her contribution and overall, will exert less influence. These assertions have implications for increasing numbers of minority group members who occupy decision-making positions due to the reduction of overt discrim ination and/or im plem entation of affirmative action programs. The theory predicts that they will lack influence and will receive negative evaluations on the basis of their ascribed status. Behavioural Styles Theory. Styles theory sees interpersonal inequality as a product of behavioural styles of interactants (Lee, 1979; Lee and Ofshe, 1981; Ofshe and Lee, 1981). Deriving fro m Bem 's (1972) Self-perception Theory and social-psychological research on self-presentation (Mazur, 1973; 1985; Mazur et al., 1980; Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974; Rosa and M azur, 1979), styles theorists claim that group mem bers respond to deference dem anding versus deferential manner of their co-workers. In this conceptualization, influence is an automatic response to styles whereas "status" is an after-the-fact rationalization of one's own behaviour such as "I deferred to him/her therefore he/she

2 must be high in status." It is postulated that in interaction situations, there is a flux of on-going cues and interactants do not make cognitive or evaluative judgments about ascribed status (Ofshe and Lee, 1981; 1983). These assertions imply that in decision-making positions, blacks can assure a position in the influence hierarchy on the basis of their styles, in spite of the historic disadvantage of their skin colour. Theoretical Implications. The contradictory predictions of status and styles views have both theoretical and practical implications. Some of the theoretical issues, no t necessarily ranked in importance, are as follows: 1. Is there a single most important factor that determines emergence and maintenance of inequality in task-groups? a. If there is such a unique dimension, is it external status characteristics or styles of behaviour?

b. Could there be an interactive relationship between status and behavioural styles? In other words, what happens when ind ivid uals possess or dem onstrate incongruent levels of "status" and "confidence"? Tuzlak (1988; Tuzlak and Moore 1984) report an increased rejection of those who act out of ro le which has also been observed in naturalistic settings (Austin and Stack, 1988; Cheek, 1976; Piliavin and Briar, 1976). 2. How do status and behavioural styles organize perceptions? According to the accumulated knowledge in small groups, perceptions can be grouped under task competence, status attributions, dominance, socio-emotional evaluation and group orientation dimensions (Ridgeway, 1987). Nevertheless, the simultaneous effects of race and confidence on these dimensions have not been systematically explored. The questions that need to be addressed are: a. Is there a single most important factor which determines perceptions? If there is such a factor, is it external status or styles of behaviour? b What happens to perceptions when individuals possess or demonstrate incongruent levels of status and styles? Practical Implications. Practical implications of Expectation States Theory pertain to the difficulties that might face blacks who attain decision-making positions. For example, their concerns may be trivialized or their ideas and suggestions m ay be systematically rejected. In addition, their personal skills, competence and group-motivations might be negatively evaluated. The practical implications of the styles theory are m ore optimistic. Those who appear confident are expected to attain influence as well as high regard in all other dimensions. The two theories also propose different remedies. The remedies suggested for status generalization are cumbersome since culturally held beliefs are seen as rooted in centuries of prejudice and discrimination. Overwhelming evidence suggests that these beliefs do expand into face-to-face

3 interactions and are resistant to change (Cohen and Roper, 1972; Freese, 1974; 1976; Freese and Cohen, 1973; Pugh and W ahrm an, 1983; Ridgew ay, 1982). In contrast, if behaviour creates interaction inequalities, the remedy lies in altering one's self-presentation. This is easier to accomplish and once accomplished, is also cross-situational (Lee, 1979). If status and styles are joint determining factors, ho wever, it is crucial to understand their interactive effects on influence and perceptions. The present study

A few studies which simultaneously vary styles and status start from different conceptualizations of styles and utilize different status characteristics. Therefore, their results are not directly comparable. For example, Lee (1979; Lee and Ofshe, 1981) argues for the efficacy of dominance which includes overpowering, controlling types of interaction. She reports support for her assertions against an achieved status characteristic (occupation). R idgew ay (1987; Ridgew ay et al.

1985) on the other hand, starts from a cognitive perspective and argues for the efficacy of demonstrated task confidence. For the latter, threatening behaviour such as dominance cannot be the basis of influence in positively connected human groups. There is substantial support for the cognitive position in the literature (Mohr, 1986; Ridgeway and Diekema, 1989), however Ridgeway has kept the status characteristics of her interactants constant (females) in contrasting dominance with competence. From these works, a systematic understanding of interactive effects of status and styles cannot be deciphered. The only direct test of status (race) and confidence has been carried out by Tuzlak (1988; Tuzlak and M oore, 1984) and she reports conjoint effects. However, her results are also inconclusive since they are obtained in a highly standardized experimental situation which limits exposure to a target person to a few minutes. M oreover, targets' dem onstration of confidence is solely nonverbal. Overall then, there is an urgent need to understand the joint effects of confidence (behavioural styles) and race (status). The present study addresses some of the aforementioned theoretical and practical issues through an experiment which was conducted in a mock-jury setting. Such settings fulfil the scope requirements of Expectation States Theory and are frequently used in studies of interpersonal influence (Lee, 1979; Nemeth and W achtler, 1974; Ridgeway, 1987; Ridgeway and D iekema, 1989). In the current study, influence was operationalized as the change in subjects' award judgm ents after exposure to a target whose race, confidence and amount of compensation formed the conditions. In line with earlier studies, 24-item semantic differential ratings of the target formed the subjective perceptions. The subjective ratings were subgrouped under task competence (such as confident/unconfident), status perception (such as influential/not influential), dominance (such as aggressive/unaggressive), socio-emotional (such as likable/unlikable) and group orientation dimensions (such as fair/unfair, Ridgeway, 1987). Hypotheses were:

4 1. Both race and confidence will determine influence. a. Subjects who are exposed to the white target will change their compensation more than subjects who are exposed to the black target. b. Subjects who are exposed to the confident target will change their compensation more than subjects who are exposed to the unconfident target. 2. Both race and confidence will determine perceptions. a. Subjects will rate the white target more positively than the black target on task competence, status, dominance, socio-emotional and group orientation dimensions. b. Subjects will rate the confident target more positively than the unconfident target on task competence, status, dominance, socio-emotional and group orientation dimensions. In the present study, amount of compensation ($2,000 versus $14,000) was also included in the design. The intent was to show that the changes in subjects' judgments were indeed due to the targets' arguments. Previous literature shows that the baseline compensation awards of subjects revolve around $14,000 (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974). Therefore, conditions in which the target insisted upon $14,000 should not lead to changes in subjects' judgments since the target's compensation will approximate the subject's baseline position. The significant changes in subjects' award choices as well as differential perceptions of the target are expected to occur in conditions where the target makes an unusual compensation ($2,000), and thus "disagrees" with the subject. It is also interesting to find out whether subjects respond to the style or race (or both) in evaluating his divergent choice ($2,000). Method

Overview. The present study is a three-factor (2x2x2) factorial design. The factor levels that form the eight conditions of the study are: Race (black/white), styles (confident/unconfident) and amount of compensation ($2,000/$14,000). Subjects. Subjects were 189 first-year University of Toronto students. They received $5.00 for participation.3 From the 189, five were "black" themselves. Since race is a crucial variable in the study, the latter are excluded from the following analyses. In addition, the present results are based upon responses of fem ale subjects. Twenty-three is the lowest common denominator of all female subjects per condition. Although male subjects were not discouraged from participating in the study, very few (19) volunteered to participate and fewer (14) kept their scheduled appointments. Setting. The experimental room was a small amphitheatre. There were two 20-inch, black and white television monitors and a speaker situated in the midst of them. The monitors were suspended from the ceiling (about 5-6 feet and a 40. angle from the subjects) to assure a clear view from all seats. Procedure. Subjects in groups of two to ten4 took part in one-hour experimental sessions. They were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions. Upon arrival, subjects were ushered into the experimental room by one of two female assistants

5 and were asked to fill out a face-sheet. The sam e assistant stayed in the room throughout the session and delivered the instructions from cue cards at the appropriate phases of the study. The other assistant activated the stimulus tapes, and helped with debriefing. Video-tapes. Three male students were used as actors. They made eight video-tapes. A white male played the role of John, and presented identical arguments ($14,000). The target (Bill) was either black or white, acted in a confident or an unconfident style and argued for $2,000 or $14,000. Students who acted as Bill were comparable in height, weight, age and clothing. At first, one of the two cameras used in the taping showed John and Bill sitting at the same side5 of a rectangular table. From then on, one camera focused on the juror who was talking at the time. Each juror presented three blocks of arguments. Student actors worked for 10-15 hours, and were paid $10.00 an hour. The final eight tapes were pre-tested on 67 first-year students who rated the target's confidence on semantic differential scales. Results indicated that the confidence manipulation was accomplished in the intended direction. Race of the target did not need a manipulation check. M anipulation of confidence. Confidence was varied through body posture (relaxed and open versus slouched and closed), eye-contact (looking at the camera versus looking down), absence or presence of nervous gestures (scratching the head, playing with a pen, etc.), and differentiations in speech (fluent versus hesitant). The black target had a slight West Indies accent which was an integral part of his status. Phases of the study. There were six phases. 1. Subjects were asked to read a case story. The case is adopted (with modifications) from Nem eth and W achtler (1 974) and is traditionally used within the styles/status research. 2. First compensation (baseline): After reading the case, subjects were asked to make an award judgment for the plaintiff who had suffered physical injuries. Subjects indicated their award choice by checking one of the award categories (ranging from $1,000 to $26,000) on a response sheet. 3. Manipulation of variables: Subjects were introduced to one of the eight video tapes under the auspices of hearing what other jurors thought about the case. The tape took approximately 10 minutes. They saw two male "jurors" who were identified as "John" and "Bill". John was the same student (white) throughout all conditions. Bill was the target. At the bottom of the T.V. monitors, 3x5 inch cards identified John and Bill according to their initial seating positions. Moreover, at pre-arranged points during instructions, the research assistant pointed to John and Bill, using their nam es. Due to these precautions, none of the subjects were confused about the target. 4. Second compensation: After exposure to the video-tapes, subjects were asked to indicate a compensation they now saw fit, regardless of the amount they awarded before. They were urged to take the other jurors' arguments into account in making up their minds. Compensations were recorded on a

6 separate response sheet. 5. Semantic differential scales: After the second compensation, the "impressions" of the subjects about their "fellow" jurors were asked. The 24-item semantic differentials were constructed on a seven-point scale. Half of the randomly selected items were from positive to negative and the other half reversed in order to control for response bias. Subjects always rated Bill second. The "order" was not counterbalanced since only Bill's evaluation is analyzed and order effects will be constant among conditions. 6. Subjects were debriefed and paid. Upon completion, they received a report about the nature of the study and its findings. Results

Analysis of Influence. A three-factor (2x2x2) analysis of variance revealed that confidence of the target had a significant effect on influence (F(1,176)=5.03, p=.026). Confident targets exerted more influence (m ean change: C =3,152 versus U =1,815). R ace effects were not significant. The only other significant effects were of the amount of compensation (F(1,176)=11.88, p=.001, mean change: $14,000=

1,457 versus $2,000=3,511) and confidence and amount interaction (F(1,176)=6.80, p=.010). Targets were able to exert the most influence when they confidently argued for $2,000 (mean change:

C/2,000=4.96 versus m ean of C /14,000, U/2,000, U/14,000 conditions=1.66, t(182)=4.82, p<.001). Table 1 shows the mean compensations by conditions. ------Table 1 About Here ------Analysis of the Subjective M easures. The semantic differential items which constitute the five dimensions were subjected to five separate multivariate analyses (M ANOVA). Univariate analyses (AN OVA) of the individual items were carried out to interpret the significant multivariate findings. Table 2 provides the aggregated means of the five dimensions. Table 3 shows the probabilities associated with the univariate (ANOVA) and multivariate (MANOVA) findings. ------Tables 2 and 3 About Here ------Ratings of Task Competence. As Table 3 indicates, there are strong main effects of all three variables on the perception of task competence. The white target (W=4.58 versus B=4.03, p=.001) and confident targets (C =4.87 versus U=3.73, p=.001) received more positive ratings. In addition, targets were perceived as more competent when they argued for $2,000 compensation ($2,000=4.61 versus $14,000=3.99, p=.001). For race and confidence, these multivariate main effects can be traced to strong univariate effects on the confident, sure of self, convincing, consistent, competent and

7 knowledgable ratings. The first four item s as well as intelligence ratings contributed to the multivariate effects of amount (Table 3). Table 3 also shows strong interaction effects on the perception of task competence. A two-way interaction of race and confidence (p=.001) was exclusively due to the confident and sure of self items. From Table 2, the nature of this interaction can be seen. The unconfident black received the most negative ratings (BU=3.32 versus m ean of W U, BC, W C= 4.63, t(182)= -8.20, p<.001). The three-way interaction among race, confidence and amount (p=.016) is due to univariate effects on the confident, sure of self, knowledgable and quality of ideas ratings. This triple interaction reflects the harsh ratings of the unconfident black target in the $14,000 condition (BU/14,000= 2.98 versus mean of all other conditions=4.49, t(182)= -6.88, p<.001). Ratings of Status. As the second portion of Table 3 depicts, effects of race, confidence and amount on status ratings are almost identical to the effects on task competence. The attribution of higher status to the target was a function of his being white (W= 3.87 versus B= 3.26, p=.001) or confident (C= 4.18 versus U= 2.95, p=.001). The target also received more positive ratings when he argued for $2,000 ($2,000= 3.94 versus $14,000= 3.19, p=.001). The significant race and confidence interaction (p.=032), which is primarily due to the leader item, is the result of the unconfident black target's negative ratings (BU= 2.44 versus m ean of W U, BC, W C= 3.94, t(182)= -8.21, p<.001).). Ratings of Dominance. Dominance ratings resemble the findings on task competence and status dimensions. The independent effects of race (p=.001), confidence (p=.001) and amount of compensation (p=.001) are strongly present at the multivariate as well as the univariate levels of analyses. White (W=3.94 versus B=3.34) or confident (C=4.35 versus U=2.93) targets were perceived as more dominant. Also, targets who argued for $2,000 received higher ratings ($2,000=3.90 versus $14,000=3.37). From Table 2, the two-way interaction between race and confidence (p=.001) shows as the unconfident black target's negative ratings (BU=2.42 versus m ean of W U, BC, W C=4.05, t(182)= - 10.65, p< .001).) Socio-emotional Ratings. At the multivariate level, race affects the socio-emotional ratings (p=.019). The white target was rated as more positive, more pleasant and more likable than the black target (W=4.55 versus B=4.06). Unlike the previous dimensions, neither styles nor amount had significant main effects. However, there were two-way interactions between race and confidence (p=.005) and a triple interaction among race, confidence and amount of compensation. The two-way interaction again reflects the negative ratings of the black unconfident target (BU=3.70 versus mean of

WU, BC, WC=4.51, t(182)= -4.36, p<.001). This low socio-emotional rating was most salient in the case of the unconfident black target who argued for $14,000 (BU/14,000= 3.58 versus mean of all other conditions=4.41, t(182)= -3.37, p<.001). What is also noteworthy is the equally positive ratings of the confident black and unconfident white targets who argued for $14,000 (B C/14,000= 4.86 ~

8 W U/14,000= 4.84). Group-orientation Ratings. In the last dimension, the black target was perceived as more group oriented (B=4.71 versus W=4.66, p=.010). This effect was exclusively due to the modest item. M oreover, targets who appeared unconfident (U =4.76 versus C =4.62, p= .001) or who argued for $14,000 dollars ($14,000=4.92 versus $2,000=4.46, p=.024) were perceived as more group oriented. The significant interaction between race and confidence (p=.008), which is due to the m odest and fair items, demonstrates that the black target's confident performance received as negative ratings as the white target's unconfident perform ance (B C=4.43 ~ W U=4.52, p> .10). There w as also a triple interaction among race, confidence and amount of compensation (p=.006). The confident black and the unconfident white targets who argued for a low compensation received the least favourable ratings (BC/2,000= 4.03 and W U/2,000= 3.97, p>.10). Generosity of both unconfident targets led to the most positive evaluations (BU/14,000= 5.06 ~ W U/14,000= 5.07). Summary and discussion

The present analysis of influence fully supports the styles related predictions (Hypothesis 1b). Subjects who saw a confident target changed their compensations. Race related predictions were not supported (H ypothesis 1a). As expected, the changes in the subjects' judgments occurred in $2,000 conditions. The analyses of the semantic differential ratings were carried out separately for task competence, status, dominance, socio-em otional and group orientation perceptions and most results gave support to race as well as styles (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). On task competence, status and dominance dimensions, white or confident targets, or those who argued for $2,000 compensation received the highest ratings. The unconfident black target received the lowest ratings in all dimensions. On socio-emotional ratings, only race had main effects. However, there were complex interactions between race and style and am ong all three variables of interest. The only dimension where the black target fared better was the group orientation. He was perceived as significantly more modest. Unconfident targets or those who awarded $14,000 also received more positive evaluations. The most negative evaluations were directed at those who behaved out of role (confident black and unconfident white). In light of these observations, it is time to readdress the theoretical and practical questions raised earlier. O ne of the inquiries was whether there is a unique factor which singlehandedly determines influence and perceptions. The present findings provide a qualified "no" to this question. The qualification is due to the dichotomization between the objective measures of influence and subjective perceptions. In the present findings, confidence is solely responsible for influence in the decision making process (Table 1). However, both race and confidence shape the subjective perceptions and evaluations (Tables 2 and 3).

9 The observed dichotomization between the objective and subjective effects of race is interesting but troublesome.6 If influence is roughly equated with the behavioural components of enforcing stratification (discrimination) and subjective ratings with the attitudinal component (prejudice, Marger, 1985), why is there a lack of overlap between the two? Although the present findings cannot provide a robust answer for this dilemma, one possible explanation might be the sample. It is possible that university students acquire norms against overt discrimination. They might also be more likely to rely on cues of competence in making task-related decisions, without relying on the same cues for subjective judgments. Another possibility is that people in general behave in ways which are different from their attitudes. For example, Ancient Greeks, Romans and Ottomans have exercised severe forms of discrimination in the absence of racist attitudes (Anderson and Frideres, 1981, pp. 210-218). On the contrary, there is reason to believe that North Americans prefer to monitor their behaviour within socially desirable ways while holding on to their prejudicial attitudes. For example, LaPiere's (1934) study involving an Oriental couple as well as a follow-up (Kutner, Wilkens, Yarrow, 1952) using blacks as the test case, showed that prejudice is abundant even in the absence of discrimination. These earlier findings are disturbingly similar to the dichotom y between the attitudes and behaviour of Toronto students. Although the implications of the discrepancy between attitudes and behaviour go far beyond the modest goals of the current study, they nevertheless point to an area which demands further investigation. The second inquiry was whether incongruent levels of status and confidence would lead to increased acceptance or rejection. Although the present results are far from being conclusive, there is nevertheless some indication of increased rejection. For example, significant interactions showed that subjects rated the unconfident black target low on the socio-emotional dimension. However, the confident black target who argued for $2,000 was also not liked. A mirror image of the same phenomenon was observed in the positive ratings of the unconfident black target as the most modest. This positive evaluation of the black target who acts within the stereotypical role is ironic in the sense that the same behavioural pattern for the same target was precisely the one which led to his low ratings on task competence (Table 2). Combined together, these findings provide some insight into the joint effects of race and confidence on perceptions and point to the futility of either/or debates. These observations are also in line with affective costs for defying stereotypical images (Austin and Stack, 1988; Cheek, 1976; Tuzlak, 1988). In summary, the present findings are somewhat optimistic in the sense that demonstrated behavioural competence of blacks seem to equate their influence to those who possess the "higher" state of the ascribed status. However, equivalence on influence could be an artifact of the the present sample of university students. After all, targets and subjects were similar in age and education and these

10 similarities (rather than the difference in race) might have attenuated the influence process. How other decision-making groups respond to race and styles remain to be seen. A more pessim istic interpretation of the findings is that even under highly attenuating circumstances, the perceptual evaluations still show a clear prejudice toward the black target. These observations have serious implications for individuals who possess lower states of status characteristics (blacks) even among their peers and colleagues. Future studies might find that women, North American Indians and French Canadians might also suffer at the affective level even if their numbers might reach parity in representation. In the long overdue move toward combatting overt forms of discrimination, we might still see disguised forms of inequality at the more subtle, more subjective processes of interaction. Of course, confirmation of the present results awaits findings from other studies which utilize different status characteristics (such as ethnicity, religion or sex) in conjunction with different portrayals of confidence. Future studies may also observe the effects of the criterion variables under face-to-face interaction situations rather than the one-way simulation utilized in this work. The ultimate goal of all these efforts will be to understand objective or subjective manifestations of ranking in task groups and remedying the hidden injuries that lower status members might suffer.

11 Table 1. Means of First and Second Compensations By Conditions +))))))))))))))))))))))0))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))), *Racea Conf.b Amountc * Change in compensation (in dollars)* * /))))))))0))))))))))0))))))))))0))))))))1 * * N * First * Second *Change * /))))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))3))))))))))3))))))))))3))))))))1 *B C 14,000 * 23 * 17,000 * 15,522 * 1,478 * *B C 2,000 * 23 * 15,913 * 11,913 * 4,000 * *B U 14,000 * 23 * 16,696 * 14,826 * 1,870 * *B U 2,000 * 23 * 12,174 * 10,174 * 2,000 * /))))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))3))))))))))3))))))))))3))))))))1 *W C 14,000 * 23 * 15,609 * 14,391 * 1,217 * *W C 2,000 * 23 * 13,826 * 7,913 * 5,913 * *W U 14,000 * 23 * 17,652 * 16,391 * 1,261 * *W U 2,000 * 23 * 16,696 * 14,565 * 2,130 * .))))))))))))))))))))))2))))))))2))))))))))2))))))))))2))))))))- aRace : B=Black (mean=2,337) W=White (mean=2,630) bConf. : C=Confident (mean=3,152) U=Unconfident (mean=1,815) cAmount: 14,000 (mean=1,457) 2,000 (mean=3,511)

12 Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Task Competence, Status, Dominance, Socio-emotional and Group Orientation Dimensions. 0))))))))))))))))))))0)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))), * * DIMENSIONSa * *ONE-WAY MEANS *TASK STATUS DOMINAN. SOCIOE. GROUP * /))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))0))))))))0))))))))0))))))))0))))))))1 *RACE Black (B) * 4.03 * 3.26 * 3.34 * 4.06 * 4.71 * * White (W) * 4.58 * 3.87 * 3.94 * 4.55 * 4.66 * *CONF. Conf. (C) * 4.87 * 4.18 * 4.35 * 4.47 * 4.62 * * Unconf (U) * 3.73 * 2.95 * 2.93 * 4.16 * 4.76 * *AMOUNT 14,000 (14)* 3.99 * 3.19 * 3.37 * 4.48 * 4.92 * * 2,000 (2) * 4.61 * 3.94 * 3.90 * 4.13 * 4.46 * /))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))1 *TWO-WAY MEANS *TASK *STATUS *DOMINAN.* SOCIOE.* GROUP * /))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))1 * B/C * 4.74 * 4.07 * 4.26 * 4.41 * 4.43 * * B/U * 3.32 * 2.44 * 2.42 * 3.70 * 5.00 * * W/C * 5.00 * 4.28 * 4.44 * 4.48 * 4.80 * * W/U * 4.15 * 3.45 * 3.44 * 4.62 * 4.52 * * B/14 * 3.70 * 2.89 * 3.08 * 4.22 * 4.95 * * B/2 * 4.35 * 3.62 * 3.60 * 3.90 * 4.47 * * W/14 * 4.28 * 3.49 * 3.67 * 4.74 * 4.88 * * W/2 * 4.87 * 4.25 * 4.21 * 4.36 * 4.44 * * C/14 * 4.59 * 3.76 * 4.04 * 4.75 * 4.77 * * C/2 * 5.15 * 4.59 * 4.65 * 4.14 * 4.47 * * U/14 * 3.40 * 2.62 * 2.70 * 4.21 * 5.07 * * U/2 * 4.07 * 3.28 * 3.15 * 4.12 * 4.44 * /))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))1 *THREE-WAY MEANS *TASK *STATUS *DOMINAN.* SOCIOE.* GROUP * /))))))))))))))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))3))))))))1 * B/C/14 * 4.42 * 3.59 * 3.83 * 4.86 * 4.84 * * B/C/2 * 5.06 * 4.55 * 4.69 * 3.97 * 4.03 * * B/U/14 * 2.98 * 2.19 * 2.33 * 3.58 * 5.06 * * B/U/2 * 3.65 * 2.70 * 2.50 * 3.83 * 4.94 * * W/C/14 * 4.76 * 3.93 * 4.26 * 4.64 * 4.70 * * W/C/2 * 5.25 * 4.64 * 4.62 * 4.32 * 4.91 * * W/U/14 * 3.81 * 3.04 * 3.08 * 4.84 * 5.07 * * W/U/2 * 4.49 * 3.86 * 3.80 * 4.41 * 3.97 * .))))))))))))))))))))2))))))))2))))))))2))))))))2))))))))2))))))))- aSmall numbers represent a negative evaluation.

13 Table 3. Multivariate (MANOVA) and Univariate (ANOVA) Probabilities Associated with Task Competence, Status, Dominance, Socio-emotional and Group Orientation Dimensions and Individual Semantic Differential Items. +))))))))))))))))0))))))0))))))0))))))0))))))0))))))0))))))0)))))), *DIMENSIONS/ * RACE * CONF *AMOUNT* RxC * RxA * CxA *RxCxA * *Itemsa,b * (R) * (C) * (A) * * * * * /))))))))))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))1 *MANOVA df=8,169* * * * * * * * *TASK COMPET. p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.001 * -- * -- * .016 * * F=* 9.3 * 33.3 * 11.1 * 5.9 * * * 2.4 * * ANOVA df=1,176* * * * * * * * * Confident p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.001 * -- * -- * .025 * * F=* 49.7 *171.4 * 28.0 *29.3 * * * 5.1 * * Sure of Selfp=* .003 * .001 * .007 *.001 * -- * -- * .057 * * F=* 9.2 * 86.2 * 7.4 *18.8 * * * 3.7 * * Convincing p=* .026 * .001 * .003 * -- * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 5.1 * 34.5 * 9.2 * * * * * * Consistent p=* .060 * .011 * .001 * -- * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 3.6 * 6.7 * 64.9 * * * * * * Competent p=* .007 * .001 * -- * -- * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 7.3 * 14.4 * * * * * * * Knowledgab. p=* .001 * .001 * -- * -- * -- * -- * .054 * * F=* 27.5 * 89.6 * * * * * 3.8 * * Good Ideas p=* -- * -- * -- * -- * -- * -- * .053 * * F=* * * * * * * 3.8 * * Intelligent p=* -- * -- * .027 * -- * -- * -- * -- * * F=* * * 5.0 * * * * * /))))))))))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))1 *MANOVA df=3,174 * * * * * * * * *STATUS p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.032 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 8.0 * 28.7 * 11.2 * 3.0 * * * * * ANOVA df=1,176* * * * * * * * * High Status p=* .002 * .001 * .002 * -- * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 10.2 * 32.3 * 10.2 * * * * * * Leader p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.006 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 17.7 * 65.2 * 28.2 * 7.7 * * * * * Influential p=* .041 * .001 * .005 *.090 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 4.3 * 25.2 * 8.2 * 2.9 * * * * /))))))))))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))1 *MANOVA df=5,172 * * * * * * * * *DOMINANCE p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.001 * -- * -- * -- * * * 14.0 * 47.2 * 7.7 * 5.3 * * * * * ANOVA df=1,176* * * * * * * * * Assertive p=* .001 * .001 * -- *.001 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 25.9 *103.6 * *12.2 * * * * * Aggressive p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.021 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 12.2 * 79.9 * 15.9 * 5.4 * * * * * Dominant p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.019 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 11.3 * 75.8 * 26.3 * 5.6 * * * * * Bold p=* .001 * .001 * .001 *.001 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 59.8 *215.9 * 21.5 *22.8 * * * * * Tense p=* .001 * .001 * -- *.033 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 16.6 * 37.4 * * 4.6 * * * / /))))))))))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))))))))))))))))1 *MANOVA df=3,174 * * * * * * *SOCIO-EMOTION p=* .019 * -- * -- *.005 * -- * -- * .038 * * F=* 3.4 * * * 4.4 * * * 2.9 * * ANOVA df=1,176* * * * * * * * * Pleasant p=* .020 * -- * -- *.008 * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 5.5 * * * 7.2 * * * * * Likable p=* .007 * -- * -- *.001 * -- * -- * .009 * * F=* 7.6 * * *12.5 * * * 7.0 * * Positive p=* .014 * -- * -- * -- * -- * -- * -- * * F=* 6.2 * * * * * * * /))))))))))))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))3))))))1 *MANOVA df=3,174 * * * * * * * * *GROUP ORIENT. p=* .010 * .001 * .024 *.008 * -- * -- * .006 * * F=* 3.9 * 21.8 * 3.2 * 4.1 * * * 4.3 * * ANOVA df=1,176* * * * * * * * * Modest p=* .010 * .001 * .014 *.001 * -- * -- * .015 * * F=* 6.7 * 46.0 * 6.2 *11.3 * * * 6.1 * * Fair p=* -- * -- * .015 *.065 * -- * -- * .002 * * F=* * * 6.0 * 3.5 * * * 9.9 * * Reasonable p=* -- * .044 * .034 * -- * -- * -- * .029 * * F=* * 4.1 * 4.6 * * * * 4.8 * .))))))))))))))))2))))))2))))))2))))))2))))))2))))))2))))))2))))))- aExact "F" in MANOVA is calculated on the basis of Wilks's criteria. bAlpha level is set at .10 rather than the more traditional .05 since MANOVA takes intercorrelations among multiple dependent variables into account. It is theoretically possible that only marginally significant univariate effects can combine to appear as significant at the multivariate level, if the effects are in the same direction.

14 FOOTNOTES 1. Expectation States Theory is a complex theoretical constellation. In the present work, Expectation States Theory is used to refer to Status Characteristics and Expectation States branch. 2. Expectation States Theory differentiates between specific and diffuse status characteristics. The first refers to differentially evaluated characteristics that apply to well defined tasks (such as mathematical ability). The latter is the focus of interest in the present paper and carries much more general implications. Race and sex are examples of diffuse status characteristics (W ebster and D riskell, 1978). 3. This study was carried out as a (2x2x2x3) factorial design, with three between subjects factors (race, confidence and compensation amount) and repeated measures on the last factor (time). Since time was included for a different concern, it is the (2x2x2) factorial portion of the results that are addressed here. 4. The varying size of the experimental groups due to the availability of volunteers is unfortunate but not likely to affect the results. Subjects were seated sufficiently apart and were instructed to consider themselves

as serving on the same jury with the members they saw on the tape, not one another. 5. Choosing the head of the table has been associated with influence (N emeth and W achtler, 1974). In order to avoid possible confounding due to the seating position, the two jurors sat at the same side of the table. 6. I thank the anonymous reviewer who raised these issues and made insightful suggestions.

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