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An attempt to seize the Adolph Hitler bridge, Rhine River, Uerdingen, Germany by 3d Bn, 67th Armored Regiment, 2d Division, 3 Mar 45, by t Col W. M. Hawkins, Cav. Cormnand and Staff College. 1946 - 1947. This Document IS A HOLDING OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 1 DOCUMENT NO.N-2253o9 COPY NO.
CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-5M 13 Mar 51
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COMIAND A:D GE RAL STAFF CCIiGE
FORT IEFAVLV ORTH
KANSAS
SCHOOL OF COMBINED ARMS
REGULAR COURSE
1946 - 1947
AN ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE ADOI.H HITLER BRIDGE, RHINE RIVER
UERDINGEN, GERMNY
BY 3D BATTALION, 67TH ARMORED REGIMENT, 2D ARMORED DIVISION
3 MARCH 1945
LT. COL. WILSON M. HAIKINS, CAVALIY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Bibliography - - - - P age 1
Introduction - - - " 2
Geographical Features t 3 t 3 Events of 2 March 1945 1945- - - Accotnt of the Battle, March T" 7
Lessons Learned ------" 10
i:i u:~ ~~B ji~: i ;:a. ' _:?.. i:; :;I ~i at : c5 I B BIBLIOGRAPHY
After Action Reports, 2d Armored Division, March 1945
History, 2d Armored Division
History, 67th Armored Regiment
- 1- INTRODUCTION
This is an account of the attempt of the 3d Battalion, 67th
Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division (reinforced) to seize the
Adolph Hitler Bridge over the RHINE RIVER at UERDINGEN, GERMANY intact on 3 March 1945. The attempt was unsuccessful for the Germans destroyed the bridge shortly after our troops seized the western approaches and abutment and were forming to cross it.
The background of events prior to 3 March were as follows:
The 2d Armored Division as part of XIX Corps and NINTH Ary had reached the ROER RIVER north of JULICH on 3 December 1944. A crossing was considered imprudent while the SCHMIDT DAMS remained in enemy hands.
During the next three months, attempts were made by FIRST Army to seize the dams, to destroy them by bombing, and the ARDENNES Campaign was fought. The campaign to close to the RHINE finally got under way late in February 1945.
The strategy of the campaign was to close to the RIINE RIVER all along the front to set the stage for forcing crossings and reduction of the RUHR DISTRICT and finally of GERMANY itself. NINTH Army was making the main effort along its right flank on the line JULICH -
NEUSS.
The 2d Armored Division attacked out of the bridgehead made by the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisina at JULICH on 26 February 1945.
CCA and CCB were attacking abreast with CCR following CCA on the left
to prevent escape of Germans attempting to get out of the pocket. The attack progressed day and night stopping only to bridge the NORD
BANAL in C B's zone.
For routes 'and progress made refer to Map A.
During this entire attack enemy air was more active than usual.
Good flying weather prevailed generally. He employed jet propelled
aircraft 'against us for the first time.
Enemy resistance at first was stubborn but as the attack gained
-2- momentum the enemy began to surrender in groups. He lacked reserves
and supplies. Considerable artillery fire was received as well as anti-
tank fire from the anti-aircraft guns .hiich defended the RUHR in great
numbers and from tanks. Duiing the period only one real counterattack
was received. The enemy attacked in groups from the Iest in attempts
to escape.
GEOGRAPHICAL EATURES
The country over which the attack took place is the flat RHINE
plain. All the land except in the villages and cities is devoted to
farming. There are no scattered farm buildings as farmers live in
the numerous small communities near their land. These villages
afforded good cover and concealment for anti-tank weapons and
accompanying infantry.
The area is adjacent to and southwest of the RUHR DISTRICT and
contained the important centers and manufacturing cities of MuNCHET -
GLADBACH, NEUSS, KTREFELD and UERDINGEI.
After the winter rains and floods the ground was -xtremely
soft and waterlogged. Cross-country movement was undertaken when
necessary, but resulted in mired tanks -in umerous cases unless preceded
/ by.reconnaissance.
EVENTS OF 2 MARCH 1945
On 2 March, the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment was part of
CCR which was following CCA on the left flank. The night of 1 - 2
March was passed in withstanding a tank and infantry counterattack
at SCHIEFBAHN by elements of 130th Panzer Lehr Division which were
attempting to escape from MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. From SCHIEFBAHN the
Battilion moved to WILLICH closing about 1130 on 2 March. It proceed
according to orders and attacked the large factory and road center
on the southwestern outskirts of KREFELD at 1500. After 10 minutes
the attack was called off. Were it not for the communications facili-
ties which exist in tank units this would have been a very difficult
task.
At 1545 the Battalion was attached to CCA and rec.ived orders to
- 3- assemble in the southern outskirts of FISCHEILN. It had to fight to get to its assembly area and lost one medium tank and destroyed one
German self-propelled gun and a few infantrymen. Shortly after assembl- ing at FISCHEUNL the Battalion was again ordered to assemble in BOSING-
HOVEN which it did closing about 1900.
The Battalion Commander reported tb CCA Headquarters about 1600.
The Division Commander verbally reassigned the B ttalion at this time to CCB.
At this time the 3d Battalion consisted of a Headquarters and
Headouarters Company containing an Assault Gun Platoon of 3 105mm
Howitzers on the M4(Sherman) tank, a Mortar Platoon of 3 81nm mortars mounted in half-tracks and a Reconnaissance Platoon, two medium tank companies and one light tank company. The medium tank companies were
still armed with the 1, tank mounting the 751mm gun except for 4 tanks in each company mounting 76mm. guns. The 76mm tanks had only 8 rounds
each of HVAP ammunition which provided our only means of making a
creditable showing in a stand-off tank fight. We were, then, a 64
round BattalionI The light tanks were all M5 's-mounting the 37mm gun.
This was two months before the end of the war in Europe.
At CCB orders were received for the attack verbally, the details
bein worked out jointly by the CCB Commander and the Battalion
Commander. The route was chosen from excellent maps and aerial photos.
The intelligence contribution to the attack is interesting. The
CCB S-2 estimated the enemy situation and capabilities as follows:
"You should have no trouble, there is nothing out there".
The attack was set for 0100 3 March, that being the earliest time
that it was believed the different elements of the force could join
in. BOSINGHOVEN.
The plan was simple: Attack straight north on the secondary road
out of BOSINGHOVEN to the Autobahn, turn east on the Autobahn, cross
the bridge and take up defensive positions on the east bank of the
RHINE in the ivicinity of UINDEIHEIM. The attack was to be in the
nature of a dash.
-4- Attachments to 3d Battalion, 67 Armored Regiment were as follows:
Company H, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment
Company K, 379th Infantry Regiment, 95th Infantry Division
3d Platoon, Company C, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion
3d Platoon, Company B, 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion
3d Platoon, Company C, 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion
Special Demolition Squad, 17th A rmored Ehngineer Battalion
Platoon Flamethrower Tanks
The Tank Battalion and Company H, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment
Shdhabituall xorked together but the other attachments were new.
The Commanders of some of the above units were not available for receipt of th attalion order. This was not considered so bad as to reire a delay in the attack for it was anticipated that if we were able to make the{ quick dash, all units would follow in trace, and it not, on > the advance guard would be engaged.
The Battalion order consisted of the general plan as outlined by
COB, an order of march since we were to start out on the road, and general instructions to the effect that only armored fighting vehicles would be taken and that all vehicles would keep well to the right of a the road. The first was to shorten the column as much as possible and to teduce the possibility of a knocked-out vehicle causing a road block. The second was to prevent any vehicle causing a road block in the event of destruction or failure.
The order of march was as followies:
Advance Guard: C 0 Co H 67th Armd Regt Commanding
Company H, 67th Armd Regt
Attached: 1st Plat Co K 379th Inf (riding on the tanks)
Special Demolition Squad, 17th Armd Engr Bn
P Fltlamethrolwer Tanks
3d Plat Co C 17th Armd Engr Bn
Main Body: (follow Advance Guard without interval)
Co C 67th Armd Regt (light tanks)
Co K 379th Inf(- 1st Plat) (riding tanks C and I Companies) Co I 67th Armd Regt
-5- Co H 41st Armd Inf Regt
Assault Gun Plat 3d Bn 67th Armd Regt
Mortar Plat 3d Bn 67th Armd Regt
3d Plat Co B 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion
Rear Guard: (follow Main Body without interval)
3d Plat Co C 702d Tank destroyer Battalion
The order of march was dictated by the following considerations:
1) That Company K, 379th Infantry had no organic transporta- tion while Company H, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment had its own half- tracks.- Thus one platoon of Company K was attached to the Advance Guard tank company in order to put accompanying infantry with the tanks and because these infantrymen had no other transportation.
2) The Special Demolition Squad was put well forward in order to be on the bridge early where it would drop off and remove the demo- litions from the bridge.
3) The Platoon Flamethrower Tanks wasplaced in the Advance
Guard in order to be forward if close fighting developed.
4) The li.ght ta.nk company was placed at the head of the Body because this constituted the reconnaissance agency for the force. 5)The Assault Gun and Mortar Platoons were placed at the rear since there was ample artillery support, These platoons had not seen. the ground in daylight and were not capable of fulfilling their pri- mary mission of providing a base of fire until daylight. They were placed toward the rear for the ride only. 6) The two Tank Destroyer Platoons were included in the force to beef up the anti-tank defense on the eastern bank. These platoons were armed with the self-propelled 90mm gun. Artillery foward obsrverrs were with each tank and infantry com- pany. There were five battalions of artillery in direct support of the attack and several more including Corps heavy artillery capable of firing into the area and available on call. The 0100 jump-off time was postponed one hour when it became evi- dent that the infantry would not close in BOSING1HOVN before 0100 and it was desired that all troops be completely joined up and briefed. -6- The platoon of flamethrower tanks never did arrive and the COB Commander cancelled their attachment. As events of the 3d March turned out, these weapons .could have been employed to good advantage. ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE, 3 MACH 194 5 The attack got off at 0200 with the Advance Guard moving forward at full spedd but not for long. As the column approached the first small road crossing, the point came under heavy direct anti-tank and indirect artillery fire. The leading tank was hit and set afire and by. its liht the next tank in column was hit quickly. As the Advance Guard had no indication of the location of the enemy, it held up and called for artillery fire on the area to its front and flanks. The Advance Guard then made several unsuccessful attempts to by- pass the burning tanks by moving cross-country but were stopped, each time by very accurate fire which cost tanks for each effort made. The CCB Commander gave orders to hold up the tank attack. He, called up the 3d Battalion 379th Infantry frorm a reserve position and ordered it to make a dawn attack supported by Company I, 67th Armored Regiment to secure the underpass west of KHEPELD-LIN. This attack was successful and the underpass was secured about 0900. Company I, 67th Armored Regiment replaced Company H in the Advance Guard and the Task Force passed through 3d Battalion 379th Infantry and proceeded on its original mission. As the Advance Guard moved onto the Autobahn, it came under heavy small arms end bazooka fire from the buildings near the Autobahn. The infantry left the tanks and started clearing the houses. .This effort was supported by all the artillery vithin range plus the fire from the tank main guns and machine guns. Company I expended its complete basic load of ammunition in attempting to reduce the resistance. The buildings were reinforced concrete.apartment-houses. The artillery fire was not too effective but had the result of driving the enemy intthehe basements. Our most effective procedure was to use artillery to drive them into the basements and then have the tanks - 7 - fire . round of armor piercing ammunition to create a hole in the wall and to follow it immediately with a round of white phosphorus through the same hole. In spite of this the progress was slow. Shortly after 1200 the Advance Guard was well on the Autobahn and sent a tank forTard toward the bridge. As this tank nosed over the first railroad overpass, this overpass being slightJl arched, it was struck by anti-tank fire which broke to left $procket and caused the tank roll back down the grade and out of the line of fire. Almost immediately after this incident, a ton truck came up the column from the rear, passed this nmocked-out tank and proceeded toward the bride. It was hit and demolished before going 200 yards. The bodies were identified as the driver and a Captain of Ordnance assigned to a Corps unit. No explanation of their action is possible. The incident illustrates a lesson which was disregarded too often in this war - do not et beyond the front line unless it is known what is being done and in case of doubt, ask. About this time a report was received from a section of light tanks which had been sent to reconnoiter to the RHIME through KREFELD- IITNN. This tank section reached the river and reported the route clear. It might be wondered why this course was not followed much earlier rather than continue the slow fight at the Autobahn. The reason was that it was not believed that vehicles could get onto the Autobahn at any point east of the point where we were trying. The Autobahn in this area is on a high embanInet approaching the heighth of over a three story building as it approaches the river. As a result of this reconnaissance and purel-j in hopes of finding some way of getting onto the bridge, the Task Force turned east throug K FELD-LINN with Company H, 67th Armored Regiment and Company H, 41st Armored InfantryT Regiment acting as Advance Guard. The former Advance Guard disengaged itself and withdrew into KREELD-ULIN where it guarded the rear and received a replenishment of its basic load of ammunition. The tanks and infantry had no difficulty in reaching K EFELD- RHEINHAFEN but a sharp fight occured when the bridge embankment was approached. The enemy on our side (south side) of the embankment -8- the ' -*' T304-- t- ,,. "..:.._ _._.. . v i: r - - vie ,err_. _5_... ryr + . ? "- , 27- ;lr'- f-'T lihus C F :o. ot,,e_ .- t>'r suicc lv+s "tin .. Y- t e ~-.0.... n .-i - ' f2-. 0 r 7> - >d ± 7 .- o i dT-ra h °-vine dethe it 'ief rNerl frcrv A C- CofCthe lour ms ,Be is.ac'cmrh!'-irc o y'rc :gin K:- 4-I '22cci, - G L '_.X.- .1. .-1 .. .r cj'jfU l .- :.rew -i .txE,7T2t _ f3.r< fi _ ..e e"Jn: _. _Jof !the river. th r.::4J .. f_.3-t,_ _- i -- '.. . - -de .st .ructon ix 'lI0tiLtP :- _ r The enemy destroyed the bridge as a force consisting of two 0 infantry companies and the engineers was being formed to make the crossin:. The Task Force had fought hard against stubborn and fanatical resistance on a mission which all hands were keen to accomplish. with success almost within its grasp the enemy had destroyed these high hopes. LESSONS LEARNED The attack indicated again the desirability of permitting time for commanders to look over the ground in daylight. Had such been possible, more success might have resulted from the night attack by knoing our way around cross-country in attempting to by-pass the burning tanks on the road. Lack of time also prevented thorough didaeSEmination of orders and the organization of the. hastily assembled units into a team. Although this actually had little effect on the outcome of the firht, it did create anxiety on the part of every commander and served to make every task more difficult. The attack is a good illustration of what can happen to tanks at night. The final lesson learned was that when the benefits to be gained are large enough, it is wise to make an attempt to secure them regard- less of the hazards and difficulties involved. Had we been able to secure the bridge intact, the benefits resulting to the force as a whole are obvious. 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