The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the End of the Cold Author(s): Douglas Lemke Source: Journal of Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 23-36 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/424828 Accessed: 13/05/2009 15:27

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http://www.jstor.org ? Journalof Peace Research,ISSN: 0022-3433 vol. 34, no. 1, 1997, pp. 23-36 The Continuationof History:Power TransitionTheory and the End of the *

DOUGLAS LEMKE Departmentof Political Science, FloridaState University

This article offers an interpretationof the currentinternational situation from the perspectiveof power transition theory. Previous efforts to understandwhat the end of the Cold War means for internationalrelations have pro- vided only part of the picture. Optimistic views tend to deny the possibility of the emergence of new threats, while pessimistic argumentsgenerally fail to recognize that the prospects for major war have been significantly reducedby the dramaticevents of the last half decade. The interpretationoffered here is potentiallyadvantageous because it draws insights from a theory with a long recordof empirical support.Power transitiontheory is con- sistent with the existence of a 'Long Peace' since WorldWar II, with the Cold War's peaceful end, and thus pro- vides confidence to those who would use it to interpretthe prospectsfor the future.The conclusion offered here is that while the end of the Cold War offers reason for celebration,there is also cause for concern.

1. Introduction emerge. Similarly, it is also incorrectto suggest For most of the years since WorldWar II the in- that we have entered into a period similar to ternational system had been characterizedby that of Europe between the World ideological rivalry, bipolarity, and a peace (Mearsheimer,1990), or that we face a situation among major powers supposedly imposed by unprecedentedin internationalrelations (Singer the tremendous destructive power of nuclear & Wildavsky, 1993). weapons. With the events of 1991 the ideologi- In this article I offer reasons for this 'mixed' cal rivalry officially ended, bipolarity was view of currentinternational reality, suggesting weakened (if not replaced),and efforts were ex- that we should apply establishedtheories of in- tended toward a less nuclear future. Analysts ternationalrelations in order to provide a con- have offered contradictoryexplanations of these text that will allow us to understandwhy the changes, as well as a range of expectations momentous changes have occurred, as well as about the future. Some suggest that the current what they mean. The theory used here to pro- course of internationalrelations is strongly con- vide an interpretation of the current inter- ducive to peace and tranquillity, while others national situation is power transition theory claim that an increasing frequency and severity (Kugler & Lemke, 1996; Kugler & Organski, of war is to be expected. These two viewpoints 1989; Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, may be labelled 'optimists' and 'pessimists'.' 1980). I compare the arguments and expla- Neither is more than half-right;rather, the end nations offered by power transitiontheory with of the Cold War has created reasons for cele- those offered by the optimists and pessimists, bration as well as concern. As the title of this focusing specifically on the 'Long Peace' that article suggests, it is incorrect to suggest, as has characterizedpostwar Great Power inter- Fukuyama(1989) does, that history is at an end. nationalrelations, the Cold War's peaceful end, The end of the Cold War likely does not repre- and the emerging post-Cold War world. I close sent the peaceful acceptance of a capitalist-lib- with expectationsof what the futuremight hold. eral internationalorder. Nor is it impossible for new challenges to the international order to 2. Power Transition Theory * I thank BabacarT. Fall, Jacek Kugler, MalvernLumsden, Power transitiontheory focuses on the strongest Michael Lusztig, A. F. K. Organski, Daniel Ponder, James and draws from their inter- Lee Ray, Suzanne Werner, and two anonymous JPR states, implications reviewers for their generously helpful suggestions. actions for war, and for the maintenanceof and Additionally, I thank Chloe Lemke for her supportand en- changes to the structureof the internationalsys- couragement. tem. It is similar to other 'systemic' theories of 24 Douglas Lemke internationalrelations, such as long cycle or bal- fensive objectives of internationalmilitary or- ance of power theory (Modelski & Thompson, ganizations such as NATO. As a democratic, 1989; Niou et al., 1989). However, unlike most market-orientedcountry, the United States (as other systemic theories it is not a purely realist the dominantstate) establishedthese patternsof theory, because it is not exclusively concerned interactionin accord with its preferences. with power (although power considerationsdo Additionally, power transition theory holds play a prominent role in it). In addition to that the internalgrowth of a countrydetermines power, power transitiontheory considers each its power. Since growthrates differ across coun- country's satisfaction with the workings of the tries, relative power is constantly changing. internationalsystem, or status quo. The status Occasionally one countrygrows so much that it quo is a useful abbreviationfor the general pat- achieves power parity (rough equality) with the tern of diplomatic,economic, and militaryinter- international system's dominant state. If the actions of membersof the internationalsystem. newly rising country (also known as the chal- In introducing power transition theory, lenger) is dissatisfied with the international Organski(1958, pp. 315-316) describes the in- status quo, it will demand changes which will ternational status quo as a stable international likely be resisted by the dominant state. The order. Specifically: combination of power parity between chal- lenger and dominant state combined with the A powerful nation tends to set up a system of relations challenger's negative evaluation of the status with lesser states which can be called an 'order'because quo provides the necessary condition for war the relations are stabilized. In time, everyone comes to to transition This war know what kind of behavior to expect from the others, (according power theory). habits and patternsare established, and certain rules as is fought for control of the 'rules of the game', to how these relationsought to be carriedon grow to be or status quo, of the internationalsystem, with accepted by all parties . . . Certainnations are recog- the expectation that victory by the challenger nized as leaders... Tradeis conductedalong recognized will be followed by a restructuringof inter- channels . . . Diplomatic relations also fall into recog- nized patterns.Certain nations are expected to support national diplomatic, economic, and military re- other nations... There are rules of diplomacy;there are lations. However, so long as the dominant even rules of war. country is preponderantthe GreatPower system is at peace. Only when a dissatisfied challenger The dominant country establishes an inter- rises to parity is war among the most powerful national order with rules that direct political, countriesanticipated by power transitiontheory. economic, diplomatic and military interactions. Because the theory suggests that parity and The dominantcountry establishes this orderbe- the challenger's dissatisfaction are jointly cause it derives benefits in the form of wealth, necessary for war, a weak dissatisfied chal- security, and prestige from doing so. Later, lenger is not to be feared. Similarly, a rising Organski & Kugler (1980, p. 23) write that country satisfied with the status quo is not ex- states fight when they do not 'like the way bene- pected to start a war even if parity with the fits are divided . . .' Recently, Kugler & dominant country is achieved, because in such Organski (1989, p. 173) summarized power instances there is no marginal gain to be transitiontheory and describedthe statusquo as achieved through fighting. Satisfied states are rules that determine 'the way goods are distrib- pacific states to whom the rules of realist power uted in the internationalorder'. The status quo politics do not apply. Since internationalstruc- codifies how the dominant country would like tures such as the distributionof power have dif- the other states in the world to behave. The rules ferent impacts on dyads of satisfied states than it creates toward this end provide it (and some on dyads that containboth satisfiedand dissatis- other states) with benefits, and are thus de- fied states, the status quo clearly differentiates fended. power transitiontheory from realism or neoreal- A description of the internationalstatus quo ism.3 since World War II would focus on the United If one were to understandthe presentand pre- Nations and its democraticunderpinnings,2 the dict the futurebased on extrapolationsof a pre- market-economy orientation of international existing theory, one should select a theory that financial institutions, and the generally de- accounts well for the events of the past. Power Continuationof History 25 transitiontheory enjoys a distinguishedempiri- tinual period without a war among the Great cal record. First of all, Organski & Kugler Powers. It is importantto understandwhy this (1980) provide strong evidence that wars be- period has been characterizedby the absence of tween contendergreat powers are fought when Great Power war, because identificationof the parity prevails between them. This finding has factors responsible for the Long Peace during been extendedto all greatpowers by Houweling the Cold War could provide importantclues as & Siccama (1988), and by Kim (1989). to whether or not the Long Peace will persist Additionally, a general relationship between now that the Cold War has ended. dyadic parity and war, or between dyadic pre- Gaddis considers bipolarityto have strongly ponderanceand peace, has been reportedby a contributedto the absence of Great Power war wide range of scholars(Bremer, 1992; Bueno de during this period. He argues, paralleling Mesquita, 1990; Garnham, 1976a, b; Geller, Waltz's (1964) prior arguments,that bipolarity 1993; Gochman, 1990; Maoz, 1993, p. 37; is easier to maintain than multipolarity,that it Weede, 1976).4 Recently, scholars have begun leads to stability in alliance configurations,and to document a relationshipbetween challenger that it makes any alliance defections that do dissatisfactionwith the status quo and war. Kim occur less worrisome. The overall effect is sta- (1991) measures dissatisfaction by observing bilizing. Finally (althoughthis does not exhaust the challenger's tau-b alliance score (Bueno de his list of contributingelements), Gaddisargues Mesquita, 1975) for the dominantstate, arguing that Cold War decision-makerswere generally that when the challengerand the dominantstate risk-averse, with this unaccustomed caution have sharply different alliance portfolios these arising from the devastating costs nuclear differences are symptomaticof different views weapons can inflict upon countries that find of the status quo. The results suggest that a themselves at war with a nuclearopponent. The negative tau-b alliance score between the chal- combined effect of these elements was the cre- lenger and dominant state is a strong predictor ation of a set of tacit 'rules' for GreatPower in- of subsequent war involving that challenger. teraction that provided order and stability.6A Werner & Kugler (1995) measure challenger clear implication is that should these elements dissatisfactionby observing extraordinarymili- be removed from the internationalscene, as, ar- tary buildups by the challenger as parity with guably, happenedwith the end of the Cold War, the dominant state approaches. Their military the Long Peace could end in hot war as the rules buildup measure of dissatisfaction is a strong break down. predictor of subsequentwar between the chal- Others have recognized the pacifying effect lenger and dominantstate. Finally, recent exten- of bipolarity and nuclear weapons. The notion sions have demonstrateda relationshipbetween that nuclearweapons are responsiblefor the ab- parityand dissatisfactionwith war as far back in sence of GreatPower war after World War II is time as 1648 (Kim, 1992), as well as to minor not a new idea (Intriligator & Brito, 1984; power wars in South America (Lemke, 1993). Kissinger, 1957; Waltz, 1981). Similarly, as In short, there is impressive empirical evidence mentioned,Waltz makes comparablearguments to supportpower transitiontheory's claims that about the stabilizing effects of bipolarity. It is parity and challenger dissatisfaction are strong possible that such elements, singly or in combi- correlatesof war.5 nation, do have stabilizing effects on inter- nationalrelations, but this claim cannotbe made based solely on the Long Peace. We must eval- 3. The Long Peace uate these claims against a larger set of cases It is likely that we will be better able to under- if we are to use them as explanationsto be ex- standthe currentinternational order if we under- trapolatedinto the future. stand the situation from which it arose. The Is bipolarity really a stabilizing element? post-Cold War world is the successor to the Deutsch & Singer (1964) provide a logically Cold War; and, hopefully a continuationof the consistent argumentsuggesting multipolarityis 'Long Peace' (Gaddis, 1986). Gaddis offers this stabilizing. Thus, there is no exclusive logical phrase to describe Great Power relations since claim behind bipolarity as a stabilizing effect. World War II, as this representsthe longest con- Haas (1970) considerspolarity across three sub- 26 Douglas Lemke

systems at various time periods, and finds that questions of extended deterrenceand of crises whereas bipolarityis generally more stable than pitting nuclear against non-nuclearcountries. If multipolarity,although multipolarityis associ- nuclear weapons make countries cautious, then ated with fewer but longer wars. He suggests we should expect a notable role for nuclear that unipolarityis the most pacific type of sys- weapons in the peaceful resolution of extended tem. Hopf(1991) argues that consideration of deterrence situations8 Similarly, in situations 16th-centuryinstances of bi- and multipolarity where a nuclear state finds itself in a conflict in Europeanhistory makes it difficult to suggest with a non-nuclearstate, we should expect the one is more stable and peaceful than the other. non-nuclearstate to be more likely to concede In more recent work, Kegley & Raymond whatever is at dispute, because the potential (1994) differentiatebetween types of multipo- costs for it are higher than those facing the nu- larity, drawing on detailed considerationof six clear state. Contraryto these expectations,Huth modem time periods. They argue that some & Russett(1984) find little or no role for nuclear types of multipolarityare more dangerousthan weapons in the resolution of extended deter- others.7The logical and empirical evidence re- rence situations, and Kugler (1984) reportsthat gardingpolarity and war suggests we should be nuclear states generally do not get their way in cautious in accepting any argumentthat bipolar- crises with non-nuclear states. Based on these ity is a significantcause of the Long Peace. indications,we should exercise some caution in Have nuclear weapons contributed to the accepting arguments that suggest nuclear Long Peace? There has only been one time weapons have been an importantpart of the period in history in which two or more countries stability of the Long Peace. had nuclear weapons they could deliver to each Gaddis's argumentabout the Long Peace dif- other's territory,and this period overlaps with fers somewhat from the presentation offered the absence of Great Power war. As a result, it here. Specifically, Gaddis argues that it is the is impossible to test propositionsabout whether unique joint occurrence of bipolarity and nu- nuclearweapons have preventedwar duringthe clear weapons that caused the postwar world to Long Peace, since there is no variationin either avoid Great Power war. Since my critique is the presence of nuclear weapons or the occur- about the independent effects of nuclear rence of war during this period. What we can weapons or bipolarityI am not able to reject his do, however, is analyze the logical bases and argument (although if the underlying logic of subsidiarypropositions of those who argue that each partof his argumentis questionable,he has nuclear deterrence promotes peace. First, the to specify better how the interaction is pacify- logical bases. The core argumentof the nuclear ing). Of course, it is not possible to offer any deterrenceschool is that the extreme costs nu- evidence supporting his argument either. The clear weapons can inflict make countries avoid postwar period is the source for his argument. going to war. Thus, we should logically expect As such, this period cannot be used to confirm a negative relationshipbetween expected costs his argument. Such an attemptedconfirmation and the propensityof countriesto engage in war would fail by tautology. At the same time, there if nuclear deterrence arguments are correct. If has never been another period in which the this proposition is true, then we should observe unique joint occurrence of bipolarity and nu- some evidence of continuallydeclining propen- clear weapons has occurred. However, there sity for war throughhistory as advances in tech- have been previous periods of Great Power nology created first the flaked-pointprojectile, peace. Any explanationof the Long Peace that the atalatl, the bow and arrow, rudimentary could also account for these previous periods of firearms,machine guns, war-planes,and so on, peace would be superior on logical and philo- thereby raising the costs of war. Whereas it is sophical grounds.9 true that the frequency of Great Power war has Thus, if the two principal elements are sus- declined over time (Levy, 1983, Ch. 6), the evi- pect to such re-interpretation,and if the expla- dence of the first half of this century should nation for the Long Peace is not relevant to make us pause before blindly accepting the analysis of any other eras of GreatPower peace, propositionthat high expected costs deter war. perhaps we should reconsider the argument Related to this concern about costs are the altogether. If we question this explanation we Continuationof History 27 might do well to consider an altemrnativeexpla- To the skeptical readerthis may appearto be nation; that of power transition theory. Recall an unexceptional explanationof the absence of that power transition theory argues that Great war, but, as Most & Starr (1982) write, any Power war is anticipatedwhen there is power good theory of the causes of war must simul- parity between the dominantcountry and a dis- taneously be a theory of the causes of peace. satisfied challenger. Great Power war cannot Power transitiontheory is both. It accountswell occur, accordingto this theory, unless these two for the instances of GreatPower war and peace, conditions are jointly present. Throughoutthe at least from the 17th century to the 20th, and Cold War the United States was the dominant this gives us confidence that the explanationof country, and the Soviet Union was the (poten- peace since World War II is well founded as tially) dissatisfied challenger.'0However, the well. Alternative explanations of the Long Soviet Union never achieved parity with the Peace do not possess this historical grounding; United States, and therefore war was not ex- their explanations cannot extend backward in pected. As Figure 1 shows, the Soviet Union time as power transition theory can. Conse- rarely achieved a GDP of even half that of the quently, power transition's explanation of the United States. The power transitionexplanation Long Peace is likely to prove superior to the of why the Cold War was part of a Long Peace alternatives discussed above. Arguments such is that power parity between the US and USSR as Gaddis's may provide the best explanationof was never observed. a single case, but if one is interestedin explain- ing international relations in general such specific explanationsprove unsatisfactory.If the emergence of nuclear weapons and bipolarity changed international relations qualitatively, Figure 1. Trendsin US and Soviet Gross Domestic then a theory that does not take this sea-change Products(Trillions of PurchasingPower Parity Dollars) 1950-90 into account will be a poor basis for extrapola- 400v ; - ^ >oe+efe8W tion into the future. I argue above that there are strong reasons for doubting that nuclear weapons or bipolarityhave had this effct inde- pendently, no explanationhas been offered for how the joint occurrence has changed inter- nationalrelations in some fashion differentfrom the independenteffects, and thus it is up to those who would argue that the present or recent past does not resemble the past or distantpast to ex- plain why this is so. Absent evidence of and an explanation for those who would 0 200 sea-change, 0 argue that such a sea-change has occurredoffer nothing more than opinion, a poor basis for foreign policy."1

4. The End of the Cold War The Cold War ended because the Soviet system became so untenable that the USSR could no longer compete with the USA. Failing at com-

ii: :li :r:ii :: ii ni ,,,i,L:: i, : : i. ' :: wE?iii lir:iiiiiii: ? ::- : :: :;l .: : petition, the USSR, and now Russia, has turned 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 toward conciliation. This is evidenced by de- mocratization, decreasingmilitary Years privatization, confrontation,and the dissolution of the Soviet -| USA Empire.The Cold War ended in parts.The first - USSR part involved Soviet internaldecay (both econ- omic and political).'2 The second saw the dis- 28 Douglas Lemke appearanceof Cold War competition, tensions writing on power transition theory made any and antagonisms. contingent statements about the Cold War's Did anyone predict that this would happen? end. However, it is possible to interpretSoviet There seems to be pretty widespreadagreement internaldecay as consistent with the underlying within the scholarly literaturethat the answer is force driving power transition theory: internal no. As far as predictinginternal decay, the only growth. Organski originally wrote of three explicit prediction I am aware of is that of stages in each country's growth path: an initial George F. Kennan,who wrote in 1947: stage of potential power markedby slow or no growth, a stage of transitionalgrowth in power . . . the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this which writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the cap- during rapid, fast-paced growth occurs, italist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds and finally a stage of power maturationin which of its own decay, and that the sproutingof these seeds is the now much more powerful countrytapers off well advanced (reprintedin 1951, p. 125, parenthetical and returnsto slow growth reminiscent of the statementin original).13 first stage (Organski, 1958, Ch. 12; for an elab- oration, see This trend can be If Kennan is the only one to predict the Organski, 1965). visualized as an curve in which the internaldecay, did anyone predict that the con- S-shaped rise the second the sequence of this would be the diminishmentin during stage provides growth that one anotherin terms of tensions and competition? Lebow writes: 'The propels countrypast It is this middle that leads to the Soviet response to decline is not one captured power. stage transition from to from by any realist theory' (1994, p. 263). & preponderance parity, Ray which Russett (1996), who argue forcefully that the power transitiontheory draws its name. It is fair to behavioralist/positivist/empiricisttradition does say that power transitiontheory provide predictionsof internationalphenomena, suggests that if a country does not reach parity with its of admit: 'there were few specific assertionsin the another during stage transitional in internationalrelations literature regarding the growth power, any subsequent power tran- sition is The Soviets did end of the Cold War in the year before its unlikely. not overtake the United States their of transi- demise'. However, they contend that Russett during stage tional in As did predict(at least partially)the end of the Cold growth power. the Soviets realized would in War in a 1982 publication. They argue that the they not, fact, 'bury the West' they at- reforms the end of the Cold War is consistent with the argu- tempted conciliatory with inter- ments associated with the democratic peace nationalstatus quo, and as a resultthe Cold War ended. failed at with proposition, reprintingan earlier argument by Having competition the dominant the Russett: country, USSR turnedtoward con- ciliation. This is the power transitiontheory in- stable peace [between the United States and Soviet terpretationof the end of the Cold War. There is Union] could be possible only if the governmentof the no prediction of Soviet internal economic and Soviet Union were to evolve into somethingmore demo- political decay here, but the consequences of cratic than the current 'state socialism' . . . (quoted in Ray & Russett, 1996). that decay are consistent with the theory. Power transition theory argues that unless the USSR The argument is that since relations within a catches up there will not be a war. The USSR dyad composed of democraciesare more peace- did not catch up, and no war occurred. ful than those in dyads including at least one be- non-democracy, should the Soviet Union 5. The Post-Cold War World come more democratic(as it did in an effort to deal with its internal decay), the tensions 5.1 The Optimists between the superpowerswould ease consider- There are a number of arguments that take a ably, thereby ending the Cold War. This sort of very optimistic view of what we can expect in contingent statement of probable events is the future.I deal with only two here in orderto evidence of the ability of some theories to pre- be brief, yet hope to convey some of the breadth dict the future. of the optimistic argumentsin print. Did power transitiontheory predict the end of One argument suggests that people have the Cold War?The immediateanswer is no. No come to understandthat the use of force is a Continuationof History 29 rather poor way of dealing with conflicts of that used to fight one another- a model of how world interest.War is now seen as so costly that it will peace may be obtained without world government. (1993, p. 30, emphasis added)16 go the way of other inefficient institutions,like dueling and slavery. The result is that increas- Modem developed democracieshave existed in ingly we have a more and more peaceful world. increasing numbers over the past century, but This process was greatly accelerated by the what is different now is that the main threat to World Wars of the 20th century. The peaceful these countries, the Soviet Union, has disap- Cold Warand what is anticipatedto be even less peared.'7The advanceddeveloped democracies violent post-Cold War world are simply further are now able to rest content in their preponder- stages in this process of decreasingfrequency of ance, secure in their stable and prosperous wars. peace. The extraordinarilyoptimistic expecta- Perhaps the most familiar expression of this tion about the future is that ultimately all states viewpoint is Mueller's (1989) 'obsolescence of will inevitably develop, liberalize, and join major war' argument.'4He argues that follow- the zones of peace. According to Singer & ing World War I a dramaticchange of opinion Wildavsky,this is joyous news. The days of war about the value of war took place in the devel- are numbered.The futurewill not resemble the oped world. Where previously war had been past. viewed as a necessary evil at worst or as an heroic institution developing men's characters 5.2 The Pessimists at best, by 1919 it was viewed pretty uniformly Perhapsthe most familiarpessimistic argument as a barbaric,outdated and inefficient way of is that of Mearsheimer(1990), who cautions us dealing with conflicts of interest.Evidence is of- that the end of the Cold War - and the subse- fered by the development of anti-war move- quent end of bipolarity - means the return of ments, as well as the subsequentstatements and multipolarity in Europe. Mearsheimer makes actions of internationaldecision-makers. Now explicit use of neorealist/balance of power that the developed world has 'learned' the truth theory in orderto arguethat this reversionfrom aboutwar, majorwar is obsolete. As soon as the bi- to multipolaritywill likely have disastrous developing world learns this lesson as well, war consequences for Great Power peace. He com- will be obsolete altogether.'5 pares the future of the Great Powers with that A second optimistic view of the future sees experienced in Europe in the 20th centuryprior the post-Cold War world as representinga radi- to the Cold War. He criticizes optimistic cal departurefrom the past. With the end of the counter-argumentsthat the futurewill be peace- Cold War a sea-changein internationalbehavior ful due to the high costs of modern war, the has occurred,the like of which is unprecedented existence of so many democracies, or due to in history. Singer & Wildavsky (1993) argue some learningprocess, and persuasively argues that the world can now be divided into 'zones of that flaws in these alternativetheories undercut peace' and 'zones of turmoil'. The formercom- our ability to accept the scenariosthey advance. prise advanced, developed democracies like the He concludes that the USA must carefully United States, Western Europe, and Japan, 'manage' the dangerous multipolaritythat the while the rest of the world falls into the latter end of the Cold War will bring. type. Within the zones of peace, war is now im- Huntington(1989) expresses similar cautions possible because democracies do not fight each about accepting the optimists' views of the fu- other. Further,developed states have a prepon- ture. He also is critical of expectationsbased on derance of power and thus need not fear attack the democraticpeace proposition,cautioning us from the zones of turmoil. According to Singer that the democraticpeace proposal: 'is valid as & Wildavsky: far as it goes, but it may not go all that far' What counts about the zones of peace is that they are (1989, p. 7). When discussing Mueller's learn- somethingnew in the world. Withouta governmentover ing process argument,he asks us to consider if them they will be peaceful and democratic.They will be perhapsmurder, rather than slavery, is not a bet- a daily reminderto the world that the old message of his- ter comparisonto war. Since murderis anything tory, that war is a naturaland inevitable part of life, no longer has to be true. The zones of peace will be a but obsolete, he cautions us against expecting demonstrationthat peace is possible among countries that war will become obsolete too. Huntington 30 Douglas Lemnke does not see the end of the Cold War as the end cause greatconcern. The currentand near-future of history or as the introductionof something Europe may have a similar power arrangement new in history. Like Mearsheimer,he sees it as to that associated with the World Wars, but the the returnof danger,of the past.'18Where the op- crucial differencenow is that the majorstates of timists see the end of the Cold War as the nega- Europe are arguably satisfied with the inter- tion of the internationalsystem's war-like past, national status quo. They are all democratic, the pessimists see it as the returnof the past. capitalist,and have defensive militarypostures. Prior to both World Wars there were powerful 5.3 ExpectationsBased on Power Transition dissatisfied states in Europe.Now there are not. Theory Europeanwar is as unlikely as the proponentsof According to power transitiontheory the end of the democraticpeace propositionclaim, but war the Cold Warprovides reason to celebrate,simi- is unlikely because Europeansare satisfied with lar to the optimists, but also suggests areas of the status quo - democracyis a part of satisfac- grave caution and concern requiring attention tion underthe currentstatus quo (for an empiri- much like the arguments of the pessimists. cal evaluation supporting this argument, see Recall that the twin components of power tran- Lemke & Reed, 1995). Barring some dramatic sition theory are relative power differentialsand and unforeseen changes in status quo evalu- evaluations of the international status quo. ations among the Great Powers, war amongst Soviet decline means the disappearanceof the them is not anticipated. main competitorto US leadership.This has im- There is one very notable contingency that mediate consequences for expectations about could undercut this predicator. The People's war between the United States and the Soviet Republic of China arguably is not, despite Union/Russia. Subsequent Russian democrati- recent experimentswith limited economic liber- zation, liberalizationand efforts to engage the alization, a member of the satisfied coalition of internationaleconomy ratherthan foment inter- states. Recent Chinese growthrates are very im- national military tensions suggest that, even pressive, and suggest that a potential transition when Russia stabilizes and begins to grow, it is to paritybetween the People's Republic and the likely to be a satisfied country. This has long- United States within the next few decades is term consequences for expectations about war possible. As evidence, consider Figure 2, which between the United States and a resurgent extrapolatescurrent GDP growth trend into the Russia. The combination of these immediate future. Should such a transition occur without and long-term factors suggests that a war be- any change in Chinese evaluationsof the status tween the United States and Russia is very un- quo, war is expected based on power transition likely. Further, this is consistent with how theory.20Thus, this pacific Great Power predic- peaceful the end of the Cold War was. The tion of the futureof the post-Cold War world is United States benefited in terms of security by contingent on Chinese growth and attitudesto- the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, and could ward the internationalsystem's status quo.2' expect no gain by attacking since the Russian Chinese growth representsonly one potential political and economic system was becoming threatto continuedGreat Power peace, although more like that favored by the USA. Conse- arguablythis is the most realistic threat.The re- quently the Russians had no reason to fear the emergence of a centralizedor authoritarianpol- United States would take advantageof Russian itical and economic system in the former Soviet weakness and strike. This is contrary to the Union coupled with a resurgence of growth in power maximization underpinnings of realist the area could also present a threat;a re-emerg- and neorealist thought that expect the United ence of the antagonismassociated with the Cold States to have taken advantage of Soviet de- War. It is also possible that other political units cline.19 could challenge the currentinternational status The power transition theory expectation for quo. Although satisfied today a united Europe the post-Cold War world is the continuationof would possess the capacity to challenge the Great Power peace. Contraryto the arguments United States. Such a contingency assumes dra- of Mearsheimer and Huntington, a multipolar matic changes in the international order, post-Cold War Europe is not one that should changes for which no ready explanationcomes #XS l ;H 04 + e * *: w S 4 * k . * * # * b b 4 * + 4 F w * + w * l

Continuationof History 31

Figure2. Trendsin US and People's Republicof China because it suggests there will never again be a Gross Domestic Products(Trillions of PurchasingPower world war. However, such deterrence argu- ParityDollars) 1980-2010 ments are based on the assumption that high 0 . i|j. |||j||....l||||..l.|.|l..j||!.||i . ..60...... costs deter conflict. This assumptionis not sup- ported by empirical evidence (Huth & Russett, 1984; Kugler, 1984). Thus, althoughthe power transition theory expectation of war should China remain dissatisfied and achieve power paritywith the United States appearssomewhat mechanistic and it is more -. , - - /-/ -- ,!00S, ** perhaps unrealistic, ~3~iiiiiiiiijiiiiiiiii,,li ,, consistent than deterrence argumentswith the ...... i E empiricalevidence we have thus far. This chill- . ing logic suggests that faith in a nuclear peace c ,^"300..0 ...... E. iS^. E. E E .,, ,, ...... may be,././iE.!. unfounded. h

::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::: ::: :::::::: ::::::>: :::::::::::::::::: :: ::::: ::: : ::. :: : i, L: :: :E: The optimists and are, based on : : ::: : : T:: .:::: i: - or. : : : : i . : : : .: : : : : : :; : : pessimists LE:::: Tl::t:tt t l' t X ;:f ;00::000::; 0 :Eted:: lt : :: * -- -f . Hif : : :r: :. :: : -:: -:: :-:: this analysis, each half right about what to ex- ;:;: tt : S;f:f::f f::t:;: t00t::;: f:; :E:t ::y:f :iS ::; : : : i ;: i :/':d D:: ::: tt: ::f :iT; iLE:::::: ff: pect in the future. According to the extrapola- tion of power transitiontheory we can expect : : fT : X ^ o :E:: : : 0: 0;,,rr 4 ;; the Long Peace to continue.22However, it is

:iL:: rr; A; conceivable that the currentperiod of peace will come to a very violent end. Should this occur : t the expectationsof the pessimists will be tragi- cally borne out. 0 The power transitionaccount of what to ex- 1980 85 90 95 2000 5 10 pect in the future is perhapssuperior to that of Years either the optimists or the pessimists for a num- ber of reasons. First, consider Singer & -| USA Wildavsky's (1993) claim that the zones of - PRC peace are something radically new in inter- national relations. Is this so? Power transition theory can be interpretedsuch that the satisfied countriesof the world do not anticipatefighting each other (since there is nothing for them to to mind. Similarly, a dissatisfied Japan might fight over). The members of the satisfied coali- rise to a position from which it could initiate a tion of states thus constitute, and arguably al- war in an attemptto change the statusquo. This ways have constituted,zones of peace. Would it assumes Japanesegrowth or US decline that is have been reasonable to expect any circum- perhaps not reasonably expected, and also as- stances under which the United States and sumes that Japan's current evaluation of the Canada would have gone to war at any point status quo will change. In the long term other since Canada achieved her independence? actors, perhaps India, might rise in power and Similarly,did anyone anticipateany situationin desire changes that might necessitate war. which the United States and Great Britain One might be tempted to argue that all of would have gone to war with each other at any these scenariosare hopelessly unrealisticdue to point duringthe 20th century?How about West the presence of nuclear weapons. Surely any Germany with any of her Western European dissatisfiedchallenger contemplating world war neighbors after post-war reconstruction? with the United States must realize that such a Satisfied countries have always constituted conflict involves a (perhapsunacceptably) high zones of peace amongstthemselves. The differ- probability of nuclear escalation and that this ence between these historic zones of peace and potential eliminates the gains that might be the post-Cold War zone of peace Singer & achieved by fighting.Admittedly, this argument Wildavsky recognize is one of size, not kind. has a certainintuitive appeal. It also is appealing The satisfied coalition of states includes more 32 Douglas Lemke countries now than it ever has in the past. But, far. This explanatorypower, both historical and the satisfied coalition of states/zone of peace contemporary, gives confidence to those who of the immediate post-World War II period would advance power transitiontheory predic- enjoyed a greater preponderance of power tions of what the futurewill likely hold. (admittedly due to the destruction of the war We should be cautiously optimistic about the itself and consequent US preponderance)than future. The end of the Cold War means the the currentsatisfied condition of states/zone of evaporationof the major challenge to the cur- peace. Any claim that the modem zone of peace rent initial status quo. Russian efforts at liberal- is different in kind because it need not fear ization, democratizationand privatizationsug- attack from without must addressthis point if it gest that Russia has moved toward being a is to be accepted. member of the satisfied coalition of states. The Second, consider the argumentthat the devel- size of the satisfied coalition means that Great oped countries, due to a learningprocess, have Power war is not to be anticipatedanytime soon. turned away from war as a means of resolving However, there are threats to this optimistic disagreements. Whereas this may have some scenario. These include Chinese growth unac- validity for the post-World War II period, it is companied by a change in attitude toward the only on this one specific 'peace' that it has any status quo,24as well as the possibility of dra- claims. Power transitiontheory can also account matic changes in powerful satisfied countries for this Long Peace (power parity between the that could lead to a change in their evaluations USA and USSR was absent). But, additionally, of the statusquo. In this regardthe true threatof power transition theory can account for other hyper-nationalist chauvinism such as that of peace at other times and in other areas of the Vladimir Zhirinovsky becomes apparent.25To globe. For example, South America has been ensure against these threats taking material one of the most internationallypeaceful areas form, the United States and other leading satis- on earth. Mueller's learning process argument fied Great Powers should continue patient cannot explain this Minor Power long peace be- cooperation with the Chinese leadership in an cause the South Americanshave not had the op- effort to encouragedemocratization and liberal- portunity to learn, first-hand,the lessons that ization. The leading satisfied states should also Europeanshave learned. But the multiple hier- assist the Russians, financiallyas well as rhetor- archy model version of power transitiontheory ically, in achieving stability and growth undera can account for the long periods of peace South democraticmarket-oriented framework. Americans have enjoyed, and in the same In terms of GreatPower conflict the world is mannerthat the Great Power Long Peace is ac- a safer place now than it has been since the Cold counted for - the necessary conditions for war War began. But, in orderto prolong this period have usually been absent among South of safety the powerful satisfied countries will American states.23 Thus, power transition have to remainvigilant and fully engaged in in- theory can account for the peace that is of ternational relations, paying attention to the interest to optimists like Mueller, and a great contingencies that could negate power transition deal more. theory's prediction of continued Great Power peace.

6. Conclusions and Implications Throughoutthis article I have arguedthat power NOTES transitiontheory is an especially useful tool that 1. A review is presentedbelow, but works representative can be used to understandthe past, interpretthe of the 'optimists' include: Rosecrance (1986), Fukuyama(1989), Jervis (1991), Singer & Wildavsky present, and predict the future. The Long Peace (1993), and Mueller (1994). Works representativeof is consistent with the theory because the necess- the 'pessimists' include: Huntington (1989) and ary conditions for war were not present. Mearsheimer(1990). Similarly, the peaceful end of the Cold War, al- 2. Although not a perfectly democraticpolitical body, the United Nations clearly reflects many characteristicsof though not predictedby power transitiontheory, democraticpolities. As evidenced in its Charter,the UN is certainly consistent with the theory, as is the is based on claims of equal rights for nations large and peacefulness of the post-Cold War world thus small, ostensibly is charged to safeguard fundamental ContinuationofHistonr 33

human rights, is charged to promote the principles of transition theory. The structuraltheory of aggression justice and internationallaw, and allows each member and power transition theory are clearly compatible. an equal number of votes (if only in the General Galtung's theory is more general, since it applies to in- Assembly). I am not suggesting that the Charter teractions between individuals, groups, and states. 'makes' the UN a democraticorganization. Rather, I am However, power transitiontheory enjoys wider empiri- suggesting that the general tenor of the (arguably) cal support,and is thus perhapsbetter suited for evalu- premier internationalbody reflects the same political ation of prospects for the post-Cold War world. (The principlesthat underliedemocracies. compatibility between the theories has been explored 3. For an interpretationthat places power transitiontheory by Danilovic (1995)). within the realist paradigm, see Lebow (1994, pp. 6. These rules for orderand stabilityare similarto, but not 249-277). Lebow writes: 'Power transition theories the same as, power transitiontheory's statusquo. Recall comprise the branch of realism that analyzes great that in power transition theory the status quo is con- power responses to [relative]decline' (p. 251). Most of sciously establishedby the dominantstate. In Gaddis's his discussion is about Gilpin's (1981) work, and is ac- conceptualizationthese rules were an unconsciousreac- curatein descriptionof that work. However, I do not in- tion to internationalCold War reality. clude Organski's power transitiontheory in this realist 7. Some question whetherthe distinctionbetween bipolar- vein because considerationof the status quo means that ity and multipolarity is a useful one at all. Consider not all countries respond to decline in the same way. Wagner(1994). The decline of one satisfied state relative to a second 8. These are cases where one state threatensa second, and satisfied state is not expected to be conflictual,because subsequentlya third state threatensthe first in an effort the gaining satisfied state has no exception of net gains to deter it from acting on its initial threat. from fighting the declining satisfied state. The rising 9. This point is persuasivelymade by Bueno de Mesquita: state would not change the declining satisfied state's 'In order for one explanationto supplantanother, it is status quo (assuming the declining satisfied state is the necessary that the new explanationyield a net increase dominant country). Thus, power considerations be- in knowledge. Both hithertounexplained facts and pre- tween satisfied states are of little importanceat best. By viously explained facts must be accounted for, within contrast, the relative decline of a satisfied dominant the limits of measurementerror. This requirementalone country relative to a dissatisfied state is, according to indicates a need to "test" hypotheses against more than power transitiontheory, expected to be associated with one case. With one case it simply is not possible both to a much higher probability of war. Evaluations of the account for previously unexplainedfacts . . . and pre- status quo are a critically important,non-realist element viously accounted-forfacts. It is difficultto see how ex- of the power transitiontheory discussed here. Further, cess contentover previousexplanations may be attained I refer to Organski's theory as the power transition with a single observation.'(1985, p. 124) theory because it pre-dates others by a considerable 10. As is usually the case with power transitionstudies, I margin. employ nationalproduct to measurepower. I define the 4. The dyadic element of these results must be stressed, as USA as the dominantcountry because it emerged after little or no evidence has been presentedto suggest a re- World War II with a much largernational productthan lationship between the existence of st'stenticparty and that of the USSR. Power transitiontheory argues that war or between vssteozic preponderanceand peace. national power is determinedby national growth. The Ferris (1973) and Siverson & Tennefoss (1984) con- resources of a state define the potential power assets sider a systemic relationshipbetween parity and peace that might be put to various purposes.The generalityof while Singer et al. (1972), Bueno de Mesquita (1981), national productnicely representsthis domestic power Siverson & Sullivan (1983), and Maoz (1993) all pre- potential, and is thus often used in power transition sent evidence or otherwise argue that there is no re- studies (Organski & Kugler, 1980; Lemke, 1993; lationship between power distributionsand war at the Lemke & Werner, 1996), although several power tran- level of the internationalsystem. sition studies have used alternativemeasures of power 5. Power transition theory, as represented here, bears (Houweling & Siccama, 1988; Kimn,1989; Lemke & strong resemblance to Galtung's (1964) structural Werner, 1996). The choice of a measure should be theory of aggression. Galtung argues that rank disequi- driven by theory as much as possible, and I argue that librium, discontinuitiesbetween ascribed and achieved power transition theory is most accurately evaluated status, will likely make actors (including states) ag- using nationalproduct data. (Not surprisingly,there is a gressive. The dissatisfiedchallenger in power transition very high correlationbetween nationalproduct data and theory is almost certainly a rank disequilibratedstate. more traditional power measures such as that of the This challenger is the second most powerful state in the Correlates of War Project; see Organski & Kugler, Great Power system (high achieved status), but enjoys 1980, p. 38, as well as Kugler & Arbetman,1989.) One few or no benefits from the status quo, and arguablyis specific problem with employing nationalproduct data not accorded the prestige its power warrants(low as- here, however, concerns questions of how accuratethe cribed status). Power transition theory further antici- estimates are for closed economies (such as those of the pates that this challengerwill be the initiatorof conflict USSR and PRC). In recognition of this problem, only (since it is the actor that desires change to the status general statementsabout relationshipsdescribed by the quo). Galtung also argues that such a rank disequlib- data are made here. The figuresthat follow are based on ratedactor would be the prime candidatefor aggressive data found in Maddison(1989), and extended with data behavior in a situation like that described by power from Mitchell (1994). 34 Douglas Lemke

11. Recently, Volgy & Imwalle (1995) provide additional lations at the global level does not reflect the ways in evidence against the existence of sea-changes in inter- which China structuresits own domestic relations.This national relations. They investigate the extent to which incongruityis synonymouswith dissatisfactionbecause bipolar or hegemonic characteristics of the postwar if China preferreddemocratic and market-orientedin- period influenced the levels of conflict (variously de- teractionsit could so organize its domestic affairs. fined). They find consistentlythat hegemonic character- 21. Concern about potential transitions between the USA istics were more importantthan bipolarinfluences. This and PRC are not new. Consider the following: 'The is certainlyconsistent with the argumentadvanced here, question is not whether China will become the most but also highlights the importanceof a recurringcon- powerful nation on earth, but rather how long it will dition, hegemony, rather than a 'new' bipolarity. Not take her to achieve this status' (Organski,1968, p. 486). surprisingly,Volgy and Imwalle argue that the past is 22. Note that nothing is said about minor power conflict. potentially a good predictorof the future. Transitions to parity between dissatisfied local chal- 12. No less an authority than Mikhail Gorbachev writes: lengers and local dominant powers are still potential 'At some stage - this became particularlyclear in the sources of conflict in various minor power regions of latter half of the seventies - something happenedthat the world, as a recent extension of power transition was at first sight inexplicable. The country [Soviet theory suggests (see Lemke, 1993). Also, note that Union] began to lose momentum.Economic failuresbe- nothing is said in this prediction about peace between came more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate great powers and minor powers. There is nothing in the and deteriorate,and unresolved problems to multiply. great power peace predictionof power transitiontheory Elements of what we call stagnation... began to appear to preclude the possibility of war between Russia and . . . (1987, pp. 18-19). Additional Russian claims of one of the newly independentconstituent republics of Soviet internal decay are expressed by several of the the former Soviet Union. The prediction of peace is contributorsto Midlarskyet al. (1994). Of course, the only one of continuedgreat power peace. Soviet system may not be completely at fault. It could 23. For a detailed discussion of the multiple hierarchy be that the 'defection' of the PRC after the Sino-Soviet model, see: Lemke (1993) and Lemke & Werner rift and subsequent US-Chinese rapprochement (1996). 'forced' the Soviets to over-commit resources to de- 24. Even here, however, there may be cause for optimism. fense purposes, such an over-commitment overtaxed This self-same dramaticChinese growth has been, to a the system, and collapse followed. It may be thatthe po- considerable extent, fundamentallydifferent from dra- tential of competition with both China and the USA matic Soviet growth under Stalin. Chinese growth has would cause any domestic system to fail. involved a large amount of interactionwith capitalist 13. It is probablypossible to assemble a ratherextensive list East and West. Foreign investmentand tradehave been of economists who made statementsabout the inherent major components of recent Chinese economic devel- inefficiencies of centralplanning, and to interpretthis as opment. By contrast, Soviet development under Stalin somewhat predictive of the Soviet Union's internal was largely divorced from the West (or East for that decay. However, Kennan's is the only statementwithin matter).Thus, the process that could allow China to de- the internationalrelations literaturewith which I am velop to the point where it might challenge the status familiar. quo entails a very real possibility of guaranteeingthat 14. For an earlier expression of a learningprocess limiting the Chinese will be satisfied with the current inter- war see: Holsti (1986, pp. 355-372, especially pp. 357, national order before parity is reached. Of course, this 370). discussion considers only economic elements of the in- 15. For a similar, although probabilistic, argument about ternational status quo. Arguably, economic concerns learning leading to a morally advancedworld in which are the most important,but other concerns certainly war could be abolished, see Ray (1989). exist as well. 16. For an argumentthat comes to a similarconclusion that 25. This threat is really only operative if a re-unified and the 'new world order' is qualitatively different from hyper-nationalistor again communist Soviet Union en- what preceded it, see Fukuyama(1989). joys a period of sustainedgrowth in which it catches up 17. 'The failure of the Soviet Union and of communism to the United States. permanentlyremoves the last systematic challenge to democracyin existence' (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993, p. 36). REFERENCES 18. 'The end of the Cold Wardoes not mean the end of pol- Bremer, Stuart A., 1992. 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DOUGLAS LEMKE, b. 1967, PhD in Political Science (Vanderbilt University, 1993); Assistant Professor, Florida State University (1993- ); co-editor (with Jacek Kugler) of Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of 'The War Ledger', and author of articles on structural causes of war appearing in International Interactions and International Studies Quarterly.