Plotinus' Reception of Aristotle

CHAPTER 13 Plotinus’ Reception of Aristotle

Sara Magrin

1 Introduction

So much has been said about Plotinus’ reception of Aristotle, and the nature of this reception has been interpreted in so many ways, that one cannot approach this subject without first providing a brief history of its develop- ment. This procedure, I hope, will allow us to identify the main philosophical domains in which Plotinus engages with Aristotle’s thought, while at the same time enabling us to better interpret that engagement. I will therefore start by sketching the views on Plotinus’ reception of Aristotle that have shaped the recent history of this subject. Then I will introduce the contemporary debate and argue that, despite its specific traits, like previous discussions, it aims at a general assessment of Plotinus’ reception of Aristotle by focusing on the analysis of Aristotle’s philosophical doctrines and Plotinus’ approach to them. I will suggest that, given the variety and complexity of Plotinus’ use of Aristotle’s doctrines, no such assessment can be reached. In contrast to this doctrinal approach, I will argue that the key to arriving at a general assessment of Plotinus’ reception of Aristotle is the analysis of his method of philosophical inquiry.

2 Plotinus’ Reception of Aristotle: A Brief History

Plotinus’ interest in Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition is well documented. In his Life of Plotinus (14.4–7), Porphyry remarks that in Plotinus’ writings Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines (δόγματα) are mingled in (ἐμμέμικται) in a concealed way (λανθάνοντα), and he says that Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in particular, is compressed (καταπεπύκνωται) in them. Porphyry also informs us that, in the meetings of Plotinus’ school, students were asked to read commentaries, some of which were by Peripatetic philosophers (14.10–14). He mentions Aspasius, Alexander, and Adrastus, but says that this list is not exhaustive and that Plotinus had his students read any commentary on Aristotle that was available. Thus not only are we told that Plotinus read and somehow incorporated Aristotle’s works into the Enneads, but we are also informed that he read

commentaries on those works, and we have the names of at least some of the Peripatetic commentators he was familiar with. This is a wealth of informa- tion, but the interpretation of it raises at least two problems. The first problem is this: the more we learn about Peripatetic philosophy in the early Empire, the more it seems that the interpretation of core Aristotelian doctrines varied significantly among the Peripatetic commentators of that period, to the point that we can speak of many forms of Aristotelianism from at least the time of Boethus of Sidon (first century BC) until that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second and early third century AD).1 Thus, while the fact that Plotinus used several commentaries to interpret Aristotle’s works establishes his interest in Aristotle, it raises the question of which Aristotle he was interested in. The second problem has to do with the use Plotinus makes of Peripatetic doctrines. By saying that Peripatetic doctrines are mingled in Plotinus’ writings, Porphyry might mean that Plotinus appropriated some Peripatetic doctrines and somehow fitted them into his own Platonism. But he might also simply mean that Plotinus often mentioned those doctrines, perhaps even to refute them, without explicitly reporting his source.2 In the last fifty years, the debate on Plotinus’ reception of Aristotle has been defined by these two problems: that of identifying which Aristotle Plotinus is interested in, and that of understanding how Plotinus uses Peripatetic doctrines. As Porphyry’s remarks in the Life of Plotinus show, the discussion of Plotinus’ reception of Aristotle can be traced back to the first generation of his students. It is only in the 60s, however, that it began to take the shape that characterizes it today, with the publication of Les Sources de Plotin, a volume of ten essays aimed at recovering the sources of Plotinus’ thought.3 Two essays, in particular, became the starting points for any subsequent analysis of the subject. By means of close textual comparison, Paul Henry and A. H. Armstrong independently argued that Plotinus developed some of his best known the- ses in psychology and metaphysics on the grounds of observations made by Alexander in On the Soul and Mantissa.4 Armstrong’s study became especially influential for two main reasons: its analysis of Plotinus’ engagement with Alexander, and the centrality in Plotinus’ thought of the thesis it examined, namely the thesis of the identity of Intellect (Nous) and its thoughts. As is well known, Plotinus posits three first principles (ἀρχαί) of reality: the One, the Intellect, and the Soul. The origin of this triad can be traced back to

1 On this issue, I refer the reader to chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this volume. Cf. Rashed 2007: 1–6. 2 For a review of possible interpretations of Porphyry’s claim, see Kalligas 2014: 57–58. 3 Dodds et al. 1960. 4 Henry 1960; Armstrong 1960.