70-2552

BERNHARDT, Raymond S., 1908- A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF REPURCHASE PROGRAMS OF UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS.

The American University, Ph.D., 1969 Economics,

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Raymond S. Bernhardt 1970

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAMS

OF UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS

by

Raymond S. Bernhardt

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of Business Administration

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Business Administration

Dissertation Advisory Conmittei

Dean of the Doctoral Program: Chairmai

TLJ I

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY l i b r a r y 1969 The American University AUG 5 1969 Washington, D.C. WASHINGTON. D. C. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF STOCK REPURCHASE PROGRAMS OF UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS

& Raymond S. Bernhardt,! 1970 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the many who have contributed so much to the successful

consummation of this study, my very sincere thanks and appreciation.

Chief among these has been the able Chairman of my Dissertation Advisory

Committee, Professor Walter P. Muhlbach, who has given so generously of

his wise counsel, advice, and time. I am greatly Indebted also to

Dr. Edward R. Lehman, unsparing in his encouragement, guidance, and time;

and to Dr. Elcanon Isaacs and Dr. Richard H. Rush, all valued members of my Committee.

Dr. Nikos G. Photias, Director of the Doctoral Program of the

School of Business Administration of The American University, has been

a steady source of inspiration and encouragement through his insistence

on high academic standards and quality performance.

I also wish to express my appreciation to my former faculty

associates at the University of Akron, particularly to Dr. Charles F.

Poston, Dr. James W. Dunlap, Dr. Stephen S. Castle, Dr. Richard C. Roberts, and Dr. Howard L. Taylor.

/ Dean Edwina B. Hogadone, of the College of Business of the Rochester

Institute of Technology, and Jerry D. Young, Director of the School of

Business Administration, have been of great assistance by their encourage­ ment and furtherance of the completion of this study: and my faculty associ­ ate, Dr. Clifford D. Brown, has aided me with his counsel,

I am indebted also to the help and advice contributed by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D. C., particularly iii

Ira Pearce and Robert H, Menke; and to the staffs of the libraries of

The American University and of the University of Akron.

My thanks and appreciation are expressed to those who have helped so much with their able clerical services: to Mrs. Lillyan Fahy, Mrs.

Grace Hahn, Miss Belinda Henry, and Miss Gail Carlson.

I am most grateful to Dr. Talal A. Bisat for his encouragement and friendly advice and to Professor Maxwell Kaufman of UCLA, a former member of my Dissertation Committee.

Above all, I wish to express my thanks j:o my wife, Ruth, for her steadfast belief in and encouragement of my efforts, and for her willingness to "loan" me for the duration.

R.S.B. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION...... 1

The P r o b l e m ...... 4

The Study ...... 5

Research Methodology ...... 6

Definition of Terms U s e d ...... 11

Scope and Limitation of the S t u d y ...... 14

Organization of the S t u d y ...... 16

II. THE QUESTIONNAIRE...... 19

Introduction ...... 19

Selection of Companies...... 19

The Questionnaire (first r e q u e s t ) ...... 20

Replies from the Questionnaire...... 20

The Second Request ...... 22

Expansion of the Questionnaire Group...... 22

Replies from the Second Questionnaire Group. 24

S u m m a r y ...... 24

Responses to the Questionnaire...... 24

Managements' Stated Reasons ...... 32

Comments by Management ...... 34 CHAPTER PAGE

Evaluation...... 39

A Study of Listed Companies: Comparison .... 42

Questionnaire ...... 46

Covering Letter Sent with Questionnaire .... 49

III. THE RESEARCH STUDY...... 50

Purpose and Objectives ...... 50

Source Materials...... 50

Selection of Companies...... 51

Extent of Repurchase: Frequency and Volume . . . 51

Lack of Disclosure of Essential Information . . 58

Purposes of Repurchase...... 66

Removal of large blocks from the . . . . 67

Acquisition of other companies ...... 73

Stock plans ...... 80

For bonuses, employee incentive awards,

and prizes...... 89

Available at a low price...... 97

Use as stock ...... 101

No reasons gi v e n ...... 104

Characteristics of Repurchasing Companies . . . 105

Methods Used to Repurchase...... 109

S u m m a r y ...... 112 vl

CHAPTER PAGE

IV. THE EFFECT OF REPURCHASE UPON

STOCKHOLDERS...... 115

Quantitative Tests ...... 116

Market Quotations of ...... 116

Earnings Per ...... 129

Maintenance of Corporate Control By The

Principal H o l d e r s ...... 136

The Risk Factor: Effect On The Debt/

Relationship ...... 141

Dividend Payments Prior To, During, and

Subsequent To The Repurchase Period .... 144

Relationship of Repurchases, In Dollars,

To Net I n c o m e ...... 154

Qualitative Tests ...... 164

The Adequacy of Disclosure...... 164

Test Of The Criteria For Adequate Disclosure . 166

Advance notice of intent ...... 166

Methods employed in repurchase ...... 167

Notification to stockholders after

repurchase has been made ...... 169

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION...... 171

Summary...... 171

The Questionnaire...... 171 vii

CHAPTER PAGE

The Research Study...... 175

The Effect of Repurchase Upon

Stockholders...... 179

Conclusion...... 186

The Research S tudy...... 186

The Questionnaire...... 191

Limitations Of The Research St u d y ...... 193

A Different Approach ...... 195

Recommendations For Future Research ...... 197

APPENDIX A

Historical and Legal Background...... 201

APPENDIX B

The Responsibility of Directors of Unlisted

Industrial Corporation To Their

Stockholders...... 239

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 259 LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

I. Corporate Stock Issued and Repurchased

By Domestic Corporations, 1964-1968 ...... 1

II. Holdings and Dollar Cost of Treasury Stock

By Ninety-Five Companies in Second

Questionnaire Group (1965-1966 Fiscal Years). . 25

III. Fifty Unlisted Industrial Companies Which

Have Repurchased Common Stock ...... 52

IV. Repurchase of Stock By Unlisted Industrial

Corporations (1964-1966) ...... 56

V. Treasury Stock Holdings of Fifty Unlisted

Industrial Corporations ...... 59

VI. Relationship of 1966 Treasury Stock Holdings

to Issued Stock of Forty-Six

Unlisted Companies ...... 63

VII. Insider.Stock Holdings of Fifty Unlisted

Industrial Companies ...... 95

VIII. Market Price vs. Repurchased Cost Per

Share; Shares Repurchased in 1964 ...... 118

IX. Market Price vs. Repurchase Cost Per

Share; Shares Repurchased in 1965 ...... 121 TABLE PAGE

X. National Quotation Bureau Over-The-

Counter Industrial Stock Average

(1965-1967) Bid Prices ...... 124

XI. Market Price vs. Repurchase Cost Per

Share; Shares Repurchased in 1966 ...... 126

XII. Relative to Outstanding

And Issued Stock Of Fifty Unlisted

Industrial Companies, 1964-1966 130

XIII. Payments Per Share By Fifty

Unlisted Industrial Corporations

(1963-1967 inc.) ...... 145

XIV. Shares Repurchased By Fifty Unlisted

Industrial Corporations ...... 150

XV. Dollar Cost Of Repurchase Compared

To Annual Net Income ...... 155 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The dollar cost of the repurchase of equities by domestic corporations in the five years 1964-1968, inclusive, has rivalled

the aggregate dollar receipts from new issues. In those five years, although $15,304,000,000 in proceeds were realized from such Issues,

the sum of $14,458,000,000 was expended by United States corporations

in buying back their own capital stock. As Table I shows, the amount spent on repurchase was greater in two of those five years, 1965 and

1968. The increase in the dollar receipts from cash issues from 1967 to

1968 was sixty-one per cent; the increase in the dollar cost of equities repurchased was one hundred twenty-six per cent.

TABLE I

CORPORATE STOCK ISSUED AND REPURCHASED BY DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS 1964-1968, (millions of dollars)1

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 TOTAL

Issued for Cash 3,091 2,272 2,513 2,844 3,583 15,304

Repurchased 1,804 2,519 2,344 2,390 5,401 14,458

Securities and Exchange Commission, Branch of Capital Markets, "Domestic Corporate Securities Issued and Retired" (Washington, D. C., March, 1969, unpublished). Available for inspection. The very magnitude of repurchase has induced a few empirical studies and many articles, but they have been confined to a con­ sideration of the effect of repurchase upon the corporations them­ selves, from the point of view of management. Little consideration, however, has been given to its effect upon the stockholders of these corporations. This is an area which has been neglected; on it this study has focussed.

Moreover, since the empirical studies and articles were re­ stricted to the repurchase activities of Mew York listed companies, there was an implicit admission that a gap existed, that investigation into the repurchase activities of unlisted companies

(on which information was then largely unavailable) provided an area of desirable future research. This was true not only because of the dearth of published material on unlisted companies per se, particularly prior to the publication in July 1963 of the Report of Special Study of

Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but also because of the unavailability of Information on repurchased stock prior to May 1, 1965.

There has been a definite lack of information about un­ listed corporations and the over-the-counter markets. An excellent series of studies by the Securities Research Unit, Wharton School,

University of Pennsylvania, was published in 1958 but roost of the statistical data presented and analyzed related to a three-month period 3 2 of the year 1949.

In sharp contrast, there has been a voluminous amount of written material on listed companies. Listed corporations have long been subject to the strict disclosure requirements of the New

York Stock Exchange and its insistence upon frequent and complete financial reports and statements, certified by competent, responsible accounting firms. With unlisted companies the reverse has been true.

Professor Sidney Robbins, the former Chief Economist of the

Special Study of Securities Markets, has indicated that the Securities and Exchange Commission, in repeated examinations of over-the-counter companies, concluded that about half of their published statements did not meet its minimum standards. In 1961, the Special Study of the

Commission discovered that more than twenty-five per cent of the 1965 issuers covered in a survey did not disseminate any financial information 3 at all to shareholders.

The operations of many listed corporations are guided by pro­ fessional managers and ownership of their stock is widely dispersed.

This has not been the case, generally, with unlisted companies. Many of these, even though they may have been in existence for 75 to 100 years, and particularly so with the more recently established firms, are still managed by the founders or their descendants who still retain control by virtue of a high percentage of stock ownership.

^Irwin Friend, G. Wright Hoffman, and Willis J. Winn, The Over-the- Counter Securities Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1958). 3 Sidney Robbins, The Securities Markets (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 51. 4

As Indicated by Professor Robbins, there has been a general im­ pression that owner-managers of unlisted companies have tended to shun disclosure, avoid regulation of their activities, and evidence a dis­ regard for the rights of minority stockholders as a consequence of 4 their high degree of voting control.

Because of these differences between listed and unlisted companies, it is believed that a study of repurchase activities de­ voted to unlisted companies may be more effective in disclosing their effects upon stockholders' welfare.

I. THE PROBLEM

Major Problem

The purpose of the present study is to determine whether, and under what circumstances, the repurchase by unlisted industrial corpora­ tions of their own common stock has been in the best interests of their stockholders.

Supporting Research Problems

The research of this study has involved investigation into areas posed by the following questions:

What specific reasons have unlisted industrial corporations given for their repurchases? Did subsequent events indicate that the stated purposes, and the actual purposes, were similar or different? If different, which of these purposes have been beneficial to the stockholders

4 Ibid.. p. 51. as well as to the corporation and which, on the baBis of factual information, have been harmful?

What has been the possible effect of repurchase upon stock­ holders as determined by such tests as market prices of common stock relative to actual cost of repurchase, earnings per share (giving effect to year-end holdings of treasury stock) compared to earnings per share on issued stock, maintenance of corporate control by the principal holders, the risk factor: effect on the debt/equity relationship, dividend payments prior to, during, and after the repurchase period, and the relationship of repurchases, in dollars, to net income?

When the directors of unlisted industrial corporations approved repurchase, was there any evidence that they took into consideration its possible effect upon the minority stockholders?

What procedures can be or could have been employed by company officials to implement repurchase activities with fairness to all the stockholders?

II. THE STUDY

Importance

After a period of some thirty-odd years, during which no empirical study of repurchase was made, attention has once again been focussed on this subject, particularly in the three unpublished studies by Richard A. 5 Stevenson, Leo A. Guthart, and Wilbur A. Rapp, respectively.

^Richard A. Stevenson, "The Reacquisition of Corporate Stock," Un­ published Doctoral Dissertation, Michigan State University, Lansing, However, while these investigations stressed the importance

of repurchase as a demand factor in the market-place and as a tool

of financial management, they have likewise recognized the need for a

probing examination of the problems posed by repurchase. Paramount among these problems is the effect of repurchase upon a company's

stockholders.

Accordingly, it is the purpose of this study to investigate

the repurchase activities of unlisted companies, utilizing primary

source material; to determine their effect upon stockholders and the presence or absence of disclosure of all the material and relevant

facts.

Research Methodology

Since this has been a pioneering effort in the evaluation of

stock repurchase by unlisted Industrial corporations, it has been based upon the use, investigation, and analysis of original source material.

Also, although the nature of the study invites prudence and carefully

guarded expressions from corporation executives, interviews have been

held with many whose companies have repurchased common stock.

1965., pp. 122-136 (Available via University Microfilm).

Leo A. Guthart, "Corporate Repurchases of Already Outstanding Common Stock," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1966., pp. 1-11. (Available for Inspection, Baker Library).

Wilbur A. Rapp, "The Role of Reacquired Common Stock in Financial Management," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1966., p. 215. (Available via University Microfilm). In order to secure informative data from a representative group of unlisted companies, it has seemed desirable to work with those companies whose common equities had a fair degree of market­ ability, as well as being of sufficient size to warrant their in­ clusion in the asset and shareholder size classification previously established under Section 12(g) (1) of the amended Securities Exchange

Act of 1934.** This would provide the availability of data necessary for this study.

It was decided that the 950 unlisted companies whose stock quotations (bid and asked prices) were recorded in Barron’s Over-The-

Counter Market each week would fit the criteria adequately. The list of companies selected comprised those whose stock quotations appeared in the May 29, 1967 issue, pp. 44-46.

From this group a random sample of 178 companies, approximately

18.7 per cent of the whole, was drawn.^ Seven companies were discarded since their numbers exceeded 950, and eleven were found to be duplicates.

Of the remaining one hundred and sixty companies, fifty were eliminated because they did not fit the category of "industrial" companies. The balance, one hundred and ten companies, constituted the working group.

The reports of these one hundred and ten companies were individually examined at the main office of the Securities and Exchange Commission in

^As of April 30, 1965, applicable to issuers with total assets in excess of $1,000,000 and a class of equity held of record by 750 or more persons (reduced to 500 or more persons after July 1, 1966). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended to August 20, 1964, p. 12.

^Ronald A. Fisher and Frank Yates, Statistical Tables for Biological, Agricultural, and Medical Research (London: Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1949), Table XXXIII, Random Numbers (1), p. 104. 8

Washington, D. C.

These company files included the Registration Statements,

Forms S-l and F-l (required under the Securities Act of 1933), and

Forms 8a, 10, and 12 (covering registration of securities required under

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); also the 10-K (annual) reports, and 8-K (current) reports, the 9-K (semi-annual) reports, the 16-K

(relating to voting trust certificates) reports, and proxy statements.

All are required to be filed with the Commission in accordance with

Sections 12(g), 13(a), 14, and 15(d) of the amended Securities Ex­

change Act of 1934 (the 1964 Amendments extended the provisions of the

1934 Act, relating to reports, to over-the-counter companies).

In some instances, companies in the working group had become

subject to the periodic reporting provisions of the 1934 Act as the

result of a prior of stock under the Securities Act of

1933; in such cases, although information was available for earlier

years, only data from 1959 on was examined. (For consistently comparable

data, only repurchases from 1964 on were included, but reports of prior years were examined to determine company policy).

However, the great majority of unlisted companies did not become

subject to the periodic reporting provisions of Section 12(g) of the 1934

Act until April 30, 1965. For this reason, the balance sheets, income

statements, proxy statements, etc. of such companies were not available

prior to that date.

The examination of the one hundred and ten unlisted Industrial

corporations, which have been under study, revealed those which had

engaged in repurchase and those which had not. Reference to the "pink," "green," and "white" sheets, issued by the National Daily Quotation Service, provided the bid and asked quotations for each security as furnished by three responsible "market Q makers" on selected dates: December 31, 1964; March 31, 1965;

April 30, 1965; June 30, 1965; and the end of each quarterly period thereafter, including December 29, 1967.

Information on dividend payments was secured by reference to

Moody's Dividend Record, including payments from 1963 on up to the date of writing of this study.

Since April 30, 1965, when unlisted companies became subject to the periodic reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended in 1964 (Section 12(g) (1), it has become necessary for direc­ tors, officers, and principal stockholders of such companies, in accordance with Section 16(a) of the Act, to file with the Securities and Exchange

Commission a statement "of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission . . . a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month." This information on holdings, transactions, and resultant

Bid and asked quotations are representative of the market but do not constitute actual transactions. 10 holdings must be filed not only for the director, officer, and principal stockholder himself but also for the "immediate family," since Rule 16a-8 extends beneficial ownership of a security to that degree.

The Securities and Exchange Commission makes this information publicly available, each month, in its "OFFICIAL SUMMARY of Security

Transactions and Holdings"; this material has been examined, beginning with the issue of February 1963, although it was determined that only two companies of the repurchasing group had reported information on holdings and transactions prior to the issue of May 1965.

In order to secure the basis for a critical evaluation of stock repurchase activities, it has seemed essential to determine from the companies themselves their specific reasons for repurchasing their own common stock. This was accomplished by sending a questionnaire in

November 1967 to a senior financial executive of each of the fifty com­ panies which had engaged in repurchase activities, as established by examination of their company files at the offices of the Securities and

Exchange Commission.

A covering letter was sent with the questionnaire. This in­ dicated the specific purpose which the writer had in mind and the use to which the answers would be put. With the realization that the general subject of repurchase was under current scrutiny by the Securities and

Exchange Commission and covered by pending Federal legislation (S510), the senior financial executive was asked to answer the questions personally 11 with the assurance given that names of Individual companies would not be divulged and that answers would be merged so as to keep

Identities unknown.

Approximately five months later the questionnaire was mailed again to the twenty companies, of the original group of fifty, which had not replied to the initial mailing.

Two weeks later, in order to secure a wider sample, the same questionnaire was sent to an additional ninety-five companies. These were part of the original list of 950 companies whose were quoted in Barron’s Over-The-Counter Market. It was found, by examination of balance sheets and income statements (as detailed in Chapter II), that

252 companies of this group held treasury stock as of the close of their

1966 fiscal year. Ninety-five of these companies held substantial amounts of stock, based on number of shares or cost, and to this selected list questionnaires were sent. Thus, a total of one hundred and forty- five companies were included in this survey.

III. DEFINITION OF TERMS USED

Treasury stock. Treasury shares are shares of the corporation's issued and fully-paid stock which have been reacquired by the corporation by purchase or donation, but which have not been (1) retired by a form of statutory reduction; (2) cancelled; or (3) returned to the status of un- 9 .

9 Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations ; Securities Regulation f (New York: Matthew Bender, 1967). Sec. 147.07. 12

Unissued stock. This has been defined as "that part of the authorized capital stock, whether or not subscribed, which has not yet 10 been issued."

Over-the counter market. The term "over-the-counter" is synonymous with "unlisted" and includes the purchase and sales of all securities which are not executed on an organized exchange. Two of the most important characteristics of over-the-counter markets are these: first, the absence of a central market-place (each purchase or sale of a security between broker/dealers, by vocal communication, letter, tele­ phone, or teletype, constitutes a market); and second, their heterogeneity, as characterized by the variety of securities traded, the participating broker/dealers, and their trading practices.

Unlisted companies. The companies whose securities are traded over-the-counter vary considerably in size of assets, number of share­ holders, and . Many over-the-counter companies are not distinguishable from listed companies by these characteristics

(actually, it is often from this group that newly-listed companies come).

However, there are also many over-the-counter companies which are small in size and in the early stages of their corporate life. Some are re­ cently-financed companies and speculative in nature.

Market makers. This term is a synonym for wholsesale dealers, the firms which form the fabric of a in specific securities.

^®Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 3rd ed. 1963), p. 507. Their functions are twofold: firBt, to buy from or sell to broker- dealers whose customers are either selling or buying; second, to add to the marketability of the specific securities in which they trade by assuming long or positions with their own financial resources.

Their functions are thus comparable to those of a specialist firm on the .^

The wholesale dealer "makes the market" in specific securities by indicating his willingness to buy or sell for his own account and risk, with the expectation of buying at his bid price and selling at his offering, or asked, price. Such a firm makes its profit on the

"spread" between the bid and asked prices. Frequently, negotiation between buyer and seller reduces the spread.

In most exchange stocks, only one specialist or specialist firm

"makes the market"; in over-the-counter trading, there may be one firm or a few dozen which perform the same function, the number being depen­ dent on the activity of trading in that particular security.

The willingness of the "market-maker" to buy or sell a specific security is Indicated by advertising in the "sheets".

The pink, green, and white "sheets". Each day the "market makers" throughout the country furnish to the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. their bid and asked quotations on the specific securities in which they 12 maintain a trading interest.

^Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Fart 2, Chapter VII, p. 554.

^Representative of the market; they do not constitute actual sales. 14

The Bureau, a privately owned company, assembles and collates this

Information. Then, after It Is arranged alphabetically by name of security, it is printed on approximately 200 pages (The National

Daily Quotation Service). The reader may see at a glance the names and telephone numbers of the "market makers" for each security, and the bid and asked prices that such firms were willing to trade at, as of the time they furnished their quotations.

These printed pages are colored "pink" for the Eastern Section of the country, "green" for the Western Section (essentially the

Chicago and Midwestern area), and "white" for the Pacific Coast.

These "sheets" are then distributed by messenger, rail, plane, mall, or truck to the firms which subscribe to the service: the professionals, the wholesale and retail broker/dealer firms throughout the country.

In this fashion, such firms are informed of the "market makers" in the particular security in which they have a buying or selling interest, either for their own account or for the account and risk of their cus­ tomers, the general public.

IV. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Scope

It has been the aim of this study to determine the extent of repurchase activities which have been undertaken by unlisted industrial corporations, as distinct from those of listed corporations; to find out the purposes cited by the management of these companies for using 15

funds in this fashion, the characteristics of corporations which under­

take such activities, the methods employed by management to Implement

them, and the resulting effect on the stockholders.

A corollary purpose is to find out whether directors take into consideration the potential effect of repurchase upon public stockholders and what methods, if any, they use to apprise stockholders, in advance, of all the material and relevant facts in connection with the decision to repurchase.

Limitations

This study has not taken into consideration the repurchases of

listed companies, since several empirical studies and many published articles have examined this area from various aspects. However, up to

the present time, no examination has been made of the repurchase activi-

tives of unlisted industrial companies, nor has any attention yet been

focussed on the effect on stockholders of such companies, as differenti­ ated from the objectives contemplated by the managements of such companies.

The Information contained in the 10-K and 8-K reports to the

Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as the proxy statements, provided basic data for this study. However, the unavailability of such data prior to April 30, 1965 necessarily limited the study to the period

from that data forward.

The problem of this study, to determine whether repurchase has been in the best interests of their stockholders, is one which, according

to Guthart and Stevenson, corporate management would prefer to minimize, or 16 to avoid its implications. Leo A, Guthart wondered whether it were 13 always equitable for a company to buy shares from its own stockholders; and Richard A. Stevenson indicated that both accountants and financial managers should be greatly concerned by the ethical problems raised by 14 the increased interest in corporate stock reacquisition.

Thus, first-hand information has been difficult to obtain except by securing stated reasons via the questionnaire method (and promising anonymity to those who answer) and then examining those reasons in the crucible of subsequent happenings.

V. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Since this is primarily an empirical study, the historical back­ ground as well as the legal and regulatory constraints relevant to the subject of repurchase have been discussed in Appendix A. In addition, consideration has been given to the basic Federal legislation requiring disclosure and reporting provisions: The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; The Report of Special Study of

Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1963, which gave rise to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964; and the Full

Disclosure Act, enacted into law on July 29, 1968 as Public Law 90-439.

13 Leo A. Guthart, "More Companies are Buying Back Their Stock," Harvard Business Review. Vol. XLIII (March-Aprll 1965), p. 53.

■^Richard A. StevenBon, "Corporate Stock Reacquisitions," The Accounting Review. Vol. XLI No. 2 (April 1966), pp. 312-317. 17

The responsibility of directors of unlisted industrial corporations to their stockholders, from the standpoint of their consideration of the possible effect of repurchase programs on the public stockholders, has been evaluated in Appendix B. Consideration is given to the extension of the law of disclosure to unlisted com­ panies, the attitude of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the recent legal trend toward the inclusion of the corporation itself among those who are classified as "corporate insiders", the differing regulations imposed externally on the directors of listed and unlisted companies, and the very recent passage of Public Law 90-439.

The results of the questionnaire, which was sent to the one hundred and forty-five unlisted industrial corporations which engaged in repurchase, have been reported in Chapter II. These reflected managements' stated reasons for repurchases and the methods which were used.

The empirical method was employed in the research study of Chapter

III to reveal the actual repurchases of the individual companies and the extent to which they did, or did not, keep their stockholders informed of their reasons for and the results of such transactions.

In Chapter IV the effect which such repurchases had upon the selling and non-selling stockholders was examined, as measured both by quantitative and qualitative tests.

The quantitative tests included the following:

a. Market prices of common stock relative to actual cost of repurchase. 18

b. Earnings per share, giving effect to year-end holdings of treasury stock, compared to earnings per share on issued stock.

c. Maintenance of corporate control by the principal holders.

d. The risk factor: effect on the debt/equity relationship.

e. Dividend payments prior to, during, and subsequent to the repurchase period.

f. Relationship of repurchases, in dollars, to net income.

The qualitative factors which were used in evaluation included the adequacy of disclosure (such as advance notice to the stockholders, timing, and communication of all the material and relevant facts) as well as the methods used, and the notification to stockholders of the re­ sults.

This study is terminated in Chapter V with a summary of the con­ clusions developed in Chapters 11 to IV, inclusive and an evaluation of them.

Since this study has revealed conditions existing prior to the recent passage of Public Law 90-439, the Full Disclosure Act, it is sug­ gested that a further study, a few years hence, determine what effect the law has had in providing more adequate disclosure to, and protection for, the stockholders of unlisted industrial corporations. CHAPTER II

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

In order to determine whether repurchase by unlisted industrial corporations of their own common stock has been in the best interests of selling as well as non-selling stockholders, first-hand information was sought from management by means of a questionnaire (and covering letter) which was sent to a senior financial executive of each company which, according to research previously conducted in the company files of the Securities and Exchange Commission, had repurchased its own common stock within the past few years.

The objective of the questionnaire was to determine managements' stated reasons for repurchase, the source of funds, advance information provided to stockholders, and the use of repurchased stock after it was acquired.

Since unlisted (over-the-counter) companies, as previously in­ dicated, did not become subject to the periodic reporting and other provisions of the amended Securities Act of 1934 until April 30, 1965

(Rule 12g-l(a), the distinction between repurchasing and non-repurchasing companies was limited by the unavailability of data prior to that date.

Selection of Companies

Since the Intent was to secure informative data from a representa­ tive group of unlisted companies, as well as to use the list as a basis for the questionnaire, one hundred and ten companies, almost 11.6 per cent

19 20 of the original group of 950 unlisted companies, were selected as the working group of companies in accord with the procedure previously indicated on pages 7 and 8 of Chapter I.

The examination of the one hundred and ten unlisted industrial corporations revealed those which had repurchased their own common stock and those which had not.

It was found that fifty companies (45 per cent) had repurchased stock in recent years; sixty companies (55 per cent) had not repurchased any.

In addition to the selection of these fifty companies for ques­ tionnaire purposes, they were also used as an essential part of the re­ search study itself, as detailed in Chapter III.

The Questionnaire (first request)

The questionnaire was mailed to a senior financial executive of each of the fifty unlisted companies which had engaged in repurchase activities in recent years.

A covering letter was sent with the questionnaire; this indicated the purpose which the writer had in mind and the use to which the answers would be put.

Replies from the Questionnaire

From the fifty questionnaires which were sent out from November

15-27, 1967, inclusive, a total of twenty-five completed questionnaires

(50 per cent) were returned. In addition, six companies (12 per cent) sent replies but did not fill out and return the questionnaires them­ selves. Thus, information was received from 62 per cent of the companies f

21

to which inquiries were sent.

Some of the replies, from the six companies, provided an

indication of the company's attitude toward stockholders:

Thank you for your letter of the______of . We feel that, our policy is strictly proprietary. We are not in a to answer your requirements.

We recently repurchased some small quantities of our stock under a plan to pay a part of executive incentive bonuses in stock. This program was short-lived and has been discontinued. The quantities purchased were small and purchases were made in the open market. I would suggest you consider our experience as insignificant and not to be included in your considerations.

______has not purchased its own stock in the past few years except in closing out its interest in a ______company when the shares were used by that company to pay off our interest.

We do not have a stock repurchase program. Any of our own stock which we have purchased in the open market during the past few years has been used exclusively for sales contests. The purchase has been made from a broker and re-registered to employees as awards, thus having no effect on the number of shares outstanding. Under the circumstances, filling out your questionnaire would perhaps be of no particular value.

In another instance, the company merely referred to two letters which had been sent to stockholders. The first letter was sent to share­ holders who owned less than ten shares each and the company offered to buy all such holdings at a flat, net (absorbing transfer taxes and brokerage

charges) price. The letter stated the company's intention to hold in its

treasury any shares purchased for use in connection with "possible future 22 acquisitions, for resale or other corporate purposes."

In the second letter, which was sent to holders of less than twenty-five shares, the company offered to purchase all such shares at a price two dollars higher than on the previous occasion (three and one- half months earlier). The purposes stated for reacquisition were the same as before, although an additional cited reason was "for a qualified

Stock Option Plan for key management employees," Also the company fur­ nished such stockholders with current information, a recent , and an Interim profit and loss statement.

The Second Request

Several months later (April 12, 1968) a follow-up letter, accom­ panied by a copy of the original questionnaire, was sent to twenty of the original list of fifty companies which had not replied. Four companies responded by sending in completed questionnaires. Thus, from the fifty companies, a total of twenty-nine completed replies (58 per cent), as well as six letters, were received.

Expansion of the Questionnaire Group

Although the percentage of replies (58 per cent) to the original quesionnaire had been quite high, information from only twenty-nine companies was available as a basis for determining managements' stated reasons for repurchase. After careful consideration, it was decided to expand the list from fifty to one hundred and forty-five companies.

To that end, the writer reverted to the original list of 950 companies whose stocks were quoted in the May 29, 1967 issue of Barron1s 23

Over-The-Counter-Market. Rather than using the statistical procedure of a random sample, it was determined to make a selection from those industrial companies, using Moody's Industrial Manual as a reference source, which reported treasury stock holdings as of the end of their

1965 and 1966 fiscal years. Such holdings would indicate that they had repurchased stock, though not necessarily in either those two years or even in the past five or six.

Of the original list of 950 companies, 416 were eliminated for the following reasons:

Mon-industrial 245 Data not available in Moody's 120 Merged with other companies 18 Listed on New York Stock Exchange or American Stock Exchange subsequently 18 Duplicates (preferred stocks) 15

Total eliminations 416

Of the remaining 534 companies, by careful examination of their balance sheets and income statements in Moody's 1967 Industrial Manual, it was discovered that 282 companies held no treasury stock; and that

252 companies (47.19 per cent) did hold treasury stock at the end of either the 1965 or 1966 fiscal year.

From the repurchasing group of 252 companies (which included the fifty companies to whom questionnaires had been sent in November 1967 and April 12, 1968) ninety-five companies were selected, thus making a total of 145 companies, equal to 57.54 per cent. As Bhown in Table II, the selected companies held substantial amounts of treasury shares, based on the criteria of percentage of issued stock and/or dollar cost. Of 24

174,610,346 shares of issued common stock, these ninety-five companies had retained as treasury stock 9,612,996 shares (5.51 per cent of the

total issued), which had been repurchased at a cost of $132,378,689.

Since these companies had participated in repurchase activities

on a fairly extensive scale, it was felt that their reasons, if they

chose to participate in this study, would be meaningful. To these ninety-five companies was sent a copy of the original questionnaire, and

an individually-typed cover letter, during the period April 24 to

May 6 , 1968.

Replies From the Second Questionnaire Group

Forty-four companies (46.32 per cent) returned completed question­

naires and seven additional companies (7.37 per cent) sent letters. Thus,

fifty-one companies (53.68 per cent) stated their reasons for repurchase

in one form or the other.

Summary

In summation, it is noteworthy that of 145 companies to which ques­

tionnaires were sent, seventy-three (50.34 per cent) responded with completed

questionnaires and an additional thirteen companies (8.97 per cent) sent

letters in reply. Moreover, the seventy-three companies represented 28,97

per cent of the 252 companies which held treasury stock as of the end of

their respective 1965 or 1966 fiscal years.

Responses to the Questionnaire

In only twelve instances were all the specific questions on each n i n vO a v 25

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mi- t m CO Sf 00 CO OV co vo m -a- o in IN. on mt ov rH rH n o o on ov OV CM H O T3 m cm n» n» in H tn •H I* t* -3 O 44 3 3 CM M O 3 B O 3 3 O U M • 3 M 5) *H O ' CO EH O 3 W 3 CM P> 3 3 . ■ A A r- HrH rH I in CO rH in o CM rH n 3 O 00 • A

f M Mt VO on VO i H IN on CNl r- 00 vo oo •n CM vo vo on Ov OV w tJ rH H OV OV —1 O # A A a A A A *n co on w o u o 3 3 : Moody's Industrial Manual, 1967 Edition. 31 32 questionnaire answered by the responding companies. For this reason, the "Yes" and "No" answers to each question do not add up to the potential total of seventy-three.

It is worthy of observation that, despite the assurance given in the cover letter to the effect that "Your response will be regarded as confidential. Names will not be divulged and the answers will be merged so as to keep identities unknown", several companies returned the completed questionnaire in envelopes which were completely free of identifying marks, thus hoping to insure against any possible identi­ fication.

Two of the letters which were received from companies in the second group (ninety-five companies) gave expression to the sensitive nature of the subject of repurchase: "Regret we do not desire to parti­ cipate in this survey"; and "I sincerely regret that it will be impossible for me to comply with your request. Matters of this type Involve questions of policy within the province of the Board of Directors, thus limiting my liberty to comment. I am sorry this is the case."

Managements' Stated Reasons

Replies to specific questions.

A. Was repurchase an isolated transaction or part of a program? Yes No

Isolated purchase 41 26 Repurchase program 31 33

Reasons for repurchase? Yes No

Stock purchase plan for employees 9 50 Stock available for stock options 32 33 33

For use in future acquisitions 33 31 For occasional or regular stock dividends 1 56 To be used for convertible issues 1 56 To increase earnings per share 16 43 Stock available at low price A3 18 Selling below 19 41 To increase financial leverage 7 48 Improve market price 17 47 Reduce cash dividend pay-out 9 48 Prevent "corporate raiding" 2 53 Permit stockholders' capital gains tax benefits 1 54

Source of funds? Yes No

Sale of assets 3 52 Excess cash 64 6 Borrowed funds 9 46

Advance information to stockholders? Yes No 10 64

How was advance notice given? Yes No

Special notice 5 28 Authorization at annual meeting 8 26

Were stockholders informed of the repurchase? Yes No

Reasons for repurchase 17 34 Source of funds 12 39 Number of shares to be repurchased 14 40 Price or price range 11 41 Method of repurchase 14 37 Time of repurchase 10 40 All material and relevant facts 18 34

What method of repurchase was used? Yes No

Tender offer 1 54 Open market purchase 56 11 Purchase from large stockholder 23 36

After repurchase, how was stock used? Yes No

Treasury stock 69 1 Retired 4 45 34

Comments by Management

The format of the questionnaire provided an opportunity for

senior financial executives of answering companies to elaborate on

their answers or to indicate reasons which had not been stated

specifically. The following are representative:

To satisfy a personal requirement of an indivi­ dual leaving the company.

Awards or gifts to employees with 25 or more years of service.

To eliminate large minority ownership by ______in our company whose customers are principally ______companies who compete with______.

To meet obligations under employee bonus incen­ tive program which was paid in part with company stock.

A basic difference of opinion developed between the two co-founders. One of the men left the company and offered to sell his stock back to the company at a price well below market.

Common stock purchased as an inducement to stock­ holder to sell his to the corporation.

Many executives accepted the opportunity to make comments concerning various aspects of their repurchase activities. These provide a good in­

sight into the thinking, reasons, and plans of their managements:

Our stock may be repurchased by our Executive Committee. Of course, if there are any questions from the stockholders they would be answered.

It was a 'one-time1 situation.

The following statement was included in our Annual Report to stockholders for the year 1966:

Another gratifying program was the distribution of shares of the company's Common Stock to employees 35

with service of twenty-five years or more. Twenty- five year employees received two shares with one additional share for each additional five years service. There were 1,721 shares distributed to 497 people. This Is a continuing program, and the employee reaction has been most favorable.

Our situation may not be appropriate for inclusion in your study as it was an isolated, one-time purchase which was the by­ product of a split in management.

Certain early purchases were made to support value of stock during two recessions.

Because of our continuing need for working capital and stock issuance throughout the years . . . it has not been possible for this company to become active in the purchase of its own stock.

The following comments were made by two companies in explaining their repurchase of large blocks of stock:

We purchased 290,000 shares of our stock from one stockholder. This stock was originally issued in exchange for the stock of !a corporation which was— owned by us. The stock was issued with the under­ standing that it had to be offered back to us if sold. Upon being offered it was purchased by us.

We have on three or four occasions repurchased blocks of stock when made available by a stockholder who might wish to dispose of his entire holdings. Purchases have been made at the bid price, and to date these pur­ chases have been used for stock options or for acquisitions with the balance remaining in treasury. Because of the relatively small amounts purchased we have not notified stockholders other than through the annual report.

Other explanatory comments were volunteered by managements:

We do not have a plan for purchase of our stock. The initial purchase was for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of a compensation agreement. We have also issued some shares of our Treasury Stock as Contest awards. Our stock is not widely traded and is listed in Over-The-Counter only. Brokers call us whenever any of the stock is available and, if we feel the price is attractive, we consider purchase of it. 36

The Company adopted a Option Plan in October, 1962. In the late fall of 1962, the Company went public (Over-The-Counter) and not long thereafter, began to acquire stock in restricted amounts to fund its Stock Option plan. The Company also acquired a block of stock from the estate of a deceased Company officer.

Your questionnaire appears to be aimed at companies with a much stronger repurchasing program than the one we have followed. Over a five year period common shares outstanding has been reduced by only 38,000 shares, or 3.2%. We would anticipate using this for a desirable acquisition if one should appear where stock would be the purchasing medium.

We have had a small "repurchase agreement program" for key employees to assist them in buying company stock. From time to time we have repurchased according to these agreements. At one time we also purchased shares on the open market sufficient to meet obligations of an estab­ lished stock option program. Now that this has been completed no other purchases of this type are contemplated.

One company which indicated an accumulation of cash in excess of

its needs made an Isolated purchase of stock in the open market to "freeze

some surplus cash" and has retained the stock in its treasury.

The only company, of the seventy-three responding, which repurchased stock via a tender offer, indicated that this was done "as a condition in

connection with shareholder approval of sale of assets and business of

company." The stockholders were informed, in advance, of the decision to repurchase, via special notice. They were told the reasons, the number of shares to be repurchased (no limit), the source of funds, the price, the method and time and, after repurchase, the stock was retired.

One company repurchased stock in the open market, using cash

in excess of the contemplated needs of the business. Its reasons were to

have stock available for future acquisitions and to increase earnings per 37 share. Management felt that another reason was to improve the market price of the stock "but only in as much as improved earnings per share would have that effect."

Another company indicated that its stockholders were not infor­ med in advance of the decision to repurchase, which was consummated in the open market, nor were any data given them. However, the price "could be figured from balance sheet and footnotes for current and prior years."

In that connection also, a company explained the circumstances of its answer that stockholders were not informed, in advance, of the decision to repurchase:

Ownership of stock by Officers and Directors repre­ sented control. Since purchase took place over several years the stockholders were aware of the program before it was completed.

Another company repurchased stock in the open market and from large and small stockholders, to have stock available for stock bonus plans and employees stock purchase plan. Although stockholders were not informed, in advance, of the decision to repurchase, they were given the reasons and number of shares repurchased, after the purchases had been made.

"All purchases are reported each quarter to stockholders. Stockholder approval was received for both plans, which authorize use of treasury stock or previously unissued stock."

Still another company gave no advance information to stockholders of the decision to repurchase, nor any reasons, but explained the situation in this way:

This repurchase of stock was not too significant— only about 4% of outstanding stock being involved. It was 38

of a one-time nature, since we had substantial excess cash funds, and the price of our stock was definitely cheap by all standards. It was the de­ cision of the Board of Directors only.

One company advised that its repurchase was part of a program; its reasons were specific and well considered and its stockholders were informed in advance and kept apprised of results:

The primary purpose for repurchase of stock was two­ fold. 1. For use in future acquisitions. 2. Because stock was available at a low price. To increase earnings per share and to improve the market price of the stock, are by-products of a re­ purchase plan but are not, in our opinion, the moti­ vation for a repurchase program.

Although no formal notice outlining the details of a proposed repurchase plan was mailed to stockholders all stockholders were advised through our quarterly stockholder releases of management's plan to repur­ chase shares offered to the company if, in the opinion of management, such purchase would be beneficial to the company. At no time did we ever go into the market on a 'bid basis' nor was any broker or dealer authorized to purchase shares on order for the company.

A final comment came from a company which indicated that its repur­ chase also was part of a program. Its reasons were to use stock in future acquisitions and to increase earnings per share; a motivating factor was that stock was available at a low price and selling below book value. It used funds from the sale of assets, did not give advance information to stockholders but, after purchasing in the open market, gave management's reasons for its action. Its clarification follows:

Our company's stock was selling far below book value. Management felt that to purchase some of its own stock would be as good an investment as company could make, and sold other securities in order to make funds available. Board of Directors unanimously voted for the program, 39

modest in scope, beginning in late December 1963 and running until mid-February, 1967, purchases totaling about 154,000 shares at average price of about $4.00 per share. Book value of stock ranged between $11-$12 during this period.

Evaluation

The very large consensus on excess cash as a source of funds

(as stated by 64 of 73 reporting managements) is significant because it represents the increase in funds which had been generated from depreciation and depletion and net income less cash dividends paid, income taxes, and capital expenditures.^

It is significant, moreover, because it emphasizes the increased attention paid by financial managers to the management of cash (a use of funds) in recent years. Having excess cash, they have attempted to in­ crease the return on Investment by judicious uses, of which repurchase of stock has become one. It will be interesting to note how the high interest rates offered on negotiable certificates of deposit in the

1968-69 period will affect the amount of funds devoted to stock repurchase.

It is evident that a majority of managements considered their ..own stock a good investment, if it were available at a low price, and con­ sidered themselves capable of determining what a "low-price" was, without reference to the opinions of outside financial experts. Forty-three, of seventy-three reporting companies, made this decision and nineteen com­ panies cited the fact that their stock was "selling below book value" as representing a desirable use of funds.

^The Increased funds, in an on-going concern, are reflected in cash, accounts receivable, inventory, and fixed assets. 40

The current trend toward mergers perhaps has been foreshadowed by the decision of companies (thirty-three in this group) to repurchase

stock for use in future acquisitions; and the accumulation of excess

cash undoubtedly has been a motivating factor in that direction.

Despite the decision by managements to employ excess cash for repurchase, there is evident no obligation or intent to inform their

stockholders in advance or to acquaint them with the reasons for this use of funds.

Of the seventy-three reporting companies, only ten indicated that

they had given advance information, while sixty-four said that they had not. (The discrepancy of one was probably due to a confusion as to what

"advance information" meant.) Only five companies Informed their stock­ holders via a special notice; eight companies indicated "authorization at annual meeting" but some of these probably included notification after

repurchase had been underway or completed.

Moreover, only seventeen companies advised that they had informed

stockholders of the reasons for repurchase (in many cases, after the fact)

and fewer companies, ten to fourteen, noted that they had provided stock­

holders with data as to the source of funds, the number of shares to be

repurchased (or previously repurchased), the price or price range, and the method and time of repurchase.

The inadequacy of disclosure to stockholders is further evidenced

by the method of repurchase which was used. A tender offer usually re­

quires advance Information to stockholders as to reasons, source of funds,

price to be paid for the stock, number of shares to be purchased, and some 41

Indication as to current earnings.

Contrariwise, repurchase of stock in the open market usually does not require disclosure to stockholders per se. The same is true with regard to purchases of blocks of stock from large stockholders, although it is quite likely that a large holder might be in a position to know, or to require information about, the current status of the company prior to the completion of the transaction. Yet neither method of repurchase would bar the disclosure of essential information to stockholders in ad­ vance of the transaction.

Of the seventy-three companies which had completed the questionnaire, only one company had requested tenders of stock from its stockholders.

Fifty-six, a great preponderance, made their purchases in the open market.

Twenty-three companies (indicating use of both methods) had purchased stock from large stockholders, presumably in substantial blocks.

There was decided unanimity by the responding companies on the use of the reput'chased stock. Sixty-nine companies retained it as treasury stock; only four companies retired their repurchases via cancellation.

This disposition would convey the impression that the acquisitions were not part of a well-conceived program. This viewpoint is substantiated by four of the major reasons stated by managements: available at low price

(43), selling below book value (19), improve market price (17), and in­ crease earnings per share (16).

Availability of the stock at a price considered favorable by manage­ ment, and below book value, could well have provided the stimulus to action.

Repurchase in and of Itself would increase the earnings per share on the 42 reduced balance of outstanding shares. This, In turn, might Improve the market price of the stock as a normal consequence.

A smaller number of companies indicated a carefully-planned use of the stock. Thirty-two companies reported that repurchase was to secure stock to fulfil the requirements of stock option plans; and thirty-three planned to hold stock for use in connection with future acquisitions.

Thus, two conclusions may be drawn from the retention as treasury stock. First, companies wished to maintain their freedom of action.

Secondly, they had no immediate use for the stock. Short-term considera­ tions provided the stimulus for repurchase. The act of repurchase per se

(with or without formal cancellation of the shares) induced higher earnings per share and a probable increase in the market price. The eventual dis­ position of the stock was a future consideration. No immediate decision was needed or taken.

A Study of Listed Companies; Comparison o A recent article, based upon a field study of fifteen listed

3 corporations, all of which repurchased ten per cent or more of their out­ standing equity capital during the decade from 1954 to 1963, provided the following reasons for repurchase of their own stock, based upon the large amount of cash being generated:

^Leo A. Guthart, "Why Companies Buy Their Own Stock," Financial Analysts Journal. Vol. XXIII (March-April 1967), pp. 105-110. q Leo A. Guthart, "Corporate Repurchases of Already Outstanding Common Stock," (Unpublished Doctoral disseration, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1966). Available for inspection, Baker Library. 43 1. Shrinking the equity base.

a. Direct effect upon earnings per share.

b. Minimum risk offered by repurchase.

c. Effective distribution of funds to stockholders at capital gains tax rates.

2. Avoid increasing equity.

a. To satisfy stock option requirements.

b. To provide shares for acquisitions.

c. To use shares to avoid dilution resulting from . conversion of outstanding convertible debentures and exercise of warrants.

3. A good Investment of corporate funds.

a. Book value as the principal yardstick.

4. To support the market for their stock.

a. Increase the demand for the stock.

b. Absorb large blocks of overhanging stock.

5. To eliminate small stockholders.

6 . To obtain or improve control.

The current study, of seventy-three unlisted corporations, has pro­ vided somewhat different reasons for their repurchase activities.

The immediate stimulus was comparable to that of listed companies.

Of the seventy-three unlisted companies, sixty-four stated that avail­ ability of excess cash was the motivating factor.

However, the indicated reasons do not convey the impression of well

conceived, carefully-planned programs. Rather than based upon an Intent

to shrink the equity base, the major reason stated by a substantial majori­

ty (59 per cent) of the companies (43) was the availability of the stock Only sixteen companies (22 per cent) Indicated the desire to

Increase earnings per share as a reason; and there was scant evidence

(one company said yes, fifty-four said no) that the effect of taxation upon the stockholder group was given serious consideration.

The listed study cited the desire to avoid increasing equity

(stock options, acquisitions, and conversions) as the second most impor­ tant reason. The current, unlisted study leads to different conclusions.

Thirty-two companies (44 per cent) gave the fulfillment of stock options as a reason, and thirty-three companies mentioned future acquisi­ tions. But only one company stated that it wished to have stock avail­ able to avoid dilution resulting from conversion and only one company wished to use repurchased stock for regular or occasional stock dividends.

In each case, fifty-six companies indicated that these were not the reasons. Thus, they were willing to use unissued stock for these purposes which would increase the equity base.

The study of listed companies concluded that book value was the principal yardstick in determining that their own stock was "a good invest­ ment" (the leading secondary motivation). The unlisted companies stated that this factor was of lesser significance; only nineteen companies,

(26 per cent), agreed that their repurchase was because the stock was selling below book value. Moreover, forty-three companies, (59 per cent), stressed the availability of stock at a_low price as the principal stimulus to action.

Support of the market was determined in the listed study as being the second most important secondary motivation. In this unlisted study 45

seventeen companies, (23 per cent), stated that improvement of market

price was a reason, but forty-seven companies denied it.

Elimination of small stockholders and the desire to obtain or

improve control were the final two reasons evidenced in the listed study.

In the current, unlisted, study only one company (by letter) detailed

its attempt to eliminate small stockholdings; but no one company mentioned

control as a motivating factor.

The element of control would seem to differentiate the unlisted

corporation from the listed. In many cases, the stockholdings of the managements of unlisted companies provide unquestioned voting control.

On the other band, the "professional managers" and directors of many

listed corporations frequently own a small percentage of the outstanding

stock.

Furthermore, the possession of voting control may be a material

factor in the unwillingness, as well as lack of interest, on the part of

managements of unlisted companies to take the minority stockholder into

their confidence by revealing the relevant facts about repurchase prior

to, or even after, the fact.

This point of view is further documented by the method of repur­

chase used— open market purchase~in contrast to the use of tenders. 46

QUESTIONNAIRE

KINDLY ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS EITHER BY "YES” OR "NO" OR EXPLAIN IN YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 9 (LAST PAGE).

YES NO

1. Was repurchase an isolated transaction or part of a repurchase program

a. Isolated purchase? 41 26

b. Part of a repurchase program? 31 33

2. Were the reasons for repurchasing stock

a. To meet obligations under employee stock purchase plan? 9 50

b. To have stock available for stock options? 32 33

c. To use in future acquisitions? 33 31

d. To use for regular or occasional stock dividends? 1 56

e. To use in conversion of convertible issues? 1 56

f. To increase earnings per share? 16 43

g. Stock available at low price? 43 18

h. Stock was selling below book value? 19 41

i. To increase financial leverage (reduce stock as per cent of total capitalization)? 7 48

j . Improve market price of stock? 17 47

k. Reduce total cash dividend payout? 9 48

1. Prevent threat to control of company by "corporate raiders"? 2 53

m. To permit stockholders to benefit from capital gains tax rates rather than to receive in­ creased dividend income? 1 54 QUESTIONNAIRE (CONT'D)

YES NO

What was the source of funds for this purchase a. Sale of assets? 3 52 b. Accumulation of cash In excess of contem­ plated needs of the business? 64 6 c. Borrowed funds? 9 46

Were stockholders Informed, In advance, of the decision to repurchase? 10 64

If so, how were the stockholders Informed a. Special notice? 5 28 b. Authorization by stockholders at annual meeting via Inclusion in proxy statement? 8 26

Were the stockholders given the following information a. The reason(s)? 17 34 b. Number of shares to be repurchased? 12 39 c. Source of funds? 14 40 d. Price, or price range? 11 41 e. Method of purchase? 14 37 f. Time of repurchase? 10 40 g. All material and relevant facts? 18 34

What method of repurchase was used a. Tender offer to stockholders? 1 54 b. Purchase in open market? 56 11 c. Purchase from large stockholder? 23 36 48

QUESTIONNAIRE (CONT'D)

YES NO

8 . After repurchase of stock, how was it used

a. Held as treasury stock? 69 1

b. Stock was retired? 4 45

c.

9. If you wish to make any comments, please do so below. 49

COVERING LETTER

November 20, 1967

Mr. William S. ______President ______Corporation Boston, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. ______:

To fulfill one of the requirements for a Ph.D. degree at The American University I am writing a dissertation on "Stock Repurchase Programs of Unlisted Industrial Corporations."

Your company has been selected, by random sampling, as one company, among many, which has repurchased its own common stock in the past few years.

You are asked, personally, to fill out the enclosed questionnaire which (hopefully) will not take up too much of your time. Your response will be regarded as confidential. Names will not be divulged and the answers will be merged so as to keep identities unknown.

The questionnaire requests "Yes" and "No" answers to specific questions.

Any additional comments which you care to make will be gratefully received and your identity safeguarded from any possible detection.

I solicit your cooperation in making this study a meaningful one.

Sincerely,

Raymond S. Bernhardt RSB:mg CHAPTER III

THE RESEARCH STUDY

Purpose and Objectives

In order to supplement and evaluate the reasons stated by mana­ gements, via the questionnaire method, for engaging In repurchase activities and the methods used to Implement them,. It was decided to make a careful examination of the actual information which had been sent by the companies to their stockholders.

The basic objectives, as with the questionnaires, was to determine the purpose and extent of such repurchases, their effect upon stockholders, and the presence or absence of disclosure of all the material and relevant facts which a selling or non-selling stockholder might need, or be en­ titled to have, in order to make a rational and intelligent decision.

Source Materials

The information which a stockholder might expect to receive directly from a company would normally include quarterly and annual reports, circulars, notices of special meetings, and notices of annual meetings, in­ cluding proxy statements and the proxies themselves.

Such reports and notices, insofar as unlisted companies are concerned, are publicly available in their entirety in only one place, the main office of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D. C. Accordingly, it was decided to utilize those facilities to examine and analyze the com­ pany files of each of the working group of companies.

50 51

Selection of Companies

As detailed In pages six to eight of Chapter I, from the list of 950 unlisted companies whose stock quotations were recorded in the

May 29, 1967 issue of Barron's Over-The-Counter Market, one hundred and ten companies had been selected as the working group for examination and study.

Of these one hundred and ten companies, it was desired to know:

1. Which of these had repurchased their own stock.

2. Which companies had not repurchased their stock.

3. How many shares were purchased.

4. What was the dollar cost of the shares repurchased.

5. When (in what years) did repurchasing take place.

The examination of the company files of each company revealed those which had repurchased stock and those which had not.

It was found that fifty companies (Table III) had repurchased stock

in recent years. Sixty companies (almost 55 per cent) had not repurchased

any stock.

Since the fifty repurchasing companies also met the criteria of

size of assets, number of stockholders, fair degree of marketability of

stock, as well as availability of data, it was determined that they would

constitute the basis of the research study.

Extent of Repurchase: Frequency and Volume

The frequency of repurchase' depends on many variables such as the

profitability of the company, the accumulation of cash, the price of the TABLE III

FIFTY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES WHICH HAVE REPURCHASED COMMON STOCK

AVM Corporation

Aerosonic Corporation

American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc.

Asgrow Seed Company

Athlone Industries

Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc.

Bergstrom Paper Company

Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation

Bristol Brass Corporation

Cannon Mills Company

C-E-I-R Inc.

Cincinnati Enquirer Inc.

Colonial Stores, Inc.

W. S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company

Dorchester Gas Producing Company

Economics Laboratory Inc.

Electrolux Corporation

Girltown, Inc.

Global Marine Inc.

Gulf Interstate Company

The Hanover Shoe Incorporated TABLE III (CONT'D)

FIFTY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES WHICH HAVE REPURCHASED COMMON STOCK

Heath Tecna Corporation

Hexcel Corporation

Hudson Pulp & Paper Corporation

Charles Jacquin et Cie., Inc.

Jessop Steel Company

E. F. Johnson Company

Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation

McCormick & Company Inc.

Metalfab Inc.

Midas-International Corporation

Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Company

Monmouth Park Jockey Club

Nuclear Data Inc.

Ozite Corporation

Pacific Gamble Robinson Company

Petrolite Corporation

The Reynolds & Reynolds Company

Sawhlll Tubular Products Inc.

Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corporation

Super Valu Stores Inc.

United States Banknote Corporation 54

TABLE III (CONT'D)

FIFTY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES WHICH HAVE REPURCHASED COMMON STOCK

United States Envelope Company

Vocaline Company of America Incorporated

The Wackenhut Corporation

H. War show & Sons Incorporated

Weiss Bros. Stores Incorporated

Western Publishing Company Incorporated

Zenith Laboratories Incorporated

Source: Company 10-K (annual) reports on file with Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. 55 stock relative to current and anticipated earnings, alternative uses of cash funds, the degree of voting control by management, the reasons for repurchase, the anticipated uses for the repurchased stock, and the availability of the stock in the market-place.

The volume of repurchase concerns the amount of the repurchase per se, its relationship to the number of shares issued and outstanding, and its dollar cost.

As Indicated in Table IV, forty-six unlisted companies (42 per cent of the working group of 110 companies) have repurchased stock in at least one of the three years, 1964 to 1966 inclusive.^ Twenty-four (22 per cent) had repurchased in 1964; twenty-three (21 per cent) in 1965; and thirty-one companies (28 per cent) in 1966.

Moreover, of the forty-six repurchasing companies, eleven (24 per cent) repurchased stock in each of the three years; ten (22 per cent) re­ acquired stock in each of two years; while twenty-five (54 per cent) repur­ chased stock in one of those years.

Aggregate repurchases of stock totaled 553,892 shares in 1964;

952,606 shares in 1965; and 485,106 shares in 1966 (Table XIV, p.150)*

The treasury stock holdings of the fifty unlisted industrial cor­ porations for each of the three years, 1964 to 1966 inclusive, are shown 2 in Table IV. Total holdings aggregated 1,242,859 shares in 1964;

"''Four companies, Athlone Industries, Hexcel Corporation, Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., and Shepart Niles Crane & Hoist Corporation, had repurchased stock in prior years.

2 . - One company, Electrolux Corporation, had repurchased 11,000 shares in 1964 but had disposed of them prior to the end of the fiscal year; no subsequent repurchases were made. 56

TABLE IV

REPURCHASE OF STOCK BY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS (1964-1966)

1966 1965 1964

AVM Corporation X X X Aerosonic Corporation X American Heritage Purlishing Co., Inc. X

Asgrow Seed Company X X X Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals, Inc. X Bayless (A.J.) Markets, Inc. X X

Bergstrom Paper Company X Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation X Bristol Brass Corporation X X

Cannon Mills Company X X C-E-I-R, Inc. X Cincinnati Enquirer X X

Colonial Stores, Inc. X X X W. S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company X Dorchester Gas Producing Company XX

Economics Laboratory, Inc. X Electrolux Corporation X Girltown, Inc. X XX

Global Marine Inc. XXX Gulf Interstate Company X X X The Hanover Shoe Incorporated X

Heath Tecna Corporation X Hudson Pulp & Paper Corporation X XX Charles Jacquin et Cie., Inc. X X X

Jessop Steel Company X E. F. Johnson Company X Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation X

McCormick & Company Incorporated X X X Metalfab Incorporated X X Midas-International Corporation X 57

TABLE IV (CONT'D)

REPURCHASE OF STOCK BY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION (1964-1966)

1966 1965 1964

Monmouth Park Jockey Club X XX Nuclear Data Incorporated X Ozite Corporation X

Pacific Gamble Robinson Company XX X Petrolite Corporation X X The Reynolds & Reynolds Company X X

Sawhill Tubular Products Incorporated X X Super Valu Stores Incorporated X United States Banknote Corporation X

United States Envelope Company X Vocaline Company of America Incorporated X The Wackenhut Corporation X

H. Warshow & Sons Incorporated X Weiss Bros. Stores Incorporated X Western Publishing Company Incorporated XX

Zenith Laboratories Incorporated - X -

TOTALS (46 companies) 31 23 24

Source: Company 10-K (annual) reports on file with Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. 58

1,255,840 shares In 1965; and 1,530,686 shares In 1966. The cost of 3 the shares held In 1966 totaled $31,807,263.

The relationship of 1966 treasury stock holdings to the issued stock of forty-six companies (four companies had disposed of their holdings by the end of 1966) is indicated in Table VI.

Total holdings of these companies were 1,530,686 shares. These represented 3.44 per cent of the total issued shares, which aggregated

44,553,073.

It is noteworthy that twelve of the forty-six companies had treasury stock holdings which exceeded five per cent of the issued stock; and four companies had holdings which exceeded ten per cent.

This is significant because of the manner in which these companies were chosen for analysis. They were selected not because they had been active repurchasers of stock but merely because they were included in a group of companies which were selected on a random sampling basis.

Lack of Disclosure of Essential Information

The most enduring impression which is secured from an examination of the reports which are sent to stockholders by the companies in which they have invested is the lack of information with regard to repurchase of stock.

There were few instances in which approval was sought from stock­ holders prior to repurchase. Even then, it is uncommon for specific reasons

^Partly estimated. Four companies either did not show cost of treasury stock or did not segregate total cost s b between holdings of their preferred and common stock. TABLE V 1^1 vO DOCO O Ov VO VD m vO u

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62 63

TABLE VI

RELATIONSHIP OF 1966 TREASURY STOCK HOLDINGS TO ISSUED STOCK OF FORTY-SIX UNLISTED COMPANIES*

Total Company Shares Shares Per Held Issued Cent

AVM Corporation 7,570 547,192 1.38 Aerosonic Corporation 3,803 625,500 .61 American Heritage (Class A & B) 21,000 516,632 4.06

Asgrow Seed Company 2,361 913,944 .26 Athlone Industries 81,000 981,884 8.25 Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 6,000 700,000 .86

Bayless (A.J.) Markets, Inc. (Common) 18,000 779,760 2.31 Bergstrom Paper Company (Class A) 14,660 375,514 3.90 Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. 1,937 549,016 .35

Cannon Mills Company (Voting and non-voting) 166,966 2,074,198 8.05 Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc. 7,709 840,360 .92 Colonial Stores, Inc. 9,331 2,825,638 .33

W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. 4,379 997,725 .44 Dorchester Gas Producing Co. 60,859 937,072 6.49 Economics Laboratory, Inc. 13,303 2,515,725 .53

Girltown, Inc. (Class A & B) 41,500 646,500 6.42 Global Marine, Inc. 1,784 1,828,281 .10 Gulf Interstate Company 183,209 1,141,088 16.06

The Hanover Shoe Inc. 113 1/3 608,330 .02 Heath Tecna Corp. 7,742 1/2 692,736 1/2 1.12 Hexcel Corporation 20,575 392,844 5.24

Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. (Class A) 22,390 654,390 3.42 Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. 11,933 408,000 2.92 Jessop Steel Company 7,520 776,289 .97 64

TABLE VI (CONT'D)

RELATIONSHIP OF 1966 TREASURY STOCK HOLDINGS TO ISSUED STOCK OF FORTY-■SIX UNLISTED COMPANIES*

Total Company Shares Shares Per Held Issued Cent

Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. 27,400 1,035,141 2.65 McCormick & Company, Inc. (voting and non-voting) 9,217 529,394 1.74 Metalfab, Inc. 58,517 343,038 17.06

Midas-International Corp. (Class A) 2,177 856,374 .25 Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co. 1,400 351,387 .40 Monmouth Park Jockey Club 28,561 859,298 3.32

Nuclear Data, Inc. 132,145 625,781 21.12 Ozite Corporation 31,110 973,770 3.19 Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. 2,908 1,309,024 .22

Petrolite Corporation 17,759 1,469,585 1.21 Reynolds & Reynolds Co. (Class A) 10,950 1,031,809 1.06 Sawhlll Tubular Products, Inc. 7,295 665,850 1.10

Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. 31,279 287,000 10.90 Super Valu Stores, Inc. 63,500 2,022,115 3.14 United States Banknote Corp. 24,712 1,569,911 1.57

United States Envelope Co. 13,123 627,535 2.09 Vocaline Company of America Inc. 37,059 716,355 5.17 The Wackenhut Corp. (Common) 1,500 329,525 .46

H. Warshow & Sons, Inc. (Class A & B) 15,476 267,372) 2.56 8,338 662,844) Weiss Bros. Stores, Inc. 30,000 425,140 7.06 Western Publishing Co., Inc. (Class A & B) 172,683 3,910,719 4.42 65

TABLE VI (CONT’D)

RELATIONSHIP OF 1966 TREASURY STOCK HOLDINGS TO ISSUED STOCK OF FORTY-SIX UNLISTED COMPANIES*

Total Company Shares Shares Per Held Issued Cent

Zenith Laboratories, Inc. 87,933 1/3 355,488 1/3 24.74

TOTAL (46 companies) 1,530,686 44,553,073 3.44

*NOTE: The following companies had disposed of their treasury stock holdings prior to 1966: Bristol Brass Corporation C-E-I-R, Inc. Electrolux Corporation E. F. Johnson Company

Source: Company 10-K (annual) reports on file with Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. 66 to be Indicated or the use for which the stock Is Intended. Blanket approval Is normally sought.

After repurchase, there Is a similar lack of Information. This

Is particularly true with regard to the amount of stock repurchased, Its cost, and the actual dates or periods when repurchase took place.

The only exception to this occurs in connection with the purchase of large blocks of stock, the use of treasury stock to acquire other businesses and to pay stock dividends, and in connection with the use of treasury stock for bonuses, employee incentive awards, and prizes. The companies fall to indicate clearly whether treasury stock, or unissued stock, has been used to fulfil their obligations under stock option plans.

Usually (because Securities and Exchange Commission rules require it) the annual reports provide information as to the number of shares held as treasury stock at fiscal year-end and its cost. However, it is difficult to determine how much stock has been repurchased during the year and the use, if any, to which it has been put.

Thus, it is possible for a substantial amount of stock to be pur­ chased during the year and subsequently resold or used in connection with acquisitions or for stock options. Yet, only the balancing amount will be revealed as additions or deductions to the treasury stock account at year- end.

This is an omission in information which a change in Securities and

Exchange Commission rules could rectify.

Purposes of Repurchase

Analysis of the records of the fifty companies under study revealed 67 these primary purposes for the reacquisition of stock:

1. Removal of large blocks from the market 9

2. Acquisition of other companies 6

3. Stock option plans 6

4. For bonuses, employee incentive awards, and prizes 5

5. Availability at a low price 3

6. Use as stock dividends 2

7. No reason given 19

TOTAL 50

1. Removal of large blocks from the market

Nine companies, of the fifty examined, repurchased large blocks of stock which were overhanging the market. In some cases, part of the repurchased stock was used to fulfil the requirements of stock option plans, but this was a secondary factor. This group included the following companies:

AVM Corporation Vocallne Company of America, Inc. Bergstrom Paper Company Weiss Bros. Stores, Inc. Global Narine, Inc. Western Publishing Company, Inc. E. F. Johnson Company Zenith Laboratories, Inc. Nuclear Data, Inc.

AVM Corporation repurchased 45,000 shares (out of 523,092 shares issued) from Rane Tool Company on January 25, 1965; 47,500 shares were re­ sold on the same day, but no information was given as to the purchaser or the sale price. Two hundred shares were sold on March 4 to an unspecified buyer at an unspecified price, and 400 shares were sold to L. A. Hobbs, an option holder, on December 31. As a result, after including miscellaneous 68 purchases of 329 shares during the year, there was a net increase of

2,771 shares in treasury stock at the end of the year.

In 1966 the company repurchased 12,000 shares from R. E. King

on October 3. After reflecting 5,300 treasury shares which were sold under the option plan, and a miscellaneous increase of 141 shares, there was a net increase of 6,559 shares of treasury stock.

Bergstrom Paper Company was established in 1904 and became a publicly owned company in 1955. However, not until 1966, at which time

50,000 shares of stock options were outstanding, did the company repurchase any stock. The annual report for 1966 explained it in this fashion:

During 1966, the estate of a major stockholder made 15,000 shares of Class A common stock available at an attractive block­ age price in October. These shares were acquired for $16.25 per share and placed in treasury to be made available as a management incentive to key employees under our restricted and qualified stock option plans. As of December 31, 1966, there were unexercised stock options granted to employees to pur­ chase Class A common stock aggregating 11,960 shares at $17.60, 7,640 shares at $16,875, and 5,720 shares at $14.50. A total of 24,000 shares remained available for future grants. The treasury stock acquired will now be available for that purpose.

Nevertheless, during that year, 1966, options were exercised on only

680 shares of stock, of which but 340 were taken from the treasury stock.

Global Marine. Inc. merged with Global Marine Exploration Company on November 30, 1964. On October 28, the company had agreed to repurchase at $9.25 per share (no quoted market then existed) 800,000 shares from

Union Oil Company of California. This was an important phase of the merger agreement and was intended to eliminate a large minority interest.

On December 30, 1964, 200,000 shares were actually repurchased and the remaining 600,000 shares on February 3, 1965. For this purpose available funds were used, as well as the proceeds from the sale of common stock and of units consisting of debentures and common stock.

Subsequent sales of common stock to employees and in 1965 secured funds for capital expenditures. At the annual meeting on

May 3, 1965 (as requested in the proxy statement) the stockholders authorized the retirement of the 800,000 shares reacquired from Union

Oil Company. The net effect of retiring 800,000 shares and selling

780,000 shares of previously unissued stock was to reduce issued stock by 20,000 shares.

E. F. Johnson Company. In June, 1963, the company had repurchased

100 shares of stock from a former director and employee at book value of

$126,907. On September 15, 1964, each share was reclassified into 280 shares. The resulting 28,000 shares of treasury stock (adjusted cost of

$4.53 per share) were cancelled, coincident with the original public offering of 250,000 shares by selling shareholders (none by the company) at $15.50 on September 15, 1964.

Nuclear Data, Inc. On January 7, 1964, Robert W. Schumann resigned as President and Chairman of the Board of this company. On February 19,

1964, the company purchased from Mr. Schumann and his wife, Barbara, a total of 132,045 shares at a total cost of $660,225. The repurchased shares represented 21.5 per cent of the 612,900 shares Issued. The purchase cost of $660,225 was large in comparison to the net income of $341,589 in

1963 and $396,489 in 1962.

The purchase was financed in large part by funds borrowed from 70 for that purpose. The agreement with the provided that the corporation should "refrain from payment of cash dividends and repur­ chase of Its shares." The repurchased shares were still held as treasury stock as of February 28, 1967, the fiscal year-end.

Vocaline Company of America. Inc. In the 8-K current report for the month of November, 1966, the company provided the details of a large block repurchase:

As of November 1966 Midtex Incorporated (formerly Midwest Technical Development Corp.) of Minneapolis, Minnesota agreed to sell and the Vocaline Company of America, Inc. agreed to purchase 37,059 shares of the Vocaline common stock, $1.50 , at a price of $3.70 per share. The sum total of this transaction was $137,118.30 and completely eliminated Midtex Incorporated as a stockholder. The 37,059 shares purchased will be held by the Company as treasury stock.

It is noteworthy that the 8-K report is sent to the Securities and

Exchange Commission, not to the stockholders.

In the annual report for 1966, issued in mid-March, 1967, some in­ formation was given but no details. A careful stockholder, looking at the liability side of the balance sheet, could have noticed the item of

Treasury Stock, 37,059 shares, carried at par value of $55,588, as well as the parenthetical explanation of "Excess of cost over par value, $81,530, of 37,059 shares of treasury stock acquired."

Weiss Bros. Stores. Inc. In the 8-K report for the month of

November, 1964, it was stated that "David B. Weiss, former president and chairman of the Board of Directors, died in an automobile accident one business day prior to the mailing by the Registrant of its Notice of Annual

Meeting .... "

In the 8-K report for September, 1965, the company reported the 71 following:

On September 14, 1965, the Registrant acquired from the Estate of David B. Weiss 26 shares of its Class A common stock and 29,974 shares of its Class B common stock, representing in total approximately seven per cent of its Issued and outstanding common stock at a total purchase price of $407,636.70. This amount was paid to the said Estate on the date of this acquisition. The said purchase price of $407,636.70 represented a per share cost to the Registrant of approximately $13.59. The asked price of the Registrant's Class A common stock on September 14, 1965, was $14.50 and the bid price was $14.00. The Registrant’s Class B common stock was not traded . . . the Registrant has been in­ formed that the offer was made by the said Executors in order to obtain sufficient cash to pay certain of the Estate's ob­ ligations, including estate taxes. The Estate of David B. Weiss remains, after the consummation of this transaction, the owner of 48,241 shares of the Registrant's common stock (12.3 per cent of the total issued and outstanding common stock.)

Exhibit A, dated September 3, 1965, detailed the basis for the establishment of the price of the block as based on the median between the bid and asked price, as of August 13, 1965, as established by a well-known brokerrdealer of New Orleans, less the standard brokerage commission and less a discount of 15 cents per share for the 14,987 shares of "B-4" stock and a discount of 75 cents per share for the 14,987 shares of "B-5" stock.

‘ Western Publishing Company Inc. The 1966 annual report of this company provided details on the acquisition of a very substantial block of stock, using borrowed funds in the amount of $10,000,000, thus increasing the company's financial leverage materially and increasing the earnings per share.

An agreement completed in December 1966, to purchase for cancellation 290,587 shares of Western common stock was con­ summated in early January, 1967 . . . one of the terms of the 1964 exchange of Western common stock for one-half of the out­ standing shares of Golden Press, Inc., owned by Simon and Schuster, Inc., was the requirement that, before any contemplated 72

sale of such stock, Simon and Schuster must first offer it to the Company at the current market price. In conformity thereto, Simon and Schuster, Inc. on December 1, 1966, made an offer to sell its 290,587 shares of Western common stock to Western Publishing Company Inc. and Western thereupon accepted the offer to purchase such shares at the current market price of $20.50 per share. The transaction was completed on January 6, 1967 and had the effect of reducing the outstanding shares of common and Class B common stock to 3,447,449 shares.

This purchase, and other requirements, led to a private sale to a group of Institutional investors of $10,000,000 principal amount of its

5 3/4 per cent Promissory Notes due 1982. Also, this block purchase of

290,587 shares amounted to 7.43 per cent of the 3,910,719 shares issued as of December 31, 1966 and to 7.77 per cent of the then outstanding

3,738,036 shares. Total treasury stock holdings of 463,270 shares amounted to 11.85 per cent of those issued.

Zenith Laboratories. Inc. By the end of 1966 this company had repurchased 87,933 1/3 shares, 24.74 per cent of the total issue of

$117,936.87. This represented a sizable investment for a company whose total assets were $1,687,462.36 and whose total debt was $764,803.95.

In Post-effective Amendment No. 1 to its S-l registration statement, the company reported on its first acquisition of its own stock:

In 1961 Zenith Laboratories, Inc. contracted to purchase from a principal stockholder 58,333 1/3 shares of common stock of the company at a cost of $75,000. To finance such acquisition, Zenith borrowed $75,000 from Weinger Associates. To induce Weinger Associates to make the loan, three principal stockholders of Zenith sold to Weinger Associates a total of 15,000 shares at a cost of $.50 per share, which would be registered but not offered for public sale unless and until a poBt-effective amendment to the Registration Statement is filed . . . the 58,333 1/3 shares were then acquired and returned to the Treasury of the Company, and are still Treasury stock.

Also during 1961 the three top officials of the company (Messrs. 73

Benjamin and Harry Wiener and Bernard Bedrick) had donated 15,000 shares equally to the company. In 1962, 1,300 shares were repurchased at a cost of $3,640 and, in 1963, 3,400 shares were repurchased for a cost of $5,445.

Thus, on December 31, 1963 there were 276,000 outstanding shares, exclusive of 78,033 1/3 shares held in treasury at a cost of $85,731.87.

The three top officials then owned, in equal amounts, a total of 140,000 shares, 50.7 per cent of the stock outstanding.

In Post-effective Amendment No. 4, received by the Securities and

Exchange Commission on February 14, 1967, it was revealed that the company had repurchased 9,900 shares of its stock at a cost of $32,205. The

140,000 shares still owned by the three top officials at that time repre­ sented 52.2 per cent of the 267,555 shares outstanding, thus cementing

their control even more strongly.

The company had previously (May 15, 1964) advised the Commission as follows:

The company submits annual reports to stockholders, which reports contain certified financial statements. No other re­ ports are expected to be sent by management, although from time to time the stockholders will be apprised of developments.

In the above connection it is worthy of note that, although this

company is subject to the Securities Act of 1933, it is not subject to

Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act since it evidently does not have 500 stock­ holders or over, thus, it does not file either 10-K (annual) or 8-K

(current) reports with the Commission.

2. Acquisition of other companies

Six companies, of the fifty examined, either used repurchased stock

for the purpose of acquiring other companies or repurchased their own 74 stock with the Intention of using It in future acquisitions. Included

In this group were these companies:

Aerosonic Corporation Electrolux Corporation Cannon Mills Company Metalfab, Incorporated C-E-I-R, Incorporated Ozite Corporation

Aerosonic Corporation was organized as a Florida corporation in

1957. At its fiscal year-end, it had treasury stock of 4,305 shares. On

March 31, 1966 it issued 502 shares in the acquisition of MacLeon Instru­ ment Corporation. Since the market on its stock on that date was 8 1/4 bid, 8 1/2 asked, it was a small transaction, without material significance.

Cannon Mills Company was organized in 1887 and has been for many years a very profitable textile manufacturer. As of June 30, 1964 the company exchanged 3,960 shares of its treasury stock, voting common, for

990 shares of Travora Textiles, Inc.

Of Travora*s 990 shares, Charles A. Cannon, chairman of the board of Cannon Mills, owned 150 shares and J. Harris Cannon, vice-president and a director of Cannon Mills, owned 520 shares, so the transaction was essenti­ ally within the family. Travora owned 1,500 shares of the voting common stock of Cannon, at a cost of $68,000, and this holding was added to Cannon

Mill's treasury stock, after the remaining ten Bhares of Travora were ac­ quired in 1966.

Cannon Mills had repurchased 2,010 of its voting common shares in

1963 and 8,827 shares more in 1964 so, after giving effect to the Travora purchase in June, it reported treasury holdings of 6,877 shares of voting common and 119,680 shares of Class B non-voting at a combined cost of

$7,780,315, as of December 31, 1964. 75

A year later, December 31, 1965, the company had treasury stock holdings of 20,856 20/100 shares of voting common and 146,109 shares of

Class B non-voting, at a combined cost of $11,733,612. These holdings represented 2.01 per cent of the voting common Issued of 1,037,189 shares, and 14.09 per cent of the Class B non-voting Issued of 1,037,009 shares.

The 10-K report to the Commission, received on May 2, 1966, de­ tailed the principal holders of voting securities as of December 31, 1965:

Of Record % Benefically %

Charles A. Cannon 10,155 .98 150,000 14.46 The Cannon Foundation, Inc 167,118 16.11 none Ruth Coltrane Cannon Estate— Charles A. Cannon, Executor and Beneficiary 55,058 5.31 55,058 5.31

Cannon Mills Company had become subject to the proxy statement re­ quirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as of April 30, 1965.

Accordingly on March 23, 1966 it sent out a notice of the annual meeting to be held April 12, 1966. Included was the proxy statement which stated, as one of the purposes of the meeting, the proposed authorization by stockholders of the purchase by the company of its own voting stock and its Class B non-voting stock. The resolution to be offered read as follows

Resolved: That the directors are authorized in their discretion to purchase, prior to the next annual meeting of the stockholders out of surplus funds, not more than 100,000 shares of common voting stock and not more than 100,000 shares of Class B common non-voting stock at a price not exceeding the market value at the time, or times, of purchase. Said shares shall be held as treasury stock and be available for use in expansion of the business and 76

for general corporate purposes . . . management favors the adoption of the resolution.

The 8-K Current Report for the month of April, 1966, showed

891,318 affirmative and 2,780 negative votes on the resolution to pur­ chase .

The company thus was authorized, within the year, to purchase an additional 9.84 per cent of the outstanding voting common of 1,016,333 shares and also 11.22 per cent of the outstanding Class B non-voting common of

890.000 shares. At prevailing prices for the two classes of stock, this might have entailed an expenditure of funds of about $22,000,000. This com­ pared to net income of $25,394,995 in the year 1965.

The proxy statement Included with the notice of the annual meeting to be held on April 11, 1967, contained a resolution regarding purchase of the companyTs own stock similar to that of the previous year. Management requested authorization to purchase 100,000 shares of voting common and

100.000 shares of Class B non-voting stock. The reason given was the same and no mention was made of a request for tender by shareholders.

The annual report for 1967 indicated that the company had increased its treasury stock holdings over those of 1966 as follows:

Voting common 3,634 shares

Class B non-voting 1.640 shares

TOTAL 5,274

The aggregate cost of the repurchases was $431,655, an average of

$81.85 per combined share.

C-E-I-R. Inc. in 1961 acquired a forty-two and one half per cent 77

Interest in a French computer company (CFRO); stock was used as part pay­ ment. In 1964 the company disposed of its interest and received back

14,000 shares. These were recorded at fair value of $157,500 and retained as treasury stock. In 1965 the company acquired the three Automation

Institute Companies, for which were issued a total of 62,604 Class A shares, of which 14,000 shares came from the treasury.

Since the company had 1,555,210 outstanding shares on September 30,

1964, its use of treasury shares for acquisitions has not been meaningful.

The same is true of the company's Stock Option Plan, which permits the use of unissued or treasury shares. However, the 4,988 shares which were is­ sued to optionees in 1965 came wholly from previously unissued stock.

Electrolux Corporation has not been an active repurchase of stock.

At the end of 1962 it held 7,000 shares in its treasury, carried at cost of $112,000. In its Form 10 Registration Statement pursuant to Section

12(g) of the 1934 Act, filed as of April 30, 1965, details were provided on two acquisitions which had taken place on August 30, 1963 and January 14,

1964:

In 1963 Registrant acquired 67,000 shares of its out­ standing common stock, 46,095 shares from the Wenner-Gren Founda­ tion for Anthropological Research, New York, N. Y. and 20,905 shares from a subsidiary of A. B. Electrolux, Stockholm, Sweden. These shares which had been held by these two stockholders for a number of years were sold to Registrant, at its request, at prices of $49.50-$50.00 per share, which were the approximate over-the-counter prices of the stock at that time. Such shares were eventually used by Registrant to acquire the assets and busi­ ness of White Mop Wringer Company.

Hence the 7,000 shares of treasury stock owned at the end of 1962, plus the 67,000 shares"acquired as above, constituted the 74,000 shares which were exchanged for all business and assets of White Mop Wringer 78

Company.

On January 14, 1964, 11,000 shares of treasury stock were ex­ changed for all the outstanding shares of ah unnamed subsidiary. In this Instance, the company did not reveal even to the Commission the cost, method, or date of repurchase, nor even the name of the acquired company.

Metalfab, Inc. Prior to June 30, 1965, the fiscal year-end, the company had repurchased 3,000 shares, at cost of $21,188, and these were shown as treasury shares In the annual report.

Note B of the report, In explaining the change in Stockholders

Equity, mentioned the repurchase of 3,000 shares and added the following:

Subsequent to June 30, 1965 the Corporation purchased an additional 31,810 shares of its common stock at an ag­ gregate price of $270,445. In connection therewith, $300,000 of short-term borrowings were obtained from a bank. The com­ mon stock reacquired is intended for use in acquisition of other businesses.

The total cost of repurchased stock was $291,633; this compares with reported net income, after taxes, of $282,951 in 1965.

The annual meeting was held on September 28, 1965 but the proxy statement of September 17th made no mention of the repurchases nor was the approval of stockholders sought.

In Schedule XIII of the 10-K (annual) report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966, treasury holdings of 58,517 shares, at cost of

$509,736, were shown. This was an increase of 23,707 shares from the previous item and represented a total increase for the year of 55,517 shares at a cost of $488,548. 79

The annual report to stockholders showed that on December 31, 1965 the company Issued 22,185 shares of common stock (previously held in trea­ sury) In exchange for the common stock of Fliteway Sales, Inc. On July 12,

It had purchased improved real property for $72,500, payable in cash ($35,000) and 5,000 treasury shares.

Included in the Notice of Annual Meeting (September 27, 1966) was the proxy statement of September 8th, which showed outstanding stock of

289,521 shares, not including 53,517 shares held of record by the Company in its treasury; also 22,185 shares held in a Management voting trust.

The source of the 22,185 shares of common stock "previously held in treasury" was revealed with the filing of the 8-K Current Report for

June 1, 1966 (received by the Commission on September 21st).

The report read as follows:

Re: Acquisition Fliteway Sales, Inc. Date: March 14, 1966

22,185 shares exchanged for 1,000 shares of Fliteway Sales, Inc.

a. 3,342 shares formerly held as treasury shares

b. 18,843 shares were transferred from a voting trust (Voting Trust Agreement dated May 1, 1965)

No reason was given as to why the 18,843 shares were taken from the voting trust for this purpose when the corporation already held 58,517 shares of treasury stock.

Ozite Corporation does not provide specific data with regard to its repurchase transactions. However, in its Form 10 Registration Statement

(May 2, 1966) treasury stock was shown as consisting of 10,402 shares $6 preferred and 31,110 shares of common, at an aggregate cost of $1,110,191. 80

No breakdown was given.

As of March 3, 1966, all directors and officers as a group held

533,880 shares, 57.13 per cent of the 930,660 shares outstanding.

In 1958 the company had acquired 6,197 shares of common stock.

This was held continuously as treasury stock. On December 30, 1965, the common was split five for one, resulting in 30,985 shares of treasury stock; an incidental purchase of 125 shares accounted for the reported total of 31,110. Nowhere was there any breakdown of cost as between the preferred and common stock.

On November 1, 1965, the company acquired the West Virginia Sponge

Rubber Products & Plastics Company for $300,000 and 13,000 shares of com­ mon stock. However, the information revealed by the company, either to its stockholders or to the Commission, was so fragmentary that it was not possible to determine whether unissued or treasury shares were used in the acquisition.

3. Stock option plans

Six companies repurchased stock for the primary purpose of having stock available to fulfil requirements under stock option plans. In this category were these:

American Heritage Publishing Company Dorchester Gas Producing Company Hanover Shoe Incorporated Sawhlll Tubular Products Incorporated United States Envelope Company H. Warshow & Sons Incorporated

American Heritage Publishing Company, Inc.. in its October 15, 1962 81

Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders, indicated that optioned stock had been increased from 35,000 to 50,000 shares and said: "the Corporation has recently repurchased 10,000 shares of its common stock which are now held in the treasury. These shares would be available for issuance under the Plan."

This information was confirmed in the annual report for the year ended June 30, 1963: "The company purchased during the year and now holds in its treasury an additional 10,100 shares of its common stock as a re­ serve for possible exercise of stock options." These shares were acquired at a total cost of $79,370, equal to $7.86 per share.

In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1964, the company acquired an additional 7,000 shares of stock at a cost of $48,217. On March 19, 1964, an option on 4,000 shares of Class B stock at $8 was granted to Ralph W.

Hench Jr., a vice-president.

For the first time in nine years the company operated at a deficit,

$364,588 and no stock was repurchased that year. In 1966 the company re­ ported a net income of $428,460 but no repurchases were made. However,

16,600 shares of common stock and 4,400 shares of Class B, acquired prior to June 30, 1964, were retained as treasury stock. The company continued its profitable course during the six-month period ending December 31, 1966, showing net income of $591,000; 3,600 shares of common stock were acquired at cost of $36,985 and held as treasury stock.

There is no evidence that any of the outstanding options were exercised during this period. The number of issued common and Class B shares remained stationary at 516,632. 82

Dorchester Gas Producing Company had 841,547 shares of common stock, $1 par, Issued as of December 31, 1963. Of these, 90,007 shares had been repurchased and held as treasury shares (43,050 shares were reserved for Issuance under restricted stock options). Net in­ come had increased in 1963 to $565,105 from $34,529 in 1962, equal to

$0.75 per share compared to $0.05.

In its 10-K annual report for the year ending December 31, 1963, the ''parents1' of the corporation were revealed as:

Metropolitan Dallas Corporation 64,047 shs. (8.5 per cent) (George S. Rooker and Preston A. Peak owned 79.5 per cent of voting stock)

George S. Rooker, chairman of the board 20,000 shs. (2.7 per cent)

Preston A. Peak, chairman of executive committee 23,000 shs. (3.1 per cent)

Another director, D. H. Byrd owned 37,471 shares.

The annual report for 1964 showed a reduction in treasury shares from 90,007 to 80,957, a net of 9,050. The 10-K form confirmed this figure indicating that they had been used for stock options. However, neither the purchaser, nor the option price, nor the market price at date of the exercise of the option was revealed. It did show the holdings of Metro­ politan Dallas as being 52,469 shares and of D. H. Byrd as 47,021, leading to the supposition that the latter had exercised the option and had pur­ chased an additional 500 shares.

In the annual report for 1965 it was shown that treasury stock had declined to 63,037 shares, a net reduction of 17,920 shares from the preced- 83 ing year. 20,800 shares had been used to fulfil stock options and

2,880 shares had been repurchased at a cost of $27,870. The average repurchase price was $9.68 per share. This was the first stock to be repurchased in several years.

The 10-K report provided further details. George S. Rooker and

Preston A. Peak each had exercised options to buy 10,400 shares at

$2.88 in December 1965 (b9d price was $12.25 in the over-the-counter mar­ ket). The repurchased stock had been acquired earlier in the year:

May 11 500 shares June 8 1,540 June 21 840

TOTAL 2,880 $27,870

Also, 30,293 shares had been issued as a 4 per cent stock dividend, payable May 28, 1965. Previously unissued stock was used.

The October 1965 issue of the "Official Summary of Security Trans­ actions and Holdings", as released by the Commission, showed that D. H. Byrd, who had exercised stock options in 1964 and received a 4 per cent stock dividend in May, 1965, had sold 4,400 shares on September 28, 1965, leaving him with 44,397 shares, plus 69,076 shares owned by a holding company which he controlled.

The same source, in the January, 1966 issue, showed that Mr. Rooker and Mr. Peak had exercised options on December 21, 1965.

In May, 1966 the company’s 8-K report indicated that J. G. Eckel, president, had exercised a stock option to buy 14,560 shares in April at

$3.85 (bid price of $12,125 in over-the-counter market) and that treasury

shares were used for this purpose. The "Official Summary" gave the precise 84 date of April 26th and his total holdings, subsequent to exercise of!

26,208 shares.

Using previously unissued stock, 32,043 shares were issued by the company as a 4 per cent stock dividend, payable May 27, 1966. The company also reported that "during the period after December 31, 1965, and prior to May 13, 1966, the registrant purchased a total of 11,612 outstanding shares of common stock which were transferred into its treasury."

The company repurchased an additional 500 shares between May 13 and December 31, 1966; also 8,855 shares in the period from January 1 to

March 15, 1967; but no details as to cost were provided.

Hanover Shoe Incorporated filed a Registration Statement with the

Commission on March 23, 1956, using Form S-l as required under the Securi­ ties Act of 1933. No repurchases of stock were reported until the year ended December 31, 1962, at which time 4,900 shares were shown as treasury stock, at a cost of $72,462.

However, nothing was said by the chairman of the board, L. B. Sheppard, about the repurchase in his letter "To Our Stockholders." Likewise, "no proxy statement, form of proxy, or proxy soliciting material was sent to stockholders for the last annual meeting." No options were granted in 1962 but an option for 600 shares was exercised at $14.74 (market value of $15.38 on date of exercise). For this option previously unissued stock was used, increasing issued stock to 604,030 shares.

At the end of 1963 treasury stock had been increased to 14,233 1/3 shares, at a total cost of $204,587. Nothing was said to stockholders nor were any new options granted. Yet, on February 4th, an option was exercised 85

to purchase 1,500 shares at $14.41 (market value of $15.88). Judging

only from the amount of Issued stock, the conclusion was drawn that

treasury stock was used.

In 1964 the company reported holdings of 12,933 1/3 shares of

treasury stock at cost of $186,647. However, 3,100 shares were purchased, at four different dates during the year, at the option price of $14.41

(market prices varied from 16 5/8 to 17.6875 at date of exercise). Since

the net reduction in treasury shares was only 1,300 shares, the presum­ ption is that the company repurchased 1,800 shares but made no mention of

the fact.

In 1965 the company's annual report showed that treasury shares had been reduced to 4,513 1/3 shares, a reduction of 8,420 from the previous year. Stock options for that amount were exercised and the treasury stock cost $121,808. No stock options were granted in 1965 and it was reported

that the Restricted Stock Option Plan which had been adopted on April 6,

1959 was terminated on May 14, 1964.

The beneficial holdings of the two chief officers, L. B. Sheppard and R. H. Sheppard, totalled 270,015 shares, 44.7 per cent of the 604,030 issued shares.

In 1966 the holdings of treasury stock dropped to 113 1/3 shares, a reduction from the previous year of 4,400 shares. E. S. Fitzgibbons, the general manager, exercised options in the amount of 4,800 shares, of which

4,300 were previously unissued and only 500 shares were treasury stock.

Hence, 3,900 shares must have been disposed of in some fashion but details were not provided. 86

Basically, the company, In its reports to stockholders and to the Commission, disclosed no facts as to its repurchases, either the amounts, cost or timing. The proxy statements showed the number of treasury shares held but not the cost. What the company did reveal was the cost of treasury shares which were sold to optionees and the number of treasury shares, and their cost, held at the close of the fiscal year.

Complete disclosure as to repurchase, per se, was definitely inadequate.

Sawhill Tubular Products. Inc. was a closely-held corporation prior to the by certain stockholders of 225,000 shares at $18.25 on February 24, 1959.

The first repurchase of stock occurred in 1963; the annual report showed 1,500 shares in treasury, at cost of $18,375. In 1964 the company repurchased 2,000 shares on August 20, 1964; of this amount, 600 shares were sold to optionees. The net addition of 1,400 shares resulted in a total of 2,900 treasury shares at cost of $37,025.

In 1965 no repurchases were made but 110 shares were sold to optionees on March 9th and December 28th, resulting in treasury shares held of 2,790 at cost of $35,678.

In 1966 during the period from March 28 to May 16 the company re­ purchased 5,747 shares in the over-the-counter market; of these, 1,242 shares were sold to optionees from January 11 to August 19. The net addition of

4,505 shares brought treasury holdings to 7,295 shares at a cost of

$123,538.

United States Envelope Company had a change of control in 1960.

On May 19 the West Virginia Pulp & Paper Company purchased 176,088 shares 87 of preferred stock and 357,898 shares of common. There were at the time 627,535 shares of common Issued and outstanding.

No stock was repurchased In 1961 but In 1962, 1,261 shares were shown as treasury shares, at a cost of $29,000. At fiscal year-end of

October 31, 1963, treasury shares had risen to 3,191 at a cost of $60,000.

On April 13, 1964, the company sent to stockholders a Notice of

Special Meeting of Stockholders and Statement Regarding Proxies; the company recommended adoption of a Stock Option Plan covering 40,000 shares, as follows:

The plan provides that the stock to be Issued on the exercise of options may be either new shares of common stock of the Company or shares reacquired and held in the CompanyTs treasury. This provision has been inserted in the Plan for the sake of flexibility in the event the Company at any time may not have sufficient shares of stock available in its treasury. The Board In approving the Plan has specifically directed that only treasury shares be used until the Board directs otherwise.

At the end of the 1964 fiscal year treasury shares had risen to

13,123 shares, at a total cost of $233,000, but no options were granted under the plan that year. In 1965 no options were granted under the plan nor were any additional shares held as treasury stock.

The proxy statement for the annual meeting to be held on February 11,

1966, indicated that as of December 24, 1965, 11,462 treasury shares were held in trust. The annual report for 1966 amplified this by stating that these shares, previously acquired at cost of $188,000, were transferred to an Independent trustee for possible use under the Stock Option Plan.

This left a balance of 1,661 shares as treasury stock. Options were granted for 9,900 shares during the year at $18.75 (fair market value at date of 88 grant) but none were exercised in 1966.

H. Warshow & Sons. Inc.. in its first annual report since the company became publicly held, reported 47,716 treasury shares of Class B stock, at cost of $230,596, reserved for options granted at prices of

$6.4075 and $6.8294.

At that time the Warshow family comprising Joseph Warshow, the president, his brother-in-law, nephew, and two sons, and their respec­ tive wives, held a combined total of 543,712 Class B shares. These were equivalent to 84.27 per cent of the 645,216 issued shares and 91.00 per cent of the 597,500 shares outstanding.

On February 4, 1963, Donald W. Layton, Joseph Warshow's nephew and a vice-president, exercised an option on 32,240 shares of Class B stock at 6.4075 (no market value on Class B, but value of $12.4375 on Class A into which Class B was convertible). On April 29, 1963, the corporation granted options, good for five years, on a total of 20,000 shares of Class

A stock to the two Warshow sons and Donald W. Layton, nephew. The option price on 15,000 shares was $11.97 and on 5,000 shares, $10.34. The Wall

Street Journal of April 30 showed the April 29 closing price as 10 1/4 bid and 11 1/2 asked.

The annual report for 1963, as of June 29, showed treasury holdings of 15,476 Class B shares, reflecting exercise of 32,240 shares by Donald

W. Layton, and a new holding of 7,220 Class A shares. No purchase cost was shown for the Class A shares nor was any time of purchase shown.

The 8-K report, for the month of January, 1964, indicated that

"Company purchased 8,338 shares of its Class A stock in the over-the-counter market at market prices availing on the various purchase dates during 1963." 89

No cost was given, no reason, and no prior authorization by stockholders was indicated.

No options to purchase securities were either granted or exercised during 1964 and 1965. On June 30, 1966, treasury holdings of 8,338 Class A and 15,476 Class B were still maintained.

On January 3, 1967, Robert B. Klausner, vice-president, exercised an option to buy 6,878 shares of Class B at 6.8294.

It seems evident that the repurchase program of this company was devoted basically to fulfilling requirements under the Stock Option Flan.

4. For bonuses, employee incentive awards, and prizes

Analysis of company records indicated that five companies used stock repurchases primarily as incentive awards:

Asgrow Seed Company Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation The Cincinnati Enquirer, Incorporated Colonial StoreB, Incorporated Pacific Gamble Robinson Company

Asgrow Seed Company was originally established in 1956 as the

Everett B. Clark Seed Company.

In the S-l Registration Statement under the 1933 Act, the company reported that on October 14, 1963, 380 treasury shares had been transferred

to eighteen executives as part of their executive bonus; on November 2,

1964, 1,792 shares were transferred to forty-one employees under a similar

arrangement. The stock was split two for one on August 25, 1965. There­

after, on October 28, 1965, a total of 3,407 shares were distributed to

thirty-five employees. Also, on May 7, 1964, (prior to the )

398 shares were sold from the treasury to a registered broker-dealer. 90

It has been possible to piece together bits of information in order to determine the amount of stock repurchased by the company. The company did not see fit to provide such data nor was it required to do so. Nor were figures provided as to the cost of repurchase.

The only specific information, other than recorded above, were the holdings of treasury stock at year-end and its cost.

1966 1965 1964

Treasury stock (shares)* 2,361 3,368 600 Treasury stock (cost) $26,708 $30,322 $ 4,500

Repurchase of stock shares* 2,400 6,352 1,340 cost ? ? ?

♦Adjusted for two for one stock split, August 25, 1965.

The holdings of treasury shares, and cost, at year-end 1964 and

1965 were approximately half of the repurchases during the year. It is evident that year-end holdings, a figure currently required by the Com­ mission, do not accurately reflect the extent of a company's repurchase program.

Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation made no repurchases of stock prior to 1966. In that year, out of 549,016 issued, 3,658 shares were re­ purchased. Of this amount 1,721 shares were distributed to employees; the remaining 1,937 shares were not shown as treasury stock but as an asset:

Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation common stock held for employee service awards (1,937 shares) $146,000.

In the annual report, under "review 6f operations", it was stated:

Another gratifying program was the distribution of shares of the Company's common stock to employees with service of twenty-five years or more. Twenty-five year employees received 91

two shares with one additional share for each additional five years of service. There were 1,721 shares distri­ buted to 497 people. This is a continuing program, and the employee reaction has been most favorable.

The 10-K report commented on its distribution of 1,721 shares, with further elaboration:

An aggregate of 3,658 shares were acquired by or for the Registrant at various times during 1966 to be used for such distribution and for possible similar distribu­ tions in the future. Since such shares were acquired for this specific purpose and not for retirement they are not shown as treasury shares on the balance sheet of the Registrant.

It is of interest to note that the stockholders, at a March 21,

1967 meeting, approved a Qualified Stock Option Plan. There was no in­ dication whether the company intended to use unissued stock or treasury shares in this connection.

The Cincinnati Enquirer. Inc. The annual report for the year ending

September 30, 1965 showed 840,360 whares of issued common stock, of which

7,599 shares were held in treasury at cost of $193,199. No comment was made in the report to stockholders, but the 10-K report to the Commission stated that:

On April 19, 1965, the Company commenced purchasing its common shares, no par value, on the open market (over- the-counter), and as of September 30, 1965, the company held 7,599 of these shares as treasury shares.

The annual report for 1966 showed treasury shares of 7,709, at cost of $207,711, a net Increase of 110 shares. However, the source and applica­

tion of funds schedule was more revealing:

Disposition of $211,778 Purchase of $210,975 treasury stock treasury stock 92

Again the 10-K report to the Commission provided further details:

From time to time during the year the Company purchased 7,811 of Its common shares on the open market (over-the-counter). On March 11, 1966, 7,500 common shares of these treasury shares were Issued to Francis L. Dale, President and Publisher of the Company. In addition, the company gave away 201 treasury shares as prizes. At September 30, 1966, the company held 7,709 common shares as treasury shares.

Control of the company was essentially held by the Enquirer Share­ holders Second Voting Trust which, as of July 31, 1965, had superseded the

First Voting Trust created originally on August 1, 1952.

The Second Voting Trust on September 30, 1966, owned 534,993 shares, equal to 64.2 per cent of the outstanding shares. Of this amount, as stated in the proxy statement for the annual meeting on January 17, 1967:

The E. W. Scripps Company is the beneficial owner of 491,436 common shares of the Company (approximately 59.2 per cent of the outstanding shares) through the holding of Voting Trust Certificates representing that number of shares.

The 7,500 common shares were issued to President Dale in accordance with his employment agreement. In addition to a specific salary, under a

Contingent Compensation Plan, he was permitted as a bonus award to "earn out" over a five year period a portion or all of the 7,500 shares set aside, in accord with the determination made annually by the Board of Directors.

It is evident that the 1966 year-end treasury stock holdings did not reveal the magnitude of the repurchase program that year.

Colonial Stores. Inc. has a history of profit-sharing distributions in common stock. 93

Total Stock Treasury Distributed Stock

1959 8,983 shs 1,869 shs 1960 11,642 1,801 1961 7,377 2,542 1962 4,995 738 1963 9,090 769

In the annual report for 1964, the Issued shares totalled

2,798,574, of which 8,368 were treasury shares at a cost of $187,612, up

substantially from 4,407 shares at cost of $79,333 at the end of 1963.

In March, 10,169 shares of treasury common stock, having a market value

of $190,770, were distributed, Indicating that 14,130 shares must have

been repurchased. However, this fact was not mentioned nor was any cost

Indicated.

In 1965 8,831 treasury shares, at cost of $245,616, were held;

8,542 shares of treasury stock were distributed, thus indicating the repur­

chase of 9,005 shares during the year.

In 1966 the company held 9,331 shares of treasury stock, at cost of

$259,241. No shares were distributed that year, so the 500 repurchased

shares presumably were added to previous holdings in the treasury.

The major stockholder of the corporation throughout this period was

the National Food Products Corporation, which held 868,275 shares, or 31.5 per cent of the total outstanding as of February 16, 1960. Its holdings

increased gradually, each year, reaching 926,804 shares in 1962 and

938,294 shares at February 16, 1967, equal to 33.2 per cent of the out­

standing stock.

Although the yearly discharge of bonus incentive liability by the

issue, in part, of reacquired treasury shares was clearly evident to 94

interested stockholders, it is likewise true that more adequate dis­

closure of details relative to the repurchase program could have been made. There is nothing in the record to show that the approval of

stockholders was ever sought or granted.

Pacific Gamble Robinson Company filed an original Form 10 Regis­

tration Statement, pursuant to Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act, with the

Commission on May 28, 1965. As of the end of 1964, 212 shares at a cost

of $2,611 were held in the treasury.

In the annual report for 1965 nothing about repurchase was men­

tioned in the "Letter to Stockholders" but note 6 to the balance sheet

read as follows:

At December 31, 1965, 1,078 shares of the Company's common stock purchased on the open market were held in its treasury and included in sundry other assets at cost of $15,818.

The 10-K report to the Commission was more revealing. In it was

disclosed the issuance of 876 shares to employees as prizes and 4,719

treasury shares purchased at various dates. However, the cost of the

repurchased shares was not shown.

In 1966 note 6 to the balance sheet stated that:

At December 31, 1966, 2,908 shares of the Company's common stock purchased on the open market were included in sundry other assets at cost of $33,741. At December 31, 1966, there were no stock options outstanding.

Again the 10-K report was more informative; 1,027 shares were

issued to employees as incentive awards and 2,800 treasury shares were

purchased at various dates.

As is evident from the above, the information about repurchases 95

TABLE VII

INSIDER STOCK HOLDINGS OF FIFTY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES

Per Cent of Outstanding Stock

Aerosonic Corporation 50.0 % American Heritage Publishing Company, Inc. 55.8 Asgrow Seed Company 54.4

Athlone Industries n.a. AVM Corporation 27.0 Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 52.4

Bayless (A. J.)Markets, Inc. 40.86 Bergstrom Paper Company 41.86 Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation 16.3

Bristol Brass Corporation 6.6 Cannon Mills Company 31.36 *C-E-I-R, Inc. 18.1

Cincinnati Enquirer 59.2 Colonial Stores, Inc. 33.1 W. S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company 19.4

Dorchester Gas Producing Company 16.9 Economics Laboratory, Inc. 19.0 Electrolux Corporation 48.8

Girltown, Inc. 73.0 Global Marine, Inc. 36.10 Gulf Interstate Company 29.3

The Hanover Shoe, Inc. 44.7 Heath Tecna Corporation 56.45 Hexcel Corporation 35.00

Hudson Pulp & Paper Corporation 63.54 Charles Jacquin et Cie., Inc. 74.7 Jessop Steel Company n.a.

E. F. Johnson Company 41.0 Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation 82.6 McCormick & Company, Inc. 49.33 96

TABLE VII (CONT'D)

INSIDER STOCK HOLDINGS OF FIFTY UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES

Per Cent of Outstanding Stock

Metalfab, Inc. 43.1 % Midas-International Corporation 64.67 Midwest Rubber Reclaiming n.a.

Monmouth Park Jockey Club 80.0 Nuclear Data, Inc. 22.0 Ozlte Corporation 54.65

Pacific Gamble Robinson Company 12.8 Petrolite Corporation 46.0 Reynolds & Reynolds Company 89.0

Sawhill Tubular Products, Inc. 38.27 Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist 8.96 Super Valu Stores 67.41

United States Banknote 27.24 United States Envelope 55.5 Vocaline Company of America 22.7

Wackenhut Corporation 67.5 H. Warshow & Sons, Inc. 54.5 Weiss Bros. Stores, Inc. 64.77

Western Publishing Company 17.6 Zenith Laboratories, Inc. 50.7

SUMMARY

20 companies 50% or over 13 companies 30 - 50% 11 companies 15 - 30% 6 companies under 15% 50

^acquired 11/22/67 by Control Data Corporation.

Source: Company 10-K (annual) reports on file with Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. 97 was very sparse. Amounts repurchased in 1964, 1965, and 1966 were reported to the Commission but not directly to the stockholders.

Neither the cost, the reason, nor the potential use of treasury shares was expressed to them. It was possible for a probing stockholder to learn partially what had happened months after the fact; but there was no approval sought, or information given, in advance.

5. Available at a low price

Of the fifty companies whose reports were scrutinized, three re­ purchased stock primarily because it was available at a low price. These were Hexcel Corporation. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation, and Shepard

Niles Crane & Holst Corporation.

Hexcel Corporation (formerly Hexcel Products, Inc.) was incorporated in 1948 but made its first public offering of stock— 50,000 shares at

$17.75'— on July 31, 1959. At the end of 1959 the five principal officers owned a total of 98,336 shares, 39.44 per cent of the 249,330 shares issued and outstanding.

No repurchase took place in 1961 but the 8-K report for June, 1962, provided details of action which had been taken:

At a special meeting of the Board of Directors of Hexcel Products, Inc., held May 31, 1962, the Vice-President of Finance was directed to purchase capital stock of the company on the open market to hold as treasury stock. The authoriza­ tion was for not more than 15,000 shares at a price not to exceed $12.50 per share. During the month of June, a total of 12,635 shares was purchased for a total price of $143,000, or an average of $11.31 per share.

In the quarterly report to stockholders, for the period ending

June 30, 1962, the letter from the president stated: 98

An opportunity to purchase a limited amount of Hexcel Products, Inc. stock on the open market at a price below book value resulted from the drop. Subse- quently in June the company purchased 12,635 shares to be held as treasury stock. This reduction In shares outstanding will be reflected in increased earnings per remaining shares.

The 10-K report for 1962 revealed that treasury holdings had in­ creased to 20,575 shares, acquired at a total cost of $222,228. It is interesting to note that the net income of the company for that year was

$253,802. The company mentioned the repurchase specifically to its stockholders in the 1962 annual report and noted that the Board of Direc­ tors, at its meeting on February 28, 1962, had increased the annual divi­ dend from $0.20 to $0.30 per share. In 1963 dividends were Increased to

$0.40 per share.

Although no additional options were granted in 1963, an option on

10,000 shares granted in 1961 to the president, W. S. Powell, was reduced in price from $15.91 to $11.17 per share "to reflect declines in the market value of the stock."

In 1964 all long-term debt was retired, the quarterly dividend was raised from $0.10 to $0.15 per share, and a stock split of 6 for 5, payable

February 15, 1965, was announced, as was the intention to maintain the $0.15 quarterly dividend on the increased number of shares to be outstanding.

The company continued to prosper during 1965 and 1966. In the latter year, net income rose to a new high of $966,375.

Throughout this period, from 1962 to 1966 Inclusive, the treasury stock of 20,575 shares was maintained unchanged. Although stock options were exercised during that time, unissued stock was used to fulfil the 99 requirements. According to the proxy statement issued for the annual meeting in May, 1967, the total holdings of six principal officers were

130,297 shares, equal to 35.0 per cent of the 372,269 shares then issued.

Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation has had a brief existence and its experience with repurchases of stock is limited. It was incorporated on March 4, 1964 when it acquired all of the outstanding stock of the former Kentucky Fried Chicken Inc. for $2,000,000. Throughout 1964 and 1965 there was no quoted market for the stock of the new company.

However, on December 30, 1965, 20,000 shares were repurchased at

$10.00 per share and held as treasury stock. There had been 510,000 shares outstanding at September 30, 1965, the end of the previous fiscal year, with a stated value of $1,654,496, so that the repurchase was equal to almost four per cent of issued stock.

According to the 10-K report for the fiscal year ended September 30,

1966, the company had resold, between December 31, 1965 and January 20,

1966, 7,300 shares, leaving 12,700 shares in the treasury. The stock was split two for one, effective February 11, 1966, thus doubling the amount of treasury shares.

On March 17, 1966 425,000 shares of stock were publicly offered at

$15.00 per share, all from present shareholders, none from the company.

The prospectus of that date included the balance sheet of January 31, 1966 which showed treasury stock of 25,400 shares at a cost of $127,000. From this information it was possible to determine that the company had resold the 7,300 shares at the purchase price of $10.00 per share, although the company did not so indicate specifically. Adjusting for the stock split 100

on February 11th, the price was $5.00.

After the new issue offering on March 17th at $15.00 per share,

the stock was quoted in the "pink sheets" at 21 1/4-21 1/2 on March 31st, and at 28-28 1/4 on Spetember 30th.

The annual report for the year ending September 30, 1966 showed

27,400 treasury shares at a cost of $184,500; and the 10-K report amplified this by indicating that 2,000 shares had been repurchased in the over-the- counter market on September 29th at prices ranging between $28.50 and $28.75 per share (a total of $57,500).

This proved to have been a good purchase. A year later, September 29,

1967, the market price was 82 1/2-84, despite the five for four split on

December 29, 1966.

The company provided scant information to stockholders as to its repurchases. Such disclosure as was made was reported in the 10-K reports to the Commission and in the prospectus required by the new issue. Prior approval was not sought from the body of stockholders and little data was provided subsequent to the repurchases*

Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corporation has been in business since

1903. Although its stock has been traded in the over-the-counter market for many years, information about the company's activities has been rela­ tively meager. However, it filed its Form 10 Registration Statement on

April 26, 1965 and revealed its repurchases. At that time 287,000 shares had been issued, 31,279 shares were held in treasury, and 255,721 shares were outstanding.

On August 13, 1947 the company had split its stock five for one, 101

after which 281,595 shares had been outstanding and 5,405 shares were

in the treasury.

Subsequent repurchases were explained in this way:

Since August 13, 1947 Registrant has purchased a total of 25,874 shares of common stock on the market at various prices not in excess of the book value of the stock, the largest single purchase in excess of three per cent of the issued and outstanding common stock, consisting in a purchase of 21,900 shares in December 1962 at a price of $18.00 per share.

On May 21, 1963 the company adopted its 1963 Employees Stock Option

Plan covering 25,000 shares of issued and reacquired common stock. However, no options were granted under the Plan and it became ineffective on June 9,

1966, according to the Notice of Annual Meeting on May 16, 1967.

At the end of 1966 the company still had 287,000 shares Issued,

of which 31,279 shares were in the treasury.

As of April, 1965 no person owned of record or beneficially more

than ten per cent of any class of securities. All directors and officers

of the company as a group, directly and indirectly, had beneficial owner­

ship of 22,904 shares, 8.96 per cent of outstanding stock. There have been,

according to the "Official Summary", no significant changes in holdings

since then.

6. Use as stock dividends

Analysis of the records indicated that only two companies, Bristol

Brass Corporation and Charles Jacquin et Cie Inc., repurchased common stock

for the primary purpose of paying stock dividends.

Bristol Brass Corporation has 500,000 shares of $10.00 par common

stock outstanding. As of December 31, 1963, 10,020 shares were held in 102

Its treasury, at cost of $102,091. A year later the treasury stock amounted to 15,036 shares, at cost of $147,770. Since no additional v data was offered, it was assumed that 5,016 shares were repurchased during 1964 at a cost of $45,679.

In 1965 there were 400 shares purchased on December 8th at cost of $3,700. At year-end a total of 15,436 treasury shares were held at an aggregate cost of $151,470. This information was gleaned from the

schedule of use of working capital. However, no mention was made of

the reason for repurchase, either in the annual report or in the proxy

statement, dated April 7, 1966, which was sent with the notice of annual meeting held on April 28th.

The 8-K report for March 1967 indicated a restriction imposed by a loan agreement: "it will not. . . acquire any of its capital stock,

except to the extent of 75 per cent of consolidated net income after

December 31, 1965."

In 1966 the company completely eliminated its treasury shares,

according to the 10-K report:

Shares of tresury stock sold November 10, 1966 809 November 18, 1966 1.000 1,809

Shares of treasury stock issued as a stock dividend

November 15, 1966 13.627

TOTAL 15,436 103

Despite the fact that repurchases took place for several years

and that the treasury shares were not Issued as a stock dividend until

November 15, 1966, a careful scrutiny of company reports has failed to uncover any disclosure to stockholders.

Charles Jacquin et Cie.. Inc. was one of the few companies which provided very complete information about its repurchase activities.

Throughout the period 1962 to 1966 inclusive, the company had 408,000

shares of issued stock.

During the fiscal year ended September 30, 1962, the company reacquired 2,300 shares at a cost of $14,651.38; on May 29, 1962 it dis­ tributed 8,000 shares as a two per cent stock dividend.

In 1963 the company repurchased 7,902 shares at cost of $46,179.92 and paid a two per cent stock dividend of 7,996 shares on May 31, 1963.

During 1964 the company acquired 11,884 shares at cost of $61,491.34 and distributed 7,790 shares as a two per cent stock dividend on May 22nd.

Between September 30, 1964 and September 30, 1965 the company pur­ chased 20,633 shares in the open market at prevailing prices; the total cost was $109,906.02. In its 8-K report for April, 1965 the company showed the number of shares bought each month since the previous September; the lowest and highest prices paid per share were recorded ($4.25 in

November 1964 and $6.00 in April, 1965) as well as the aggregate cost. On

May 26, 1965 a three per cent stock dividend distributed 11,462 shares of treasury stock acquired on the open market at cost of $58,883.

In 1966 the company repurchased 8,110 shares at cost of $53,134.96 and paid a three per cent stock dividend of 11,648 shares, acquired at 104 cost of $66,512, on May 20th.

On May 23, 1967 a three per cent dlvldent of 11,702 shares was distributed; 5,997 shares of treasury stock had been acquired since

September 30, 1966.

The tabular presentation below shows the holdings, and cost, of treasury shares at the end of each year; also the number of shares repur­ chased and the number of shares distributed as stock dividend, with their respective costs.

1966 1965 1964 1963 In treasury Shares 11,933 15,471 6,300 2,206 Cost $67,642 $81,019 $29,996 $13,958

Repurchase of stock Shares 8,110 20,633 11,884 7,902 Cost $53,135 $109,906 $61,491 $46,180

Stock dividend Shares 11,648 11,462 7,790 7,996 Cost $66,512 $58,883 $45,453 $46,873

It is noteworthy that the holdings of treasury shares at year-end do not adequately reflect the amount of shares repurchased and/or distributed in the form of a stock dividend. Yet current Commission re­ gulations do not require the complete presentation provided above. Without it the stockholder is uninformed.

7. No reasons given

Of the fifty companies which repurchased stock, nineteen, 38 per cent, mentioned no reasons for this expenditure of funds in their reports to stock­ holders or in the reports which the 1934 Act required that they furnish to the Commission. These companies Included the following: 105

Athlone Industries Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals Incorporated Bayless (A. J.) Markets, Incorporated W. S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Company Economics Laboratory Incorporated Girltown Incorporated Gulf Interstate Company Heath Tecna Corporation Hudson Pulp & Paper Corporation Jessop Steel Company McCormick & Company, Incorporated Midas-International Corporation Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Company Monmouth Park Jockey Club Petrolite Corporation Reynolds & Reynolds Company Super Valu Stores, Incorporated United States Banknote Corporation Wackenhut Corporation

Characteristics of Repurchasing Companies

A. They are almost uniformly profitable.

The unlisted industrial companies included in this study were

found to be profit-makers, particularly during the period of repurchase.

There were a few exceptions. One company, American Heritage Pub­

lishing Company, Inc.. incurred a net loss of $364,588 in 1965, the first

in nine years. No stock was acquired that year nor in the following year,

1966, even though a sizable net income of $428,460 was then shown. However,

in the six months' period ending December 31, 1966, 3,600 shares were

acquired at a cost of $36,985.

Athlone Industries had operated at a deficit from 1962 to 1965

Inclusive, but its repurchased stock had been acquired in 1957 and prior

years. C-E-I-R. Inc. lost money in 1962 and 1963 but its acquisition of

stock occurred in 1961. A substantial net income was reported in 1964,

1965, and 1966. 106

B. There is a high degree of voting control by the family group, or by the officers and directors.

As shown by Table VII, of the fifty companies studied, twenty reported control of at least fifty per cent of voting stock. Thirteen indicated control of thirty to fifty per cent; and eleven reported holdings of fifteen to thirty per cent. Only six showed holdings by management in­ terests of under fifteen per cent.

Of these seven companies— Athlone Industries. Boston Herald-Traveler.

Bristol Brass. Jessop Steel. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming. Pacific Gamble

Robinson, and Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist— specific data was furnished on only the latter two companies. It is possible, then, that a different con­ clusion might result from more adequate data.

Without such data, however, thirty-three companies, or sixty-six per cent of those studied, were controlled to the extent of at least thirty per cent by management.

C. These companies typically pay cash dividends.

Of the fifty companies whose reports were scrutinized, forty-three, eighty-six per cent, paid dividends to stockholders in cash. The following seven companies did not:

Athlone Industries Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated C-E-I-R, Incorporated Global Marine Heath Tecna Charles Jacquin et Cie, Incorporated Nuclear Data

Athlone Industries (Holland Furnace Company until May 24, 1966) had not paid dividends since 1961. It had operated at a deficit from 1962

to 1965 inclusive.

Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals. Inc. has a company policy against pay­ ing cash dividends, as stated in its prospectus dated September 28, 1965:

The Company has never paid cash dividends on its common stock. It has been the policy of the Company to use funds available from earnings to finance the development of its business. It is expected that this policy will continue.

C-E-I-R. Inc. had a substantial operating loss in its fiscal years of 1962 and 1963. It earned a goodly profit in 1964, 1965, and

1966 but had a deficit in its retained earnings account which precluded dividends.

Global Marine Inc. was organized out of a merger in October 1964.

It has paid dividends on preferred stock but none on common.

Heath Tecna Corporation was organized as recently as April 25, 1958 it has become a most prosperous business since then. Net sales expanded from $6,137,918 in 1964 to $24,086,323 in the fiscal year ended April 30,

1967. In the same period net Income rose from $202,301 to $1,724,998 in a steady upward trend. Certainly, the company’s earnings picture justi­ fied the initiation of dividends, unless the rapid growth required the retention of cash funds, in the opinion of the directors. At any rate, no payments have been made nor any explanation or exposition of the company’s attitude in this regard.

Charles Jacquin et Cie.. Inc. followed a policy of paying dividends in stock, rather than in cash. In the four fiscal years ending September 30,

1963-1966 inclusive, the company repurchased a total of 48,529 shares at a cost of $319,241 and paid dividends of 38,896 shares in treasury stock which had cost $217,721. From September 30, 1966 to May 8 , 1967 additional pur­ chases of 5,997 shares were made in the open market and 11,702 shares were 108 used to pay the three per cent stock dividend on May 23rd. The company did not state its policy in so many words, but its actions could leave no stockholder uninformed.

Nuclear Data. Inc. had operated profitably during the three fiscal years ending February 28, 1962 to 1964 inclusive. However, on February 19,

1964, the company purchased from Robert W. Schumann, the then president, and his wife a total of 132,045 shares (21.5 per cent of the issued stock) for an aggregate purchase price of $660,225.

The purchase was financed by the issuance of five per cent unsecured notes. The loan agreement stated "the Corporation has agreed, among other things, to maintain net current assets of at least $700,000, to refrain from payment of cash dividends and repurchases of its shares . . . "

Under a subsequent refunding plan, in January 1966, the company agreed to a further restriction on payment of cash dividends and repurchases of its shares.

D. The repurchasing companies, with the exception of those which used shares specifically in mergers, for options, dividends, and bonuses, continue to retain the repurchased stock as treasury shares.

1. Of the nine companies which purchased to remove large blocks from the market, only four companies did not hold on to the stock. AVM

Corporation used its shares as stock option, and Global Marine as bonuses;

E. F. Johnson Company had purchased 6,160 shares from a former director and employee in June 1963 at book value. These were cancelled on December

31, 1964. Western Publishing Company repurchased 290,587 shares from

Simon and Schuster, Inc., per previous agreement, and cancelled the stock. 109

The other five companies retained their holdings in the treasury.

2. Of the six companies which acquired stock for the primary purpose of acquiring other companies, Cannon Mills and Ozite maintained their holdings in the treasury.

3. Of the three companies which repurchased stock because it was available at a low price, Hexcel Corporation and Shepard Niles Crane &

Hoist Corporation made their acquisitions in 1962 and held them intact throughout. The third company, Kentucky Fried Chicken, repurchased 20,000 shares in December 1965, sold 7,300 shares within three weeks, and has kept the remainder.

4. Of the six companies which indicated that the purpose of their repurchased stock was in connection with stock options, two companies,

American Heritage Publishing Company and H. Warshow & Sons. Inc., kept their holdings intact and did not use them for options.

5. Of the nineteen companies which provided no specific reason for repurchasing, eighteen companies retained their shares as treasury stock.

One company, Athlone Industries (then Holland Furnace) had held 198,700 shares as treasury stock since 1957. After a change in ownership the company sold

117,700 shares on February 11, 1966. This was evidently done to save taxes, by using the tax loss as an offset against the net income of that year.

In summary, thirty of the fifty companies, sixty per cent, retained their repurchased shares, from year to year, as treasury stock.

Methods Used to Repurchase

Unlike the situation with respect to listed companies, in no single 110

Instance did any one of these fifty unlisted industrial companies purchase, or attempt to purchase, their shares from shareholders by means of a tender offer.^ Thus, repurchase was effected in either of two ways:

1. Purchase of shares in the open market.

2. Purchase of large blocks of stock from large

stockholders, from the estates of large stock­

holders, officers, or directors, and as a conse­

quence of mergers.

Of the nine companies whose primary purpose was to remove large blocks from the market; one company, Nuclear Data. Inc.. repurchased the holdings of the president and his wife and effected a change in control, since the president resigned as officer and director shortly after the sale; one company, Global Marine. Inc. repurchased 800,000 shares of its stock from Union Oil Company of California in accordance with the speci­ fic provisions of the merger agreement.

The reasons for the purchase of stock in the open market and the non-use of the tender offer method stem naturally from the characteristics of the repurchasing companies and the circumstances under which repurchasing took place.

a. No change of control was desired. Since this

was a management project, it was decided upon by

^Only one company, of the second questionnaire group (95 companies) indicated that the tender method had been used; none of the fifty companies under study had used this method. the officers and directors then holding office.

Vith specific regard to that group, at least thirty per cent of the voting stock was already owned by thirty-three (66 per cent) of the fifty companies studied. It is quite possible that, if the appropriate data were publicly accessible, this high degree of voting control would be present in even more companies. There was thus no need, from a control standpoint, to attempt to purchase addi­ tional stock in large amounts.

There was no substantial build-up of cash to require directors to decide upon repurchases as the most desirable alternative use of funds. On the contrary, of the nine companies which purchased large blocks of stock, four (Global Marine, Nuclear Data. Western

Publishing. and Zenith Laboratories) financed them with borrowed funds. So, too, with Metalfab, which borrowed

$300,000 from a bank to finance its repurchase of

31,810 shares.

There is no evidence that a substantial accumulation of funds was a motivating factor in repurchase (despite managements' statements to the contrary in the replies to the questionnaire).

There was no compulsion to disclose their activities with respect to repurchase. Purchase by tender would have necessitated disclosure; purchase in the open 112

market Imposed no such constraint. The failure

of every company to utilize tender stresses

the unwillingness to tell their stockholders

what they were doing and the reasons which manage­

ment had in mind,

d. In many cases, the companies had not indicated in

their published reports any specific reason for

repurchase of their own common stock.^

Of the fifty companies under study, nineteen re­

vealed no specific reason for repurchase. Use

of the tender method normally requires a company

to inform its stockholders of intent to purchase,

approximate price, number of shares desired, source

of funds, reasons for purchase, and proposed use of

the shares to be acquired. Hence, in their case it

was more desirable to purchase stock in the open market

or to purchase a substantial block, from a large

stockholder.

Summary

From an original list of 950 unlisted companies, one hundred and ten companies were selected as the working group for examination and study.

Of these, it was found (after examination of company files) that fifty companies had repurchased stock in recent years. It was determined that

^This was also indicated by reports from the original quesionnaire group of the same fifty companies. 113

they would constitute the basis of the research study.

As regards the frequency of repurchase, It was found that four

companies had repurchased stock in years prior to 1964, and forty-six

companies had repurchased stock in at least one of the three years,

1964-1966 inclusive. Twenty-four had repurchased In 1964, twenty-three

in 1965, and thirty-one in 1966.

Of the forty-six companies which had repurchased stock in the years 1964 to 1966 inclusive, aggregate repurchases totaled 553,892 shares in 1964; 952,606 shares in 1965; and 485,106 shares in 1966.

Of the forty-six companies which showed treasury stock holdings at

the end of 1966 (four companies had disposed of them), total holdings ag­ gregated 1,530,686 shares. These represented 3.44 per cent of the total

issuance of 44,553,073 shares. Twelve of the forty-six companies had

treasury stock holdings which exceeded five per cent of the issued stock; and four companies had holdings which exceeded ten per cent.

There were few Instances in which approval from stockholders was

sought prior to repurchase. After repurchase, there is a similar lack of in­ formation. Usually the annual reports provide information as to the cost, but it is difficult to determine how much stock has been repurchased during the year and the use, if any, to which it has been put. Only the balancing amount is shown. This is an omission in information which a change in Securities and

Exchange Commission rules could rectify.

The primary purposes of repurchase were found to be the removal of large blocks from the market. the acquisition of other companies, fulfilment 114 of commitments under stock option plans. use for bonuses, employee

Incentive awards, and prizes, availability at tilow price, and use as

stock dividends. Of the fifty companies under study, nineteen gave no

specific reason for their repurchase of stock.

Among the characteristics of unlisted repurchasing companies are these:

a. They are almost uniformly profitable.

b. There is a high degree of voting control by the family group or by the officers and directors.

c. These companies typically pay cash dividends.

d. With the exception of those which used shares specifically in mergers, for options, divi­ dends, and bonuses, they continue to hold the repurchased stock as treasury shares. Of the fifty companies under study, thirty retained their repurchased shares from year to year.

The methods used to repurchase were two:

a. Purchase in the open market.

b. Purchase of large blocks of stock "off the market."

The reasons for the non-use of the tender offer method were due

to the characteristics of the repurchasing companies and the attendant

circumstances:

a. No change of control was desired.

b. There was no substantial build-up of cash.

c. There was no compulsion to disclose their activities with respect to repurchase.

d. In many cases, the companies stated no specific reason for repurchase of their own common stock. There were nineteen such companies of the fifty companies under study. CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF REPURCHASE UPON STOCKHOLDERS

In Chapter II the replies to the questionnaire from seventy- three companies provided the reasons stated by the various managements for the repurchase of their own common stock.

In Chapter III the research study revealed the actual repurchase transactions of the individual companies and the extent to which they did, or did not, keep their stockholders informed of their reasons for and the results of such programs.

It is now appropriate to determine the effect which such repur­ chases had upon the selling and non-selling stockholders, as measured both by quantitative and qualitative tests.

The effects of repurchase will be measured by the following quantitative tests:

a. Market prices of common stock relative to actual cost of repurchase.

b. Earnings per share, giving effect to year-end holdings of treasury stock, compared to earnings per share on issued stock.

c. Maintenance of corporate control by the principal holders.

d. The risk factor: effect on the debt/equity relationship.

e. Dividends payments prior to, during, and subsequent to the repurchase period.

f. Relationship of repurchases, in dollars, to net income. 116

The qualitative factors which are employed in evaluation

include these:

a. The adequacy of disclosure.

1. Advance notice to stockholders.

2. Timing.

3. Communication of all the material and relevant facts.

b. The methods used to effectuate the program.

c. The notification, to stockholders, of the results of the repurchase program after its conclusion.

I. QUANTITATIVE TESTS

Market Quotations of Common Stock

Of the fifty companies included in the study, four had repurchased

stock prior to 1964: Athlone Industries, in 1957 and prior years; Hexcel

' (Products) Corporation in 1962; Midwest Rubber Reclaiming in years prior

to 1961; and Shepard Niles Crane & Holst in December, 1962 and prior years.

Athlone Industries1 average cost of reacquired stock was $14.23; at

December 31, 1964, the "pink sheets" showed a market quotation of 7/8 - 1.

Hexcel Corporation1s stock cost $10.80 per share in 1962; by the end of 1964,

the quotation was 25 3/4 - 26 1/4. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming1s cost for

1,400 shares was an average $10.00; by year-end, the quotation was 16 1/4 -

17 1/4. The most recent repurchase by Shepard Niles Crane & Holst was in

1962 at $18 per share; by the end of 1964, the quotation had risen to 21 -

21 1/2 .

The market reaction in Athlone Industries' stock was not related to

its repurchase program (when it bore the name of Holland Furnace Company) 117 but was due primarily to unprofitable operations which began in 1960.

The stock was quoted as high at 29 5/8 bid in 1961 but then declined steadily to a low of 3/8 bid in 1965.

Midwest Rubber Reclaiming* s repurchase of 1,400 shares was not significant relative to its total issue of 351,387 shares and the in­ creased market quotation of its stock should not be attributed to that phase of its operations.

However, both Hexcel Corporation and Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist admittedly bought stock in 1962 because of its low price; and the repur­ chased amount of approximately eight per cent, in each case, was substantial and price-influencing.

In each case the officers and directors concurred in the judgment that repurchase, at the time and price prevailing, was a desirable use of funds. The subsequent rise in quotation of the stock indicated that the non-selling stockholders had benefited from the decision taken. The selling stockholders sold their stock out for their own private reasons and I voluntarily.

Table VIII shows the relationship between the cost of stock repur­ chased in 1964 by twenty-four unlisted industrial companies and the range of bid prices of their common stock in the following year. Also shown is the relationship of repurchased stock to the total issue, as a percentage.

The lack of available data relative to the amount of shares repur­ chased and their cost is evidenced by this table. Eight companies, of a total twenty-four, did not see fit to make this information available to their own stockholders. 1X8

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However, this presentation does not suffer In effectiveness be­ cause It was possible to determine from a comparative analysis of treasury stock holdings that the repurchases of seven of these companies were not significant In comparison to the total amount of Issued stock.

Only In the case of Cannon Hills were the purchases substantial.

Based on changes In the amount of treasury stock at year-end, and assuming no sales of stock during the year, It has been possible to cal­ culate that Cannon Mills repurchased 20,518 shares of Class B, non-voting stock In 1962 at an average price of $66.08, and 18,546 shares in 1963 at an average price of $78.78. These amounts represented 1.98 per cent and 1.79 per cent, respectively, of the 1,037,009 Issued shares. At the end of 1964, the "pink sheets" recorded a market quotation of 93 1/2 - 95; and In 1965, the bid price ranged from a low of 90 to a high of 127.

Reference to Table VIII indicates that, of the sixteen companies which publicized the number of shares repurchased in 1964 and the cost of repur­ chase, in every single instance the bid price of the stock In 1965 was at least as high (and higher in fifteen cases) at some point during the year as the average cost of the repurchased stock in 1964. Expressed in a dif­ ferent fashion, it may be said that if a stockholder who sold his stock in 1964 had not sold out then but retained his stock until 1965, his proceeds might have been greater. Had the selling stockholder been advised that the company was repurchasing stock and decided, for that reason alone, not to sell his holdings, his financial situation could have been improved.

In 1965 twenty-three of the companies repurchased some of their own common stock. Table IX presents a comparison between the cost of repur- 121

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■ I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CM s t s t S t CM CM a rH rH CO rH rH rH w m 0 0 CM rH IT| CO CO CO S t Ov rH VO t— 1 rH rH H CM CM CM H CO I

CP to CO cd 1—1 CJ 0 0 d •H I VI CV • o o > I d 7 u HI 3 d o o 00 r » A •H 2 a < 01 VI W •H & V) cd • CJ to cd & g VI >» O 3 CO & a. X9 o a M C T) cd • S X> d H o . cd 0) M O rH CJ o cd td Vi CJ CJ i a p . H n w d c j u a. o s iH «■ Pm M d O 0 CJ o 3 10 3 P . O r r i CJ CUD • *S VI

o A (Class Corp. Paper 33 1/2 22 - 25.47 1.28 •H M CJ • to d h cd O 3 3 St U O_ to CO w o o d d VI m o t ) . Cd rH ■U H •H CO n 0) eq U 3 m 3 cn d d H U 3 VI d CO H d cd n § d o o CO o d d *h aj orH M c j to § 0) VI o *n d 3 VI Ctf o rH to d O O CJ rH S i CJH SJ Vt &— > v r l 5 d rH Vi M O H p fl) ffl 5 ! Vi cd •H O O •H rH 3 Charles Jacquin et Cie., Inc. Inc. Cie., et Jacquin Charles 3/4 4 1/2 - 7 5.33 5.06 m O CJ Q Pulp Hudson OCJ (Non-voting) Inc. Company, & McCormick 42 1/2 32 - 37.55 .5 TABLE IX (CONT'D) ft ft M-l ft ft ft ft ft VO o J2 ft cd ft VI fl iH 60 CO 0 VO ft O t3 ft tCOft 1 ft n f m cn in ft ft CM r- O ft VOCM CO cn ft in tM ft VI <0 at atft 3 at a I1i i 1 I I l 1 1 • • • • • A ft m tatft ft tf ft ftft CM ft < rH ft cd CN u ft tftft ft ft at o u ft 3 a o o b 3 a at Of CJ ft CO at * • • -"A* VO CO ft ft X X rO cn cn m cn cn CN ft ft U ft flv, M o ft o o 3 o 0 cd 3 Sn ■ ~N X cn ft ft '0 ft rO 00 Nl- 00 «* cn NT CN in ft ov o in H O O f l i i p N f lE* l 3 Cld U n n t a ,3 VI ft at >, ft ft M .a3 3 ft 3 fto 3 O ft 0) Ift Vl CDO n at at oo O o. 3 3 a cn •ft* • •• » • » • 0.n o 0 a t ft ft cd K 3 ft O 3 o o 3 CO ft . m < cn t00 3 ft cO ov CD CD as O ft 3 3 O 3 3 O3 CO CO 3 ►t 0 CV 3 O 3 ft ft •ft -ft /ft V-/ CN in st st cn Nf 00 ft m ft CO <■ VO CN ft OO ft Vl Jfl O ov m CN ft ft ft cn m cs CN pq ft • ft 3 O Vl CD " ft Vi PL. 3 VI ft at 3 vi O VI o 3 VI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 ft * • • • ft • • • 3 /V ja a 3 O 3 /v/v ft ft ft 3 ft ft m m ft ’ftO S S C VI VI 1-| 3a 3 ft O 3 o o Vl3 3 3 3 ft 3 3 3 ft 3 m 3 vi 3 o • VI vO £> ft ft ft ft m ft cn o ov VI 3 W /1 at 3 3 Si­3 3 s u 3 M A • A

•o •o ft « ft u w VI VI u n o o u o u o u 3 o a o 3 a a) § (0 ft 122 123 chase per share in 1965 and the range of bid prices on the stock during the following year, 1966; and the relationship between the number of repurchased shares and the issued stock.

Five of the twenty-three companies did not provide any information as to the cost of the shares which they repurchased, but the high and low range of bid prices for their stock is included in the list.

Two noteworthy observations regarding this compilation should be made. First, the spread between the high and low bid prices of each stock was very wide, with the sole exception of Cincinnati Enquirer, whose stock is closely held and rarely traded.

In the case of Aerosonic Corporation. Global Marine, and Reynolds &

Reynolds Company, the high bid price was at least double the low bid during the year. In the case of seven other companies, specifically AVM Corpora­ tion. Bayless Markets. Bristol Brass. Cannon Mills Class B, Charles Jacquln,

Ozlte Corporation, and Western Publishing Class B, the advance from the low price was fifty per cent or more. In every other case but two (McCormick &

Company. 29.2, and Zenith Laboratories. 25.9), the advance from the low bid exceeded thirty per cent.

Another way of expressing the wide spread is to say that, of twenty- three companies which repurchased their own stock in 1965, twenty-two com­ panies had an advance from the low bid of at least twenty-five per cent.

This compares with a range of the National Quotation Bureau Over-the-

Counter Industrial Stock average in 1965 from a low bid of 197.28 to a high of 249.11, an Increase of twenty-six per cent. (Table X).

The second significant observation derived from the list in Table IX NATIONAL QUOTATION BUREAU OVER-THE-COUNTER S* 4 M cd

J3 TJ TJ 'O o u .fl >4 a o I o OO A

\ v-/ r s rH cn VO r-r CM CM O cn m CM i—1 CM o o cn m m ncn cn H H rH CM CM n91 cn rH >n CM CM CO cn cn m r- + a — CU CJ cd 9 • • • ■ * • * rH VO vO 00 Ov CM cn CM o CM CM rH o —1 I— CM w v© in rH rH CM r-» rH 00 •a H av m rH r-» oo o CM cn i—i m VO 9V av in CM r-> CM cn rH VO VO rH r-» VO 91 m n o H + Q *n cd a 0) CJ • • • * • • • *H cn £ O' CQ 4-1 4J Vi O cd O 9 y a* 9 9 o cd o a 9 M a> 3 124 125 la that the high hid price in 1966 of the stock of every one of the eighteen companies providing coat information exceeded the cost of the stock which was repurchased in 1965. Expressed differently, it could be said that if a stockholder in any one of eighteen companies had refrained from selling his stock (which was repurchased by his company) in 1965, he or she might have secured a higher price from its sale in 1966.

The situation was most pronounced in the case of Global Marine. Inc., which repurchased over twenty-four per cent of its Issued stock in 1965, at a cost of $9.25 per share. In 1966 the bid price on its stock ranged from a low of 15 1/4 to a high of 31 1/3.

Table XI compares the cost of stock repurchased by thirty-one com­ panies in 1966 with the range of the high and low bid prices of their stock in 1967. Of these thirty-one companies, only twenty-five informed their stockholders of the cost of repurchase.

As was the case in 1966, the range in quotations was remarkably wide in 1967. Of the thirty-one repurchasing companies, twelve companies recorded an increase of at least 100 per cent from the low bid price of their stock (seven companies had an increase exceeding 200 per cent); seven others recorded increases of fifty to ninety-six per cent; nine had increases of twenty-five to forty per cent; and the remaining three had increases of ten, twenty-one, and seventeen per cent respectively. The

National Quotation Bureau Over-the-Counter Industrial Stock Average in

1967 ranged from a low bid of 228.93 to a high of 359.57, an increase of fifty-seven per cent.

The high bid price of the stock exceeded the cost of repurchase in every case but two. Colonial Stores repurchased only 500 shates of a total TABLE XI co *CT rx <44 A CJ fcj m m CTV 4CJ44 VO 01 P M M 0 (UQ> CO bM OJ O cd o CO COCP,a P 10 09 Pt CTV *S O H O C A CJ pfl pec ^.d 44 S3 0 a a rH BO CD 1 if 1 0 ^ U N O 0 I )

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s x - X o cn o • 0 0 m oo cn H n n to O in f cn < H d co o c x r rx rx CO 00 cn cn o rx rx 0 CM 00 A M M (S (S O j x H 44 0 U 00 M U S 1 1 1 1 . . . e ) A id N ctv CTV rX H "CTrH H Q. rH H < CJ d • cd cd d CO > > O a CP rH >» m . . r-» co U 0 pc 0 cd ) ) T O XT X O CTV x^ x r xr cn | CM \| C m N MJO cm o CM O h O f C P CM c o o i h CM rx CTv M3 00 CM cd 1 1 1 .

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Global Marine, Inc. (Class A) b) 42 - 13 3/4 205.5 n.a. .2 Gulf Interstate Company 16 - 4 1/2 255.6 4.90 3.34

Heath Tecna Corporation c) 53 1/2 - 7 3/4 590.3 4.12 1.12 126 TABLE XI (CONT'D) C/3 •fl mm .fl 6>S •fl M-l Pi •H vo $ H CJ p Cfl 4-1 fl u a cd o 0 Or C/3 M o fl a fl

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o n in H oo vo M1 |X n in in m H cn fx fx cn H CM st 00 LTV CM rl CM S OV cn cn o H m cm CM O O Stst CM H •fl rM OV *00 •H rH A H a C/3 C/3 p 4J EM fl cj fl o cd CJ 00 3 I I I • • • • a • • • • M d oo cd XSV n rH cn CM rH h CM St H cn > 4*4 l cn fl lrt r fl o 0 o d) fl cd CO a fl fl fl a ) A cn cn rH Hi T) CJ * cn 4J 4-1 4-1 4-1 a fl o CO fl fl

Vocaline Company of America, Inc. 18 7/8 - 3 1/2 439.3 3.70 5.17 The Wackenhut Corporation 29 1/4 - 7 1/4 303.4 7.00 .5

Weiss Bros. Stores, Inc. (Class A) 15 - 11 3/4 27.7 13.59 7.06 127 TABLE XI (CONT'D) tj 3 O ft pci rt rt O 0 m 01 o rt: « S* 3 a a 3 o 3 ►» < co

av /-s h CO

"s. <43H rt! 1 VO rH H rH CM CM rs H •rt •rt o av ui CM IN o £ CJ (rt H rt ". rt n 3 3 a 3 3 O oo 0 ft 3 3 3 CJ >> 3 ( • • A • * CM co T-} it August 15, rt m it 1967. J T CO CO •a v« FL. u •rt 4-1 4-1 O j-to S 3 at 9 o vi rt o rt CO o to o ft o a 128 129

issue of 2,825,638 shares, and W. S. Dickey Clay repurchased 4,379

shares of a total issue of 997,725.

However, Metalfab repurchased 22.65 per cent of its issued stock,

at a cost of $8.80 per share, in 1966. In 1967, the bid price of its

stock ranged from a low of 6 1/4 to a high of 12 1/4.

Girltown repurchased 6.06 per cent of its stock in 1966, at a cost

of $8.59 per share. In 1967, the bid price of its stock ranged from a low

of 8 7/8 to a high of 11. 1/2. (Its sale to Genesco, Inc. was proposed in

March of 1967).

Weiss Bros. Stores repurchased 7.06 per cent of its stock, from the

estate of its recently-deceased president, at a cost of $13.59 in1966.

The quotation on its stock in 1967 ranged from a low of 11 3/4 bid to a

high of 15 bid.

The only other company of the group which repurchased at least

five per cent of its issued stock was Vocaline Company of America (5.17 per

cent); the cost of its repurchased stock in 1966 was $3.70; in 1967, the

quotation on the stock ranged from a low bid of 3 1/2 to a high bid of 18 7/8.

In summary, it is possible to say that a stockholder in any of these

companies might have served his own financial interest better by retaining

his stock until 1967 rather than disposing of it in 1966, although his own

personal situation might have offered no alternative except to sell.

Earnings Per Share

Table XII compares the earnings per share, relative to outstanding

and issued stock, of the fifty unlisted industrial companies which were in­

cluded in this study. The outstanding stock classification gives effect to 130

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•O 00 H N i n \ o CO CM CM sr cn 0) r* rH r- r- lt) r* cn CM in cn 9 •• ... .•.•. <0 cn t-H CM CM rH (0 sf VO OV rH VO 1—1 c n sr o CM CM c n m n CO rH r - o o v o CO in cm m c n ...... • . . . 3 c n H CM CM H O

•o O Ov VO CM sr VO r s v o O 0) rH is . cn CM H CM rH Pv cn 9 . .* *•. . . • to H rH CM CM CM H (0 •co- m VO ov CO CM v o m vO CM CM OV rH iH 0 0 0 0 CM H CM r - co HH'O HJ •*• • • • • « • CO C/3 vo 9 H H CM CM CO H H H ov O co-

T) co rH CO CNI CO Is. CO vo to O H o Q) ch m CO OV CM n o - f cO OV CM CJ 9 # • * ... 00 N r l C M co s r M H00 t - t X VO vo W OV cm cm m m N O lO cm cn m co in ov ov cn cn o vo is . ov cm 4-1 « • • ■ • • * * . . . I W O H 9 rH tH rH CM rH CM cn sr O p i § H CO­ S CO CO h U P

o • •H 9 • 4-1 R o cdH u * tH o o * 60 R • C H XR& at •H R R O o •H O * o cd ■H CJ O 9 ■H p . 4-4 X *9 f r 4-4 • 0 Cd tH • R o o cd o o tH R at cd I tH u tH R CJ • o o &. at ft CJ Ch cdo H o at 0 tH p.at RCIS ft R o to O u • *kHJ H o co CJ cdx> o a at cd O tH tO 9 O cdcj RR 4-1 at o D*H ►J H *H co o Cd ft (X o at X tH tH XJ ft tH rH cd at Ua) (0 9 A at cn a o 9 •n •w O rH R HJ at u PH cn (0 •H o 5 R tH H CO at 0 tH o rH H at rH R at ft •R o HJ 4 J cd > xt at O rH o u R O rH XI MH o 4-1 U (0 tH CO M O at M O rH c cd HJ cd a o o rH •H rH 9 ffl at at 9 at E. E. F. Johnson Kentucky Company Fried Chicken Corporation 1.78 1.73 2.17 1.55 2.17 1.55 1.77 1.77 1.48 a w o e> O W W ffl w o n Company, & Inc. McCormick 3.78 3.71 3.17 3.11 2.69 2.66 132

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sr VOCTV av oo o cn H H sr oo vo cn O cm m VO CM VO 4J o v t - . -< r rH• sr• o■ vo vo sr cn pH CM t—t oa in­

*d CM rH st r- CM cn CM CM is. OV m rH H 00 a) oo sr st co rH OV CM m CM av CM m m CM 3 • • ■ • • * • ■ H ** ••» to rH H rH CM • to cn H to- in VO o v cn rH m Ov vo vo cm s r is. o s r h m oo co sr

T» rH m p H oo CM o O OO H CM rH sr •a sr o fl o cn o ov cn o av co rs VO OO VO VO cn u 9 • • • * ...••••• CO H rH rl CM CM rH cn CO H H S VO vo W OV I—I n m N CM rH r s O CM pH sr oo in oo vo • N CO O o sr o av ov rs vo CM vo tn m 4J • • • « • * * •. * • • • • « I CO fl rH rH rH rH CM CM rH sr CM o

fl. • HO o fl U u H 4-1 o CO • 00 u • *H fl. fl to o H 1 fl -u PC O H u ° ° o • U to fl u 3 o fl in fl o 13 fl r H pH •H *H to O fl M fl a .3 lO -M T) H fl I fl a o O fl O fl H fl. fl CO u O ni ^o o ° Pi H O H fl •rl n h iH H U H • 4-1 H 4i fl fl O a a fl » CtJ „&& H O P flfl.9 15 « M f l « CO H H P3 fl o rO rH fl 3 Oi 14 A I s - fl H 3 A H Pi O A H S H •9 fl ° g *J (0 a fl H 4-» 3 O -H fl pH T> I> «H 1 CO fl fl ° ■H H H rH H r H CO fl o fl 0) *H O O ■H f l H fl fl 0 H W •H H f l «fl fl. fl H •fl *o fl O -rl a -u >> fl •H O fl N fl a> a) fl25 .fl Si fl 2 * £ § § S 55 O cm Ph a: CO CO CO 133

XI o a) o CO3 03 M co-

vo ov CM fl o 3 O

XJ vo O in cu 00 O CO 3 • * • CO rH rH 03 M •CO- m VO cn «-t VO cn CM • oo o av fl * • * 3 H rH O ■co­

t3 o v o o 3 v o c m s r r>» c j 3 • • • H 03co H rM H CO- vo X vo cn w ov cn oo m >o cm >n oo I 3 O cd § S

CJ ¥ 0 3 rl

fl • cn a 1 • o Pi fl & CJ fl 0 H o fl C H o CJ O H CJ « CL •H - CO f l » CO 00 d) I id CO Q) C H cj A S M •H fl 41 CJ O O O •G O CJ Pi CO JJ CO fl fl • A CO •H cd 3 a O <4 rH fl o CJ ^ • CO * S CO r£3 J3O fl •a o o Ph cd o 3 3 M fl •fl CO PQ bO fl fl at « co a)eS fl 5 as & co f l iH CJ t 4 co fl ■8 cd • d) JU Q» I* W t* JS N £ 134 the shares which have been repurchased and which are held as treasury stock at the fiscal year-end.

It is worth restating that the number of shares which have been repurchased during the year are not necessarily equal to the number of shares held as treasury stock at that point in time; yet this study indicates that sixty per cent of the repurchasing companies do maintain their holdings, from year to year, as treasury shares.

If a company has repurchased its own stock and retains it as treasury stock, its outstanding stock has been reduced by the amount of repurchased shares and the difference between outstanding stock and issued stock is equivalent to the number of treasury shares.

For this reason, the earnings per share relative to outstanding stock and to issued stock differ materially only if the treasury stock is large in proportion to the issued stock.

According to Table VI (p.63) only twelve of the fifty companies held treasury stock, at fiscal year-end 1966, exceeding five per cent of the issued stock. These included the following:

Athlone Industries Nuclear Data, Inc. Cannon Mills Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Dorchester Gas Producing Vocaline Company of America Gulf Interstate Company Weiss Bros. Store Hexcel Corporation Zenith Laboratories Glrltown, Inc. Metalfab, Inc.

Nuclear Data (21.12 per cent) had repurchased 132,045 shares of its own stock from its president and his wife shortly before fiscal year-end of February 29, 1964. Without the effect of the repurchased stock, earn­ ings would have been $0.56 per share; adjusted for the repurchased treasury stock, they were raised to $0.71. In the two following years the company suffered a severe decline in income but the earnings per share in 1966 135 were reported as $0.41, rather than the $0.32 which would have reflected the entire Issued stock. The same was true of Gulf Interstate Company

(16.06 per cent). Unadjusted earnings declined from fifty-six cents to twenty-eight cents in 1966 but the reduced stock moderated the decline to

$0.33. Metalfab. Inc. (17.06 per cent) had improved earnings in the 1964-

1966 period. Net Income rose from $237,036 in 1964 to $282,951 in 1965 and to $347,061 in 1966. Per share earnings, unadjusted for the treasury stock, rose from $0.69 in 1964 to $1.01 in 1966. Adjusted for the treasury stock, they rose to $1.22 in 1966 (22.65 per cent of issued stock was repur­ chased in 1966).

Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist (10.90 per cent) had repurchased stock at $18 in 1962 because of its low price, in the opinion of management, and had retained the entire amount as treasury stock. Its unadjusted earnings per share rose from $1.43 in 1964 to $3.81 in 1966; but its adjusted earnings in 1966 Increased even more sharply to $4.28. In the 1966 market the price of its stock ranged from a low bid of 20 to a high bid price of

32.

Cannon Mills1 (8.05 per cent) unadjusted earnings in 1964 were $8.22 per share but its adjusted earnings rose to $13.32 in 1965. Dorchester Gas

Producing1s (6.49 per cent) earnings rose from an unadjusted per share figure of $0.78 in 1964 to an adjusted $1,37 in 1966; and Girltown1s (6.42 per cent) earnings per share rose from an unadjusted $0.72 in 1964 to an adjusted $0.92 in 1966.

However, these Increases reflected sharply higher net income rather than merely the result of reduced stock outstanding.

Hexcel Corporation (5.24 per cent) and Vocaline Company (5.17 per 136 cent) reported steady earnings in the 1964-1966 period. Hexcel’s unadjusted per share figure of $2.32 rose to $2.60 on an adjusted basis;

Vocaline1s unadjusted of $0.35 in 1964 became an adjusted $0.36 in 1966,

Athlone Industries (8.25 per cent) had repurchased its stock in

1957 and prior years when it was operating- successfully; beginning in

1961, it reported heavy operating deficits but retained 198,700 shares of treasury stock, 22.06 per cent of the 900,884 issued. When it began, in 1966, to operate again at a profit, it sold some of its stock re­ taining 81,000 as treasury shares. Its unadjusted earnings of $0.62 per share were reported at the adjusted figure of $0.67.

Overall, it may be said that the repurchase of stock affected the reported earnings per share of the individual companies in the same pro­ portion that the holdings of treasury stock bore to the issued stock; over a period of a few years, such repurchases, if held as treasury stock, tended to accentuate the actual growth in net Income per share or to

-moderate the decline. Its effect on stockholders who retained their stock was beneficial; on stockholders who sold their stock out, without knowing that the corporation was repurchasing, the effect was detrimental.

Maintenance of Corporate Control bv the Principal Holders

It has previously been shown that there was a high degree of voting control by the family group or by the officers and directors. Of the fifty companies studied, thirty-three, or sixty-six per cent, were controlled by management interests to the extent of at least thirty per cent. (This is in sharp contrast to the low control factor of listed companies).

Hence, there was no need to repurchase stock for the purpose of 137 accentuating control. However, it was possible to increase their pro­ portionate control by using the funds of the remaining stockholders

(70 per cent) to repurchase stock.

The control of Cannon Mills by the Charles A. Cannon interests was undoubtedly augmented by the repurchase of 166,966 shares of the com­ bined voting and Class B shares at a cost to the company of $11,733,672.

Although only 20,857 shares were voting common, the repurchase of the

146,109 shares of Class B and the authorized repurchase of 100,000 shares of voting and 100,000 shares of non-voting Class B would be a significant deterrent to a would-be "corporate raider."

In 1963 the four principal holders of Girltown. Inc. owned 425,679 shares, equal to sixty-six per cent of the issued stock; so sure of con­ trol were they that proxies for the annual meeting were not even solicited.

By 1966, 41,500 shares of stock had been repurchased with corporate funds, at a cost of $309,303; by March 17, 1967, when a special meeting was called to authorize the sale of the company to Genesco, Inc., a total of 49,000 shares had been repurchased. The management holdings had Increased to a total of 442,577 shares, which were then equal to 72.9 per cent of outstand­ ing stock.

Global Marine. Inc.repurchased 800,000 shares of common stock from

Union Oil Company of California, in accordance with a merger agreement, in late 1964 and early 1965. The two principal holders of stock, J. H. Hillman

& Sons Company and J. H. Whitney & Company had owned 544,145 shares, equal to twenty-two per cent of issued stock. By March 17, 1967, giving effect to cancellation of the repurchased stock and to their own repurchases, their 138 holdings had risen to 667,477 shares, equal to 36.47 per cent of out­

standing stock.

Gulf Interstate Company had repurchased 78,074 shares as of

January 29, 1965; of the 1,063,014 shares left outstanding, all directors and officers as a group owned 311,741 shares, equal to 29.3 per cent. As of February 21, 1967, 191,000 shares had been repurchased, leaving 950,088

shares outstanding. All directors and officers as a group owned 311,741

shares, equal to 32.8 per cent.

Charles Jacquin et Cie., Inc. has followed the policy of purchasing

stock in the open market at various times during each year and then paying a stock dividend of two to three per cent each May. On September 30, 1962,

the president, Maurice J. Cooper, and his wife owned a total of 200,644

shares, equal to 49.2 per cent of the 408,000 shares issued, and 49.4 per cent of the stock outstanding.

On September 30, 1966, Maurice J. Cooper and his wife owned a total of 206,599 shares, equal to 50.6 per cent of the 408,000 issued shares and

52.2 per cent of the 396,067 shares outstanding. (In addition, the Cooper

children owned a total of 92,174 shares on that date).

It is evident that even though the Cooper holdings increased some­ what during the four-year period the company's policy of repurchase did not

increase his proportionate control materially, nor was it necessary.

It is worthy of note, however, that the changes in the Cooper hold­ ings were at no time reflected in the Securities and Exchange Commission's

"Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings."

Nuclear Data. Inc. in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal year ending 139 February 28, 1963, Indicated that its officers and directors owned

302,660 shares, equal to 49.4 per cent of the 612,900 shares issued.

The principal holders were Mr. and Mrs. Robert W. Schumann (president) with 139,345 shares, and Norman S. Jones (vice president) with 115,715 shares. Almost a year later, the company, using borrowed funds, repur­ chased 132,045 shares from the Schumanns (Robert W. Schumann had pre­ viously resigned as officer and director on January 7, 1964). Norman S.

Jones' holdings had declined somewhat to 110,863 shares, 18.09 per cent of issued stock, but twenty-three per cent of the 480,755 shares then outstanding.

Mr. Jones, a co-founder of the company with Robert W. Schumann, became chairman of the board and Richard J. Sandberg, formerly secretary of the corporation, assumed the presidency. The company retained the re­ purchased stock in its treasury through 1967, thus assuring continuity of the revised management. Mr. Jones and the other officers owned 170,615 shares, equal to 34.6 per cent of the 493,636 shares then outstanding, and adequate to maintain working control. Thus, the company repurchased stock to maintain corporate control by internal management.

Working control of Sawhill Tubular Products. Inc. rested with the

Sawhill family at the end of 1963. Mrs. Claire B. Sawhill, her daughter, and son owned an aggregate of 256,098 shares, equal to 38.46 per cent of the 655,850 issued shares, and 38.54 per cent of the 664,350 shares outstand­ ing. However, in 1966, an outside group sought to wrest control away from the Sawhills. In April, Crane Company solicited stock tender offers from stockholders, as well as purchasing stock in the open market. Its high-water 140 mark of holdings was 145,101 shares, or about twenty-two per cent of the

658,555 shares outstanding. To defeat the "raider", the company repur­ chased 5,747 shares In the period from March 28 to May 16, 1966; and the

Sawhill family Increased Its holdings from 256,098 to 264,833 shares, equal m to 40.21 per cent of the outstanding. This was, evidently, sufficient to win the contest and Crane Company shortly thereafter sold its entire holdings and retired from the contest.

Certainly, the amount of stock repurchased by the company was not substantial in amount, but it helped to maintain management in control ef­ fectively.

When David B. Weiss, president and chairman of the board of Weiss

Bfos. Stores. Inc.. was killed in an auto accident in late 1964, no threat to the continuity of management was involved, even though his holdings were almost twenty per cent of outstanding stock. However, on September 14,

1965, the company repurchased 30,000 shares from the Estate of David B.

Weiss, and the Estate retained 48,241 shares.

After the repurchase, the Weiss family interests owned a total of

255,907 shares, equal to 60.19 per cent of the 425,140 issued shares, and

64.77 per cent of the 395,140 shares outstanding. In that instance, main­ tenance of control was not the primary objective but rather the desire to provide funds for the payment of estate taxes. However, the repurchase did prevent the potential sale of a large block of stock to unfriendly interests.

Whether the purchase price of $407,636.70 was the optimum use of funds at that time was probably given scant consideration by the Weiss management.

The three principal stockholders of Zenith Laboratories were able 141

to strengthen their control of the company with the aid of the company's

repurchase program. In 1961 the company seized the opportunity to repur­

chase 58,333 1/3 shares from a principal stockholder at a cost of $75,000, using borrowed funds; and 15,000 shares were donated to the treasury by

the three principal stockholders. Both of these blocks were retained as

treasury shares as were the 1,300 shares repurchased in 1962 and 3,400

shares in 1963.

At December 31, 1963, these three, who were the leading officers and directors, each owned 46,667 shares, an aggregate of 140,000 shares, equal to 39.54 per cent of 354,033 1/3 issued and 50.7 per cent of 276,000 outstanding shares.

During 1965 the company repurchased 9,900 shares at a cost of

$32,205.00 and added these to treasury stock. Thus, at the end of 1966,

though the three principal stockholders still owned 140,000 shares, these represented 39.4 per cent of the 355,488 1/3 shares of issued stock and

52.5 per cent of the 267,555 shares outstanding.

The Risk Factor: Effect on the Debt/Equity Relationship

This study, concerned as it is with unlisted industrial corporations, has uncovered no evidence that the financial managers have resorted to re­ purchase with the intent of altering the debt/equity ratio per se. To the extent that repurchased stock has been retained, from year to year, as treasury stock (and this has been true in a majority of cases) and to the extent that the cost of the treasury stock has reduced the stated value attributed to the common equity, the proportion of debt to equity and debt

to total capitalization has increased. But this effect has been a by-product, 142 rather than a primary objective. It has Increased the reported earnings per share and contributed to a higher market price of the stock. To that degree, It has been beneficial to the non-selling stockholders and harm­ ful to the selling stockholders.

Of the fifty companies under study, only four borrowed funds with which to repurchase stock. In so doing, they increased the debt/equity ratio and the leverage factor more markedly than if they had employed cash as a source of funds (i.e., a reduction in use of an asset).

Metalfab. Inc. repurchased 55,517 shares of common stock at a cost of $488,548 in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966. Short-term borrowings and long-term debt during the year increased from $1,632,366 to $2,408,816; and stockholders' equity declined from $2,017,502 to $1,715,195. The debt/ equity ratio increased, as a result, from eighty-one per cent to one hundred forty per cent. Net Income rose from $282,951 to $347,061, an increase of twenty-three per cent; but earnings per share, at year-end, rose from

$0.83 to $1.22, an increase of forty-seven per cent. Hence, the increased leverage that year benefited the stockholders who retained their stock.

Ten days prior to the fiscal year-end on February 29, 1964, Nuclear

Data. Inc. repurchased 132,145 shares of stock for $661,125. The source of funds was a promissory note for $360,000, issued to a bank, and the pro­ ceeds from sale of land and buildings in amount of $300,000. Total debt increased to $873,536 from $441,830 a year earlier. The note agreement, among other things, provided that "the Corporation has agreed . . . to re­ frain from payment of cash dividends and repurchase of its shares."

The company's net income declined from $396,489 to $341,589, equal 143 to fourteen per cent; but the earnings per share rose from $0.64 to $0.71, equal to eleven per cent. This was a reflection of the increase in debt/ equity ratio from forty-two to one hundred twenty-one per cent, and sharply higher leverage.

The company's fortunes grew steadily worse. In December, 1964,

$450,000 was borrowed from the First National Bank of Chicago, secured by all inventory and accounts receivable; and in the year ending February 28,

1965, net Income declined to $76,947. However, net income increased the following year to $200,442 but declined somewhat to $160,962 in the year ending February 28, 1967. Total debt at that point had reached $1,660,163, compared to equity of $1,228,185. The company still retained 132,145 shares in its treasury.

The difficulties experienced by the company were compounded by its use of borrowed funds to reduce its outstanding equity; and the quotation on its stock sank to a low of 4 3/8 bid on December 31, 1966.

Western Publishing Company. Inc. exercised an opportunity, under prior agreement, to repurchase 290,587 shares in early January, 1967, from

Simon and Schuster, Inc. for $5,957,033.50 ($20.50 per share). This, and other requirements, led to a private sale to a group of institutional in­ vestors of $10 million principal amount of its 5 3/4 per cent promissory notes due 1982.

At the end of 1966, total debt of the company had been $26,203,709.

This was low relative to stockholders' equity of $74,748,912; hence, the additional debt seems not to have been detrimental to the stockholders.

Moreover, net income was not only high but stable ($6,919,000 compared to

$6,895,788 in 1965). The quotation on the stock dipped to a low of 16 1/2 144 bid in mld-1967, but recovered to 25 1/4 at year-end. Earnings per share had declined from $0.91 to $0.45 in the first nine months but im­ proved sharply in the final quarter of 1967 so that earnings, rather than repurchase, was the primary price-influencing factor. However, the re­ purchase of this large block of stock did moderate the effect of the de­ cline in net income on earnings per share, and helped when income re­ covered. On balance, the increase in the debt/equity ratio seems not to have been unfavorable to the stockholders.

In 1961 three principal stockholders of Zenith Laboratories loaned the company $75,000 with which to purchase 58,333 1/3 shares from a re­ tiring stockholder (actual cost of $75,146.87). In April, 1962, the com­ pany sold 120,000 shares publicly at $4.50 per share. Subsequently, the company repurchased 1,300 shares in 1962 for $3,640.00; 3,400 shares in

1963 for $5,445.00; and 9,900 shares in 1965 for $32,205.00. Total repur­ chases of 87,933 1/3 shares cost $117,936.87 and they were all retained as treasury stock at December 31, 1966. Total debt of $764,803.95 was not unduly low in comparison to stockholders' equity of $922,658.41 but was not burdensome. The stock was quoted at 3 3/8 - 3 3/4 at year-end 1966 so the company might have resold the stock at a handsome profit had it been necessary to maintain the company's liquidity.

Dividend Payments Prior to. During, and Subsequent to The Repurchase Period

Table XIII provides a record of the dividends paid by the fifty unlisted Industrial corporations during the period 1963 to 1967 inclusive.

The dividend payments have been adjusted for the stock dividends and splits 145

CO l CM OHH o in O O H o o o vO I CO in *h *h vo \o ai VO CM iH CM CO P"* ctv • 0 a • • a CO

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TABLE XIII (CONT'D) t S VO VO VO

jaX> T3 44 CO p 0) U e S CO >0

nr m ri in CM rH t S o O H O m H in un *rt CMm © i—i m JO JO h o 04 1' a • " £ u O CJ & co • * • *H W 4-1 H r 3 O 53 © O J 4 0 O M CO co a 0 O 0 a fl 0 N 9 a V • HC CO * * in • • CO o o CO * 4J u o h 01

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rH m 00 O M <0

United States Banknote .30 .30(e) .22 1/2 nil nil United States Envelope .60 .60 .60 .60 .60 Vocaline Company of America *20(f) .20(f) .10 nil nil 147 148

en o rsCM vOov m

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M OS -u (s. iH VO rH • OV P * F s n rH CO v O CTV CO a » • a p p p P CO CO tj CJ e u to CD CO DO o fl a H o P P o w 4-t U U V p a •H A ID a c a a ai ai £ I* P •k CO 00 4) TJ a) at a) 0) u CJ O <0 CO cu a •H 0> o o o a o P a p •H P P p p _ u a, co p CO P P U 41 111 0) Q i CP p p to •rH cd Dl Pi Pi Pi _ 3 o ta HP 13 O o o o CJ • *o o CO 9 Ip p o o (P aj P JZ p t-1 CO M a •§ p p AS HC (4 .O O 03 CU ip 00 a) rt CO cu P Ai E* CO p •H u iH 10 a cd • 3 W E* E* CM which were paid during those five years. Table XIV portrays the number of shares repurchased by the same corporations during 1964 to 1966 and

Table VI (p. 63) shows the holdings of treasury stock in 1966 and their relationship to the total number of shares issued.

AVM Corporation repurchased 8.34 per cent of its Issue in 1965.

Prior to that year, it had paid no dividends; it paid $0.20 in 1966 and

$0.25 in 1967.

Bergstrom Paper Company repurchased a block of 15,000 shares in

1966, equal to 3.99 per cent of issue. It had raised its dividend pay­ ment to $0.70 in 1966 and then made a substantial increase to $1.10 in

1967.

Glrltown's repurchase in 1966 amounted to 2.73 per cent, but divi­ dend payments remained steady at $0.50.

Global Marine repurchased 800,000 shares in late 1964 and early

1965, almost one-third of the entire issue, then cancelled 600,000 shares. However, it paid no dividends throughout the years, 1963 to

1967 inclusive, so its repurchases had no effect on dividend payments.

Gulf Interstate repurchased 3.79 per cent of its issue in 1964,

5.88 per cent in 1965, and 3.34 per cent in 1966. Its dividend payments were $0.25 in each year from 1963 to 1966 Inclusive, then rose to $0.30 in 1967. Here, too, its repurchase program had little effect.

Metalfab. Inc.1s repurchase of 77,702 shares in 1966 constituted

22.65 per cent of issued stock, but its dividend of $0.40 in 1967 was the same as in 1966 and not far above the $0.35 payment of 1965.

Nuclear Data's repurchase of 132,145 shares in 1964 amounted to

2.56 per cent of the total, but no dividends were paid in the period 1963 TABLE XIV co 6 a> h m a)

t s 1 0 0 CM t s tn cn co CMO tn ov J < •riM

M t S CM in m o o o o l l i i I I I I i i I * 1 O st 1 II 1 II 1 A A

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" s - / o I I IO I O U M H to m cn o o vo t—i cn vo ov o r-* ov cn rH o m m w w <* CJ H co U n cd *n ■ ) W 0) > O Mi M CJ O J d cu td tJ n Me to tn OO 4J Me (0 n a a) a to o ^ a • o < | k /- H o a 1 I tI It I • H cu cu H • • * • • •> I I I I * P**d P**d * A A A n ' H & S V d • cd at B 5 W o n g mi o at id .

VO ov st t s r- O O m 10 at oo cn oo COSt cm cn p H CM rH vo cn CM o o O OVOV -* n «k A r - ' ' - r a CM cm 150 TABLE XIV (CONT'D) w < s* o ra 4 O Cd 3 -i cuH -1 u (0 a) a) U

o o o H H H iH H i 0 W U O U o w o 3 CJ 1 in oo i IN OV I M M | I m o H O H I *H 1 « • a i cd HOO rH o\ ovo m iH ov o H cn iH 4J |H IH a o O* HI O* 3

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cn cn t w o o § o CO M cd o u tn

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Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. 6,035 .92 8,355 8,000 151 Charles Jacquin et Cie., Inc. 8,110 1.99 20,633 11,884 152

M 0) o CN -H o o> v o H *o r- on a x CN h u a 0) cn

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vo vo CM O O H CO CO Sf Sf CO H m I H m r io l m o i r- m rH O £ CO O p CO ■u 9 Q B O M a)J a) M 0 o co + _ l I l cn l « I l l I Icr> l l l • I • * |A |A IA I A A | A A | A A J

r-~ MCO CM •CO T3 CJ U O CO CO P•P +J O O U a 0 a>a) CO 0 Of Of CO j •cd

+ rH CO CM U 1 4-1 CU 0 <0 0 a. a> 0 £ co l 1 j

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r* r o < o t O O O O a i at o CO O CO CM CO M CJ M O *H CO m H 0 •H J CO *J ^ ^ t* N *H 0 01 60 (0 q J *H 0 01 a o h ^ S O PH « O) 4J flj 0 0 0 . _. II I II I II • Of CJ Of • • fO co

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rH rH 0 rH 14H•H a ¥ CO 4-1 0 O 3 M o 0 0 M 0 Of O U 0 O 0 I 1 1 9 a 3 4J 0 00 o 0 0 153 to 1967 Inclusive.

Likewise, the 3.14 per cent repurchase in 1966 by Super Valu

Stores, the 5.17 per cent repurchase In 1966 by Vocaline Company of

America, and the block purchase of 30,000 shares (7.06 per cent) by Weiss

Bros. Stores seemd to have no appreciable effect on dividend payments.

In summary, it would be fair to say that repurchases by this group

of companies had no perceptible, specific effect on their dividend pay­ ments and, in this regard, did not affect their stockholders materially,

for or against.

Relationship of Repurchases. In Dollars. To Net Income

Table XV shows the dollar cost of repurchases compared to the

annual net income of each of the fifty unlisted Industrials in the three

year period, 1964 to 1966.

The most striking feature of this presentation is the lack of

availability of cost information. Even in those Instances where the com­

panies publicly revealed the number of shares repurchased, they did not

inform their stockholders of the cost per share and total cost of the

repurchases. This information could be made an integral part of the source

and application of funds schedule which most companies are now incor­

porating in their annual reports.

Girltown's repurchase cost was not large relative to its net Income

save in 1966, when it amounted to over twenty-seven per cent. It is of

interest to note that the company was sold out to Genesco, Inc. in March,

1967.

Global Marine’s repurchase cost of $7,400,000 in the years 1964 and

1965 greatly exceeded the combined net income of $4,307,000 in those two 155

TABLE XV

DOLLAR COST OF REPURCHASES COMPARED TO ANNUAL NET INCOME ($000)

1966 1965 1964

AVM Corporation RE n.a. n.a. 33 NI 1,065 246 220

Aerosonic Corporation RE none 8 NI 285 86

American Heritage RE none none 48 NI 428 (365) 349

Asgrow Seed RE n.a. n.a. n.a. NI 1,077 1,031 1,063

Athlone Industries RE none none none NI 605

Barnes-Hind RE 103 none none NI 720 564

Bayless Markets RE 71 89 none NI 841 866 917

Bergstrom Paper RE 244 none none NI 1,322 665 1,011

Boston Herald-Traveler RE n.a. none none NI 2,169

Bristol Brass RE none 4 46 NI 1,768 368

Cannon Mills RE none n.a. A*&» NI 20,484 25,395 17,055

C-E-I-R, Inc. RE none none 158 NI 1,450 1,845 1,602

Cincinnati Enquirer RE 211 193 none NI 1,954 1,766 1,530 156

TABLE XV (CONT'D)

DOLLAR COST OF REPURCHASES COMPARED TO ANNUAL NET INCOME ($000)

1966 1965 1964

Colonial Stores RE 14 251 n.a. NI 7,479 6,413 5,738

W. S. Dickey Clay RE 89 none none NI 1,872 2,130 2,417

Dorchester Gas Producing Co. RE 133 28 none NI 1,197 958 658

Economics Laboratory RE 339 none none NI 3,800 2,959 2,487

Electrolux Corporation RE none none n.a. NI 10,002 9,445 7,702

Girltown, Inc. RE 152 87 40 NI 554 509 462

Global Marine RE n.a. 5,550 1,850 NI 3,519 2,460 1,907

Gulf Interstate RE 187 347 243 NI 319 250 635

Hanover Shoe RE none none n.a. NI 1,439 1,293 1,075

Heath Tecna RE 32 none none NI 748 489 202

Hexcel Corporation RE none none none NI 966 718 607

Hudson Pulp & Paper RE 161 213 212 NI 4,212 3,665 2,534

Charles Jacquin RE 53 110 61 NI 367 311 221 157

TABLE XV (CONT'D)

DOLLAR COST OF REPURCHASES COMPARED TO ANNUAL NET INCOME ($000)

1966 1965 1964

Jessop Steel RE none none n.a. NI 3,269 1,010 1,036

E. F. Johnson Company RE none none n.a. NI 1,801 1,471 1,227

Kentucky Fried Chicken RE 257 none none NI 1,794 790

McCormick & Company RE 3 99 n.a. NI 1,964 1,647 1,408

Metalfab, Inc. RE 684 21 none NI 347 283 237

Midas-International RE none 13 none NI 1,890 1,976 1,791

Midwest Rubber RE none none none NI 356 506 561

Monmouth Park Jockey RE 71 12 221 NI 844 747 775

Nuclear Data, Inc. RE none none 660 NI 200 77 342

Ozite Corporation RE n.a. n.a. n.a. NI 1,951 893 228

Pacific Gamble Robinson RE n.a. n.a. 3 NI 1,173 1,570 1,435

Petrolite Corporation RE 301 none 175 NI 4,238 3,705 3,617

Reynolds and Reynolds RE 341 58 none NI 2,176 1,893 1,570 158

TABLE XV (CONT'D)

DOLLAR COST OF REPURCHASES COMPARED TO ANNUAL NET INCOME ($000)

1966 1965 1964

Sawhlll Tubular RE 88 none 19 NI 1,080 660 1,080

Shepard Niles Crane & Holst RE none none none NI 1,094 932 409

Super Valu Stores RE 1,920 none none NI 4,543 4,045 3,632

United States Banknote RE 343 none none NI 1,012 801

United States Envelope RE none none 163 NI 1,879 541 11

Vocallne Company of America RE 137 none none NI 246 169 204

Wackenhut Corporation RE 11 none none NI 670 666

H. Warshow & Sons RE none none 12 NI 1,117 934 928

Weiss Bros. Stores RE 408 none none NI 625

Western Publishing RE 583 2,030 none NI 6,919 6,896

Zenith Laboratories RE none 32 none NI 74 107 42

Source: Company 10-K (annual) reports on file with Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. 159 years. However, the repurchase of 800,000 shares from Union Oil Company of California arose from the merger of two companies, was an integral part of the merger, and was well publicized.

In the three years, 1964 to 1966 inclusive, Gulf Interstate Company. spent $777,000 in repurchasing stock compared to $1,204,000 of net income in that period. From the point of view of non-selling stockholders, the rise in quotation on the stock to a high of 16 bid in 1967 seemed to place the repurchases in a desirable light, since the repurchase cost averaged

$5.19 per share. Despite the fact that at the end of 1966 the company held treasury stock of 183,209 shares, slightly more than sixteen per cent of the total' issue, this was not the only Important market factor. In the late summer of 1967, the company announced that its first half earnings had risen from $0.15 to $0.94 per share and the price of 7 - 7 1/2, as of

June 30, rose sharply to 15 - 15 1/4 on September 29. Admittedly, the re­ purchase helped to accentuate the rise in net income on a per share basis.

Metalfab, Inc. spent $705,000 on stock repurchases in 1965 and 1966, compared to net Income of $630,000 in those two years. The announced pur­ pose was for use in acquisition of other businesses and most of the funds came from borrowings. At the end of 1965 the company issued 22,185 shares in exchange for the common stock of Fliteway Sales, Inc. and, on July 12,

1966, it purchased improved real property, paying partly in cash and the rest in 5,000 shares of stock. The stock rose to a high bid of 12 1/4 in

1967, much above the average repurchase price of $8.80 in 1966. This pro­ gram was financed on a low after-tax cost, had a specific objective, and was well-publicized after completion. 160

Nuclear Data's cost of repurchase was $660,225 in 1964, far greater than net income that year of $342,000. However, the repurchase was triggered by the failing health of the president and led to a change in top management. The funds to consummate the transaction were largely borrowed, which placed the company in a precarious position, with net income declining sharply in 1965. However, the market effect was bene­ ficial. Compared to the purchase cost of $5.00 the range of quotations in the three following years was:

1967 1966 1965

High 16 7/8 9 9 5/8 Low 4 1/8 4 6

Since the selling stockholder was well aware of the company's situation, his dealing with the company was on an arm's length bargaining basis. The non-selling stockholders' best Interests may well have been put in jeopardy by this overly-large use of company funds; however, the alternative to company purchase may have been a forced sale to a purchaser outside the management group and this could have resulted either in a drastic change in management, a sharp drop in market price, or both.

The repurchase of 63,500 shares in 1966 by Super Valu Stores. Inc.. at a cost of $1,919,715 relative to net income of $4,543,040 marked a change in policy by the company. In October, 1963, in connection with the acquistion of Food Marketing Corporation, of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 186,154 shares of $0.97 cumulative, voting, second preferred stock had been issued.

It was callable at the option of the company and convertible into common,

Bhare for share, after October 6, 1964 and up to October 6, 1973.

Voluntary conversions reduced the issue to 179,271 shares as of 161 December 26, 1964, and to 140,475 shares at fiscal year-end of 1965; in these cases, previously unissued common stock was issued to the pre­ ferred stockholders.

However, in 1966, between January 10 and March 14, the company acquired 35,000 shares in the open market. Of this amount, 34,747 shares were re-issued to preferred stockholders as the result of a forced con­ version (call for redemption on April 6, 1966 at $30.74 per share), Be­ tween June 6 and December 8, the company repurchased an additional 28,500 shares, so that these also were available for conversion purposes. It is interesting to note that the company had sold 90,000 shares of common publicly at $30.50 on January 4, 1962.

In 1966, the common stock ranged from 32 7/8 bid to 24 1/2 bid, in comparison to the company's average cost of repurchased stock of $30.23.

In 1967 the range was 40 1/2 - 25 3/4 bid. This raises two interesting questions. First, did the stockholders who sold stock out at an average price of $30.23 in 1966, without knowing of the company's repurchases, suffer in view of the subsequent rise in market quotation to 40 1/2 bid?

Secondly, did non-selling stockholders gain more from the repurchases of stock than if the company had followed its prior custom of using unissued stock for preferred conversions?

In November, 1966 Vocaline Company of America had an opportunity, which it exercised, to repurchase 37,059 shares in a block from a selling stockholder. The price was $3.70 and involved $137,118, a substantial amount relative to 1965 net income of $168,743 and 1966 net income of $246,013.

However, it seemed to work out well from the standpoint of non-selling stockholders because the market quotation was 8 3/8 - 8 5/8 on March 31,1967; 162 and its closing price on the American Stock Exchange, on December 29,

1967 was 17.

The repurchase by Weiss Bros. Stores. Inc. of 30,000 shares of stock from the estate of David B. Weiss at $13.59 per share, an aggregate of $407,637, was large in proportion to net income of $625,187 for the fiscal year ended July 31, 1966. However, the price was not out-of-line with the issue price of $11.75 on January 10, 1962, nor with the 1965 range of 17 1/4 - 12 1/4 bid. Moreover, as previously mentioned, purchase of this block by the company kept it from other potential purchasers. Furthermore, since the Weiss interests owned approximately sixty-five per cent of the stock, they didn't have to be concerned about the reaction of minority stock­ holders. It should be said that the company carefully detailed every phase of this transaction in its report to the Securities and Exchange Com­ mission (Form 8-K for the month of September, 1965); and the annual report for the year ended July 31, 1966 provided adequate information to the stock­ holders. However, since the transaction took place on September 14, 1965, the timeliness of disclosure is open to criticism.

In its original Registration Statement pursuant to Section 12(g) of the amended 1934 Act (Form 8A, received May 3, 1965), Western Publishing

Company. Inc. reported treasury stock holdings of 4,439 shares of common

Btock, and 64,656 shares of Class B. In the two following years, 1965 and

1966, the company repurchased additional stock at an aggregate cost of

$2,613,594. This was not unduly large relative to combined net income of those two years amounting to $13,814,788. However, the repurchase of 290,587 shares in early January, 1967, Involved the not inconsiderable sum of

$5,957,033 and led to the private sale to a group of institutional investors 163 of $10 million principal amount of its 5 3/4 per cent promissory notes due

1982.

Despite the material increase in debt and repurchase of 290,587 shares of Class B, the annual report did not reveal the whole story. The consolidated income account showed common stock retired at a cost of

$2,132,642 without indicating how many shares were Involved or whether some of these shares were Class B. The outstanding common shares declined from

2,234,158 at December 31, 1966 to 2,083,438 at the end of 1967, a net de­ crease of only 150,720 shares.

However, the report to the Securities and Exchange Commission said that "An agreement completed in December, 1966, to purchase for cancella­ tion 290,587 shares of Western common stock, was consummated in early

January, 1967." The annual report revealed a different story. Common stock was retired at a cost of $2,132,642, far less than the repurchase price of the block at $5,957,033, and no breakdown was given as to the total num­ ber of shares involved, nor as to how many were common and how many were

Class B. This is important because the common shares have 1/3 vote per share, in the election of directors, whereas Class B shares have one full vote per share. The outstanding common shares declined from 2,234,158 at

December 31, 1966, to 2,083,438 at the end of 1967, a net decrease of 150,720 shares. The outstanding Class B shares declined from 1,503,878 at year-end

1966 to 1,361,678 at the end of 1967, a net decrease of 142,200 shares.

But, 296,172 Class B shares were held as treasury stock. Hence, the 290,587 shares which were purchased were not cancelled. They are subject to re­ issue. It is not possible to say, at this point in time, whether this pro­ cedure will prove beneficial or not to the present stockholders, over the long-run. 1 6 4 .

Over the short-run, the repurchase was helpful to non-selling stockholders. The price paid of $20.50 per share compares with the quoted range of 27 1/4 - 16 1/2 bid In 1967, and the quoted market of 25 1/4 -

26 on December 29, 1967, a year after the purchase was consummated. This is significant, also, because the company's net income declined from

$6,919,000 in 1966 to $4,269,400 in 1967, equal to thirty-eight per cent; and earnings per share on the combined common and Class B declined from

$1.62 to $1.00, also thirty-eight per cent. If the block repurchase had not been made, the earnings per share would have declined to $0.92, a drop of forty-three per cent.

It may be concluded from the above that if the proportion of dollar repurchase cost to net income is high and if the amount, in dollars, is large relative to the company's liquidity, the stockholders should be ad­ vised as to how the money is being spent. Some stockholders may feel that this information is important to them and should be revealed

2. QUALITATIVE TESTS

The Adequacy of Disclosure

When repurchases are initially proposed to a company's board of directors as a desirable use of funds and the sources of funds are also being considered, a major area of discussion should be to decide not only what funds are involved but how the company's stockholders are, or may be, affected by the proposal.

Since the board of directors is elected by the voting stockholders 165

and is ultimately responsible to them,'*' it would seem desirable that

a decision by the board to use company funds to repurchase common

stock should be communicated to the stockholders, as a statement of

policy.^

This is so, moreover, because repurchase, in its Implementation,

separates the stockholder body into two constituent groups, the selling

stockholders and the non-selling stockholders.

The disclosure to stockholders might well consist of the fol­

lowing:

1. Advance notice of intent by special letter or message to stockholders; or a request for approval (authorization of repurchase) as included in the proxy statement for a special or annual meeting.

a. This would Inform the stockholders of a policy decision: the Intent to repurchase; and would include details considered material and relevant. Among these would be the reasons for repurchase and the source of funds, the number of shares to be repurchased, the price range considered attractive (both by management and outside con­ sultants), the timing, and the potential methods of repurchase which might be employed.

b. This would enable each stockholder to appraise

The control of a corporation can be considered as being in the hands of those who have the voting power to elect the board of directors of the corporatlon.,, Pearson Hunt, Charles M. Williams, and Gordon Donaldson, Basic Business Finance. (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 3rd ed., 1966), p. 382. 2 "It„ seems reasonable to expect that the basic objectives of management will normally be identical with the objectives of the common shareholder and that management in its decisions should reflect this identity of interest.11 Ibid., p. 389. 166

the policy decision and to evaluate how material were the facts relative to his continued owner­ ship or possible intention to sell.

2. Prompt and timely communication of the number of shares repurchased, the methods employed (tender, open-market purchase, or large block), and the price paid.

3. Notification, after completion, of the use to which the repurchased stock had been put (such as stock op­ tions, acquisitions, treasury stock, cancellation, etc.), and the effects of repurchase as contrasted with the original purpose(s).

Test of the Criteria for Adequate Disclosure

Advance notice of intent

Of the fifty unlisted industrial companies Included in this study, only three— Cannon Mills. Global Marine, and Charles Jacquin— gave advance notice of Intent to repurchase; only one company, Cannon Mills, specifi­

cally asked for stockholder authorization in advance of repurchase; and no company provided stockholders with the detailed information which was

in the possession of the directors and which might be considered material and relevant by the stockholders in deciding on the most desirable course of action relative to their own investment.

Cannon Mills1 annual report for the year ending December 31, 1965, revealed treasury stock holdings at a cost of $11,733,612. But it was not until 1966, after it had become subject to the proxy statement require­ ments of the amended Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on April 30, 1965, that the company saw fit to include in the proxy statement for the April

12 annual meeting, as one of the purposes of the meeting, the proposed authorization by stockholders of the company's plan to repurchase not 167 more than 200,000 shares of common and Class B common stock at the discretion of the directors; and the information provided to the

stockholders, as to reasons, sources of funds, timing, price range, and methods of acquisition, were meager and vague. In effect, manage­ ment and the board of directors asked stockholders for a "blank check" to spend about $17,000,000 within the yearl

Global Marine. Inc. was formed by merger on November 30, 1964.

An important feature of the agreement was the decision to repurchase

800,000 shares of stock to eliminate a large minority interest which the merger would produce. This decision was carefully spelled out and publicized to the stockholders, who knew the reasons for repurchase and the intent to cancel the reacquired shares. The subsequent offering of units, consisting of debentures and common stock, as a source of funds, required the filing of a Registration Statement with the Securities and

Exchange Commission and delivery of a prospectus to purchasers, so that there could be no unawareness of the company's intentions.

Charles Jacquin et Cie. Inc.had been repurchasing stock in the open market for several years prior to 1964 and had used the reacquired stock for stock dividends. Even though the stockholders were not speci­ fically asked to authorize the program, they could hardly fail to be aware of what was going on. Yet, it could not be said that they were given advance notice, except of the policy per se.

Methods employed in repurchase

The three basic methods used to repurchase stock are; 168

1. Open-market purchases.

2. Purchase of large blocks "off the market."

3. Invitation to tender stock at a specified price.

The use of the tender method by listed companies, and by outside companies who wish to secure control of such publicly held companies, has become so common in recent years that legislation was initiated during the

90th Congress to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for 4-5 full disclosure in connection with cash tender offers. This proposed legislation was initiated prior to the inception of this study and has since become law, (Public Law No. 90-439 passed July 29, 1968).

Hence, it is significant (and this was a basic reason for the under­ taking of this present study) that in no single instance has even one of the fifty unlisted companies included in this study attempted to repur­ chase stock by an invitation to tender (except one company, AVM Corporation, which tried to eliminate very small holdings); all repurchases have resulted either from open-market purchases, or by purchases of a large block of stock "off the market."

The use of the tender method, by incumbent management, requires the revelation of "material and relevant facts" to stockholders; conversely, open-market purchases can be consummated secretly, without publicity, and without providing reasons or details.

^S510, as referred to the Committee on Banking and , United States Senate. 5 In 1966 there were over 100 cash tender offers (to acquire control of corporations) involving companies with securities listed on national securities exchanges as compared with eight in 1960. 169

The Inevitable conclusion to be reached is that the companies in­ volved have been unwilling to disclose what they were doing or to reveal the reasons for repurchase, the sources of funds, the cost of acquisition, the number of shares repurchased or to be repurchased, or the use to which they intended to put the stock. Nineteen of the companies revealed no reason at all for their repurchases.

Notification to Stockholders After Repurchase Has Been Completed

In general, the information communicated to stockholders has been sparse and incomplete. Usually, companies have indicated their treasury stock holdings— number of shares and aggregate cost— and, by comparing the balance sheets of successive years, it has been possible to determine the change. But, since sales of stock often took place during the year, the treasury share holdings did not give an accurate record of the number of shares repurchased and their cost.

It was relatively rare for a company to report specific details on repurchase, such as the number of shares, the time of purchase, and the cost. However, some companies such as Bergstrom Paper. Girltown. Charles

Jacquin, Metalfab. Nuclear Data. Super Valu Stores. Weiss Bros. Stores. and Western Publishing were exceptions in this respect.

The majority of companies failed to reveal the cost of repurchase, the number of shares, or to break down the cost as between preferred and common stock or as between common and Class B shares.

Much of the material uncovered in this study was not communicated to stockholders but was reported only to the Securities and Exchange Com­ mission; the 8-K and 10-K reports were found to be much more revealing than the annual reports. 170

In cases where the repurchases Involved large blocks of stock,

the information was found to be adequate. This evaluation would include

such purchases by Bergstrom Paper. Metal fab. Nuclear Data. Vocaline Company

of America. Weiss Bros. Stores, and Western Publishing.

However, there were few instances where the company attempted to

compare the results of repurchasing with their original reasons, other than

to comment on the resulting increase in earnings, or to state the specific

uses of stock, such as in connection with stock option plans, bonus arrange­ ments (e.g., Cincinnati Enquirer), purchase of other companies, and the like.

In summary, it is a fair statement of fact that the companies involved

in this study, all unlisted companies, did not provide adequate or timely

disclosure to their stockholders; and that in cases where the information

provided was adequate, it was as a result of the reports required by a

governmental agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission. CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I. SUMMARY

The Questionnaire

The results of the questionnaire, which was sent to a leading financial executive of one hundred and forty-five unlisted industrial corporations which had repurchased stock, were reported in Chapter II.

Seventy-three companies (50.34 per cent) responded with com­ pleted questionnaires and an additional thirteen companies (8.97 per cent)

sent letters in reply. Moreover, the seventy-three companies represented

28.97 per cent of the 252 companies which held treasury stock as of the

end of their respective 1965 or 1966 fiscal year.

The replies to specific questions Indicated that the source of

funds used in repurchase came mainly from an accumulation of excess cash

(64 companies); yet it was indicated that repurchase was more often an

isolated purchase (41 companies) than part of a well-conceived program

(31), The most frequently expressed reason for repurchase was the avail­ ability of stock at a low price (43); the fact that the stock was selling below book value was of much less significance (19).

Other important reasons stated by management, in order of frequency,

were:

1. To have stock available for use in future acquisitions (33);

2. To have stock available for stock options (32);

171 172

3. To Improve market price (17); and

4. To Increase earnings per share (16).

Inadequacy of Disclosure

Despite the decision by the various managements to employ excess

cash for repurchase, there was evidenced no feeling of obligation or in­

tent to Inform their stockholders in advance or to acquaint them with the reasons for this use of funds. Of the seventy-three reporting companies

(all of which answered this specific question), only ten indicated that

they had given advance information.

Moreover, only seventeen companies advised that they had informed stockholders of the reasons for repurchase (in many cases, after the fact) and fewer companies, ten to fourteen (depending on the specific item), noted that they had provided stockholders with data as to the source of

funds, the number of shares to be repurchased, the price or price range, and the method and time of repurchase.

The inadequacy of disclosure to stockholders was further evidenced by the method of repurchase which was used. A tender offer usually requires advance information to stockholders as to reasons, source of funds, price

to be paid, number of shares to be purchased, and some indication as to cur­ rent earnings. Contrariwise, repurchase of stock in the open market or via

large blocks "off the market" usually does not require disclosure to stock­ holders per se.

Of the seventy-three companies, only one had requested tenders of

Btock; fifty-six made their purchases in the open market; and twenty-three 173

(indicating use of both methods) had purchased stock in large blocks.

There was substantial unanimity by the responding companies on the use of the repurchased stock. Sixty-nine retained it as treasury stock; only four companies retired their repurchases via cancellation.

Thus, two conclusions may be drawn. First, the companies wished to maintain their flexibility; secondly, they had no immediate intention either to cancel or to re-issue the stock. Short-term considerations provided the stimulus for repurchase. The act of repurchasing per se

(with or without formal cancellation) induced higher earnings per share and a possible increase in the market price. The disposition of the stock was a future, not an immediate, consideration.

Comparison of Listed and Unlisted Studies

The responses to the questionnaire from seventy-three unlisted corporations were compared to the results of a field study of fifteen listed corporations, in which the reasons for repurchases were sought.

In both studies, the availability of excess cash was noted as the source of funds. However, in the use of funds, the reasons for repurchase, this current study diverged quite sharply from the conclusions of the listed study.

Unlike the listed study, which conveyed the impression of a well- planned program to shrink the equity base and avoid increasing equity, this unlisted study came to a different conclusion. Fifty-nine per cent of the companies stated the availability of stock at a, low price as the reason; this involved an advantageous opportunity rather than a carefully con­ ceived plan. 174

The listed study stressed, as a leading reason for repurchase, the direct effect upon earnings per share, and the effective distribution of funds to stockholders at capital gains tax rates. This unlisted study reported that only sixteen companies (22 per cent) indicated the desire to increase earningB per share as a reason; and only one company said that the effect of taxation upon the stockholder group was given serious con­ sideration.

The study of listed companies concluded that book value was the principal yardstick in determining that their own stock "was a good in­ vestment" (the leading secondary motivation); in this unlisted study only nineteen companies mentioned book value as a criterion, but forty-three stressed the availability of stock at a low price as the principal stimulus to action.

The certainty of control has seemed to differentiate the unlisted corporations from the listed. The former group is characterized, in many cases, by managements which possess unquestioned voting, or at least work­ ing, control of their companies; on the other hand, the "professional managers" and directors of many listed corporations frequently own only a small percentage of the outstanding stock.

The possession of voting control may be a material factor in the unwillingness, as well as the lack of interest, on the part of managements of unlisted companies to take the minority stockholders into their confi­ dence by revealing the relevant facts about repurchase prior to, or even after, the fact. This point of view is further documented by the use of open-market purchases by unlisted companies in contrast to the use of 175 tenders by listed companies.

The Research Study

The research study itself, as detailed in Chapter III, involved a careful examination of the actual published information which had been sent by one hundred and ten unlisted companies to their stockholders.

The basic objectives, as with the questionnaires, were to determine the purpose and extent of such repurchases, their effect upon the stock­ holders, and the presence or absence of disclosure of all the material and relevant facts which a selling or non-selling stockholder might need, or be entitled to have, in order to make a rational and Intelligent de­ cision.

Of the one hundred and ten companies, whose reports were examined, it was found that fifty companies had repurchased stock in recent years: fortyi-six in.at least one of the three years, 1964 to 1966 inclusive, and four in earlier years (mainly in 1962); and sixty companies had not repur­ chased any stock.

Extent of Repurchase

Of the forty-six unlisted companies, twenty-four (22 per cent) had repurchased in 1964; twenty-three (21 per cent) in 1965; and thirty-one

(28 per cent) in 1966. Moreover, eleven companies (24 per cent) had repur­ chased stock in each of the three years; ten (22 per cent) in each of two years; and the remaining twenty-five (54 per cent) in one of those years.

Aggregate repurchases of stock totalled 553,892 shares in 1964;

952,606 shares in 1965; and 485,106 shares in 1966. 176 X The treasury stock holdings of the fifty corporations were shown for the years 1964 to 1966 inclusive. Total holdings aggregated

1.242,859 shares in 1964; 1.255,840 shares in 1965; and 1,530,686 shares in 1966. The 1966 holdings cost $31,807,263.

The treasury stock holdings of the forty-six companies in 1966 represented 3.44 per cent of the total issued shares, which aggregated

44,553,073. However twelve of these companies had holdings which ex­ ceeded five per cent of the issued stock; and four companies had holdings which exceeded ten per cent.

Lack Of Disclosure

Careful examination of company reports left the impression of a lack of information with regard to repurchases.

There were few Instances in which approval was sought from stock­ holders prior to repurchase. Even then, blanket approval was normally re­ quested. After repurchase, there was a similar lack of information. The only exception to this occurred in connection with the purchase of large blocks of stock, the use of treasury stock to acquire other businesses and to pay stock dividends, and in connection with the use of treasury stock for bonuses, employee incentive awards, and prizes. The companies failed to indicate clearly whether treasury stock, or unissued stock, had been used to fulfil their obligations under stock option plans.

3-Only forty-six in 1966; four companies had disposed of their holdings by the end of 1966. 177

Usually the annual reports provided information as to treasury stock held, and Its cost, as of each fiscal year-end. But this data does not indicate the actual amount of stock repurchased during the year and the use, if any, to which it was put. The Securities and Exchange Commission does not require this information^ merely the balancing amount between the treasury stock held at successive year-ends.

This is an omission in information which a change in Securities and Exchange Commission rules could rectify.

Purposes of Repurchase

Analysis of the records of the fifty companies under study revealed these primary purposes for the reacquisition of stock;

1. Removal of large blocks from the market 9

2. Acquisition of other companies 6

3. Stock option plans 6

4. For bonuses, employee Incentive awards, and prizes 5

5. Availability at a low price 3

6 . Use as stock dividends 2

7. No reason given 19

TOTAL 50

These reasons for repurchase were not too unlike those revealed by the questionnaire if it is considered that "removal of large blocks from the market" and "availability at a low price" have much the same underlying purpose. In both instances, the use of reacquired stock in mergers and for stock option plans ranked high; and use as stock dividends ranked low.

The study of company reports indicated far more stress on repurchase of stock for bonuses, employee incentive awards, and prizes than did the questionnaire replies and the fact that nineteen companies (38 per cent) gave no reason at all for repurchase underscored the evident lack of intent to disclose to stockholders what they were doing.

The research study differed materially from the conclusions of the article on listed companies which stressed the primary reasons for repurchase as the direct effect upon earnings per share, minimum risk offered by repur­ chase, and effective distribution of funds to stockholders at capital gains tax rates.

The unlisted study revealed no Instance in which the effect on earnings per share was the primary purpose nor was there any mention of the tax aspect at all.

The fourth primary reason for repurchase mentioned in the article on listed companies was to support the market for their stock (increase the demand for the stock and absorb large blocks of overhanging stock); the un­ listed study, on the other hand, emphasized the removal of large blocks from the market as the leading primary purpose.

The characteristics of repurchasing companies were found to be these

a. They are almost uniformly profitable.

b. There is a high degree of voting control by the family group or by the officers and directors.

c. These companies typically pay cash dividends.

d. With the exception of those which used shares specifically in mergers, for options, divi­ dends, and bonuses, they continue to hold the repurchased stock as treasury shares. Of the fifty companies under study, thirty (60 per cent) retained their repurchased shares from 179

year to year.

The methods used to repurchase were two:

a. Purchase in the open market.

b. Purchase of large blocks of stock "off the market."

The reasons for the non-use of the tender offer method were due to

the characteristics of the repurchasing companies and the attendant circum­

stances :

a. No change of control was desired.

b. There was no substantial build-up of cash,

c. There was no compulsion to disclose their activities with respect to repurchase,

d. In many cases, the companies stated that they had no specific reason for repurchase of their own common stock. There were nineteen such companies of the fifty companies under study.

The Effect of Repurchase Upon Stockholders

The effect of repurchases upon the selling and non-selling stockholders was evaluated in Chapter IV, as measured both by quantitative and qualita­ tive tests.

The quantitative tests included the following:

a. Market prices of common stock relative to actual cost of repurchase;

b. Earnings per share, giving effect to year- end holdings of treasury stock, compared to earnings per share on Issued stock;

c. Maintenance of corporate control by the principal holders;

d. The risk factor: effect on the debt/equity relationship; 180

e. Dividend payments prior tof during and subsequent to the repurchase period; and

f. Relationship of repurchases, in dollars, to net income.

The qualitative tests employed included these;

a. The adequacy of disclosure: Advance notice to stockholders, timing, and communication of all the material and relevant facts;

b. The methods used to effectuate the program;

c. The notification, to stockholders, of the results.

'The Test of Market Price Relative to Repurchase Cost

Two of the four companies which had repurchased stock in 1962 did

so because of its low price; the repurchased amount in each case was about

eight per cent, hence substantial and price-influencing. One company's

stock, by the end of 1964, had more than doubled (Hexcel Corporation):

the other increased by over sixteen per cent. Thus, the non-selling

stockholders benefited. The selling stockholders sold their stock volun­

tarily and for their own private reasons.

Of the twenty-four unlisted companies which repurchased stock in

1964, only sixteen publicized the number of shares repurchased and their

cost. However, in every single instance the bid price of the stock in 1965

was at least as high (and higher in fifteen cases) at some point during

the year as the average cost of the stock repurchased in 1964. Two of

these companies repurchased a substantial portion of their issued stock,

11.05 and 21.56 per cent respectively. In each case, the high bid price

in 1965 was approximately double the cost of the repurchased Btock. 181

In 1965 twenty-three companies of the group repurchased some of their own common stock; five of these did not provide Information as to the cost. However, twenty-two of the twenty-three companies witnessed an advance in quoted price of their stock from the low bid of at least twenty-five per cent. (The increase, from low bid to high bid price, of the National Quotation Bureau Over-the-Counter Industrial Stock average was 26 per cent).

The high bid price in 1966 of the stock of every one of the eighteen companies providing cost information exceeded the cost of the stock which was repurchased in 1965. It could be said that if a stockholder in any one of eighteen companies had refrained from selling his stock (which was possibly repurchased by his company) in 1965, he or she might have secured a higher price from its sale in 1966,

The situation was most pronounced in the case of one company,

Global Marine. Inc., which repurchased over twenty-four per cent of its issued stock in 1965 at a cost of $9.25 per share. The quotation on the stock rose in 1966 from a low bid price of 15 1/4 to a high of 31 1/2.

Of thirty-one companies which repurchased stock in 1966, only twenty- five Informed their stockholders of the cost. The range in quotations was remarkably wide in 1967, with twelve companies recording an increase of at least 100 per cent from the low bid price (seven companies had an increase exceeding 200 per cent). It was shown that the high bid price of the stock exceeded the cost of repurchase, a year earlier, in every case but two

(their purchases were minute). 182

Thus, in 1966 as in 1965 and 1964, a stockholder in any of these companies might have served his own financial interest better by retaining his stock until the following year. Had he known that his sale was made at a time when his company was buying back stock without conveying that material fact to him, he might have acted differently.

The Test of Earnings Per Share

Only twelve of the fifty companies in the group held treasury stock, at fiscal year-end 1966, exceeding five per cent of the issued stock. It was concluded, after examination, that the repurchase of stock affected the reported earnings per share of the individual companies in the same proportion that the holdings of treasury stock bore to the issued stock.

Over a period of a few years such repurchases, if held as treasury stock, tended to accentuate the actual growth in net income per share or to moderate the decline. Its effect on stockholders who retained their stock was beneficial; on stockholders who sold their stock out, without knowing that the corporation was repurchasing, the effect was detrimental.

Maintenance of Corporate Control by the Principal Holders

Of the fifty companies studied, thirty-three, or sixty-six per cent, were controlled by management interests to the extent of at leasty thirty per cent. (This is in sharp contrast to the low control factor of listed companies). Hence, there was no need to repurchase stock for the purpose of accentuating control. Yet, it was possible to increase their propor­ tionate control by using the funds of the remaining stockholders (seventy per cent) to repurchase stock; in fact, this actually happened in the case I

183 of Cannon Mills. Girltown. Inc., Global Marine. Inc., Gulf Interstate

Company. Charles Jacquin et Cie. Inc., Nuclear Data. Inc., Sawhill Tubular

Products. Inc., Western Publishing Company. Inc., Weiss Bros. Stores. Inc., and Zenith Laboratories.

The Risk Factor: Effect on the Debt/Equity Relationship

No evidence has been uncovered that financial managers repurchased stock with the intent of altering the debt/equity ratio per se. To the extent that repurchased stock was retained, from year to year, as treasury stock (and this has been true in the majority of cases) and to the extent that the cost of the treasury stock has reduced the stated value attributed to the common equity, the proportion of debt to equity and debt to total capitalization has increased. But this effect has been a by-product, rather than a primary objective.

Of the fifty companies, only four borrowed funds with which to purchase stock. In so doing, they increased the debt/equity ratio and the leverage factor more markedly than if they had employed cash as a source of funds (i.e., a reduction in use of an asset).

Dividend Payments Prior to. During, and Subsequent to the Repurchase Period

It was concluded, after examination of dividend payments by the fifty companies, that repurchases had no perceptible, specific effect on them and, in this regard, did not affect their stockholders materially, for or against. Relationship of Repurchases, in Dollars, to Net Income

The most striking feature of this comparison was the lack of

availability of cost information. Even in those cases where the com­

panies publicly revealed the number of shares repurchased, they did not

inform their stockholders of the cost per share and total cost of their

repurchases. This information could be made an integral part of the

source and application of funds schedule which most companies are now

incorporating in their annual reports.

Despite the lack of cost data, there were a few instances where

the cost of repurchases was very substantial relative to net income. This

was true with such companies as Global Marine. Gulf Interstate Company.

Metalfab. Nuclear Data, Super Valu Stores. Vocaline Company of America.

Weiss B r o s 'Stores. and Western Publishing Company. However, these com­

panies had the opportunity, or were faced with the necessity, of making

large block purchases "off the market." Their actions were well publicized

and did no apparent harm to the body of stockholders; on balance, the re­

purchases were beneficial.

' The Adequacy of Disclosure

Because repurchases separate the stockholder body into two consti­

tuent groups, the selling stockholders and the non-selling stockholders,

it would seem desirable that a decision by the board of directors to

use company funds to repurchase common stock should be communicated to

them as a statement of policy.

Based upon the criteria of advance notice of Intent, prompt and

timely communication, and notification after completion, the fifty companies 185 186 studied provided insufficient information. Only three gave advance Furthermore, there were few instances where the company attempted notice of intent to repurchase; only one specifically asked for stock­ to compare the results of repurchasing against their original reasons, holder authorization in advance of repurchase; and no company provided stock­ other than to comment on the resulting increase in earningB or specific holders with the detailed information which was in the possession of the uses of stock, directors and which might he considered material and relevant by the stock­ In summary, the conclusion was reached that these companies did not holders in deciding on their own course of action. provide adequate or timely disclosure to their shareholders; in cases

The three basic methods of repurchase include open market purchase, where the information was adequate, it was as a result of the reports r £ purchase of large blocks "off the market", and invitations to tender stock, qulred by a governmental agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission,

The use of the tender method by incumbent management requires the revelation II. CONCLUSION of "material and relevant facts"; conversely, open-market purchases can be This empirical study, a pioneering investigation of stock repur­ consummated secretly, without publicity, and without providing reasons or chases by unlisted industrial corporations, has attempted to determine details, It is significant, therefore, that not even one of the fifty un­ whether, and under what circumstances, such repurchases of common stock listed companies attempted to repurchase stock by an invitation to tender, have had an advantageous or disadvantageous effect upon their stockholders. The inevitable conclusion is that the companies have been unwilling The quantitative and qualitative tests which were used in the to disclose what they were doing, Nineteen of the companies revealed no evaluation of this problem, by examination of published reports sent to reason for their repurchases; and this study has steadily indicated the stockholders and to the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as of the unavailability of data regarding the number of shares reacquired and their reasons stated by managements to whom questionnaires were sent, were those cost, which have in legislative and business discussions been considered relevant The information communicated to stockholders after repurchase has and germane, been sparse and incomplete, Usually, companies have provided fairly adequate information as to treasury stock holdings (this is required by ' The Research Study the Securities and Exchange Commission) but it was not possible to secure Of the fifty companies which had repurchased stock, four had done an accurate record of shares repurchased and their cost, so prior to 1964; forty-six repurchased common stock in the years 1964-

In casea where repurchases involved large blocks of stock, the in­ 1966 inclusive, Twenty-four companies repurchased in 1964, twenty-three formation was found to be adequate; otherwise, it was the opposite, in 1965, and thirty-one in 1966. However, eight companies in 1964, five in 1965, and six in 1966 did not reveal information with regard either to 187 the number of shares repurchased or their cost, or both.

The first quantitative test of the research study compared the actual cost per share of repurchase by forty-six companies during the

1964-1966 period with market quotations prevailing a year later. Of fifty-nine recorded instances (sixteen in 1964, eighteen in 1965, and twenty-five in 1966), the high bid price exceeded cost in fifty-six cases (fifteen in 1964, eighteen in 1965, and twenty-three in 1966).

Despite the consistency of this test's results, there was no conclusive proof that the rise in market quotations was due solely to the effect of repurchase, nor was it possible to determine whether the effect was appreciable or minimal. Many other factors were present, such as changes in the net income of the firms, a rise in the general level of security prices, a change in price/earnings relationships, and the increased inflation psychology of the marketplace.

The second test compared earnings per share, in the years 1964,

1965, and 1966, relative to issued and outstanding stock. This test gave effect to the shares which had been repurchased and which were held as treasury stock at the fiscal year-end.

It was observed that the repurchase of stock affected the reported earnings per share of the individual companies in the same proportion that the holdings of treasury stock bore to the issued stock; also, that such repurchases tended to accentuate the actual increase in net income in its effect on earnings per share: a decline in net income was moderated in its effect on per share earnings. To that extent the effect on stock- 188 holders who retained their stock was beneficial; the effect on selling stockholders was detrimental.

The third test involved the maintenance of corporate control by the principal holders as influenced by the repurchase of common stock by the corporation. It was found that, of the fifty companies studied, thirty-three, or sixty-six per cent, were controlled by management in­ terests to the extent of at least thirty per cent stock ownership

(contrasting sharply with the low control factor of listed companies).

Although there was no need to repurchase stock for the purpose of clinching control, it was possible for the corporate insiders to increase their pro­ portionate control by using corporate funds. In nine specific instances this was found to be the situation. But there was no evidence to indicate that the strengthening of control by management interests affected the other stockholders beneficially or harmfully.

The fourth quantitative test involved the risk factor, the effect of repurchase upon the relationship between debt and equity. Repurchase of common stock per se reduces stockholders' equity; if debt is part of the capital structure, the reduction in equity increases the leverage of the capitalization. By so doing, the effect of any change of net in­ come is accentuated, as is the potentiality of ultimate failure of the firm. It is also likely that the price/earnlngs relationship of the common stock will be altered.

In addition to the effect of capital reduction by repurchase it­ self is the further increase of leverage occasioned by using borrowed 189 funds with which to repurchase common stock. The tax deductibility of interest reduces the cost of capital but increased fixed charges add to the risk of ultimate loss.

According to Modigliani and Miller, the total market value of the company's securities will not change despite the composition of 1 the capital structure: the market value of the equity should decline because of the lower price/earnings ratio resulting.

Of the fifty companies under study, only four borrowed funds with which to repurchase stock. No evidence, however, waB found that there was an intent to Increase the debt/equity ratio as a primary motivating factor; rather, it was a necessary source of funds. Furthermore, there was no proof that such action either benefited or harmed the stockholders.

It may well be that the time-span of the study was too short to permit such a result to be revealed.

The fifth test concerned the record of dividend payments during the period 1963 to 1967 Inclusive (i.e., prior to, during, and after the repurchase period). The findings were not conclusive. Repurchases had no consistent, appreciable, or direct effect upon the dividend payments of the companies under study. In some cases, dividend payments were changed due to a change in net income; in others, the companies had a policy of not paying dividends and repurchase did not alter this policy. It was not possible to isolate repurchase as having a perceptible effect upon

Franco Modigliani, and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment," American Economic Review, June 1958, p. 261-297. 190 dividends.

The final quantitative test concerned the relationship of repur­ chases, in dollars, to the net income of the firm. In some cases, the amount spent was relatively high; in others, low. There was no con­ sistent relationship. There was, however, a lack of information as to the cost per share and the total cost involved. It was concluded that if the amount spent on repurchase was high relative to net income, it might affect the company's liquidity and be detrimental to the stockholders for that reason. Accordingly, some stockholders might wish to be more adequately informed about the extent of, and the reasons, for the repurchases.

The qualitative tests concerned the adequacy of disclosure. It was found that only three, of the fifty companies studied, gave advance notice to stockholders of intent to repurchase; only one specifically asked for stockholder authorization in advance of repurchase, and no company provided stockholders with the detailed Information possessed by the officers and directors and which might be considered material and relevant by the stockholders in deciding on their own course of action. No company (of the fifty included in the research study) re­ quested invitations to tender, a method of repurchase which usually en­ tails the furnishing of Information. Nineteen companies revealed no reason for their repurchases, and the information communicated to stock­ holders after repurchase was as sparse as it was beforehand and during the period that repurchases were being made.

It was concluded that disclosure to stockholders was not adequate but there was no conclusive proof that the effect on them was beneficial 191

or to the contrary.

The Questionnaire

Of 534 unlisted Industrial corporations, 252 (47.19 per cent) held

treasury stock (i.e., previously repurchased) at the end of either their

1965 or 1966 fiscal years. A questionnaire was sent to 145 companies, almost fifty-eight per cent. Fifty of these companies had been selected by random samplingj the other ninety-five, because examination of their

financial statements indicated that they held substantial amounts of

treasury stock, (twenty-four companies held at least ten per cent of their

issued stock in their treasury; nine companies held over twenty per cent).

The replies which were received from senior financial executives of

seventy*-three companies Indicated that owner-managers of unlisted companies have tended to shun disclosure and evidence a disregard (though this is not susceptible to proof) for the possible effect of erpurchase upon public

stockholders.

Their answers stated that they had not provided advance information about repurchase to their stockholders, in the great majority of cases, nor were the stockholders informed of the reasons for repurchase. In only one instance (ninety-five companies of the second questionnaire group had made substantial repurchases of stock) did they invite tender offers from stockholders. The usual method was to repurchase stock in the open market or to purchase blocks of stock from large stockholders. This pro­

cedure coincided with the desire to avoid disclosure which the study of

the companies' financial records had revealed.

The conclusions from the questionnaire replies differed materially 192 from those of a recent study of repurchase by listed corporations. The latter conveyed the impression of well-conceived, carefully planned repur­ chase programs rather than the isolated purchases stated by unlisted managements in the questionnaire. The study of listed companies stressed the desire to shrink the equity base as the primary motivating factor, to affect earnings per share directly, and to distribute funds effectively to stockholders at capital gains tax rates. Contrariwise, only sixteen of the unlisted companies indicated repurchase as resulting from a desire to

Increase earnings; and only one company stated that the effect of taxation on the stockholder group was given serious consideration. Furthermore, a willingness to use unissued stock for stock dividends and conversions was contrary to a desire to reduce the equity base.

Both the listed study and the replies to the questionnaire of the unlisted study cited the availability of excess cash as the primary source of funds for repurchase. There was no evidence from the research study that this was so; four companies even used borrowed funds for the purpose.

It is quite possible that the extent of repurchase was a major influence; however, most companies were not impelled to repurchase stock because of the pressure of idle, and excess, cash.

The answers to the questionnaire, and the letters which were re­ ceived from companies which chose not to answer the questionnaire Itself, conveyed the impression that those managements were unwilling to commit themselves in an area which was currently under investigation by a sub­ committee of the United States Senate. 193

Several companies mailed their replies in plain envelopes (despite

the stamped, self-addressed, furnished envelopes), completely devoid of

identifying marks, despite the given assurance that replies would he kept

confidential and the anonymity of the sender preserved. Others chose not

to reply to the questionnaire because they felt that their policy was

strictly proprietary, or that the decision to repurchase was wholly within the province of the directors, not to be revealed either to their stockholders or to the general public. Because of this attitude, it is possible that the replies to the questionnaire, the stated reasons of management, left much unsaid.

As was the case with the research study, it is evident that the answers to the questionnaire did not provide consistent answers to the problem.

It was hoped that these tests would provide conclusive evidence of the effect upon stockholders, whether helpful or adverse. Based upon the findings of this study, however, it must be said that they have provided neither conclusive nor consistent answers to the problem posed.

As is often the case with inductive presentations, this study has revealed hitherto unknown facts and factors relating to repurchase without providing proof, conclusive in itself, that it was beneficial or harmful to the stockholders of unlisted corporations.

Limitations of the Research Study

This study has suffered from various limitations:

1. The difficulty of securing information as to the buyer and seller in unlisted transactions. This is available in the offices of "market-makers" of individual securi­ ties, as detailed on their daily blotters, or from the security traders themselves. It would probably take the authority of a subpoena from the Securities and Exchange Commission to secure this privately- held data.

The lack of data on unlisted corporations prior to

May 1, 1965.

The lack of adequate information in published financial reports relating to the number of shares repurchased during the year, the date of repurchase, the cost of the repurchased shares, and the method of repurchase, in­ cluding the name of the seller in certain instances where a conflict of interest might be presumed.

The failure of the Securities and Exchange Commission to require a complete schedule of repurchases (both number of shares and cost) and subsequent resales within the year. Present regulations require merely that companies provide the balancing item, the difference between treasury stock held at the beginning and end of the year.

The unwillingness of managements to be specific about the reasons for repurchases.

The brief period of years for the examination of the results of repurchases. 195

A Different Approach

Despite the inability of this present study to provide an adequate answer to the problem, the magnitude of repurchase is such that a further investigation, and a different approach, seems desirable.

In the year 1968 domestic corporations spent almost $5 1/2 billions in the repurchase of their own stock, while securing somewhat more than

$4 1/2 billions from the sale of new issues of equities.

The repurchase of common stock results in the temporary or per­ manent reduction of a company's capital, depending upon whether the stock is cancelled, held as treasury stock, or reissued, or whether additional debt is incurred. Has this reduction in capital increased or decreased the wealth of the company? This is the basic question for determination, and concerns both the company and its stockholders.

The real test of a reduction in capital is its effect upon the real earning power of the company. This should be the test of management in deciding upon repurchase as the best alternative use of company funds. Yet if earning power, the on capital funds, is to be accepted as the criterion, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of "earning power" and to give consideration to the element of time.

The accounting profession has not developed unanimity as to the method of determining net Income. Accrual accounting results depend in goodly measure upon the judgement of the individual accountant who, while he endeavors to match expired costs to the realized revenue of the period, must still be concerned about the effects of the various methods of 196 inventory valuation, of depreciation methods and year-to-year changes in such methods, and of the different methods of allocating income taxes to a current year or over a period of years. The expenses of advertising and promotion, of research and development, of bad debts, and of handling

the changes in accounts resulting from the on-rushing tide of mergers—

these plague the accountant who wishes to present the results of the cur­ rent period on a basis which is consistent and comparable to those of a prior year. Thus, it is difficult to consider one year's earnings, or net

income, as an definitive, unchallengeable figure.

Within the accounting profession, as concerns income concepts,

there have been two conflicting viewpoints; current operating performance. and all inclusive. The emphasis under the former is upon the ordinary, normal, recurring operations of the firm during the current period. Prior period adjustments and extraordinary items should not affect the net in­

come item, but should be reflected in the retained earnings account. Eldon

S. Hendriksen has well expressed the all inclusive concept:

"The annual reported net incomes, when added together for the life of the enterprise, should be equal to the total net in­ come of the enterprise."2

He has also mentioned the difficulty of accepting the net income of

3 a single year as final:

Because the useful lives of assets usually extend over many

^Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory. (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 113.

3Ibid.. p. 115. 197

periods and because income-producing transactions are not at uniform stages of completion at the end of each period, the net income of a single period is, at best, an estimate based on good judgment. Because of the necessarily subjective nature of accounting, the net income of a single period is tentative and always subject to verification at later dates.

Since the earnings of one year cannot be considered definitive, the effect on stockholders1 interests can properly be measured only over a period of many years (the brief time-span of this present study has likewise been insufficient to measure the effects of repurchase in an adequate fashion).

The effect of inflation has become more marked in recent years;

It is advisable and appropriate to consider the change in the value of the dollar in a study of the effects of repurchase. Again, the change should be measured over a span of years, rather than one or two.

Recommendation for Future Research

A research study, in the future, can be built upon the conclusions of this study: to determine the effects of repurchase upon the earning power of unlisted industrial companies over a period of years, utilizing the steadily growing store of information and trend toward more adequate disclosure, as well as permitting yearly layers of evidence to accumulate.

Another research study of the repurchase activities of unlisted corporations has been provided by the recent passage of the Full Disclosure

Act, Public Law No. 90-439. The present study has furnished details of the situation as it existed prior to the enactment of the law. Some years hence, after implementing guidelines have been established by the Securities and 198/199

Exchange Commission, there will be an opportunity for a comparable study

to determine the changes which have resulted. APPENDICES APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

I. HISTORICAL

The problem of repurchase Is not new nor has it been confined to the United States. It has been a universal problem, making its impress upon the business community, the legislation, and the legal decisions of countries throughout the civilized world. It is significant, however, that the approval of repurchase by majority rule in the United States stands alone in the world of comparative 1 law.

France

The French seemed to have learned well from the disastrous collapse of the "Union Generale," a well-known banking company, in 1882, Its insolvency was hastened by purchases of its own shares, made with the company's funds and credit.

The broad and comprehensive French literature on corporation does not indicate that purchases by corporations of their own stock are common in France; and legal actions involving repurchase seem not to have occurred in the twentieth century. This apparently is due to the attitude of the courts which, for the most part, have held

Artur Nussbaum, "Acquisition by a Corporation of its Own Stock," 35 Colum. L. Rev. 976 (1935),

201 202 2 such purchase illegal.

Currently, in accord with article 217 of the Constitution of

1958, except in a few cases a corporation may not hold its own shares as treasury stock.

Germany

In 1884 (law of July 18, 1884, art. 215 d.) the corporation law was amended to provide that corporations might not acquire their own shares in the course of their "business management." In 1897 the language of the statute was altered to read that a corporation must not acquire its own stock "in its regular business management." This new wording was construed by corporation lawyers to mean that any purchase which was not a regular business transaction was allowed.

For Instance, purchases made to "support the market" or to eliminate minority groups antagonistic to the management were considered permissible. Since the law provided neither penal liability nor Invalidity of the purchases, managements were happy to adopt the conclusions of legal writers and to continue the repurchase of their stock until they were forced, by financial necessity, to abandon the practice.

During the period of years from 1925 to 1928 a substantial inflow of American funds had caused an over-expansion of Industry in Germany.

With the cessation of such investments from abroad, business contracted

2Ibid., p. 972. 203 in 1929, earnings declined, and stock prices fell. Many companies, banks in particular, tried to maintain the market prices of their shares by their own purchases.

In July 1931 when the banks were closed by decree of the government, they owned their own stock in the following amounts:

Percentage of Stock Capital own shares Bank (millions of marks) acquired

Banner Bankvereln 36 63.9% Allgemeine Deutsche Creditanstalt(Adca) 20 55.0 Commerzbank 75 49.3 Deutsche Bank and Discontogesellschaft (D. D. Bank) 285 36.8 Dresdner Bank 100 55,0 Darmstaedter und National-Bank 60 58.3

Industrial companies, too, attempted to prop up the prices of their securities by large-scale repurchases. As an Instance of this, the annual report for 1931 of "I. G. Farben," then the largest manufacturing enterprise in Germany, revealed that of the total outstanding stock of 1,100,000,000 marks, 114,000,000 had been re­ acquired.^

A change in the corporation law in 1931 put further restrictions on repurchase but it was financial necessity— lack of available funds— more than the legal prohibition, which forced an abandonment of the practice. This is still true. Under the corporation law (Aktiengesetz) in effect on January 1, 1966, the corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) has unlimited legal capacity to act. There is no ultra vires.

3Ibid.. p. 973. 204

England

The oft-cited case of Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409

(1887), has become a landmark in British law. It established a precedent which is still carefully adhered to in the British Companies

Acts, which appear to forbid reacquisition of stock (Section 54 of the Companies Act, 11 and 12 Geo. 6 c 38 (1948).

The case had been brought before the House of Lords on an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal. In 1880, the executors of Whitworth, a deceased stockholder, had sold his shares to G. W.

Schofield, a director, acting as agent for the firm of James Schofield and Sons, Limited. However, only partial payment of the purchase price had been made prior to the company's liquidation in 1884.

It was the decision of the court that the purchase of a com­ pany's own shares was ultra vires. Lord Macnaghten said that:

It appears to me that the notion of a limited (liability) company taking power to buy up its owns shares is contrary to the plain intention of the Act of 1862, and inconsistent with the conditions upon which, and upon which alone, Parliament has granted to Individuals who are desirious of trading in partnership the privilege of limiting their liability.

But it was the opinion of Lord Herschell which has persisted in the annals of legal history and which has applicability to the current day. He said:

What was the reason which induced the company in the present case to purchase its shares? If it was that they might sell them again, this would be a trafficking in

^Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 433 (1887). 205

the shares, and clearly unauthorised. If It was to retain them, this would be to my mind an Indirect method of reducing the capital of the company . . . I can quite understand that the directors of a company may sometimes desire that the shareholders should not be numerous, and that they should be persons likely to leave them with a free hand to carry on their operations.

He continued:

But I think It would be most dangerous to countenance the view that, for reasons such as these, they could legitimately expend the moneys of the company to any extent they please in the purchase of its shares. No doubt if certain shareholders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company, and are willing to sell their shares, they may be bought out; but this must be done by persons, existing shareholders or others, who can be induced to purchase the shares, and not out of the funds of the company.5

Other Foreign Countries

Switzerland, under the prevailing Code of Obligations, a corporation may not, except in a few cases specified by law, purchase its own shares or take them as pledge. In Sweden, in accordance with the Act of September 14, 1944, the prohibition is similar to that of Switzerland. So, too, Austria and Italy.

In Canada, as might be expected, British precedent has been controlling (Alberta Flouring Mills Co. v. Christie, 58 Can. Sup.

Ct. 208, 219 (1919); and in Belgium, in addition to following the French dictum, corporate directors and officers are liable to criminal punishment for buying shares of their own corporation, thus

Intentionally impairing the stock capital or statutory reserves.

5Ibid., p. 417. 206

United States

Despite the prohibition against repurchase in most foreign countries, and particularly in England, approval of repurchase gained early acceptance in the United States. At the present time, ninety percent of all jurisdictions by statute expressly or implicitly empower a corporation to purchase or redeem its own shares. Currently, five states do not have express statutory authorization for corporations 6 to repurchase their own shares.

However, since a corporation's power to purchase its own shares presents opportunities for abuse and prejudice to the rights of other shareholders and corporate creditors, all jurisdictions place limitations upon such power, either by statute, by common law, or both. These limitations take two major forms:

1. Financial requirements

a. Payment must be made out of surplus;

b. Use of funds prohibited in the event of

existing or resulting insolvency;

c. Existing or resulting assets must exceed total

preferential amounts in liquidation.

2. Equitable limitations

a. Additional restrictions imposed by courts in

^Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations: Securities Regulation (New York: Matthew Bender, 1967) Sec. 147.03. Arizona, Idaho, Maine, New Jersey, and New Mexico. 207

order to prevent fraud, oppression, or unfairness

upon other shareholders or corporate creditors.

In a given purchase of stock, at least three different sets of legal obligations on the part of the corporation and corporate management may be involved:

1. Obligations to other shareholders of the same

class, or a different class, who are not selling

their shares;

2. Obligations to corporate creditors;

3. Obligations to the shareholder who is selling

his stock to the corporation.7

II. LEGAL

Despite the existence of the American rule (right to repurchase), as distinct from the English rule (which denies the existence of the right), and to its adherence by the great majority of courts in this country, several leading cases have supported the minority rule. This is based primarily on the trust fund theory which was expounded in 1824 by Judge Story in Wood v. Dummer. 3 Mason 308,

30 Fed. Cas. 435, no. 17, 944 (C. C. Me. 1824), to the effect that

"the stock capital is to be regarded as a trust fund for the corporate creditors."

Sixty years later Judge Carpenter cited Judge Story's comments

7Ibid.. 147.04. 208

In Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 560 (1884) and elaborated as follows:

The stock of a corporation is its only basis of credit. Unlike a partnership, its members generally are not individually liable for its debts. The character, reputation, and credit of its promoters do not attach to the corporation itself except to a limited extent. Hence, it is of vital Importance that the law should rigidly guard and protect the capital stock.

He continued:

Otherwise, especially in these days when so large a portion of the business of the country is carried on by corporations, confidence, on which the prosperity of the country largely depends, would be seriously impaired. Hence it is that in equity the capital stock of a corporation is now regarded as a trust fund for the payment of debts. The creditors have a lien upon it, which is prior in point of right to any claim which the stockholders as such can have upon it; and courts will be astute to detect and defeat any scheme or devise which is calculated to withdraw this fund, or in any way to place it beyond the reach of creditors.

The Penal Law of the State of New York (Section 664, Consol.

Laws 1909, c. 40) forbade a corporation from purchasing its own stock except out of surplus. However, Judge Learned Hand thought that even such a restriction was too lenient. In the frequently-cited case of In Re Tichenor-Grand Co.. 203 Fed. 720 (S.D. N.Y. 1913), he said:

If a corporation has received property into the treasury of the value of its authorized shares, that is no doubt subject to the vicissitudes of its enterprises, which will be re­ presented by public knowledge of its success or of the value of its shares. If, however, it purchases its own shares, this affects neither the value of the other shares, the success of its enterprises, nor the amount of its apparent . It is merely a method of secret distribution, against the deceit of which its creditors have absolutely no means of protection. The fund which they have the right to 209

rely upon has been surreptitiously taken from them. It seems to me very little relief against the evils which such a right causes, to limit it to cases where the corporation 1b thought to he solvent.

As recently as 1934, the year of the passage of the Securities

Exchange Act, Chief Justice Rand of the Supreme Court of Oregon referred to the minority rule when he said the "There is a great conflict of authority as to the right of a corporation to purchase g its own stock."

Despite repeated references by the courts to the trust fund theory and the minority rule, a well-documented Note on the subject in 1966 recapitulated in this fashion:

The power of a corporation to purchase its own shares— once the subject of "the most stubbornly fought conflict in corporation law" (Nussbaum 35 Colum. L. Rev. 971, 978 (1935) )— is today granted by all American jurisdictions although it is still denied in England . . . Thus, to meet the frequent objection that creditors and holders of preferred stock may be adversely affected by a corporate distribution of cash assets in return for common stock, most jurisdictions Impose solvency limitations upon repurchases and require that they be made from capital surplus or retained earnings . . . share repurchases are today so firmly established as a matter of routine business management that, despite the persistent arguments for a return to the English rule, attempts to abolish the practice are unlikely to succeed.9

Although it is evident that stock repurchase has flourished in the United States, it is likewise true that such programs have introduced problems which the courts have found difficulty in resolving.

g Loveland & Co. v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 39 p. 2d 668 (Ore. 1934).

%otes, "Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Federal Security Laws," 66 Colum. L,. Rev. 1292 (1966). 210

Common Law Background

The traditional common law concept was that the person with inside knowledge, if he were an officer or director of the

corporation, owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation. However,

the courts have long been perplexed by the need to define the

scope of duty owed by corporate officers and directors to their

shareholders from whom they purchased stock. Most courts have

agreed that before an obligation can be imposed upon a director

to disclose facts affecting the value of the corporation’s stock,

some fiduciary relationship between the director (i.e. directors,

officers and insiders) and the shareholder with whom he deals

must be established.

The majority rule is that "while directors occupy a trust

relation to the corporation which they direct, their duty does

not apply to the stockholders." This view was expressed in the

case of Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn, 210, 212, 177 S.W. 479,

480 (1915).

In the case of Carpenter v. Danforth. 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868),

an action to rescind a sale of stock to the defendant director

on the ground of fraud and undue influence, it was held that the

mere sale of stock by a shareholder to a director did not create

any trust relationship between the parties. Nor was the director

required to disclose facts known to him which might affect the value

of the stock.

A director or officer could engage with impunity in stock 211

transactions without disclosing Information as long as he refrained 10 from active fraud or misrepresentation.

The minority rule holds that an officer or director of a

corporation is under a fiduciary duty to stockholders to disclose

information affecting the stock value. In the leading case of

Oliver v. Oliver. 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903), the court stated:

, . . the fact that he (the director) is trustee for all is not to be perverted into holding that he is under no obli­ gation to each . . . (he) is, in most important and legitimate sense, trustee for the stockholder . . . (and) . . . if the facts so known to the director cannot be published, it does not follcw that he may use it to his own advantage, and to the disadvantage of one whom he represents.

This viewpoint has been followed in a substantial number of 11 cases.

Chronologically, the deviation from the so-called majority

rule manifested itself first in the "Special Facts" doctrine, which

extended the concept of a duty to disclose, recognizing that "although

there is normally no fiduciary relationship between corporate insiders

and their shareholders such an obligation will be imposed where the

circumstances of a particular case so demand." This rule was expressed

first in the early case of Strong v. Repide. 213 U.S. 431, 29 S. Ct.

525 (1909).

10 Harry G. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1961), p. 378.

1 1 ■ ■ Bettendorf v. Bettendorf. 190 Iowa 83, 179 N.W. 444 (1920); Lyon v. Carey. Ill Kan. 470, 206 Pac. 1109 (1922); Stewart v. Harris. 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904); and Poole v. Camden. 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1916). 212

In this case the Supreme Court stated that:

If it were conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that the ordinary relations between directors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to disclose to a shareholder the general knowledge which he may possess regarding the value of the Shares of the company before he purchases any from a shareholder, yet there are cases where, by reason of the special facts, such duty exists.

It has been held under this "Special Facts" doctrine that a corporate insider must inform a stockholder, from whom he contemplates buying stock, of those matters relating to the corporate business which the shareholder has a right to have at his disposal when 12 negotiating the sale.

later, the minority common law rule developed to the effect

that an officer or director had an affirmative duty to disclose to the stockholder all information materially affecting the value of his

shares. It was held that non-disclosure of inside information, regardless

of "special facts," constituted a breach of fiduciary duty to the 13 stockholder.

Today it is thought by some legal authorities that the "Special

Facts" rule, by its expanding recognition of different types of special

facts, has merged with the minority rule and has replaced the majority 14 mile.

12 Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P. 2d 958 (1945).

13Henn, o]i. cit., p. 379. 14 Notes, "Securities Regulation-Civil Liability for Failure to Disclose the Fraud of a Third Person," 35 UMKC L. Rev. 320 (1967). 213

Judicial recognition of the merger of "Special Facts" with the minority rule was well expressed by Judge Leahy in Speed v.

Transamerica Corp., 99 F., Supp. 808, 828-829 (D.C. Del. 1951), when he said:

The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the stock of minority stock­ holders without disclosing material facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his insider position but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which judgment would have affected the judgment of the insiders.

He went on to say:

The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction. Some courts have called this a fiduciary duty while others state it is a duty imposed by the "special circumstances."

In the case of Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (1963), the court said:

We think Judge Leahy in Speed v. Transamerica Corp. stated the general principles that are applicable, in terms upon which we cannot improve. These underlying principles apply not only to majority stockholders of corporations and corporate insiders, but equally to corporations themselves (underlining by the author) when acting through their officers, directors, or agents.

Furthermore, in California in 1945, in the case of Taylor v.

Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 980 (1945), the court referred to the earlier decision by the Supreme Court of California in the case of American

Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 98

P. 2d 497 (1940), in which the majority rule, the "Special Facts" doctrine and the minority view were all carefully enumerated. 214

In this Instance, the court said:

While It Is true that a numerical majority of the decided cases have adopted the legalistic view that a director owes no duty at all to the stockholders, a substantial minority have adopted the more realistic view that such a duty exists because the stockholders have placed the directors in a strategic position where they can secure first-hand knowledge of important developments, and where they can make it appear the shares are much less valuable than they really are . . .

The astonishing thing is that practically every legal writer in this field has approved the so-called minority view . . .

The so-called majority rule is predicated on the theory that the corporation— the collective stockholders— is a separate and distinct legal entity, an artificial personality, to whom the director owes his duty. The legal writers above referred to and the more recent cases adopting the minority view have pointed out the fallacy of this reasoning . . .

These authorities logically point out that the detailed information a director has of corporate affairs is in a very real sense property of the corporation and that no director should be permitted to use such information for his own benefit at the expense of his stockholders. The so-called majority rule permits a director to secure for himself profits rightfully belonging to all. Such a rule offends the moral sense, and is contrary to our modern concept of the duty of a director toward those he represents.

If the detailed information which a director has of corporate affairs is the property of the corporation and if he should not be permitted to use such information for his own benefit at the expense of the stockholders, should he be permitted to use such information when, as a director, he acts for and in behalf of the corporation itself?

Purchase and Redemption of Shares

Redemption is the process of redeeming redeemable shares. A

"purchase" by a corporation differs from a "redemption" in that the right or duty of the corporation to buy does not arise from a provision 215

In the articles and may not relate to all the shares of a given class.

It results from a specific agreement between the corporation and the shareholder which may be entered into either at the time the shares are created or at a subsequent time.

When a corporation purchases outstanding shares, the transaction may or may not result in a reduction of the capital stock. Depending upon the statute law of the specific jurisdiction involved, the corporation may be permitted to "cancel" the shares so purchased, thus reducing its authorized capital, or it may be permitted to hold the purchased shares as "treasury shares" (treasury stock). In the latter instance, these shares are still authorized but not outstanding and they can be resold. But whether or not the purchased shares are formally

"cancelled," their purchase may result in reducing the corporation's assets below its liabilities, or below the total of its liabilities and stated capital.^

Today, the great majority of all jurisdictions (90 per cent) have statutes which authorize and regulate the purchase and redemption of its own shares by a corporation.

Among the more important statutes are these: New York Business

Corporation Law (1963); The Model Business Corporation Act; Ohio

General Corporation Law (1955); Illinois Business Corporation Act (1957); and the General Corporation Law of Delaware (1967).

•'■■’Alexander K. Frey, C. Robert Morris Jr., and Jesse H. Choper, Cases and Materials on Corporations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 936, 937. 216

Section 513 of the Business Corporation Law of the State of New

York concerns the purchase or redemption by a corporation of its own shares and provides that a corporation, subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, may purchase its own shares, or redeem its redeemable shares, out of surplus or out of stated capital except when currently the corporation is insolvent or would thereby be made insolvent and except when such redemption or purchase would reduce net assets below the stated capital remaining after giving effect to the cancellation of such redeemable shares.

The Model Business Corporation Act was prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association. It has currently been adopted, in whole or in part, by twenty-three jurisdictions.16

The relevant provisions of the Act are Sections 2, 5, 17, 31, and 40.

Section 2. Definitions

(h) "Treasury shares" means shares of a corporation which have been issued, have been subsequently acquired by and belong to the corporation, and have not, either by reason of the acquisition or

thereafter, been cancelled or restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares. Treasury shares shall be deemed to be "issued" shares, but not "outstanding" shares.

Insubstantial adoption by twenty states: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

Partial adoption by three states: Connecticut, Maryland, and North Carolina. 217

Section 5. Right of corporation to acquire and dispose of its

own shares

A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and, if the articles

of incorporation so permit or with the affirmative vote of the holders

of at least two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the

extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available

therefor.

To the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used

as the measure of the corporation's right to purchase its own shares,

such surplus shall be restricted so long as such shares are held as

treasury shares, and upon the disposition or cancellation of any such

shares the restriction shall be removed pro tanto.

Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a corporation may

purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares for the purpose of:

(a) Eliminating fractional shares.

(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the

corporation.

(c) Faying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment

for their shares under the provisions of this Act.

(d) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this

Act, the retirement of its redeemable shares by 218

redemption or by purchase at not to exceed the

redemption price.

No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent.

Section 17.

Treasury shares may be disposed of by the corporation for such consideration expressed in dollars as may be fixed from time to time by the board of directors.

Section 31.

Neither treasury shares, nor shares held by another corporation if a majority of the shares entitled to vote for the election of directors of such other corporation is held by the corporation, shall be voted at any meeting or counted in determining the total number of outstanding shares at any given time.

Section 40.

Dividends may be declared and paid in its own shares out of any treasury shares that have been reacquired out of surplus of the corporation.

The Ohio General Corporation Law (1953) covers the purchase of own shates by corporation in its Section 1701.35, and the Reduction of

Stated Capital in Section 1701.31.

The Illinois Business Corporation Act (1957) handles the matter in the following provisions:

Section 157.6 Power of corporation to acquire its own shares. 219

Section 157.58 Redemption and cancellation of shares.

Section 157.58a Cancellation of reacquired shares.

The General Corporation Law of Delaware,- as the result of a comprehensive review and study authorized by the Delaware Legislature in 1963, was substantially revised and modernized by passage of Senate

Bill No. 123, Laws of 1967, effective July 3, 1967. Provisions applicable to treasury shares and repurchase are included in the following:

Section 153.

(c) Treasury shares may be disposed of by the corporation for such consideration, expressed in dollars, as may be fixed from time to time by the board of directors, or by the stockholders if the certificate of incorporation so provides.

Section 160. Corporation's power respecting ownership, etc.

of its own stock

Every corporation may purchase, receive, take or otherwise acquire, own and hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, pledge, use and otherwise deal in and with its own shares; but no corporation shall use its funds or property for the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when the capital of the corporation Is impaired or when such use would cause any impairment of the capital of the corporation, except that it may purchase or redeem out of capital its own shares of preferred or special stock in accordance with Section

243 of this title. Shares of its own capital stock belonging to the corporation, or to another corporation, if a majority of the shares 220 entitled to vote in the election of directors of such other corporation is held by the corporation, shall neither be entitled to vote nor counted for quorum purposes. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the right of the corporation to vote its own stock held by it in a fiduciary capacity.

Section 174. Liability of directors for unlawful payment

of dividend or unlawful stock purchase or

redemption; exoneration from liability;

contribution among directors; subrogation

(a) In case of any willful or negligent violation of the provisions of Sections 160, 173, or 243 of this title, the directors under whose administration the same may happen shall be jointly and severally liable, at any time within six years after paying such unlawful dividend or after such unlawful stock purchase or redemption, to the corporation, and to its creditors in the event of its dissolution or insolvency, to the full amount of the dividend unlawfully paid, or to the full amount unlawfully paid for the purchase or redemption of the corporation's stock, with interest from the time such liability accrued.

Any director who may have been absent when the same was done, may exonerate himself from such liability by causing his dissent to be entered on the books containing the minutes of the proceedings of the directors at the time the same was done, or immediately after has has notice of the same.

(b) Any director against whom a claim is successfully asserted under this section shall be entitled to contribution from the 221 other directors who voted for or concurred in the unlawful dividend, stock purchase or stock redemption.

(c) Any director against whom a claim is successfully asserted under this section shall be entitled, to the extent of the amount paid by him as a result of such claim, to be subrogated to the rights of the corporation against stockholders who received the dividend on, or assets for the sale or redemption of, their stock with knowledge of facts indicating that such dividend, stock purchase or redemption was unlawful under this chapter, in proportion to the amounts received by such stockholders respectively.

Section 243. Reduction of capital

(a) Any corporation may reduce its capital at any time in one or more of the following manners:

(1) By retiring or reducing the outstanding shares

of any class.

(2) By purchasing shares of any class for retirement

either by lot or pro rata from all holders of

shares of the class.

(3) By purchasing shares for retirement from time to

time in the open market or at private sale, in

both cases at not exceeding such price or prices

as may be fixed or approved by the stockholders

entitled to vote upon the reduction of capital

to be effected in that manner.

(4) By the exchange by the holders of outstanding shares of any class of stock, with or without par

value, for the same or a greater or lesser number

of shares of the same or of a different class or

classes of stock, with or without par value, the

effect of which is to work a reduction in capital.

(5) By reducing the par value of the shares of any

class of stock having par value in conjunction with

appropriate action under section 242 of this title.

(6) By reducing the amount of capital represented by

shares of stock having par value by an amount not

greater than such amount exceeds the aggregate par

value of such shares or the amount of capital

represented by shares of stock having no par value.

(7) By retransferring to surplus all of any part of the

amount by which capital shall have been increased

by transfer thereto from surplus pursuant to the

provisions of section 154 of this title if such

transfer shall not have been made in respect of

any designated class or classes of stock.

(8) By retiring shares owned by the corporation. If

such reduction of capital be effected by retiring

shares, then, if the consent or resolution of

stockholders referred to in subsection (b) shall

so provide, an amount not exceeding that part of

the capital of the corporation represented by 223

such shares may be charged against or paid

out of the capital of the corporation in respect

of such shares.

No reduction of capital, however, shall be made unless the assets of the corporation remaining after such reduction are sufficient to pay any debts, the payment of which shall not have been otherwise provided for, and the certificate of reduction required by subsection

(b) shall so state.

Blue Sky Legislation

Apparently the term "blue sky law" first came into general use in Kansas to describe legislation aimed at promoters who "would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple."

Though Connecticut in 1903 and Nevada in 1909 adopted statutes to regulate non-utility securities, Kansas usually is given credit for having passed the first general securities law in 1911. The Kansas

Act provided for the registration of securities and of securities salesmen.

Between 1910 and 1933, when the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, the blue sky movement spread rapidly throughout the country.

The fashion set by Kansas soon spread widely until blue sky laws of one kind or another were adopted by virtually all the states as well as all the Canadian provinces (for example, by Manitoba as early as

1912).

Blue sky laws essentially fall into three classifications: 224

1. The "fraud" type of statute, which does not require

either qualification of securities or licensing of

securities dealers;

2. The "licensing" type which requires dealers in securities

to be licensed but does not require registration or

qualification of the securities themselves; and

3. The "licensing and inspection" type which requires both

that securities be registered or qualified and that dealers

be licensed.

From the standpoint of a consideration of repurchase programs, blue sky legislation is of significance essentially because such laws,

lacking uniformity and possessing both limited applicability and in­

ability to prevent the occurrence of fraudulent actions and the issuance

of securities of doubtful merit, paved the way for federal securities

legislation. It is noteworthy that, despite the lack of uniformity of

blue sky laws but with consideration to the proponents of states' rights,

Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 specifically provided for no 17 infringement on blue sky legislation.

The Securities Act of 1933

The Securities Act of 1933 did not spring full grown from the brows

of New Deal legal craftsmen. It followed a generation of state regulation

and almost a century of legislation in England. Public sentiment, aroused

^Louis Loss, Securities Regulation (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2nd Edition, 1961), pp. 30, 31. 225 by practices and methods under which securities had been distributed in the period since World War X, called for Federal intervention, to fill the void caused by the ineffectual safeguards and lack of enforcement rigor of the various state blue sky laws.

The Securities Act was designed to provide disclosure to Investors of material facts concerning securities publicly offered for sale in interstate commerce, either by an Issuing company or by any person controlling such company, and to prevent fraud, deceit, or misrepresen- 18 tation in the sale of securities generally.

The basic philosophy of the Securities Act of 1933, then, was full and fair disclosure, a carry-over from the full disclosure philosophy of the British Companies Acts.

According to Barnett, the first requirement of disclosure in

England was contained in secion 38 of the British Companies Act of

1867.^ However, according to Professor Loss, it was the 1929 Companies

Act which was one of the models used in drafting the Securities Act of

1933.20

The common law did not impose upon the seller an obligation to make any disclosure in a sale of securities. The basis of liability at the common law, both in actions of rescission and of deceit, was

1831 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 22 (1965). 19 George, E. Barnett, "The Securites Act of 1933 and the British Companies Act." Harvard Business Review, XIII (October, 1934), pp. 1-18. 20 ^uLoss, op. cit.. p. 1. "material misrepresentation."

Under the Companies Act of 1867 the civil liability of directors

and promoters is prima facie for an "untrue statement" in a prospectus; under the Securities Act of 1933 the liability of an issuer, and the

prima facie liability of other persons, is for an "untrue statement of

a material fact" or the omission "to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.

The man who left the greatest mark on the philosophy of federal

securities regulation in this country, in the opinion of Professor

Loss was Justice Louis D. Brandeis. He was a great advocate of publicity 22 and of disclosure in the handling of other people's money.

Both Justice Brandeis' philosophy and the insistence on full

disclosure were merged in the message which President Franklin D.

Roosevelt sent to the Congress on March 29, 1933:

I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal Supervision of traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce . . . there is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every new issue of securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be con­ cealed from the buying public. This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine, "Let the seller also beware." It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.

^Barnett, Op. Cit., pp. 1-18. 227

What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's money are trustees acting for others.23

In an article published in August, 1933 Felix Frankfurther, the then distinguished professor of Harvard Law School and a consultant for the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which drafted the Act, made some observations which are relevant to the subject of repurchase and those who are responsible for initiating these programs.

In discussing the civil liabilities resulting from the Act, pertaining to the issuer, underwriters, directors, officers, and "any person" who participated in the preparation or certification of any part of the Registration Statement, he commented: "He who is unwilling to assume the responsibility of a fiduciary has no business to be a fiduciary"; and, with particular relevance to over-the-counter (unlisted) corporations, with which this study is concerned, although he was not attempting to differentiate between listed and unlisted corporations, he said:

The Securities Act thus proceeds on the principle that when a corporation seeks funds from the public it becomes in every true sense a public corporation. Its affairs cease to be the private perquisite of its bankers and managers; its bankers and managers themselves become public functionaries. This principle has been slow of acceptance, particularly with those profitably accus­ tomed to the old and easy ways.24

23?7 Cong. Rec. 954 (1933).

2*Felix Frankfurther, "The Federal Securities Act: II," Fortune. VIII (August, 1933), p. 111. 228

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Just as the Securities Act of 1933 primarily concerned new issues of securities, the Securities Exchange Act pertained to the trading markets, to the securities which had previously been issued 25 and which were being traded on the recognized exchanges.

Congress recognized the need for continuing information about companies in the realization that the absence of such data facilitated the issuance of misleading information, prevented an adequate evaluation of their securities, and encouraged manipulation. Hence, a primary objective of this Act was the extension of the principle of disclosure to those securities which had already been Issued and in which trading 26 was taking place.

The anti-fraud provisions of the Act, as amended in 1936, include

Section 10(b) and Section 15(c)(1), but the latter is limited to over- the-counter transactions and applicable only to transactions by brokers and dealers.

Section 10(b) reads as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula­ tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate

25 Public Law No. 291, 73rd Congress (H.R. 9323). 26 Sidney Robbins, The Securities Markets (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 91. 229

in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

It is worthy of note that Section 10(b), as enacted by Congress, specifically extended the anti-fraud provisions to include purchase

or sale, whereas Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 applied

only to sales.

It may not be readily apparent why the specific provisions of

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as originally enacted, were confined

to listed securities and companies and not extended to cover over-the-

counter companies.

In a discussion of the basic disclosure requirements of the ! Exchange Act, specifically Section 12 (Registration Requirements for

Securities), Section 13 (Periodical and Other Reports), Section 14

(Proxies), and Section 16 (Directors, Officers, and Principal Stockholders),

Professor Loss, a recognized authority on. the subject, commented in

this fashion:

The limitation of Sections 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Exchange Act to listed securities was not due to any conviction on the part of Congress that similar safeguards were not equally essential with respect to securities traded in the over-the- counter markets. The several exchanges were concrete, organized institutions which one could see and touch, and it was a relatively simple matter to condition the use of those markets upon compliance with the registration and other provisions. By contrast, the over-the-counter market was an amorphous thing which did not present a ready platform on which to base similar provisions.

As the Commission had occasion to observe in 1936: "Prior to the enactment of the statute, the over-the-counter market was one of the enigmas of our financial system. Authentic data were lacking with respect to its nature, its function, its size and the technique of its operation." It was not surprising, therefore, that, after setting up a fairly detailed system of regulation of the organized exchanges, Congress threw the entire problem of 230

the over-the-counter market into the lap of the newly created Commission.

Despite the decision of the Congress to permit the Commission to adopt rules governing the applicability of the Exchange Act to the over-the-counter markets, it is significant that the preamble to the

Act included that area in its sphere of regulation:

To provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes•

Rule 10b-5. In 1942, in order to implement Section 10(b) of the

Act, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5. This rule prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices by any person in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. It is, accordingly, broader in application than Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which is limited to fraudulent sales of securities.

Rule 10b-5 provides that:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the :malls, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

(1) To employ any device, scheme, or attifice to defraud, (2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum­ stances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or

27 ...... Louis Loss, Securities Regulation. II, p. 1149 231

sale of any security.

Rule 10b-5f as an anti-fraud provision, has given rise to a great many legal actions and decisions, as well as several significant interpretations by the Securities and Exchange Commission itself.

While it applies to "any person", insider or outsider, its most fiercely-contested problems have arisen, up to the present time, in connection with the purchase of securities by corporate insiders.

This phase of repurchase lies outside the scope of the present study.

The Holt and Morris Study of Repurchase

In an article which was published in 1934, Holt and Morris provided the results of a study which they had made of repurchased 29 stock during the years 1931-1933. (Thirty-one years elapsed before 30 the results of another study on this subject appeared in print.)

Their study, which concerned eighty cases of stock repurchase, forty preferred issues and forty common, undertook to determine the ex­ tent and importance of the practice of repurchase, and to provide a basis for consideration of some of the practical implications which are initiated when stock is reacquired. Their conclusion was that "stock repurchases have been few and relatively unimportant and unnoticed . . . excess working

^Robbins, o r . clt., p. 92.

^Walter A. Holt and Edwin 1. Morris, "Some AspectB of Reacquired Stock, 1931-1933." Harvard Business Review. XII, No. 4 (July, 1934), pp. 505-510.

^^Leo A. Guthart, "More Companies Are Buying Back Their Own Stock," Harvard Business Review. XLIII, No. 2 (March-Aprll, 1965). pp. 40-53. 232 capital arising from a reduced volume of business and unusually low security prices were, no doubt, important factors in stimulating this 31 action."

In view of the fact that the Securities Act of 1933 had been enacted a year previously and that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had become law on June 6, a month before the publication of their article, some of the observations of the authors, viewed from the vantage point of 1968, are interesting as bearing on the consequences of repurchase and in relation to legal interpretations and legislation which have developed since that period.

They concluded that legislation already enacted would not affect repurchase:

The practice of reacquiring stock may continue unchecked, as far as the law on the subject is concerned, until the position of the creditors is endangered . . . when stock is reacquired for the purpose of correcting overcapitalization, all groups may benefit because a more efficient business unit is created. However, in the absence of such a good reason, the wisdom and desirability of the action is open to question.

The investigation disclosed that a larger portion of the stock was purchased in the open market than by offers through an investment banking house. This does not raise any particular problem, but does indicate a tendency to avoid publicity. In this connection the New York Stock Exchange has ruled that all corporations stock after January 29, 1934 must offer full information on all options. The extent of holdings of treasury stock must be reported to the Exchange monthly and notification given before resale.

Their study concluded with a prophetic observation:

31 Holt and Morris, loc. cit. 32 Ibid. 233

No attempt has been made to deal conclusively with the legal aspects of the practice (reacquisition of stock). It is sufficient to say that creditors and stockholders alike were not inclined to question the activities of the management. There were cases in which the results, without a doubt, were beneficial to all interests concerned, while it is questionable whether the courts would have sanctioned others. It should be noted that the stock exchanges and the Government have taken steps which will reduce substantially the recurrence of abuses which frequency have arisen when corporations reacquired their own stock.

1934-1964

In the years subsequent to 1934 and prior to 1964, the subject of repurchase received scant attention and the magnitude of repurchase activity was small. According to Guthart, as recently as 1954, only slightly more than 5 million shares were repurchased on the New York

Stock Exchange, By 1965, however, the pace had increased markedly.

In that year New York Stock Exchange corporations repurchased 37,170,000 34 of their own common shares.

Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and

Exchange Commission

A joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives on September 5, 1961 authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission to undertake a major investigation of the rules and regulations of national securities exchanges and national securities associations for the protection of investors.

33 Ibid. 34 Guthart, oj>. cit., p. 40, 234

A combination of factors induced Congress to authorize the study: the record number of companies which were selling securities publicly for the first time; the substantial number of "hot issues"

(new issues of securities which sold at a substantial premium over the offering price on the first day, then suffered a sharp collapse in price in the post-offering trading markets); the participation in the marketing of new issues by newly formed, inadequately capitalized dealer-finns; the unusually high price-earnings ratios of many companies; high trading voldme in the listed and unlisted markets; the inability of broker/ dealer firms to cope with the greatly increased volume of paper work, characterized by high "fails" to receive and deliver stock certificates; the extended time required to transfer certificates to the ultimate 35 owners; and the rapid growth of investment companies.

The joint resolution of the Congress added subsection (d) to

Section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act. The wording of the law, and the discussions which took place prior to passage, indicated a desire for a very broad study of the rules, practices, and problems in the securities business and the securities markets, as well as a determination of such conditions as might require further legislation or changes in the rules previously promulgated by the Commission.

Section 19(d) reads as follows:

The Commission is authorized and directed to make a study and investigation of the adequacy, for the protection of Investors, of the rules of national securities exchanges and national securities

35 Robbins, op. cit., p. 76. 235

associations, including rules for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. The Commission shall report to the Congress on or before April 3, 1963, the results of its study and investigation, together with its recommendations, including such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable.^6

As directed by Public Law No. 87-196, a very broad study was initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the first segment of the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets was transmitted to the Congress on April 3, 1963.

In its letter of transmittal (III D), the Commission made reference to the subject of disclosure with regard to the over-the- counter markets:

Much of the material submitted evidences the fundamental importance of adequate disclosure by issuers as a most vital means of protection . . . the report further demonstrates, as have prior studies, that the longstanding contrast in the disclosure-oriented protections afforded investors owning securities listed on national exchanges and investors owning securities traded in the over-the-counter market is not warranted ... .

Issuers of over-the-counter securities, unlike their listed counterparts, are under no obligation to comply with the Commission's proxy rules or, except in certain cases, to furnish annual and periodic financial reports. Another void in investor protection in the over-the-counter market relates to insider trading . . . the policies expressed in these sections should also be applicable in the over-the-counter market . . .

Accordingly, the Commission will recommend extension of those sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which provide for the filing of annual and periodic reports, compliance with the

36 Paragraph (d) was added by Public Law No. 87-196 (75 Stat, 465) and was amended by Public Law No. 87-561 (76 Stat. 247) which increased from $750,000 to $950,000 the appropriation authorized for the study. 236

proxy rules, and protections against Insider trading to certain companies whose securities are traded in the over-the-counter market.37

In the body of the Special Study itself, in summarizing the over-the-counter markets, the report elaborated on the distinctive nature of this market in this fashion:

The over-the-counter markets are large and important, they are heterogeneous and diffuse, they are still relatively obscure and eyen mysterious for most investors, and they are also compara­ tively unregulated. These characteristics are not unrelated: the obscurity stems in part from the markets' very size, variety, and diffuseness, while the relative lack of regulations reflects a failure to keep pace with their growth and change since enactment of the original securities laws plus the difficulty of encompassing their wide variety in uniform regulatory measures.

Many of the recommendations embodied in the Special Study were adopted by Congress and enacted into law as Public Law No. 88-467, approved August 20, 1964 (78 Stat. 565). They are now known generally as the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964.

Securities Acts Amendments of 1964

This legislation added to and amended various sections of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Subsection (g) (1) of Section 12 extended the.requirement for filing a registration statement with the Commission to over-the-counter

•^Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 88th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 95, 1963, Part 1, Letter of Transmittal, p. vii.

3®Report of Special Study, Part 2, Chapter 7, p. 669. 237 companies.

Every Issuer which Is engaged In Interstate commerce, or In a business affecting Interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of the malls or any means or Instrumentality of Interstate commerce shall (file a Regis­ tration Statement):

1. within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of its first fiscal year ended after the effective date of this subsection on which the Issuer has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by seven hundred and fifty or more persons; and

2. within one hundred and twenty days after the last day of Its first fiscal year ended after two years from the effective date of this subsection on which the issuer has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by five hundred or more but less than seven hundred and fifty persons.39

Furthermore, by amendment of Section 13(a), issuers registered pursuant to the new Section 12(g) were required to submit annual (10-K) and periodic (9-L, semi-annual, and 8-K, current) reports, in order to keep current the information contained in the Registration Statement itself.

Further amendments provided, as in Section 14, that the new companies registered pursuant to Section 12(g) (1) must comply with the proxy regulations of the Act; with the periodic information filing, under

Section 15(d); and with the insider trading provisions (directors, officers, and principal stockholders), under amended Section 16(a).

^Public Law No. 88-467, approved August 20, 1964 (78 Stat. 565). 238

On September 15, 1964, the Commission adopted Rule 12g-l (a) which provided that:

For issuers which otherwise would be required to file a registration statement pursuant to Section 12(g) at an earlier date, the time within which such registration statement must be filed is extended to April 30, 1965.

Thus, April 30, 1965, became the date when over-the-counter

companies, of the prescribed asset size and number of stockholders,

became subject to the requirement of filing a registration statement,

such as listed companies had been furnishing since 1934. APPENDIX B

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTORS OF UNLISTED INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATIONS TO THEIR STOCKHOLDERS

It seems clear that, based upon the replies to the questionnaire which was sent to 145 industrial companies as well as on the examination of the reports which were sent by fifty companies to their stockholders and to the Securities and Exchange Commission, adequate disclosure, with specific regard to repurchase programs, was not provided either to those stockholders who sold out their stock or to those stockholders who did not sell.

The Need for Disclosure

If the above group of companies did not provide adequate disclosure to stockholders, the question might well be asked: "Why should directors disclose information regarding repurchase to their stockholders? Isn't this a matter which lies solely within the purview of the directors?"

Such a question used to result in the answer that it was the responsibility of the directors of a corporation to make decisions on matters of policy and it was the duty of operating officials to Implement those decisions, that repurchase of common stock was merely one of many uses of funds; as such, it need not be singled out for special attention or for the specific consideration of the stockholder body.

Another point of view was to the effect that if an individual

239 240 stockholder decided to sell out his holdings in a corporation, based upon his analysis of the company and his own specific financial re­ quirements, no sale would take place unless a buyer for his stock were found. If the buyer chanced to be the corporation itself rather than some other individual, what difference did that make?

As a general rule, in accordance with the standards of business ethics which prevailed prior to 1930, it was considered equitable for a corporation to purchase or redeem its own stock unless there were some evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. The absence of state regulations of a restrictive nature permitted small corporations to trade in their own securities without fear of running afoul of the law.

(Even today, North Carolina appears to be the only jurisdiction which, aside from the usual requirements, has express statutory regulations pertaining to a corporation's trading in its own securities.)*

The Change in Attitude after 1930

The collapse of the securities markets in the 1929-1930 period

Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations: Securities Regulation (New York: Matthew Bender, 1967) Sec. 147.03.

The North Carolina General Statute #55-52(c) provides that a corporation subject to other financial requirements may purchase its shares out of surplus only in certain enumerated instances, including the following:

On an organized securities exchange, if the board of directors shall have obtained authorization so to purchase within a period of one year preceding the purchase, by the vote of the holders, of a majority of the shares of the class to be purchased, after full disclosure to them of the specific purpose of the proposed purchase. 241

Induced a change in attitude regarding the responsibility of issuing corporations to their stockholders, a change from the concept of "let

the buyer beware" to that of "let the seller beware."

This change was embodied in the securities legislation which was enacted during the early years of the Roosevelt administration— the

Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

These Initial cornerstones of federal corporation law were based upon the desirability of full disclosure and the Securities Acts

Amendments of 1964, which extended the rules and regulations of the 1934

Act to over-the-counter securities, carried the concept of full disclosure

one further step.

Fuller Recognition of a "Fiduciary Standard"

The modern decisions of courts facing the problem for the first

time have almost uniformly held that a "fiduciary standard" is applicable

to a corporate manager in share-purchasing transactions. In this respect 2 they have turned the clock back to the leading case of Oliver v. Oliver 3 and to the "Special Facts" doctrine of Strong v. Repide in 1909...... 4 In the case of Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, Justice

Rives held that a corporation, in purchasing the shares of one of its

shareholders, had a duty to disclose material information. He said:

2118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).

3213 U.S. 419, 23 S. Ct. 521 (1909).

4263 F. 2d 748 (5th Circuit 1959). 242

Practically all jurisdictions recognize a "fiduciary relationship" arising from the directors and officers to their corporation and to the stockholders as a whole, while a "growing minority" accord this duty to individual stockholders, especially concerning the purchase of stock from a shareholder . . . the actual intent to deceive is not required where one party is so placed in such an advantageous position to the other.

Extension of the Law of Disclosure to Unlisted Companies

Three years later, in 1962, Professor William L. Cary, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, made a plea for 5 higher corporate standards:

I have mentioned that the federal law about disclosure is limited: it applies only to particular events (e.g., sale of securities), particular companies (e.g., those whose securities are listed), and particular persons (e.g., members of the board of directors). Should the law of disclosure be broadened? I think it should.

Six months later Part 1 of the Report of Special Study of

Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission was trans­ mitted to the Congress. In this study, it was demonstrated that the longstanding contrast in the disclosure-oriented protections afforded investors owning listed securities and those owning securities traded

in the over-the-counter market was not warranted.

In 1964 giving effect to the recommendations contained in the

Special Study, the Congress passed the amending Acts of 1964 which, by amending specific sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, extended

5 William L. Cary, "The Case For Higher Corporate Standards," Harvard Business Review. XL (September-October, 1962), p. 58.

g ...... Report, of. Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 88th Congress, 1st sess., H. Doc. 95, 1963, Part 1, Letter of Transmittal, p. vii. 243 the disclosure provisions to over-the-counter companies.

Further Extension of the Disclosure Concept

The thrust of these laws, however, was directed toward the pro­ tection of the purchasine investor, rather than of the present stock­ holder who sells his stock in the open market and then learns, to his dismay, that his company without his knowledge, has been quietly re­ acquiring stock (perhaps his very own!).

Chairman Manuel Cohen of the Securities and Exchange Commission has strongly advocated further disclosure in this area:^

The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to protect investors against fraud and to give them adequate information when they purchase securities. The Securities Exchange Act was designed to protect Investors through a combination of disclosure, anti­ fraud, anti-manipulative, and regulatory requirements in both the purchase and sale of securities. But I think it is safe to say that our primary emphasis and thought over the years has been on protecting investors in the purchase of securities. This, of course, has been the area of greatest abuse in the past. And certainly the loss which an investor suffers when a stock he purchases declines in price seems at first blush more tangible than the loss an investor suffers when he sells securities that later rise in price (underlined by the author). But is it any less a loss to that seller who would not have sold had he been in possession of all the facts? I think not.

The Corporation as an Insider: The Duty of Disclosure

The great majority of recent stockholder derivative actions have been directed against corporate insiders, and have been based upon

Rule 10b-5 or Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

However, it is well to recognize the recent trend toward the

^Manuel F. Cohen, "Note on Take-Over Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock," 22 Bus. Law. 149 (November, 1966). 244 inclusion of the corporation itself among those who are classified as "corporate insiders." 8 In the fairly recent (1963) case of Kohler v. Kohler Co., the court cited the decision in Speed v. Transatnerica Corp., 99 F.

Supp. 808, 828-829 (D.C. Del. 1951):

It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without disclosing material facts affecting the value of the stock, known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position but not known to the selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected the judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders.

The judge then went on to enlarge the classification of those on whom the duty of disclosure rested:

These underlying principles apply not only to majority stock­ holders. of corporations and corporate insiders, but equally to corporations themselves when acting through their officers, directors, or agents. (underlined by the writer).

In addition to negating the corporate fiction, he defined a material fact as being one "which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities."

His definition of materiality was adopted two years later (1965), ...... 9 in the case of List v. Fashion Park, Inc. along with the common law definition that where "a reasonable man would attach importance (to the fact misrepresented) in determining his choice of action in the transaction,

8319 F. 2d 634 (1963).

9340 F. 2d 457 (2d Cir.) cert, denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). 245 the fact misrepresented is material."

As bearing specifically on repurchase by unlisted corporations, where it has been shown that adequate disclosure has not been provided, the List test of reliance is significant;

The proper test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact.

The case of the Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf

Sulphur Co. has not yet been definitely decided. However, in the original trial before Judge Bonsai, the court (1967) adopted the Kohler rule on materiality and the List test of reliance.

On August 13, 1868, Judge Bonsai's decision was reversed in part by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, No. 30882. One of the important judgments in that decision further stressed the necessity of providing equal information to both parties to a transaction:

The only regulatory objective is that access to material information be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal to that of the insiders.

In an article commenting on the implications of the Texas Gulf

Sulphur case (prior to the decision from the Court of Appeals),

Professor Ruder tied the corporation up in the same package as the insider 10 in discussing methods of disclosure;

^David S. Ruder, "Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: The. Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur," 61 NWU. L. Rev. 900 (1967). 246

Under some circumstances, affirmative disclosure of material facts may be required. If the company is purchasing or selling stock, it is subject to the same restrictions as any insider. (underlined by the writer).

This being the case, when important considerations require that certain information be kept secret, the company may be foreclosed from dealing in its own securites. Certainly the policy considera­ tions relating to corporate transactions in its own shares are as strong as those relating to transactions by other corporate insiders. The necessity to examine corporate information for the purpose of deciding at what point facts known to the corporation become "material facts" should be obvious.

Although the above-mentioned pronouncements by judges and legal writers, in extending the duty of disclosure to corporations, apply equally to listed as well as over-the-counter companies, the latter have evidenced greater reluctance to provide adequate disclosure to their shareholders in repurchase activities as shown by their reliance on open market purchases rather than the use of tenders.

Consideration by Directors of Unlisted Companies of the Possible Effect

of Repurchase Upon Stockholders

Insofar as the unlisted companies under study were concerned, there was little proof to indicate that their directors considered the effect which repurchase might have upon both selling and non-selling stockholders.

Of fifty-five companies which responded specifically to the ques­ tion in the questionnaire, only one company said that a reason was "to permit stockholders to benefit from capital gains tax rates rather than to receive increased dividend income."

Furthermore, so little concerned were these directors with 247 providing the material facts about the repurchase program to their shareholders, enabling them to act intelligently with reliance upon all the relevant factors, that only ten companies, out of seventy-four which responded specifically to this question, claimed that they had informed stockholders, in advance, of the decision to repurchase.

Likewise, there was no evidence from the research study of company reports that the effect of repurchase upon the stockholders was considered, with Cannon Mills' request for blanket authorization a possible exception.

In this connection, the request of Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.

(an unlisted company, but not one of those under study) for authorization of repurchase by its stockholders, provided an Interesting contrast.

(Exhibit 1).

Regulations Imposed on Listed and Unlisted Companies

The directors of listed and unlisted companies have acted differ­ ently with regard to their repurchase activities. The listed companies have provided far more information about, and in advance of, repurchase to their stockholders than have their unlisted counterparts. Their method of repurchase has frequently involved the use of tenders, which have detailed the statement of purpose, source of funds, number of shares

Involved and time-duratlon, and the price to be paid.

The actions of the unlisted companies have been characterized by inadequate disclosure, and purchase of shares in the open market or in large block, off-the-market, purchases. Their actions, and implementation, 248

EXHIBIT 1

DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC.

Notice of annual meeting of stockholders to be held on

April 19, 1967.

The purposes of the meeting are as follows:

3) To consider the recommendation of management that the Board

of Directors be authorized to purchase, hold, or transfer

shares of the Company's own stock for the purpose of invest­

ment and diversification.

Proxy Statement

"It is the intent of management, should the stockholders approve, that the Board be authorized to purchase up to a total of 100,000 shares of the stock, from time to time, when the market conditions are favorable, using only unrestricted surplus (unappropriated and non-committed surplus) with any and all such acquisitions to be made so that no stockholder is favored over any other . . . management has had no negotiations, discussions, or understandings with anyone relating to the acquisition or the reissuance of any shares of the Company's stock. Management believes that the in­ terests of your Company can be better served by providing the Board of Directors with this authority so that it may take ad­ vantage of opportunities to acquire the stock that may arise from time to time in order to implement the charter amendment adopted last year permitting diversification in the Company's activities."

It was indicated that an affirmative vote of at least 66 2/3 per

cent of all voting stock issued and outstanding was required to adopt the

implementing resolution.

Source: Notice for Annual Meeting April 19, 1967. 249 have been unilateral, failing to provide stockholders with the material facts on which they might rely to arrive at an intelligent investment decision.

Although much of this differentiation might have arisen due to the much higher degree of voting control possessed by the unlisted companies, enabling them to pay less attention to the Interests of their minority stockholders than is true of the professional managers'who direct the operations of the listed companies, it is probably of even greater significance to evaluate the influence of external regulatory agencies upon the two groups of companies.

With specific reference to the repurchase of securities, the listed companies (whose stocks are traded on the New York Stock Ex- 11 change) have been subject to regulation by the Exchange and its listing requirements ever since their application for listing was approved.

In addition, they have been subject to the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, and to its Rules and Regulations, ever since the enact­ ment of that law over thirty years ago.

In contrast, unlisted companies (prior to May 1, 1965) had not been subject to any regulatory agency beyond the minimum restrictions imposed by the laws of the state in which they were incorporated and such standards as were Imposed by the common law.

This situation, of course, was altered by the passage of the

^Thls term applies to other Exchanges also; for reasons of simplicity, it is here confined to the New York Stock Exchange. 250

Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, which extended the registration, periodic reporting, insider reporting and trading, and proxy solicita­ tion requirements of the 1934 Act to include over-the-counter companies having at least $1,000,000 in assets and a class of equity security held of record by at least five hundred persons, and this extension became effective on April 30, 1965.

Thus, today, the companies whose securities are traded on the

New York Stock Exchange are subject to the requirements of the Exchange and of the Securities and Exchange Commission: the unlisted companies are subject only to the rules and regulations of the Commission.

Requirements of the New York Stock Exchange

Before securities may be admitted to trading on the New York

Stock Exchange, they must be approved for listing by the Exchange and, in addition, must be registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After a company has filed a registration statement with the

Securities and Exchange Commission and the Exchange has certified, to the Commission, that it has approved the particular security for listing and registration, registration follows automatically 30 days later (although the Exchange may request an earlier effective date).

The Listing Agreement between the Exchange and the applying company commits the company, after listing is approved, to a code of performance. Among the most important of the objectives of the

Agreement is that of "timely disclosure, to the public and to the Exchange, of information which may affect security values or influence investment 251 decisions, and in which stockholders, the public, and the Exchange have a warrantable interest."

Under the Agreement the Corporation specifically agrees that it:

will report to the Exchange, within ten days after the close of a fiscal quarter, in the event any previously issued shares of any stock of the Corporation listed on the Exchange have been reacquired or disposed of, directly or indirectly for the account of the Corporation during such fiscal quarter; such report showing separate totals for acquisitions and dispositions and the number of shares of such stock so held by it at the end of such quarter (Exhibit 2).

The New York Stock Exchange publishes a booklet for the benefit of directors of listed corporations, "The Corporate Director and the

Investing Public," in which is spelled out, in considerable detail, its requirement that such corporations should provide timely and adequate disclosure of corporate news and that publicity should be released by the fastest available means. It stresses the fact that a director's fiduciary responsibility to shareholders is of greater importance in a publicly owned than in a privately owned company; and it emphasizes the desirability of weighing the interests of both present and potential stockholders who at any given moment may be considering 12 buying or selling the company's stock.

On July 18, 1968, as a consequence of various legal actions and the suit instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission against

12 The New York Stock Exchange, November, 1965. EXHIBIT 2

THE NUMBER OF REACQUIRED SHARES

HELD BY LISTED COMPANIES AS TREASURY STOCK

SHARES HELD TOTAL SHARES

American Standard Inc. 1,679,539 11,709,936 Federated Department Stores Inc. 950,931 21,764,212 United Fruit Company 957,730 8,785,376

Gardner-Denver Company 321,662 5,639,728 American Home Products Corporation 1,935,856 49,457,430 Colgate-Palmolive Company 1,035,811 15,899,477

Food Giant Markets Inc. 407,800 3,350,779 Dayco Corporation 250,075 1,776,746 Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 203,423 1,650,062

Essex Wire Corporation 486,964 8,485,600 Ronson Corporation 213,870 3,233,061 Foremost Dairies Inc. 510,274 8,556,992

Brown Shoe Company 574,505 3,868,273 o* o* * 0 0 * 0 o o o - o o a* (u o a*

Dresser Industries Inc. 483,235 9,707,550 ct

National Lead Company 105,257 12,086,309 p>

Del Monte Corporation 216,229 11,680,943

The source of this Information is based on a tabulation of re­ ports received by the New York Stock Exchange of changes in the number or reacquired shares held by listed companies as treasury stock.

a. As of September 22, 1967 b. As of August 22, 1967 c. As of July 26, 1967 d. As of May 22, 1967 e. As of February 21, 1967 253 the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,^ the Exchange revised that portion of its

Company Manual dealing with timely disclosure and made broad, public distribution via its booklet, "Expanded Policy on Timely Disclosure."

Since many companies had become uncertain about what they should reveal, the Exchange's advice was: "When in doubt, disclose.

As applied specifically to repurchase, even more helpful than its general advocacy of timely disclosure, is the Exchange's requirement that listed corporations state the total number of shares repurchased, disposed of, and held as treasury stock at the end of the fiscal quarter and that this information be conveyed within ten days.

This information is more revealing than that which is required, currently, under the Rules and Regulations of the Securities and Ex­ change Commission.

Requirements Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Information required to be furnished by both listed and unlisted companies (only since April 30, 1965) with regard to repur­ chases is contained in the Form 10-K Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act, as well as the general form for annual reports by issuers which have securities registered pursuant to Section 12.

Item 2, Increases and Decreases in Outstanding Equity Securities, specifies the Information to be filed with the Securities and Exchange

•^S .E .C . v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S. D. N. Y. 1966).

^ The Times-Union. Rochester, New York, October 30, 1968, p.l-D. 254

Commission within 120 days after the end of the fiscal year. (This is the time requirement for the entire Form 10-K report.)

It is to be noted that the information required is merely that of reconciling the treasury stock at the end of the current fiscal year with the amount held as of the close of the previous fiscal year.

It does not require the amount of repurchased stock to be stated, nor the amount disposed of, nor the cost paid or date acquired. Also, since this information is furnished merely as a part of the 10-K report,

120 days after the close of the fiscal year, it certainly does not qualify as timely disclosure or as information released by the fastest available means.

Registrants are also required to keep such information current, by filing Form 8-K:

Item 8 Decrease in Amount of Securities Outstanding

If the amount of any class of securities of the registrant outstanding has been decreased through one or more transactions and the aggregate amount of all such decreases not previously reported exceeds 5 percent of the amount of securities of the class previously outstanding, furnish the following information:

(a) Title of the class, the amount outstanding as last previously reported, and the amount presently outstanding.

(b) A brief description of the transaction or transactions involving the decrease and a statement of the aggregate amount of cash or the nature and aggregate amount of any other con­ sideration paid or to be paid by the registrant in connection with such transaction or transactions.

This requirement could produce information on repurchases which would be helpful in disclosure but the decrease, to be reported, must exceed 5 percent of previously outstanding stock (since the previous 255 report) so that a company, if it so wished, could easily circumvent the intent of this provision.

The requisite filing of data in the Form 10-K and 8-K reports, then, is far less of a constraint on the directors of unlisted companies in their consideration of a repurchase program than a similar requirement imposed on listed companies plus the need to provide the far more specific information required by the Listing Agreement of the New York

Stock Exchange. Even more to the point, it enables unlisted companies to avoid timely and adequate disclosure, in keeping with their normal attitude toward minority stockholders.

Proposed Federal Legislation: S.510

In the fall of 1965, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Securities Subcommittee, Introduced a bill requiring greater disclosure in connection with cash take-over bids (tender offers).

It also would give the Securities and Exchange Commission broader author­ ity to require Issuing corporations to prqvide full disclosure in con­ nection with repurchase of their own shares.

This bill made little progress in the Eighty-Ninth Congress but was re-introduced in the Ninetieth Congress as S. 510 under the spon­ sorship of Senators Williams and Kuchel and referred to the Securities

Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the United

States Senate.

S. 510 had the strong advocacy of the Commission, whose Chairman,

Manuel F. Cohen, and General Counsel, Philip A. Loomis, Jr., testified 256

in its behalf, as did the leading officials of the New York Stock

Exchange and American Stock Exchange. Many lawyers and professors

of finance, who had written articles on the subject, were also witnesses.

Enactment of Public Law 90-439. the Full Disclosure Act

Senate bill S. 510 was ordered printed on August 29, 1967, and was

reported out to the Senate as Report No. 550, The Committee on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce reported its companion bill out as House Report No.

1711. After agreements on proposed amendments were concluded in committee,

the bill was passed by the House on July 15, 1968,. by the Senate on

July 18, and it was enacted into law on July 29, 1968 as Public Law 90-439,

"An act providing for full disclosure of corporate equity ownership of

securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."

The present study was initiated while hearings on Senate bill

S. 510 were in progress. Its passage as Public Law 90-439 is very gratifying, since it provides the Securities and Exchange Commission with specific and broad authority to establish rules and regulations which

"may require such issuer to provide holders of equity securi­ ties of such class with such information relating to the reasons for such purchase, the source of funds, the number of shares to be purchased, the price to be paid for such securities, the method of purchase, and such additional Information, as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public Interest or for the protection of investors, or which the Commission deems to be material to a determination whether such security should be sold."

In effect, the new law adds Subsection (e) (1) to Section 13

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 257

The passage of this Act represents a good beginning. Only time will tell how well the Commission will implement its newly acquired power, in order to provide the disclosure of such information as seems best to serve the interests of those shareholders of unlisted industrial corporations who are affected by repurchase: those who sell and those who do not sell. BIBLIOGRAPHY t bibliography

A. BOOKS

Baker,. Ralph J., and William L. Cary. Cases and Materials on Corporations. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1959, Supplement Sec, 11, pp. 1401-1428.

Brandeis, Louis D. Other People’s Money. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1914.

Cavitch, Zolman, Business Organizations: Securities Regulation. New York: Matthew Bender, 1967.

Cohen, Jerome B., and Sidney M. Robbins. The Financial Manager. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Dean, Joel. Managerial Economics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951.

DeBedts, Ralph F. The New Deal*s SEC. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Feuer, Mortimer. Personal Liabilities of Corporate Officers and Directors. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961, p. 131.

Fisher, Ronald A., and Frank Yates. Statistical Tables for Biological. Agricultural, and Medical Research. London: Oliver & Boyd, Ltd., 1949, Table XXXIII, Random Numbers (1), p. 104.

Frey, Alexander H., C. Robert Morris, Jr., and Jesse H. Choper. Cases and Materials on Corporations. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Friend, Irwin, G. Wright Hoffman, and Willis J. Winn. The Over-The- Counter Securities Markets. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958.

Hendriksen, Eldon S, Accounting Theory. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965.

Heim, Harry G. Handbook of the Law of Corporations. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1961..

Hunt, Pearson,. Charles M. Williams, and Gordon Donaldson. Basic Business Finance. Third Edition. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966, pp. 539-543.

259 260

Kohler, Eric L. A Dictionary for Accountants. Third Edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 507.

Loss, Louis. Securities Regulation. Second Edition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961.

Manne, Henry G. Insider Trading and the Stock Market. New York: The Free Press, 1966, p. 14.

Robbins, Sidney. The Securities Markets: Operations and Issues. New York: The Free Press, 1966, pp. 51, 91, 92.

Robicheck, Alexander, and Stewart Myers. Optimal Financing Decisions. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.

B. PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Andrews, William D. "The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares," 78 Harvard L. Rev. 505 (1965).

Axelrod, Leonard I. "Over-The-Counter Market: Its Organization, Its Problems," Financial Analysts Journal, XVIII, No. 6 (November-December, 1962), pp. 71-73.

Baker, Richard L. "Non-Dilutive Stock Benefits," 22 Bus. Law. 439 (January, 1967).

Barnett, George E. "The Securities Act of 1933 and the British Companies Act," Harvard Business Review. XIII (October, 1934), pp. 1-18.

Berle, Adolph A., Jr. "Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock," 25 Michigan L. Rev. 827 (1927).

Bierman, Harold Jr., and Richard West. "The Acquisition of Common Stock by the Corporate Issuer," Journal of Finance, XXI, No. 4 (December, 1966), pp. 687-696.

Brigham, Eugene F. "The Profitability of a Firm's Purchase of its Own Common Stock," California Management Review. VII, No. 2 (Winter, 1964), pp. 69-75.

Buchalter, S.D, "Purchase by a Corporation of its Shares: Corporate Cannibalism Without Indigestion," 41 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin 446 (August, 1966). 261

Cary, William L. "The Case for Higher Corporate Standards," Harvard Business Review, XL (September-October, 1962), pp. 53, 58.

Cohen, Jerome B. "Protecting Investors in Acquiring Control via Cash Tender Offers," Commercial & Financial Chronicle (July 14, 1966), p. 1.

Cohen, Manuel F. "Note on Take-Over Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock," 22 Bus. Law. 149 (November, 1966).

Comment, "Insider Liability under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10-b-5, The Cady, Roberts Doctrine," 30 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 121, 122 n.4 (1962).

Conant, Michael. "Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares," 46 Cornell L. (£. 53 (1961).

Dean, Arthur H, "The Federal Securities Act: 1," Fortune, VIII (1933), p. 50.

Donaldson, Gordon. "From the Thoughtful Businessman," Harvard Business Review. XLIII, No. 4 (July-August, 1965), p. 31.

Ellis, Charles D. "Repurchase Stock to Revitalize Equity," Harvard Business Review, XLIII, No. 4 (July-August, 1965), pp. 119-128.

Elton, Edwin, and Martin Gruber. "The Effect of on the Value of the Firm," The Journal of Finance, XXIII, No. 1 (March, 1968), pp. 135-149.

Ferber, David. "Disclosure of Corporate Information," Financial Analysts Journal, XXII, No. 4 (July-August, 1966), pp. 19-22.

Fleck, James D. "Corporate Share Repurchasing: An Informal Discussion," Harvard Business School Bulletin. XLI, No. 1 (January-February, 1965), pp. 10-13.

Fleischer, Arthur Jr. "Corporate Disclosure/insider Trading," Harvard Business Review. XLV (January-February, 1967), pp. 129-135.

______. "Corporation Law: An Assessment," 78 Harvard L. Rev. 1146, 1166 (1965).

______, and Robert H. Mundheim. "Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer," 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. No. 3 (January, 1967), pp. 317-370.

Foster.,. Paul. M. . "Asset Disclosure for Stockholder Decisions," Financial Executive (July, 1967), pp. 28-44. 262

Frankfurter, Felix. "The Federal Securities Act: II," Fortune, VIII (August, 1933), p. 111.

Guthart, Leo A. "More Companies are Buying Back Their Stock," Harvard Business Review, XLIII (March-April, 1965), p. 40.

______. "Why Companies Are Buying Back Their Own Stock," Financial Analysts Journal, XXIII, No, 2 (March-April, 1967), pp. 105-110.

Hayes, Samuel L. Ill, and Russell A. Taussig. "Tactics of Cash Take- Over Bids," Harvard Business Review, XLV, No. 2 (March-April, 1967), pp. 135-148.

Holt, Walter A., and Edwin L. Morris. "Some Aspects of Reacquired Stock, 1931-1933." Harvard Business Review; XII (July, 1934), pp. 505-510,

Horwich, W.D. "Stock Redemptions under Section 303 and the Accumulated Earnings Tax," 10 Tax Counselor's Quarterly 117 (June, 1966).

Hunt, Pearson. Letter to the Editor, Harvard Business Review, XLIII, No. 4 (July-August, 1965), pp. 36-37.

Israels, C.L. "Corporate Purchases of its Own Shares--Are There New Overtones," 50 Cornell L. 620 (Summer, 1965).

Jacobs, Donald. "The Marketable Securities Portfolios of Non-Financial Corporations: Investment Practices and Trends," Journal of Finance, XV, No. 3 (September, 1960), pp. 340-355.

Jennings, Richard W, "Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations under Rule 10-b-5," 62 NW. U. L. Rev. 809 (1968).

Kaplan, A.D. "The Current Merger Movement," Harvard Business Review, XXXIII, No. 3 (May-June, 1955).

Kennedy, W. McNeil, "Transactions by a Corporation in its Own Shares," 19 Bus. Law. 319 (January, 1964).

Latty, Elvin R. "Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes," 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 363, 378 (1958),

Liles, M., Jr. "How and When Does Corporate Inside Information Become Public?" 28 Ala. L. Rev. Ill (January, 1967).

Loomis, Philip A., Jr. "Recent Activity at the Securities and Exchange Commission," 61 NW. U. L. Rev. 667, 683 (1966). McDowell, R. A. "Directors' Liabilities in Securities Transactions," 22 Bus. Law. 76 (November, 1966).

Merjos, A. "Into the Till; Listed Companies Have Stepped up their Buying of Treasury Stock," Barron's (August 22, 1966).

______. "Inot the Treasury," Barron's AueuBt 17, 1964), pp. 9-12.

Miller, Samuel H. "The Tangle of Ethics," Harvard Business Review. XXXVIII (January-February, 1960), p. 60.

Mock, Edward J., and Donald Hart Shuckett. "Decision Models for the Acquisition of Treasury Stock," Management Services (March-April, 1968), pp. 49-55.

Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. "The Cost of Capital, Cor­ poration Finance, and the Theory of Investment," American Economic Review (June, 1958), pp. 261-297.

■ . . "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, American Economic Review, LIII, No. 3 (June, 1963), pp. 433-443.

- . ", Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business. XXXIV, No. 4 (October, 1961), pp. 411-434.

Note, "Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds," 70 'Yale L. J. 308 (1960).

Note, "Duty of Corporate Officers and Directors Who Purchase Stock From Their Shareholders," 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 71 (1953).

Note, "Insider's Duty to Disclosure When Purchasing Stock From a Shareholder," 43 Iowa L. Rev. 109, 113 (1957).

Notes, "Corporate Stock Repurchases Under the Federal Securities Laws, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1292 (November, 1966).

Notes, "Securities Regulation-Civil Liability for Failure to Disclose the Fraud of a Third Person," 35 UMKC L. Rev. 320 (1967).

Notes, "Texas Gulf Sulphur and The Duty of Disclosure, Another View," 55 Georgetown L^ .J. 664 (March, 1967).

Nussbaum, Artur. "Acquisition by a Corporation of its Own Stock," 35 Colum. L. Rev. 971, 978 (1935).

Phalen, Richard. "The Insider and the SEC," Dun's Review (September, 1966), p. 38. 264

Ruder, David S. "Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws.: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur," 61 NW. U. L. Rev. 872 (1967).

...... "Dangers in a Corporation's Purchases of its Own Shares," 13 Prac. Law. 75 (May, 1967).

Rundell, C.A. "From the Thoughtful Businessman," Harvard Business Review, XLIII, No. 6 (November-December, 1965).

Scanlon,. John J. ."How Much Should a Corporation Earn," Harvard Business Review, XLV, No. 1 (January-February, 1967), p. 8.

Schmults, Edward C., and Edmund J, Kelly. "Cash Take-Over Bids- Defense Tactics," 23 Bus. Law 115 (November, 1967).

Stevenson,. Richard A. "Corporate Stock Reacqulsitions," The Accounting Review. XLI, No. 2 (April, 1966), pp. 312-317.

Strong,. George H. "Management's Fourth Dimension," Financial Analysts Journal. XXIII, No. 2 (March-April, 1967), pp. 97-102.

Walter, Robert. "The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from His Stockholders," 32 Yale L. J. 637 (1923).

Wood, Donald, and Eugene Brigham. "Stockholder Distribution Decisions: Share Repurchase, or Dividends," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. I, No. 1 (March, 1966), pp. 15-26.

Young, Allan. "The Performance of Common Stocks Subsequent to Repurchase," Financial Analysts Journal. XXIII, No. 5 (September- October, 1967), pp. 117-121.

Zech,. Robert F. "Ethics in Business: The Responsibility of Management," Financial Executive (July, 1963), pp. 37-39.

C. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES,

AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Company Manual. New York Stock Exchange. Listing Agreement, A 18-34 (July, 1968).

"The Corporate Director and the Investing Public," The New York Stock Exchange, November, 1965.

"Expanded Policy on Timely Disclosure," New York Stock Exchange, July, 1968. 265

Loomis, Philip A., Jr. "Corporate Disclosure and Insider Information," A reprint of a Panel Interview at Fall Conference of the Financial Analysts Federation, Atlanta, Georgia, October 7, 1968.

Moody’s Dividend Record. New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc.

Moody's Industrial Manual. New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968 Editions.

National Daily Quotation Service. New York: National Quotation Bureau, Inc.

"Over-the-Counter Markets Study," prepared by Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc. for National Association of Securities Dealers, August 22, 1966.

U.S. Congress.. Report, of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 88th Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. 95, 1963, Part I, Letter of Transmittal, p. vii, and Part II, ch. 7. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.

U.S. Congressional Record. 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933, Vol. 77, Part I, 954.

U.S. Public Law 90-439. 90th Congress, S. 510, July 29, 1968.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 31 Ann. Rep. (1965), 32 Ann. Rep. (1966), 33 Ann. Rep. (1967). Washington: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Branch of Capital Markets. "Domestic Corporate Securities Issued and Retired." Washington, March, 1969, unpublished.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Directory of Companies Filing Annual Reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1965 Washington: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings. V°ls. 29-33 Inc. (1963-1968). Washington: Government Printing Office.

D. NEWSPAPERS

Barron's: National Business and Financial Weekly, May 29, 1967, pp. 44-46. 266

______, June 24, 1968, pp. 1, 8, 10, 12, and 15.

New York Times. August 16, September 15, September 19, and October 13, 1968 (Section 3, p. 1).

0-T-C Market Chronicle. New York: William B. Dana Company, Vol. 1, No. 2-33 inc (June, 1967-September, 1968).

The Times-Union. Rochester, New York, October 30, 1968, p. ID.

Wall Street Journal, New York: Dow Jones and Company, Inc., May 26, 1967, p. 25.

E. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

Guthart, Leo A. "Corporate Repurchases of Already Outstanding Common Stock, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1966.

Rapp, Wilbur A. "The Role of Reacquired Common Stock in Financial Management." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1966.

Stevenson, Richard A. "The Reacquisition of Corporate Stock." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Michigan State University, Lansing, 1965.

F. LEGAL CASES

Alberta Flouring Mills Co. v. Christie, 58 Can. Sup. Ct. 208, 219 (1919).

American Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 98 P. 2d 497 (1940).

Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. ch. 14, 22, 187 A 2nd 405, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

Bettendorf v. Bettendorf. 190 Iowa 83, 179 N.W. 444 (1920).

Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.. 193 F. 2nd 461, 464 (2nd Cir. 1952).

Carpenter v. Danforth. 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868).

Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. ch. 494, 199 A 2d 548 (1964). 267 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).

Crandall v. Lincoln. 52 Conn. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 560 (1884).

Geller v. Transamerlca Corp.. 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943),

Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P. 2d. 958 (1945).

Hoover v. Allen. 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. 2d 531 (1932).

Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D, Penna. 1947).

Kors v. Carey, 158 A 2nd 136 (Del. Ch. 1960).

Lawrence v. Decca Records Inc., 27 Misc. 2d 445, 203 NYS 2d 225 (1960).

List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F. 2nd 457, 462 (2nd Cir) 382 U.S. 811 (1965).

Loveland & Co. v. Doernbecker Mfg. Co., 39 P. 2d 668 (Ore. 1934).

Lyon v. Carey, 111 Kan, 470, 206 Pac. 1109 (1922).

Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F. 2d 748 (5th Cir., 1959).

Mathes v. Cheff, 190 A 2nd 524 (1963).

McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F. 2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 939.

The Northern Trust Co. v, Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 111. App. 134, 108 N.E. 2nd 493 (1952).

Oliver v. Oliver Co., 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E, 232 (1903).

O’Neill v. Maytag, 339 F. 2nd 764 (2nd Cir. 1964).

Poole v. Camden. 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1916).

Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co., 74 P. 938 (1904).

Propp v. Sadacea, 175 A. 2nd 33 (1961).

Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. #91699 (1st Cir. June 2, 1966). Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.. 339 F 2d 24 (1964).

Scrlgglns V. Thomas Dalby Co.. 290 Mass. 414 (1935).

Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 212, 177 S.W. 479, 480 (1915).

Speed y. Transamerlca Corp.. 99 F Supp. 808, 828-829 (D. Del. 1951).

Stewart v. Harris. 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904).

Strong v. Repide. 213 U. S. 431, 29 S. Ct. 525 (1909).

Surowltz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.. 383 U. S. 363 (1966).

Taylor v. Wright. 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P. 2d 980 (1945).

In Re Tlchenor-Grand Co., 203 Fed. 720 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).

Trevor v. Whitworth. 12 App. Cas. 400, 433 (1887).

Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.. 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).

Wlnchell v. Plywood Corp., 85 N. E. 2d 313 (1949).

Wood v. Dummer. 3 Mason 308, 30 Fed. Cas. 435, No. 17, 944 (C. C. Me. 1824)

G. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CASES

Cady Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 (1961).

S.E.C. v Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.. 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963).

S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), and reversed in part by S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. et al., U. S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, No. 30882, August 13, 1968.

Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 SEC 373 (1943).