Sunland Tribune Volume 30 Article 7 2005 Who Loaded What, When, and Where: Capt. James McKay and the Spanish American War Joe Knetsch Pamela K. Gibson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/sunlandtribune Recommended Citation Knetsch, Joe and Gibson, Pamela K. (2005) "Who Loaded What, When, and Where: Capt. James McKay and the Spanish American War," Sunland Tribune: Vol. 30 , Article 7. Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/sunlandtribune/vol30/iss1/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sunland Tribune by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Who Loaded What, When, and Where: Capt. James McKay and the Spanish­ American War Arrival of a battalion at Tampa in 1898. (Courtesy of the Henry B. Plant Museum Photographic Collection.) Joe Knetsch, Ph.D. ries of rotten beef, spoiled hardtack, and Paµ1el a K. Gibson railroad cars sitting for weeks on sidings with perishable foodstuffs inside: all these he usual story of the Tampa-based made spectacular headlines in many news­ preparations for the Spanish­ papers. The infamous "embalmed beef" American War is one of confusion, scandal played well in the "Yellow Journal­ incompetence and near chaos on ism" of the day. Public outcry demanded the waterfront. Testimony of many high­ that all of these horrific events had to be in­ ranking and important officers and volun­ vestigated to provide an answer to the ques­ teers noted the general lack of organization tion: How can they be prevented from ever in the loading of the transport fleet prior to happening again? The real question is, did the invasion of Cuba. Most of the regular of­ they ever happen at all? And, whether they ficers also noted the lack of transports, the happened or were invented, who was to fact that only one rail line went to the Port blame? of Tampa, and that the railroad cars were In one of the more startling chapters in mostly unlabeled and had to be opened in­ the history of the "Splendid Little War,'' an dividually to discover their contents. Sto- entire army was fitted out in Tampa, Flori- 45 da and prepared to invade Cuba. Tampa in On April 30, President McKinley and 1898 was a growing town of just over 14,000 Secretary of War Russell Alger sent a note souls with few modern facilities. Its munic­ to General Shafter canceling his reconnais­ ipal streets were unpaved and mostly cov­ sance-in-force and advising him to continue ered with Florida's ubiquitous sand. Few troop preparations. In Washington, the buildings were up-to-date; most were run­ Army and Navy were debating which strat­ down unpainted wooden structures. The egy was to prevail. The Navy insisted on the only spectacular building in the area was blockade and bombardment of Havana and Henry Bradley Plant's luxurious Tampa Bay other major positions. By coordinating the Hotel, opened in 1891 on the banks of the Army, the Navy, and the Cuban insurgents, Hillsborough River. The town did have two Admiral William T. Sampson and others felt railroads entering it but only one track that the Spanish Army in Cuba could be went to Port Tampa, nine miles south of the starved into submission. The potential Tampa town center. There, one major quay hitch in this plan was the whereabouts and awaited the military transports of the War; power of the Spanish Navy, led by Admiral that quay normally accommodated nine Pascual de Cervera. As it turned out, the U.S. ships with ease. In an emergency, Tampa Navy strategists over-estimated the power, could have handled an army of about 5000, speed, and ability of the Spaniards. Many of but not one of nearly 30,000, which is ap­ the Spanish fleet's ships were not as well­ proximately what finally showed up for the armed as thought. Some were not even affair.I completed vessels and were still under con­ Tampa was one of three major points struction when the fleet left the Cape Verde chosen for the gathering of the army. New Islands for the theater of engagement. Over­ Orleans and Mobile also played minor roles all, U.S. intelligence about the fleet was lim­ in the impending war, but Tampa was desig­ ited and the overseas network of agents nated by the joint Army-Navy Strategy very amateurish. The Office of Naval Intel­ Board as the point of debarkation in the ligence was relatively new, understaffed, original plan for the invasion of Cuba. This and saddled with more responsibilities than plan called for an army of about 6000 men it could handle at that stage of its develop­ to be shipped to the southern coast of Cuba ment.3 Added to the intelligence deficit was and to deliver arms, ammunition and other Admiral Sampson's lack of effective block­ supplies to General Maximo Gomez, the ading vessels with enough fire-power to leader of the Cuban forces in the Eastern effect his plans. Thus the President, Secre­ Provinces. The troops headed to Cuba un­ tary Alger, General Miles, and others sent der this plan were to be a reconnaissance­ new orders to Shafter. in-force and not an actual invasion group. In analyzing the force needed to take On April 29, 1898, General of the Army Cuba, the Army debated the force's size and Nelson Miles chose Brigadier General the site of invasion over and over. Following William Rufus Shafter to assemble this a report from Shafter that his advance com­ force at Tampa. Shafter was advised to mand was ready to move, Alger and Miles avoid any direct action in Cuba and to "give instructed him to be ready to move out on aid and succor to the insurgents, to render May 9, 1898. Shafter's command was to be the Spanish forces as much injury as possi­ augmented by the regular forces then at ble, [while) avoiding serious injury to your Chickamauga and the Gulf ports. The addi­ own command." The men Shafter com­ tional 12,000 to 15,000 men, the strategists manded were all to be regular army, with no reasoned, would be enough to take Mariel volunteers contemplated. But war had been and possibly Havana if they acted quickly declared on the 25th of April and the pres­ and decisively. During this same time sure on President William McKinley and McKinley issued his famous call for volun­ Congress was intense and argued for the teers, which would bring the invasion force use of a large volunteer force. Admiral to about 70,000. Most of the volunteers George Dewey's surprising victory in Mani­ were National Guardsmen, with a strong la changed the battle plans, and what had lobby in each state capital. The political started out as a diversionary attack now pressure to swear in and activate these brought on the possibility of greater action troops was tremendous, but so were the and acquisition.2 The Philippine victory problems. Many of these troops were al­ would have major consequences for Tampa. ready partially trained in Army fashion, but 46 View of the wharf at Port Tampa during the Spanish-American War. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center Collection.) most had obsolete weapons. Few had uni­ inforced by about 6000 troops, bringing his forms and most did not seriously train command to approximately 12,000 men. A every month. Consequently, the mobiliza­ plan was launched to send the majority of tion was slow. With the Spanish Navy still at this force to Key West, until it was discov­ large in the Atlantic, potentially posing a ered that the drinking water in that island threat to the North American coastline, the city was running short with just the de­ orders to sail were delayed. mands made upon it by the Navy and the A direct assault on a fortress as well-de­ civilian population. Water would have to be fended as Havana was reckoned to be cost­ shipped into that port before any assault ly. The timing of the battle plan would also could be launched from there. The Key place any possible attack at the beginning West plan was scratched and the new vol­ of the rainy season, complicating the op­ unteer troops and other regulars from along eration even more. General Nelson Miles the eastern seaboard were sent to Tampa, strongly urged against such an assault, which by May 25 had over 17 ,000 men un­ based upon his experiences in the Civil War der arms awaiting the word to invade Cuba. and his vast knowledge of military strategy The number of troops in Tampa then out­ and tactics. Instead, the General advised an numbered the city's civilian population. attack on the southern coast of Cuba, The camp at Tampa Heights and the one at preferably on the weakly defended eastern the Port of Tampa were already overcrowd­ end. An offensive launched from this loca­ ed. The City of West Tampa opened its arms tion would be less costly in lives and pre­ to the incoming forces until it also had sent the best opportunity to use the Cuban more than it could handle. Troops were forces to help destroy Spain's hold on the is­ transferred to new camps in Lakeland and land. The discovery of Admiral Cervera's Jacksonville. s fleet in the area of Martinique on May 13 al­ The constantly changing plans, strategy lowed the administration a "publicly accept­ and orders put a heavy strain on Shafter able excuse for postponing a campaign that and his command.