Sunland Tribune

Volume 30 Article 7

2005

Who Loaded What, When, and Where: Capt. James McKay and the Spanish American War

Joe Knetsch

Pamela K. Gibson

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Recommended Citation Knetsch, Joe and Gibson, Pamela K. (2005) "Who Loaded What, When, and Where: Capt. James McKay and the Spanish American War," Sunland Tribune: Vol. 30 , Article 7. Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/sunlandtribune/vol30/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sunland Tribune by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Who Loaded What, When, and Where: Capt. James McKay and the Spanish­ American War

Arrival of a battalion at Tampa in 1898. (Courtesy of the Henry B. Plant Museum Photographic Collection.)

Joe Knetsch, Ph.D. ries of rotten beef, spoiled hardtack, and Paµ1el a K. Gibson railroad cars sitting for weeks on sidings with perishable foodstuffs inside: all these he usual story of the Tampa-based made spectacular headlines in many news­ preparations for the Spanish­ papers. The infamous "embalmed beef" American War is one of confusion, scandal played well in the "Yellow Journal­ incompetence and near chaos on ism" of the day. Public outcry demanded the waterfront. Testimony of many high­ that all of these horrific events had to be in­ ranking and important officers and volun­ vestigated to provide an answer to the ques­ teers noted the general lack of organization tion: How can they be prevented from ever in the loading of the transport fleet prior to happening again? The real question is, did the invasion of Cuba. Most of the regular of­ they ever happen at all? And, whether they ficers also noted the lack of transports, the happened or were invented, who was to fact that only one rail line went to the Port blame? of Tampa, and that the railroad cars were In one of the more startling chapters in mostly unlabeled and had to be opened in­ the history of the "Splendid Little War,'' an dividually to discover their contents. Sto- entire army was fitted out in Tampa, Flori- 45 da and prepared to invade Cuba. Tampa in On April 30, President McKinley and 1898 was a growing town of just over 14,000 Secretary of War Russell Alger sent a note souls with few modern facilities. Its munic­ to General Shafter canceling his reconnais­ ipal streets were unpaved and mostly cov­ sance-in-force and advising him to continue ered with Florida's ubiquitous sand. Few troop preparations. In Washington, the buildings were up-to-date; most were run­ Army and Navy were debating which strat­ down unpainted wooden structures. The egy was to prevail. The Navy insisted on the only spectacular building in the area was blockade and bombardment of Havana and Henry Bradley Plant's luxurious Tampa Bay other major positions. By coordinating the Hotel, opened in 1891 on the banks of the Army, the Navy, and the Cuban insurgents, Hillsborough River. The town did have two Admiral William T. Sampson and others felt railroads entering it but only one track that the Spanish Army in Cuba could be went to Port Tampa, nine miles south of the starved into submission. The potential Tampa town center. There, one major quay hitch in this plan was the whereabouts and awaited the military transports of the War; power of the Spanish Navy, led by Admiral that quay normally accommodated nine Pascual de Cervera. As it turned out, the U.S. ships with ease. In an emergency, Tampa Navy strategists over-estimated the power, could have handled an army of about 5000, speed, and ability of the Spaniards. Many of but not one of nearly 30,000, which is ap­ the Spanish fleet's ships were not as well­ proximately what finally showed up for the armed as thought. Some were not even affair.I completed vessels and were still under con­ Tampa was one of three major points struction when the fleet left the Cape Verde chosen for the gathering of the army. New Islands for the theater of engagement. Over­ Orleans and Mobile also played minor roles all, U.S. intelligence about the fleet was lim­ in the impending war, but Tampa was desig­ ited and the overseas network of agents nated by the joint Army-Navy Strategy very amateurish. The Office of Naval Intel­ Board as the point of debarkation in the ligence was relatively new, understaffed, original plan for the invasion of Cuba. This and saddled with more responsibilities than plan called for an army of about 6000 men it could handle at that stage of its develop­ to be shipped to the southern coast of Cuba ment.3 Added to the intelligence deficit was and to deliver arms, ammunition and other Admiral Sampson's lack of effective block­ supplies to General Maximo Gomez, the ading vessels with enough fire-power to leader of the Cuban forces in the Eastern effect his plans. Thus the President, Secre­ Provinces. The troops headed to Cuba un­ tary Alger, General Miles, and others sent der this plan were to be a reconnaissance­ new orders to Shafter. in-force and not an actual invasion group. In analyzing the force needed to take On April 29, 1898, General of the Army Cuba, the Army debated the force's size and Nelson Miles chose Brigadier General the site of invasion over and over. Following William Rufus Shafter to assemble this a report from Shafter that his advance com­ force at Tampa. Shafter was advised to mand was ready to move, Alger and Miles avoid any direct action in Cuba and to "give instructed him to be ready to move out on aid and succor to the insurgents, to render May 9, 1898. Shafter's command was to be the Spanish forces as much injury as possi­ augmented by the regular forces then at ble, [while) avoiding serious injury to your Chickamauga and the Gulf ports. The addi­ own command." The men Shafter com­ tional 12,000 to 15,000 men, the strategists manded were all to be regular army, with no reasoned, would be enough to take Mariel volunteers contemplated. But war had been and possibly Havana if they acted quickly declared on the 25th of April and the pres­ and decisively. During this same time sure on President William McKinley and McKinley issued his famous call for volun­ Congress was intense and argued for the teers, which would bring the invasion force use of a large volunteer force. Admiral to about 70,000. Most of the volunteers George Dewey's surprising victory in Mani­ were National Guardsmen, with a strong la changed the battle plans, and what had lobby in each state capital. The political started out as a diversionary attack now pressure to swear in and activate these brought on the possibility of greater action troops was tremendous, but so were the and acquisition.2 The Philippine victory problems. Many of these troops were al­ would have major consequences for Tampa. ready partially trained in Army fashion, but 46 View of the wharf at Port Tampa during the Spanish-American War. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center Collection.)

most had obsolete weapons. Few had uni­ inforced by about 6000 troops, bringing his forms and most did not seriously train command to approximately 12,000 men. A every month. Consequently, the mobiliza­ plan was launched to send the majority of tion was slow. With the Spanish Navy still at this force to Key West, until it was discov­ large in the Atlantic, potentially posing a ered that the drinking water in that island threat to the North American coastline, the city was running short with just the de­ orders to sail were delayed. mands made upon it by the Navy and the A direct assault on a fortress as well-de­ civilian population. Water would have to be fended as Havana was reckoned to be cost­ shipped into that port before any assault ly. The timing of the battle plan would also could be launched from there. The Key place any possible attack at the beginning West plan was scratched and the new vol­ of the rainy season, complicating the op­ unteer troops and other regulars from along eration even more. General Nelson Miles the eastern seaboard were sent to Tampa, strongly urged against such an assault, which by May 25 had over 17 ,000 men un­ based upon his experiences in the Civil War der arms awaiting the word to invade Cuba. and his vast knowledge of military strategy The number of troops in Tampa then out­ and tactics. Instead, the General advised an numbered the city's civilian population. attack on the southern coast of Cuba, The camp at Tampa Heights and the one at preferably on the weakly defended eastern the Port of Tampa were already overcrowd­ end. An offensive launched from this loca­ ed. The City of West Tampa opened its arms tion would be less costly in lives and pre­ to the incoming forces until it also had sent the best opportunity to use the Cuban more than it could handle. Troops were forces to help destroy Spain's hold on the is­ transferred to new camps in Lakeland and land. The discovery of Admiral Cervera's Jacksonville. s fleet in the area of Martinique on May 13 al­ The constantly changing plans, strategy lowed the administration a "publicly accept­ and orders put a heavy strain on Shafter able excuse for postponing a campaign that and his command. Additionally, the com­ the Army was not yet ready to launch."4 mand also had to assist in preparing and Between May 9 and 14, Shafter was re- staffing three separate expeditions to Cuba 47 to deliver guns, ammunition and medical and that was in the 1840s. It had no experi­ supplies to the Cuban insurgents. Two of ence with water-borne invasions. The only these excursions were led by Captain J.H. sea-going transports available to the Army Dorst of the Fourth Cavalry. The first of his were run-down old coastal vessels, the Navy attempts to land supplies and troops met having taken most of the faster, lighter ves­ with stiff opposition by the Spanish com­ sels for use as cruisers.8 Congress was not mand at Point Abolitas, about forty miles helpful. That august body was chronically east of Havana. The commander of the resistant to any enlargement of the Army Spanish forces, Colonel Balboesis, was during peace-time. Since the Civil War, the killed in the action, but his men succeeded Army had been consistently cut in size and in driving the United States troops off be­ was under-funded in almost every depart­ fore they could accomplish their goal. The ment. It had only enough weapons on hand second expedition was very successful in to field a force of 25,000 men, yet in 1898 it delivering 7500 rifles, 1,300,000 rounds of was fighting essentially a two-front war in ammunition and 20,000 rations to the Cuba and the Philippines. The Quartermas­ Cuban forces at Port Banes on the northern ter Corps was relatively small at the out­ coast of Cuba. The last of the three expedi­ break of the war and had not ordered tions, under the command of Lieutenant enough materials to handle an army of C.P. Johnson, consisted of men of the Tenth more than 25,000, the approximate size of Cavalry, the famed Buffalo Soldiers, and the effective troops available for service.9 At 375 armed Cubans. This hugely successful the beginning of the War, it should be re­ expedition included the troop- and supply­ membered, the plans did not call for a full­ carrying ships Florida and Fanita, the lat­ scale invasion, and the Quartermaster's and ter owned by Captain James McKay of Tam­ Commissary's staffs were gearing up for on­ pa. Landing near Palo Alto, the party met ly a small reconnaissance-in-force type of resistance from a Spanish force. The Army operation. No U.S. military leader had ever took casualties (one dead and nine wound­ led a force larger than a regiment. Most of ed) in the short but spirited engagement the activity between the Civil War and the that followed. These shipments and deliver­ Spanish-American War had been against ies of arms, ammunitions and supplies were the western tribes of Native Americans, and an added burden to Shafter and his staff, these campaigns rarely required more than but they helped to keep up morale and in­ a regiment. Most of the companies in the terest in the impending Cuban invasion.6 regular regiments had not worked together The United States Army was organized at all. Regimental-scale war games or ma­ during this war into eight different Corps. neuvers were unheard of until later. All told, Each Corps was approximately 30,000 men the Army was simply not prepared to un­ divided into three divisions. The divisions dergo an operation like the invasion of Cu­ were further divided into three brigades and ba. Everything had to be learned from ex­ these divided into three regiments. The perience and that was going to be a hard Corps were composed only of infantry. Cav­ teacher.10 alry and artillery units were assigned to The general lack of military readiness assist each Corps, but were relatively in­ was exemplified by America's coastal de­ dependent in operation. The Fifth and fense. Military historian Walter Millis, in his Seventh Corps called Tampa home at the classic Arms and Men: A Study of Ameri­ beginning of the conflict. The Fifth Corps can Military History, made the following was composed mostly of regular troops aug­ observation: "In 1897 the truest symbol of mented by some volunteer units as they ar­ American military policy was still the rived in camp. It was the Fifth Corps that heavy, immovable and purely defensive sea­ received the honor of spearheading the in­ coast gun." When the war seemed unavoid­ vasion of Cuba. 7 able, McKinley asked Congress for addition­ The biggest obstacle to the invasion of al funding and received in return the "Fifty Cuba was the lack of nearly everything. Million Dollar Bill" to fund the war. The Transports were the first priority for the Army, reflecting outmoded thinking and re­ Army, but it had never before had to build, sponding to the fears of Congressmen from rent or contract for such a large number of the coastal states, spent the majority of its vessels. The U.S. Army had only invaded allotment on coastal defense. Very little one other country (Mexico) in its history funding went to the Quartermaster's Corps, 48 the Medical Corps or the Signal Corps.11 _, When the Endicott Board met in 1885, it . :· had recommended 2362 gun emplacements and batteries be installed to defend the American coastline. At the outbreak of the Cuba war only 151 had been installed. Con­ gressional under-funding haunted even this well-thought out plan.12 The coastal de­ fense system may have been the "truest symbol" of United States policy, but it did little to solve the problem of assembling the largest invasion force seen to date by the American public.13 At Shafter's headquarters in Tampa, the biggest problem was getting the transports and loading them efficiently so they could be unloaded in the briefest time possible. An amphibious landing of the size contem­ plated for Cuba had never before been at­ tempted by the Army, and Shafter had no experienced help on his staff to solve the loading problems. At that juncture, the Quartermaster, Colonel Charles F. Hum­ phrey, discovered the talent needed was close at hand in the person of Captain James M. McKay, Jr. McKay had already been involved in the Cuban revolution and had run both guns and volunteer fighters to the island on the Fanita, his fast new ship.14 The Captain had long familiarity with the Cuban maritime trade. He earned his title of "Captain" by sailing with his fa­ ther in their beef business in Havana, and as the owner of the family shipping line at his father's death. In 1886, he threw in his lot with the Plant Steamship Company and captained the Plant System steam packets Mascotte and, later, Olivette. Both those ships and his own Fanita were to play im­ portant roles in the invasion and subse­ quent events. (McKay's long and distin­ guished career would later include two Loading an artillery piece onto a transport at terms as a Florida Senator, United States Port Tampa. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center Collection.) Marshal for the southern district of Florida, two years as Mayor of Tampa, and Postmas­ ter of Tampa in 1914.) McKay's knowledge General Grenville M. Dodge), Humphrey of the waters around Tampa Bay and along stated: "He [McKay] was my principal assis­ the Cuban coasts made him a valuable per­ tant. He came to me by order of the Secre­ son to the invasion, however it was his inti­ tary of War and was a most valuable man. mate knowledge of the loading and unload­ He had been a steamship captain, and a ing of ships that made him indispensable.IS United States marshal more recently." The Colonel Humphrey was very pleased to Colonel went on to describe his "principal have someone of McKay's experience on assistant,'' in the following terms: "He was hand to assist in the complicated operation. an exceedingly level-headed man. At Port In testimony before the Committee Investi­ Tampa, and subsequently in Cuba, his gating the Conduct of the War (often called range of duties with ocean transportation the "Dodge Committee" after its chairman, were exceedingly great. He did everything 49 the fact that many of the railroad cars filled ,. ~ .~. . " .. with provisions, ammunition, weapons, for­ ; . age, etc., were unlabeled and the bills-of­ . ' lading had not arrived in Tampa to allow them to be sorted out before loading onto the ships. Colonel Humphrey described the resulting problems: "The loading of the transports was at best difficult, owing to the limited wharf facilities and not having on hand full cargoes; it being necessary to bring transports into the canal to be loaded, and often before loading could be complet­ ed sent them into the harbor, to be brought back in a future time to complete cargo."17 Somehow, space had to be found for 16,154 men and 834 officers, along with the large amount of military stores needed to con­ duct the campaign.18 It was miraculous that the entire operation was completed be­ tween 2:30 a.m. on June 7, 1898 and 9:00 p.m. on the following day. Given the severe problems with unmarked railroad cars, im­ patient officers and men, a severe lack of lighters to haul materials to ships at anchor and a lack of trained stevedores on the docks, this was truly a miracle.19 That this was done with a relatively minimal number Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, left, of breakdowns in the process is a tribute to speaks to Captain Lee of the British Army near Humphrey and McKay. one of the campsites in and around Tampa dur­ During the operation, Captain McKay ing the build-up to the Spanish-American War. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center was involved in a number of high-level de­ Collection.) cisions that profoundly affected the expedi­ tion. The original estimate for the number an exceptionally good man could do in that of troops that could be transferred to Cuba very responsible position." Colonel Hum­ in the available ships was given as over phrey also noted it was McKay's natural dis­ 30,000 men and material. McKay, with his position to try and accommodate people, expert knowledge of transports, advised and he tried to procure for any officer what­ Shafter that this number was too high and ever they requested. Most of the time, revised it to accommodate 24,000 men Humphrey noted, McKay was miles away more comfortably. When the loading was in from the war command and did much of the its final stages, McKay, along with General supervising of the unloading by himself.16 Henry W. Lawton, was assigned the task of This was a tremendous responsibility for a adjusting the arrangements by moving civilian working under a military comman­ troops from one ship to another, in order to der in time of war. give them as much room and freedom of Captain McKay's biggest problem was movement as possible. McKay also oversaw the loading of the materials at Port Tampa. the loading of the materials so that the am­ To load the materials of war onto thirty­ munition and rations would be off-loaded eight transport ships not designed for first, followed by the forage and medical wartime use meant that each one be fitted supplies.20 For a civilian to undertake such out for its new role. Cargo ships had to be responsibilities demonstrated McKay's abil­ made comfortable for the transport of ities and acumen, as well as the faith others troops and horses. Accommodations had to had in him. When General Shafter appeared be fitted for the officers and medical staff. in front of the Dodge Commission, he Supplies had to be placed in such an order specifically noted the service of Captain so as to be convenient for debarkation in McKay and declared: "I regard him as a Cuba. All of this was made more difficult by most efficient man; I am not a seafaring so Supplies stacked next to the gangways, awaiting loading onto transports at Port Tampa. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center Collection.) man, but when a man goes about everything most of whom were working at cross pur­ and makes no back steps, you don't have to poses." Only after a frantic search did Wood have an expert opinion on him." Every es­ and Roosevelt find, by separate routes, sential person involved in the loading oper­ Colonel Humphrey, and get the assurance ation knew that Captain McKay was in that the Yucatan was their assigned trans­ charge. He was obeyed as if he were a rank­ port. 22 It was after this initial drama that ing officer in the regular service.21 the Rough Riders got to their ship and pre­ This positive picture of the process of pared for their final destiny and future loading the troops and materials differs sub­ fame. stantially from that offered by two of the Few have ever questioned this account more famous critics of the affair, Colonel by the future President, and nearly every Leonard Wood and Lieutenant Colonel biographer of "T.R." has repeated the story Theodore Roosevelt. The "standard" ver­ intact, but why not question Roosevelt's sion of the story comes almost directly from version of the event? Historians have long Roosevelt's classic, The Rough Riders. In known that the future President was an this highly colorful - and colored - ac­ "unreliable witness" when it came to many count, the loading is filled with drama and aspects of the war in Cuba. From his asser­ foreboding, but ends with the happy seizure tions that he suffered with his troops in the of the Yucatan by the Rough Riders and the sandy camp at Port Tampa while officers fending off of the troops from the Seventy­ enjoyed the luxury of the Tampa Bay Hotel First New York Volunteers. Of course, the (where, in fact, Roosevelt stayed for three Second United States Regular Infantry are days with his wife Edith), to his claim that graciously allowed to board their vessel in his unit attained the summit of Kettle Hill time for departure. The story also suggests first (it was as likely that soldiers of the that the procedure was total chaos with no Ninth Cavalry did), Roosevelt's credibility is one in charge. Colonel Humphrey, in the far from airtight. account, "might just as well have been One of the key features in Roosevelt's asleep, as nobody knew where he was and portrait of confusion and chaos at the em­ nobody could find him, and the quay was barkation point in Tampa was the fact that crammed with some ten thousand men, there were, in the space of forty-eight 51 hours, nearly 17 ,000 men and prov1s10ns Bates. There were enough horses and mules loaded onto the transport fleet and only one loaded onto the transports to power these rail line feeding the quay. The image was of wagons. The biggest producer of later criti­ a mass of disorganized men and horses try­ cism was the lack of ambulances, which ing to get onto their various ships. Stacking Shafter had personally ordered left behind, the vessels three wide in the canal also pre­ rationalizing that the rough roads of Cuba sented a picture of relative disorganization. would not cause anyone wounded to notice However, given the enormity of the task and the difference between an ambulance and a the efficiency with which it was performed, wagon. The greatest problem for loading all it is hardly likely that chaos reigned. Roo­ the stores was the lack of space on the rail­ sevelt, it must be remembered, was a Lieu­ road line leading to the port. The conges­ tenant Colonel of a regiment; orders may tion and confusion of not having properly not have reached down that far in the chain labeled cars also greatly hampered the load­ of command. Both Humphrey and McKay ing of the stores.24 testified that Shafter had approved a list of Captain McKay's testimony about the units to be placed upon each ship and that Rough Riders and the seizing of the Yu­ almost all reached their assigned destina­ catan is most interesting. When questioned tion in fairly good order. Most telling, as far by General Dodge about the orders alleged­ as the accuracy of Roosevelt's account is ly received by these troops, the captain did concerned, is the fact that although reports not hesitate to declare that it was part of indicate that everyone knew that McKay their orders to report to that ship. When was in charge of the loading, "T. R." seemed asked about Colonel Wood's knowledge of unaware of that fact. He wrote the Dodge the orders he stated: "He must have known Commission that: "I never saw Captain it. He marched right aboard." When asked McKay, and, indeed, never heard of him un­ point blank about the Rough Riders seizing til I heard of his testimony [to the Commis­ the Yucatan, McKay replied: "They didn't sion.) "23 As famous, energetic and politi­ do anything of the kind." All of the boarding cally astute, as he was, Roosevelt could not went pretty much as scheduled with little have had knowledge of everything, especial­ confusion, according to the captain. McKay ly since he was relatively far down on the presented a paper with notations of the chain of command. troops to board the Yucatan. General James James McKay's own testimony before A. Beaver of the Pennsylvania Volunteers the Dodge Commission sheds a great deal of read this paper aloud: "Yucatan designated light on the activities of this "level-headed" No. 8, headquarters band and companies C, man and, as well, on the activities so criti­ D, G, and B, Second United States Infantry, cized by Roosevelt. During the greatest part First Regiment U. S. Volunteer Cavalry." of the brief war McKay was on active duty General Beaver asked McKay if all that was as Colonel Humphrey's assistant. He served designated before anyone went on board. from May 4 until August 30, 1898 with only "Yes sir; that was designated," replied ten days away from active duty. The ship McKay.25 It was this testimony of Captain captain testified that he was in charge of McKay, countering Roosevelt's story of the loading the stores of the commissary, quar­ event, that prompted "T.R." to write the termaster and artillery along with mules Commission. and wagons. McKay noted that each ship General William R. Shafter had a good carried no fewer than 100,000 rations laugh over Roosevelt's seizure story. Upon aboard and that many had more. This was hearing of the Roosevelt riposte to McKay's enough to feed the troops while in transport statements the gruff old veteran wrote to and for the first few days after landing. The the Dodge Commission himself. In his letter captain also stated that he only found five of December 21, 1898, the General quoted ships overcrowded in the initial loading and a letter he had received from Major Leon S. that these were soon relieved, with the sur­ Roudiez of the Quartermaster's Corps. Ma­ plus troops being sent to less crowded ves­ jor Roudiez wrote: "I have a distinct recol­ sels. The Plant System steamer Olivette lection of meeting the wild and woolly served as a hospital ship for the first part of 'Rough Rider' [Roosevelt) at the foot of the the invasion. McKay oversaw the loading of gang plank as he was about to embark on a 124 wagons for the immediate forces and an transport. His men had halted and were in a additional 60 to 80 for those of General J. C. double column behind him. I did not know 52 him at the time and, not noticing his rank, I supplies of the Fifth Corps in Tampa and at asked for the officer in command ... He stat­ Daiquiri, and even accompanied some of ed that he was in command of the regiment these supplies to the front. The Captain as­ temporarily during Colonel Wood's ab­ sisted the Quartermaster for the Fifth Corps sence." Roudiez's letter continued: "I then and earned that gentleman's unwavering informed him that he was assigned to the trust. McKay also earned the respect of the transport before us and that he could march commanding general and most of the mem­ on board at any time. As we were talking bers of his staff. To load nearly 17 ,000 offi­ Colonel Wood appeared upon the upper cers and men onto 38 transports from a deck of the ship and hailed us. I repeated to quay serviced by only one railroad line and Colonel Wood what I had said to Colonel do it in less than forty-eight hours is a Roosevelt, and went on. The 'Rough Rider' remarkable feat. General Shafter had prom­ then galloped on board." Roudiez's final ised President McKinley that this would be comment speaks directly to the discrepancy done and Humphrey and McKay made it between Roosevelt's and McKay's version of happen. At the other end of the line, McKay the boarding. "There are a great many fun­ had to oversee the unloading of the stores at ny things testified to by various parties," he Daiquiri while Humphrey was doing similar wrote, "who appear before the commission, duty at Siboney. Left alone with such re­ and I really don't know whether it is worth sponsibility, Captain McKay made sure of while to worry about their statements or the safety of his vessels first and waited un­ even pay the slightest attention to them."26 til the pier was refurbished by the Army Given Shafter's views on headline grabbing, Corps of Engineers and it was safe to un­ the General undoubtedly enjoyed forward­ load. Most of the stores he then unloaded ing Roudiez's letter to the Commission. were medical supplies in heavy demand at Some stories, scandals, and conflicted the front. Testimony by General John West­ accounts of the War are not as well re­ on shows that McKay did his job well, searched as others. The widely publicized promptly, and with utmost safety.28 That embalmed beef scandal, for example, was nearly everyone in command positions be­ tackled by two different government com­ lieved Captain James McKay, Jr. did his job missions and found to be untrue. That the efficiently is ample indication of the value of meat was the victim of being left on a side­ his services. More specific and public com­ track for days on end in the heat of a Flori­ memoration of this gallant service is long da June is not disputed. The heat did break over-due. Captain McKay deserves to be rec­ down some of the chemical components of ognized for his service in the war that the beef packing and made some changes to opened the "American Century." the taste, but the product was not the cause of the illnesses reported. Indeed, more war­ time diseases were attributed to the heat, ENDNOTES mosquitoes, and dehydration of the troops than to any foodstuffs sent for their meals. 1. Karl H. Grismer. Tampa: A History of the City of Tampa and the Tampa Bay Region of Florida. St. General Nelson Miles' charges of bad beef Petersburg: The St. Petersburg Printing Company, and inedible bread made his testimony 1950. 207-211. Also see James W. Covington. "The sensational, but it did not make it true, as Rough Riders in Tampa." Tampa Bay History 20 the two investigating commissions discov­ (Spring/Summer 1998): 5-16. 2. Graham A. Cosmas. An Army for Empire: The ered.27 Unsanitary conditions in many United States Army in the Spanish-American War. camps also added greatly to the suffering of Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, the troops. As in the case of the overcrowd­ 1971. 111-125. 3. Jeffery M. Dorward. The Office of Naval Intelli­ ing on the ships and the confusion on the gence: The Birth of Americas First Intelligence docks, much of the controversy was stirred Agency, 1865-1918. Annapolis: Naval Institute up by those reporting - accurately or in­ Press, 1979. 63-67. accurately - on the War, or by those wish­ 4. Cosmas. 126-130. 5. Cosmas. 130-131. ing to politically damage the McKinley 6. Russell A. Alger. The Spanish-American War. New administration. York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1901. 42-44. The service rendered by Captain James 7. Cosmas. 130-133. McKay, Jr. in the course of the Spanish­ 8. Allen R. Millett and Peter Maslowski. For the Com­ mon Defense: A Military History of the United American War was difficult and dangerous. States ofAmerica . New York: The Free Press, 1984. He oversaw the loading and unloading of the 271-277. 53 9. William A. Ganoe. The History of the United States 17. Ibid. 3667. Army. [Revised Edition] Ashton, MD: Eric Lund­ 18. House of Representatives Document No. 2. 55th berg, 1964. 370. Congress, 3rd Session. 1898. Annual Report of the 10. Cosmas. 35-110. Also see Ganoe. 355-370. Secretary of War. 90. 11. Millett and Maslowski. 271. 19. Dodge Commission. 3668. 12. Ganoe. 361. 20. Dodge Commission. Testimony of General Shafter. 13. Walter Millis. Arms and Men: A Study of American 3208-3209. Military History. New York: Mentor Books, 1956. 21. Ibid. 3209, 149. 22. Theodore Roosevelt. The Rough Riders. New York: 14. Grismer. 211. New American Library, 1961 edition. 44-45. He al­ 15. Grismere. 319-320. For his services with the Plant so gives a similar story of this event in a letter to Steamship Company see Arsenio M. Sanchez. "The the Dodge Commission. See pages 524-525 of Vol­ Olivette and Mascotte of the Plant Steamship ume 8. Line." Sunland Tribune. 20 (November 1994): 49- 23. Dodge Commission. Letter of Theodore Roosevelt. 50. And Edward A. Mueller. Steamships of the Two Volume 8. 524. Henrys: Being an Account of the Maritime Activi­ 24. Dodge Commission. Testimony of Captain James ties of Henry Morrison Flagler and Henry Bradley M. McKay. 2655-2679. Plant. Jacksonville: Edward A. Mueller, 1996. 24- 25. Ibid. 2659. 27. 26. Dodge Commission. Letter of General William R. 16. United States Senate Document No. 221. 56th Con­ Shafter. Volume 8. 525-526. gress, 1st Session. 1900, Volume 7. Report of the 27. Millet and Maslowski. 286. Commission Appointed by the President to Inves­ 28. Dodge Commission. Testimony of Brigadier Gener­ tigate the Conduct of the War Department in the al John F. Weston. War with Spain. 3655. [Hereafter "Dodge Commis­ sion" and page number.]

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