Tuesday, August 26 2003, 10.30 am:

MR ANDREW MACKINLAY (called) Examined by MR DINGEMANS

LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Yes, Mr Dingemans. MR DINGEMANS: Could you tell his Lordship your full name. A. Yes, my Lord. I am Andrew Mackinlay. I am the Member of Parliament for Thurrock. I was elected in 1992 so I am in my third term. The first term I was a member of the Transport Select Committee and in the other two Parliaments I have been a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Q. You are now a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee? A. Correct. Q. You were party to the Foreign Affairs Committee to investigate the decision to go to war in Iraq? A. Correct, an enthusiastic advocate that we should do that investigation. Some were not. Q. One of the suggested reasons for that investigation has been said to be the dispute between Mr Gilligan and Mr Campbell. What was your understanding of the situation? A. That is incorrect. I am pleased you asked me. The reason why -- and I have indicated to you I was enthusiastic we should investigate this matter of the Government's justification for going to war -- was against a backdrop of many people, many very good people who either were opposed to war initially or then had doubts afterwards. There was currency in the press and in the political world that the Government had exaggerated the case; and it seemed to me that Parliament had a duty to look, albeit retrospectively, as to whether or not the Government had exaggerated that case. Also it is against a backdrop that for the first time in our history Parliament actually voted an affirmative resolution to commit our armed forces to a conflict situation -- it has never happened before -- and all 650 of us had to wrestle with our consciences on the time we voted in the early spring there. Whatever way we voted, we were deeply, deeply troubled and therefore we were very much committed to this. The historic duty of Parliament, which perhaps we might return to, is one of scrutiny. It seemed to me no greater duty than to scrutinise this issue. The very final point I make on this is in a way after all the Prime Minister is offered no other inquiry in the open on this. There are thousands of people who were killed in that conflict and, most importantly of all, some considerable number of British service personnel have been killed and their loved ones, I would have thought, demanded there should at least be some review as to whether or not the sacrifice of their loved ones had been appropriate in terms of the evidence which the Government presented to Parliament and people. It was what was part of their persuasion. Q. Can I take you to FAC/1/43. This appears to be a Chairman's note. We understand this to be prepared by the Clerk to the Committee. If one looks under 1, this is the 10th July, the decision to go to war in Iraq, to consider developments: "If I understand correctly what this is about, I am quite concerned that the Committee risks (a) getting dragged deep into the Campbell-Gilligan dispute, which it has very wisely avoided so far ..." Can I just stop there and ask you what was your attitude to this point? A. The conflict between Gilligan and Campbell, No. 10 and the BBC is not my business. The important thing was there was somebody out there, amongst others probably, who we know was a senior public servant -- or that is what was reported -- who was repeatedly uttering that the Government had exaggerated the case. Mr Gilligan is the one who is continually reporting that. Clearly it is key to our inquiry to try to seek and to probe what Gilligan's source is and, if we can find a source, on what basis is he saying the Government exaggerated the case for war. That was our interest. I could not give a damn about conflict as such between Gilligan and Campbell. It is the fact that the Gilligan man was reporting that there was somebody senior out there who was saying that the case had been exaggerated. Of course there were others printing it as well. I go back to this question of currency. In my view we would have been failing in our duty if we had not pursued it, but the Gilligan/Campbell thing is because of what Gilligan was saying and the fact that there was somebody out there who I think we needed to see. Q. Did you perceive you had the cooperation you ought to have done from the Government? A. No, absolutely not. Q. Can I take you to FAC/3/10 and paragraph 6 of the report. This is the report published on 7th July. At paragraph 6 we can see at the top: "We are strongly of the view that we were entitled to a greater degree of cooperation on access to witnesses and to intelligence material." That criticism is balanced lower down the page to make it clear that the Foreign Secretary had seen you in private session? A. Yes. Q. Was that the view of the Committee in relation to cooperation? A. Well, it would be a consensus. I remember when Lord Hutton has his opening day of the Inquiry, he said words to the effect, "I and I alone will decide these matters". I did mutter, my Lord, "Lucky Lord Hutton", because the fact is in the nature of a committee you have to reach some consensus. In the span I would be the other end. I could live with this: "We are confident our inquiry would have been enhanced if our requests had been met." I think that is an understatement, but I can live with that. Yes. Q. There was a meeting, we have heard from Mr Anderson, on 10th July, after your initial report has been published, when it was decided to call back Dr Kelly. Did you support the idea that Dr Kelly should be called to give evidence? A. I did, and I guess I was critical to it because there was a division. I think -- I am open to correction on this -- it went 4/3, something like that. And -- yes. Q. We have seen some correspondence, MoD/1/73, whereby Mr Hoon writes -- sorry, there is a letter to Mr Hoon from Mr Anderson asking for answers. A. Hmm. Q. Down the page, asking and saying that the Clerk is writing to Dr Kelly inviting him to appear. The further letter is at 74, that is to Dr Kelly, asking him to turn up, and at page 82, MoD/1/82, we have the reply from Mr Hoon on 11th July, whereby at the bottom he says: "Although the FAC has now completed its own inquiry I can understand why you also wish to see Dr Kelly." He says: "I am prepared to agree to this on the clear understanding that Dr Kelly will be questioned only on those matters which are directly relevant to the evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of the dossier. Dr Kelly was not involved in the process of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier." Over the page it was noted he would have appeared before the ISC and asks that you restrict his time to 45 minutes. Were you aware of those proposed restrictions on Dr Kelly's evidence? A. Yes I was. I did not agree with them. You know how people say: I hear what you say. My reaction to that is let us hear what you say. I consider it a monumental cheek of the Secretary of State to try and tell us what we should and could inquire into and the duration. I was prepared to live with it because I was prepared to do battle, if and when it was necessary. I would have challenged in Committee if we had been constrained or I had been constrained. Q. We know that Mr Gilligan had sent some e-mails to members of the Committee. At BBC/13/17 we can see an e- mail dated 30th June. This is obviously before the inquiry has completed its report. A. Hmm. Q. "John, as promised here is my analysis of the Campbell evidence. I've added some further notes at the bottom. Andrew." He talks about the dodgy dossier, various questions that have been asked, et cetera. Were you aware of these communications? A. No, I was not until it had come out in this Inquiry some few days ago in relation to Chidgey. Q. What is your attitude to persons who themselves appeared before the Committee making suggestions to members of the Committee? A. I think this highly inappropriate. Q. Why? A. Well, a number of things. One, I think rules of natural justice apply and I also want to tell you what I would have done if I had received it. Also in relation to Chidgey, I notice they went to a political party, which seemed to me to compound the kind of problem that the BBC are in of being partisan -- not party political partisan, but to have sent it to a Liberal researcher compounded something which is unacceptable to me. Also I would consider it an affront that I was going to be fed this by somebody who was so, so central to all the debate and discussion, absolutely outrageous, and -- I want to tell you what I would have done if I had received it, because if I had received it, it would have been madness for him to have sent me one. I have not seen this -- Q. We have seen a draft he prepared apparently to send to you. Did you get any e-mails? A. Well, not -- I will double-check -- Q. Did you get any? A. Not at all. The only thing I could sort of say is I do not think we received this at all. I want to tell you what my reaction would have been and what I would have done with it. When I go home, Lord Hutton, probably it will be on these computers, "Hutton, see this". I delete so much if it is not clearly obvious who the person is who is -- it is out. But I do not remember deleting this and I have checked with my small office and nobody recalls it. But if I had received it, I would not have just mentioned it to the Chairman in passing, I would have told Donald and the Clerk and I would have insisted we debate -- it was brought to the attention of all members of the Committee beforehand. The reason why I think Gilligan would have been mad to send it to me is because that is what I would have done. Then of course it would have opened up a whole new chasm, elephant trunk -- he would have been in a deeper hole. So that is what I would have done because, in a sense, once I had shared it with the Committee, then it would have opened up a whole range of things and clearly it would have been public and widened the whole controversy, but I can tell you that I have never seen this. I have not received one like this. It has not reached me. If I had, I would have been affronted and angry and I would have brought it to the attention of the whole Committee. I would have insisted that Anderson -- I think Anderson would have agreed anyway, but we would have held, as we often do, sometimes, you know, quick sessions. We ask witnesses to wait. LORD HUTTON: You think you did not receive it? A. I am certain Andrew Mackinlay has never received it, my Lord, no. MR DINGEMANS: Can I turn to 15th July? What do you recall of Dr Kelly's appearance at the beginning of the session? A. Apart from the question he was softly spoken, I thought very controlled, except for -- I mention this in my witness statement -- two people who accompanied him and sat immediately behind him. To me that was quite significant, but I can amplify on that in a moment if you like. Q. You tell us what you want to tell us. A. When he came in, if you remember, I am kind of more or less sitting in the position I am to you, Lord Hutton. The crescent is round there, but I noticed these two people who I would say kind of escorted him in, sat immediately behind him. There is nothing wrong with this. I immediately I think started to imagine he had been sort of like briefed, programmed, prepared, that these were the minders. At the time I did not know who they were. One I think has given evidence to you. LORD HUTTON: One of them was his line manager, Dr Bryan Wells. The other was a colleague in the Ministry of Defence. A. It started -- it had some -- I noticed it. MR DINGEMANS: You did not say anything at the time? A. No. I wish I had actually later on. I wish I had literally said: Dr Kelly, can you tell me who those people are? I did not -- Q. What was the temperature that day? A. I kept my jacket on throughout. Q. You kept your jacket on. Did everyone else keep their jackets on? Was it hot? A. No, I thought by the standards of that committee room it was the norm. You did have this wretched fan going which you noticed was switched off at some stage. Q. Can I ask you about some of your questions? A. Yes. Q. FAC/4/15, question 105, which is towards the bottom of the page. You are asking him about the journalists. A. Yes. Q. "Dr Kelly: I have met very few journalists. "Andrew Mackinlay: I heard 'few', but who are the ones in your mind's eye at this moment? What are their names? "Dr Kelly: That will be provided to you by the Ministry of Defence." This continues over the page: "Andrew Mackinlay: No, I am asking you now. This is the high court of Parliament and I want you to tell the Committee who you met." I think you wanted to say something in relation to that? A. Yes. My Lord, if I may. LORD HUTTON: By all means. Do you want to look at your witness statement? A. Yes. Thank you very much. It is against a backdrop -- that question is against the earlier questions where I had said: can you tell me the journalist? He said: see the Ministry of Defence. I asked him again. See the Ministry of Defence. I asked him again. If I could get to my house, my house is surrounded by journalists. So I say: could you let us -- by Thursday, by Thursday. He again said: the Ministry of Defence. I thought this a prevarication, unnecessary, inappropriate and in a way was not only unfair and unreasonable, it was a challenge to the whole business of Parliamentary scrutiny. Other people answer questions candidly, they might not find it easy, and it seemed to me this should not be allowed to rest. So I returned to it at this point. You see, my Lord, just supposing in a moment, my Lord, you were to ask me a question and I said: see the chairman of my constituency party. Probably because you are a disciplined man not a muscle in your face would move. Then you asked me again and I said the same thing, my Lord, and again. Then you try and help -- LORD HUTTON: You thought Dr Kelly should answer because he was before a Committee of Parliament? A. Absolutely. Absolutely. I suspect what I am leading up to is even with your patience there would become a stage where you would have to say to yourself: what I am doing here? Does Mackinlay understand the gravity of the situation? There are other people who answer my questions. There is a public responsibility. I have to do some way of doing it. Your style would be different to mine, the craft and the words, but you would indicate to me expectation. So I had to do that. I referred to the fact that it was before the high court of Parliament. I have indicated also in my witness statement the sessional orders which make it quite clear that it is a high crime and misdemeanour to prevaricate, to prevent witnesses coming, not to answer questions, et cetera et cetera. Also the Erskine May supporting thing. I then went on in my witness statement: "The power of the House to punish for contempt is well- established and its origin is probably to be found in the medieval concept of the English Parliament as a primary court of justice. The power to fine or to imprison for contempt belongs at common law to all courts of record, although the Commons is no longer regarded as a court of record." I went on: "The power of commitment remains exercised by the House, distinctly accepted by the House of Lords in other case law." LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. But the fact is Government departments and many of our witnesses do not understand that every year -- not medieval -- every year we pass the sessional orders which are unequivocal in indicating it is a contempt not to answer, to prevaricate is a contempt, to try and influence witnesses or to prevent them appearing is a contempt and it is a high crime and misdemeanour and the fact that it is ignored does not make it any less valid. MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you some questions about your other questioning towards the end of the session? FAC/4/24: "Andrew Mackinlay: Since you wrote to your superiors in the way you have done, have you met Geoff Hoon? "Mr Kelly: No. "Andrew Mackinlay: Any ministers? "Mr Kelly: No. "Mr Pope: Any special advisers?" You pick up the question: "Any special advisers? "Dr Kelly: No. "Andrew Mackinlay: Do you know of any other inquiries which have gone on in the department to seek the source -- to clarify in addition to you or instead of you or apart from you? None whatsoever? Dr Kelly: No." Perhaps you can read out your next question? A. That is question? Q. 167. A. "I reckon you are chaff; you have been thrown up to divert our probing. Have you ever felt like a fall guy? You have been set up, have you not?" Q. Did you consider that to be a fair question? A. Yes, I do think it is; and because it is against a backdrop of where the Government had indicated they think that Dr Kelly is the sole source. He then comes along to us. He has convinced me and everybody else at this stage, because we have made a quantum leap, he has convinced me that he is not the source -- the Gilligan source, very impressively, very impressively indeed. I could take you through that if you like. I hope you will just take from me by this stage I am, along with others, absolutely convinced that he is not the source. I feel very angry for him and for Parliament against the backdrop of what I just said, you know, about misleading Parliament and so on. LORD HUTTON: If you just elaborate a little on what you meant by he was "a fall guy". In what sense was he a fall guy? A. Because at that moment of time -- I now know differently -- at that moment of time, I think the Government -- I use that collective term -- was quite pleased for Dr Kelly to come up, hoping that the thing would sort of be fudged and that the thing would more or less sort of die away. I can see a scenario where that could have happened incidentally. LORD HUTTON: It would be fudged. Did you think that the Government, although it believed that Dr Kelly was the source, that the Government hoped that your Committee might take a different view? Was that what was in your mind? I want to understand exactly what you are thinking about. A. They would have hoped -- first of all there are actual limits. An inquiry cannot go on forever, you have to draw stumps. There was the Parliamentary recess coming up which I am sure had not escaped their mind. Also, if he gave the evidence as he did, and I do not know whether or not it had been rehearsed -- I do not know -- if he gave the evidence as he did, the Committee could conclude, could they not, that: well, it looks like he contributed to this, we will never exactly know precisely, and basically we draw stumps; I mean, after all, elsewhere in our report on the Campbell thing we more or less draw stumps, do we not? We are not detectives. I can foresee a situation where they hoped this would have blurred it to such an extent and the controversy would die away. LORD HUTTON: So the Committee would not come to a definite view one way or the other as to whether Dr Kelly was the source? A. I can almost write the words now of a report which says: it is impossible for us to judge, et cetera et cetera. But I was very angry, as I say, for him and for Parliament. On the question of -- do you want to ask me about chaff, sir? MR DINGEMANS: Yes. A. I mean, I have had lots of hating e-mails and letters since. A lot of people do not understand the word "chaff". Q. What did you understand? A. Well, chaff to a weapons expert is what is thrown out by our destroyers and from our fighter aircraft to deflect incoming -- Q. Exocet missiles? A. Absolutely. In the context of this it did not seem to be inappropriate. He was a defence expert. I told you I thought he was set up. I told you he was the fall guy. I think that is self-explanatory why I think that is so. That was the reason for that word. No offence was meant. Our Committee -- the paradox, the irony was that my Committee did suffer from chaff because we were successively diverted because we then wrote very indignantly saying: we think he has been badly used. Q. Did you think that was a question that permitted of any ready answer from the witness? A. Well, I do not know about you, sir, but I think it is often -- I think it is fair and reasonable sometimes to put things in quite trenchant terms to see if a person gives a reaction or then comes out with more. LORD HUTTON: Mr Mackinlay, may I ask you, coming back to your thought that Dr Kelly had been set up. A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: There has been evidence from a number of witnesses in the Government that the view which they took was that your Committee had been investigating Mr Gilligan's report, that this civil servant had come forward to say that he might be regarded as the source and that therefore the Government was under a duty to inform your Committee and to let your Committee examine him, if they so wished, and that if they had not done that, they might have been charged with conducting a cover-up. Now what is your view on that? A. Yes, sir. A number of aspects there, sir. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. May I just complete this one? Again those questions were against a backdrop, if you remember, of me saying: Dr Kelly, has there been any investigation you know of to find out the sources? LORD HUTTON: If you would like to continue adding about your -- A. Sorry, counsel, I do apologise. MR DINGEMANS: Do not worry. Answer his Lordship's question. A. I do not buy this business of him coming forward voluntarily. I think by this time the heat was on. I also -- LORD HUTTON: I was asking you more about the Government's view that they were obliged to disclose to your Committee that this civil servant had come forward. A. Lord Hutton, you are absolutely correct, they were obliged to disclose this to the Committee but they did not. They became aware of this I think on 30th June. They in my view deliberately stalled, hoping our report would come out. I saw on your website some note from -- I forget who it was, one of the senior people, saying: I think they were already abroad. We were not already abroad. How he knows our discussions, our travel arrangements, et cetera. The whole thing, in my view, was designed to hope that they could avoid him coming before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. I noticed that Sir Kevin in his evidence to you argued he should not do so. Sir Kevin, in my view, is wrong on two counts. One, basic British constitution that we are entitled to scrutinise; I have already covered that. The second one, I think he is badly lacking in political antennae, which he is paid to have, because there is no way on God's earth in my view that the press would have allowed, once Dr Kelly became known, for him not to have been scrutinised in public, and I have to be candid with you: I for one would not have acquiesced in that by my silence. I think it is our duty to have Dr Kelly before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. LORD HUTTON: So therefore is your view that once it was known to the Ministry of Defence that he had come forward -- A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: -- and might have been the source, they were then under a duty to inform your Committee and also to -- whether one says require or ask him to come forward? A. As I said in my witness statement, my Lord, I think what they should have done immediately -- LORD HUTTON: Just on that direct question: is it your view that once Dr Kelly had come forward to the Ministry of Defence, that they were under a duty to inform your Committee and also were under a duty to ask him or to require him to appear before your Committee? A. They are under a duty to inform us immediately and then give us the opportunity of deciding if we wanted to call him, which we would have done. All of this is against a backdrop. I do not believe they were really trying to find the source. That is why I go back to also the questions before. They did not want to discover Dr Kelly. They hoped the thing would burn out, fizzle out, in my view. That is why I asked him if there had been any investigations. There clearly had not been rigorous or vigorous investigations. MR DINGEMANS: Why do you say they would have been under a duty to put Dr Kelly before the Foreign Affairs Committee? A. Because Parliament has the duty to scrutinise. I do not accept that the Government can put conditions. I think the Clerk has written to you about saying the Osmotherly rules -- I cannot pronounce it -- are purely Government decisions. They have no countenance in Parliament. Rightly so. As you gather, I am very jealous of that. What might interest you, my Lord, is I have been through this battle before. In the previous Parliament the Government tried to argue the Osmotherly rules to prevent us calling witnesses in relation to the Sierra Leone inquiry. Basically we saw them off. I can give you specific reference of a woman called Ann Grant -- LORD HUTTON: I do not think we need go into that detail. A. I can write to you. MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you that: on the Monday when the report had been prepared, published, what then did the FAC want to see Dr Kelly for? They were not going to, and you have made it clear they were not interested in the dispute between Mr Campbell and Mr Gilligan. A. You are absolutely correct. What we wanted to know -- we now have the public servant who is allegedly going round saying that the Government exaggerated the case. Well, that was what our inquiry was about, nothing to do with Gilligan or Campbell. I want to see him because I want to know whether or not he has been saying that and if he is, is there any credence to it. Q. Right. Your Committee took the view that Dr Kelly had been badly treated. I think you have told us about that. Can I take you to MoD/1/89 which is a letter of 15th July from Mr Anderson to Mr Straw. The second paragraph: "The Committee deliberated ... and asked me to write to you, expressing their view that it seems most unlikely that Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's prime source and colleagues have also asked me to pass on their view that Dr Kelly has been poorly treated..." Why did you believe that? A. Because I did not think he was the main source. I approached the hearings in a quasi-judicial way. I do listen to the evidence and try to approach in a quasi-judicial way. At the end of that hearing, I -- but there was unanimity actually, it was one of the areas where there was really consensus. We felt he was not Gilligan's principal source. We felt that the Government had known that because, although my colleagues do not use that term, implicitly they thought he was the fall guy, he had been set up. We were angry, my Lord. He gave an extremely powerful, persuasive, convincing performance. Ingrained on my mind is where Mr Pope is asking him, he says: I want to ask you, clearly, do you think you are the principal source? Dr Kelly says: no, I do not think that I am. It was very powerful. Q. After the hearing, you pursued some Parliamentary Questions? A. I did, yes. Q. Can I take you to drafts of the answers at TVP/2/15? We can see at the top from the draft the template to be used for reply, so it is in draft format. A. Yes. Q. We see your question: "To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which journalists Dr Kelly has met over the past two years, for what purpose and when the meetings took place." A. Yes. Q. What was your purpose in pursuing those questions? A. Because Dr Kelly, if you remember, said: ask the Ministry of Defence. That is precisely what I did do. I am tenacious, I will not be thrown off on a thing like this. It seemed to me because I had no reply, he volunteered, if you remember, when I was grilling him, he said: Susan Watts and one other. It was like extracting teeth from a whale I thought. I will not be thrown off. So I put down these questions which he told me to do and it pins them down. Q. Then you were in the process of getting replies, as we know. A. Yes. Q. Is there anything else relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with? A. Yes, there is. If you look at the draft reply on your website on this, in fact -- this was the last day of Dr Kelly, I think, if you remember I think you had evidence of this. He actually does not mention Rutherford, except on one occasion. This is the man who I think you have had evidence for who had contacts over some years, 20 or 30 times, and just before Dr Kelly's name comes out, he, not for the first time, actually visited him at his house. That is not volunteered in the draft answer. I think that is probably is relevant. Basically, the conclusion I have, and I regret to say this, is that Dr Kelly just dug deeper each time he prevaricated with his employers, with the Committee -- Committees perhaps, although I am not privy to the other one, and then Mackinlay puts down this Parliamentary question. There comes a stage where, if he had said: I met Rutherford many times, he came to my house, that would have blown up the fact from what evidence I have been able to ascertain from what you have received that he had misled his employers from those initial interviews, initial but inadequate interviews in my view that he had. I think that is kind of quite critical. The man had volunteered that information, I guess, and it was inadequate. We do not know why the gentleman was trying to get him on a mobile phone. The point is he knew that he was now in quite deep water. Q. Perhaps I ought to re-phrase the question: is there anything that you know from your personal knowledge, rather than your analysis of everything else, that you can assist his Lordship with? A. May I just -- on this particular area? LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. No, I am very grateful. No. LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed. A. Is that all? MR DINGEMANS: Is there anything else you want to say? A. There is, my Lord. When Dr Kelly died, I did issue a statement and it was difficult for us all, as you will understand. I said -- LORD HUTTON: You just take your time if you want to look at the wording in your statement. Is it towards the end of your statement? A. I know it is ingrained on my mind, my Lord. I sort of said: I deeply regret the death of Dr Kelly. If there is any way that my questions contributed to his distress or stress, I deeply regret that, and I expressed my condolences to his wife and family. After that, my Lord, I have not had any dealings with any journalists. We have turned down hundreds of requests, avoided them and so on. Why I share this with you is important. The repeated showing of that narrow clip has resulted in an awful lot of hate mail and so on. I am not complaining about that. I think also that clip does not educate or inform, it misleads, because it does not give the backdrop of this, but it created a very bad climate and I have had lots of things. I have not been able to hit back or defend myself. Why have I not? Three very important reasons: One, to talk to the press in those circumstances seemed to me highly inappropriate. The Doctor had not had his funeral. Believe it or not, I do respect and have a high regard for the enormous stress for his family at their loss. Secondly, I did listen to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister basically said: let us all cool down and shut up, or words to that effect. Third, probably the most important thing, was the Hutton Inquiry. So I have gone to enormous lengths to talk to the press. Just to complete the picture, my local newspaper had daubed on its walls, "Kelly's blood on Mackinlay's hands". I have shown the utmost restraint and I want to continue to do so. It is difficult. Even yesterday afternoon the Today Programme phoned up my house wanting me to go on this morning, presumably to save you the trouble of listening to me because you would have heard it on your way in, or, my Lord, they could have put to me this: Mr Mackinlay, do you not think it is bad that you are talking to the press before the Hutton Inquiry? I am not asking for your guidance or protection, but I want to say this: I will do everything I can reasonably to avoid -- I have never spun on this -- until you report, but I hope you will also understand I do not have tenure. My whole basis as an MP is based upon reputation and I have not been able to hit back or to respond. But you see I am like a sprung coil this morning, my Lord. I am very, very angry because I think not only Mackinlay is at stake but the future of Parliament because, my Lord, this could go either way. Your report could either very welcomely open up a whole new vista of openness in Government or it could be used as the Hutton rules whereby it buttresses Osmotherly and all this sort of thing in the future. I think we are at a crossroads as regards Parliament. I am desperately anxious that nobody has spoken up for Parliament. The final thing, sir -- LORD HUTTON: I think Mr Mackinlay I should just say, as I am sure you appreciate, the Bill of Rights itself provides that the affairs of Parliament should not be commented on other than in Parliament. Therefore you will appreciate it will not be appropriate for me to express views on the affairs of Parliament. That is a matter for Parliament itself. A. In a way that makes it more difficult for me to be restrained, but I will continue to be restrained. Lord Hutton, there is one final point you might want to consider. The Government refused us access to documents and to people who we all now see. The irony was if they had given us the JIC assessments, by way of example, or access to documents, we certainly would have agreed, we would have compromised, we would have seen them in private. The irony is that all these people and documents are given to you and I am very much pleased you have them, but you also can put them on a website. If it was so critical that they should not be out in the public domain. They will not let Parliament have them; now the balloon has gone up, they are available. You are rightly putting them on the website. It just shows how the Government do everything they can -- this Government is not the only one, there have been previous Governments -- to obstruct scrutiny. They do not like scrutiny. They see scrutiny as automatically going to be criticism, whereas it can be investigatory. Thank you, my Lord. LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed. MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, my Lord.

MR JOHN MCLEOD SCARLETT (called) Examined by MR DINGEMANS

Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name? A. John McLeod Scarlett, my Lord. Q. What is your occupation? A. I am Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. I am also head of the Intelligence and Securities Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. Q. Can you tell us, in outline, what the Joint Intelligence Committee does? A. Yes. The Joint Intelligence Committee is a real Committee. It meets once a week. It is chaired by myself. It meets in the Cabinet Office. It has sitting on it senior representatives of the policy and intelligence community, foreign, defence and security fields, the heads of the three intelligence agencies, senior officials from major policy departments, Foreign Office, Home Office, Defence Ministry, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, representatives of the DTA and the Treasury. Q. Who do you report to? Do you have a boss or are you at the top as it were? A. I report to Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Coordinator, but I was JIC Chairman responsible for the presentation of assessed intelligence to the Prime Minister and the Government. I have direct access to the Prime Minister. Q. And can I just ask when you started to be Chairman, when you became Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee? A. Yes, on 3rd September 2001. Q. So in March 2002 you had been in post about five to six months? A. Yes. Q. We are told that there had been some previous drafts of the dossiers. Can you help us with that at all? A. Yes. The first drafts of what eventually became the dossier and assessment published in September 2002 were put together starting in February 2002. Initially there was a draft which covered four countries -- LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Scarlett, who initiated that draft? Whose decision was it that it should be prepared? A. My Lord, that was a task that we were passed by the Overseas and Defence Secretariat in the Cabinet Office on behalf of the Prime Minister's Office. MR DINGEMANS: So that is February 2002. What is the structure of the dossier then? Are you able to say what it broadly was about? A. Yes, it was in effect four chapters, although we did not call them that, I think, which covered and were based on our intelligence assessments for those four countries, which included Iraq. That was one of the four countries. Q. Four separate countries, one of which was Iraq? A. Was Iraq. Q. And was that project pursued? A. No, it was not. In mid-March it was decided by the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Office not to pursue the paper on four countries; and we were asked to drop that, but to carry on with the draft relating to Iraq. Q. Who told you physically that? A. I was told that by Alastair Campbell, speaking on behalf of the Prime Minister's Office and quoting a conversation that he had had with the Foreign Secretary. Q. Right. So you have now dropped the other three countries out of it and you are concentrating on Iraq? A. Yes. Q. And does the process continue? A. It does. Almost immediately we finalise the paper on Iraq, based on our current, then, intelligence assessment and I submitted that on 21st March to the Prime Minister's Office. Q. And was that dossier -- is it right to call that a dossier? A. Well, I never called it a dossier. But it was being called -- LORD HUTTON: You called it a paper? A. I called it the assessment, my Lord. LORD HUTTON: Assessment, yes. A. But it was being called a dossier in public at that stage. MR DINGEMANS: If we can call it a dossier. I am sorry for the loose use of language. A. I accept that. Q. Was that dossier published? A. No, it was not. Q. Why was it not published? A. Because it was decided not for the moment to pursue the project for a published intelligence assessment on Iraq. Q. Do you know why that was? A. I do not know exactly why. I would not expect -- Q. Did you pick up any indications why that might be the case? A. My understanding at the time was that the judgment made at the political level, policy level was that the time was not right to put that assessment into the public domain. Secondly, that the document as it stood did not contain as much detail and information to explain the assessment judgments which were in it, which would have been informative for the public. Q. Right. So your understanding was those two reasons. To form an understanding, you need to have evidence to form that understanding. What did you form that understanding from? A. That was based on one, possibly two conversations, I cannot quite remember exactly at that time, with the Prime Minister's Office. Q. And anyone in particular in the Prime Minister's Office? A. Certainly one of them was Sir David Manning. Q. Right. So the March dossier is decided not to be published. Does that mean that the process of keeping the dossier under review stops or not? A. No, it does not. There was a difference between that decision, and I was clear about this, and the decision on the four country paper. The four country idea was dropped. The proposal for a dossier, a public dossier on Iraq was not dropped. It was just not the right moment, so it was kept in being. Q. Were various drafts produced of that dossier? A. It was kept under continuing review through the spring and early summer, with occasional updating. This is the draft which specifically relates to WMD in Iraq. Q. Can I take you to 20th June because that is the date on which we have a dossier. That is CAB/3/82. This is headed "History of UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq". We can see "One Document Version 20 June 2002". That appears to become part 2 of the dossier actually published on 24th September. A. It forms the basis for what was eventually part 2 of the September dossier. Q. We have, over the weekend, been provided with another dossier dated 20th June. Can I take you to CAB/23/15? It does not appear to be coming up. I know someone will be looking at that. If one looks at the contents of the dossier that we have now got, that is also dated 20th June. The contents appear to be an executive summary, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq and the Iraqi regime, crimes and human rights abuses. The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq, we have seen something dated 20th June which I imagine was the basis for that part. But the other parts of the 20th June version we have not seen before. Can you just help us with how we had got to the stage at 20th June of having almost, in terms of contents, the contents of the dossier as it is published? A. Right. What you have just put up on the screen was one part of the dossier which was in continuous formulation during the spring and the summer. It was the part that related to the history of weapons inspections. But there was separate work going on at the same time, under the aegis of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat but led by the Foreign Office, which related to the human rights record of the Iraqi regime. That is also one of the papers that were passed to you at the weekend. Then there was a third part, which was relating to WMD in Iraq, which was the sort of current draft of the paper which the assessment staff had written in March the same year and which I referred to earlier on. These three papers were brought together by the Overseas and Defence Secretariat and circulated on 4th September to senior officials, including the FCO, MoD and to No. 10, specifically Alastair Campbell. That represented in the view of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat the current state of the dossier as of that moment. Q. As at 20th June? A. No, 20th June is a misleading date in real terms. Q. Right. A. I think it is there because it is in the IT somewhere as being, you know, that was the date when it was logged in. But in terms of its current applicability on 4th September, that was, in the view of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, the current draft. LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Scarlett: we have been furnished with a dossier dated 5th September which is at CAB/3/7. Would that be the assessment you are referring to as being circulated on 4th September? A. My Lord, no, it is not. I am sorry for the confusion. When I realised this confusion existed I asked immediately for the 4th September papers to be sent to you. The 5th September draft, written here, and the "5 September" written at the top there, I should say there that is the handwriting of a member of my staff, that was a draft which on the initiative of assessment staff was being worked on with effect from 3rd September. It was at their initiative, their attempt to begin updating the draft on Iraqi WMD, taking into account the statement that the Prime Minister had made that day. LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. A. It is a separate text from the text which is attached to the minute which was circulated by OD Secretariat on 4th September. MR DINGEMANS: Sticking if we may on 20th June, we know because of what becomes part 2 that there is an early version of that part of the document. We know from the document that I cannot pull up on the screen at the moment that there is another draft that appears to collate everything in one format dated 20th June. Is what you are saying that this was at least in the process of being put together from June 2002 and is then circulated on 4th September? A. June has no particular significance apart from that date at the top. But in real terms it has no particular significance. There was a continuous drafting process covering WMD, human rights and the history of weapons inspections which had been going on in effect from March and then April. Q. At some stage in June, it may be an IT reason, it is all together in one dossier, if one can call it that. A. Yes. Q. And that document is then continued to be worked on, is that right, up until 3rd September? A. I think the only part that was worked on was that relating to WMD. Q. Right. Then on 3rd September -- I am now told I can show you the CAB 23s. Can I just show you the 20th June. CAB/23/15. A. I cannot read it. Q. That is not CAB/23/15. Yes, it is. I am very sorry. I will come back to that. LORD HUTTON: These things only came over the weekend, did they not, Mr Dingemans? MR DINGEMANS: My Lord even this morning. That still does not excuse it. I am sorry. 3rd September, if I can go back to there. A. Yes. Q. 3rd September, that is the Prime Minister's announcement, is that right? A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: That was a public announcement, was it not? A. Yes. MR DINGEMANS: What did he say? The general gist was a dossier was to be published. A. He said the Government's assessments of Iraq's WMD's capabilities -- I cannot remember the precise words -- would be published in the next few weeks. Q. And that is effectively forming the basis of the distribution on 4th September of the dossier? A. The response of OD Secretariat, who were the lead secretariat on this overall project at that moment, was to circulate the dossier in its existing form to the senior officials that I mentioned in advance of a meeting which the head of OD Secretariat knew that Alastair Campbell intended to hold the following day, to discuss the question of presentation of what the Prime Minister had said. Q. We know that on 5th September there was then a meeting at 12 o'clock. Can I take you to CAB/11/16? This is an e-mail dated 5th September from the PA to Tom McKane. Can you help us with who Tom McKane is? A. Well, Tom McKane, he was the person who circulated the note and the draft dossier on 4th September. He was the -- I called him the head, he was the deputy head of Overseas and Defence Secretariat. The head was Sir David Manning. Q. Right. What was the meeting to do? A. The meeting was to discuss the overall presentation of the Government assessment which the Prime Minister had referred to. So it was intended to discuss how this would be done, what the overall format -- the best structure for the assessment should be, and how responsibilities for preparing it, drafting it, taking it forward, should be allocated. Q. Right. Who chaired that meeting? A. Alastair Campbell. Q. We can see the list of attendees there. At that meeting was anything considered? We have seen -- in fact the dossier that is dated 20th June 2002 but I still cannot show you, that was the dossier that people were looking at, is that right? A. That was the dossier which was on the table at that meeting, which is an important clarification which I want to understand. It was not the one which is dated 5th September which you have been looking at previously, so -- Q. The 5th September dossier we can see at CAB/3/7. This is the Iraqi WMD programmes? A. Yes. Q. That assessment I think you told us someone was working on independently of the dossier; is that right? A. It was not exactly independent. It was the assessment staff, on their own initiative, were looking at this draft which they had been working on since March. They were anticipating having to update it and review it and they set that work in motion. This draft here, 5th September, represents the state of the drafting as of that day. But it was not the draft that was in front of the meeting at 12 o'clock. Q. The draft that was in front of the meeting was the 20th June draft effectively? A. Yes. Q. I am going to try one more time to get it on screen. It appears that part of the confusion is I now have two CAB/23/15s. If I say CAB/23/15 we now get it. A. That looks like it. Q. Can you see at the top 20th June 2003? LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, this is CAB/23? MR DINGEMANS: 15. It is the first CAB/23/15, my Lord. This is what was on the table at the meeting on 5th June. A. 5th September. Q. Sorry, 5th September. We can see the executive summary: "Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. History of UN weapons inspections. Crimes and human rights abuses." That is what everyone was looking at. What was the shape of the discussion on 5th September? I think we have heard there were no formal notes kept; is that right? A. Of that particular meeting, no, there were not. It was on the table. I do not recall any study of that text or any detailed discussion of any kind of that text at the meeting. Q. Right. So what was the purpose of the discussion, then, on 5th September, if it was not to look at the dossier? A. The purpose of the discussion was to consider how the Prime Minister's statement should be taken forward and what the structure of the dossier should now be; and, at some point in that meeting, probably very early on, I do not recall, it was effectively decided to put this drafting to one side. Q. Right. That draft did not contain anything about 45 minutes, is that right? A. It did not. Q. We will come back to the intelligence, if I may, in relation to that. A. Yes, of course. Q. Also on 5th September at CAB/11/13 there is a memo from John Williams. We have heard from him, he is a press officer in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A. Head of news department. Q. "Iraq: Dossier. "I have looked at the capping piece for the Iraq dossier as a newspaper sub would. I offer the following suggestions. I would be happy to discuss why I believe they will make the document easier for Ministers to defend in interviews." You appear to be on the distribution list. A. Yes. Q. If you look at the bottom right-hand name, what was your view about these contributions from senior press personnel? A. Well, John Williams, at this point, was commenting on something which had been drafted by Tom McKane and circulated along with his note of 4th September. So he was not commenting on anything that I or my staff had written. Q. Right. A. When he refers to a capping piece, that was the expression that Tom McKane himself used to describe his own draft which was intended to be -- I am not sure he called it that at that stage -- a sort of foreword to the overall document. John Williams was coming at it as a news expert to see whether he could amend it. Q. Can I take you to CAB/11/17, which is a memo sent after the meeting or -- if you look at the bottom of the page, this is an e-mail from Jonathan Powell to Alastair Campbell: "What did you decide on dossiers?" Then after the meeting, 14.38, we can see the time at the middle of the page, Sandra Powell appears to come back on behalf of Alastair Campbell: "Re dossier, substantial rewrite with JS and Julian M in charge which JS will take to US next Friday and be in shape Monday thereafter. Structure as per TB's discussion. Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation as such." Now, what was going to be substantially rewritten? A. This is a reference to the overall dossier, referring to Iraq and WMD, but also to the other two parts. But it is a particular reference to the section on WMD. It related the agreement that we had reached at that meeting, although the agreement, in some respects, was not completely tied down at that stage. Q. We will come to the 9th September memo. A. That is right. For assessment staff, under Julian Miller's leadership and then my leadership, to review the existing state of the draft and to consider whether, operational security considerations permitting, more detail could be added; whether specific reference could be made to individual items in a text coming from intelligence reporting; and I am almost certain it was sort of agreed at that stage whether reference could be made to previous JIC assessments and the history of the JIC assessment on this subject. LORD HUTTON: Now Julian Miller is the head of your assessment staff? A. Yes, my Lord. He is my main deputy and chief of assessment staff. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you on to 6th September, CAB/17/5. Here is an e-mail, and both the sender and the recipient have been blanked out. A. Hmm. Q. What it says is: "Barry, a good paper. Some minor comments from the BW side." What does "BW" mean? A. Biological warfare or biological weapons. Q. Then it makes comments such as: "Not sure we can be quite as categorical as 'never' ... intelligence refers to a maximum time of 45 minutes. The average was 20 minutes. This could have important implications in the event of a conflict", and various other comments of a similar nature. Can you help us with what this document is? A. This is an e-mail which comes from Defence Intelligence Staff and is sent to a member of assessment staff. It is not about the public paper which we have been discussing. It is an e-mail about a draft which was currently under work on a classified JIC assessment, assessing Iraq's capability for the use of chemical and biological weaponry and their sort of scenarios for use. So this relates to the drafting process which was, at that point, under way for that classified assessment. Q. That was the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments, is that right, for the purposes of the dossier? A. No. It is important to be clear, this was a separate process. At this time, in the first week of September, the JIC was considering a classified assessment, which was completely separate as an exercise from a public assessment, of chemical and biological weaponry and possible scenarios for use, including in the event of a conflict in Iraq, or by the Iraqi regime. That assessment -- or that subject had been commissioned by the JIC itself in late August. The normal JIC process had applied. There had been a meeting of the interdepartmental Current Intelligence Group headed, as normal, by a deputy head of assessment staff on 28th August, to consider a first draft of that classified assessment. That first draft had then been considered in a full meeting of the JIC on 4th September, which was Wednesday, as normal. The JIC had discussed that draft, had noted that important new intelligence was coming in, which was relevant to this subject, and had asked assessment staff, again as is quite normal, to go away, to reconsider their existing draft, in particular to reconsider the important new intelligence from various sources and to prepare a new draft. Assessment staff had taken that task away. On 5th September they had produced a revised draft which they had sent, as is normal, to the participating working level members, who would be represented in the Current Intelligence Group and which would include Defence Intelligence Staff, DIS. This e-mail is the response from DIS to the main drafter of the paper. This is part of the classified process. Q. Can I take you to CAB/17/3 which I think are redacted extracts from JIC papers. We can see the 5th September JIC draft which provided, at page 4, paragraph 3, final bullet: "Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons, including CBW weapons. Intelligence also indicates that from forward deployed storage sites, chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 45 minutes." Was that the first time that intelligence had featured in the JIC assessments? A. Yes, that intelligence was based on a report which was issued on 30th August -- LORD HUTTON: May I ask you: issued by whom, as it were? A. By SIS in this case, by the Secret Intelligence Service. LORD HUTTON: I see, yes. MR DINGEMANS: On 30th August. We have heard a lot about whether things are single-sourced or double-sourced. A. Hmm. Q. Was this intelligence single-sourced? A. This was a report from a single source. It was an established and reliable line of reporting; and it was quoting a senior Iraqi military officer in a position to know this information. Q. And were people unhappy about the use of single-sourced as opposed to double-sourced material? A. Not at all, because the use of those terms in this context represents a misunderstanding of the assessment process. The assessment process takes into account a large number of considerations when it is considering intelligence against the background of other information which is available and what has already been assessed, and also, of course, the reliability and record of the particular line of reporting in question. In this particular case, it was judged straight away that the intelligence was consistent with established JIC judgments on the command, control and logistical arrangements and capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces and their experience and capabilities in the area of use of CP ammunitions. It brought an additional detail because for the first time in our reporting it gave a particular time, gave some precision. Q. A timescale? A. So against that background it was incorporated into the draft assessment which was sent out on 5th September. To answer your question, it is correct this was the first time that this was included in a classified JIC or any JIC document, and usually they are classified. Q. Because it had come in on 30th August? A. Exactly. Q. We can see, then, a final assessment on the intelligence issued on 9th September. This assessment is separate from the dossier process, is that right? A. Completely. Q. We can see the terms of it which appear to be broadly consistent with what has been said before, but appear to have picked up the point about the intelligence showing that it was 20 to 45 minutes. A. Exactly. Q. Can I take you to a document, CAB/11/21, which is an e-mail from Daniel Pruce to Mark Matthews. We have heard from others that Daniel Pruce was making contributions above his pay grade. What were your views on these type of contributions? A. Well, I had no view on this e-mail because I did not see it. Q. You were not copied into any of this material at all? A. No. Q. Can I just ask you this: Mark Matthews is asked: "I promised some quick thoughts on John's draft of 9th September." We have seen drafts of the dossier, now seen 20th June. 5th September somebody has written in in handwriting. I think you have said that is a member of your staff? A. It is. Q. Then we have seen 10th to 11th September. Where are they getting the dates of the drafts from to write in in the handwriting? A. The handwriting at the top applies to a 5th September one, that simply is internal assessment staff handwriting. It has no more significance than that. Indeed, the 10th and 11th -- yes, the 10th September draft you refer to also has, I think, on the top of it handwriting "10th/11th September". That is handwriting from my staff. It is drafting being done by my staff. Q. Was that done contemporaneously or just to help us? A. I do not know, I am afraid. Q. Because it would be difficult to remember nearly a year after the event when this draft was produced, unless there is something to help date you at the time. A. No, I am confident, and my staff are confident, the one marked 5th September represents the state of work as of that date. The one marked 10th/11th September is the draft which was circulated outside assessment staff on those dates. They are the significant dates. LORD HUTTON: I appreciate you say you have not seen this e-mail, but whom do you think the reference is to "John"; is that you? A. My Lord, I have seen this subsequently of course and I have done some work on it. I am virtually certain this is a reference to work put forward by John Williams from the Foreign Office. LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Thank you very much. Yes. MR DINGEMANS: You think that might have been more of his beginnings of a foreword, as it were? A. Well, it is more than that. I am virtually certain this is a reference to John Williams' draft because he did do some additional drafting, not just of the foreword but of the -- or redrafting of the text which had been circulated on 4th September and which was on the table at the meeting of 5th September. So he was really on his own initiative working on that and had circulated it to No. 10 inter alia probably, judging by this, on the 9th. Q. On 9th September we have heard from Mr Campbell that there is another meeting. A. Indeed. Q. Can you tell us, so far as you recollect, who was there? Relevantly -- I do not need to know the identities, but you and Mr Campbell. Was it the Joint Intelligence Committee as well? A. Not at all. Q. Who else was there then? A. Can I just be clear on this in case there is any misunderstanding? LORD HUTTON: I am sorry, Mr Scarlett. We give a break for the stenographers. I think this might be a convenient time just before we get on to that. I will rise for five minutes. 11.45 am: Short Break 11.50 am: MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, we were turning to the meeting of 9th September. Can I just pull up CAB/6/2 which is a memorandum from Alastair Campbell that was sent after the meeting. I had asked you who was at the meeting; and this memo, in some respects, may assist in that, because it says: "At our discussion this morning, we agreed it would be helpful..." It is from Alastair Campbell to you and various people are copied in. Were all those people at the meeting? A. No, they were not. Q. Who was at the meeting? A. I do not have an exact recollection. There was an initial discussion between Alastair Campbell and myself and then a broader meeting which included officers from SIS, and from Overseas and Defence Secretariat. Q. Right. A. And probably others but I am afraid I do not remember. Q. Where did this meeting take place? A. In Alastair Campbell's office. Q. Who chaired the meeting? A. Alastair Campbell. Q. What was the purpose of the meeting? A. It was a continuation of a discussion we had had on 5th September. It had had the same agenda, but in this case to finalise the arrangements for the format, the structure, and sort of taking forward the presentation of the Government's assessment. I would like to say here that both this meeting, on 9th September, and the meeting on 5th September, were chaired by Alastair Campbell because they were unique -- they were wholly and only concerned with those issues. There was no discussion of intelligence issues, intelligence matters, intelligence at all, at that meeting or at those meetings so it was wholly appropriate, in my view, that they should be chaired by Alastair Campbell. It was not, in any sense of the term at all, an intelligence -- neither of them were intelligence meetings. Q. Right. We can see in the third paragraph, having made the point that "... this must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and your team, and that its credibility depends fundamentally upon that", in the third paragraph it picks up that: "... you are working on a new dossier, according to the structure we agreed at the meeting last week, to meet the new circumstances which have developed over recent weeks and months", and that people should wait to comment on that. The structure is set out towards the bottom of the page. Continuing over the page, it makes a whole series of points about the presentation and the public line and, if one continues to the bottom of the page, the fact that Mr Campbell was going to chair a team that would go through the document from a presentational point of view and make recommendations to you. A. Yes. Q. That left you dealing with the intelligence, is that right? A. It left me in charge of the drafting of those parts of the dossier that were related to intelligence in any way at all or were intelligence based. I and my team were responsible for that, of course answering to the JIC. Q. Mr Campbell I think used the expression, or it may have been in the documents one has read, of "ownership", the document being owned by you. What did you understand that to mean? A. Ownership, that I was absolutely to be in charge. LORD HUTTON: Well, you said Mr Scarlett that you were to be in charge of the document in any way relating to intelligence. A. Hmm. LORD HUTTON: But presumably someone must have had overall charge and responsibility. I mean, someone must have been concerned with the final product. Was that to be you or someone else or was it the position that there were a number of people who were concerned with the final shape of the dossier as it would be made available to the public? A. Well, my Lord, why I made the slight qualification that I did is for that reason, that it was almost completely clear by this stage, by the time this note went out, that I was that person. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. But there was still some slight ambiguity about who would be responsible for the parts of the dossier which were not going to be intelligence based. This relates to human rights and weapons inspections, in particular, where the FCO had been seen to be the lead department. In fact in this text here I think it says at the end: "Writing by Committee does not work but we will make recommendations and suggestions, and you can decide what you want to incorporate. Once they are incorporated, we need to take a judgement as to whether a single person should be appointed to write the final version." There was still a slight ambiguity there as to who would write the final version. The reason why I had had discussion with Alastair Campbell at the beginning of the meeting on my own was to say to him that it was very important that only one person and one unit had ownership and command and control of this exercise, that that should be me, that I wanted it stated clearly in writing; and I wanted that to be the outcome of our meeting, which, with the slight qualification at the end there, it was. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: The slight qualification, what, being at the bottom of page 3 of that? A. I say qualification, it is a slight ambiguity. Q. That he was dealing with documents from a presentational point of view as it were? A. No -- LORD HUTTON: How does the paragraph begin? A. The page on my screen, it begins, the paragraph: "In the meantime, I will chair a team ...", that is fine. That was going to look at the presentational point of view, fine. That was going to make recommendations to me, fine. There is a reference as to a further judgment to be made "as to whether a single person should be appointed to write the final version." LORD HUTTON: I see. MR DINGEMANS: In fact no other person was appointed, is that right? A. I made sure that was me. LORD HUTTON: Was there a later decision to that effect or was it simply understood, or in the way that matters worked out it was you, was that the position? A. No -- well, my Lord, I do not want to make too much of this point because there was really not too much discussion about it. It is just that there was an ambiguity in the way that note was written. In practice, and I am sure it was Alastair Campbell's understanding at the time that I went away as the person in charge of the whole exercise. MR DINGEMANS: The dossier of 10th/11th September is produced. We have that at DOS/2/2. We can see in the top right-hand corner "10/11 September 2002", again beginning with the foreword. You, in fact, produce a memo that we have dated 10th September at CAB/23/2. This is one of the new documents. Can you just help us with what this is? A. Right. This is the note I think of the 10th September memo. Q. Yes, it is dated 10th September at the bottom, if we scroll down. We can see that. A. Yes, which I sent to Alastair Campbell and I attached the draft, the first page of which you just had on the screen. Q. You say in paragraph 2 of the memo that it has been: "... significantly recast with considerable help from John Williams and others in the Foreign Office. It still needs further work. I cannot yet confirm that I am content with the overall tone of the paper and the balance between the main text and annexes." Then John Williams, it appears, was off to New York. When you were redrafting the dossier, is it right to say that Mr Williams from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office communications side was assisting you? A. Well, not really. John Williams was working on his redrafting which he had been doing following the 4th September. Of course that was helpful of him to do that; but I was concerned that that redrafting which was happening independently from me might cause confusion as to who was actually controlling this. It was one of the points I had in mind when I asked for the 9th September note to be issued. Q. We have seen other memos or e-mails that followed this draft when it was distributed. Can I take you to CAB/11/25? This is an e-mail from Daniel Pruce to Claire Sumner in August 2003, but the original one is from Philip Bassett to Daniel Pruce and Alastair Campbell: "Re Draft Dossier (J Scarlett version of 10th September)". That is your one, as it were? A. Yes, that is my version. Q. "Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now." Were these comments ever shared with you? A. Not by e-mail, no. Q. Were they shared with you orally? A. Well, very briefly, only in the sense that I attended a discussion on 11th September at 1800 hours in Alastair Campbell's office to consider the presentational aspects of the draft circulated the previous day, and the main comments made at that meeting I do see reflected now that I see them in some of these e-mails. Q. So the type of comments that we can see going around by e-mail were presented orally to you by Mr Campbell, is that right? A. Yes. Q. In terms of comments about structure and language et cetera et cetera? A. Well, I have no record of that discussion, but my memory is that the advice from the presentational side that I received was that the draft, as it existed, needed to contain less assertion, if possible more detail, and less rhetoric and that was it, really. Q. Were members of the intelligence agencies aware of the input that was coming, albeit orally, to you on the back of these e-mails? A. Yes. Q. Did they have any views about the propriety or otherwise of such comments? A. There were no worries of any kind expressed to me, at any stage, about the propriety of the arrangement. Q. Was there any view that No. 10, if one uses the term generically, was trying to beef up the dossier at all? Were there any views being expressed by the members of the intelligence agencies as far as you were aware? A. None at all. Q. Can I take you to an e-mail which is CAB/23/15. It is the first CAB/23/15. This is an e-mail that, again, we got this morning. A lot is redacted. It is subject "Re Iraqi dossier questions from No. 10." "Dear all." First of all, can you tell me where this e-mail comes from? A. This is an e-mail written by a member of my assessment staff in the middle of the day on 11th September, which is passing out to the agencies and departments who are contributing to the drafting process of the public dossier some comments, mainly questions, that according to this e-mail emanated from No. 10. Q. "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on the first draft of the dossier. Unsurprisingly they have further questions and areas they would like expanded." Those comments had been received by you orally from Mr Campbell, is that right? A. I do not know. I mean, we have located this e-mail in assessment staff and have submitted it because it says what it says. The person drafting it only recalls that I said to him that further comments had been received on these points from No. 10. I -- Q. Sorry, you were going to say something. A. I have no recollection of it and I have no record, myself, of receiving them and I do not know who they were received from. Q. But it seems that the main comments that had been passed to you were that they like the use of a specific personality, Miss Taha, in the paragraphs on chemical warfare. "2. Is there any intelligence that Iraq has actively sought to employ foreign experts, in particular in the nuclear field? 3. They want more details on the items procured for their nuclear programme. How many did they buy? What does this equate to? "Can we say how many chemical and biological weapons Iraq currently has by type! If we can't give weapon numbers can we give any idea on the quantity of agent available!" by which I take it to mean that he thought that was being a bit hopeful. A. Yes. Q. Then he says this: "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around at least some of these buoys before..." buoys in terms of navigation marks. A. Indeed. Q. "... but particularly item 4. But No. 10, through the Chairman, want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a last! call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included. "Responses needed by 1200 tomorrow." It appears to betray an attitude that pressure is being brought to bear to get anything good by way of intelligence for the dossier. Is that a fair analysis? A. No, it is not a fair analysis. This is simply part of the work in progress. In effect these questions are questions seeking more detail to support statements or areas of discussion which are in the draft. This is entirely consistent with what the original tasking comprised of. It was entirely consistent with what I wanted to do, and the fact that it was wanted for the document to be as strong as possible was also what I wanted -- strong in the sense of it being comprehensive, as detailed as possible as the intelligence allowed and as informative as possible. LORD HUTTON: In your view, Mr Scarlett, would there be anything wrong with No. 10 -- I use that term generically -- informing you or the assessment staff that they wanted as much intelligence in the dossier as was possible, on the basis that anything that could go in would in fact be valid intelligence in the judgment of the intelligence community? A. My Lord, I saw and see nothing wrong in that at all. It was up to our judgment, my judgment and eventually the judgment of the JIC whether it was safe to include intelligence and whether that intelligence was soundly based and consistent with our assessments. That was our judgment. LORD HUTTON: Yes, of course. Yes. MR DINGEMANS: Would people at a level below the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time have understood, as it were, there to be at least a desire for more intelligence, genuine intelligence which could be used in the dossier and quite a lot of activity in the last couple of weeks leading up to the publication of the dossier? A. Well, the people involved in the drafting process, and the people receiving e-mails of that kind and other messages, because there were telephone calls and informal meetings as well as formal meetings, they would have known at that time that there was quite a lot of work going on, and that the assessment staff, the drafters were attempting to identify intelligence which could safely, in all respects, be used in the draft dossier, in the interests of making it more informative. That was consistent with our overall objective. So they would have felt -- they would have been conscious of that search, as it were, for further releasable information. Q. Did you know, at the time, of any involvement Dr Kelly may have had in commenting on in particular biological and chemical weapons? A. No, I did not. Q. We have seen an e-mail, it is CAB/3/21, where he appears to comment, through someone else, about growth media and I know you have seen it subsequently. Did you see that at the time? A. No, I did not. Q. That is because it would have gone through a reporting source before you would be addressed on that, is that right? A. This is a working level e-mail being taken by the drafters in assessment staff. Q. In the assessment staff? A. Yes. Q. This had got up, as it were, to JIC assessment level but would not be sent on to you? A. I would not have expected to see this particular e-mail. Q. We have seen I think at the same time some other comments that were made. I think you have seen those. For example, there is someone who says that he was ADIST at the time who was an expert on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction who reported unhappiness within the DIS. Were you aware of any of these expressions of unhappiness? A. No, I was not. Q. And that is because it is all dealt with within the DIS? A. Those expressions of unhappiness, as I understand them now, relate to specific issues which were under discussion between DIS and the central drafters several days after this. They related to particular points that were in the drafts. They were discussed within the formal drafting group, particularly on 17th September. They were dealt with within that process and they were not brought forward by the DIS senior management to the level of the JIC. Q. On 12th September we know that Mr Miller is going to come and see Mr Smith, Godric Smith, CAB/11/35, to "...show someone the latest thinking on the dossier tomorrow without getting into circulating copies, just so as they are on the right track." What would you say about people at this stage going with drafts of the dossier back to Mr Smith or Mr Campbell in No. 10? A. Well, on this particular instance I was not in London that day. I have spoken to Julian Miller subsequently. He recalls telephoning Godric Smith and it would be normal for him to be talking to Godric at his level. He does not recall meeting him, as it turns out. Q. On 16th September 2002 we get another draft of the dossier. We can see that at DOS/2/58. You can see, again, the handwriting in the top right-hand corner? A. Yes. Yes. Q. If we turn to DOS/2/72, we have towards the bottom of the page the comment: "Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so." I will not take you through the language between all the dossiers if that is all right, but the language between the dossier of 10th/11th September and 16th September seems to have become less strong. Is there anything you can comment on in relation to that? A. That is true, but only partly true. In the 16th September text that we have here, I think this point is mentioned four times in the overall text. It is mentioned once in the executive summary as a judgment. LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Mr Scarlett: in the copy of the 16th September dossier which we have -- A. Yes my Lord. LORD HUTTON: -- the contents page is at DOS/2/59. It sets out the executive summary. Certainly my next page in the dossier is 60 which begins with part 1 and the executive summary does not appear to be there. Would it have been the same as the executive summary in the preceding dossier? A. Well, I thought, my Lord, that you had been and the Inquiry had been supplied with the executive summary. I am sorry. MR DINGEMANS: They have come in this morning as well. I am not sure they have got to his Lordship yet. A. I am sorry about that. LORD HUTTON: Not at all. Am I right then in assuming that the executive summary, or perhaps not, in the dossier of 16th September was the same as in the earlier dossier of 10th and 11th September? A. You are, my Lord. As it happens, I have it written down in front of me here that the executive summary on 16th September on this point said that Iraq has military plans for use of chemical and biological weapons some of which could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. I think that is right. LORD HUTTON: You said there were, what, two other places? A. Then in the text itself it is mentioned twice. On page 15 under the heading of "Main Conclusions". LORD HUTTON: That is in the text of the dossier itself, is it? A. In the dossier itself. LORD HUTTON: Yes. Give me a moment. "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so". Yes. A. On page 17, my Lord, almost exactly the same. So before it was main conclusions, now it is in the text itself. There I think it says, instead of saying "these weapons", it says "chemical and biological weapons". LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans had taken you to the penultimate line in page 17, but is there an earlier reference in that page? A. No, on page 15, sir, now page 17. LORD HUTTON: That is the wording "may be able to deploy". A. On page 15 I think it says "may be able to" as well. MR DINGEMANS: I just took the wording to illustrate what it said in the text. We did not have the foreword. A. But there is also a conclusion which is attached to this draft. Q. Right. A. At the end. LORD HUTTON: That is what page in the dossier itself? A. I am afraid I do not know the page number for that. LORD HUTTON: Well we will try to find it. MR DINGEMANS: I think that is another document that we have just received, as it were. LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. A. I am sorry, but I can -- MR DINGEMANS: We will get all the documents and drafts. A. May I just say that in the conclusion it says "some weapons" -- and it is specified in the way the conclusion is drafted that this is chemical and biological weapons -- "could be deployed within 45 minutes of an order". The reason I am going over this is I am saying in this particular draft there are four different references. Two of them use the language which was used in the 10th and 11th, two of them use slightly different language. Q. The conclusion, in the text, we know that is drafted by you effectively, is it not, the dossier? A. Yes. Q. The conclusion was drafted by you as well, is that right? A. Yes. Q. But the foreword, that was not you? A. Not the foreword. This is the executive summary, drafted by us. Q. So the executive summary was also by you? A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: Just before we leave this, Mr Scarlett, it is a difference in wording -- A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: -- and these dossiers or drafts are obviously very carefully prepared. I mean, a possible view is that whoever drafted this page, 17, deliberately used that language "may be able to deploy". Is it possible that there was some debate as to whether it was too strong to say "could be deployed" and therefore a person drafting this particular page decided to use the words "may be able to deploy"? A. My Lord, I have discussed this draft in detail with the officers who drafted it and who work on my staff. They have no memory of changing the wording. They have no recollection of any particular reason for changing the wording. As far as they can judge, as far as I can judge, there was not intended to be any significance at the time in the change of this wording. LORD HUTTON: Was the position, then, that a number of members of your assessment staff were engaged in the drafting? It came to you and ultimately you took responsibility for the final draft? A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: But do I understand that a number of hands might have been involved in the preparation of the draft by the assessment staff? A. The work in assessment staff was being carried out by a small unit, mainly of two people, who were answering to one of the deputy heads of the unit. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. In fact, I can correct that, at that particular moment the deputy head was absent; and then answering to the chief of assessment staff who was in charge of the drafting group. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. So this detail was in the hands, in terms of the central drafting process, of assessment staff under the leadership of Julian Miller. LORD HUTTON: Julian Miller. Yes, I see. Yes. Thank you. MR DINGEMANS: Had the publication date moved on to a faster track than originally intended for the dossier? It is a form of words that was used by the Prime Minister's official spokesman at BBC/4/69, about halfway down the page: "Asked whether the timing of publication of the dossier, on the very morning that Parliament resumed, was deliberate in order to do everything on one day, or whether it was because the dossier would not be ready before then, the PMOS said that the publication had been moved onto a faster track than originally intended and that had caused some difficulties." Do you know what that is referring to? A. I do not, no. Q. Right. And we know from a memo that Mr Campbell made some comments at CAB/11/66. What do we see here? A. Well, further down the page he refers -- Q. It is a memo from Mr Campbell to you, is it? A. Yes, it is, yes. Q. He says "... a number of drafting points." A. Yes. Q. He says that as he was writing it, "... the Prime Minister had a read of the draft you gave me this morning, and he too made a number of points"; that is right? A. Yes. Q. He expresses his view on how well you have done; and then deals with chapter 3 being reordered, use of pictures, no civil nuclear point, not enough on human rights. Then detailed comments on the draft which is said to be much stronger, at the bottom. If one turns the page, one can see, for example, paragraph 1: "In light of the last 24 hours, I think we should make more of the point about current concealment plans. Also in the executive summary, it would be stronger if we said that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, he has made real progress, even if this echoes the Prime Minister." There are various other specific comments. A. Hmm. Q. In particular, after 6, "vivid and horrifying" is said not to fit with the dry text around -- A. Yes. Q. -- which is obviously very much a point on presentation. A. Yes. Q. And also had the effect of weakening the dossier. Can I take you to points 9 and 10: "9. On page 16, bottom line, 'might' reads very weakly. "10. On page 17, 2 lines from the bottom" -- this was the bit of the dossier I had taken you to so one could relate it to the comment -- "'may' is weaker than in the summary." A. Yes. Q. So he is picking out there an inconsistency in the document? A. Yes. Q. "'Might' reads very weakly" also appears to be asking for a strengthening of the language; is that fair? A. Well, it is saying -- it is not asking for, it is making that comment. I read that as a comment at the time, and, you know, on the basis of the intelligence could it be strengthened? Q. And we see your response. This is CAB/11/70. If we go to the bottom of 71 we can see the date, 18th September 2002. A. Yes. Q. So you have responded the next day, as it were? A. Yes. Q. Going up to 9 and 10, you remember I read 9 and 10 as it were? A. Yes. Q. "We cannot improve on the use of 'might' on the old page 16." You say "might" is still appropriate, whether weak or not. A. Yes. Q. "The language you queried on the old page 17 has been tightened", as it were? A. Yes. Q. This tightening of the language, did any of this cause unhappiness as far as you know amongst members of the Intelligence Services? A. Well, what actually happened around this point is that there was a separate process going on considering the confusion, slight muddle, if you like, which existed in the 16th September draft which we were just discussing where there were four references, two using one language, and two using another. This was completely separately from this picked up in the normal drafting process. On 17th September, there was a meeting of the formal drafting group chaired by the chief of assessment staff, attended by all the main players, including DIS. DIS had submitted six pages, I think, of points which they wanted discussed at that meeting, or they proposed should be discussed at that meeting, and those points included comments and suggestions about the way in which the 45 minutes point should be addressed. That was discussed at the 17th September meeting, separate from this. Q. The DIS had discussed that? A. The DIS had raised it, but it was discussed anyway at the meeting -- Q. At the JIC? A. No, not at the JIC, at the drafting group chaired by Julian Miller which was a specific group established to oversee the drafting of the public dossier. Q. What was the date on which they discussed these comments? A. 17th September. Q. 17th September? A. In the morning. Q. What was the outcome of that discussion? A. The outcome of that discussion was that the assessment staff drafters would go back to the original intelligence and would go back to the classified assessment, which had included this point about 45 minutes, which was issued on 9th September, which I have referred to earlier. Q. Which we have seen now? A. Yes. And that they would bring the wording of the overall text in to line with the intelligence and with the existing classified assessment, which is what they did. LORD HUTTON: Were there some suggestions by DIS, at that meeting, that the wording in the previous dossier had been a little strong on the 45 minute claim? A. My Lord, yes. The proposal from DIS related to the way in which it was worded in the executive summary, as a judgment. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. They had no objection to this item being included in the text of the dossier and they did not object to it being included in the executive summary, but they queried whether it was right to include it as a judgment and they suggested that it should be qualified in the executive summary with the words, I think it was "intelligence suggests that", rather than it being placed as a judgment. That was what they proposed at the 17th September drafting group meeting. LORD HUTTON: I think Mr Martin Howard said in his evidence that the discussion on this point did relate to the use of language with reference to the words you have just mentioned, that is a debate about whether it was appropriate to say "we judge" as opposed to "intelligence indicates" or "intelligence suggests"; is that your understanding? A. That is correct, yes. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: And we have heard that Dr Kelly, in a conversation with Ms Watts, described this type of process as "wordsmithing". Is that a concept that you are familiar with in the intelligence world? A. Again it is not a word I have used but it is a concept which I am very familiar with and is a good professional concept. Q. Which is if I say "something shows this", that is stronger than "something suggests this"? A. It depends on context, but it might well be, yes. Q. That is the sort of thing that, rightly or wrongly, gets people working at the level of the DIS sometimes agitated to make recommendations about the draft? A. Yes. And I think that is entirely normal. Q. And had you at this stage, we are now on 19th September, picked up any of this, you know, concern about the way in which the 45 minutes was being expressed? A. No, personally I was not aware of any concern about this. I did know, but only sort of very briefly, that there had been discussion of this point, but as I have said, there were many other points under discussion too, at the 17th September meeting; that the drafters had gone away to look at the original texts, and had put forward amended drafting which had then been circulated in the draft of 19th September. I was aware of that. LORD HUTTON: Was this sort of discussion something which was not unusual in intelligence circles if an assessment was being prepared, that different members of the intelligence community would put forward different suggestions as to the precise word perhaps to be used in a sentence? A. It is completely normal, my Lord, and it is important that it should happen, but it is completely normal. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: We know on 19th September you circulate a further draft. Can we look at CAB/23/1. LORD HUTTON: Sorry, can we just go back for a moment to Mr Campbell's memorandum to you at CAB/11/66. If we could look at the second page, 67. Mr Dingemans has referred you to this page in some detail, Mr Scarlett. You will see in paragraph 1 there is the reference or the statement by Mr Campbell: "Also in the executive summary, it would be stronger if we said that despite sanctions ...", et cetera. Then Mr Dingemans also referred you to paragraph 2: "In the text (page 23) it is weaker 'may have'." Then in paragraph 9 the reference is "'might' reads very weakly." Then in 10: "... 'may' is weaker than in the summary." Then in 14: "The nuclear timelines issue is difficult. I felt it worked better in the last draft." Then 15: "It would be stronger if you could be more explicit about when a JIC assessment has gone to..." You said in reply to Mr Dingemans that those were comments rather than suggestions; and just if we could then look at your reply at CAB/11/70, in paragraph 6.1 you there say: "We have strengthened language on current concerns and plans..." But in 2 you say: "On the position of Saddam's sons, the intelligence supports only 'may have'." So you are not accepting Mr Campbell's suggestion there? A. No. LORD HUTTON: On 8, that is at 71, you say: "We do not have intelligence which allows us to list quantities on the old page 15 for the various delivery means. "9. We cannot improve on the use of 'might' on the old page 16." Now, would it be a fair summary to say that whether one regards Mr Campbell's suggestions as being comments or suggestions, the position was that when you considered those comments or suggestions and they were not supported by the intelligence, you said that in reply to Mr Campbell? A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: And you have already referred to the distinction between presentation and intelligence. Have you any comment in that context on the memorandum from Mr Campbell and the memorandum in reply? A. (Pause). As I understood it at the time, my Lord, he was for the first time in this process, on the basis of the drafts that he had seen, asking questions, and, in some limited respects, making requests, really, for changes. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. And was asking me whether that would be possible. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. And it was up to me to decide whether it was possible, whether it was not, whether it was something I would agree to do, would not agree to do, whether it was consistent of course with the underlying intelligence and whether it was consistent with our assessment. So I saw this very much as a list of points from him entirely up to me to respond to or not as I saw fit. I hope that answers the question my Lord. LORD HUTTON: Yes, thank you. Yes, Mr Dingemans. MR DINGEMANS: 19th September. We have a letter from DIS which is CAB/3/79, commenting on the revised draft which they say is 15th September. We are told that is an error and it was in fact the 16th. A. Yes. Q. We can see a whole series of detailed comments: "Procured materials for use it its illegal development of long range missiles" and a suggested changed language. These are intelligence personnel, is that right? A. Yes, this was from the Defence Intelligence Staff, it is probably coming through their sort of central reference point for this exercise and it is representing further changes and suggestions. Q. If you go over the page to 80, we are told Dr Kelly was at this meeting. A. Yes. Q. You can see for example the third paragraph down there is a reference to the number of litres of aflatoxin and the rationale accuracy. A. Yes. Q. You can see some of them are accuracy, some them deal with intelligence comments. But picking up the comment that his Lordship made, I mean these, on the face of it, to a lay person, seem fairly similar to the type of comments that Mr Campbell was suggesting to you in his memorandum of 17th September. Is that fair or unfair? A. (Pause). Well, these are dealing with a great deal more detail and, of course, they are the comments from experts. Q. I appreciate that, but these are intelligence personnel. A. Yes. Q. And Mr Campbell is not an expert in intelligence. A. He is not. Q. He is suggesting or appeared to be suggesting some changes. I appreciate you did not accept all the changes, in the same way no doubt you did not accept all these changes. But you are at least accepting comments from persons who are not qualified in intelligence. A. Yes, I was accepting. And I see absolutely nothing difficult in that at all. It was entirely up to me as to how to respond. I was completely in control of this process. I felt it at the time and feel it subsequently. Q. Now, we know there was discussion about a conclusion. A. Hmm. Q. Did you originally draft a conclusion to the document? A. I did. Q. When it was published was there a conclusion? A. No, there was not. Q. What was the process by which the conclusion came to be dropped? A. I had originally drafted a conclusion, I think, although I cannot clarify it precisely from the record, over the weekend of the 14th and the 15th and, as I recall, that was my initiative. It was issued on the 16th as part of that draft, as I have already stated, largely in sort of box form. In the draft of the 19th it had been much reduced to two or three paragraphs. I had never really felt happy with it. I did not think it was quite right, had quite the right tone or, crucially, that it added anything to what was in the rest of the text; and so I had been musing on this particular aspect for some days, I cannot quite remember exactly how many, and I decided to drop it. Q. Right. We can see there is a further draft produced on 19th September. I think we have seen that a number of times before. On 20th September you write a memo to Mr Campbell. That is CAB/18/38, a new document. You say here that you are attaching the final draft version of the dossier, taking account of additional comments from you and others received over the last 24 hours. Does that suggest that after the memo of the 17th September Mr Campbell had made further comments? A. Yes, there were I think two, possibly three e-mails which came from him subsequent to the 17th September. Q. Right. Some of them you accepted and some of them you rejected again? A. Yes. Q. And the Prime Minister's foreword which we know had been drafted is now incorporated and the conclusion has been dropped? A. Yes. Q. That is when the conclusion, as it were, goes? A. Yes. Q. You say you are now content that the text now reflects as fully and accurately as possible the intelligence picture on Saddam's mass destruction weapons? A. Yes. Q. That remains your conclusion, does it? A. That remains my conclusion as to the intelligence picture on the basis of the intelligence we had at that time. Q. Then we see that the document is published on 24th September. A. Indeed. Q. Can I just ask you about some aspects of the drafting process? The process which led to the publication of the dossier we have been told, on a number of occasions, was unique. This was the first time that intelligence had been published in this way, is that right? A. That is not quite right. Q. Right. A. There was a precedent of which we were conscious, although it is a very limited precedent, in terms of the Government's document on responsibility for the 9.11 attacks which was published on 4th October 2001. Q. That was just before or just after you had become Chairman? A. It was a month after I had become Chairman. Q. So you had been involved with that process? A. I had. Q. Were you happy with this process by which communications personnel were involved in making suggestions about the dossier to you? A. As long as I was in charge I was happy. In fact, I should add I found it quite useful to have presentational advice. Q. There have been reports in the newspapers, and so I will ask you about those, about rows at the time of the publication of the dossier. There is a reference in an article published by Mr Beaumont, we have heard him give evidence -- A. Yes. Q. -- which said there were fairly serious rows between Campbell, Omand and Lander. You are no doubt familiar with those type of articles and newspaper comments. Were you aware of any such rows or arguments? A. I am familiar with those type of articles and that one is completely untrue. No foundation whatsoever. Q. Were there any serious rows or disagreements -- A. No. Q. -- between -- I had better finish the question first. A. Sorry, my apologies. Q. Between you and Mr Campbell? A. No. Q. Or between others on the JIC and Mr Campbell? A. No. Q. At FAC/3/47 at paragraph 148 Dame Pauline Jones, when she is giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, reported that there was -- and having been asked similar questions about this, it is paragraph 148, if one scrolls down -- that there was as she put it "turbulence in the machine" about some of these aspects. I am sorry, it may be over the page -- A. No, it is here on my screen. Q. Yes: "There was clearly turbulence inside the machine and some people have been talking..." Is she right about that? A. First of all, I do not know who her sources are, she has not stated them. As far as I know, she is completely wrong or she is wrong. What I should add here is that it is a question of what one means by "turbulence" or, although you have not used the word, "unhappiness". It is a very general term, "turbulence inside the machine". I think as it stands it really means nothing. It needs further definition before it is possible to answer whether it or might or might not be well founded. Q. Regardless of who her sources were or not, you were at the time Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee? A. Yes. Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness, if we ignore turbulence -- A. As Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and as somebody in frequent contact with the senior members of the intelligence community including the most senior, of course, I was not aware of any unhappiness within the intelligence community about the contents of the dossier and the judgments that we were making in it. It was the case and remains the case that all my colleagues on the JIC were completely supportive in giving authority for that assessment to be issued. That is what I mean about definition. That is regarding the contents and the judgment. And I was aware that at a working level, maybe higher, there were worries within the intelligence community about the precedent that would be set by a document of this kind; and the importance of ensuring that in no way did it impinge on operational security and the security of sources. I myself of course shared that concern and paid a great deal of attention to addressing it, to make sure that absolutely vital condition was not breached. That is a separate sort of worry and an entirely reasonable and logical one. Q. Now the Foreign Affairs Committee made a comment in their report of 7th July at FAC/3/34. It is paragraph 100: "We conclude that the language used in the September dossier was in places more assertive than that traditionally used in intelligence documents." First of all, is that sentence justified? A. No, it is not. Q. "We believe that there is much value in retaining the measured and even cautious tones which have been the hallmark of intelligence assessments and we recommend that this approach be retained." Did you agree with their comments in that respect? A. Well, I am bound to agree that it is important to use measured and well founded language in intelligence assessments; but the implication of the recommendation, which is more than implication, which is that that had changed, I do not accept and I do not agree, no. Q. I am proposing to move off the dossier. Is there anything you want to say in relation to the dossier that you have not said in answer to my questions? A. Well, there is one thing, my Lord, that I might say which relates to the purpose of the exercise as far as I was concerned, if I may. LORD HUTTON: Yes. A. As far as I was concerned, this was an objective which was a very worthwhile objective if quite a difficult one; and it was to put into the public domain and to share, as far as could be done safely, the intelligence assessment on this issue which was being provided to the Prime Minister and the Government. It was no more or less than that. And in no sense, in my mind, or in the mind of the JIC, was it a document designed to make a case for anything. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: If I may now move on to the broadcast on 29th May. A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: I wonder, Mr Dingemans, if I just might ask Mr Scarlett one point. Mr Scarlett, I think you have already referred to this, but I think it might be helpful if you would just explain in a little more detail the contacts between the various branches of the Intelligence Services, like DIS, and the assessment staff, and there is a body which you refer to in your statement, I think its acronym is something like CIG. A. The Current Intelligence Group, my Lord. LORD HUTTON: How did that operate in relation to the JIC? Is there a continuous process of discussion that goes on or not? Because one could perhaps take two views of how the process works. One is that information comes up to the assessment staff, they assess it, they prepare an assessment for the JIC, it is passed on to the JIC, or another possible view might be that whilst the assessments come up there is continuous contact to and fro. Could you just elaborate on that a little? A. Yes of course, my Lord. Starting at the bottom, the process goes as follows: intelligence is issued by the intelligence collection agency, let us say SIS, let us say GCHQ, and that is issued and they will make clear how they evaluate the report. That will be issued to a number of what we would call customers in policy departments who would have an interest in that particular subject and, depending on the subject, it will be issued to the Ministry of Defence and in many, many cases to Defence Intelligence Staff as they are the intelligence experts in the Ministry of Defence. It will also be issued to the relevant individuals in assessment staff, who are the central assessment people. That is the raw intelligence. And assessment staff have access to all intelligence which comes in from the issuing agencies, and of course depending on the subject. The JIC works on the basis -- the JIC is responsible for the presentation of centralised intelligence assessments to the Government at the most senior level. Of course it is a question of deciding which subjects are going to be assessed. That decision is taken on the basis of a work programme which is kept continually up-to-date, and individual subjects are chosen for assessment. Whatever the subject is, it needs to have a sponsoring department, almost always a policy department which wants an assessment on a particular situation to support whatever policy considerations they have in mind. That is agreed at an interdepartmental group chaired by the chief of assessment staff and is put on the work programme; and the assessment staff work according to that work programme although of course it is flexible, if need be. So a particular subject has been chosen for an assessment, the initial draft of that assessment will be prepared by the relevant assessment staff officer and he will draw up that draft either initially just on his own, on the basis of his own expertise, or he may well start consulting his contacts around Whitehall because by and large, although these are exceptionally able and well qualified people, they are not necessarily great experts in all the detail of their particular subject. Their skill is in bringing together in a coordinated way the expertise which exists around the British Government machine. That first draft will then be circulated to interested parties who will have a chance to work on it, think about it, compare it, look at the underlying intelligence. Then a formal meeting of an interdepartmental group is brought together and that is the Current Intelligence Group. That sort of formalises this process. Those groups or the CIG meet under the chairmanship of one of the deputy heads of assessment staff, the particular deputy head who deals with that particular area, and will discuss the draft which is before the group and which they will have considered beforehand, looking at the raw intelligence. All this is very firmly rooted in the raw intelligence but also in other source information, open source information, diplomatic reporting and so on. They will agree a new draft and it will almost always be changed to some degree as a result of the work of the CIG. Then it is recirculated to the relevant departments for further comment and maybe some further changes are made and it is presented to the JIC for formal consideration at a full meeting of the JIC at the most senior level. Also within the assessment staff before each JIC there will be a meeting chaired by myself, or I will look at the drafts and also may propose changes to go into the draft for the JIC to consider. Then there is the final meeting. Again, almost always the JIC will make changes, not absolutely always, but very frequently, to the draft and it is then issued by assessment staff on behalf of the JIC. But it does happen with complicated subjects and fast moving subjects in particular that after a meeting of the JIC there will be a further draft prepared and circulated for consideration out of Committee and then issued with the authority of the JIC depending on what further comments have come in. That is the structure of the normal classified process. It is a very well established, very rigorous and well tried structure. But of course within it, it has an informal side to it; and within those parameters that I have set out, there is a great deal of contact which is taking place all the time between the assessment staff desk officers and their counterparts in other ministries. LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you. Yes, Mr Dingemans. MR DINGEMANS: The 29th May broadcast. Were you made aware of that broadcast? Did you hear it, for example? A. I did not hear it. Q. Were you contacted in relation to it? A. Yes, I was contacted in the office -- for some reason I was there quite early -- by the duty press officer in No. 10. Q. What were you consulted about? A. I was told that there had been a broadcast on the Today Programme. I think I was told that it was by Andrew Gilligan but I cannot be absolutely sure about that. I was told that it made some sort of central allegations. Q. Were you told what the allegations were? A. Yes, I was. I was told that there had been a reference to -- it was the public assessment, 24th September, the inclusion in it of the 45 minutes point, that that had been inserted at the behest of No. 10, against the wishes of the intelligence community, even though the Government knew it to be wrong. Q. And was that allegation true? A. It was completely untrue. Q. And how did you feel about it? A. Well, I was a bit surprised to start with; but I knew instantly that it was completely untrue. There was nobody in a better position than I was to know that and I said so. Q. We know that there were reports of the denial. A. Yes. Q. We know also that Mr Ingram appeared on the Today Programme in the course of which he said that the 45 minute claim had been single sourced. Had you communicated that to Mr Ingram? A. No, I should add that I was also told that the report said it had come in late and it was based on a single source. So I was aware of that. What I denied were the allegations which I have just listed. Q. Right. A. I knew nothing about Mr Ingram's appearance and I was not consulted about it. Q. Was there consideration given to writing a letter from you, putting the record straight? A. Over the weekend, that idea was put to me by Alastair Campbell and I said I would not do that. Q. And is there any reason why you would not write a letter? A. I just did not think it would be appropriate and it would certainly not have been normal for any chairman of the JIC to make that sort of statement in public. Q. Right. So it was really for reasons of precedent and usual practice that no letter was written? A. Well, yes, I mean from what I have just said. Q. 4th June there is a leak inquiry. Can we go to CAB/18/36. These are some documents that I think came with your note. It is to the head of Security Policy Division copied to Sir David Omand. If we scroll down to the bottom of the page we see it is from you on 4th June 2003. Going back to it, it says: "I have spoken with David Omand about the two recent reports of concern ... Andrew Gilligan's (inaccurate) report on the Today Programme on 29th May about the 45 minute report on CW in Iraq", then references in the Sunday Times to a note. "It is not clear that it would be useful, or wise, to institute a full inquiry into these leaks. Nevertheless, they are both serious. If they continue they will cause significant problems and undermine the atmosphere of trust which underlies our work. David and I would be grateful if you could look into how this matter could be managed short of a full inquiry." That is, as it were, a formal response to the Andrew Gilligan report, is that right? A. Well, not really. What this represents is the result of a conversation between myself and David Omand where we -- looking at -- David Omand of course as the security and intelligence coordinator I am sure would wish to speak to this, but he has the responsibility for the Cabinet Secretary of looking at sort of issues relating to leaks overall Government-wide, although the lead on any leak inquiry will always be taken by the department concerned. In this particular case it was not quite clear what department was concerned. And I, as head of the Intelligence and Security Secretariat, am the senior officer to whom Security Policy Division report and Security Policy Division have overall responsibility for security policy Government-wide including on the conduct of leak inquiries. So it is normal for them in situations like this to discuss with and if necessary advise David Omand on what sort of response might be appropriate to a particular situation. In this particular situation it was not at all clear, at that stage, what had happened, whether it was even feasible to identify or try to -- yes, identify and stop leaks of the kind described. The purpose of this minute was simply to seek advice from Security Policy Division who were the proper people from whom to seek advice as to whether, and if so how, the work might be taken forward. LORD HUTTON: Have we seen in the course of going through the various notes and memoranda between you and Mr Campbell this note that appears to have been referred to in the Sunday Times? A. Yes, my Lord, you have. LORD HUTTON: What note -- A. It is the note of 20th September. It is the one on the screen a fairly short time ago which covered the final approved version of the dossier handed to him on 20th September. MR DINGEMANS: CAB/18/38. Is this the document to which you were referring? A. I am sure it is. It is. LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans, CAB/18? MR DINGEMANS: 38, my Lord. It is another new document. LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. MR DINGEMANS: You get a response on 6th June, CAB/18/40; is that right? A. Yes. Q. We can see what the issue is from the beginning of the memorandum: "Your note of 4 June asked for early advice on how best to manage the leaks ... in particular the Today Programme ... This note sets out what might be done initially short of establishing a full inquiry." A. Yes. Q. He then carries out an analysis of what might be done short of a formal inquiry. I will not, if that is all right with you, take you through the whole document -- A. That is all right with me. Q. -- but I will take you to CAB/18/49 which is Sir David Omand to you effectively summarising that exchange. You have obviously written a minute of 9th June. "I read with interest Head of Security Policy Division's advice. I share your view that we don't at present have a basis on which we could launch a formal leak inquiry." There are ways and means of attempting to pursue the matter? A. Yes. LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans, this may be a convenient time. I will rise and sit again at 2 o'clock. 1.05 pm: The short adjournment