ICSS INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SPORT SECURITY

July | August 2014 Vol 2 | No 2

Staying strong: security in and London

Securing sport Security and safety Security and safety

Making Boston stronger

In the wake of the bombing in 2013, a team from Harvard University carried out extensive interviews with participants to identify strengths and weaknesses in the incident response to the terror attack. This abridged version of their final report focuses on the lessons learnt

n 15 April 2013 at 2.49pm, two improvised in future events? In particular, what aspects of the way explosive devices (IEDs) detonated near command and coordination of these organisations were the finish line of the Boston Marathon. established and practised contributed to the substantial O Three people died and more than 260 success – and to the less successful moments – in the others needed hospital care, many having lost limbs aftermath of the Boston Marathon attack? or suffered horrific wounds. Those explosions set off about 100 hours of intense activity that drew ‘Task environment’ in rapidly evolving events worldwide public attention. The response by It is useful to begin by taking a step back from the emergency medical, emergency management specific circumstances of the marathon bombing to and law enforcement agencies and by the public at understand more generally the nature of similar events large has now become known as ‘’. from the perspective of those trying to lead and manage Viewed as a whole, the events following the them. Crisis events can be characterised as: marathon bombing posed enormous challenges. ■■ High-consequence: lives, property, community The response spanned geographic boundaries, and economy are at grave risk; levels of government (local, state and federal), ■■ Complex: many things are happening that professional disciplines and the public and may or may not be connected; private sectors. It brought together in both well- ■■ Novel: this situation, or combination of planned and spontaneous ways organisations with situations, has not been routinely experienced widely varying operating norms, procedures, cultures, so there is no pre-prepared ‘script’ of actions sources of authority, perspectives and interests. to address it. Instead, plans for coping must be Our aim in researching this response, through developed, in real time, as the event evolves; interviews with a wide range of participants, was to ■■ Volatile/rapidly evolving: additional novel examine the conditions that contributed to making elements continue to be generated as the Boston Strong – as well as those that made the event evolves; response less effective than it might have been. One key ■■ Chaotic: the environment is ‘noisy’ due to the factor was command – the processes, procedures, and circumstances and to the reactions of survivors, structures that facilitated decision-making and execution bystanders, citizens, responders and leaders. within the various agencies and organisations involved in the response. A second key factor was coordination From the perspective of the observer or leader, among the wide array of agencies, organisations events of this kind create a task environment that and groups that mobilised in one or more aspects of is highly uncertain, ambiguous, confusing and response. Many of these entities worked together in unstructured. In turn, this implies intrinsically teams, both small and large. The fact that they could that leaders are trying to lead during an event work together as effectively as they did is a credit to where they confront: those involved, but it is also an object lesson to those ■■ In an adversarial situation or criminal who will face the next unpredictable, swiftly evolving investigation, there is a profusion of leads, disaster or attack. What was it – in prior preparation clues, valuable insights and, simultaneously, and in the moment – that enabled these very different a great number of distractions, red herrings groups and organisations to work together as effectively and false leads. Valuable information is as they did? What are the obstacles that still need to confounded with, and difficult to distinguish be addressed to ensure an even better performance from, irrelevant or inaccurate reports; The finish line of the Boston Marathon, which in 2013 was the scene of a terror attack that killed three people and injured more than 200 Justin Green/Alamy

14 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 15 Security and safety Security and safety

■■ Poor understanding: the plethora of information The events of Thursday 18 April to Friday 19 April First responders spring into action in Boston. Due ■■ Community acceptance of and cooperation with and misinformation is disorganised and difficult stand in sharp contrast as ‘no-notice’ events. The two to the nature of marathon planning, the command the request to ‘shelter in place’ (stay at home to verify, assess, analyse and grasp as a whole. alleged bombers are believed to have shot and killed structure was able to move quickly to a ‘war’ footing during the police manhunt for the perpetrators). This condition is commonly described as ‘low an MIT police officer, carjacked a vehicle and engaged situational awareness’; in a gun battle with police in Watertown that resulted in In addition to the years of training, joint exercises ■■ High risks for the community and, therefore, for the death of one of them. The conclusion of this shoot- and comprehensive planning, what made these strengths the organisations and the individuals involved; out then triggered an intense 18-hour manhunt for the possible? Effectiveness at the finish line (emergency ■■ Fear and anxiety for all concerned. surviving perpetrator, which ended early on the Friday medical and law enforcement), in the trauma-centre EDs, evening. As these events unfolded, command had to be in the criminal investigation, in the apprehension of the No individual, organisation or structure can perform organically assembled while events were ongoing. By perpetrators, was a result of extensive prior planning with a high degree of precision and efficiency in such contrast with Monday’s events, the rapidly assembling and a product of both centralised and decentralised a task environment. Much of our work in the report, responders in Watertown had only the doctrine of action in the moment of the crisis. therefore, was an examination of the way incident incident management and their experience and management, as the structure of coordinated command, personal relationships with one another to build upon. Decentralised actions operated in the context of the Boston bombing events. The marathon bombing events thus enable us to Survivors, bystanders, and responders of all types near the The high degree of effective coordination among response see the same organisations and people cope with two blast zone determined independently what needed to be agencies and other organisations was, in many ways, the contrasting events and the resulting challenges of applying done and could and did take action at their own initiative hallmark of the successful elements of the response. incident command in two quite different settings. with little or no direction. Medical responders from the This contrasts sharply with some prior events – medical tents self-deployed and acted without needing Hurricane Katrina is perhaps the most salient example Strengths of the response centralised direction. People in the trauma centres – during which cooperation and coordination were Given the characteristics and implications of the receiving patients had the requisite skills, equipment and dramatically weaker. Much has been learnt in the environment flowing from the bombing, the strengths facilities, so that they could and did act swiftly without intervening years – and was on display in Boston shown by the response in Boston were quite dramatic, needing much direction or additional organisation. during the week of 15 April 2013. and are listed below under categories of medical, law Individual subordinate leaders across many disciplines There were, however, significant weaknesses as well. enforcement and community response. (eg police, fire, emergency medical response [EMS]) The stresses of the events in Boston showed some fault demonstrated effective personal leadership in organising lines in the doctrine – and in the depth of implementation Emergency medical response Kelvin Ma/Bloomberg/Getty Images and directing small-scale operations with little need for of the doctrine – and these provide an opportunity to ■■ Rapid, effective response by survivors, bystanders line and evacuating thousands of bystanders direction by central commanders. progress in Boston and elsewhere before another crisis. and many types of professional responders to on the street and in establishments in the Members of the public submitted video and help the blast survivors; 13-block crime scene; photographic evidence. Professionalism and courtesy were Command in ‘fixed’ and ‘no-notice’ events ■■ Rapid, effective mobilisation of trained personnel ■■ Rapid ground-up and top-down establishment displayed by tactical units and other law-enforcement The week of 15 April provided examples of two very from the marathon’s medical tents; of central coordination/command; officers to neighbourhood residents in Watertown different settings of incident command. The response ■■ Effective on-scene triage and identification of ■■ Delegation from central command to subordinate during the shelter-in-place request on Friday 19 April. to the bombing at the finish line was in the context of a which victims needed transport most urgently; structures for tactical operations; Cooperation with the request by the public was high. ‘fixed event’ – a highly planned and structured event in ■■ Rapid, effective mobilisation of transport ■■ Rapid mobilisation of a sweep of the area Training, practice, experience and, in the moment, which assets necessary to operate the marathon, as well to convey injured survivors to emergency for additional explosive devices by Explosive near-selfless behaviour and ingenuity figured prominently. as assets that might be needed to deal with contingencies departments (EDs), including summoning Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams; Medical personnel (at the scene and in EDs) had years arising in the context of the marathon, were carefully of additional ambulances, maintaining open ■■ Rapid mobilisation of investigative work; of training, drills and practice at handling mass-casualty identified, provided and pre-positioned before the race. roadways, and use of police vehicles; ■■ Securing the crime scene; events and they were willing to work despite the threat of The marathon itself – as a huge collection of interrelated ■■ Coordinated apportionment of seriously wounded ■■ Obtaining public and private surveillance video; possible additional explosions. Many survivors, bystanders operational activities – was set up to be managed through patients among local trauma centres; ■■ Searching for evidence to identify methods and and non-medical responders (police, National Guard, an incident command structure. Possible emergencies ■■ Preparing for the unpredictable, all bombing the perpetrator(s); spectators, runners etc) also had some knowledge of arising from or during the event had been considered victims were searched by hospital staff outside ■■ Requesting information (especially photos and first aid (eg use and availability of tourniquets) and – including scenarios involving large-scale medical the ED in case one was a suspect carrying video) from the public to aid the investigation; were willing to stay and help (at great risk from possible emergencies (such as widespread heat exhaustion on a weapons or explosives; ■■ Mobilisation of a massive investigative review further blasts). Business owners and managers displayed very hot day) and the possibility of a terror attack. Thus, ■■ Effective work in EDs handling the surge of of video, pictures and other evidence; ingenuity and cooperation. For example, buildings were the immediate response on the Monday sprang from a grievously wounded survivors; ■■ Pursuit of suspects: while leaving room for evacuated through rear doors; some buildings directly in platform of structure, process and personnel designed ■■ Creation of ED ‘micro-sites’ in which individual improvement, definite strengths were also the cordoned-off crime-scene area voluntarily emptied. to be able to cope with a significant emergency. teams of medical personnel could concentrate exhibited in: The general public also contributed to these efforts in While there was no detailed plan to deal with the without distraction on a single victim. • Confrontation with suspects in Watertown; the following days. Many people generously gave their time precise scenario that unfolded, there was a general • Massive manhunt for the second suspect after to help – for example, Lenox Hotel staff volunteered for structure, already activated, that brought together Law enforcement response he escaped from the initial contact area; days. The public also responded very positively to requests many of the agencies that would naturally be involved ■■ Rapid response to help survivors of the blasts; • Successful apprehension of the second suspect. for photographic and video images of the marathon scene in responding to an event of this type; and this structure ■■ Great initiative and improvisation shown at and with surprising degrees of compliance to the shelter- formed the skeleton of the command structure that the blast scene (eg use of police cars to transport Community care in-place request on the climactic Friday. would be developed as the event progressed. In effect, blast survivors once available ambulances had ■■ Community response to help stranded runners Tactical leaders at the scene when the blasts occurred the incident command structure set up to manage been fully utilised); and spectators; or who arrived shortly thereafter showed self-conscious, the event could transition to a ‘war’ footing when the ■■ Rapid securing of the blast area – including ■■ Community provision of video, photographs disciplined self-management – supported by their years emergency arose. stopping 5,000 runners a mile short of the finish and other information; of training and experience, as well as by mental access to

16 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 17 Security and safety Security and safety

New Year’s Eve, 4 July concerts on Boston’s esplanade examining options, and issuing instructions. In a highly along the Charles River) and major episodic events confusing event, there is a tendency for everyone to be (eg home games when Boston was in the World pulled into tactical matters despite knowing that it is Series, the Super Bowl, and celebrations following important to establish a cross-agency, integrated, senior championships). Hosting the Democratic presidential strategic and policy-making level of engagement that looks

Dan Lampariello/Corbis nominating convention in 2004 – the first post-9/11 to the big picture and a longer timeframe. Recognising political convention in the nation – led to new levels that they needed to form such a command and to have of sophistication in subsequent event planning and a location for it, senior officials gathered at the Westin cooperation across agencies and levels of government. Copley Place Hotel, commandeering a ballroom. Repeated As the National Incident Management System (NIMS) attempts were made to convene the group and to get it took hold in the past decade, it too contributed to more focused on work at the strategic level; it finally took the effective collaboration in both simulated and real events. governor, saying, in effect, “I want everyone to put down Public safety agencies planned and conducted inter- their phones and gather so that we can figure out what agency and cross-jurisdictional exercises and drills for we have and what we are going to do.” The tactical pull mass-casualty events – with scenarios for transportation from subordinate staff – represented by the cell phones disasters, terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Post-9/11, that the senior leaders had in their hands – can be increased federal funding for training and exercises, as overwhelmingly powerful. well as the requirement that most occur at regional scale, There are many forces that combine to pull in this contributed to the development of closer institutional direction, including: (a) the tactical issues are important; relationships. Response to regular winter storms and less (b) subordinates actively seek, and do seem to need, frequent hurricanes or severe wind storms also shaped guidance; (c) the tactical issues have a clarity and a culture of collaboration at the command level. Overall, sense of urgency that the more abstract and yet-to-be- these leaders established professional relationships and defined strategic issues may not; (d) senior commanders An explosion erupts near the finish line. As part of the law-enforcement response around got to know each other personally through meetings often were promoted from subordinate ranks, and are 5,000 runners abandoned the marathon and other interactions. As a result, they developed comfortable in and feel competent and confident in tactical/operational command roles; models of effective leadership in moments of great stress. the National Guard and others were (e) senior commanders may not have Illustratively, as senior law enforcement leaders told us: gathered at the hotel, with Governor Deval Patrick full confidence that their subordinates “I was tempted to go hands-on, but I knew I was needed soon arriving, followed later by Boston Mayor Thomas The setting and situation of dealing with can handle issues with the suddenly to organise and direct”, and “I thought about historical Menino (who was released from a hospital where he elevated importance of those now leaders and what they had done, and I realised that the was recuperating from surgery). This structure generally the flow of casualties from the bombing on the table. With the importance people around me needed me to remain calm and that worked effectively to manage the need for strategic of the issues having suddenly been would help them be able to do what they needed to do”. thinking and policy setting, while balancing the pressures sites was very different from usual elevated, everyone needs to step up In hospital emergency departments, senior leaders that each leader felt to be involved in tactical decisions a level (away from tactics toward emphasised maintaining ‘micro-sites’ within the ED and information flows within their own organisations. strategy), but the tendency is to be environment in which small teams of medical personnel Another form of centralised control operated as trust, respect for the competence of their peers and pulled down a level instead. operated in conditions as similar as possible to their injured victims of the bombing were triaged and allocated their agencies, and understanding of complementary Making this step upward toward strategy is not a normal operating situations. The setting and situation to different hospital facilities through the Massachusetts capabilities across their respective professional disciplines natural act, particularly under the stress of a breaking, of dealing with the flow of casualties from the bombing Public Health Coordination Center, which had been pre- (eg law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical, highly uncertain event – and, while many participants sites was very different from usual for the policy-level activated for the marathon. public health and hospital-based emergency medicine); seemed intellectually to recognise the necessity to leaders overseeing the situation, but they took it as their High-level coordination among multiple agencies in they also developed an understanding of how best to do so, it was still difficult to maintain the more task to make the tactical conditions and situations of the the response was also effectively achieved in the criminal coordinate and collaborate across agencies and built strategic focus consistently. individual medical teams – working on one patient at a investigation – both for evidence processing at the mutual understanding of the cultures and imperatives time – as familiar as possible. crime scene by multi-agency teams led by FBI evidence of their respective organisations. Secure, dedicated facilities for command and technicians and in the processing of surveillance, media- coordination: In an event of the size, complexity and Centralised actions in the moment and citizen-provided video and photographic evidence. Weaknesses in the response duration of the marathon bombing, there is a need for a While tactical leaders displayed considerable initiative Similarly, communication with the public about the status Inevitably, weaknesses also appeared in the handling substantial command facility near the locus of the event. at the scene and in hospitals, top leaders of many of the investigation and requests to the public were of the response. Our research focused on structural The space needs to be secured, covered, lit and equipped organisations and jurisdictions were creating a structure regularly handled effectively on a centralised basis. and procedural elements of the response apparatus with chairs, tables and the tools useful for coordination for command and coordination at the strategic/policy that resulted in persistent and remediable weaknesses and collaboration – everything from easels and pens to level. This worked both from the bottom up (individual Centralised actions in advance so as to suggest ways in which these weaknesses copiers and printers. Services – bathrooms, coffee, food leaders seeking each other out on the street in the This capacity for coordinated action at the command could be ameliorated: – need to be readily available. Some process needs to be minutes after the bomb blasts) and from the top down, level was the result of many years of collaborative developed to secure the area (since it would be a natural once the command post was established at the Westin effort, driven by planning and carrying out public safety Strategic command issues target in the case of a multi-stage attack) and to screen Copley Place Hotel. Within a short time period, senior support for numerous fixed events organised in the Establishing and maintaining strategic oversight or entrants (since an overwhelming number of people from leadership of the Boston Police Department, the FBI, ATF Boston area each year. These included ‘routine’ events ‘command’: Early in the event, senior officials in every multiple agencies will present themselves at the boundary, (Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms), Massachusetts State (eg regular season games of the city’s professional teams) response agency were immediately notified (if they were each with a story that he or she regards as compelling Police, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority as well as annual events that attracted large crowds not already on the scene) and became engaged with about why he or she should be inside). For operational police, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, (eg the Boston Marathon, First Night celebrations on subordinates in defining the situation, developing and security, the work area must have a well-defined perimeter,

18 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 19 Security and safety Security and safety

but there is no simple way to describe which people particularly difficult to sort out. Such conflicts may be done effectively in most cases during this event, better from which agencies should be admitted and who should part of the essence of true crisis events – that is, part of means of monitoring and responding to the flow of public be turned back. (Exercising judgement at the boundary what makes them crises is that not all of the values are information emanating from numerous media and social is delicate, and a recipe for negative ‘my agency doesn’t aligned, and the conflicts among them have not been media sources are still needed. take instructions from your agency’ interactions.) anticipated and sorted out in advance, and so instead The Westin Copley Place Hotel was a reasonable have to be confronted and dealt with in real time under Tactical command issues choice in the circumstances on the afternoon of the the pressure of the event. Better mechanisms for ‘Self-deployment’: To a great extent, people deployed bombing, as it provided many of the kinds of spaces identifying and resolving these conflicts are needed. to assigned tasks in many episodes of this event as a (large rooms for press conferences and for organising This is appropriately a role for political leaders, but also result of official requests and in the context of units of task groups, smaller rooms for command staff to meet involves operational officials in defining the issues and which they were a part (eg when tactical teams were in) and could provide needed facilities and services. Even questions for practical resolution. requested to deploy to Watertown in the early hours of so, no space that is suddenly taken over will be perfectly Friday morning). However, in a number of episodes there configured. At the Westin, the command group had to Rotation, depth and fatigue: By the end of the law- were many self-deployments or self-reassignments in the evolve through several different iterations to finally reach enforcement pursuit and apprehension of the second sense that the movement was initiated by the individual space in which it could work effectively, as successive suspect on Friday evening, many of the people managing rather than as the result of a mutual assistance request chosen locations each became overcrowded and noisy. the overall event generally, and the Watertown event transmitted between agencies and then affirmatively or (Some key meetings among a very small group of senior specifically, had been awake for 36 or more hours and systematically from a dispatcher to a unit. officials, for example, took place in a suite high up in had more generally been sleep-deprived since Monday’s Examples of self-deployment in this sense are medical the hotel, and removed from the ballroom area where bombing. Part of the reason for this is that few had true staff reporting to the trauma centres on Monday (though most of the group was assembled and most of the work deputies on whom they could trustingly rely and with this was managed well and presents positive lessons that was being done.) whom they were reasonably interchangeable – or, to put should be applied more generally); some of the officers One area in which further work might be useful would it another way, both they and their deputies had been responding to the shooting of Officer Sean Collier at MIT be to specify some of the general characteristics that fully deployed throughout the event, leaving no unused on Thursday evening (18 April); many officers responding would be desirable for a forward ‘command space’, so that (rested) capacity in the system. This inevitably degrades to radio traffic concerning the encounter with terror those in the area early could take control of configuring performance. No one knows in an ongoing event just how suspects at Dexter and Laurel streets in Watertown; Mayor Thomas Menino, Governor Deval the space to provide some of the ‘zones’ within it that will, long it will go on, so methods for ensuring rotation and tactical teams chasing reports within their assigned Patrick and Boston Police Commissioner predictably, be necessary. rest are essential to sustained performance. Ed Davis address the media. Effective search sector during the search; people moving toward communication is vital in such events the boat on Franklin Street in Watertown on Friday evening Focus and filtering of distractions: In an event with Systems for coordinating and communicating information: Bill Greene/Getty Images (where news media video shows a large and unstructured 24/7 news and social media saturation, and minute- One particularly compelling need for better coordinated Attending to the emotional needs of survivors and flow of police officers in many different uniforms moving by-minute ‘news’ breaking on social media, there is an information concerned the information families needed family members: What people need most in the moment toward the reported location). This created confusion, enormous amount of information circulating at any about the location of their loved ones who might have of crisis is for feelings of safety and security to be command challenges, crossfire situations, and other been injured during the event. Were they restored. They may also have needs that are idiosyncratic, conflicts in a number of instances. Better mechanisms for among the injured? If so, where were as individuals all respond differently. The need to protect determining the appropriate limits to improvisation and they now? In the swirl of the event, there the young and preserve the dignity of the dead is a self-deployment are needed, including rapidly identifying What people need most in the will inevitably be some mistakes and near universal sentiment. The honour guard that stayed a staging area for all responders and not permitting any misinformation. While there is no way to with the body of Martin Richard not only afforded breach of the established perimeter. moment of crisis is for feelings of eliminate all such errors, there could be him the dignity and respect he deserved, but also a much better system for capturing and allowed his father, with a severely injured wife and Micro-command: Self-deployment, together with a great safety and security to be restored disseminating reliable information about young daughter, to leave the scene. These kinds of desire to be present and involved in the events, created patient status and location. actions are easy to take and very important for victims problems of establishing effective command. At the and family members. Developing plans for community macro-level, the process of leadership and management given time, and much of it is wrong. It is important for Legal changes to allow more information to be conveyed: care should be a high priority. tends to be collaborative and to focus on cooperation senior-level decision-makers not to be unduly exposed to In ordinary circumstances, there are severe restrictions and coordination, but in tactical situations definitive and the flow of raw information, lest their attention be diverted (for example, those embodied in privacy clauses of Maintaining regular general communication with the authoritative command is an essential resource. Someone away from the central real events. Better systems need to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability public: As events rapidly evolved, combined official needs to be ‘in charge’ – and those present need to be developed for monitoring and vetting the external flow Act of 1996 [HIPAA] and in policies adopted by health communication with the public (joint press conferences recognise who that is and to accept it – or grave and of information and filtering it for presentation to policy- institutions to maintain compliance with it) on the release and press releases) decreased. The effort that would be unnecessary danger can be created for responders present level commanders – while ensuring to the greatest extent of information about the health status of patients. These required to coordinate on a more continuous basis may at the scene, civilians nearby and suspects. The difficulty possible that significant information is not filtered out. may well be wise and appropriate in circumstances where well be worth it – and by developing standard protocols of establishing micro-command at various episodes patients can provide guidance about what information they to simplify that coordination in durable ongoing events within the marathon response looms as one of the most Mission conflicts: Inevitably, when many organisations want released and to whom. In mass casualty situations, we might be able to reduce the costs of this necessary persistent and troubling weaknesses. In contrast to the come together to work on a common challenge they however, it may make sense to provide exceptions to function further. formation of unified command at the strategic level, the do not all see it the same way, or see the importance these restrictions by creating a presumption that the establishment of definitive command in fluid situations of different goals and priorities within it in exactly the patient would prefer to have information released to Maintaining accuracy of public information in a media- among ground-level responders from multiple agencies same rank order. Conflicts among these values within a friends or relatives if in the good-faith judgment of and social media-saturated event: Other definitive, official was repeatedly problematic (eg at the MIT shooting collection of organisations in which there is no intrinsic health professionals this would be helpful in providing information about the event also needs to be coordinated scene; at the ‘naked man’ event in Watertown, where the hierarchy – no one overarching agency that has authority better care or reducing the likelihood of errors of and communicated, directly (through press conferences driver of a vehicle was directed to strip naked; and at the over all and that can resolve the issue definitively – are identification or treatment. and social media) and through the press. While that was Franklin Street boat episode). This implies unfinished

20 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 21 Security and safety Security and safety

Recommended preparations for future crises

Robust development, practice, exercise, ‘Fixed’ or planned events can during such events, senior commanders In the face of the bombing, and application of incident management be effective platforms for practising should themselves form a unified Boston showed strength,

processes and skills (codified in the incident management skills even when command structure to make decisions resilience, even defiance – Dominick Reuter/Corbis National Management System) greatly no emergency occurs, and they are and implement them, identify a separate and these were key drivers enhance the ability of emergency highly useful if emergency contingencies staging area to which deploying of the overall outcomes … responders to operate in complex, materialise at a fixed event as happened individuals and organisations should that is, of ‘Boston Strong’. multi-organisational, cross-jurisdictional at and after the 2013 Boston Marathon. report and await instructions before These qualities are latent crisis situations. Skills honed at such events can also undertaking field operations, and in in many communities in the The great value of common systems prepare responders and response advance of such events should establish United States and elsewhere. and the understanding that these organisations to perform more effectively protocols for the formation of ‘sudden’ Celebrating examples of produce among responders who have even in ‘no-notice’ emergencies that may teams composed of individuals from community resilience – both never previously met or worked together occur at other times. different organisations that may not have local examples and from should not be underestimated. They can Because coordinating multiple previously worked together. further afield – may help to literally be lifesavers for responders and agencies and disciplines will be Community resilience should be cultivate a culture of Police beneath a ‘Boston Strong’ sign near the site of one others at a crisis scene. particularly difficult in ‘no-notice’ events, systematically developed and celebrated. confidence and self-reliance. of the bomb blasts on the first anniversary of the attack

Protocols and technology: for integrating, in the field and in real-time, the useful substantial degree by the multi-dimensional preparedness In a confusing night-time gunfight, police When the bombs exploded on local knowledge of the ‘home-town team’ with the of the region. Response organisations have undertaken Monday afternoon, arriving police capabilities of the external groups that are contributing detailed and careful planning for the many fixed events, jumped from their cars to join the fray and other vehicles in the area were capacities are much needed. such as the marathon, that are staged annually in the warned through dispatch and other Boston area. They have seen to the development of radio traffic not to block egress Extraordinary powers and procedures in emergency both institutional and personal relationships among business in the process of developing and successfully routes for emergency medical vehicles, and to a great situations: Police and other organisations generally response organisations and their senior commanders, cascading the doctrine of unified command down to extent roadways remained passable for ambulances and operate in ‘routine’ situations – circumstances that are ensured the adoption of formal coordination practices, the lowest levels of tactical operation. other emergency vehicles. In Watertown, by contrast, a familiar to them, for which they have evolved standard regularly held intra- and cross-organisation drills and large number of police officers from different jurisdictions operating procedures, for which they have trained exercises, and generated experience during actual events. Micro-coordination, trust and respect: Related to the arriving individually in separate vehicles in the middle and practised, and in which their actions fit and are Importantly, the senior commanders of these organisations problem of establishing micro-command is the issue of a confusing night-time gunfight jumped from their supported by the legal and policy framework in which seem to have internalised the ‘mindset’ of strategic of generating appropriate coordination and collaboration cars to join the fray and left a tangle of abandoned they are embedded. For example, procedures generally and operational coordination. at the field level in encounters among officials from vehicles with flashing lights that would later impede specify that when a police officer has fired his weapon It also suggests that the major contributing factors different agencies. both the exodus of an ambulance transporting a gravely in an ‘officer-involved shooting’ incident, an investigation to much of what went well – and to some of what went In several instances during this event, officials from wounded police officer to hospital and the pursuit of a should be instituted and he or she should more or less less well – were command and coordination structures, one agency, when asked to identify themselves to officers fleeing suspect because no one could quickly figure out immediately surrender his or her weapon to a supervisor. relationships, and processes through which responding of the jurisdiction in which they were operating, refused to who had the keys and ability to operate which vehicle. Most officer-involved shootings are of short duration, and organisations were deployed and managed. The do so or refused to show identification. Better protocols – This may call for different training and protocols for are over before supervisory officials are on the scene, so response organisations – particularly at senior levels a ritualised process recognised by and participated in by officers arriving at an unfolding trouble event, and it may this protocol generally makes a good deal of sense. But – demonstrated effective utilisation of the spirit and both parties – for self-identification and introduction need require additional procedures for dispatchers to remind in Watertown in the early hours of Friday 19 April, there core principles of the NIMS, mandated by Congress in to be developed and practised. arriving vehicles not to block local streets (unless there was substantial ambiguity about whether the ‘event’ was 2002 but still a work in progress in many areas of the is a tactical reason to do so). It might also call for the over. Some officers who had fired their weapons tried to country. But the many highly positive dimensions of inter- Discipline, fire control and training: Control over fields development of a shared ‘universal key’ that could be surrender them to supervisors, and some supervisors organisational collaboration in the Boston response are of fire and authorisation to fire is another critical micro- used by any police officer to operate vehicles from any sought and obtained weapons from officers involved juxtaposed with some notable difficulties in what might command issue, and it is more complicated in a sudden jurisdiction in emergency circumstances. in the shooting at Dexter and Laurel streets. Others, be termed ‘micro-command’, for example the leadership team of people from multiple agencies. The risks of however, said that officers should retain their weapons and coordination at the street level when individuals contagious or otherwise undisciplined fire in a US city Structuring field teams to take advantage of local and stay in the effort until the event was over. It may and small teams from different organisations suddenly are substantial. This may call for further emphasis in knowledge and external resources: A key feature of be useful to clarify guidelines and provide greater come together and need to operate in concert. Improving training on fire control; waiting for authorisation to fire; events where multiple jurisdictions are involved is that discretion in the event of longer-duration events than these aspects of crisis response will, we hope, help make care in identification of targets; and slow, aimed fire. It no one entity has all of the resources, capabilities and current guidelines seem to be predicated upon. Boston, and other cities round the world, even stronger. may also call for changes in procedures used in training. knowledge needed to address the event most effectively For example, a common practice is to have all people – and that is precisely why so many are called upon to Conclusion: focus on macro This article is an abridged version of the full report on a firing line fire at the same time – it might be useful be involved. This means that the division of labour among and micro-command ‘Why Was Boston Strong?’, authored by Herman B on occasion to practise ‘directed fire’ in which the range the responders is important. Often, a singularly important Overall, the research carried out during the project points ‘Dutch’ Leonard, Christine M Cole, and Arnold M Howitt supervisor calls out individual authorisation to fire (so asset in situations of this kind is the local knowledge of strongly to the fact that the emergency response following of the Harvard Kennedy School, and Philip B Heymann that officers become practised in listening in some those from the immediate vicinity of the event – that is, the bombing in Boston and the events in Cambridge of Harvard Law School (April 2014) circumstances for authorisation and firing after hearing it). the knowledge held by the local team. Better processes and Watertown at the end of the week were shaped to a www.hks.harvard.edu/programs/crisisleadership/events/why-was-boston-strong

22 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 ICSS Journal – Vol 2 | No 2 23 ICSS Journal - Back Cover-2.pdf 6/12/12 10:25:36