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Mali: A Political Economy Analysis Boubacar Ba and Morten Bøås Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2017 ISSN: 1894-650X The report has been commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views, official policy or position of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the authors. Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d Address: P.O. Box 8159 Dep. NO-0033 Oslo, Norway Internet: www.nupi.no E-mail: [email protected] Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 Mali: A Political Economy Analysis Boubacar Ba (Independent Consultant, Bamako) and Morten Bøås (NUPI) Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs November 2017 Contents Map of Mali .......................................................................................................................... V About the report .................................................................................................................. VI List of acronyms ................................................................................................................... VII 1. Introducing Mali: 2012, the ‘long’ year ..................................................................... 1 2. Mali today .................................................................................................................... 2 3. Understanding Mali: a narrative of people, place and space .................................. 4 The first decades .......................................................................................................... 4 The Tuareg minority: a history of withdrawal, resistance and separatism as an alias ................................................................................................. 5 2012: The year of violent transformation ................................................................... 6 4. Mali – the politics of a centre-peripheral state ........................................................ 8 The long, winding road: Bamako and local government relations ........................... 8 5. The Malian political economy: in-between the formal and the illicit ..................... 10 The political economy of aid ....................................................................................... 10 Agriculture and minerals ............................................................................................. 11 Crime and trafficking ................................................................................................... 13 6. Non-state armed actors – who are they and what do they want? ........................... 16 Iyad Ag Ghaly – the evolution of a Sahel Big Man ..................................................... 16 AQIM and MUJAO ......................................................................................................... 17 Macina Liberation Front – Central Mali: the new zone of war? ................................. 20 Islamic State influence in Mali and the Sahel? .......................................................... 21 7. ‘Ships that pass in the night’ – fracture, continuity and shifting loyalties ........... 23 Crime and resistance: fracture and continuity .......................................................... 24 8. Security and state stability in the Sahel ................................................................... 27 9. Implementing the Algiers Agreement – DDR and SSR in limbo? ............................. 29 10. Human rights in Mali ................................................................................................... 31 11. Conclusions: risks and opportunities for Norway ..................................................... 32 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 34 Annex I: Insurgency groups active/still relevant in Mali ................................................ 37 Annex II: Main donor support for governance, security and development (Mali/Sahel) ... 39 GAO KIDAL MALI ofMali Map MALI National capital ALGERIA Regional capital Town, village Taoudenni Poste Maurice Cortier Major airport International boundary Regional boundary Main road Bordj Mokhtar Other road MAURITANIA Track MOPTI Railroad Timéiaouîne Ti-n-Zaouâtene 0 100 200 300 km Tessalit î In Guezaam TOMBOUCTOU s m le Aguelhok i 0 100 200 mi T Assamakka u u d d KIDAL TOMBOUCTOU e e é é l l l Tidjikdja a V Kidal Edjéri SEGOU V ak ou Aleg SIKASSO a Tombouctou z Lac Bourem 'A (Timbuktu) l Bogué Faguibine GAO e d Kiffa 'Ayoûn el 'Atroûs CAPITAL DISTRICT Néma Gourma- e é Râs el Mâ er l Kaédi Nig Rharous l a Goundam Gao V Ménaka KOULIKORO S Lac e n Niangay Andéramboukane e Ansongo g Sélibabi a l Nioro Nara Nampala Tahoua Aourou du Sahel Douentza Mali, Map No. 4231 Rev.3, March 2013, UNITED NATIONS UNITED 2013, March Rev.3, 4231 No. Map Mali, Nayé Mourdiah MOPTI NIGER Kayes Diéma Mopti Oullam SENEGAL Bandiagara Birnin Madaoua Tambacounda KAYES KOULIKORO Niono KAYES Djibo Dori Tillabéri Konni é Djenné Tera ul Bafoulabé ao SEGOU B Ouahigouya Niamey ani GAMBIA Ségou B San N Sokoto Kita i Dosso Lac de Koulikoro Tougan Kaya Bogandé g Manantali B e a r k o g y Kati BURKINA FASO Birnin Kebbi n Bamako Koundara i e f CAPITAL r Dédougou Gummi a Koutiala i OuagadougouV é Balaki B r DISTRICT é o e l o Diapaga u N Koudougou l ig t Fada- o a Gaoual a Kamba N a é t l Kombissiri B N'gourma B o l GUINEA- g o a L. de a V n Tenkodogo BISSAU Labé Dinguiraye Siguiri Bougouni B c Koko Sélingué Sikasso h TTiinnkkiissssoo e SIKASSO Pô Bobo- Diébougou Léo NIGERIA GUINEA Yanfolila V Kolondiéba Dioulasso o T BENIN The boundaries and names shown and the designations l t a Navrongo O Kontagora used on this map do not imply official endorsement or N Kainji Banfora G Djougou acceptance by the United Nations. o Reservoir Kankan i SIERRA r GHANA e O LEONE Gaoua h Wawa e CÔTE D'IVOIRE Map No. 4231 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support March 2013 Cartographic Section About the report In June 2016, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Comprehensive Terms of Reference (ToR) Affairs (MFA) commissioned NUPI to provide were developed to serve as a general template for political economy analyses of eleven countries all eleven country analyses. The country-specific (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Malawi, Mali, ToR and scope of these analyses were further Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, South determined in meetings between the MFA, the Sudan and Tanzania) deemed important to Nor- Norwegian embassies, NUPI and the individual wegian development cooperation. The intention researchers responsible for the country studies. was to consolidate and enhance expertise on these NUPI has also provided administrative support countries, so as to improve the quality of the and quality assurance of the overall process. MFA’s future country-specific involvement and In some cases, NUPI has commissioned part- strategy development. Such political economy ner institutions to write the political economy analyses focus on how political and economic analyses. power is constituted, exercised and contested. VI List of acronyms ADC Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change ADEMA Alliance for Democracy in Mali AFISMA African Union International Support Mission to Mali AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ATT Amadou Toumani Touré AU African Union CMA Coordination Movement for Azawad CMFPR I Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance I CMFPR II Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance II CNDRE National Committee for Recovering Democracy and Restoring the State CPA Coalition du Peuple de l’Azawad CSCRP Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FAMA Malian Armed Forces FLM Macina Liberation Front GAITA Groupe d’Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés GIA Armed Islamic Group GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat HCUA Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad IBK Ibrahim Boubacar Keita IDPs Internally Displaced Persons ISGS Islamic State in the Greater Sahara JNIM Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen MAA Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali MNA National Movement of Azawad MNLA Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad MPA Popular Movement of Azawad MUJAO Movement for Jihad in West Africa RPM The Rally for Mali VII 1. Introducing Mali: 2012, the ‘long’ year Mali is in serious trouble. The rebellion in the When Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (henceforth: North that surfaced simultaneously with the IBK) was elected president in August 2013 by a military coup in 2012 has still not resulted in a huge majority, he won on the basis of a campaign sustainable settlement. This is evident in the pre- platform of restoring Mali’s territorial integrity vailing insecurity in the North that allows groups and tackling the massive corruption and mis- such as Belmokhtar’s al-Mourabitoun to conduct management of the country (Ba and Bøås 2013). attacks like that of 18 January 2017 against a Not much progress has been made on these UN base in Gao that killed more than 70 Malian fronts, and the people of Mali blame their presi- army soldiers
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