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Fauna & Flora International

Report to National Fish & Wildlife Foundation ‘Save the Tiger’ Fund

Final programmatic report for project number: 2001-0152-015 Grant Period May 2002- April 2003

Pelestarian Harimau Sumatera: Kerinci Seblat

Kerinci Seblat Tiger Protection Project

Juvenile Sumatran tiger seized, September 2002, Merangin district, Jambi Province

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Project summary

The purpose of the project is to support Kerinci Seblat National Park (KSNP) in the implementation of the Indonesian Government commitment regarding protection of endangered species and particularly the critically endangered Sumatran tiger.

In the longer term, the project looks to develop a sustainable and effective species protection programme in one of Southeast Asia’s most important national parks which may serve as a model for other species protection programmes elsewhere in Indonesia.

Pre-emptive and positive action was taken to reduce the poaching of the Sumatran tiger within and around Kerinci Seblat National Park (TNKS) and against trafficking in tiger and tiger products outside the forest.

The project team also worked to protect Sumatran tiger prey species and tiger habitat and additionally intervened in and sought to identify the causes of human-tiger conflict incidents to protect both forest-edge communities and Sumatran tigers.

Through working with national park rangers and other staff, the project team additionally sought to build capacity and awareness of tiger conservation issues and threats to survival of the species.

The project operated during the reporting period under the day-to-day control and direction of Unit Manager Alip Tantun Hartana SSI, a member of TNKS management staff, reporting directly to the Director of the national park who subsequently reports to the Director General of Protected Areas in Jakarta.

Day-to-day activities were conducted by Tiger Protection and Conservation Units and recruitment of a third four-man TPCU was completed in October 2002 with funding from 21st Century Tiger. The units operated from two Base Camps at Sungai Penuh, capital of Kerinci district and at Bangko, capital of Merangin district, 120 miles to the east of Kerinci.

Note: The original proposal was for a two-year project, with a first year budget of $110,000. The grant agreed by STF was for a one-year project, with a budget of $55,000. It should not therefore be expected that all the objectives and activities listed in the original proposal will have been accomplished in full.

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Summary of activities and results against the objectives in original proposal:

• To extend the capacity of the Tiger Protection and Conservation Units by establishing a third and ideally fourth TPCU team based at Bangko to allow better patrol coverage and more comprehensive and effective intelligence.

Formation of a third Tiger Protection and Conservation Unit funded by 21st Century Tiger commenced in June 2002 and recruitment was completed in October 2002 to bring field staffing capacity to three four-man units operating from two base camps.

In addition two community supporters have joined the team as support staff and to provide additional rangers in the field as required.

A fourth TPCU is planned to be formed in late 2003 to operate in the southern area of the National Park which is too far from existing bases for the existing team to provide effective cover.

• To continue to assist the National Park management in development of an integrated anti-poaching strategy.

The Tiger Protection and Conservation Units are managed, on a day-to-day basis by a senior member of the National Park’s Conservation division who reports directly to the head of the National Park.

Reports from the Tiger project are made to monthly planning meetings of park directors and managers from all four provinces and integrated into the National Park’s operational planning procedures. Data from field surveys and patrols is also fed into the National Park’s database and GIS systems.

Unfortunately, the end of the Kerinci Seblat Integrated Conservation and Development Project in September 2002, saw a drastic reduction in central government funding to the National Park which means that in areas where the Tiger project does not have capacity to operate, practical in-field anti-poaching strategies cannot yet be implemented for financial reasons.

• To increase the capacity of National Park rangers to successfully detect, pursue and prosecute the individuals or groups involved in the poaching of tigers.

Park rangers regularly join TPCU patrols and operations, and as a result many are now more aware of the range and scale of threats to Sumatran tiger in and around KSNP and anxious to respond effectively. All enforcement operations conducted by the team are done so under National Park control and guidance.

Regrettably, subsequent to the ending of the Kerinci Seblat Integrated Conservation and Development Project, financial support for National Park operations, including for park ranger activities has been sharply reduced.

This means that almost all routine National Park ranger patrols and operations have now ceased and so rangers, even where highly motivated, need support from the PHS team for even routine tiger-oriented field work.

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• To further develop and refine intelligence and work towards the successful prosecutions of individuals and syndicates and to further develop effective links with TRAFFIC and other national and international bodies.

Over the course of 2002–2003, the project established close links to TRAFFIC SE Asia and assisted a Traffic investigator in a survey of the trade in Sumatran tiger in Sumatra in late October and early November 2002 in Jambi province.

The project was a founder member of the Jaringan Advokasi Harimau Badak Gajah (Tiger, Rhino and Elephant Campaign Group), which was established in July 2002. The organisation is an alliance of NGOs and Forestry department units concerned with species conservation that has been established to combat poaching and trafficking in these species.

The team also commenced supplying data on tiger trafficking and poaching incidents to the CITES Indonesia Tiger Task Force.

Incidents such as the refusal of Merangin district Chief of Police to sanction the arrest of a syndicate of five men responsible for the killing of two or more Sumatran tigers in August and September 2002 are indicative of widespread ignorance of Indonesian wildlife law among the police.

Such lack of awareness has been previously been identified as a serious handicap to enforcement of laws to protect Sumatran tiger and disbursement of funds is awaited to conduct a series of training workshops for police and park edge judiciary regarding wildlife crime law and law enforcement.

Intelligence collection techniques continue to be refined, not least to ensure the safety of community informants, and the team has implemented new measures to ensure that the identity of the original informant – almost invariably a member of the poacher or dealer’s community – is not compromised and the informant put in danger.

On two occasions during the program period, the tiger team was congratulated by senior police detectives in two different districts for the professionalism of its information and intelligence collection operations.

Unfortunately difficulties are often encountered in moving from intelligence to arrest stage since law enforcement in Sumatra tends to be dysfunctional on occasion. As a result, on occasion the team may secure evidence of a crime having been committed but an enforcement operation cannot be conducted because of the danger of a public order situation developing.

This is a national law and order issue rather than one at purely local level and so outside of the scope of this team to address and the project has had to work around the issue.

• To educate specific local communities on the protected status of tiger and the species’ role in the forest ecology and to develop an effective education programme which is clearly linked to enforcement.

TPCU team members offer advice and education informally to forest edge communities in areas regularly patrolled as a matter of course and awareness of tiger status and the species’ needs is now much higher in these communities.

Progress towards developing and instituting a more formal public awareness program has not been made since it is now accepted that this would require a trained and dedicated member of staff and back-up resources and funds not available to the team at present.

Early in 2003, the team held informal discussions with a number of Tiger Shaman in the Kerinci area where tigers hold an important position in cultural values and beliefs.

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The purpose was to establish whether the shaman (pawang) might be willing to design a campaign using traditional law and beliefs to raise awareness among older men of tiger status and the threat now facing the species; the approach was made after analysis of data on known and suspected tiger poachers revealed that the overwhelming majority of tiger poachers are aged 35 or more and are likely to come from traditional forest edge communities with a strong belief in magic. The response was very positive and will be explored further.

• To involve and motivate communities in reporting poaching activities and possible conflict situations and to reduce incidence of tiger-human conflict for the future welfare and protection of local communities.

As local communities come to trust members of the project, so information has become much more freely available and villagers may travel long distances to report poaching activities or a tiger behaving inappropriately.

The project team has received much support from an informal network of Ham Radio operators who assist both in passing on communications from teams in the field to their base camps and information from remote communities far from telephones.

The most positive responses have come from communities where the project has previously intervened to mitigate or resolve human-tiger conflict incidents and where a safe resolution has been achieved and where community leaders have accepted the causal factors - almost invariably human - behind tigers moving into farmland or predating livestock.

Increasingly it has become clear that many communities do not like poaching or other wildlife crime but previously felt powerless to intervene since they did not expect any response from authorities and felt powerless to intervene without support from the authorities

Where a positive response is made to reports or concerns expressed, communities become empowered and will often subsequently take the initiative in barring poachers or illegal loggers from entering an area without feeling the need to call for support from the Tiger team.

Meanwhile early intervention in human-tiger conflict reports has become a priority concern of the team subsequent to analysis of tiger mortality in and around Kerinci Seblat National Park that revealed that unchecked human-tiger conflict is second only to pure poaching as a cause of tiger mortality.

Death rates among tigers moving into farmland or predating livestock fall sharply where an early response is made to reports, however apparently minor.

In the team’s experience to date, all serious human-tiger conflict incidents – for instance an attack on a person – are preceded by warning signs, often over a long period. If these warning signs are responded to promptly it is likely that many serious incidents would be avoided and both local community and Sumatran tiger better protected.

• To continue to monitor tiger and other large mammal populations through field research and phototrapping.

The FFI team member had hoped to be able to continue to conduct regular field work and camera trapping for tiger and other large mammals during the program period; however this objective proved to be unrealistic given other work pressures.

However the TPCUs collect baseline data on flagship and keystone species and frequency of encounter, forest quality and threat and changes in threat on each patrol made and these field sheets provide valuable data on tiger movements and general biodiversity in and around the national park.

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Report on the activities detailed in the December 2000 project proposal

• Establish 2/3 additional Protection and Conservation Units at existing Tiger Base in Bangko.

Recruitment of a third Tiger Protection and Conservation Unit funded by 21st Century Tiger began in June 2002 and was completed in October 2002. Units operate from the project’s original Mess in Bangko, Merangin district and from a second, smaller Mess in Sungai Penuh, Kerinci district. Planning for implementation of a fourth unit to be established in Rejang Lebong district, Bengkulu will commence shortly.

• Expand existing intelligence collection and patrols to Muara Bungo and Musi Rawas districts. Develop patrol schedule for north Kerinci and Solok district to north west of the park.

Patrols and surveys identified an important tiger population in the national park in Muara Bungo district which was threatened by illegal logging and clearance of national park forests by a large palm oil conglomerate. The latter threat has now receded after intervention by the National Park and Forestry department in Jakarta using field data compiled by TPCU rangers.

A patrol schedule for north Kerinci area and southern Solok district has been implemented in a move to tackle heavy prey-base poaching, particularly in the foothills of Mt Kerinci, and this has been successful in some areas. The patrol routine is however regularly disrupted by operational emergencies, in particular the requirement for an immediate response to reports of human-tiger conflict.

Planned expansion of patrol coverage was badly affected between August-November 2002 due to the destruction of one of the project’s two jeeps which had been loaned to the National Park for use in an illegal logging operation which was to be filmed by a film crew.

Intelligence collection was also extended to Solok district, West Sumatra province, north of Kerinci where significant threat has been revealed and continues in Pesisir Selatan, West Sumatra which, for some years, has been a centre of poaching of both Sumatran tiger and Sumatran rhinoceros.

Long distances and poor communications between the area and the team’s current operational bases have caused problems in development of intelligence collection in North Bengkulu district of Bengkulu but initial results show cause for serious concern both with regard to poaching and trafficking.

Intelligence collection and the monitoring of suspected poachers and dealers continues in Merangin and Kerinci districts although, in the latter area, threat to tiger appears to have dramatically reduced subsequent to concentration on this core area of the park over the program period.

• Maintain and expand patrol schedule in high priority areas. Support anti- poaching units in deep forest, in ‘at threat’ areas where poaching is suspected or reported and in areas of high tiger density.

Two Tiger Protection and Conservation Units funded by the donor were fully-staffed and in operation for the full period of the grant and were supplemented by a third TPCU (funded by 21st Century Tiger) formation of which started in June 2002 and for which recruitment was completed in October 2002.

Teams are operational and on 24-hour standby for not less than 20 days per month of which not fewer than 12 days are intended to be spent in the forest on field patrol duties. This generally equates to not less than two field patrols per month per TPCU team.

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Experience shows that, in Kerinci Seblat NP, poaching for Sumatran tiger is most usually a crime of the outer zones of the forest and is most likely to occur within up to six hours walking time (5-15km dependent on terrain) from road head or settlement.

Therefore TPCU patrol routes have been altered somewhat since the program’s inception to take account of poaching pressures and the areas in which individuals suspected to hunt tiger are believed to be operating so as to make the most effective use of limited manpower operating across an immense wilderness area.

Experience in the field indicates that larger patrol units (4-5 men) are more effective operationally than units of 2-3 men and so staffing of patrol units has been adjusted accordingly.

In areas where there is advance information suggesting that an arrest might be made, the number of rangers joining a patrol may be increased and back-up requested from the National Park or from police.

Where threat to personnel safety is very high, teams on occasion had to work under-cover to remove snares or to assess threat and in such instances, teams of up to three men are deployed and work in plain-clothes.

Significant reductions in threat to Sumatran tiger and prey species were recorded in all areas where patrols are regularly conducted and was particularly significant in areas where enforcement operations have been previously conducted and arrests made.

Threat is measured on basis of active snares or human presence indicators and is concluded to have been contained where no active threat is found to be active but where tiger and prey species, in particular deer, are still present or are apparently increasing in numbers due to ending or reduction in poaching pressure.

• Collect intelligence on the identity of tiger hunters/buyers of tiger products and liaise with national and international agencies working to cut the trade links between poacher and end-user.

The main focus of project activities continued to be the province of Jambi which forms the largest proportion of the National Park’s 14,000 sq kms and which hosts a number of critical tiger habitats.

However threat data was also collected from West Sumatra province (Solok and Pesisir Selatan districts) and, towards the end of the program period, began to be collected from South Sumatra and from Bengkulu province (two districts).

Significant trafficking threat was identified in Bengkulu city and in Musi Rawas district of South Sumatra province, also reported in Solok district and in the West Sumatra capital of Padang.

More than 70 brokers, sub-dealers (some of whom also lead poaching syndicates), district and provincial level dealers in Sumatran tiger along with four taxidermists, have now been identified mainly in the provinces of Jambi and in West Sumatra.

Initial data suggests that poaching threat is highest in North Bengkulu district of Bengkulu and in the Merangin district of Jambi and that trafficking threat is highest in the southern areas around the park where dealers appear to be buying tiger products from Jambi and North Bengkulu districts. Threat against tigers has fallen sharply in Kerinci district.

Dealers in tiger products were found to range from opportunists who will buy or broker sales of tiger pelts and bones and other wildlife products when available through to professional wildlife traders who actively seek tiger skins and bone on a regular basis and may commission poaching incidents and supply cables and other snare materials.

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The team concentrated on identifying poachers and dealers and not end-users (buyers of pelts or stuffed tigers) during the program period since on-going threat is considered highest from active wildlife criminals who will continue their activities unless stopped. Furthermore, there are few end-users in the communities surrounding the national park.

Examination of profiles of dealers and brokers in tiger products reveals the major professional dealers are, almost without exception, individuals who also deal, legally or otherwise, in non- timber forest products, in particular in snake skins and in fresh-water turtles and in Asian pangolin (Manis javanicus) scales.

These latter products are mainly intended for export, in most cases via Singapore, to Far Eastern markets and it is unlikely to be a coincidence that these wholesalers are also buying tiger bone and other tiger body parts.

No significant linkage was found between illegal logging ‘bosses’ and tiger trafficking but the project team recorded incidents in which illegal saw mill owners were reportedly buying tiger pelts, apparently to offer as gifts to officials to gain protection.

At district and sub-district level, a significant percentage of sub-dealers and district level dealers also deal in ‘gaharu’, a fungal infection of the Aquilaria tree which is a highly sought- after incense, and in cave swiftlet nests. Some of the individuals identified were subsequently found to have been previously identified as possible dealers in Sumatran rhinoceros horn.

Over the course of the program, the team has been concerned to note an apparent upsurge in demand for tiger bone with prices now averaging Rp150,000 per kg at forest edge (direct from poacher) to Rp200,000 per kg or more at district dealer level compared with an average of Rp100,000-Rp125,000 per kg at forest edge in 2001.

During this time the Indonesian rupiah has appreciated by more than 20 per cent against the dollar – from over Rp10,000- USD1 in April 2002 to the current level of just over Rp8000- USD1 . If, as is believed, tiger bone is mainly intended for an export market, this suggests there has been a significant rise in the price over the last two years.

Members of the Indonesian armed forces, in particular local level militia officers and some junior officers of district and sub-district military commands continued to be implicated, by report, in illegal logging and reported as buyers of Sumatran tiger skins, often bought as gifts for commanding officers.

Regrettably, Military appreciation of the importance of upholding civil and conservation law appears on occasion to be seriously lacking while past history in Indonesia means there are still difficulties in seeking to advance legal cases against members of the Indonesian armed forces.

However the project has secured increasing support from Military Police between 2002-3 regarding cases in which members of the military are implicated.

After considerable lobbying, a case alleging assault by an army officer against a member of the Tiger team and a National Park ranger and theft of a Tiger project motorcycle is expected to be heard by a Military Tribunal in Jambi shortly.

Two army officers who bought flesh of one of the two young Sumatran tigers shot in Merangin district in August 2002 were subsequently disciplined, confined to barracks for three weeks and lost seniority.

Unfortunately, the head of Kerinci military district did not agree to hand over an army officer to police for questioning. The army officer in question had stored a tiger skin for the tiger dealer Nursamsi.

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• Collect and collate information and intelligence from members of the community, researchers, NGOs, TNKS and KSDA rangers for use by project and park managers and by national and international agencies.

All data collected, both from patrols and surveys and from intelligence collection is collated within the team and maintained on a database. Non-sensitive information is input to National Park GIS and data systems and available upon request to approved or recognised agencies.

Sensitive information, including the identities of known or suspected wildlife criminals and on confirmed wildlife trafficking incidents was passed to the CITES Tiger Task Force Indonesia manager and is also passed to responsible senior officers of PHKA in Jakarta and provincial capitals as relevant.

• Pursue and prosecute, where possible, individuals or groups involved in tiger poaching and trafficking.

Effective, fair and transparent implementation of laws regarding habitat and species protection is now widely regarded as one of the most crucial issues to be resolved regarding conservation in Indonesia.

To this end, FFI and TNKS became founder members, in 2002, of a network of conservation NGOs and Department of Forestry directorates and units with the specific purpose of supporting and implementing enforcement of laws against poachers and traffickers in Sumatran tiger, Sumatran elephant and Sumatran rhinoceros.

The project has liaised with other member agencies of the Tiger, Rhino and Elephant Campaign Group on at least three occasions since formation of the network, most recently (April 2003) in an effort to locate and apprehend a North Sumatra man who was driving through Bengkulu province buying tiger pelts.

The team confirmed the proposal that arrest and prosecution of district level dealers is an effective method of tackling wildlife crime over a wide area and has a greater impact than the arrest of poachers.

In September 2002, following a five months long undercover investigation, a senior civil servant working for the Kerinci district government was arrested in a joint operation with local police while in possession of the skull of one Sumatran tiger and the pelt of a second adult male tiger.

This arrest resulted in a dramatic downturn in poaching incidents involving Sumatran tiger in and around the Kerinci district since poachers no longer had a market for tiger skins and bone.

In early December, Kerinci Prosecutors demanded a 2 year 6 months sentence for this man. Upon delivery of a very unexpectedly light sentence by the local panel of judges, the case was referred to Appeal at Jambi court by the Prosecutors department and final sentence is expected shortly. Prosecutors have advised that, if they are not satisfied with the Court of Appeal sentence, that they will Appeal to the Crown Courts at Jakarta.

Although police forces in some areas of KSNP have been very supportive, this has not always been the case, particularly in an incident in Sungai Manau sub district, Merangin where the Chief of Police refused to sanction an operation to arrest a man who had just shot dead a young Sumatran tiger. As a result of his refusal to support enforcement, a second tiger was lost three weeks later to the same poaching syndicate.

However, due to lobbying by the team’s Field Manager and by the Head of the National Park, three of the four Governors of provinces surrounding KSNP have now issued provincial laws strengthening protection for Sumatran tiger.

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This instruction is likely to make legal action against poachers and traffickers easier although traditional Indonesian respect for high-ranking civil servants and other influential individuals continues to handicap enforcement and prosecution. Enforcement is further complicated when the suspect is a member of an enforcement agency as in a case revealed in November (Investigator: Traffic SE Asia). In this instance, it has proved extremely difficult to identify a police officer willing to arrest a fellow police officer, particularly one of such high rank.

Enforcement operations against tiger poachers became very much more difficult in 2002-3 since poachers in many areas around KSNP are now generally unwilling to move evidence (tiger pelts/bones etc) out of their villages for fear of arrest while it is exceptionally difficult to conduct arrest operations in a poacher’s home village.

Conversely, tiger dealers are also increasingly unwilling to visit villages to conduct transactions both for fear of arrest while transporting criminal evidence and also fear of being robbed or cheated during the transaction.

Therefore tiger dealing in the areas in which the team has been operating has been disrupted and the team has sought to instil distrust between links in the tiger trafficking networks by planting misleading or false information regarding the activities of poachers, dealers and the project itself.

The patrol teams continue to be hampered by continued delays in the re-issue of National Park gun licences and this delay, which has now lasted more than one year, has seriously impacted upon the teams’ abilities to respond to breaches of the law in the field where offenders are believed or known to be armed.

• Establish standardised data collection methodology for Tiger unit members at Air Hitam, Bengkulu and at Tiger base camp Bangko.

Plans to establish a third Unit based at the Rhino Protection Unit base camp at Air Hitam, North Bengkulu were not implemented due to communications problems in this area which would have impacted on unit operations and effectiveness.

• Expand, in collaboration with National Park management and managers of KSDA the FFI survey and camera-trapping programme to obtain clear data on tiger populations, trends and habitats in and around the park.

Work pressures on the FFI team member meant that this planned activity could not be implemented. It is hoped that a graduate student from University of Indonesia will be conducting camera-trapping and survey work over the course of 2003-4 to advance this crucial area.

• Train selected TPCU and RPU staff in data collection, monitoring and camera- trapping.

Although six members of the TPCU team have now received basic training in camera trapping techniques, operational pressures are such that this activity was found to not be realistic as a project routine activity since camera trapping placements must be regularly maintained and the maintenance schedule cannot be guaranteed given operational pressures on the team.

All members of the TPCU collect baseline biodiversity data as a matter of routine on all patrols and surveys except where an enforcement operation is planned or under way.

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• Establish an in-field training schedule for TPCU teams with Rhinoceros Protection Unit at Air Hitam to share rhino and tiger monitoring and conservation expertise.

This proposed activity has not been accomplished to date but remains as a target for implementation by the two program teams as time allows.

• Support national park authorities in the control of illegal logging and land clearance.

The massive scale of illegal logging in Sumatra has now become an issue of international concern, the more so as, with the exhaustion of production forests, logging syndicates have turned their attention to national parks and other protected forests.

Endemic corruption among some enforcement and supervisory agencies responsible for timber certification and control of logging practices and powerful financial backing for the syndicates and illegal saw mills has made it extremely difficult for the National Park to respond effectively.

Furthermore, arrests of chainsaw operators or logging trucks as in a Tiger operation in December 2002 does not lead to the subsequent arrest of illegal saw mill owners and closures of any of the hundreds of illegal sawmills now operating around the park edge and – in at least one area – within the National Park.

Continued delays in re-issue of national park gun licences and the high level of violence exhibited by some illegal logging syndicates against rangers meant that the Tiger team suspended formal, uniformed patrols in some areas of the National Park .

The team however took part in a number of operations against illegal logging by the National Park and provided support wherever possible and when this did not conflict with the primary mission of the project.

• Investigate the likely causes of human tiger conflict. Train park rangers and encourage adoption of a standard operating procedure.

Analysis of more than 30 cases of human-tiger conflict in and around Kerinci Seblat National Park handled by the team since 2000 indicates that human factors were present in more than 90 per cent of cases examined.

Preliminary data collected suggests that a combination of factors are required to trigger serious cases of human-tiger conflict and that illegal logging, poaching of prey base or land clearance taken on their own will rarely trigger serious conflict, however when tiger habitat is impacted by prey base poaching and land clearance or illegal logging, risk of human-tiger conflict appears to rise sharply.

This has made counselling of park edge communities and mitigation of human-tiger conflict easier since traditional adat (custom) law in this area of Sumatra holds that incidents of human-tiger conflict are the responsibility of the community and not the fault of the tiger.

The outcome of investigations of human-tiger conflict incidents by the team does not support the traditional belief that tigers involved in conflict incidents are old or sick animals.

Analysis of data collected by the team regarding tiger mortality from human-tiger conflict, poaching and trafficking cases where the origin of the tiger was known identifies unchecked human-tiger conflict as the second most important cause of human-induced tiger mortality after ‘pure’ poaching.

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Since analysis of tiger deaths in and around KSNP included trafficking cases where the trigger factor behind the death of the tiger was unknown, it is very probable that unresolved human-tiger conflict may be responsible for more tiger deaths than poaching for purely commercial motives.

An effective reporting procedure for human-tiger conflict incidents and a swift response to reports is central to effective resolution and reduction in revenge killings of tiger and to prevent escalation and this is central to the project’s conflict handling procedures.

Therefore TNKS rangers and forest edge communities are encouraged to report any concerns regarding tiger presence outside of forest, even where no incident has (yet) occurred.

The most time-consuming and lengthy problem encountered by the team during the Program period was in the Sungai Asam area of North Kerinci at the foot of Mt Kerinci.

Problems started in this area in February 2002 when a man was badly clawed by a young male tiger moving with a larger female in farmland and scrub some 5km from forest edge. These animals and a third, very large, adult male were intermittently in this area at least through until September 2002 and villagers regularly requested support and assistance from the team even where no incident had occurred.

In late November 2002 a Sungai Asam farmer was reported missing by his family when he did not return from his farm. Early in December the body of this man was found and it was subsequently found that this man had been killed and eaten by a tiger, however, because of delays in the body being found, the animal responsible could not be identified.

One of these animals continues to move in and out of the Sungai Asam area, however villagers are now aware of the procedures to maintain safety and now only rarely call for back up.

Even where TPCU rangers are on site to provide counselling and support, tigers may be lost as in mid August and early September 2002 when two and possibly three Sumatran tigers died at the hands of a group of poachers when they ventured into the boundaries of a village in Merangin district approximately 100 miles east of Kerinci.

Here, although the village at the centre of the problem was supportive of the PHS team and its effort to protect both the village and the two tiger cubs in question, the situation was complicated by hostility to TNKS and the PHS team by the many illegal loggers in this area.

Following the killing (shooting) of the first cub by a man from another village the PHS team requested police support to enable arrest of this man and provided witness statements and evidence of crime in the form of tiger flesh obtained by a member of the TPCU team. The request was ignored and, as a direct result, the second cub was shot dead by an accomplice of the first poacher early in September.

Only after the PHS Unit Manager directly approached the Head of Provincial Police in Jambi city did the head of district police agree to assist in this incident and instructed his staff to seize one of the two tiger skins.

However the chief of police still refused to agree to arrest the man in question claiming that he had a right to shoot any tiger involved in a conflict incident. This is absolutely not the case in Indonesian law.

In the Birun case, human-tiger conflict incident was manipulated by poachers and this was again observed in February 2003 when a marine ‘moonlighting’ at the recently cleared Agricinal oil palm plantation near Ipuh, North Bengkulu shot a tiger which had clawed a man’s buttocks and eaten a goat. The Marine then presented the pelt of this animal to his commanding officer.

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Early and positive intervention in human-tiger conflict therefore continued to be a priority of the project in 2002-3 since unchecked conflict kills tigers and leads to hostility among conflict- hit communities against both tigers and the National Park and allows for situations to be exploited by wildlife criminals.

• Liaise with all stakeholders, local and national government, local communities, and media organisations to maximise positive tiger publicity and public relations.

Due to supplying information on threat to Sumatran tiger and enforcement operations and seizures by the project, government officials at provincial and district level have become increasingly aware of the serious threats to Sumatran tiger.

In Jambi province where tiger is the provincial mascot, the local government has become very supportive of tiger conservation initiatives, including the issue of local regulations regarding conservation and protection of tigers.

In Kerinci district, the head of local government has recently issued local regulations to civil servants and others regarding tiger and deer conservation in an effort to support the National Park’s species conservation initiatives while in Bengkulu, the park has secured the support in principle of local army commanders to restrict and control hunting activities in surviving forest out side the National Park.

In West Sumatra province, following information supplied to the provincial government regarding the scale of tiger poaching and trafficking, in particular from Pesisir Selatan district, the provincial government has also issued advisory notices to all civil servants regarding tiger conservation. Regrettably, this support for tiger conservation does not extend to habitat conservation and illegal logging in West Sumatra province is quite out of control.

Local newspapers have been found to be generally supportive and keen to publicise tiger conservation issues but are prone to be sensational.

• Liaise with conservation and protection organisations outside the immediate project area in Sumatra to identify and cut trade routes and identify and prosecute the buyers of and dealers in tiger products.

The team maintains contact with TRAFFIC SE Asia and has also developed contacts with WWF Malaysia and WWF Indonesia for this purpose.

The project is currently in discussion with TRAFFIC SE Asia regarding the possibility of an investigation of the trade in Sumatran tiger in Batam Island, Singapore and seaboard ports of Sumatra with subsequent enforcement against individuals identified.

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Appendix 1

Examples of activities conducted by the project since date of last Annual Report

Examples of Intelligence Received and Response – June 2002-April 2003

Month Area Number of tigers Details and follow-up reported killed June 2002 Lempur, South Kerinci 0 Skin of a tiger killed in 2001 in Sungai Manau, Merangin district, already changed hands twice, being offered for sale by an army officer. No action possible to date July 2002 Mt Kerinci/Ladeh Panjang, 1 Tiger caught in deer snare. Shot with borrowed gun. Poacher identified and Kerinci flesh sample obtained. Pelt and bone sold to Nursamsi. Pelt believed sold to a police officer in West Sumatra. Bone to Padang. No action possible to avoid compromising operation being developed against Orang Tua and NURSAMSI July 2002 Balai Selasa, Pesisir Selatan, 1 Tiger killed in pig snare. Sold to Ef for Rp1.7m. Trail lost. Flesh sample West Sumatra obtained from poacher July 2002 Sungai Penuh, Kerinci 1 Tiger killed (in pig snare) in Pesisir Selatan district of West Sumatra province. Sold to dealer in terrapins and snakes for Rp3.8 million Sold to an army officer in Kerinci for Rp4.5m. Subsequently sold on to an unknown location and buyer Dealer identified (March 2003) as regularly trafficking, opportunistically in tiger products. Dealer complained (March 2003), that now impossible to sell tiger products in Kerinci. August 2002 Birun – Sungai Manau sub 1 confirmed: Killing (shooting) of an adult tiger close to Birun village reported early August. district, Merangin district, possibly 2 Carcass not found so report not validated Jambi 15-18.08.02: Birun: Community team members monitor ongoing reports of tiger cub entering village: 18.08.02 Cub shot dead by poachers (T, SBR, SK) from Perentak village (2km east). Some flesh given to army officers – subsequently disciplined (3 weeks sanctions) by military police following detailed complaint by PHS team . Tiger flesh obtained as criminal evidence. Formal report made to police

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requesting back-up. Poacher seeking to sell cub’s pelt & bones but refused to take out of village – dealers reportedly unwilling to enter village. Because of lack of firearms, PHS requests police back up for an arrest operation. Request ignored by Head of Merangin district police. Following Incident II (see below) and intervention of Head of Provincial Police in Jambi, skin of a 6-8 months old tiger cub confiscated by police but no arrest operation sanctioned, placing PHS Intelligence team members in extreme danger Police subsequently allowed the identities of two members of the PHS team become known to T and his fellow syndicate members leading to death threats. One community helper can still not return to his village September 2002 Birun – Sungai Manau 1 Tiger, sub-adult or sibling of the above cub, snared and shot after raiding chicken house and repeatedly moving around village edge Cub shot by Sbr on the same day as a decision taken to seek to catch and, if possible, relocate cub for its own safety Tiger intel team immediately acquired tiger flesh as criminal evidence and established where the carcass had been hidden The pelt of this second tiger was subsequently sold by Sbr to an illegal saw mill owner in the Sungai Manau area August 2002 Gunung Kerinci – Sulak 1 ‘Friend’ of PHS team reports Sumatran tiger killed, accidentally, in a deer snare Gedang, Kerinci district, Jambi on Mt Kerinci in July. Intel team subsequently identifies poacher and obtains a portion of dried tiger flesh. Bones and skin of this tiger already sold to Nursamsi and subsequently sold on to Padang, West Sumatra No action taken against poacher to prevent risk of compromising on-going intelligence operation against Nursamsi and a second Siulak dealer August 2002 Lubuk Cempedak - Balai 1 Sample of dried tiger meat acquired - tiger killed in pig snare earlier in 2002. Selasa, Pesisir Selatan district, West Sumatra No enforcement action possible province August 2002 Air Haji - Pesisir Selatan, West 1 Knuckle/foot bones of a Sumatran tiger dug up following intelligence tip off Sumatra regarding site – tiger killed in a pig snare earlier in 2002.

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No enforcement action possible. Skin believed to have been sold to Kerinci, via Ef, a dealer in fresh water turtles, to an army officer in late July 2002. August 2002 Air Haji - Pesisir Selatan 1 Hairs and spinal bones of a Sumatran tiger dug up following intelligence tip off regarding site. Tiger (different individual to the above) killed in a pig snare. No enforcement action possible. September 2002 Siulak – Kerinci 2 Suspected dealer Nursamsi contacts PHS intelligence team member to offer 2 tiger pelts. ‘Sting’ operation launched in co-operation with Kerinci Police Nursamsi arrested on 04.09.02 in Sungai Penuh in possession of the pelt of one Sumatran tiger (adult, male) believed to have been killed in Pesisir Selatan district in early August 2002 and the skull of a young, possibly female, tiger killed in North Kerinci/Pesisir Selatan area early in 2002 (poacher unknown) Army intelligence officer working with Nursamsi escaped during the operation Tiger skin and skull stored in Army quarters in Sungai Penuh December 2002: Prosecutors seek a 2 year 6 months sentence for Nursamsi: Judge imposes XX sentence. Prosecutors appeal to Jambi Judicial Court of Appeal: Decision expected May 2003 September 2002 Koto Renah - Jangkat sub 0 Tiger skin reported for sale in remote enclave village: Animal killed in 2001. district, Merangin, Jambi Team on standby to arrest but informant failed to bring poacher to agreed site. High possibility this report was correct and that this is an animal suspected killed in Muara Manderas, Jangkat, in late May/June 2001 (human-tiger conflict incident – water buffalo attacked) September 2002 Pulau Sangkar, Batang 2 On-going intelligence operation against a rogue army officer known to be Merangin sub district, Kerinci holding and seeking to sell two tiger skins killed in different areas of the national park between 2001-2 Information received regarding pelt’s location and informants observed tiger skin. Skins then moved to two different locations. Enforcement operation launched in conjunction with Kerinci police but pelts lost. One pelt believed still held by suspect (March 2003), one possibly sold in November/December in Sungai Penuh via Temaie (see below). Team continues to seek evidence to arrest and charge this suspect Skin of an adult Golden cat Catopuma temminki) seized and warning letters issued to one man who had agreed to store one of the tiger pelts

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October 2002 Bangko – transmigration area 1 Kubu aboriginal (Sanat) offering strips of tiger pelt for sale. C2 Man tentatively identified but arrests of Kubu tribal people are politically highly sensitive. Team leaders still seeking a route to approach tribal elders requesting that they enforce traditional prohibitions against killing of tiger. October 2002 Sungai Penuh, Kerinci 1 Stuffed tiger for sale, believed from Temaie area. Team members unable to obtain entry to make contact with broker/dealer) – a rogue police officer. Believed to be pelt from Pulau Sangkar. December – reported sold or confiscated by a senior police officer. Trail lost October 2002 Siulak – Kerinci 1 Tiger killed in deer snare in Renah Pematik enclave area, east of Kerinci valley: Pelt reported sold to Singaporean businessman for Rp8 million by a Siulak broker long known to PHS team. Information too late to secure an arrest. November 2002 Jambi City 1 Tiger incisors (2) for sale by dealer in snakes and freshwater turtles: Broker subsequently led investigators to Police Officer (below) and has been twice met at the offices of a major dealer in snake skins, turtles and crocodile skins who is suspected to also deal in tiger and rhino horn Contact is being maintained with this man pending police or other support for an operation against the main dealer November 2002 Jambi City 4 Three stuffed tigers, pelt of a fourth Sumatran tiger offered to DM and Traffic Investigator. Stuffed animals (2) seen, pelt and third stuffed animal held by dealer and not seen Two stuffed tigers held by a senior police officer who also offered to broker the sale of a third stuffed tiger and pelt of a fourth (via a dealer). Tiger pelt believed to be from Sarolangun area of Jambi November 2002 Jambi City 1+ Tiger incisors (2 real, 3 fake) and thoracic vertebrae for sale by traditional medicine salesman. March 2003: thoracic vertebrae still unsold, one tiger incisor available. Strips of ?dog? skin painted to resemble tiger being offered for sale, also bear claws and incisors of clouded leopard November 2002 Jakarta Airport 1+ Tiger claws for sale in airport duty free shop (Toko Hasil Laut). Shop also selling bear claws and claws of a smaller cat (Pantera pardus?) Shop previously reportedly selling tiger incisors: CITES Tiger Task Force advised of this case but no action reported.

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December 2002 Talang Arah-Ipuh, North 1 Tiger killed in a snare in ex-logging forest and carried to Kerinci for sale. Bengkulu and Sungai Manau, No buyers found willing to buy this pelt in Kerinci so poachers sought a buyer Jambi in Sungai Manau district. No sale made and poacher(s) returned to Bengkulu Pelt believed to have been subsequently sold locally

December 2002 Muara Labuh area, Solok 1+ Family of known poacher advises he killed an adult female tiger in October district West Sumatra and sold to Padang city. Man continues to be monitored by PHS team seeking a/ poaching location and b/evidence with which to arrest and convict. January 2003 Sungai Manau area, Merangin Tiger snares reported active . Snares found and disarmed. Poachers identified. Community helper now monitoring their activities . Desember 2002 C2 Bangko 1 Transmigrant holding a Sumatran tiger skin and planning to sell to F (snake and reptile dealer). No price agreement reached. Poacher believed trying to sell through army militia officer. Information late reaching team, no team member able to safely enter and facilitate an operation February 2003 Birun- Perentak, Sungai 1 Sumatran tiger killed (shot dead) by Sbr (cf August/September 2002). Manau district, Merangin Pelt seen by informant(s) but poacher unwilling to transport out of area to a site where PHS can safely launch an operation. Previous experience shows that Police in Merangin district are unlikely to be willing to support enforcement actions in this area. Pelt subsequently sold to illegal logging sponsor No enforcement action possible at time to avoid dangerous compromise of informants’ identities

February 2003 Bangko, Merangin district and 0 Turtle and snake skin dealer from Bangko soliciting tiger pelts from hunters in Tapan Tapan, Pesisir Selatan district area of Pesisir Selatan, West Sumatra. Dealer now under investigation. February 2003 Siulak, North Kerinci Dog reportedly eaten by tiger, owner outraged and set snares. Team investigated in field but found no evidence to support February 2003 Jambi City 1 Strips of fake tiger skin (dog skin painted) and a newer incisor (genuine) being offered by traditional medicine salesman (see October). February 2003 Agricinal oil palm plantaton, 1 Tiger shot by oil palm estate guard (marine officer moonlighting). Bones and Ipuh, North Bengkulu flesh handed to local people. Skin given to commanding officer. Case being handled by TNKS Bengkulu section and by KSDA

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March 2003 Muara Siua sub district, 1 Tiger killed in a snare by South Sumatera province ungulate poacher. Merangin Skin seen and measured by PHS community helper but subsequently moved before an operation could be launched March 2003 Sipurak-Sula Rivers area, 0 Armed poachers from Sarolangun district and South Sumatera province Merangin district hunting elephant and tiger Three of syndicate identified. All team members to area. Poachers not found. Carcass of one elephant found. Information on three more elephant killed received. Second syndicate believed operating from Kerinci March 2003 Air Haji area, Pesisir Selatan, 3 Normally reliable informant reports dealer/broker Ef carried three tiger pelts to West Sumatra province Bangko in late February 2003 where sold to an unidentified dealer. Ef previously tried to sell these pelts in Kerinci but could find no buyer. April 2003 Borders of West Sumatra and 1 TPCU member offered a tiger pelt by poachers while in Kerinci. Poachers then Bengkulu province returned to North Bengkulu. Ranger traveled 200km to poacher’s home village but found tiger pelt sold previous night to a previously unknown sub-dealer. Tiger foot bones secured validated original report Ranger immediately went to buyer’s home where he was advised the pelt and bones had been sold that morning to a traveling businessman from Medan, North Sumatra. HBG members in Bengkulu advised of the incident but businessman not identified and no telephone contact possible to towns in the North Bengkulu area (phone lines down) so road blocks could not be set.

April 2003 Solok district, West Sumatra 0 Continuation of investigation into tiger poaching in this area: Buyer identified as a reptile and Asian pangolin buyer selling on to a dealer in the district capital of Solok. Pelt of a clouded leopard seen at the dealer’s house but no action taken to prevent endangering final stage of investigation which requires contact to be made with the main dealer in this syndicate. April 2003 Kerinci- Sungai Penuh area 1 TPCU member offered a tiger pelt, allegedly from south Kerinci area which has been concealed since 2002 because poacher cannot find a buyer and is frightened of TNKS Intelligence…No evidence produced. Report possibly relates to a tiger believed to have entered farmland in mid 2002 in this area. April 2003 Kerinci – Sungai Penuh area 0 Police officer and a known tiger poacher shooting deer in forests above Sungai Penuh. One man believed armed with an AK47 or similar. Gang

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believed to be the same as operating in Ulu Sipurak Villagers from this area posted as look-outs so that a combined police and park operation can be launched when the team enters the area.

Conflict and Conflict Related

August- Birun-Perentak villages, Tiger cubs entering Cubs killed by professional poachers. Chief of District Police September Sungai Manau, Merangin, villages, one goat refused enforcement operation claiming poachers’ action justified 2002 Jambi clawed, 2+ chickens because cubs had entered village boundaries – even though eaten poachers were from a different village and had traveled to this site and subsequently sought to sell the pelt(s).. September Sungai Asam, Kerinci ‘Small’ tiger ‘following’ Patrol and counsel. No tiger prints found 2002 people in farmland October 2002 Sungai Asam, Kec Gunung Tiger in farmland Patrol and counsel. Prints of a large tiger present. Farmers report a Kerinci ‘small’ tiger following farmers in the evening October 2002 Siulak Mukai, Kec Gunung Bear attacks man in No reason for this attack found – possible cubs present. Team Kerinci farmland assisted to reduce danger of revenge attacks and indiscriminate placing of snares December Sungai Asam, Kerinci Man missing in farmland Attack initially blamed on bear (from description of body and injuries 2002 (late November) and due to proximity of incidents - +/- 8km) due to incorrect subsequently found dead information to PHS. Subsequently believed to be tiger. The victim and eaten was killed and entirely eaten (feet missing), body concealed in undergrowth. February 2002 Sungai Asam, Kerinci Tiger in farmland. Dogs Patrol and counsel. Prints of a very large tiger present eaten February 2003 Muara Labuh – Solok, West Golden cat Tiger reportedly ate a goat and chickens in farmland 5km+ from Sumatra national park borders. Caught alive by villagers. Found to be adult Golden cat. Village refused to release to the park without a substantial payment over and above value of the goat allegedly killed and demanded this in such a way that the team was unable to find resolution.

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Police refused to intervene claiming their police station would be burned. Team forced to withdraw, intelligence team entered following day and learned the animal had been sold to an unknown wildlife dealer for US$170.

February 2003 Tapan, Pesisir Selatan, Young dispersing Two young tiger reported killed by semi-professional poacher long West Sumatra animals? known to PHS team after taking chickens and a goat: One sold to a buyer in Solok regency, West Sumatra.

February 2003 …Rejang Lebong district, Inaccurate report Report of two tiger cubs/young tigers alarming a local community. Bengkulu Team immediately visited the site but found it is 1 day walk from forest edge and no cause for concern February 2003 Agricinal Palm Oil Tiger in recently cleared Tiger taking dogs, goat in recently opened oil palm plantation. Man plantation, Ipuh, North oil palm scratched on buttocks. Incidents not reported to TNKS or to KSDA Bengkulu, Bengkulu (15km+ from park borders). Tiger shot by armed security guard. March 03 Air Liki, Hulu Tabir, Man clawed on buttocks Remote forest enclave village. Animal believed young. Clearances Merangin underway in this area, also illegal logging April 03 Muara Pangi, Muara Siau Horse Investigation revealed a tiger intermittently coming out of forest into farmland: The horse was killed after being placed as bait by a father and son team who then shot the tiger and sold it to a Chinese businessman in Bangko. Police also followed this case and also failed to seize evidence before it was lost April 2003 Birun, Sungai Manau, No victim Tiger moving in community forest close to village.. Durian season Merangin may have drawn this animal out of forest cover. Poacher Sabar, who killed two tigers in August and September advised TPCU members that he would never kill tigers again – he had not realized how seriously it would be taken. April 2003 Pemunyian, Muara Bungo No victim Tiger moving into farmland intermittently. Being monitored by team district with help from TNKS rangers in area

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Field Patrol data August-February 2003

Patrol Rangers Area Field days Tiger Sign Tiger snares Ungulate Past Tiger Note: Date in team recorded Active Snares poaching Active recorded/ reported Yes/No Talang Kemuning-G Kunyit, 0 0 N No encounter. Tiger reported regularly June 2002 3 4 0 Kerinci present 0 31 N Montane forest. Heavy historic poaching June 2002 4 Lake Gunung Tujuh 5 0 has decimated prey base and recovery will be slow Talang Asal- Tanjung 0 0 N Large adult. Habitat threatened. Hill forest July 2002 4 4 1 Berugo, Kab Merangin TKA – Sungai Kemarau: 0 43 No data 3 adults, one cub present in forest at July 2002 4 6 4 Kab Muara Bungo edge of large oil palm plantation 0 0 N Conflict zone 5km from national park July 2002 4 Sungai Asam, Kab Kerinci 4 2 forest edge: large adult female, smaller animal, suspected male Danau Kabut – Kab 0 0 Y Probably large male usually resident at June 2002 4 5 1 Merangin Ulu Sipurak salt licks. Old snares present Air Ketaun-Air Putih, Rejang 0 0 No data Lowland hill forest. Very low prey base July 2002 FFI 4 0 Lebong Lempur-Renah Agung - B 0 4 N Deer snares active in farmland at forest July 2002 3 Atap Ijuk- Selempaung, Kab 4 0 edge Kerinci Tiger Snared in a N/R Y Tiger killed by Siulak deer poacher. Deer July 2002 3 Ladeh Panjang 3 1 deer trap snares dismantled. Information from Mitra tiger: snare count not made July 2002 4 Liki-Ladeh Panjang 4 1 0 N/R Y Many old snares found. None active 0 0 N Two wire cable snares, inactive at Ulu Sipurak area, Kab August 2002 N/R 6 1+ encounter, purpose unclear but set close Kerinci and Merangin to salt licks on a large mammal trail Sengak river area, Kab 0 0 N Forest threatened by illegal logging and August 2002 N/R N/R 1 Merangin poaching 0 0 Y See conflict reports: All animals August 2002 N/R Birun area, Kab Merangin 36 2+ subsequently killed 10.08.02 4 Pungut , Kec Air Hangat, 1 0 0 Y Hill Forests around Renah Pematik 6 Kab Kerinci Enclave area

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11.08.02 4 Ladeh Panjang Kec 2 0 30 Y High Ungulate poaching threat area 6 G.Kerinci 20.08.02 5 Sepurak: Kec Muara Siaua, 3 0 0 N Critical Tiger and ungulate habitat Merangin and Kec Batang 6 Merangin 24.09.02 6 Muara Hemat, Kab Kerinci 0 0 0 N Combined operation with national park 4 and local government – illegal logging 10.10.02 4 Gunung Tujuh, Kec Gunung 1 0 0 N Very low prey base: evidence of very 6 Kerinci, Kab Kerinci heavy poaching in the past 11.10.02 4 Tanjung sam, Kec Gunung 1 0 3 N Access point to core zones of forest in Raya, Kerinci 6 North Bengkulu and Pesisir Selatan districts 17.10.02 5 Gunung Tujuh - Sungai 1 0 0 N No active snares found. Very low prey Kuning/Rena Pematik 6 base recorded. Suspected poacher pursued but lost 23.10.02 12 Sepurak 0 0 0 N Teams split to cover key salt licks. No active threat identified but indications of 6 suspect activity in recent past: reports of elephant poaching received 27.10.02 3 Pendung Talang Genting, 0 0 0 Y Past heavy poaching area pre to patrol Kec Gunung Kerinci, Kerinci 4 coverage by TPCUs. In 2000 and 2001. No active snares found 30.10.02 3 Renah Kayu Embun, Kec 1 0 0 Y Past high threat poaching and conflict Sungai Penuh, Kerinci site: no snares active. Community now actively barring entry to poachers. No 5 snares active. No indications of recent poaching activity. Ungulate population apparently beginning to recover on basis of footmarks found. 30.10.02 3 Jangkat, Kab Merangin 2 0 0 Y Southern fringes of Sipuprak priority 6 zone: entry point to core zone forests of Bengkulu 10.11.02 12 Ladeh Panjang 3 0 126 Y Poachers from Siulak – Ramadan period 6 hunting 17.11.02 3 Pungut Mudik, Kec Air 0 0 0 Y Forests to south of Rena Pematik enclave 6 Hangat, Kerinci – Ramadan poaching prevention 22.11.02 2 Sepurak 1 0 0 N Protection patrol – focused on ungulate 4 protection (Ramadan poaching) 24.11.02 2 Tanjung sam 6 0 0 0 N Ramadan poaching prevention 24.11.02 12 Lempur-Selagan – Kec 2 0 67 Y Former tiger poaching area (snares in Gunung Raya, Kerinci- Kec 2001): Ramadan poaching patrol 6 Muko Muko, North Bengkulu

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29.11.02 3 Tanjung Kasri- Renah 1 0 0 Y Tiger poaching formerly active on this Kemumu Kec Jangkat, 4 patrol route. Ungulate poaching formerly Merangin active. Ramadan anti-poaching focus 29.11.02 2 Siulak, Kec Gunung Kerinci 0 0 0 Y Anti-poaching and conflict mitigation 4 (community support) 22.12.02 3 Renah Pemetik, Kec Air 0 0 0 Y Formerly high ungulate poaching area. 6 Hangat, Kerinci Tiger snares formerly found in this area. 22.12.02 4 Masego, Kec Gunung 0 0 0 N Access point to Sipurak eco-system and 6 Raya, Kerinci to Renah Kemumu 05.01.03 12 Gunung Kerinci 1 0 0 Y TPCU asked to assist in the Search & 6 Rescue Operation for 3 missing climbers due to field and tracking skills 10.01.03 2, Birun area, Kec Sungai 1 2 0 Y Information received regarding active Manau, Kab Merangin tiger snares. Traps recovered. Poachers 2 identified but no legal evidence to secure a conviction 17.01.03 3 Birun area 1 0 0 Y New information regarding active tiger 2 snares: None found.

05.02.02 3, Renah Kayu Embun, Kerinci 1 0 0 Y Routine maintenance patrol in former 5 high risk poaching and conflict area 05.02.02 4 Gunung Tujuh 5 1 0 0 N Maintenance patrol 24.02.03 4 Lempur – Selagan 4 1 0 0 Y Maintenance patrol 25.02.03 3 Tebat Jambi, Selampaung, 0 0 0 Y Maintenance patrol Kec Gunung Raya, Kerinci 3 11.03.03 4 G. serampang- Sula- 8 2 0 0 0 Carcass of adult Asian elephant found: Sepurak tusks missing. Many old snare remains on G Nilo/ Gun shots heard in G Nilo area 11.03.03 4 R. Kayu Bungkuk-D. 7 0 0 0 0 Remains of many old camps, old bird Kebut- G. Sumbing snares 12.03.03 4 G. Nilo-D. Kabut-Sungai 7 2 0 0 0 Many old (deer) snares at edge of very Lalang dsk extensive illegal land clearance. 24.03.03 12 Dusun Tuo, S. Nilo-H. 5 1 0 0 0 Extensive land clearances in Sarestra Sengak- S. Tebal area. No elephant now present. 1 tiger only 16.04.03 5 Ipuh Ilau-Pulao Tenggah 6 1 0 0 0 Armed poachers reportedly operating in (Bengkulu Utara & this area (entering from Bengkulu side Merangin districts) of park)

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22.04.03 5 Sikancing Muara Siau, 5 1 0 0 0 Survey patrol: I adult tiger definitely Merangin present, indications female with a cub but latter prints unclear Intermittent 9 Ladeh Panjang 5 1 0 0 0 ‘Ambush’ operation to arrest from 20-27 April

.

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HUMAN-TIGER CONFLICT IN AND AROUND KERINCI SEBLAT NATIONAL PARK, CENTRAL SUMATERA, INDONESIA

Presented at Human-Wildlife Conflict Mitigation Workshop: Pekanbaru, September 2002

Deborah Martyr & Alip Tantun Hartana

When the FFI/TNKS Tiger Protection project launched in KSNP in 2000, resolution and handling of tiger-human conflict was recognised as likely to be an important component of the program both for well-being of local communities and conservation of wild tigers

However analysis of conflict incidents in and around KSNP between 2000-2001 indicates that handling of conflict issues may be vital for long-term survival of Sumatran tiger in the wild.

And it was only as the program developed that the extent and scale of human tiger conflict around KSNP and the extent to which human-tiger conflict acts as a trigger to illegal killings of tiger has started to become clear.

This is because, in KSNP, human-tiger conflict incidents were, until very recently, only ever fully reported or responded to where a human being was killed or injured or where multiple large livestock depredation occured.

Between February 2000-September 2002, the PHS team has collected data on or investigated and intervened in more than 30 cases – some lasting over periods of weeks and even months - of human- tiger conflict.

Additionally, FFI Kerinci collected some data, opportunistically, on human-tiger conflict incidents between 1996-2000 and FFI team members were working in a village in Tapan, Pesisir Selatan during a serious incident in which two villagers were killed by one or more tigers.

The majority of cases analysed in this report relate to two kabupaten in Jambi province - Kerinci and Merangin - with only incidental data from other kabupaten around the park.. This is reflects not a lack of conflict elsewhere in the national park but capacity of the TNKS/FFI tiger team to investigate and intervene.

Because many of these cases may appear relatively trivial – the killing of a hunting dog for instance – the majority would not have been reported to Balai TNKS or to KSDA and it is unlikely that field investigations would have been made except in those cases where the conflict involved an attack on a human being

Yet these cases, are known to have directly or indirectly resulted in the illegal killings of not fewer than 15 Sumatran tigers and, given statistics held on tiger trafficking in and around KSNP, the real total number of Sumatran tiger killed in conflict-related killings is likely to be much higher.

Unresolved and, or, unreported conflict is therefore (Table 1) leading to the deaths of large numbers of Sumatran tiger and other carnivores every year either as a direct result of forest-edge communities protecting themselves or due to poachers or others intervening to kill an animal which has a high commercial value on the wildlife black market.

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Table 1

Causal factors in the death of 75 Sumatran tigers 1996-2002 30 25 20 15 Number of tiger killed 10 5 0 Accidentally Conflict or Tiger Unknown snared conflict poaching related

Unknown:- factors not established: data mainly collected from trafficking intelligence by PHS team.

Data collected from six kecamatan in kabupaten Kerinci and Merangin in Jambi province clearly show the high mortality rate for tigers involved in actual or perceived conflict situations. This chart does not include the second of two tiger cub killed in September in Sungai Manau (desa Birun)

Table 2

Outcome of Human-carnivore conflict incidents known to the PHS team over 2001-2 in six sub districts

Fate of individuals involved

3,5 3 2,5 2 Killed 1,5 Believed safe 1 0,5 0 Bangko Gunung Gunung Muara Sungai Sungai Kerinci Raya Siau Manau Penuh

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In Sumatra as elsewhere in tiger range states, response priority is given to reports of attacks on human beings

However human-tiger conflict takes many forms, from potential as in a tiger entering and moving through or even taking up residence in farmland and so frightening local people through to an actual depredation event where livestock is taken or a person is attacked.

In all these cases, local communities – or poachers manipulating the community - are likely to take steps to protect themselves against an actual or perceived threat unless steps are taken to resolve the problem, even if only through education.

In TNKS, tiger-human conflict events are logged and graded/categorised by the PHS team as received although the initial reporting procedure is still far from satisfactory and only extends to those kabupaten where the team is able to operate.

To date TNKS PolHut have not received training in human-tiger conflict management or reporting procedures and decisions required at each stage of the procedure or the judgements that must be made.

There is reason to suspect that some human-tiger conflict incidents are not reported because communities do not expect to receive a satisfactory response from nature conservation agencies. However the high value (USD450-500 average) of a tiger pelt on the wildlife black market is likely to also be a factor in under-reporting of conflict incidents.

The table (Table 3) below indicates the types of depredation recorded between May 2000-August 2002 where the conflict incident or case was reported to PHS and illustrates the fact that Human-Tiger Conflict involves a much wider range of issues than attacks on people or on valuable large livestock such as cattle and water buffalo.

No Casualty refers to an incident where a tiger was behaving inappropriately in farmland or was causing alarm to forest workers and where the tiger may have been killed but where there was no depredation on livestock or attack on human beings.

It is critically important for all agencies concerned with tiger conservation to appreciate that the fact that no serious attack or incident has occurred does not mean that the tiger is safe from attack.

By moving into a human landscape or into an area of forest where forest product collectors – loggers or others - are active, the tiger may be killed even where it has not posed an active threat.

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Table 3

Tiger-Human Conflict – Subject of attack or depredation in 30 cases Recorded by TPCUs 2000-20002

Human-Tiger Conflict type 2000-2002

Cattle, water buffalo Goats Dogs Poultry People No casualty

The above table refers to cases and not to individual incidents of depredation by a Sumatran tiger – or other large carnivore (occasional cases of livestock depredation by clouded leopard are recorded).

The high number of cases relating to dogs is due to the habit of forest-edge farmers, particularly in the Kerinci area, of using dogs to guard their farmland against crop-raiding by wild pig (Sus sp)

Attacks on cattle and on water buffalo were generally (but not always) made in enclave communities where sawah is close to national park forest edge. It is likely that the number of water buffalo attacked Is higher than suggested above given the habit of illegal loggers of using water buffalo to extract timber from forest to road head.

It is unlikely that such incidents would be reported to KSNP or other authorities given that the victim is working illegally and so incidents of in-forest conflict would be most likely to be reported only if an individual were seriously injured or killed and so police and other authorities became involved.

All attacks on goats and on chickens and ducks were made close to settlements relatively far from forest edge – on occasion +2km – or by farmhouses in enclaves close (-1km) from forest edge. This is likely to be the reason for the very high fatality rate for tigers taking poultry or village-type livestock.

Cases below include data held by FFI on human deaths and injuries in human-tiger conflict dating back to 1996

All but one of these incidents occurred outside of forest and outside the protected area and involve four deaths in three separate incidents in Kerinci (2) and Pesisir Selatan kabupaten (1) – all in ladang or sawah and two further cases of personal injury to the victim(s) in Bengkulu (an illegal logger dragged from his pondok ) and a farmer clawed in what was apparently an accidental attack by a sub-adult tiger still following its mother.

The table below also gives the outcome for known incidents of Human-Wild Pig conflict where tiger died as a result of entering snares set for wild pig by farmers. It should be noted that in

30 31 only one case was a report of such an incident lodged with TNKS and, by the time TNKS rangers reached the area to check the report, the animal had been skinned, boned and sold.

Table 4

Outcome of Human-wildlife conflict incidents known 1996-2002 by conflict type and victim category

Impact on tigers of conflict incidents

7 Dog Human-Tiger 6 Livestock Human-Tiger 5

4 Man Human-Tiger 3 No physical victim 2 Human-Tiger 1 Poultry Human-Tiger 0 Tiger safe or no reliable Tiger killed or believed Tiger Human-Pig information killed

As forest degradation and loss of prey base through illegal logging, poaching and other activities increases, so it is probable that tiger, especially younger transient/dispersing animals are being forced into closer contact with local communities.

Although it is widely assumed that tigers involved in human-tiger conflict incidents are old or sick animals, there does not appear to be any real evidence to support this and eye-witnesses in a number of incidents have suggested the ‘problem tiger’ was young.

A simple analysis of human-tiger conflict in the area around TNKS where we have data available to us shows that almost all recent incidents of human-tiger conflict reported occurred outside the national park borders or in enclave areas

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Table 5

Incidents in relation to the protected area and incident type

Land Tenure Status of conflict sites

8 7 6 Pig 5 Tiger-Dog 4 Tiger-Livestock 3 Man 2 No physical victim 1 Poultry 0 Site within National Outside protected area Park

It is important to note that in some conflict cases checked, tiger were on occasion moving far from forest-edge, often through relatively open farmland or through farmland with areas of scrub (semak belukkar) and bamboo groves which may give cover to the tiger.

In Kerinci in February 2002 an adult female and sub-adult male cub were moving through farmland (cinammon, coffee, scrub, tebo) more than 4km by compass bearing from national park forest edge when a farmer was clawed by the younger of the two animals..

The ‘Batak tiger’ – a young male tiger who depredated more than 40 dogs in the Kerinci valley between June 2001 and February 2002 was particularly active in one area of the Kerinci valley more than 2km from forest edge.

It may be significant that, in both these cases, heavy prey-base poaching had previously occurred or was occurring in nearby forest and that available prey – wild pig – was concentrated in farmland and farmland edge.

In the February 2002 incident, a migration of bearded pig (Sus barbatus oi) may have had a bearing on these two tigers’ movements.

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Table 6

Forest cover (tutupan hutan) in 19 selected Conflict sites

Dalam kawasan hutan

Pingir hutan kurang 500m 500m-1km

2km atau kurang

Lebih 2km dari pingir hutan

If any constructive response is to be made to human-tiger conflict it is essential that factors which may be leading to the situation are identified and, where possible, the causes addressed either in the course of the conflict handling or subsequently.

The PHS team has found that, with support from trained personnel, villagers are generally more than capable of identifying the factors which may have caused or contributed to a human-tiger conflict incident. However it helps to discuss, with community leaders, the natural life cycle and sociology of tigers.

However unless solid data already exists, an assessment, even if brief, of forest quality and prey base presence, is helpful to the conflict management team. This is obviously particularly important where dealing with a fragmented block of forest.

Villagers will generally be well aware of poachers or chainsaws operating in forest close to their farmland however they are very unlikely to admit to poaching or illegal logging where it is members of their own community responsible. Therefore field investigation is important where first-hand data is not available from previous patrols or surveys.

There is growing circumstantial evidence (see below) that poaching of tiger may itself be a trigger in human-tiger conflict and this was certainly the case in the incidents at Birun and Perentak, Kec Sungai Manau, Kabupaten Merangin, Jambi in late August and early September 2002 .

Subsequent investigation of this incident strongly suggested that the mother of two tiger cubs killed by a known tiger poacher who manipulated a conflict case for commercial ends was herself killed prior to the cubs being killed.

In an incident in Kerinci in October 2000, a tiger which killed a farmer’s wife is believed to have previously killed a deer poacher’s hunting dog and was then poisoned but, survived the poisoning with a seriously damaged intestinal tract which prevented it hunting properly.

Little data exists to suggest what would be the impact on sub-adult or juvenile cubs where their mother is killed by poachers, but it is possible that young animals not yet fully able to hunt successfully might indeed move towards human settlements and take domestic livestock.

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The table below outlines the main external factors found present in kecamatan around KSNP where the PHS team have received reports of human-tiger conflict or investigated reports in the field.

Table 8

External factors identified in Human Tiger Conflict by Area

Possible Contributory Factors Identified in 30 Human Tiger Conflict Incidents in 12 sub-districts

Sungai Penuh Tiger poaching reported Sungai Manau Pau Pancung Soal Forest clearance underway Muko Muko Utara Jangkat Poaching of deer & other Hulu Tabir species Gunung Raya Gunung Kerinci Logging or NTFP collection Batang Merangin Bangko 02468Air Hangat

In a total of 30 cases noted below, in only three cases, was there no evidence of logging (legal or otherwise), poaching of ungulates or forest clearance for ladang or plantation

As the table below indicates, in a significant number of these cases, poaching of tiger had been reported in the surrounding area.

Table 9

Human Tiger Conflict: Common Factors Observed

35 30 25 Series1 20 15 10 5 0 Total Logging / Ungulate Forest Tiger Incidents NFTP poaching clearance poaching

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Table 10

Tiger mortality factors in nine kabupatens

16 Bengkulu Utara 14 Kerinci 12 Merangin 10 Muara Bungo 8 Musi Rawas 6 Pesisir Selatan 4 Rejang Lebong 2 Sarolangun 0 Solok Conflict Tiger Unknown Accidental poaching

* Unknown – tigers trafficked by dealers or through brokers or known to have been killed by identified poachers, but reason for killing is unknown since source of tiger is unknown

Conclusions

Effective handling of Human-Tiger conflict is an issue which needs to be urgently addressed in Sumatra with a consensus between stakeholders on territorial responsibilities and appropriate responses.

The scale of Human-Tiger conflict in Sumatra is seriously under-reported and lack of reporting and response by relevant agencies leaves poachers and others free to manipulate a conflict incident and on occasion kill tigers.

Although human-tiger conflict appears at its highest outside of forest edge in farmland and around forest-edge villages, further investigation of the situation is likely to show that under- reporting of conflict extends to in-forest incidents.

Lethal retaliation (shooting/snaring/poison) is most likely to be made where tiger move in or close to settled human locations (villages) or farmhouses of local people.

Killings of tiger involved in conflict appears to be higher in areas where tiger poaching is also reported.

Lack of understanding of tiger behaviour is hampering effective management of conflict incidents and may lead to inappropriate or a dangerously slow response to an incident.

Recommendations

• A carefully drafted practical procedure and decision tree for the reporting of all human-tiger conflict incidents – actual or potential – requires to be developed and implemented urgently.

• The protocol must include a clear definition of human-tiger conflict which, for protection of the species, must extend to human-tiger conflict in the forest whether inside or outside a protected area. Although it is generally accepted that a tiger involved in a conflict situation within a protected area is not a ‘problem tiger’, this does not reduce the likelihood of illegal killing of that animal by the community involved in conflict with the animal.

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• A clear definition of a problem tiger requires to be drafted and circulated to all stakeholders.

• KSDA and protected areas rangers and others – in particular police - urgently require access to information on tiger behaviour and habitat so that they can judge the appropriate response.

• A code of practice for inter-institutional liaison – national park/KSDA/police/local government - regarding human-tiger conflict needs to be developed. There should be a police wildlife liaison officer in every kabupaten where there is a record or potential for human-tiger – and, indeed, elephant, conflict. This officer should be able to act as a liaison officer between police and nature conservation officers in emergency situations

• Codes of practice drafted at government level must ensure that any laws or guidance drafted do not allow poachers or others to claim ‘self protection’ for killing of tigers as is the case in Malaysia where it is almost impossible to prosecute a tiger poacher because of the ‘self protection’ clause.

• A rapid response procedure in human-tiger conflict emergencies is required where a tiger must be caught for its and the community’s safety. However capture or shooting of the tiger should be the final resort and only taken under carefully specified circumstances and following examination of all other options.

• Codes of practice for the translocation of tigers or their placement in zoos need to be drafted urgently

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