No. 227 Strategic Forum September 2007 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement by Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr.
be holistic—to include new strategy and Embassies is expanding. A Country Team in Key Points planning approaches, decisionmaking pro- Paris, for example, must partner with local cedures, personnel training and incentives, authorities on counterterrorism, the North and resource-allocation flexibility. U.S. Embassies are confronting unprec- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and edented challenges that do not fall neatly into the European Union, as well as country- diplomacy’s traditional categories of political, Expansion of Engagement economic, and consular affairs. A rising tide specific operations such as Afghanistan and of transnational threats coupled with weak U.S. Embassies face unprecedented Kosovo. The team must also further com- governance in fragile states poses serious challenges. The kinds of issues that con- mercial interests and cooperation within risks that demand concerted action. found governments today—from orga- regional and international financial insti- U.S. Embassy staffs—our Country nized crime, drug trafficking, and terror- tutions. In Moscow, the Country Team must Teams—are ideally positioned as the first lines of engagement to face challenges to U.S. ism to nuclear proliferation, human rights, promote democratic reform efforts while national interests. Yet effective interagency ethnosectarian conflict, global disease, enhancing opportunities for U.S. busi- collaboration is often a hit-or-miss proposition, and climate change—no longer fit within nesses in a dynamic emerging market, as due to diluted authority, antiquated organiza- diplomacy’s traditional categories.1 Just well as improve nuclear security initiatives tional structures, and insufficient resources. as nonstate actors everywhere are becom- and monitor avian flu. It must do this while The Ambassador is not sufficiently empowered to act effectively as the Country ing more powerful, regions of geostrate- working on global and regional energy Team’s leader. Despite longstanding policy to gic importance in the developing world problems as well as traditional diplomacy. the contrary, the Ambassador often is regarded find themselves beset by weak or dysfunc- In Abuja, Nigeria, the Country Team must not as the President’s representative but as the tional governments and increasingly peril- monitor and help to deal with instabili- State Department’s envoy. Thus, personnel from ous socioeconomic situations. While some ties in the Niger Delta, engage in HIV/AIDS other U.S. agencies tend to pursue their own might reasonably question the categorical relief and economic development programs, lines of communication and operation, with inadequate coordination among them. quality of the 2002 National Security Strat- and assist in the first civilian transfer of Civilian resource deficiencies exacer- egy’s assertion that “America is now threat- political power. In Bogotá, Colombia, the bate the problems emerging from agency- ened less by conquering states than we are Country Team faces major counternarcotic centric structures and behaviors. In practice, by failing ones,” there is still plenty of rea- and counterinsurgency problems as well as it is difficult for the U.S. Government to son to be concerned about the trends.2 regional political problems. allocate resources to strategic priorities at the country level. What does this mean for Embassies? All of these tasks must be coordinated Given the critical challenges, it is time First and foremost, Embassy staffs—our and deconflicted, and the Country Team to reinvigorate the Country Team’s role in U.S. Country Teams—must continue to must work with unified purpose. In achieving U.S. national security objec- engage with allied, partner, and competi- practice, this often does not hap- tives. The team must be reconfigured as a tor countries, even as the terms of these pen. This is especially true in cross-functional entity with an empowered engagements grow more complex. Indeed, the area of stabilization and and recognized single leader for all agen- cies. The Country Team’s makeover must the number of programs operated out of reconstruction missions,
No. 227, September 2007
NationalReform Security Series About This Study personnel overseas to accomplish U.S. objec- Since late 2006, INSS has worked in partnership with the Project on National Security Reform. tives. With the proliferation of agencies and Hosted by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the project is a nonpartisan initiative dedicated personnel overseas, the execution of U.S. for- to improving the ability of the U.S. Government to integrate all elements of national power in pursuit eign policy—heretofore led by the Department of national security. Toward this end, the project is conducting a study of the interagency process to of State—became more complex. support a reform agenda that would parallel the historic Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Among the first instances in which one Reorganization Act of 1986, which helped to transform the American military and its world-class can find the problem of interagency coordina- capability for joint warfare. INSS will feature analyses in this area in a Strategic Forum series on tion in the field is President Harry Truman’s National Security Reform. declaration of economic and military assis- This report presents initial findings from the Project’s Structure Working Group, specifically from tance to Greece and Turkey in 1947. Inter- the country-level issue team led by Robert Oakley. Ambassador Oakley’s team investigated how the estingly, the State Department—to which United States organizes itself for integrated efforts at the Embassy, or Country Team, level. President Truman delegated authority of the While assuming sole responsibility for the opinions expressed in this article, the authors wish to programs—administered the program dif- acknowledge the contributions of other team members: John Agoglia, Gary Anderson, Michael S. ferently for each country. In Turkey, the U.S. Bell, Robert Feidler, Robert Grenier, Donald Hays, Princeton Lyman, John McLaughlin, Robert Pearson, Ambassador also served as the chief of the Anthony Quainton, David Rhoad, Michael Welken, Anne Witkowsky, and Casimir Yost. American Mission for Aid to Turkey. In Greece, For more information on the Project on National Security Reform and its bipartisan leadership, however, “Dwight P. Griswold was appointed visit www.pnsr.org. . . . to be Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, and his mission was outside and independent of the embassy at Athens and of Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh.”5 Inevitably, where the wars in Afghanistan and, more Country Team, there can be no prospect of the Greeks observed that Griswold controlled acutely, Iraq, revalidate the sacrosanct prin- success in achieving national security objec- the resources, so they bypassed the Ambassa- ciple of unity of effort. However, this prin- tives. The question is whether Country Teams dor and dealt directly with him. The Ambas- ciple can be applied more broadly. As Secre- are structured properly and resourced suf- sador’s authority diminished, and a conflict tary of State Condoleezza Rice notes, “More ficiently to be effective. A brief examination within the Embassy emerged. Rather than and more, solutions to the challenges we of the Country Team’s evolution helps dis- reconfirming the Ambassador’s authority in face lie not in the narrow expertise of one pel some common misconceptions about the the matter, the State Department recalled agency acting in one country, but in part- answer to this question. both Mr. Griswold and Ambassador MacVeagh, nerships among multiple agencies working and then deployed a new Ambassador who creatively together to solve common prob- Evolution of the Country also served as chief of the aid mission. This lems across entire regions.”3 Team course of action revealed two longstanding Despite some positive steps toward this Department of State tendencies: the assump- objective, senior policymakers in and out The struggle to gain control over tion that effective diplomats can avoid such of office in both the executive and legisla- unwieldy interagency activities at the coun- contretemps, and the default position that the tive branches lament the continued inabil- try level is not of recent vintage.4 As the United Ambassador is ultimately responsible for all ity of the United States to integrate all ele- States emerged from World War II, it engaged Embassy activities. ments of national power. Their frustrations in massive nationbuilding and foreign assis- By 1951, with Defense Department and apply not only to the national level, but also tance efforts to reconstruct European states economic aid programs expanding overseas, to the Country Team, the critical intersec- and to counter Soviet influence. To undertake President Truman saw the need to specify tion where plans, policies, programs, and this commitment, U.S. Government agen- mechanisms for coordination at the coun- personalities all come together. The Coun- cies, such as the Departments of Agriculture, try and regional levels. General Lucius Clay, try Team builds the American image abroad Defense, and Treasury, as well as the Eco- who served as Military Governor in post- and implements strategy. Without an effective nomic Cooperation Administration, dispatched war Germany and helped create the Mar- shall Plan, undertook negotiations among government agencies to identify the best Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic means to achieve coordination overseas. Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. Michael Casey, Jr., is a Research Assistant in INSS. The Along with establishing the concept of the authors welcome critical feedback. Comments may be addressed to Ambassador Oakley at oakleyr@ndu. Country Team, the resulting Memorandum edu or Mr. Casey at [email protected]. of Understanding Between the Departments
Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007 of State and Defense and the Economic military commander and, if necessary, request each agency in the field pursued its own objec- Cooperation Administration—commonly a decision by higher authority.”7 In con- tives without regard to the larger mission. It referred to as the “Clay Paper”—concluded: trast, to this day the military is not routinely quickly became apparent that the civilian and enjoined to work with Ambassadors or to ele- military approaches to the war in Vietnam dur- To insure the full coordination of the U.S. vate differences of opinion to higher levels. ing this period were fundamentally at odds with effort, U.S. representatives at the coun- one another. try level shall constitute a team under Vignettes These two diverging approaches were the leadership of the Ambassador. . . . The not reconciled. As the military increased its Ambassador’s responsibility for coordi- Often, those investigating the problem of use of bombs and artillery, civilian casual- nation, general direction, and leader- integrating elements of national power at the ties mounted, thus undermining the objectives ship shall be given renewed emphasis, and country level conclude that the authority of the of the Strategic Hamlets Program. The pro- all United States elements shall be reindoc- Ambassador must be reinforced. However, as gram muddled along until the U.S. Government trinated with respect to the Ambassador’s the brief overview of the Country Team concept developed a new, more successful structure. role as senior representative for the United illustrates, Presidents repeatedly have reasserted Several lessons are illustrated: States in the country [emphasis added].6 the Ambassador’s authority, which suggests a recurring problem with the Ambassador’s abil- ■ Even with high stakes, Presidential The Country Team concept, mentioned ity to generate integrated interagency support attention, and ostensibly clear lines of author- first in the Clay Paper, is a construct not cod- ity, agencies worked at cross purposes. ified in law. It is an executive measure to grant the Ambassador the means to coordi- the Country Team concept ■ It is particularly difficult to reconcile nate all U.S. Government activities to maxi- is an executive measure military and other agency objectives. mize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in to grant the Ambassador the country to which he or she is assigned. the means to coordinate ■ The Ambassador’s laissez-faire Despite the efforts of Presidents Truman all U.S. Government approach was ineffective, but not atypical, and Dwight Eisenhower through Executive activities to maximize and in fact understandable. orders and memoranda such as the Clay Paper, the effectiveness of U.S. interagency coordination at the country level Vietnam: CORDS. In 1966, President remained elusive. Shortly after arriving in the foreign policy in the Lyndon Johnson intervened to correct the per- White House, President John F. Kennedy decided country to which he or sistent inability of U.S. Government agen- to solve the problem definitively by dispatching she is assigned cies to act in concert. He appointed the Dep- a letter to all Ambassadors in which he outlined uty Chief of Mission in Saigon, Ambassador his expectations for the Country Team, as well William Porter, to lead the pacification effort as the authorities at the Ambassadors’ disposal. for U.S. objectives and interests. A closer look at there. Likewise, President Johnson appointed President Kennedy also granted Ambassa- some historical vignettes suggests some reasons a National Security Council (NSC) staff mem- dors complete authority over the composition for why this is so. ber, Robert Komer, to ensure that all agencies of the Country Team, with the proviso that Vietnam: The Strategic Hamlets in Washington coordinated to provide full sup- employees of every agency had the right to Program. Despite President Kennedy’s inter- port to Ambassador Porter.9 Nevertheless, the appeal to Washington if they found themselves vention, agencies at the Country Team level United States failed to achieve unity of effort in disagreement with the Ambassador. Addi- in the Republic of South Vietnam continued with the assignment of two individuals; struc- tionally, President Kennedy addressed the issue to operate along their own lines of effort. The tural changes were still needed. Ambassador of military forces engaged in military oper- 1962 Strategic Hamlets Program in Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and military commander ations. In such instances, Kennedy declared underscored this fact. The program required General William Westmoreland simply did that the Ambassador “should work closely with U.S. Agency for International Development not work closely together, nor did their staffs. the appropriate area military commander (USAID), military advisors, Central Intelligence The U.S. Government reorganized on multi- to assure the full exchange of information.” Agency (CIA), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), ple occasions to assert civilian control over the If the Ambassador felt “that activities by the and other U.S. Government personnel to deploy pacification mission, but to no avail. Finally, United States military forces may adversely into the provinces of South Vietnam and work Komer proposed a new structure—the Civil affect our over-all relations with the people together. However, the Ambassador to Vietnam Operations and Revolutionary Development or government of [country],” the Ambassador believed in allowing each agency full author- Support (CORDS) program—which was “should promptly discuss the matter with the ity over its own programs.8 The result was that enacted on May 1, 1967.
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum CORDS successfully unified the efforts of to mount, but not before U.S. public opinion working well together. This same attitude was the U.S. Government by placing the program turned decidedly against the war. Nevertheless, reflected in formal communications with the in the Headquarters of Military Assistance the case of CORDS demonstrated that: Departments of State and Defense. Command–Vietnam (MACV). Komer was Later, under more trying circumstances assigned as the Deputy Commander of MACV ■ Formal integration mechanisms at and different leadership, civil-military col- for CORDS and given the rank of Ambassador. multiple levels are necessary even with good laboration deteriorated in a manner that Ambassador Komer “had status equivalent to individual leadership. ultimately contributed to a precipitous drop a three-star general and ranked third in the in public and congressional support, with- MACV hierarchy behind Westmoreland and his ■ Changing individual behaviors drawal of U.S. forces, and mission failure. military deputy, General Creighton Abrams.”10 requires more than policy pronouncements The United States and United Nations tried Yet he was also under the authority and had from higher authority; it requires control of to pursue a two-track policy of fighting and the full support of U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, personal incentives. negotiating with a Somali warlord without sufficient unity of effort in either Washington ■ The ingrained desire for unity of pur- or Mogadishu. Somalia and the checkered without a standing system pose in military culture can be used to support record of interagency collaboration illustrate designed to reward interagency collaboration in the right decision- several points: interagency collaboration, making structure. successful interagency ■ Informal coordination mechanisms coordination may prove Unfortunately, the lessons from CORDS can work well if backed up by good leaders were lost after the withdrawal from Vietnam and their personal commitment. as fleeting as individual and not highlighted again until a series of leader assignments limited interventions in the 1980s and 1990s. ■ Senior civilian and military leader Somalia: Operation Restore Hope. guidance in favor of civil-military collabora- Ambassador Robert Oakley, as the Presidential tion is helpful. Ellsworth Bunker. A combined staff of military Special Representative for Somalia, and Com- and civilian personnel supported Ambassa- bined Joint Task Force Commander Lieuten- ■ Without a standing system designed to dor Komer at Headquarters of MACV, and this ant General Robert Johnston had a close, col- reward interagency collaboration, successful structure was replicated down to the district laborative relationship, as did their staffs. At interagency coordination may prove as fleet- level in all 250 districts in South Vietnam.11 the time, their relationship was widely iden- ing as individual leader assignments. Ironically, “subordinating civilian capa- tified as a major contribution to the success bilities to the military chain of command of the united task force phase of the Somalia Afghanistan and Iraq. In actually realized the principle of the primacy operations.13 Since the U.S. Liaison Office was September 2003, facing a difficult transi- of civil power. This unique placement gave too small for a formal Country Team struc- tion from a counterterrorism focus to a more civilian entities greater influence than they ture, Oakley and Johnston agreed on alterna- robust nationbuilding/counterinsurgency mis- ever had before because it provided resources tive informal coordination mechanisms. One sion in Afghanistan, President George W. Bush they did not previously have.”12 It also helped of Johnston’s senior officers attended all USIA appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as U.S. Ambassa- to ensure that the political objectives took meetings; Oakley’s deputy chief of mission was dor to Afghanistan. Khalilzad said he deployed precedence over those of the military. One of Johnston’s political advisor and attended all to Afghanistan to “ensure the concerted use of the key means by which civilians were able to unified task force meetings; and Oakley and all instruments of U.S. power to accelerate the control military activities was their newfound Johnston met at least once a day. By dint of defeat of the Taliban insurgency and the recon- responsibility to write performance reports for shared past experience (for example, Vietnam struction of Afghanistan.”14 Khalilzad shared their military colleagues. and Lebanon) and a common commitment to this view with the U.S. military commander, Ambassador Komer developed the con- collaboration, the critical civil-military rela- Lieutenant General David Barno, and they were cept for CORDS, but Ambassador William Colby tionships and complex issues requiring coordi- successful in integrating not only U.S. Govern- institutionalized it in MACV and synergized its nation were managed successfully. The ques- ment agencies but also international partners activities with Ambassador Bunker. In doing tion of who was senior never arose, as Oakley and nongovernmental organizations. One way so, Ambassador Colby prevented major con- and Johnston identified and resolved any dif- that Khalilzad and General Barno drove the flicts among civilian and military leaders that ferences quickly. It also helped that the Chair- spirit of unity of effort throughout the Country might have trickled down and complicated col- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informally told Team was by locating their offices adjacent to laboration in the field. CORDS’ successes began both that mission success depended on their one another in the Embassy.
Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007 When Ambassador John Negroponte enough to merit use of force. Counterintui- While such examples exist, the fact is that all arrived in Iraq, he and General George tively, some might wonder if interagency coor- too often, representatives from different agen- Casey also established adjacent offices to dination is better when there are less compel- cies pursue their organizational interests at the ensure a coordinated, unified approach to ling reasons for it. The answer is no. As the case expense of a broader, integrated approach for U.S. policy. This was a stark change from of aid in Greece and innumerable other anec- reasons that must be identified if reasonable the practice of Ambassador Paul Bremer dotes could illustrate, tensions among Ambas- remedies are to be found. and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, sadors and other government agencies’ repre- whose offices were in different buildings sentatives, USAID directors, and representatives Enduring Problems and who did not routinely coordinate with from the Departments of Agriculture, Com- one another, thereby setting a poor example merce, and other agencies are commonplace Interagency collaboration is a hit-or-miss for the Country Team. when the Ambassador tries to lead in any- proposition despite the ostensible authority of Under the current Embassy structure in thing other than a laissez-faire manner. This the Ambassador and the longstanding con- Baghdad: does not mean, however, that Country Teams vention of the Country Team. The core prob- cannot succeed in effectively integrating their lem, summed up well by the Department of The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ambassa- efforts when they have the right leadership and State’s Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, is dor Ryan Crocker) has full authority for the focused policy support. that “Other agencies often view the Ambas- American presence in Iraq with two excep- South Africa is a case in point. During sador as the Department [of State’s] repre- tions: 1—military and security matters the transition period from Apartheid (1992– sentative, rather than the President’s. The which are under the authority of General 1994), the U.S. Ambassador successfully built Ambassador is left with the responsibility, but Petraeus, the U.S. Commander of the Mul- not the authority, to coordinate the activi- tinational Force–Iraq, and 2—staff work- ties and address the often competing needs of ing for international organizations. In areas because the Ambassador the mission.”17 Seeing the Ambassador as a where diplomacy, military, and/or security is often not seen as the Department of State representative who either activities overlap, the Ambassador and the overarching national ignores or willingly sacrifices other agency U.S. commander continue cooperating to representative, agencies objectives in favor of State objectives legiti- provide co-equal authority regarding what’s encourage their mates other organization-centric behavior best for America and its interests in Iraq personnel on the Country that creates major obstacles to unity of effort. 15 [emphasis added]. Team to pursue their These obstacles may be grouped in three over- lapping categories to facilitate examination: own objectives and lines These brief overviews of ongoing opera- authority, structure, and resources. tions, along with the previous vignettes, illus- of operation, without Diluted Authority. Ambassadors do trate several key conclusions about the state of adequate consultation or not have adequate explicit authorities to unify interagency collaboration at the country level: coordination the efforts of the Country Team, and their task has only grown more difficult in recent years. ■ Military authorities retain substan- Not only must Ambassadors coordinate major tial independent freedom of action during a cross-agency working group, which the government activities such as diplomacy, com- military operations. political counselor chaired. USAID trans- mercial relations, use of force, and intelligence ferred $1 million each year to the U.S. Infor- activities, but they also must provide inter- ■ Proximity, informal coordination mation Agency to fund more short-term visitor agency coordination for numerous sub-spe- mechanisms, and senior leader attitudes can training programs; the Defense Attachés went cialties within a given area. With over 30 gov- increase the chances for successful civil-mili- beyond their normal roles to liaison (with ernment agencies now dispatching employees tary integration but do not offer a reliable sys- Washington’s permission) with the African overseas, non–State Department personnel often temic solution to the problem. National Congress “armed forces” leadership outnumber diplomats.18 As noted earlier, the to facilitate integration into a national army, Presidential letter to Ambassadors lays out their ■ The United States has not had a structured and the Agricultural Attaché provided invalu- overarching authority but does not spell out the solution for civil-military integration in irregular able feedback on the farming communities’ specific responsibilities of other agencies vis- conflict at the country level since CORDS. attitudes toward the political transition. In à-vis the Ambassador. Personnel from govern- sum, the entire team focused on the primary ment agencies often deploy to the Country Team The vignettes also illustrate that coordina- U.S. objective: to help see a successful, rela- without understanding the Ambassador is the tion is difficult even when the stakes are high tively peaceful transition out of Apartheid.16 President’s representative. They do not receive
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum adequate guidance from their agencies on rela- The White House, and to some degree not viewed as an extension of the Country Team tionships with the Ambassador and with other the Department of State, do not pay suffi- and, in fact, are not even counted in the mis- agencies, nor do they receive thorough brief- cient attention to the Ambassador’s authority sion’s complement of U.S. personnel in-coun- ings on the Presidential letter and its intent. vis-à-vis other agencies, thereby compound- try, except for security purposes. As a result, the This is particularly true of personnel from the ing the problem. In many cases, support for Ambassador’s ability to oversee the operations Departments of Defense, Justice, and Treasury, the Ambassador from State depends largely of these personnel while in-country is largely as well as other government agencies. In partic- on the importance of the post, personal dependent upon the funding agency’s availability ular, Ambassadors lack the proper tools to exert influence of the Ambassador, or critical and commitment of direct-hire supervisory staff their authority, such as effective control over nature of the issue, rather than on the insti- to the Embassy who can provide accountabil- employee performance reports. tutional role of the Ambassador as the Presi- ity to the Country Team. This problem applies to Because the Ambassador is often not dent’s representative. The mistaken assump- civilian and military contractors. seen as the overarching national repre- tion is that the Ambassador and Country The Ambassador, understandably, has sentative, agencies encourage their per- Team are not necessary to tee up feasible no authority over nongovernmental orga- sonnel on the Country Team to pursue policy options for Washington. Their opin- nizations or U.S. businessmen. Yet many ions and insights usually are not valued Ambassadors ignore the opportunities these highly enough when it comes to designing organizations and individuals present for many Ambassadors ignore policies and setting priorities. In addition, improving and spreading U.S. influence in the opportunities NGOs since Washington does not do a good job of a more cohesive fashion. The private sector and U.S. businesses integrating its priorities, Ambassadors lack a in particular is a valuable asset in promot- present for improving and framework for balancing valid, but compet- ing U.S. values and policies, but it is often spreading U.S. influence in ing, interests. Currently, for example, coun- ignored by the Country Team for other than terterrorism often overwhelms other issues, commercial or security issues. a more cohesive fashion, no matter what the country, and “new” but Finally, in crisis situations, such as the even though the private important issues such as health and the recent devastating tsunami in Southeast Asia sector in particular is a environment do not receive adequate atten- or the earthquake in Pakistan, diverse ad valuable asset tion or recognition in Washington. hoc organizational structures further under- Another manifestation of the indepen- mine the Ambassador’s ability to coordinate dence of other agencies in the field and a activities. There is no commonly accepted their own objectives and lines of oper- major reason the Ambassador finds it diffi- and established mechanism for the Ambas- ation, without adequate consultation cult to provide effective oversight is informal sador to use when multiple agencies and or coordination. Some of these agency parallel communications. The proliferation their personnel surge into the country. Each personnel, as the late George Kennan of email and cellular phones has created agency in Washington has its own office or observed, “seem to operate directly or new channels outside of formal communi- offices to respond to emergencies, conflict, indirectly under the authority of Wash- cations schemes. As agency representatives or failed states, and they often do so without ington bosses, some in the State Depart- bypass the Ambassador and obtain guidance adequate coordination. Civilian policy and ment, some elsewhere.”19 This state of directly from Washington bureaus, Ambassa- civil-military coordination at the regional affairs, he added, “invites . . . the foreign dors are isolated from the operations of other level is underpowered, so Ambassadors and ambassador and ambassadorial staff sta- agencies, and the de facto autonomy of other their country-level programs cannot be coor- tioned in Washington to take their prob- agencies grows. Direct communications with dinated across the region for greater effects. lems directly to other departments and superiors in the home agency without the In these respects, inadequate regional and agencies, bypassing the State Department Ambassador’s knowledge also reinforce an emergency decisionmaking structures com- entirely.”20 Without an adequate voice in informal incentive system that rewards indi- pound the problems already inherent in the the performance assessment of agency vidual agency-centric behaviors. Embassy’s organizational structure. leads and vice versa, there are no built-in The increasing reliance upon contrac- Antiquated Organizational Struc- incentives to putting the priorities of the tors rather than direct-hire government person- tures. The complexity and number of Country Team above those of individual nel can lead to a serious diminution in the effec- demands facing the Country Team often out- agencies. When rare exceptions to this tiveness, timeliness, and accountability of U.S. strip the capacity of the existing Embassy orga- general rule have been made—as in the activities if direct Embassy oversight is not pro- nizational structure to deal with them. The administration of the CORDS program vided (for example, police training in Iraq and current staff structure often encourages indi- during Vietnam—results were positive.21 Afghanistan). Contractors and subcontractors are vidual agencies to go their own way rather
Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007 than to strive for unity of effort, particularly in across multiple programs, both civilian training program for Department of State or larger posts. Embassy structure tends to be built and military. State and USAID consolidated other civilian government agency personnel around political and economic affairs, and their foreign assistance programs for each assigned abroad. Ambassadors are not neces- these traditional lenses for viewing the world country, but the programs are developed sarily trained in critical management or lead- insufficiently encompass U.S. policy objectives. in Washington rather than initiated in the ership skills, nor are they trained in planning. Moreover, direct reporting to the Ambassador Country Teams. Even resources contained The selection process for Ambassadors makes him or her a bottleneck for information in the State Department budget are subject does not insist that individuals selected— exchange, which needs to occur more routinely to so many constraints due to the cumber- career or noncareer—have proven track among different agencies in the Embassy. Like- some and decentralized approval process in records of successful involvement in for- wise, coordination between and among clusters Washington that they offer the Ambassador eign affairs, or management experience, of agency representatives with common or com- little flexibility. nor does it require prior experience of ser- plementary programs is insufficient. An additional challenge to the Coun- vice abroad with a proven track record of Resources. Resource deficiencies try Team is that in Washington, policy is effectively representing U.S. interests. The exacerbate the problems emerging from selection process for Ambassadors also often agency-centric structures and behaviors. To ignores language and cultural skills. They begin with, Washington generally does not Embassy structure do not receive adequate training to com- recognize the Country Team’s ideal posi- tends to be built pensate for these lacunae. The same care is tion to allocate resources to priority pro- around political and often lacking in the selection and training grams. Washington does not provide an economic affairs, and of agency heads. agreed interagency statement on overall these traditional lenses Obtaining trained personnel to support U.S. objectives and priorities and grants its for viewing the world the Country Team is also a problem. In the Ambassadors only limited—if any—con- insufficiently encompass special case of postconflict stabilization, the trol over resources. This leaves the Ambas- State Department’s Coordinator for Recon- U.S. policy objectives sador and Country Team no real opportu- struction and Stabilization is making an effort nity to evaluate ends, ways, and means in to develop a roster of capable civilian person- the context of a strategy. Thus, if Coun- nel. President Bush also has called for a Civil- try Team plans are done, they are writ- conducted in one place, while resources ian Reserve Corps. This is meant to compen- ten loosely because the lack of control over are located in others. This necessar- sate, partially, for an inadequate number of resources severely limits control over out- ily has an impact on the unity of effort of permanent employees. Incentives provided comes. Ambassadors simply allow each the Country Team. This problem inhib- for personnel from some civilian agencies— organization to pursue broad, generic its “the synchronization of [administration including the State Department—for deploy- objectives. Any attempt to investigate inter- and budget] with the priorities and initia- ment abroad are not nearly sufficient in rela- agency resource tradeoffs would inevitably tives of U.S. foreign policy. The bifurca- tion to need, and the inability of agencies incline agencies to withhold their resources tion of policymaking and budget manage- to compel nonmilitary employees to accept or openly defy the Ambassador’s authority. ment within the [State Department] has certain assignments or to be called up and In essence, this means that the govern- rendered it administratively and finan- assigned on a timely basis for a long enough ment cannot allocate funds to rank-order cially less responsive to the changing reali- period of time to learn to do the job remains priorities at the country level or adminis- ties of international affairs.” 22 This applies a major problem. At one point in Afghanistan, ter resources in an integrated manner for equally to other agencies, and therefore the Country Team had only a single repre- maximum effect. On rare occasions when compounds the difficulty of assembling the sentative responsible for a program involving resources are provided, the lack of budget resources to implement policy objectives. hundreds of millions of dollars, hundreds of authority means they cannot be redistrib- While inadequate fungible resources are civilian contract personnel, and hundreds of uted when circumstances and priorities dic- a major problem, poorly managed human U.S. military personnel. It was almost totally tate. Even in emergencies, Congress places resources are an even greater problem, begin- reliant upon contractors, who had little or restrictions that severely hamper a unified ning with the Ambassador. The Ambassador’s no supervision. approach to the use of operational funds by job is becoming much more complicated, yet Even when the Country Team is com- different agencies. There is no single indi- Ambassadors frequently lack the skills nec- posed of highly qualified personnel, secu- vidual or office in Washington with the req- essary to harness all elements of national rity restrictions upon the movement of civil- uisite knowledge and authority to assist the power. This is due to problems in selection as ian personnel are a severe obstacle to their Ambassador in managing surge resources well as the absence of a career professional effectiveness in the field. State Department
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum and other U.S. Government personnel are not held accountable for meeting the Country Team’s State Department–led interagency working trained to operate in semipermissive envi- planned objectives. groups can provide interagency oversight. ronments. Ambassadors, understandably, are A recent Senate Foreign Relations Com- For crisis situations or where there are major cautious because they are held accountable mittee (SFRC) report recommends that the programs by a non-State agency (for exam- for the safety of personnel. More often, how- Ambassador have the authority “to approve ple, Defense, Justice, or CIA), there should be ever, Washington will dictate policies that all military-related programs implemented in an NSC-led interagency group. restrict freedom of movement for Embassy country.”23 It is prudent that such Ambassado- In some situations (conflict and immedi- personnel when security threats are high. rial authority should go beyond purely mili- ate postconflict), there will need to be shared, tary programs and include all agencies. How- but explicitly delineated, authority between the Restructuring Country ever, this authority should contain a provision Ambassador (or Presidential special advisor) Teams for appeal to Washington in the event that there and the military (Combined Joint Task Force) is a difference of view that cannot be resolved commander as well as the regional combat- Given the evolving security environ- at the Embassy level. Whereas the Ambassa- ant command. This can alternate depending ment and critical challenges confronting dor and Country Team will have a better feel on the situation. The Ambassador should have our nation, it is time to revalidate the Coun- for country relations, the Washington level has authority over not only civilian agencies but try Team’s critical role in achieving U.S. broader perspectives on regional and global also civilian functions carried out by military national security objectives and to rethink issues that may determine decisions on country forces. There should be a clear delineation of the concept of the Country Team as a com- authority and an institutionalized process for mittee working for a lead agency. Instead, dealing with nongovernmental organizations the Country Team of the future must be Washington should and international humanitarian aid agen- reconfigured as a cross-functional team with provide integrated cies in both routine and crisis situations, by an empowered national leader. The Coun- policies and priorities for all government agencies. The same should be try Team’s makeover must be done holisti- regions and individual true for businessmen and contractors. cally—to include new strategy and planning countries and then allow Reforming Structures. The Ambas- approaches, decisionmaking procedures, per- more authority and sador should have the latitude to struc- sonnel training and incentives, and resource ture the Embassy to meet local circum- operational autonomy allocation flexibility. stances and U.S. priorities. For example, in Authorities. First and foremost, the White for Ambassadors and Bogotá, the high priority of counternarcotics House must augment the Ambassador’s de jure Country Teams to pursue and counterinsurgency programs would be authority with some practical de facto authorities those objectives reflected in the organizational structure. In that will provide the means to lead the national other countries, the structure would reflect security team in-country effectively. Ambassado- the importance of counterterrorism, mili- rial authority should be clarified and strength- policy, as well as providing a longer-term view- tary-to-military relations, or environmental ened both in the Presidential letter to Ambassa- point. The SFRC report also recommends that and economic issues. dors and in guidance from agencies to agency in the case of special operations forces, there One option to improve Country Team representatives in-country, but the Department of should be a memorandum of understanding effectiveness is to create two deputy chiefs State also must select, train, and reward Ambas- with the relevant regional combatant command of mission (DCM) in larger Embassies one sadors for asserting their authority appropriately making clear the Ambassador’s authority. This for substantive issues and one for program within the new Country Team concept. In short, also should be implemented. management. The DCM for management the Ambassador must acknowledge and strongly Washington should provide integrated would be in charge of all administrative support all agencies, not just the Department of policies and priorities for regions and indi- resource allocation in support of the Coun- State. The chief of mission should work with State vidual countries and then allow more try Team and its policy agenda. The per- and other agencies to ensure that individuals authority and operational autonomy for son need not necessarily be a State Depart- and supporting personnel selected for the Coun- Ambassadors and Country Teams to pursue ment foreign service officer. The DCM for try Team have the requisite expertise needed for those objectives. At the same time, the State policy would perform the executive secre- success and also should have a major input in Department and the NSC need to ensure tariat and chief of staff functions for the the performance evaluations of agency heads and that all agencies support agreed policy and Ambassador, supervising the various func- their subordinates. Likewise, other agency per- Country Team objectives and that the mis- tional components, as well as serving as sonnel should be able to rate the Ambassador’s sion is provided with timely policy guidance. the Ambassador’s alter ego. There should performance, and the Ambassador should be In most situations and for most Embassies, be a small staff with deep knowledge of all
Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007 agency operations and procedures to sup- All Defense offices and person- while taking steps, however, not to bypass port the DCM(s). This staff would monitor nel should be consolidated under a sin- their equivalents at the Joint Staff and the all incoming and outgoing communications gle office with a designated officer in Office of the Secretary of Defense. The so- to ensure that they are properly distrib- charge. Similarly, all intelligence person- called Joint Interagency Coordination Group uted, that action responsibilities are clearly nel (including military) should be coor- system in fact was intended to improve shar- assigned, and that they conform to exist- dinated under a single authority. Law ing of knowledge, but it has been less than ing policy. Particularly sensitive outgoing enforcement elements should also be col- adequate for unified action or for plan- messages should be discussed by the agency located and coordinated. ning. The Integration Planning Cell of the head directly with the DCM or the Ambas- There should be a clear delineation proposed Interagency Management System sador. In certain situations where there is a of responsibilities for communicating with would provide for much better interagency high degree of military participation, con- representatives of local and other govern- coordination with the combatant commands sideration could even be given to an Active ments (Embassies) and international orga- but would still be advisory in nature, if it duty military officer serving as DCM. nizations. Any fixes of the Country Team were activated. Concomitant with the need for two DCMs must be complemented by changes at the The incipient new U.S. Africa Command is the critical requirement to restructure the regional level. There needs to be an align- is planned to be much more integrated on an Embassy into functional components. Exam- ment of authorities between State and interagency basis than any previous combat- ples of such components could include law Defense at the regional level. As the Presi- ant command, with a State Department offi- enforcement (to include the consular func- dent’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mis- cer serving as the deputy to the military com- tion); trade promotion/development; economic sion dictates, the Ambassador has author- mander and similar integration at lower levels. ity over all personnel “except those under If successful, this integration could provide a command of a U.S. area military com- solution for routine interagency regional coop- any fixes of the mander.” 24 It is clearly appropriate for eration, including the role of the combatant Country Team must combatant commanders to have the inde- command. A State Department deputy assigned be complemented by pendent authority to act in the context of to each of the combatant commanders could changes at the regional deployed forces engaged in active hostili- be dual-hatted as a deputy assistant secretary of level, and there needs ties, but the letter of instruction leaves gaps state. There should not be a permanent regional to be an alignment of with respect to political-military activi- Ambassador. However, in crisis situations, either authorities between State ties, such as bilateral training and exer- an Ambassador or a Presidential special repre- and Defense at this level cises, conducted by U.S. forces stationed sentative should serve as the coordinator for all in a country in peacetime; and the status U.S. Government activities. of military forces falling under functional Resources. The methods of select- analysis; political/intelligence analysis and combatant commanders, particularly Spe- ing and training Ambassadors and agency coordination; antiterror programs; crisis plan- cial Operations Command. The subjection heads must change. An interagency train- ning and response; public information/public of military elements assigned to diplomatic ing program for Ambassadors and agency affairs/cultural activities; and democracy pro- missions to the authority of the Ambassa- heads is required. Annual offsites for all motion and social sector activities. Employ- dor must be reiterated and enforced, but its agency heads could improve the prospects ees of all agencies—as appropriate—would scope also needs to be expanded and more for unity of effort. Senior managers from populate each functional cluster to ensure an clearly defined. Particularly in the case of all agencies should receive periodic eth- integrated approach. Agency participation in special operations or intelligence-related ics training to ensure that the functioning these components should be broad rather than military personnel, experience shows that of the Embassy and their own actions are restrictive. Each component would have a des- they are most effectively employed when held to the highest standards. ignated chairperson—in some cases the DCM, placed, at the direction of the Ambassador, Personnel systems must adapt to incen- in others an agency head reporting to the under the delegated coordinating authority tivize people to serve in high-risk countries. DCM and Ambassador. This would facilitate of an established mission element. All agencies must strengthen their person- interagency communication and coordination. On issues of formulating and imple- nel numbers to assure effective management To promote information sharing, a truly uni- menting regional priorities, it is critical that and coordination of grantee- and contrac- fied communications architecture should be the State Department’s cadre of regional tor-implemented programs in-country. This created. The use of agency proprietary systems assistant secretaries enjoy good two-way is particularly true with regard to USAID, and back-channel communications should communication with Defense’s five (soon to which has experienced a steady decline in be limited. be six) regional combatant commanders, direct-hire numbers. There must be a reserve
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum personnel or “surge” capacity for civilian training, and equipping programs. If there intelligence-related functions. Although it agencies beginning with State, but including are differences of view that the Ambas- needs to be comprehensive, there should other key agencies as well. Defense and, to sador cannot resolve, personnel would be an effort to keep it as short as possible, a lesser degree, USAID already have a surge appeal to Washington. focusing on objectives. The office in Wash- capacity for crises. Ambassadors must be able More flexibility needs to be built in at the ington that oversees this process should be to call upon everyone and employ all avail- Country Team and Washington levels for the staffed by an interagency team to ensure able resources in response to exigencies. In movement of funds from one function to another proper representation and coordination. Embassies and in Washington, there needs to and for the management of contingency funds Members of the Country Team should and personnel. The chief of mission should have understand that they will be judged based on the authority to allocate funds from all sources personal performance in meeting the objec- the future Ambassador for priority projects. Additionally, Ambassadors tives of the plan and that the Ambassador/ must be, and be seen as, should be much more aggressive in advocating DCM will have a heavy formal input into indi- a national representative for resources for non-State agencies included in vidual performance ratings. This will mean empowered to make their Country Teams. The Ambassador should giving much more thought to leveraging the have the authority to terminate funds if the proj- capabilities of other agencies and being lever- tradeoffs among 25 instruments of power ect is clearly failing to deliver expected results. aged in return, in pursuit of overall mission A new approach to the Country Team objectives. Agency heads should be rewarded and to develop clear plan can facilitate these changes. As called for meeting objectives when doing so requires strategies to advance for in the new Joint State–USAID Strategic investing some of their agency’s resources and U.S. national interests Framework and the new Strategic Planning energy in other agency programs. Process, the Mission Program Plan (MPP) Washington should develop an agreed also would be reformulated to become inter- interagency policy document and should be routine coordination of all resources— agency, emphasizing the primacy of an inte- give priority to Country Team recommen- military and civilian. grated policy planning process in which all dations in deciding upon resources for the On the funding side, there must be a agencies provide input and endorse the final field. The Country Team should review the rationalization of existing contingency funds plan, including recommendations for the document annually, starting with input and capacity to act on supplementals. There amount and allocation of operational funds. from the Ambassador. The Ambassador and should be a resource push with Congress An agreed interagency policy docu- Country Team should use the interagency for the appropriation of all-purpose reserve ment that clearly spells out objectives and document to tee up the areas of policy con- funds. Current congressional restrictions programs should accompany the MPP. The flict so that Washington is forced to make upon a unified approach to the utilization of Country Team should initiate the document policy decisions. operational funds by different agencies need with the personal approval of the Ambassa- to be removed so that the Country Team can dor, who should be responsible for settling Conclusion achieve unity of effort and respond rapidly to differences of opinion. The interagency changing local conditions. document most likely will need to have The critical challenges to our nation’s A single officer answering to the compartmented annexes to accommodate interests demand a new Country Team concept Ambassador (normally the DCM or USAID mission director) should be responsible for coordinating the expenditure of all opera- The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members research and strategic gaming organization within the National of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security tional civilian funds—including for devel- Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, opment, disaster relief, refugees, postcon- its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of flict reconstruction, counternarcotics, and events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal international security affairs and defense studies. Through an Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at law enforcement programs—as well as active outreach program, including conferences and publications, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force military funds with an essentially civil- INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal ian objective, such as civic assistance or challenges and policy options. can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu. capacity-building. This officer will require INSTITUTE FOR NATIONA L STRATEGIC STUDIES extensive interagency training to under- James A. Schear David H. Gurney stand operations and procedures, includ- Director of Research Director, NDU Press ing funding for military-related education,
10 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007 Notes 13 See Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia: Not and a more effective structure capable of tack- Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995). 1 In addition to working group members, the authors st 14 As quoted in Robert Killebrew, Erin Simpson, Chris- ling the challenges of the 21 century. The sig- wish to thank James A. Schear, Christopher J. Lamb, and Mat- topher Griffin, and Kate Bateman, “The Country Team in nal mark of success for the new Country Team thew Shabat for their reviews. 2 American Strategy” (Washington, DC: Department of State/ will be changing the way other members of George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of Department of Defense, December 2006), 24. the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White 15 Susan B. Epstein, U.S. Embassy in Iraq, CRS Report the Country Team perceive the Ambassador. house, September 17, 2002), 1; available at
For further reading on the Country Team, see: Laipson, Ellen, with Olga Romanova. “Improving the Interagency Process to Face 21st Century Security Challenges.” Henry L. Arnas, Neyla, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley. Harnessing the Stimson Center Workshop Report, October 2005. Interagency for Complex Operations. Defense and Technology Paper No. 16. Washington, DC: Center for Technology and Na- Schnaubelt, Christopher M. “After the Fight: Interagency Opera- tional Security Policy, August 2005. tions.” Parameters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005–2006): 47–61. Blaufarb, Douglas S. The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Stewart, Richard W. “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Inter- Performance, 1950 to the Present. New York: The Free Press, 1977. agency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification.” Research paper, National War College, 2006. Carlucci, Frank, and Ian Brzezinski. “State Department Reform,” Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Strachan, Hew. “Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Iraq.” Survival 48, no. 3 (Autumn 2006): 59–82. Studies, 2001. U.S. Department of State, Report of the Overseas Presence Advi- Coffey, Ross. “Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to sory Panel. “America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century,” Secure Victory in Iraq.” Military Review 86, no. 2 (March/April November 1999. 2006): 24–34. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 109th Congress. “Embas- Hamlin, Ross E. “The Country Team—A Model for Coordination.” sies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Decem- Air University Review, July/August 1967. ber 15, 2006. Johnson, Alexis. “The Country Team in Operation,” speech presented to U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, November 14, 1963. Operations, 88th Congress. “The Ambassador and the Prob- lem of Coordination,” September 13, 1963. Kennan, George F. “Diplomacy Without Diplomats?” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997). Winant, John H. “Who’s in Charge Here? The Roles of the Joint Task Force Commander and the Chief of Mission in Complex Killebrew, Robert, Erin Simpson, Christopher Griffin, and Kate Bate- Stability and Reconstruction Operations.” Research paper, U.S. man. “The Country Team in American Strategy.” Washington, DC: Army War College, 2007. Department of State/Department of Defense, December 2006.
No. 227, September 2007 Strategic Forum 11 Other recent titles from NDU Press Privatizing While Transforming The Future Nuclear Landscape Marion E. “Spike” Bowman Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 57, John F. Reichart July 2007) (Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 5, April 2007) China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications Can Deterrence Be Tailored? Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes M. Elaine Bunn (INSS Special Report, June 2007) (Strategic Forum No. 225, January 2007) Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot Combating Opium in Afghanistan of NATO’s Readiness for CBRN Attacks Ali A. Jalali, Robert B. Oakley, and Zoe Hunter Michael Moodie and Robert E. Armstrong with (Strategic Forum No. 224, November 2006) Tyler Merkeley (Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 56, China, Russia, and the Balance of Power June 2007) in Central Asia Eugene B. Rumer Counterintelligence and National (Strategic Forum No. 223, November 2006) Strategy Michelle Van Cleave China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, (School for National Security Executive Education Report, April 2007) and Tools Philip C. Saunders Sino-Japanese Rivalry: Implications for (INSS Occasional Paper 4, October, 2006) U.S. Policy (INSS Special Report, April 2007) Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response? Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Marvin C. Ott Euroatlantic Institutions (Strategic Forum No. 222, September 2006) Jeffrey Simon (Strategic Forum No. 226, April 2007)
For on-line access to NDU Press publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu
12 Strategic Forum No. 227, September 2007