“Is This the End of Perestroika?” International Reactions to the Soviet Use of Force in the Baltic Republics in January 1991

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✣ Una Bergmane

On 5 February 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev sent a letter to François Mitterrand in which he complained that Western reactions to the use of force in the Baltic republics in January 1991 had reminded him of “the worst moments of the Cold War.”1 In hindsight, Gorbachev’s assessment of the situation might seem exag- gerated. The condemnations and threats to cut economic aid that followed the shootings in Vilnius and Riga were certainly unpleasant for the USSR but cannot be compared to key Cold War crises such as the Berlin Blockade or the Cuban missile crisis. The only concrete steps against the Soviet Union were taken by the European Parliament and Canada. The latter suspended its offer of technical assistance and a $150 million line of credit to the Soviet Union, and the former blocked a $1 billion European Community (EC) food aid package.2 Meanwhile, large European powers such as West Germany and France, as well as the United States, initially tried to downplay the seriousness of the Vilnius events and harshened their tone only after the shootings in Riga.3

1. Traduction non officielle de la lettre de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev à François Mitterrand, 5 February 1991, in Archives Nationales, Paris, AG 4/CD 242, Dossier 4. 2. A. Riding, “Baltic Assaults Lead Europeans to Hold Off Aid,” The New York Times,23January 1991; p. A1; and “Ottawa Suspends Credit to Soviet Union,” The Toronto Star, 22 January 1991, p. A3. 3. See Youri Dubinin, Moscou-Paris dans un tourbillon diplomatique: Témoignage d’ambassadeur (Paris: Imaginaria, 2002), p. 368; “Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, 18 January 1991,” in George Bush Presidential Library, (online at http://bush41library .tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-01-18–Gorbachev.pdf); and Christian Neef, “Secret Papers Reveal Truth behind Soviet Collapse,” Der Spiegel, 11 August 2011, online at http://www.spiegel .de/international/europe/the-gorbachev-files-secret-papers-reveal-truth-behind-soviet-collapse-a-779 277.html.

Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2020, pp. 26–57, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00939 © 2020 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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At the same time, Gorbachev was not the only one who saw the dynamics surrounding the Baltic crackdowns as a sudden resurgence of Cold War tensions and practices. Starting from 14 January, news outlets such as The Times of London, Le Monde, Aftenposten, Dagens Nyheter, Helsingin Sanomat, The Washington Post,andThe New York Times compared the Vilnius events to the Soviet interventions of 1956 and 1968 in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.4 For the international press, the Cold War comparison was a rhetorical tool to at- tract readers’ attention by framing events in the Baltics as a possible U-turn in Soviet internal dynamics. Meanwhile, for Western policymakers the end of perestroika and the return of Cold War tensions posed the danger of a looming crisis that had to be contained while preserving overall relations with the USSR. This article shows that the main Western concern regarding the crackdown in the Baltics was the future of perestroika; namely, whether the use of force in the Baltics might mean the end of perestroika. Gorbachev felt this concern and was shocked that the West was losing trust in him so easily. He conveyed this sentiment to French President Mitterrand: Under the sign of the new political mentality, difﬁcult tests in connection with German uniﬁcation, the events in Eastern Europe were overcome and a common language was soon found in the face of aggressions in the Gulf. . . . One might wonder why, then, the trust and mutual understanding, so laboriously acquired, now evaporates so shockingly easily.5 The answer to Gorbachev’s question—Why had the West started to doubt his willingness to pursue perestroika?—can be found by considering perestroika not just as a project of political and economic reforms but also as an attempt both to forge domestically and project internationally a new So- viet identity.6 The scope and depth of reforms, in both domestic and foreign

4. Editorial, “A Brutal Mistake,” The Times (London), 14 January 1991, p. 11; and Bernard Féron, “Coup de force en Lituanie Suez et Budapest: Les conﬂits croisés de 1956,” Le Monde (Paris), 15 January 1991, p. 1; Dragnes Kjell, “Døgnet,” Aftenposten (Oslo), 14 January 1991, p. 6; “Vålnaden i Vilnius,” Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 14 January 1991, p. A2; Olli Kivinen, “Kuka yrittää sammuttaa liekin?,” Helsingin Sanomat (Helsinki), 14 January 1991, p. C1; Mary McGrory, “Rethinking New World Order,” The Washington Post, 15 January 1991, p. A02; and “The New Old Face of Tyranny,” The New York Times, 14 January 1991, p. A16. 5. Traduction non ofﬁcielle de la lettre de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev à François Mitterrand, 5 February1991 (see note 1 supra). 6. For comprehensive analyses of changing Soviet identities as a factor behind the emergence of the perestroika reform project, see Robert English, “The Sociology of New Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 43–80; Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms and National

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policy, envisioned by the Soviet liberal thinkers required no less than a recon- ceptualization of key ideas about the nature of the Soviet state and its place in the world. In domestic policies it meant the embrace of human rights, free speech, and democracy.7 As Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated, “If we want to be a civilized country, we must have the same laws and regulations as the rest of the civilized world.”8 In foreign policy it necessi- tated the abandonment of what Aleksandr Yakovlev, one of the key perestroika thinkers, called the “psychology of the besieged fortress.”9 The encircled rev- olutionary state was to become a member of a larger Western (and/or Euro- pean) community, sharing values more important than class interests.10 As one Soviet ofﬁcial wrote in 1988:

By Europe we should understand not only the political phenomenon but also a deﬁnite model as to how we live, think, communicate with other people. The processesthataregoingontodayinourcountry...havethedimensionof a movement towards a return to Europe in the civilizational meaning of the term.11 The United States and its allies were pleased and responsive to these developments. Ever since Gorbachev had become General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the USSR had “accumulated” important symbolic capital by successfully projecting a new identity that corresponded to the ideological preferences of Western liberal democracies.

Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 271–316; Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1995); and Marie-Pierre Rey, “‘Europe Is Our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept,” Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), pp. 33–65. 7. Mikhail Gorbachev, Gody trudnykh reshenii: Izbrannoye: 1985–1992 (Moscow: Alfaprint, 1993), pp. 46–55. 8. “Ostavka bolshe, chem zhizn’: Beseda Fedora Burlatskogo s Eduardom Shevardnadze,” Literaturnaya gazeta, April 4, 1991, p. 3. 9. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Muki prochteniya bytiya: Perestroika—Nadezhdy i real’nosti (Moscow: Novosti, 1991), p. 181. 10. “Vremya trebuet Novogo Myshleniya: Zapis besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s uchastnikami ‘Issyk- Kul’skogo foru-ma,’” Literaturnaya gazeta, 5 November 1986, p. 2; and Vystupleniye Gener- alnogo sekretarya TSK KPSS M. S. Gorbacheva na 43-y sessii General’noy Assamblei OON, 7 December 1988, available online at https://news.un.org/ru/audio/2013/02/1002831; and “Ad- dress Given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe,” 6 July 1989, Available online at http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_mikhail_gorbachev_to_the_council_of_europe_6_july _1989-en-4c021687-98f9-4727-9e8b-836e0bc1f6fb.html. 11. Vladimir Lukin, “Novoe myshlenie—Novye prioritety,” Moskovskie novosti, 25 September 1988, quoted in Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Rela- tions (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 166.

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By 1987, in the eyes of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Soviet Union was no longer the “evil empire” it had been in 1983.12 However, the deliberate deployment of violence against civilians in the Baltics failed to meet domestic and international expectations of proper behavior, belying the notion of a newly transformed Soviet Union.13 As a columnist of the main Finnish newspaper noted: “Bloodshed in Vilnius is a heavy blow for all those inside and outside the USSR who hoped that the USSR would develop as democratic state and embrace the norms of European civi- lization. Humane states do not send tanks against unarmed civilians.”14 Gorbachev’s abstention from the use of force in Eastern Europe in 1989 had consolidated his heroic image in the West, and many Western ofﬁcials feared that the violent repression in the Baltics signaled a deeper change in Soviet policies. What was especially alarming in the West was not just that force had been used against civilians—a crackdown resulting in more than 100 deaths in Baku a year earlier had not provoked similar outrage—but that force had been used in the Baltic republics, a region that Western governments had never regarded as a legal part of the USSR.15 To date, historians and political scientists have largely analyzed the So- viet government’s use of force in the Baltics in January 1991 in the larger context of Soviet internal dynamics, seeing them as a “dress rehearsal for the August coup”; as part of a larger conservative effort to undermine Boris Yeltsin; as a lesson for the Soviet military, which in August 1991 refused to use force against civilians; and as an effort by the CPSU or Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) to preserve power.16 The key debate about the degree of Gorbachev’s involvement in the Vilnius and Riga attacks, well summarized by

12. “Soviets Not the Evil Empire Anymore, Reagan Declares: Euphoric President Hails Pact,” Los Angeles Times, 11 December 1987, p. 1. 13. Peter Katzenstein deﬁnes “norm” as collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction,” in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, p. 5. 14. Kivinen, “Kuka yrittää sammuttaa liekin?,” p. C1. 15. On the Western non-recognition policy, see Lauri Mälksoo, Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: The Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR: A Study of the Tension between Normativity and Power in International Law (Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2003); Robert A. Vitas, The United States and Lithuania: The Stimson Doctrine of Non Recognition (New York: Praeger, 1990); and Ineta Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia: Past, Present and Future as Deﬁned by International Law (Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). 16. Anthony D’Agostino, Gorbachev’s Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. 290; John B. Dunlop, “The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No.1 (Winter 2003), pp. 96–98; Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Revolution from Above, 1985–2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 329, 332; Rachel Walker, Six Years That Shook the World: Perestroika—The Impossible Project (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993),

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Ainius Lasas, is ongoing, and the question of exactly who in Moscow gave the orders remains open.17 International reactions to the violent crackdowns in the Baltics have been little discussed, but the few authors who have written about the foreign responses have judged them to be strong and swift. Timothy Snyder has analyzed Polish reactions to the violence in Vilnius in the context of the Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation of the late 1980s and early 1990s.18 John Dunlop and Rachel Walker, in their works on the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, write about the “international outrage” that followed the killings in Vilnius and Riga and the “swift Western action to punish Gor- bachev for them.”19 Kristina Spohr assesses the January events as “the crucial turning point in the story of the Baltic independence struggle” and indicates that Western powers “vehemently spoke out against Soviet violence.”20 At the same time, these authors, whose main focus lies elsewhere, mention the international reactions to the January events only brieﬂy. They pay much less attention to the Baltic question than do some of the key U.S. policymakers at the time who later wrote memoirs about the period, such as George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Condoleezza Rice and Philip Zelikow, James Baker, Robert Hutchings, Robert Gates, and, especially, Strobe Talbott and Jack Matlock.21

p. 228; John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 151; Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (New York: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 117–118; Brian D. Taylor, “The Soviet Military and the Disin- tegration of the USSR,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003), p. 30; and Amy Knight, “The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 79–81. 17. Ainius Lasas, “Bloody Sunday: What Did Gorbachev Know about the January 1991 Events in Vilnius and Riga?,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2007), pp. 179–194. For the versions that deny Gorbachev’s responsibility, see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 279–283; and John Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 173–174. For those who argue that Gorbachev gave authorization for the crackdowns (as reflected in formerly classified KGB communications), see D’Agostino, Gorbachev’s Revolution, pp. 289–292; Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War Studies,Vol.6,No.4 (Fall 2004), p. 40; Lasas, “Bloody Sunday,” pp. 179–194; and Taylor, “The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR,” pp. 40–43. 18. Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 253–254. 19. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia, p. 152; and Walker, Six Years That Shook the World, p. 228. 20. Kristina Spohr, “Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations: Western Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame,” Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2006), pp. 24–25. 21. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publish- ing Group, 1999); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); James Addison Baker and

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This article analyzes the variety of international reactions to the January events, paying special attention to the U.S. position. The article begins by giving an overview of the Soviet use of force in the Baltics and the first U.S. reactions. It then explains why the use of force was perceived, both in the West and in the Soviet Union, as the end of perestroika and demonstrates how this fear shaped European reactions to the crisis. The second part of the article discusses how domestic pressures and the international context spurred the United States to take a harsher position on the Baltic question, one at variance with its previous “Gorbachev-first” perspective. The analysis here is based on declassified archival materials in the United States, France, Russia, and Latvia. Documents pertaining to the Baltic states at the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, including records of the National Security Council (NSC) staff and the transcripts of President Bush’s conversations with Soviet leaders, shed important on the January 1991 events and the lobbying efforts of the Baltic diaspora. A copy of President Bush’s letter to Gorbachev regarding the use of force in the Baltics is stored in Baker’s private papers at Princeton University’s Mudd Library. The French Diplomatic Archives and French National Archives, consulted with special authorization, reveal information not only about the French position but also about the reactions of other European states. In January 1991, French diplomats stationed abroad painstakingly reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris about both civil society and government reactions to the January 1991 events in ev- ery European state, offering a panoramic overview of European responses to the use of force in Riga and Vilnius. Gorbachev’s letter to Mitterrand, sent at the end of January 1991, gives a unique insight into Soviet perceptions of the international responses to the January crisis. Several useful documents for this research are also available in the archive of the Gorbachev Foundation and in the Latvian State Archives. U.S. congressional records and daily newspapers from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, and the Nordic countries contribute to an understanding of the domestic pressures that Western governments were facing regarding the Baltic question.

Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995); Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Ac- count of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997); Robert Michael Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); and Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995). Until 1993, Strobe Talbott was a prominent journalist specializ- ing on the Soviet Union, but from 1993 until 2001 he served as a high-level State Department aide to President Bill Clinton.

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The January 1991 Events and the Initial U.S. Reactions

On the evening of 12 January 1991, Soviet forces headed toward the broad- casting tower in Vilnius. After arriving at the building, the tanks were faced with hundreds of unarmed people who had come to defend it. After briefly hesitating, the tanks started to move through the crowd, and the soldiers opened fire. Fourteen people were killed, more than a hundred were wounded, and the television tower was taken by force. The same night Soviet forces seized the Lithuanian radio and telegraph building. In the early hours of 13 January, the Baltic independence movements— Rahvarinne (Popular Front of Estonia), Latvijas Tautas Fronte (Popular Front of Latvia), and Saj˛udis¯ (literally “Movement”)—called citizens of the three republics to defend their freely elected parliaments. During the day thousands of volunteers from the countryside arrived in the capitals. On the night of 13 January, barricades were set up around key buildings in the three cities. For a week, people remained at the barricades day and night, taking turns sleeping in churches and schools. Soviet troops continued tactics of harass- ment, though without undertaking large-scale attacks.22 On 20 January, in an attempt to seize the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs, soldiers from the USSR’s Special-Purpose Police Detachment (Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naz- nacheniya, or OMON) killed five people and injured eleven.23 On 14 January, Gorbachev gave a speech before the Supreme Soviet about the events in Vil- nius and blamed Lithuanians for the clashes.24 His own foreign policy adviser, Anatolii Chernyaev, found the speech “pathetic, inarticulate and sickening.”25 The use of force in the Baltics did not come as a surprise to either the United States or any other major Western power. Since the early years of perestroika, various political forces including Gorbachev’s own liberal advisers, Yeltsin’s Russian democrats, and Soviet hardliners had competed to define not only the political course but the very identity of the country, putting Gor- bachev under increasing political pressure. In the fall of 1990, the Soviet president was fighting for his political survival. As noted by Archie Brown, being

22. On 14 and 16 January, OMON attacked barricades on three bridges in Riga, killing one person and injuring several others. On 16 January, OMON also seized the Police Academy in Riga. 23. The shooting took place in front of a hotel in which the Latvian acting president was dining with a delegation of Polish parliamentarians. 24. The Current Digest of the Russian Press, Vol. 43 No. 2 (13 February 1991), p. 8. 25. Anatoly Chernyaev, The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991, trans. Anna Melyakova (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2011), p. 8, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB345/The% 20Diary%20of%20Anatoly%20Chernyaev,%201991.pdf.

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caught between the radical Russian democrats and the Baltic nationalists on the one side and the hardline wing on the other, Gorbachev chose a tactical retreat and temporary concessions to those who represented the most powerful threat: the CPSU, the military, and the KGB.26 Since the summer of 1990, the hardliners had been pushing Gorbachev to restore order in the rebellious republics by declaring a state of emergency and imposing direct presidential rule.27 When in December all the key security institutions—the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and KGB—fell under the control of the hardliners, the Baltic governments started to fear that Soviet forces might destabilize the situation in their republics in order to declare a state of emergency. These developments, which later become known as Gorbachev’s “turn to the right,” did not go unnoticed in the West.28 For example, the French embassy in Moscow reported to Paris that during the ﬁrst week of December 1990 a meeting of the recently created Soviet Defense Council took place at which the liberal elements of the presidential entourage (Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Vadim Bakatin) were disowned.29 Shevardnadze’s spectacular resignation on 20 December was preceded by other important changes in Soviet leadership circles. With deep concern, the Baltic states observed the removal of Bakatin, with whom they had good relations, from the position of minister of internal affairs.30 Their anxiety increased with the appointment of the former head of the Latvian KGB, Boris Pugo, as Bakatin’s replacement and the designation of Colonel Boris Gromov of the Soviet Army as Pugo’s deputy. 31 In late December, the Latvian deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet told U.S. diplomat George Krol that “if force is not used against us we will certainly achieve our goals. But if force is used, then we are going to be thrown back so far into totalitarianism that we will not be able to ﬁnd our way out

26. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 271. 27. Plokhy, The Last Empire, pp. 37–38. 28. For more on Gorbachev’s turn to the right, see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 90–91; Knight, “The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” pp. 77–81; Spohr, “Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations,” p. 22; D’Agostino, Gorbachev’s Revolution, pp. 286–287; and Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, p. 242. 29. TD Moscou 213, Lituanie-les conséquences intérieures de la crise (2/2), n.d., in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 30. Memorandum of Conversation between George Krol, Consul of the USA, and Dainis ¯Ivans,¯ Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, Riga, 29 March 1991, in Latvian State Archives (LVA), 1991_254_261.5. 31. Ibid.

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again.”32 On 20 December, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resigned and in a dramatic speech warned the Supreme Soviet about the dangers of a coming dictatorship.33 His message created shock waves among Soviet citizens and in Western capitals and shaped reactions to the events that took place in Vilnius a few weeks later. The use of force against unarmed civilians seemed like a fulﬁllment of Shevardnadze’s prophecy.34 On 7 January, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov announced the ar- rival of 32,000 additional troops in the Baltics to reinforce the draft of Baltic citizens into the Soviet Army. At the same time, Soviet paratroopers were deployed to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. On 8 January, the three Baltic states released a joint statement indicating that the real purpose of the Soviet Army movements was to prepare for a crackdown in the Baltics. The heads of the three republics urged “the international community, parliaments, and governments of all nations to oppose the Soviet actions.”35 The White House, however, reacted with caution, trying to avoid direct criticism of Gorbachev. On 10 January, Ambassador Matlock reported that the danger of bloodshed in the Baltic region was real, and he urged Bush to send a letter to Gorbachev emphasizing grave U.S. concerns about the situation.36 The president, however, decided not to act. On 11 January, Gorbachev himself called Bush. Scowcroft convinced the president of the need to mention the Baltic states, but Gorbachev preempted him. Rice later speculated that the main aim of the Soviet leader’s call was to test how concerned the U.S. government was about the Baltic situation. When Bush expressed hope that force would not be used against the Baltic republics, Gorbachev launched into a monologue, from which Bush and his aides understood that the Soviet attitude was noncommittal.37 However, Bush did not persist and turned instead

32. Memorandum of Conversation between George Krol, Consul of the USA, and Andrejs Krasti¸nš, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, 17 December 1990, in LVA, 1990_90_405.7. 33. “In Moscow, the Forces for Force,” The New York Times, 20 December 1990, p. A30. 34. “IV Sezd Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR: Ukhod E. Shevardnadze 2\2,” YouTube video, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5EP4If4esI. 35. “Statement by the Council of the Baltic States, Calls upon the World Community, the Parliaments and Governments of All Nations to Take a Stand against the Actions of the Soviet Union,” 8 January 1991, in Archives Nationales, AG 4/CD 242, Dossier 4. 36. American Embassy in Moscow to Secretary of State, Subject: Imposition of Presidential Rule in Lithuania, 10 January 1990, in George H. W. Bush Presidential Library (GHWBPL), Dan Quayle Vice President Records, Subject Files, Highlights Baltics. 37. Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, 11 January 1991, in GHWBPL, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/memcons-telcons; and Memorandum for the Vice President from Carnes Lord, Subject: Crackdown Looming in the Baltics and Caucasus, 11 January 1991, in GHWBPL, Dan Quayle Vice President Records Subject Files, Highlights Baltics January.

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to questions concerning the imminent start of the Gulf War. When journalists later asked the president whether he had addressed the crackdown in the Baltic during the call, he tried to downplay the seriousness of the conversation, explaining: “There was not great discussion of that.”38 Bush’s reticence was driven by both short-term goals and long-term con- siderations. In the short term, the U.S. attitude was influenced by the crisis in the Gulf. With the deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait approaching and the international alliance led by the United States preparing for war, the administration was trying not to complicate relations with the USSR. Soviet acquiescence in the military intervention was crucial for maintaining the international coalition but was extremely unpopular among Soviet hardliners, who saw it as the last step toward the loss of Soviet superpower status. The Bush administration’s long-term Soviet policy was marked by support for the integrity of the USSR and by support for perestroika. The reasons the United States and other Western powers feared the collapse of the former Cold War enemy are well known and extensively discussed in the literature— fears that the breakup of the USSR would bring chaos, possibly a new dictatorship in Moscow, civil wars, and uncertainty about the status of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.39 At the same time, the new USSR, the country of Gorbachev and perestroika, had become an important partner for the West. Washington’s former Cold War enemy might be weakened, but it was still strong enough to exercise considerable influence in international affairs. Peaceful regime change in Eastern Europe, German reunification on Western terms, the resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorizing the 1991 Gulf War, the Charter of Paris, the final signature of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)— none of these key events and processes that marked the end of the Cold War would have been possible without Soviet consent or help. A smooth transition from the Cold War to a post–Cold War era depended to a great extent on the

38. George Bush, “Exchange with Reporters on the Telephone Conversation with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev,” 11 January 1991, interview by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The Amer- ican Presidency Project. 39. Norman A. Graebner et al., Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War (West- port, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 132–134; Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Mo- ment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post–Cold War Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), p. 319; James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptabil- ity, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 183; and Plokhy, The Last Empire, p. xvi. See also the conversation between Bush and Mitterrand in April 1990 that summarizes the main arguments for support for the integrity of the USSR: The White House, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Meeting with President Mitterrand of France, 19 April 1990, in GHWBPL, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/ﬁles/memcons-telcons/1990-04-19 –Mitterrand%20[1].pdf.

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continuing democratization and stability of the USSR. Gorbachev was fully supported by the United States because he was perceived as the guarantor of positive domestic change. The January 1990 crisis in the Baltics highlighted the tension between the preservation of the Soviet state and the pursuit of perestroika. After the OMON killed 14 people in Vilnius, French diplomats in Washington informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris that the U.S. government had responded with unexpected ﬁrmness.40 In reality the U.S. administration was maneuvering between condemning Soviet actions in Vilnius and pursuing U.S.-Soviet talks on the Gulf War. The task was complicated, and initially the strategy was to assign the harshly worded conversations to Secretary of State Baker, while Bush kept his usual friendly tone with Gor- bachev. On 15 January, Baker called the new Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and warned him that “our ability to pursue our new relationship depends on your government upholding the principles of perestroika” and “if you do not get something done, Sasha, this will be the end of the whole thing.”41 A few days later, White House Chief of Staff John Su- nunu announced that the summit initially scheduled for February might be canceled because of the events in the Baltics.42 When, however, Gorbachev himself called the White House on 18 January, Bush openly told him he had “really empathized” with him during the week.43 The only “pressure” Bush put on Gorbachev was the phrase, “We are so hopeful that the Baltic situation could be resolved peacefully. [The use of force] would complicate things so much.”44 The rest of the conversation was devoted to the Gulf War. Clearly, Bush was reluctant to do anything that might be perceived as an attempt to “punish” Gorbachev.45 However, after the killings in Riga on 20 January, the mood inside the Bush administration started to change. The reasons for these changes were summarized in a memorandum written by Rice for Scowcroft. Rice called for a stronger U.S. reaction to the situation in the Baltic, arguing that the use

40. TD Washington 91, Fiche télégraphique: Lituanie: Les raisons de la fermeté américaine, 13 January 1991, 7:25 p.m., in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 41. Baker and DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 380. 42. Don Oberdorfer, “Moscow Warned on Baltic Repression,” The Washington Post, 18 January 1991, p. A16. 43. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, 18 January 1991, in GHWBPL, Presidential Memcons and Telcons. 44. Ibid. 45. Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Condoleezza Rice, Responding to Moscow, 21 January 1991, in GHWBPL, NSC Files, Rice Files, Soviet Union/USSR, Subject Files, Baltics.

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of force meant perestroika was in danger and that the White House risked losing its credibility by letting both the Europeans and the U.S. Congress take a stronger stand than Bush on the Baltic question. According to Rice, the Baltic story was just a sign of a much deeper crisis in the Soviet Union that was spurring the central government’s continuing shift toward the right. Thus, the senior director of Soviet and East European affairs on the NSC staff urged the administration to abandon the “any Gorbachev is better than the alternative” logic and to focus on keeping the Soviet president committed to perestroika. “Our goal,” Rice argued, “must be to use what leverage we have to persuade him not to commit suicide through a Faustian bargain with forces on the right.”46 For the ﬁrst time Rice proposed that Bush consider alternatives to Gorbachev besides Yeltsin; namely, the democratically minded aides in Gorbachev’s own circle: Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, and Bakatin.

The Use of Force in the Baltics as the End of Perestroika

In the context of the increasingly evident shift in Soviet internal dynamics, the crackdown in the Baltics seemed the ﬁnal proof that perestroika was being rolled back. According to Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens, the violence in Vilnius vindicated Shevardnadze’s warnings about a Soviet dictatorship in his 20 December resignation speech.47 The use of force in the Baltic republics was at odds with the international and domestic expectations of how the new Soviet Union should treat its own citizens. Both Bush and Baker, in their ﬁrst statements on the crisis, stressed the incompatibility between perestroika and the use of force in the Baltic republics. The secretary of state told reporters that the continuation of U.S.-Soviet cooperation lay in the pursuit of perestroika in the USSR, thus implying that the use of force in the Baltics adumbrated the end of Soviet reforms. Baker maintained that perestroika was based “on the rule of law, not the rule of force.”48 The press found Baker’s statement “tough” and so did President Bush, who, according to Paul Goble, was not pleased by its harsh tone.49 Nevertheless, Bush’s own communication for the press, prepared by

46. Ibid. 47. Alan Riding, “Europeans Warn Soviet about Aid,” The New York Times, 14 January 1991, p. A1. 48. Alan Elsner, “Baker Slams Moscow for Baltic Crackdown,” Reuters News, 13 January 1991. 49. Paul A. Goble, telephone interview, 17 April 2013. In 1990–1991, Goble was a special adviser for Soviet nationality and Baltic affairs at the U.S. Department of State.

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Rice, contained similar wording. In the afternoon of 13 January, the president insisted: “Events like those now taking place in the Baltic states threaten to set back or perhaps even reverse the process of reform which is so important in the world and the development of the new international order.”50 The apparent end of perestroika was also the central narrative in both the U.S. and the European media. The dramatic wording used by journalists in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Nordic countries, and Poland when writing about the situation in the Soviet Union conveyed the sense of an imminent crisis, and this shaped public opinion and put pressure on decision-makers.51 Roger Steel in The Guardian wrote that “the hopes for glasnost have collapsed”; Le Monde concluded that perestroika had received its coup de grâce; and The Wall Street Journal heralded the “bloody end of perestroika.”52 For the Swedish Aftonbladet, perestroika had died in “the bloodbath of Vilnius,” and reports in The New York Times likewise suggested that the new post–Cold War world order had been killed in the street of Vilnius.53 A lead editorial in The Times of London discussed the eventual need for the West “to revive and redeﬁne George Kennan’s doctrine of containment.”54 Even in countries like Finland and Germany, where the governments were trying to downplay the seriousness of the Vilnius events, the press was using the strongest terms possible to describe a perceived Soviet return to backward- ness and totalitarianism. A columnist for the conservative Frankfurter Allge- meine Zeitung argued that the USSR was turning back to Stalinism, and the

50. Bush, “Exchange with Reporters on the Telephone Conversation with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.” 51. The impact that the political orientation of these various news outlets had on coverage of the Baltic crisis varied slightly from country to country, but generally the differences between the center-right and center-left press were minor. For the most part, the press was limited to the choice of stronger or milder rhetorical tools. For example, in France and Germany the center-left newspapers (e.g., Le Monde and Süddeutsche Zeitung) argued that perestroika might have come to an end, whereas the Catholic La Croix and conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung talked about the return of Stal- inism. See Noël Copin, “Toujours le stalinisme,” La Croix, 15 January 1991, p. 5; “Zurück zum Stalinismus,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 January 1991, p. 1; Daniel Vernet, “Coup de grâce pour la perestroïka,” Le Monde, 15 January 1991, p. 1; and “Litauen: ‘Wir können nicht glauben, dass dies auf Befehl Gorbatschows geschieht’: Ein blutiger Akt im baltischen Drama,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 14 January 1991, p. 3. 52. Vernet, “Coup de grâce pour la perestroïka,” p. 1; and Peter Gumbel, “Besieged Baltics: Lithuania Crackdown Signals a Bloody End to Era of Perestroika,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 January 1991, p. 1. 53. A. M. Rosenthal, “The New World Order Dies,” The New York Times, 15 January1991, p. A19; and “Skammens tystnad: Perestrojkan dog med blodbadet i Vilnius,” Aftonbladet, 14 January 1991, p. 2. 54. “No New Iron Curtain,” The Times, 15 January 1991, p. 11.

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main Finnish newspaper, Helsinki sanomat, warned that Moscow was going “back to the Middle Ages.”55 The fact that force had been used against unarmed civilians was certainly troubling for the West. Since the eighteenth century, the renunciation of wanton violence against peaceful protests has been crucial for the self-perception of the enlightened modern state and society, as well as for its definition of sameness and otherness.56 The consolidation of the human rights discourse and Cold War narratives reinforced this trend. The new “civilized” Soviet Union was expected to uphold human rights and norms and turn away from the violent practices of its totalitarian past. When force was used against unarmed civilians, German and Finnish journalists explicitly underlined Soviet otherness, qualifying Soviet actions in Vilnius as non-European.57 Meanwhile in France Le Monde published an opinion piece by Czesław Miłosz pointing at the “Europeanness” of the Baltic countries and insisting “they have the right to expect that they are recognized as sovereign members of the community of European nations.”58 Western relationships with state violence have always been ambivalent, Silvan Niedermeier notes, with wanton violence coming to be seen as barbaric and uncivilized but controlled use of state violence often being perceived as justified.59 What made the West fear the end of perestroika was not just the killing of unarmed civilians in the Soviet Union but the setting and the cir- cumstances of the events. The shootings in Vilnius and Riga were not the first time that force had been used against civilians under Gorbachev. On 9 April 1989 a demonstration in Tbilisi was dispersed by force, leaving 20 dead and more than 100 injured. In January 1990 during the crackdown in Baku, at least 140 people were killed. In both cases the United States and its European allies were cautious in their reactions and even supported Gorbachev. But as Edward W. Walker has pointed out, the events in Vilnius and Riga differed from the two previous cases.60 The Baku crackdown was preceded by anti- Armenian pogroms, whereas the Baltic independence movements had always

55. “Zurück zum Stalinismus,” p. 1; and “Moskova palaa keskiaikaan,” Helsinki Sanomat,14January 1991, p. A3. 56. Jürgen Martschukat and Silvan Niedermeier, Violence and Visibility in Modern History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 3. 57. Kivinen, “Kuka yrittää sammuttaa liekin?,” p. C1; and “Zurück zum Stalinismus,” p. 1. 58. Czesław Miłosz, “Lituanie le grand mensonge,” Le Monde, 23 January 1991, p. 2. 59. Martschukat and Niedermeier, Violence and Visibility in Modern History,p.3. 60. Walker, Dissolution, p. 77.

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been extremely careful to avoid violence.61 In the case of Tbilisi, local military commanders and the Georgian authorities bypassed the Soviet Politburo in implementing the crackdown, whereas in the Baltic case it was clear that the orders had from the center.62 Geography also played an important role, as the press in the Baltic Sea countries, with which Estonians, Latvians, and Estonians had close historical and cultural ties, was especially interested in events in Vilnius and Riga. The Swedish tabloid Expressen urged its readers to write to the Soviet president and ask him to give Sweden’s neighbors “their national freedom back.”63 In Den- mark, two of the country’s biggest newspapers, the center-left Politiken and the conservative Berlingske Tidende, called their readers to a jointly organized protest in support of the Baltic states.64 Poland’s Rzeczpospolita spoke about its “despair and shock” and called on the Polish government to recognize the independence of Lithuania.65 The Baltic states were special in the eyes of the West because of the non- recognition policy. Neither the United States nor most of its allies recognized the 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic states as legal under international law. This did not mean that Western countries were willing to destabilize Gorbachev’s power or ruin their relations with the USSR for the sake of the independence of the three small republics. But it did mean that although limited state violence inside Soviet borders—in Tbilisi and Baku—was tolerated, the Baltic republics were different. When dealing with those republics, Gor- bachev was expected to show the same restraint he had displayed in Eastern Europe. Despite many contradictions in U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Baltic states in 1990–1991, one element remained constant in Bush’s stance on the Baltic question: the repeated request that the USSR not use force. The ﬁrst time Bush met with Gorbachev in Malta, he urged the Soviet president to abstain

61. Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2),” p. 46. See also Mark R. Beissinger, “The Intersection of Ethnic Nationalism and People Power Tactics in the Baltic States, 1987–91,” in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 231–247. 62. Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2),” pp. 27–32. 63. “Skriv till Gorbatjov,” Expressen, 14 January 1991, p. 1. 64. “Støt Litauen: Mød op,” Politiken, 14 January 1991, p. 1. 65. Fiche télégraphique, Objet: Réactions polonaises à l’intervention militaire soviétique en Lituanie, 14 January1990, in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667, TD Varsovie 19; and “Das of- ﬁzielle Warschau tut sich schwer mit einer Stellungnahme,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,15January 1991, p. 3.

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from violence in the Baltic states.66 In the spring of 1990, Bush wrote to Gorbachev twice, making the same demand, and a similar request was repeated by Baker to Shevardnadze.67 After the shooting in Vilnius, Rice was thus able to point out to Scowcroft, “The use of force has been our red line since the administration took ofﬁce. They have used force and we have done nothing.”68 All of these factors—the Baltic geographical situation, the non- recognition policy, Western fears for perestroika, and Baltic ties with the Nordic countries—help to explain the West’s extensive press coverage of the bloodshed in Lithuania and Latvia. If the Soviet forces behind the attacks had hoped the international community would be too focused on the Gulf War to pay substantial attention to what was happening in the Baltic republics, they were mistaken. On 14 January the Vilnius events dominated front-page headlines across Europe and North America.69 According to USA Today,over the weekend of 12–13 January, news broadcasts in the United States split their coverage fairly evenly between the upcoming Gulf War and the events in Lithuania.70 After 13 January, more than 160 foreign journalists were in Riga and Vilnius providing daily coverage for their news outlets.71 This complicated the task of the Soviet military. Armed seizures of the government and parliament buildings in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn would require the shooting of civilians standing on the barricades, under the watchful eyes of the Western press.

66. Memorandum of Conversation, Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union, Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta, 3 December 1989, in GHWBPL available online at https://bush41library.tamu.edu/ﬁles/memcons-telcons/1989-12-03–Gorbachev%20Malta% 20Second%20Restricted%20Bilateral.pdf. 67. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 223; George H. W. Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (London: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 601; Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 239; President Bush to President Gorbachev, draft letter, n.d., in GHWBPL, NSC Files, Rice Files; and Bush to Gorbachev, draft letter, n.d., in Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library (Princeton University), James A. Baker III Papers (MC 197), Box 108, Folder 15, James Baker Notes, Message Sent to USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 24 March 1990. 68. Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft from Condoleezza Rice, concerning the “Lull” in the Baltic Crisis, 15 January 1991, in GHWBPL, NSC Files, Rice Files, Soviet Union/USSR, Subject Files, Baltics. 69. See the front pages of the 14 January 1991 editions of Aftenposten, Dagens Nyheter, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Helsinki Sanomat, Le Figaro (Paris), Politiken (Copenhagen), Rzeczpospolita (War- saw), The Guardian (London), The Times (London), The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post,andSüddeutsche Zeitung. 70. Matt Roush, “TV Commentary: On the Air, Doom, Gloom and Optimism,” USA Today,14 January 1991, p. D01. 71. Note in the papers of Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis, n.d., in LVA, Fonds 270, Apraksta 8, Lietas 11.

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However, the strongest backlash against the Soviet government’s use of force in Vilnius, and later Riga, came from inside the Soviet Union. The ﬁrst to protest against the events in Riga and Vilnius were members of Gor- bachev’s own circle and Russian democratic forces. As in the West, their outrage was driven by the feeling that the attacks were a betrayal of perestroika and its principles. Memories of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslo- vakia and the recently-ended Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had prompted Gorbachev’s liberal advisers to speak strongly against the use of force in Eastern Europe, and they were dismayed by the violence in Vilnius and Riga.72 Yakovlev, according to his own memoirs, was hospitalized.73 Ev- genii Primakov, a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo, asked Gorbachev for permission to resign. Andrei Grachev, who had been appointed head of the CPSU International Department, refused to accept the position.74 In a letter to Gorbachev, Chernyaev said he felt the “same painful shame” he had felt under Leonid Brezhnev and Konstantin Chernenko.75 Disappointment and outrage were not limited to the political elites. Dur- ing the crisis Gorbachev received telegrams from concerned Soviet citizens not only in the three Baltic republics but also in Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, condemning the use of force.76 On 14 January in Riga, more than 600,000 people staged a rally to express solidarity with Lithuania. That same day, 6,000 people gathered in Leningrad, and a crowd of 4,000 paraded through Red Square in Moscow, shouting “Shame!,” “Down with the Mur- derers!,” and “Down with the Nobel Prize Winner!”77 Tens of thousands also demonstrated in L’viv (L’vov), Tbilisi, and Chisin, au˘ (Kishinev). On 20 Jan- uary, one of the largest protest rallies by civil society in the USSR took place in Moscow, with more than 300,000 taking part.78

72. Andrew Bennett, “The Guns That Didn’t Smoke: Ideas and the Soviet Non-use of Force in 1989,” Journal of Cold War Studies,Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 92–95. 73. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Sumerki (Moscow: Materik, 2005), p. 499. 74. Memorandum from Chernyaev to Gorbachev, 25 January 1991, in Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation (AGF), Dok. 8789. 75. Chernyaev, The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991, p. 10; and Chernyaev to Gorbachev, n.d., in AGF, Dok. 8780. 76. Collection of telegrams received by the Kremlin in January/February 1989, Fond 89, in Yale Uni- versity, Sterling Library, 89-28-32. 77. FLST Leningrad 9, Fiche télégraphique, Objet: Réactions à Leningrad aux évènements de Vilnius, 14 January 1991, AD, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667; and Francis Clines, “Moscow Protesters Denounce Attack in Lithuania as Kremlin Keeps Silent,” The New York Times, 14 January 1991, p. A6. 78. “300 000 krävde baltiska frihet,” Dagens Nyheter, 21 January 1991, p. 1.

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Russian President Boris Yeltsin ﬂew to Tallinn to show his support for the Baltic states on 14 January. He called on Soviet soldiers deployed in the Baltic republics to disobey orders and not to shoot civilians. Yeltsin supported the leaders of the three Baltic republics in a joint statement inviting the UN Secretary General to convene an international conference to resolve the Baltic question.79 At the peak of the Gulf crisis, the world was facing another serious problem: the Soviet regime had used force against Lithuania and Latvia.

European Reactions to the Soviet Use of Force in the Baltics

The strongest reaction to the Soviet government’s use of force came from the countries that for historical reasons were able to identify emotionally with the Baltic nations. A sense of sameness, rooted in a shared fear of the Soviet other and in a shared cultural heritage, was the driving force behind civil society reactions in Eastern and Northern Europe. Small demonstrations, from a few dozen to hundreds of people, took place in Soﬁa and Oslo. More extensive demonstrations were staged in Czechoslovakia, where several thousand people marched in the streets of Prague on 13 and 14 January.80 In Finland, the Baltic question was particularly sensitive because of the discrepancy between public sympathy for the linguis- tically and culturally close Estonia and the government’s strategy of keeping a neutral position vis-à-vis “Soviet internal problems.” In Helsinki several hundred people marched from the Soviet embassy to the president’s palace, calling forPresidentMaunoKoivistotoresign.81 In Denmark, which over the previous months had emerged as one of the main advocates for Baltic independence, some 15,000–20,000 people protested in solidarity with Lithuania.82 In Sweden, which had a signiﬁcant Baltic community, smaller demonstrations had already been held in Stockholm over several months, but after the shootings in Vilnius, roughly 5,000 people assembled, including the Swedish, Latvian, and Estonian ministers of foreign affairs.83 On the morning of

79. The Current Digest of the Russian Press, Vol. 43, No. 2 (13 February 1991), p. 9. 80. TD Oslo 16, Lituanie, 14 January 1991and TD Prague 50, Situation en Lituanie: Réactions en Tchécoslovaquie, 14 January 1990, both in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 81. “Marssijat vaativat Koivisto eroa Helsingissä,” Helsinki Sanomat, 14 January 1991, p. C3. 82. “20 000 mødtes for Litauen,” Politiken, 15 January 1991, p. 1. 83. “Sorgﬂor på ﬂaggorna: Montagsdemonstration for Baltikum samlade 5000,” Dagens Nyheter,15 January 1991, p. A5.

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13 January, the heads of Latvian and Estonian diplomacy, the deputy speaker of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, the leader of Latvijas Tautas Fronte, Dainis ¯Ivans,¯ and the deputy speaker of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Bronius Kuzmickas, arrived in Sweden with the authority to create governments in exile. They were received by Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson, who offered ﬁnancial help for their stay in the West during the crisis. After holding a meeting to coordinate their actions, the foreign ministers left on a tour of Europe, and the deputy speakers headed to the United States.84 Meanwhile, the Lithuanian foreign minister Algirdas Saudargas headed to Poland, where he was warmly welcomed by the parliament. At the time, the Soviet embassy in Warsaw and its consulates in Gdansk´ and Kraków were con- tinually besieged by protesters.85 In the days after 13 January, demonstrations of 10,000–15,000 people took place in all the biggest Polish cities, marking not only Polish support for the Baltic nations but also a huge step toward historic reconciliation between Poland and Lithuania. The Polish Council of Ministers announced that Poland stood side by side with the Lithuanian people.86 In an act of solidarity, a Polish parliamentary delegation joined Lithua- nian colleagues in the besieged parliament building and declared themselves readytodiebytheirside.87 A group of Swedish lawmakers traveled to Vil- nius, Riga, and Tallinn and met with their Baltic counterparts. The Icelandic minister of foreign affairs, Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, as well as the Swedish deputy minister of foreign affairs, visited the Baltic capitals during “the weeks of barricades” and expressed their support for the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian causes. The prime ministers of all the Scandinavian countries, sepa- rately and in joint statements, urged the Soviet Union to stop the use of force and warned that suspension of aid could be a possible outcome of the fail- ure to do so. Sweden’s prime minister went even further and announced that Soviet actions in the Baltic republics cast doubt on peace and détente in Eu- rope in general.88 The Baltic cause was supported not only by Poland and the Nordic countries but also by Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, and Canada, each of which expressed outrage at Soviet actions. Canada warned that it

84. Dainis ¯Ivans,¯ interview, Riga, 19 May 2015. ¯Ivans¯ was chairman of Latvijas Tautas Fronte from 1988 to 1990 and deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia from 1990 to 1992. 85. “Das ofﬁzielle Warschau tut sich schwer mit einer Stellungnahme,” p. 3. 86. TD Varsovie 96, Objet: Réactions polonaises aux évènements en Lituanie, 16 January 1991, in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 87. Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, p. 254. 88. TD Stockholm 24,La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667.

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would “reconsider all aspects of its relations with the USSR, including its credit line of nearly a billion dollars.”89 Czechoslovakia’s government called on Hungary and Poland to take joint action in leaving the Warsaw Pact.90 Im- mediately after the events in Vilnius, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd announced that the United Kingdom had to “consider the whole of our relationship with the USSR and how and under what conditions [it] can be preserved.”91 Speaking in the name of the EC, the foreign minister of Luxem- bourg, Jacques Poos, made clear that further aid to Moscow was conditional on “the continuation of perestroika and the democratization of the Soviet Union,” implying that the use of force in Vilnius had put in doubt the Soviet Union’s commitment to the perestroika reforms.92 Thus, not only the United States but also France and Germany initially appeared to be more cautious than their northern partners. The Baltic question was not crucial for Mitterrand, who was interested in good long-term relations with the USSR, and his main ally, Helmut Kohl, was trying to downplay the importance of the Vilnius events.93 As Kristina Spohr has explained, in the aftermath of German reunification, which took place on 3 October 1990, the German government’s Ostpolitik was a “Soviet first policy.”94 Soviet interests were the highest priority for Bonn, not only because of the personal friendship between Kohl and Gorbachev and the chancellor’s gratitude for the smooth reunification but also because 338,000 Soviet troops still had to be withdrawn from the former East Germany. Kohl both trusted Gorbachev and publicly claimed that the Soviet president had not personally ordered the attacks.95 Similarly, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas stated on 15 January that when Shevardnadze, in his resignation speech, had referred to an impending dictatorship he “did not target Gorbachev as the future dictator.”96

89. Situation en Lituanie: Réactions internationales, 14 January 1991, in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 90. “Prague Urges Allies to Quit Warsaw Pact as a Protest,” The Wall Street Journal Europe,14January 1991, p. 4. 91. TD Londres 75, ﬁche télégraphique, Objet: Situation en Lituanie: Réactions ofﬁcielles britan- niques, 14 January 1991, in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 92. Riding, “Europeans Warn Soviet about Aid,” p. A1. 93. The Current Digest of the Russian Press, Vol. 43, No. 7 (20 March 1991), p. 24. See also extracts from Kohl-Gorbachev conversations published by Der Spiegel in 2011: Neef, “Secret Papers Reveal Truth behind Soviet Collapse.” 94. Spohr, Germany and the Baltic Problem after the Cold War,p.30. 95. David Gow, “Kohl Struggles to Salvage Policy to Support Gorbachev,” The Guardian,15January 1991, p. 9. 96. Élysée REU0872, Roland Dumas juge que l’horizon s’assombrit en Union Soviétique, in Archives Nationales, 5AG 4/CD 242, Dossier 4.

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However, Dumas and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher issued a joint statement condemning the “blow against democracy, law and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.”97 Spohr notes that, unlike Kohl, Genscher was genuinely keen to see the Baltic question resolved.98 However, according to the Soviet ambassador in Paris, Yurii Dubinin, Dumas later tried to downplay the importance of the declaration: “He believed that it was necessary to call me to explain: ‘We were not able not to do this.’”99 Dubinin also recalls that on 24 January the French president told him that France had been trying to calm the reactions of some of its European partners. Nevertheless on 17 January even Mitterrand wrote a letter to Gorbachev regarding the Baltic situation, urging him to start a constructive dialogue with the Baltic republics.100 The increasingly harsh European reactions to the Baltic crisis put the White House in a complicated position. On the one hand, Bush had to preserve relations with the USSR. On the other hand, the administration risked losing credibility and, as Rice put it, “ced[ing] the high ground” to the Congress.101

Domestic Pressures in the United States

After the 13 January shootings in Vilnius, the Bush administration came under strong pressure from the U.S. Congress and the Baltic diaspora to take a stronger stand on the Baltic question. Meanwhile, the press was setting the tone for a strenuous debate about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Wall Street Journal blamed Gorbachev for the killings in Lithuania, calling the Vilnius events “a peace laureate’s putsch.”102 USA Today pointed out that the Soviet president had “veered dangerously off the path to democracy.”103 On a similar track, New York Times columnist William Saﬁre argued that, if necessary, Gorbachev would be ready to “crush not only the independence movements in the captive nations but the reformers inside the republics.”104

97. Déclaration commune des ministres des Affaires étrangères de France et d’Allemagne, 13 January 1991, in Archives Nationales, 5AG 4/CD 242, Dossier 4. 98. Spohr, “Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations,” p. 26. 99. Dubinin, Moscou-Paris dans un tourbillon diplomatique, p. 368. 100. François Mitterrand to Mikhail Gorbachev, 17 January 1991, in private archive. 101. Memorandum for Scowcroft from Rice, Responding to Moscow, 21 January 1991. 102. “A Peace Laureate’s Putsch,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 January 1991, p. 12. 103. “Attack in Lithuania Threatens Democracy,” USA Today, 14 January 1991, p. A08. 104. William Saﬁre, “Gorbachev’s ‘Bloody Sunday,’” The New York Times, 17 January 1991, p. A23.

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The columnist Mary McGrory asked in the Washington Post, “But does Gor- bachev want to throw away his reputation, tarnish his Nobel Peace Prize, lose the respect and trust of the West by sending tanks against unarmed people? Can’t he think of something else?”105 From the time Lithuania issued a proclamation of independence on 11 March 1990, important differences had emerged between Congress and the administration in their attitudes toward the Baltic question. The administration thought that Baltic independence could be achieved only with full Soviet consent, whereas many members of Congress believed that if the Soviet government did not respect the Baltic states’ right to self-determination, Lithua- nian independence should be recognized without Moscow’s acquiescence. Even before violence erupted in Vilnius, the U.S. Congress had taken a stronger stand than the White House on the Baltic question. On 11 January, the Senate adopted (by voice vote) a resolution calling on Gorbachev to refrain from further use of force against the democratically elected governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.106 U.S. legislative initiatives regarding the Baltic situation proliferated in January. Three resolutions were proposed regarding possible sanctions against the USSR.107 Other initiatives concerned a possible discussion of the situation at international organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN, condemnation of the deployment of Soviet troops, and provision of humanitarian aid to Lithuania.108 However only one of the initiatives submitted in

105. Mary McGrory, “When Diplomacy Slept,” The Washington Post, 20 January 1991, p. B1. 106. The resolution was introduced by Senator Bill Bradley (NJ-D) and cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 35 other senators. “Resolution on the Use of Force in the Baltics,” Congressional Record,11 January 1991, S 892. 107. On 22 January, Senator John Heinz (R-PA) submitted a resolution urging the denial of all U.S. trade credits and economic assistance to the USSR. The same day, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) and 25 cosponsors introduced a similar resolution in the House. On 7 February Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA) and 54 cosponsors proposed to revoke U.S. subsidies to the Soviet Union. See “A Resolution Urging the Denial of All United States Trade Credits and Economic Assistance to the Soviet Union,” S.Res. 16, 102nd Cong. (1991); “To Express the Sense of the House of Representa- tives That the United States Should Suspend Trade Assistance and Beneﬁts for the Soviet Union until All Soviet Troops Have Been Removed from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and Should Reafﬁrm Its Recognition of the Independence of Those Nations,” H.Res. 41, 102nd Cong. (1991); and “To Re- voke Recently Extended U.S. Taxpayer Subsidies to the Soviet Union as a Consequence of Its Attacks on Freedom of the Press and Democracy in the Baltic Republics in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia,” H.J.Res. 80; 102nd Cong. (1991). 108. The two resolutions were introduced by Representative Helen Bentley (R-MD) and Representa- tive Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) and 64 cosponsors on 23 January. “Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives That the President Should Bring the Matter of Lithuanian Territorial Sovereignty before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Other International Or- ganizations,” H.Res. 39, 102nd Cong. (1991); “Concerning United Nations Action Regarding the

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Congress after 13 January was approved: Senate Resolution 14, calling on the president to proceed with economic sanctions against the USSR.109 In January 1991, U.S. senators and representatives delivered more than 200 speeches on the Baltic question, roughly three times the number made in March 1990, when Lithuanian independence was proclaimed. The inter- est the Congress took in the Baltic question can be explained in part by the existence of a large, well-organized Baltic diaspora in the United States.110 In January 1991, as in the spring of 1990, the members of Congress who most vocally supported the Baltic cause came from states with signiﬁcant numbers of Baltic American constituents.111 Representatives and senators from both major parties, such as Jessie Helms (R-NC), Robert Byrd (D-WV), and Don Ritter (R-PA), seized the opportunity to criticize Gorbachev. Dozens of members of Congress with no previous record of strong commitment to Baltic independence also condemned the Soviet actions. Their activity can be explained both by a genuine distress in the face of the use of force against civilians and as an attempt to gain visibility by discussing a sensitive issue that was making international headlines. Furthermore, many members of Congress were pushed to act on the Baltic issue not only by their Baltic American constituents but also by human rights support groups. During the crisis, as President Bush later explained to Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, the president received a letter from conservative activist and commentator Paul Weyrich warning the White House that he had “never seen the conservative

Soviet Union’s Treatment of the Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia,” H.Con.Res. 50, 102nd Cong. (1991); “Calling upon President Gorbachev to Refrain from Further Use of Force against the Democratically Elected Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia,” H.Res.33; 102nd Cong. (1991); and “A Bill to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to Authorize the Provision of Medical Supplies and Other Humanitarian Assistance to the Lithuanian People to Alleviate Suffering during the Current Emergency,” S.37, 102nd Cong. (1991). 109. “A Resolution to Express the Sense of the Senate That the President Should Review Economic Beneﬁts Provided to the Soviet Union in Light of the Crisis in the Baltic States,” S.Res. 14; 102nd Cong. (1991). 110. According to the U.S. census, in 1990, 938,958 people of Baltic descent were living in the United States; 86 percent were Lithuanians, 10 percent were Latvians, and 4 percent were Estonians. See U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census 1990, Census of Population Detailed Ancestry Groups for States, CP-S-1-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Ofﬁce, 1990), pp. 5, 18, available online at https://usa.ipums.org/usa/resources/voliii /pubdocs/1990/cp-s/cp-s-1-2.pdf. 111. In 1990, the U.S. states with the largest Baltic American populations were Illinois (117,559), Pennsylvania (108,846), New York (864,417), and the states with the highest percentage of Baltic Americans among the population were Connecticut (1.38 percent), Massachusetts (1.26 percent), and Illinois (1.03 percent). See ibid.

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movement more united than in the case of the Baltic States.”112 In the same conversation, Bush noted that

Most of these people didn’t believe in dialogue with the USSR to begin with. ButthisisbroaderanddeeperthanIthought....Ontheleft,someinthe human rights community, who wouldn’t join with the right except on this are also excited.113

As in the spring of 1990, leaders of the Baltic diaspora were disappointed by what they perceived as the administration’s soft stand on Soviet actions in Lithuania and Latvia. For example, Anthony Mazeika from the Lithua- nian American community wrote to President Bush that he was deeply disappointed by U.S. policy and would do everything in his power to counter the president’s reelection in 1992.114 Several Lithuanian Americans wrote to the president to alert him about the presence of U.S. citizens (in most cases their children) in Vilnius or to talk about the suffering of their relatives in Lithuania, and others called for economic sanctions against the USSR.115 On 22 January, National Security Adviser Scowcroft met with the president of the American Latvian Association, Valdis Pavlovskis, as well as Asta Banionis from the Lithuanian American Committee and Mari-Ann Rikken from the Estonian American National Committee.116 The meeting was tense from the beginning, as the three visitors accused the administration of having turned a blind eye to the Baltic republics. In the middle of the conversation Bush suddenly joined the group to express his support for the Baltic cause. His appearance, however, did not improve the ambiance, and the meeting ended with a clash between the president and the Baltic Americans. Rikken accused

112. Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh of the USSR, 28 January 1991, in GHWBPL, http://bush41library.tamu.edu/ﬁles/memcons-telcons /1991-01-28–Bessmertnykh.pdf. 113. Ibid. 114. Anthony Mazeika to President Bush, 12 January 1991, in GHWBPL, WHORM Subject Files, CO091. 115. Ilona Dapkus to President Bush, 14 January 1991, Aida Macnickas to President Bush, 29 January 1991, Amanda Muliolis to President Bush, 13 January 1991, Peter Sillar to President Bush, 12 January 1991, and Alyson Dutch to President Bush, 22 January 1991, all in GHWBPL, WHORM Alphabetic Files. 116. Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, from Nicholas Burns, through Condoleezza Rice, “Your Meeting with Representatives of Major Baltic-American Organizations: 22 January 1991,” in GHWBPL, NSC Files, Hutching Files, Baltic States.

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Bush of “appeasement”, angering the president, who told her “not to use this word.”117

U.S. Pressures on the Soviet Union and the Impact of International Reactions

After the shootings in Riga on 20 January, the Bush administration decided to exert greater pressure on the USSR. Concerned about both the stability of Gorbachev’s power and Soviet policy vis-à-vis Iraq, Bush preferred to try a personal approach before exercising public pressure. On 23 January 1991 he sent a letter to Gorbachev—a carefully worded document, in which he tried to balance warnings about possible consequences of Soviet actions in the Baltics with reassurances of the U.S. desire to preserve good relations with the USSR in the long term. Bush first noted the restraint his administration had shown and the internal pressures he personally had faced, and he then warned his Soviet counterpart that “unless positive steps toward peaceful resolutions of the conflict with the Baltic leaders are taken,” the United States would adopt economic sanctions: freezing Export-Import Bank credit guaranties and Commodity Credit Corporation guaranties, withdrawing support for special associate status for the Soviet Union in the International Mone- tary Fund and World Bank, and suspending most of the two organizations’ technical assistance programs.118 On a more positive note Bush then assured Gorbachev that he did not underestimate the difficulties the Soviet president was facing. “Nobody wanted the disintegration of the USSR,” he noted, and he pledged to do everything in his power to preserve U.S.-Soviet relations in this “difficult period.” At the end of the letter, however, Bush reminded Gorbachev that the use of force was incompatible with perestroika:

Mikhail, I cannot help but recall that you yourself told me that you personally could not sanction the use of force in the Baltic States because it would mean the end of perestroika. . . . I urge you to turn back now to a course of negotiations

117. Mari-Ann Kelam, interview, Tallinn, 18 June 2013. Kelam was a leading Estonian diaspora activist. 118. POTUS to President Gorbachev, 23 January 1990, in Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, James A. Baker III Papers, MC#197, Series B: Secretary of State, Box 109; and Letter to President Gorbachev, n.d., in GHWBPL, NSC Files, Burns Files, Subject Files, GB-Gorbachev Correspondence (3).

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and dialogue and to take concrete steps to prevent the further use of force and intimidation against the Baltic peoples and their elected leaders.119 The day before Bush’s letter was sent to Moscow, Canada suspended its offer of technical assistance and a $150 million line of credit to the Soviet Union.120 On 23 January, the European Parliament blocked a $1 billion EC food-aid package for the Soviet Union. The EC suspended a high-level meeting with Soviet trade ofﬁcials scheduled for the same week and announced that it would temporarily halt the implementation of a $550 million technical assistance agreement with Moscow in reaction to the latest violence in Latvia.121 By the end of January, the Soviet government started to slow its actions in the Baltic states, mostly because of the role played by internal factors, such as the outrage of civil society, the support of Yeltsin and other Russian democrats for the Baltic cause, and the unwillingness of the Soviet military to get in- volved in “internal policing.”122 But international reactions also had an impact on Soviet leaders’ calculations. From 13 January to 31 January, Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign Minisstry changed their communications strategy on the Baltic situation. In the ﬁrst days after the shootings in Vilnius, to the great surprise of Gorbachev’s foreign policy adviser, the Soviet president had not seemed to notice the extent of foreign indignation.123 On 13 January, Deputy Foreign Minister Gennadii Kovalev delivered a message from Gorbachev to the U.S., French, German, Italian, British, and Finnish ambassadors. The document stated that the situation in Lithuania was unstable because of the Lithuanian governmental crisis and unbearable provocations against the Soviet military and their families.124 The message also expressed the intent to work with the new National Salva- tion Committee and dismissed the Lithuanian parliament and government as the “old authorities.” U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock noticed Kovalev’s “trembling hands,” and the French ambassador perceived his explanations as a

119. See the two letters cited in the previous footnote. 120. “Ottawa Suspends Credit to Soviet Union,” The Toronto Star, 22 January 1991, p. A3. 121. Riding, “Baltic Assaults Lead Europeans to Hold Off Aid,” p. A11. 122. Taylor, “The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR,” pp. 40–42. 123. Chernyaev wrote to Gorbachev: “I have an impression that you do not read even the ciphered telegrams from abroad, which are full of protest, indignation, anger, disappointment and threats to break all the planned communications with us from the governments, parties and the public.” See Chernyaev, The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991, p. 11. 124. TD Moscou 181, Lituanie, Message de M. Gorbatchev, 13 January 1991, in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667.

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return to Soviet hypocrisy and a sign of Gorbachev’s deep embarrassment.125 Embarrassed or not, Gorbachev was clearly avoiding addressing the fact that thirteen people had been killed the previous night and was attempting to le- gitimize the National Salvation Committee. After the shootings in Riga, Gorbachev’s attitude started to shift. On 22 January, Primakov, Press Secretary Vitalii Ignatenko, and Chernyaev convinced Gorbachev dent to let them prepare a speech for him to deliver before the Supreme Soviet. Even though Gorbachev did not read the text as written, he used it as a draft and publicly dissociated himself from the killings in the Baltics.126 The same day in Paris, the minister-counselor from the Soviet embassy met with the deputy director of the European affairs division of the French Foreign Ministry and, “visibly embarrassed” according to the French diplomat, delivered a document that denied Moscow’s responsibility for the shootings.127 On 23 January, Ambassador Matlock handed Bush’s letter to the Soviet president. In response Gorbachev claimed that the country was on the brink of a civil war and that he had to do everything to avoid it—“even things that might be inexplicable.”128 On 26 January, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmert- nykh arrived in Washington. He had left the position of Soviet ambassador to the United States only two weeks earlier. Traveling to Moscow overnight from 13 to 14 January, he had seen the ﬁrst shocking pictures from Lithuania while changing planes in London and brought to Gorbachev British newspapers with photographs of Soviet tanks crushing civilians in Vilnius.129 On 26 January he was back in Washington with Gorbachev’s answer to Bush’s letter. The trip took place in the context of increasing tensions between the USSR and the United States concerning the Gulf crisis. Immediately after arriving, Bessmertnykh met Baker. According to Talbott and Michael Beschloss, this conversation convinced the Soviet foreign minister that the Bush administration could not fend off calls for sanctions unless there was tangible proof that the situation in the Baltics was improving.130

125. Ibid.; and Matlock, AutopsyonanEmpire, p. 455. 126. The Current Digest of the Russian Press, Vol. 43, No. 4 (27 February 1991), pp. 11–12. 127. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, direction d’Europe, René Roudaut, Note a/s: Explication sovié- tiques sur l’intervention armée à Vilnius, 21 January 1991, in La Courneuve, Europe (1991–1995), URSS 7667. 128. Matlock, AutopsyonanEmpire, p. 470. 129. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 312. 130. Ibid., p. 323.

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Two days later, on 28 January, Bessmertnykh visited President Bush at the White House and conveyed to him Gorbachev’s promise that Soviet forces deployed in the Baltics in early January would be withdrawn. The meeting between the U.S. president and Soviet foreign minister lasted 45 minutes and was devoted entirely to the Baltic crisis. Bush used much harsher words than in his letter to Gorbachev. After congratulating Bessmertnykh on his new position, the U.S. president stated that, although he had no intention of inter- fering in Soviet internal affairs, the USSR had to understand that the Baltics were a special case for the United States.131 Bessmertnykh divided his explanation on the Baltics into two parts, ﬁrst speaking freely without notes and then reading parts of Gorbachev’s letter. Bessmertnykh’s perspective seemed to differ in signiﬁcant ways from Gor- bachev’s letter. Although both men portrayed the violence as an unfortunate accident, Bessmertnykh acknowledged the Soviet Union’s share of responsibility, whereas the sections the minster read from Gorbachev’s letter directly blamed “irresponsible Baltic leaders” who were supposedly “organizing harass- ment of national minorities.”132 In response Bush stressed the pressures he was facing at home, arguing at length that if progress was not made in the Baltics, U.S.-Soviet relations “would be in peril.” He emphasized:

We are doing our best to stay on track here but I am becoming a minority at this point. . . . I am sure Gorbachev knows how strongly we feel about use of force. . . . [W]e don’t have much time. The sooner you find visible ways to show things are changing for the better. I am not making this up. I don’t want you to underestimate the feeling. You must find a way to be flexible on the constitution. I do not want to see this relationship fall apart.133 Baker then reinforced the president’s argument, saying he did not know how much time “we will have before we have to do something.”134 At this point Bessmertnykh tried to change the topic and implicitly reminded his hosts that they needed Soviet cooperation for other matters, but Bush and Baker refused to play along. When Bessmertnykh mentioned START, Bush cut him short, saying he did not perceive START as a favor to anyone. The Soviet foreign minister then evoked the need to address the settlement in the Middle East

131. Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh of the USSR, 28 January 1991GHWBPL. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid.

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and even made a historical reference to the year 1943, “when Germans were at Stalingrad.” Baker avoided the Gulf War topic by expressing his hopes that withdrawal of forces from the Baltic republics would minimize the chances of any further “accident,” and the president then concluded the conversation. A few hours after the meeting, Bessmertnykh told journalists in Washing- ton that some army units would be withdrawn to allow a resumption of talks between Moscow and the secessionist governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. On 31 January, a spokesman for Gorbachev conﬁrmed that Soviet troops “have either left the region or are about to do so.”135 There were two main reasons for Gorbachev’s retreat on the Baltic issue. First, Soviet internal dynamics pressured him to distance himself from the forces carrying out the operation. Second, Western reactions, limited as they were, had an impact on Gorbachev. A letter he sent to Mitterrand at the end of January shows he had taken seriously Western threats to slow down economic cooperation and aid. The Soviet president warned that such an action would be an “unforgivable historical mistake,” and he asked Mitterrand to use his inﬂuence on the international stage to help him.136 According to Chernyaev, the Soviet president expressed similar disappointment about Western attitudes when talking with the foreign ministers of Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands on 16 February.137 “They had come to exhort Gorbachev to stick with democracy and the Charter of Paris. But they were greeted with a counter-attack: are they not ashamed for believing that Gorbachev was betraying perestroika?!”138 In Gorbachev’s perception, as Andrei Grachev has noted, foreign policy and internal politics were two separate domains in which different kinds of action could be pursued.139 The Soviet leader believed that, if his foreign policy stayed the way it had been during recent years, nobody would question his commitment to perestroika. This assumption turned out to be wrong—his shift in domestic policies made the West anxious about the overall future of the reform movement.

135. “Troops Leaving Baltics, Soviets Say; Convoys on the Move, but Lithuanians Skeptical on With- drawal,” The Washington Post, 31 January 1991, p. A13. 136. Traduction non ofﬁcielle de la lettre de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev à François Mitterrand, 5 February 1991, in Archives Nationales, AG 4/CD 242, Dossier 4. 137. The three ministers were the former, current, and future chairmen, respectively, of the EC Coun- cil of Ministers. 138. Chernyaev, The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991, p. 27. 139. Andrei Grachev, Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Cam- bridge, UK: Polity, 2008), p. 199.

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By early February 1991, additional Soviet troops had left the Baltic republics. The elected Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian governments continued their work, and citizens left the barricades. Another Baltic crisis was over, though without providing a solution to the Baltic question. However, unlike in the spring 1990, the January 1991 events ended with a relative victory for the Baltic nations. They had been able to hold their ground during the stand- off with Soviet forces, and the West had started to doubt Gorbachev.

Conclusion

The reactions of the United States and its allies to the violent repression in Vilnius and Riga are a telling case for larger processes related to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. government had many strong reasons—from the 1991 Gulf War in the short term to European stability in the long term—to downplay the seriousness of the Baltic situation, and yet it still threatened the USSR with economic sanctions. Norms in this case definitely influenced Western policy regarding the So- viet Union. But their role was subtle and complex, not simply a reflection of a selfless U.S. desire to promote human rights. Norms, as collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity, play both constitutive and regulative roles.140 They define actors’ identities and function as standards prescribing behavior. Both Soviet liberal democratic circles and the international community expected the leaders of the newly reformed Soviet Union to find a peaceful solution to the Baltic problem. For Soviet liberals, rejec- tion of violence as a tool for achieving political goals was part of the larger enterprise of defining a new Soviet identity. For the West, the Soviet government’s refusal to use force in Eastern Europe was one of the main elements in overcoming the Cold War divide and underscoring sameness in the former Soviet “other.” Thus, in Soviet internal politics abstention from excessive state violence played a constitutive role, whereas on the international stage it had a regulative function: Soviet compliance with this norm reinforced the image of the new Soviet identity, shaped by the values of liberal democracies. Thus, when the USSR used force in the Baltics, international and domestic supporters of perestroika feared it might signal the end of the reform movement. For international actors such as the United States, this shift would have directly endangered their interests. Successful handling of the post–Cold War

140. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” p. 5.

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transition depended on the USSR’s embrace of its identity as a peaceful member of the international community. The juridical status of the Baltic states situated them in the gray zone between international and domestic policies. The particular situation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—Soviet republics de facto, independent states according to the non-recognition policy—made the United States and its allies much more sensitive to the killings in the Baltics than to the crackdowns in Georgia and Azerbaijan. On its own, the Western non-recognition policy did not lead to the independence of the Baltic states, but it did give those states a strong argument for pursuing independence, as well as greater visibility on the international stage. This relative “visibility” of the Baltic case was a key element behind the U.S. and European reactions to the use of force. The attempted crackdown took place at the peak of the Gulf crisis, just one day before the expiry of the UN deadline for Iraq. Moscow’s attempt to deal with the Baltic problem while the international community was focused on the Middle East did not work. The killings in Vilnius and Riga still received considerable attention both inside and outside the USSR. Diaspora lobbying in Congress and congressional pressure on the White House made the case visible in U.S. domestic debates, thus limiting the Bush administration’s room for maneuver. To what extent the pressure from Congress and civil society was not only a factor that Bush had to take into account in his Baltic policy but also a rhetorical tool that allowed him to put pressure on the USSR, while affirming his own commitment to good U.S.-Soviet relations, is hard to assess. In any case, the fact that the Baltic question in the United States was not just international but also part of domestic politics played an important role. Furthermore, despite being on the periphery of the Soviet Union, the Baltic republics had the huge advantage of being on the Western periphery— unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia. Cultural and historical ties with Northern and Central Europe contributed to the visibility of the Baltic cause in Europe. Vis- its by Swedish and Polish lawmakers and the foreign minister of Iceland, as well as the presence of foreign journalists, enabled outsiders to track developments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The level of international attention paid to the use of force in the Baltic states, as well as the Western threats to implement economic sanctions, were an unpleasant surprise for Gorbachev, who had seen the issue as purely domestic. Did the use of force in the Baltic republics contribute to any change in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union? The short answer is no. Even if some mid-level officials, such as Rice, raised the possibility of replacing Gorbachev, the White House stayed faithful to the “Gorbachev-first policy.” The pressure

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Bush put on his Soviet counterpart was clearly not an attempt to undermine him by supporting Baltic independence. Rather, it was an effort to keep Gor- bachev on the democratization track, a crucial element, the administration believed, in securing a successful transition to a post–Cold War order.

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Mario Del Pero (Sciences Po Paris) and Matthew Evan- gelista (Cornell University) for reading and commenting on a draft version of this article. This research was conducted and ﬁnalized during my postdoctoral fellowship at Cornell University and my visiting fellowship at the Aleksanteri Institute in Finland. I want to thank all the participants of the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conﬂict Studies seminars at Cornell for discussing the early results of this research. I am also thankful to Andreas Mørkved Hellenes (Aarhus University), Marko Tiainen (Aleksanteri Institute), and Sigrid Kaasik-Krogerus (Aleksanteri Institute) for generously helping me to survey and understand the Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish press, and to Tilo Schabert for his help with my archival work. Last but not least, I would like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their stimulating and in- sightful comments on my work.

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