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For correspondence and Inquires: i*4b@@@@@~zŒg~6°*HiÉ@@@@~6*x˜•D Financial Stability & Statistics Department $b@@@@@~|0(°*H·b@@@@@@´*4*xg@@@@@@~6°*,4*2(* Qatar Central Bank …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe P.O. Box: 1234 1234 :Ü.¢U Doha - Qatar ô£b - áMhódG Tel.: +974 44456348 +974 44456348¡Œ£•- Fax: +974 44318346 +974 44318346 :¢ùcÉa [email protected] website: www.qcb.gov.qa

,4*2(³*‚}˜»$e€<&* Board of Directors

Áb.—%*2¡†~6œ+Ñ*vc<t£~{D*,2b†~6 ,4*2(°*z•¸z£)4„Abp´* H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Saoud Al-Thani The Governor - Chairman of the Board of Directors

Áb.—%*–~|£Aœ+vžAt£~{D*,2b†~6 ,4*2(°*z•¸z£)4d)bF„Abp´*d)bF H.E. Sheikh Fahad Faisal Al-Thani Deputy Governor - Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors

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PREFACE ó«¡“ Qatar Central Bank is pleased to release its third ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G øY ådÉãdG √ôjô≤J Qó°üj ¿CG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ô°ùj Financial Stability Review for the State of Qatar for 2011. äÉfÉ«Ñd É«é¡æek Ó«k – ó j eÉ°T ôjô J ƒgh ,2011 É©d ô£b ádhO ‘ The Review provides a systematic analysis of the data ∏ Ω ≤ π ≤ Ω pertaining to the banking system, and other financial πjƒªàdGh ÚeCÉàdG É¡«a Éà iôNC’G á«dÉŸG äÉYÉ£≤dGh ,‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG sectors including insurance, finance, investment ‘ Ióéà°ùŸG äGQƒ£àdG RGôHEG ≈∏Y π«∏ëàdG Ωƒ≤jh .á°UQƒÑdGh Qɪãà°S’Gh and stock market. The analysis further highlights the developments that occurred in 2011 in each sector, ,É¡«∏Y áÑJΟG èFÉàædGh ,É¡KhóM ÜÉÑ°SCG ¿É«H ™e ,´É£b πc ‘ 2011 ΩÉY along with the reasons for their occurrence, and their …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Èà©jh .É¡«a áæeÉμdG ôWÉîŸG ¢SÉ«b øY Ó°†ak repercussions, in addition to the assessment of the É« jôaCG ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á £æe ‘ á « dG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG óMCG inherent risks.. Qatar Central Bank is one of the few ≤ ∫ ≤ ∏ ∏≤ central banks in the MENA region that publishes an .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ∫ƒM Ók ≤à°ùe Éjƒæ°Sk Gôjôk ≤J Qó°üJ »àdG independent report on financial stability.

The world economy has traversed an unsettled path, ÖfGƒL äOCG å«M ,Iô≤à°ùe ÒZ á∏Môe »ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G RÉàLG ó≤d where a significant rise in vulnerabilities in several §HGôJ çhóM ¤EG áeó àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G øe ójó©dG ‘ IójGõàŸG ©°†dG advanced economies created an unholy nexus between ≤ ∞ banking, fiscal policy and sovereign debt, threatening ,ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódGh á«dÉŸG á°SÉ«°ùdGh ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ´É°VhCG ÚH »ë°U ÒZ to swamp the global economy into a double-dip hóÑjh .êhOõe OƒcQ áeRCG ‘ ¢Sɪ¨f’ÉH »ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G Oó¡j äÉH ɇ recession. Decisive actions by policymakers appear ÖæŒ ¤EG äOCG ób äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ƒ©fÉ°U ÉgòîJG »àdG ᪰SÉ G äGAGôLE’G ¿CG to have averted the outbreak of a full-blown crisis, ◊ although the global economic situation remains on ÉÑjôbk ∫GR’ »ŸÉ©dG …OÉ°üàb’G ™°VƒdG øμd ,á∏eÉ°T ájOÉ°üàbG áeRCG ´’ófG knife-edge and the recessionary headwinds are, by no äÉ«YGóàdG äóàeG óbh .OƒcôdG ôWÉfl ó©H ™°û≤æJ ⁄h ,ô£ÿG áaÉM øe means, over. The repercussions of these developments ,É« jôaCG ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á £æe ¤EG äGQƒ£àdG òg øY áªLÉædG were manifested in the MENA region, and in particular, ≤ ∫ ≤ √ the oil-importing countries were more significantly .§Øæ∏d IOQƒà°ùŸG á≤£æŸG ∫hO ‘ á°UÉîHh affected.

The financial sector in Qatar still constitutes a bright √òg º°†N ‘ áÄ«°†e á£≤f πãÁ ô£b ádhO ‘ ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG ∫Gõj ’h spot in the midst of these developments. Active ãeCG èjõe «Ñ£Jh ,á« ëŸG ƒæÑ d É©ØdG ºYódG RõY å«M ,äGQƒ£àdG support to the domestic banks, coupled with a judicious π ≥ ∏ ∑ ∏ ∫ policy-mix enabled the sector to successfully weather á«dÉŸG äÉHGô£°V’G á¡LGƒe ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG IQób øe ,äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG øe the global financial storm. The banking system in ‘ íjôe ™°Vh ‘ …ô£≤dG ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG »≤H óbh .ìÉéæH á«ŸÉ©dG Qatar remains in fine footing, with comfortable capital IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô dG áÑ°ùf ¢VÉØîfGh , GƒeC’G ¢ShDhôd Ió«L äÉjƒà°ùe X cushions, low delinquent loans and high profitability. ≤ ∫ π The non-banking sector is being gradually nurtured in Ék ≤ah É«éjQóJk ‘ô°üŸG ÒZ ´É£≤dG õjõ©J ºàjh .á«ëHôdG ƒ‰h OGó°ùdG line with the long-term national development strategy. ±ô°üe Ö©∏j ,¬ÑfÉL øeh .πLC’G á∏jƒW á«æWƒdG ᫪æàdG á«é«JGΰSE’ On its part, Qatar Central Bank has been playing a pro- ÉŸÉ°Shk Éæek BG ‹ÉŸG ´É£ dG Y ®ÉØ G LCG øe ÓYÉak GQhOk …õcôŸG ô£b active role to ensure that the financial sector remains ≤ ≈∏ ◊ π safe, sound and solid. .Ék μ°Sɪàeh

Qatar Central Bank would like to extend great thanks ¿Éæàe’G º«¶Yh ôμ°ûdG ¢üdÉîH Ωó≤àj ¿CG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Oƒjh and gratitude to H.H. The Emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin ,ióØŸG OÓÑdG ÒeCG ÊÉK ∫BG áØ«∏N øH óªM ï«°ûdG ƒª°ùdG ÖMÉ°U Iô°†◊ Khalifa Al Thani, to H.E. The Heir Apparent, and to H.E. óªM ï«°ûdG ‹É©eh ,ÚeC’G ó¡©dG ‹h ÊÉK BG óªM øH º«“ ï«°ûdG ƒª°Sh The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for ∫ their support and assistance. Thanks and appreciation ≈∏Y ,á«LQÉÿG ôjRhh AGQRƒdG ¢ù∏› ¢ù«FQ ÊÉK ∫BG ÈL øH º°SÉL øH are also attributable to government entities, banks and äÉ¡÷G ¤EG ôjó≤àdGh ôμ°ûdÉH ¬Lƒàf ɪc .Iôªà°ùŸG º¡JÉ¡«LƒJh º¡ªYO other financial institutions operating in Qatar, which »àdGh ô£b ádhO ‘ á∏eÉ©dG iôNC’G á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh ∑ƒæÑdGh á«eƒμ◊G provided QCB with the relevant information to draft OGóYEÉH ΩÉ«≤∏d ájQhô°†dG äÉeƒ∏©ŸÉH …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ójhõàH âeÉb the Review. .ôjô≤àdG Gòg

ÊÉK ∫BG Oƒ©°S øH ˆGóÑY ßaÉëŸG

Abdullah Bin Saud Al Thani The Governor

Page TABLE OF CONTENTS No. äÉjƒàëŸG ∫hóL Executive summary 19 …ò«ØæàdG ¢üîq ∏ŸG Chapter 1 : Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J :∫hC’Gq π°üØdG ❖ Introduction 23 áeóq ≤ŸG ❖ ❖ GCC developments 30 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ äGQƒ£àdGq ❖ ❖ Developments in Qatar 41 ô£b ‘ äGQƒ£àdG ❖ ❖ Concluding remarks 49 á«eÉàÿGq äɶMÓŸG ❖ Chapter 2: Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£J :ÊÉãdG π°üØdG ❖ Introduction 53 áeó≤ŸG ❖ ❖ Global monetary policy 53 á«ŸÉ©dG ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG ❖ ❖ Monetary policy measures 56 ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGAGôLEG ❖ ❖ Monetary developments during 2011 58 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ájó≤ædG äGQƒ£àdG ❖ ❖ Liquidity management 66 ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG❖ ❖ Concluding remarks 72 á«eÉàÿG äɶMÓŸG ❖ Chapter 3: Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J :ådÉãdG π°üØdG ❖ Introduction 75 áeóq ≤ŸG ❖ ❖ Financial depth and intermediation 79 á«dÉŸG áWÉ°SƒdGh ‹ÉŸG ≥ª©dG ❖ ❖ Profitability 92 á«ëHôdG ❖ ❖ Stability analysis 95 QGô≤à°S’G π«∏–❖ ❖ Risks in banking 105 ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ôWÉîŸG ❖ ❖ ❖ Concluding remarks 121 á«eÉàÿG äɶMÓŸG

Chapter 4: Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCGq ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£Jq :™HGôdG π°üØdG ❖ Introduction 125 áeó≤ŸG ❖ ❖ Qatar Development Bank 125 ᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æH ❖ ❖ Finance companies 128 πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T ❖ ❖ Investment companies 130 Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T ❖ ❖ Exchange houses 132 áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T ❖ ❖ ❖ Insurance sector 135 ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b » FÉ©dG ´É£ dGh äÉcô°ûdG ´É£b ❖ ❖ Corporate and household sectors 138 ∏ ≤ º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG❖ ❖ Equity markets 143 á«eÉàÿGq äɶMÓŸG ❖ ❖ Concluding remarks 146

Chapter 5: Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J :¢ùeÉÿG π°üØdG ❖ Introduction 149 áeó≤ŸG ❖ ❖ Payment and settlement infrastructure 151 äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶæd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ❖ ❖ Governance infrastructure 160 áªcƒë∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ❖ ❖ Liquidity infrastructure 163 ádƒ«°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ❖ ❖ Regulatory infrastructure 169 ᫪«¶æàdG á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ❖ ❖ Concluding remarks 175 á«eÉàÿG äɶMÓŸG ❖ Box ItemsPage ôWôWC’GC’G

Box 1-1 Cost income ratios 35 πNódG ¤EGEG áØáØ∏μàdG Ö°ùf 1-1 QÉWE’GE’G

Box 1-21-2 Some common Sukuk structures 37 á©FÉ°ûdG ∑ƒμ°üdG πcÉ«g ¢†©H 2-1 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO ‘ »eÓ°SE’G»eÓ°SE’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG äÉgÉŒG 3-1 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G Box 1-3 Islamic banking trends in GCC in 201038 ∏ ∫ ≤ 2010 ΩÉY ∫ÓN »é«∏ÿG Box 1-4 Stock market concentration in GCC countries 40 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ º¡°Sº¡°SC’GC’G ¥Gƒ°S¥Gƒ°SCGCG ‘ õcÎdG áLQO 4-1 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 1-51-5 Labor force samplesample survey 44 á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG í°ùe 5-1 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 1-6 Foreign investment survey in Qatar (Final results) 45 ô£b ‘ á«ÑæLá«ÑæLC’GC’G äGQɪãà°S’ÉH ¢UÉÿG¢UÉÿG í°ùª∏d á«FÉ¡ædG èFÉàædG 6-1 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 1-7 Credit bureaus in GCC countries 47 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG õcGôe 7-1 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 2-1 Monetary policy, financial stability and sovereign 54 debt sustainability – Feedback loops ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ á°ùaÉæŸG 1-2 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 2-22-2 Financial dollarization 62 á«dÉŸG IôdhódG 2-2 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 2-3 Treasury bills as instruments of liquidity 66 management ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOIQGOE’E’ äGhOäGhOCÉcCÉc áæjõÿG ¿hP¿hPCG3-2CG3-2 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G Box 3-13-1 The response of the banking sector to øY IQOÉ°üdGh áæ ©ŸG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ©a OQ 1-3 QÉWE’GQÉWE’G 76 ∏ ≈∏ ≤ π policy announcement …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Box 3-2 The structure of Islamic banking77 »eÓ°S»eÓ°SE’GE’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG πμ«g 2-3 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 3-33-3 Performance of Islamic banks, 2009-1178 2011 – 2009 á«eÓ°Sá«eÓ°SE’GE’G ∑ƒæÑdG AGOAGOCGCG 3-3 QÉWQÉWE’GE’G

Box 3-4 GCCGCC banking sector - Dependence on Y OɪàY’G - »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG 4-3 QÉWE’G 81 ≈∏ ∏ ∏ ∫ ≤ foreign liabilities á«ÑæLC’G äÉeGõàd’G Box 3-5 Bank lending survey 83 ‘ô°üŸG ¢VGôbE’G í°ùe 5-3 QÉWE’G

Box 3-6 Real estate price index 85 äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG ô°TDƒe 6-3 QÉWE’G

Box 3-7 Credit boom 87 ¿ÉªàF’G IôØW 7-3 QÉWE’G

Box 3-8 Possible repercussions of the Eurozone crisis 91 on domestic banks á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y hQƒ«dG á≤£æe áeRCÓd á∏ªàëŸG äÉ«YGóàdG 8-3 QÉWE’G

Box 3-9 Cost efficiency of GCC banks 94 á«é«∏ÿG ∑ƒæÑdÉH ∞«dÉμàdG IAÉØc 9-3 QÉWE’G 3 RÉH äÉÑ £àe «Ñ£àd ájô£ dG ƒæÑdG OGó©à°SG ióe 10-3 QÉWE’G Box 3-10 Basel III : Preparedness of Qatari banks 98 ∫ ∏ ≥ ≤ ∑

Box 3-11 Loan loss provisioning in GCC countries 100 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üfl 11-3 QÉWE’G á¡LGƒŸ ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »WÉ«àMG ôaƒj …òdG ‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG 12-3 QÉWE’G Box 3-12 Countercyclical capital buffer add-on 102 ∫ √ ájQhódG äÉÑ∏≤àdG BoxACRONYMS 3-13 Risk perception survey 103 ôWÉîŸG ∑GQOEG äGQÉ°üàN’Gí°ùe 13-3 QÉWE’G

BoxAE 3-14 Advanced Analysis of Economycredit quality in the banking system 105NFSR Net Stable‘ô°üŸG Funding ΩɶædG Ratio ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL π«∏– 14-3 QÉWE’G ATM Automated Teller Machine NI Net Income Box 3-15 Credit risk stress test 107 ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ≈∏Y §¨°†dG QÉÑàNG 15-3 QÉWE’G BhD Bahrini Dinar NII Net Interest Income Box 3-16 Stressing to breaking point 107 ∫OÉ©àdG á£≤f óæY §¨°†dG 16-3 QÉWE’G BoD Board of Directors NIM Net Interest Margin Box 3-17 Net stable funding ratio 108 ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf :17-3 QÉWE’G Box 3-18 New metrics for measuring banking 110 sector liquidity ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¢SÉ«≤d IójóL ¢ù«jÉ≤e :18-3 QÉWE’G Box 3-19 Risk of roll-over and premature withdrawal- Y áÑJΟG QÉKB’G – ôq ÑŸG Öë°ùdGh øjódG ójóŒ ôWÉfl :19-3 QÉWE’G 114 ≈∏ μ Implications for bank liquidity á«aô°üŸG ádƒ«°ùdG Box 3-20 Network topology of domestic 118 inter-bank exposures á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH äÉWÉÑJQ’G áμÑ°T Ö«côJ :20-3 QÉWE’G

Box 4-1 Affordable housing in GCC countries 127 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G :1-4 QÉWE’G

Box 4-2 Profile of GCC insurance sector 135 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b øY áëŸ :2-4 QÉWE’G

Box 4-3 Corporate sector stress test 140 äÉcô°ûdG ´É£b ≈∏Y §¨°†dG QÉÑàNG :3-4 QÉWE’G

Box 5-1 Legal and regulatory framework 149 governing payments system äÉYƒaóŸG º¶æH ¢UÉÿG »ª«¶æàdGh ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G 1-5 QÉWE’G Box 5-2 Principles for financial market 150 infrastructure á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ÇOÉÑŸG 2-5 QÉWE’G Box 5-3 New initiatives in the P&S system ɶæd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG áãjó G äGQOÉÑŸG :3-5 QÉWE’G 152 Ω ◊ infrastructure äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Box 5-4 Response of the banking sector to the 165 QMR policy change regarding QMR deposits ™FGOƒH á°UÉÿG á°SÉ«°ùdG Ò«¨àd ´É£≤dG áHÉéà°SG :4-5 QÉWE’G

Box 5-5 Yield curve - based on T-bills yield 167 áfGõÿG ¿hPCG óFÉY EG ¤EG kGOÉæà°SG – óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe :5-5 QÉWE’G

Box 5-6 Major regulatory developments during 2011 171 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN á«°ù«FôdG ᫪«¶æàdG äGQƒ£àdG :6-5 QÉWE’G ACRONYMS äGQÉ°üàN’G

AE Advanced Economy NFSR Net Stable Funding Ratio

ATM Automated Teller Machine NI Net Income

BhD Bahrini Dinar NII Net Interest Income

BoD Board of Directors NIM Net Interest Margin

BoP Balance of Payments NOI Net Operating Income

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China NPL Non Performing Loan

BSI Banking Stability Index O/D Others/ Deposit

C/D Currency/Deposit OCC Office of the Comptroller of Currency

CD Certificates of Deposit OMO Open Market Operation

CDS Credit Default Swap P&S Payments and Settlement

CIR Cost Income Ratio POS Point of Sale

CPI Consumer Price Index PPI Producers Price Index

CPMA Consumer Protection and Markets Authority PPP Public Private Partnership

CRAR Capital Adequacy Ratio PRA Prudential Regulation Authority

DFM Dubai Financial Market QCB Qatar Central Bank

DFSA Dubai Financial Services Authority QCBDR Qatar Central Bank Deposit Rate

DIFC Dubai International Financial Centre QCBLR Qatar Central Bank Lending Rate

ECB European Central Bank QCBRR Qatar Central Bank Repo Rate

ECC Electronic Cheque Clearing QDB Qatar Development Bank

EIA Energy Information Administration QE Qatar Exchange

EME Emerging Market Economy QE2 Quantitative Easing

EU European Union QFC Qatar Financial Centre

FCD/QM Foreign Currency Deposits/ Quasi Money QFCRA Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority

FIFA Federation of International Football Association QFMA Qatar Financial Markets Authority

FSI Financial Soundness Indicator QMR Qatar Money Rate

FVR Funding Volatility Ratio QPS Qatar Payment System

G-20 Group of Twenty QR Qatari Riyal

GBP Great Britain Pound QSA Qatar Statistics Authority

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council RMB Chinese Renminbi

GDP Gross Domestic Product RoAA Return on Average Asset

GI Gross Income RoE Return on Equity GSDP General Secretariat for Development Planning ROTC Return on Tier-I capital

HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices RTGS Real Time Gross Settlement

HHR Hui Heubel Ratio RWA Risk Weighted Asset

IAS International Accounting Standards S&P Standard and Poor’s

IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

IILM International Islamic Liquidity Management SD Standard Deviation

IMF International Monetary Fund SIPS Systemically Important Payment System

IPO Initial Public Offering SME Small and Medium Enterprise

LC Letter of Credit SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

LCR Liquidity Coverage Ratio TA Total Asset

LDR Loan to Deposit Ratio TASI Tadawul All-Share Index

LG Letter of Guarantee TD/QM Time Deposits/ Quasi Money

LIBOR London Inter-bank Offered Rate TFP Total Factor Productivity

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas TR/D Total Reserve/Deposit

MBT Ministry of Business and Trade UAE United Arab Emirates

MENA Middle East and North Africa US United States

MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International USD US Dollar

MSM Muscat Securities Market WAM Weighted Average Maturity

NAPS National ATM and Point of Sale WAROI Weighted Average Rate of Interest

NDA Net Domestic Asset WEO World Economic Outlook

NDS National Development Strategy WTI West Texas Intermediate

NFA Net Foreign Asset WB World Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY …ò«ØæàdG ¢üî∏ŸG The economic expansion of Qatar continued unabated ≈∏Y ,´É£≤fG ¿hO 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ¬©°SƒJ …ô£≤dG OÉ°üàb’G π°UGh in 2011, notwithstanding the uncertainties in the áªFÉ≤dG äÉjóëàdGh áeó≤àŸG ∫hódG É¡Jó¡°T »àdG äÉÑ∏≤àdG øe ºZôdG developed world and the challenges in several MENA õFÉcQ â X óbh .É« jôaCG ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG hO øe ójó©dG ‘ countries. The macroeconomic fundamentals remain ∏ ≤ ∫ ∫ robust, although growth is expected to moderate in ΩÉY ∫ƒ∏ëH ádóà©e äÉjƒà°ùà ƒªædG äÉ©bƒJ ºZQ ájƒb »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G 2012, owing to the self-imposed moratorium on new §ØædG ´É£b ‘ Iójó÷G ™jQÉ°ûª∏d …QÉ«àN’G ∞bƒ∏d Gô¶fk ∂dPh ,2012 hydrocarbon projects. The non-hydrocarbon sector ™e É«°TÉ“k IójGõàe ᫪gCG »£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG Ö°ùàcG ɪc .RɨdGh is increasingly assuming prominence, in line with the . jƒ£dG ióŸG Y á«æWƒdG ᫪æàdG á«é«JGΰSEG long-term development strategy of the country. π ≈∏

With banks being the mainstay of financial äÉÄ«¡dG πª©J ,á«dÉŸG áWÉ°Sƒ∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G Iõ«côdG πμ°ûJ ∑ƒæÑdG ¿CG å«Mh intermediation, the authorities are keeping a close π¶J ¿CG ¿Éª°V πLCG øe Öãc øY áÄ°TÉædG äGQƒ£àdG áÑbGôe ≈∏Y á«æ©ŸG watch on the evolving developments so as to ensure k that they remain robust, profitable and liquid, especially É¡«æ«Y Ö°üf á©°VGh ,ádƒ«°ùdGh á«ëHôdGh Iƒ≤dÉH ᪰ùàe äGQƒ£àdG √òg keeping in view the disconcerting developments äGQÉÑàNG âfÉc óbh .áeó≤àŸG ∫hódG Égó¡°ûJ »àdG áHô£°†ŸG äGQƒ£àdG in the developed world. The stress tests on banks ôWÉflh ádƒ«°ùdGh ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉîà ≥∏©àj ɪ«a ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y §¨°†dG regarding credit, liquidity and market risks testify to ɪc .É¡°SÉ«b ” »àdG äÉeó°üdG √ÉŒ ΩɶædG áfhôe ≈∏Y Ó«dOk ¥ƒ°ùdG the resiliency of the system to these measured shocks. Attempts are also underway to deepen and broad- ∫ƒ°üë∏d É¡bÉ£f ™«°SƒJh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ≥ªY IOÉjõd ä’hÉëŸG ôªà°ùJ base the financial markets so as to engender a more .ÉYƒæJk ÌcCG ‹Ée ´É£b ≈∏Y diversified financial sector.

Despite the heightened pace of economic activity in ƒªædG ¿CG ’EG ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG IÒJh óYÉ°üJ ºZQ 2011, monetary growth decelerated in the wake of »àdGh á©ÑàŸG áeÉ©dG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ÒHGóJ ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ É©LGôJk ó¡°T …ó≤ædG several policy measures which considerably reduced the risks of speculative capital in the economy. ó≤a ∂dP ™eh ,ádhódG ‘ ÜQÉ°†ŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ôWÉfl π«∏≤J ¤EG äOCG Nevertheless, proactive liquidity management by ≈∏Y …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe ádƒ«°ù∏d á«bÉÑà°S’G IQGOE’G â∏ªY the QCB ensured stable liquidity conditions without óbh .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ≈∏Y §¨°†dG ¿hO ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°VhCG QGô≤à°SG ¿Éª°V pressure on interest rates. Benign inflation situation ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ù∏d áfhôŸG øe ójõŸG ádóà©ŸG ºî°†àdG äÉjƒà°ùe âMÉJCG provided greater leeway to monetary policy to signal a soft interest rate regime which provided further IQƒ°üH ƒªædGh Qɪãà°S’G õ«Ø– ‘ Iô°ù«ŸG IóFÉØdG Ωɶf ᫪gCG RGôHE’ impetus to investment and growth. Going forward, á«LÉàfEG ábÉW OƒLh QGôªà°SG …ODƒj ¿CG πÑ≤à°ùŸG ‘ íLôŸG øeh .ÈcCG the persistence of excess capacity in the domestic ΩÉ©dG ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G ¤EG »∏ëŸG ¿Éμ°SE’G ¥ƒ°S ‘ á°†FÉa housing market is likely to keep overall inflation at a .Iô≤à°ùe äÉjƒà°ùe ‘ comfortable level.

The non-banking sector is small in both size and ᫪gC’Gh ºé◊G å«M øe É©°VGƒàek ‘ô°üŸG ÒZ ´É£≤dG •É°ûf Èà©j systemic importance. The finance houses are being ®ÉØ◊G ≈∏Y É¡JQób å«M øe Éjó–k πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T ¬LGƒJh .á«eɶædG challenged to keep their delinquent loans in check, ¬LGƒJ ÚM ‘ ,Iô£«°ùdG â– OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ∫ó©e ≈∏Y while investment companies face the risks of limited k diversification. The insurance industry remains CGõ› ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b πX ɪc .OhóëŸG ´ƒæàdG ôWÉfl Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T fragmented with low penetration, even though their ó«÷G iƒà°ùŸG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ¬∏¨∏¨J ∫ó©e ¢VÉØîfG ÖfÉL ¤EG financial soundness indicators reveal a healthy picture. äÉcô°ûdG ´É£b ó¡°Th ,´É£≤∏d á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe ¬Jô¡XCG …òdG The corporate sector appears to be in a recovery mode, following from the after-effects of the crisis. For ¥ƒ°S â¶aÉM óbh .áeRC’G ≈∏Y áÑJΟG QÉKB’G ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ¢TÉ©àfG á∏Môe the second year in a row, the equity market remains á≤£æe ‘ AGOCG iƒà°ùe π°†aCG ≈∏Y ‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y á«fÉãdG áæ°ù∏d º¡°SC’G among the best-performing in the MENA region, ±hÉîŸG ÒKCÉJ QGôªà°SG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG although overall, the global and regional economic .¥ƒ°ùdG ≈∏Y ᫪«∏bE’Gh á«ŸÉ©dG ájOÉ°üàb’G concerns continue to weigh on the market.

The financial infrastructure is being strengthened to ¥ƒ°ùdG OÉ°üàbG äÉjó– á¡LGƒŸ á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG õjõ©J ºàj meet the challenges of a modern market economy. äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCG Ú°ù– ‘ QGôªà°S’G ÖfÉL ¤EG ,áãjó◊G The payments and settlement systems are being continuously improved, the governance mechanisms á«æÑdG ºYOh õjõ©J ºàj âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘h ,áªcƒ◊G äÉ«dBG åjó–h are being modernized, while the liquidity and regulatory äÉ°SQɪŸG π°†aC’ Ék ≤ah ᫪«¶æàdG á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdGh ádƒ«°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G infrastructures are nurtured and strengthened in line .áªFÉ≤dG with extant best practices.

19 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J

اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ّاول CHAPTER ONE

ﺗﻄﻮرات اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد ّاﻟﻜﻠﻲ MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

INTRODUCTION áeóq ≤ŸG The World Economic Outlook released in April 2012 2012 πjôHCG ‘ ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U øY QOÉ°üdG …QhódG ôjô≤àdG ™bƒJ projected global GDP growth at an annualized rate ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒªæj ¿CG zá«ŸÉ©dG ájOÉ°üàb’G äÉ©bƒàdG{ ¿Gƒæ©H of 3.5% for 2012 and a higher 4.1% for 2013. These ^ ^ numbers are higher than those provided in the January ‘ %4 1 ƒëf ¤EG ™ØJôj ɪc %3 5 …ƒæ°S ∫ó©Ã 2012 ΩÉY ‘ »ŸÉ©dG 2012 projections. For 2012, the annualized growth in ‘ QOÉ°üdG ôjô≤àdG ‘ äOQh »àdG äÉ©bƒàdG ¥ƒØJ ΩÉbQC’G √ògh .2013 ΩÉY the Advanced Economies (AEs) has been increased ™bƒàŸG …ƒæ°ùdG ƒªædG ∫ó©e ™aQ ójó÷G ôjô≤àdG øª°†J óbh .2012 ôjÉæj marginally to 1.4% from 1.2% earlier, whereas ‘ ,%1^4 ¤EG %1^2 øe É«°ûeÉgk 2012 ΩÉY ‘ áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ emerging and developing economies (EMEs/DEs) are k expected to grow at a much higher annualized rate ∫ó©Ã Gƒ‰ á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G ≥≤– ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ¬fCG ÚM of 5.7%. Growth in the US is expected to hold steady äÉj’ƒdG ‘ ƒªædG π¶j ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øeh .%5^7 ¤EG π°üj ÒãμH ≈∏YCG …ƒæ°S at 2.1%, higher than the 2011 numbers, whereas ¬fCG ÚM ‘ ,2011 ∫ó©e øe ≈∏YCG …CG ,%2^1 óæY ÉàHÉKk á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG growth in Japan is expected to rebound to 2% in øeh .2012 ΩÉY ‘ %2 ¤EG π°ü«d ¿ÉHÉ«dG ‘ ƒªædG ¢û©àæj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe 2012. Among emerging and developing economies, except for India, growth in the BRICS (acronym for ƒªædG ∫ó©e ™ØJQG ,óæ¡dG GóY ɪ«a ,á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G ÚH Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has been ¤hC’G ±hô◊G øe ≥à°ûe QÉ°üàNG »gh) "BRICS" ∫hO ‘ ™bƒàŸG scaled up from the previous projections, reflecting a øY (É«≤jôaCG ܃æLh Ú°üdGh ,óæ¡dGh ,É«°ShQh ,πjRGÈdG :á«dÉàdG ∫hó∏d combination of strong fundamentals and structural äÉ°SÉ«°ùdGh ájƒ≤dG ¢ù°SC’G øe áYƒª› ¢ùμ©j ɇ ,á≤HÉ°ùdG äÉ©bƒàdG policies. Growth in the Middle East and North Africa q (MENA) region is expected to remain subdued, ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øªa ,É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ ÉeCG .á«∏μ«¡dG reflecting the ripple effects as many of the economies øe ójó©dG Ò«¨J ≈∏Y áÑJΟG QÉKB’G ¢ùμ©j ɇ ,’óà©ek ƒªædG ∫ó©e π¶j reorient their economic policies in the wake of the .»Hô©dG ™«HôdG ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ájOÉ°üàb’G É¡JÉ°SÉ«°S ∫hódG Arab spring.

Recently released data (“second estimates”) by á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒ∏d »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ≠∏H the Bureau of Economic Analysis placed US real äÉfÉ«H Ö°ùM ∂dPh ,2011 ΩÉY øe ™HGôdG ™HôdG ∫ÓN %3^0 GDP growth at 3.0% in 2011:q4, reflecting positive ¢ù ©jh ,…OÉ°üàb’G « ëàdG Öà e øY IQOÉ°üdG zá«fÉãdG äGôjó àdG{ contributions from private inventory investments, μ π ∏ μ ≤ personal consumption expenditures, exports and non- ,¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ‘ ¿hõîŸG Qɪãà°SG øe πμd á«HÉéjE’G äɪgÉ°ùŸG ∂dP residential fixed investments that were partly offset áàHÉãdG äGQɪãà°S’Gh ,äGQOÉ°üdGh ,á«°üî°ûdG á«cÓ¡à°S’G äÉ≤ØædGh by negative contributions from federal (as also, state ¥ÉØfEÓd á«Ñ∏°ùdG äɪgÉ°ùŸG É«FõLk É¡∏HÉb »àdGh »æμ°ùdG ÒZ ´É£≤∏d and local) government spending. The consumer price ≠∏H óbh .(áj’h πc ‘h »∏ëŸG ¥ÉØfE’G ∂dòch) ‹GQó«ØdG »eƒμ◊G index (CPI) for All Urban consumers stood at 3.0% in ájô°† G WÉæŸG ‘ Ú ¡à°ùŸG ™«ª÷ (CPI) ¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SCG ô°TDƒe December 2011 (Chart 1-1). ◊ ≥ μ∏ ∂∏ .(1-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ %3^0 According to the second estimates released by OÉ–Ód »FÉ°üME’G ÖàμŸG ÉgQó°UCG »àdG äGôjó≤àdG çóMCG äô¡XCG Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e ¿CG (Eurostat) »HhQhC’G real GDP growth in the Euro Area was 1.4% in 2011 ^ ^ as compared to 1.9% in 2010. Driven by continuing ΩÉY ‘ %1 9 ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %1 4 ≠∏H hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ weaknesses in the banking sector and fiscal áeGóà°S’G πFÉ°ùeh ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∞©°V QGôªà°SG ¤EG Gô¶fhk .2010 sustainability issues, sovereign spreads have widened 샰VƒH ájOÉ«°ùdG øjódG äGóæ°S ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ¢ûeGƒg ™°ùàJ ⁄ ,á«dÉŸG sharply over the past year, not only in the troubled ‘ ɉEGh ,Ö°ùëa áHô£°†ŸG ∫hódG §«fi ‘ »°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN peripheral countries, but also in the core economies. k In its latest Financial Stability Review released in …òdG ÒNC’G ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ‘h .É°†jCG á«°ù«FôdG äGOÉ°üàb’G December 2011, the European Central Bank (ECB) ôWÉfl á©HQCG »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG OóM ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ Qó°U identified four key risks to stability in the Euro area: π©ØdG OhOQ IôFGO :»gh ,hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G Oó¡J á«°ù«FQ negative feedback loop between public finances, ,…OÉ°üàb’G ƒªædGh ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dGh áeÉ©dG á«dÉŸG ´É°VhCG ÚH á«Ñ∏°ùdG financial sector and economic growth; funding problems; weakening macroeconomic activity and »∏μdG ó«©°üdG ≈∏Y …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ∞©°Vh ,πjƒªàdG äÓμ°ûeh credit risks for banks, in turn reducing the availability øe ó◊G ¤EG ∂dòd É©ÑJk …ODƒ«°S …òdGh ,∑ƒæÑdG iód ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉflh of credit; and finally, risks of a slowdown owing to OÉ°üàb’G π∏N áé«àf …OÉ°üàb’G DƒWÉÑàdG ôWÉfl GÒNk CGh ,¿ÉªàF’G ôaƒJ global imbalances. The total capital shortfall for Euro 113^2 hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ∑ƒæH ∫Ée ¢SCGQ ‘ õé©dG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh .»ŸÉ©dG Area banks has been placed at Euro 113.2 billion, PIGS of which the share of the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, ∫ɨJÈdG) »gh É¡«a `dG ∫hO á°üM äRhÉŒ å«M ,hQƒj QÉ«∏e Greece and Spain is over 50% (Euro 63.1 billion). The Ò°ûJh .(hQƒj QÉ«∏e 63^1) %50 áÑ°ùf (É«fÉÑ°SCGh ¿Éfƒ«dGh GóædôjGh estimated median forecast for Euro Area GDP growth ‘ hQƒ«dG á≤£æŸ ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉæ∏d äÉ©bƒàdG §°Sƒàe äGôjó≤J in 2012, based on the forecasted numbers of different ób É¡fCG ¤EG ,äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG ∞∏àfl äÉ©bƒJ ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk ∂dPh ,2012 ΩÉY

23 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J agencies, works out to be 0.4%.1 What is however ΩÉ©d »≤«≤◊G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e ¿EÉa ó«cCÉàdÉHh 1.%0^4 ƒëf ≠∏ÑJ clear that real GDP growth for 2012 would be πc ¬H âeÉb Ée øe óªà°ùe ∂dP ≈∏Y π«dódGh É°†Øîæek ¿ƒμj ±ƒ°S 2012 definitely lower, as evidenced from the downward Ék ≤ah ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e ≠∏H óbh .¢†ØÿÉH ƒªædG ä’ó©Ÿ πjó©J øe ä’ÉcƒdG revisions of growth rates by all the agencies. Inflation, HICP as measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %2^7 ( ) ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ óMƒŸG »°SÉ«≤dG ºbô∏d Prices (HICP) was 2.7% in 2011 as compared to 1.6% .2010 ΩÉY ‘ %1^6 ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH in the previous year.

Chart 1-1: Growth and inflation in major ºgCG ‘ ºî°†àdGh ƒªædG ä’ó©e :1-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ global regions ⁄É©dG ∫ƒM ≥WÉæŸG

6 3.53.5 3.03.0 4 2.52.5 2.02.0 2 1.51.5 0 1.01.0 Percent 2009:12009:1 2 2009:4009:4 2 2010:1010:1 2 2010:4010:4 2 2011:1011:1 2 2011:4011:4 0.50.5 Percent -2 0.00.0 -0.5-0 -4 -1.0-1 -6 -1.5-1

US_growth Euro Area_growth Japan_growth

US_infln (right scale) Euro Area_infln (right scale) Japan_infln (right scale)

Economic activity in Japan appears to have slowed, áLhOõŸG áHô°†dG ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ Gk DƒWÉÑJ ¿ÉHÉ«dG ‘ …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ô¡XCG following the double whammy of the Great East ΩÉY øe ∫hC’G ™HôdG ∫ÓN »eÉfƒ°ùàdG áKQÉch ÒÑμdG ¿ÉHÉ«dG ¥ô°T ∫Gõdõd Japan earthquake and the subsequent Tsunami in %0^6 áÑ°ùæH OÉ°üàb’G ¢Tɪ fG ᫪°SôdG ôjQÉ àdG äô¡XCG ɪc .2011 the first quarter of 2011. According to official reports, μ ≤ the economy shrank 0.6% during 2011:q4 owing to ´ÉØJQGh »LQÉÿG Ö∏£dG ∞©°V áé«àf 2011 ΩÉY øe ™HGôdG ™HôdG ∫ÓN weakening external demand, a strong currency and øeh .ófÓjÉJ ‘ äÉfÉ°†«ØdÉH á£ÑJôŸG ¢Vô©dG ä’ÓàNGh ±ô°üdG ô©°S supply disruptions related to the floods in Thailand. »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¢ûªμæj ¿CG …ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ™bƒàŸG On an annualized basis, real GDP is expected to ≠∏H …òdGh 2010 ΩÉY ‘ ƒªædG ∫ó©Ã áfQÉk ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %0^9 ƒëæH decline by 0.9% in 2011, compared to a growth of ÉàHÉKk íÑ°üj å«ëH ,ájƒb èFÉàf ƒªædG ≥≤ëj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ¬fCG ɪc .%4^4 4.4% in 2010. Growth is expected to be buoyant, äÉahô°üŸG ¤EG ÒÑc óM ¤EG dP ™Lôjh ,2012 ÉY ‘ %1^7 óæY being pegged at 1.7% in 2012, largely as a result ∂ Ω of reconstruction-related expenditures. In its latest ‘ ÒNC’G ¬YɪàLG ‘ ¿ÉHÉ«dG ∂æH Qôbq ɪc .ó««°ûàdG IOÉYEÉH á£ÑJôŸG meeting in February 2012, the Bank of Japan decided ∂dòc Qôq ≤Jhn ,%0^1 - 0 ¥É£f ‘ IóFÉØdG ô©°ùH ®ÉØàM’G 2012 ôjGÈa to maintain its policy rate at around 0-0.1%. It also É«dÉMk ” å«M ,QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°SG ≥«≤ëàd πLC’G §°Sƒàe ±óg ™°Vh decided to introduce a medium-term goal for price .∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SCG ô°TDƒe ‘ …ƒæ°ùdG Ò¨àdG ∫ó©Ÿ áÑ°ùædÉH %1 ójó– stability, which is presently set at 1% in terms of the annual change in the CPI.

Two major developments in the global economy during »ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G ɪgó¡°T Ú«°ù«FQ øjQƒ£J ºgCG ¿CG ôcòdÉH ôjó÷Gh 2011 deserve a mention. First, in recognition of fiscal ∞«æ°üJ RQƒH ófCG OQófÉà°S ádÉch ¢†«ØîJq :∫hC’G 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN concerns, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) downgraded US AAA øe IóMGh áLQO QGó≤à …OÉ«°ùdG á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG sovereign credit rating by one notch from AAA to AA+ k AA (with a negative outlook). Likewise, confidence in the ±hÉîª∏d É¡æe ÉcGQOEG ∂dPh ,(á«Ñ∏°S äÉ©bƒJ πX ‘) + íÑ°ü«d fiscal sustainability of Japan also eroded, with S&P á«dÉŸG áeGóà°S’G ‘ á≤ãdG äÉjƒà°ùe AGƒ°S óM ≈∏Y â©LGôJ É«fÉKhk .á«dÉŸG lowering its sovereign credit rating from AA- (stable) É¡Ø«æ°üJ (S&P) RQƒH ófCG OQófÉà°S ádÉch â°†ØNq å«M ,¿ÉHÉ«dÉH to AA- (negative) in January (with a stable outlook), ‘) ôjÉæj ‘ (AA-)negative ¤EG (AA- )stable øe …OÉ«°ùdG citing a weak growth outlook that puts pressures √QhóH …òdGh ,ƒªædG ∞©°†H äÉ©bƒJ ¤EG IÒ°ûe (Iô≤à°ùe äÉ©bƒJ πX on the sustainability of government finances. This is Y òg Èà©Jh .á«eƒ G á«dÉŸG áeGóà°S’G Y ÉWƒ¨°Vk ¢VôØj presumably the first time that two major developed ≈∏ √ μ◊ ≈∏ nations have been downgraded in a single year within øe ÚàdhO ºgCG ∞«æ°üJ ¢†ØN É¡«a ºàj »àdG ¤hC’G IôŸG »g íLQC’G a span of few months. In early 2012, the ratings of as ΩÉY ™∏£e ‘h .ô¡°TCG á©°†H ¿ƒ°†Z ‘h IóMGh áæ°S ∫ÓN áeó≤àŸG ∫hódG

1 1 European Central Bank (2011). Financial Stability Review (December), Table 1.1. For IMF, ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U Ωóîà°SG .(1 – 1) ∫hóL .(Ȫ°ùjO) ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J .(2011) »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG :Qó°üŸG the updated numbers for January 2012 have been employed. The ECB forecast is taken to .¥É£ædG Gòg ‘ §°SƒdG ᣠf »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG æÑdG äÉ©bƒJ Èà©Jh .2012 ôjÉæj ô¡°ûd áKóëŸGq ÉbQC’G ‹hódG be the mid-point of the range. ≤ ∂ Ω

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 24 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J many as nine Eurozone countries were lowered by one hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ∫hO øe ∫hO ™°ùJ ¤EG π°üj Ée ∞«æ°üJ ¢†ØN ” ,2012 to two notches, leaving Germany as the only economy »àdG Ió«MƒdG ádhódG »g É«fÉŸCG âëÑ°UCG å«M ,ÚàLQO hCG áLQO QGó à with a AAA rating and stable outlook. ≤ .á«∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG äÉ©bƒàdG QGô≤à°SG πX ‘ AAA ∞«æ°üJ ≈∏Y â∏°üM Globally, the banking system once again appears to Ò°ûJh .AÉæH IOÉYEG á∏Môà »ŸÉ©dG ó«©°üdG ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ôÁ be in rebuilding mode. Data reported by The Banker ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ IQOÉ°üdG "The Banker" á∏› É¡à°VôY »àdG äÉfÉ«ÑdG (2011) indicates that, as compared to a drop in 2009, É¡fCG ’EG ,2009 ΩÉY ±QÉ°üŸG äGOƒLƒe ™LGôJ øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ¬fCG ¤EG bank assets increased by around 6% to reach USD k 101.6 trillion in 2010. Pre-tax profits also witnessed a Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏jôJ 101^6 ¤EG π°üàd 2010 ΩÉY ‘ %6 ƒëæH Gƒ‰ â≤≤M jump, increasing by 77% to reach USD 5434 billion in áÑ°ùæH É¡YÉØJQÉH IõØb ÖFGô°†dG º°üN πÑb ìÉHQC’G äó¡°T ɪc .»μjôeCG 2011. .2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 5434 ¤EG π°üàd %77 ÉgQób

Developments in financial markets varied across ,ó≤ædG ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘h .∫hódG ÈY á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘ äGQƒ£àdG âJhÉØJ constituencies. In the money markets, the economy äGóæ°ùdG AGô°T äÉ«∏ªY ∫ÓN øe ¬°TÉ©àfG »μjôeC’G OÉ°üàb’G π°UGh of USA continued to be stimulated by the purchase ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S) á«°ù«FôdG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG Ò¨àJ ⁄h .á«eƒμ◊G of government bonds. The key interest rate (Federal ¢ù › øYCG ,…OÉ°üàb’G ƒªædG DƒWÉÑJ X ‘ ¬fCG å«M ,(á«dGQó«ØdG Funds Rate, FF) remained unchanged and as economic ∏ ∏ π growth slowed down, the Federal Reserve announced ∞°üàæe ≈àM á«°ù«FôdG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG Ò«¨J ΩóY ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G not to change the key policy rate until mid-2013 (later øeGõàdÉHh .(2014 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ¤EG Ék ≤M’ IÎØdG ójó“ ”) 2013 ΩÉY extended to late-2014). Concurrently, in support of ¢ù∏› CGóH ,á°†ØîæŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCÉH á°UÉÿG ¬à°SÉ«°ùd ɪYOhk ∂dP ™e its low interest policy, it launched Operation Twist É¡«∏Y ≥∏£j äGóæ°ùdG AGô°ûd á«dOÉÑJ IGOCG ΩGóîà°SG ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G (selling USD 400 billion of short-term treasuries in »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 400 ™«H ” å«M) (Operation Twist) í∏£°üe exchange for the same amount of longer-term bonds) äGóæ°ùdG øe ᫪μdG ¢ùØf πHÉ≤e πLC’G IÒ°üb áæjõÿG äGóæ°S øe to further stimulate the economy. On the other hand, ,ôNBG ó«©°U ≈∏Yh .…OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG õ«Ø– πLCG øe (πLC’G á∏jƒW in response to inflationary concerns, the European k Central Bank (ECB) raised its key policy rate (Marginal ô©°S »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ™aQ ,ºî°†àdÉH á≤∏©àŸG ±hÉîª∏d áHÉéà°SGh Lending Facility, MLF) by 25 basis points in April ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 25 ƒëæH (¢VGôbE’G äÓ«¡°ùJ ô©°S) »°ù«FôdG IóFÉØdG 2011. After a pause in June, the key policy rates were IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ™aQ ” ,2011 ƒ«fƒj ‘ äÉÑãdG øe IÎa ó©Hh .2011 πjôHCG again increased by 25 basis points in July 2011. In ºbÉØJ øe ó◊G πLCG øeh .ƒ«dƒj ô¡°T ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 25 ƒëæH á«°ù«FôdG order to arrest the worsening funding conditions, in íæŸ É›ÉfôHk Ȫ°ùjO ‘ »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG CÉ°ûfCG ,á«dÉŸG ´É°VhC’G December, the ECB instituted a program of advancing IOÉYEG äÉ«∏ªY ÖLƒÃh .Gô¡°Tk 36 É¡Jóe IóFÉØdG á°†Øîæe ¢Vhôb low-interest loans with a term of 36 months. Under its »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ¢VôbCG ,É¡H Ωƒ≤j »àdG πLC’G á∏jƒW πjƒªàdG LTRO, the ECB loaned €489 billion to 523 banks at an k interest rate of 1%. The extraordinary crisis measures ∞fCÉà°SGh .%1 ¤EG π°üJ IóFÉa áÑ°ùæH hQƒj QÉ«∏e 489 ≠∏Ñe ÉμæH 523 ƒëf to support banking sector liquidity continued with the ‘ ¬WÉ°ûf áeRCÓd á«FÉæãà°S’G ÒHGóàdG QÉWEG ‘ »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ECB announcing another round of low-cost funding – …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ΩÉb 2012 ôjGÈa ‘h ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ádƒ«°S ºYO π«Ñ°S LTRO2- in February 2012. Meanwhile, Bank of Japan ∂æH π°UGh ,¬°ùØf âbƒdG ‘h .áØ∏μàdG ¢†Øîæe πjƒ“ Ëó≤àH »HhQhC’G continued with its easy monetary, maintaining the key IóFÉØdG ô©°S ≈∏Y ɶaÉk fi ,Iô°ù«ŸGq ájó≤ædG ¬à°SÉ«°S …õcôŸG ¿ÉHÉ«dG policy rate (Uncollateralized Overnight Call Rate), at ¿hóH IóMGh á∏«∏d Ö∏£dG â– ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S) á«°ù«FôdG 0.0-0.1% range. At the same time, it decided to increase á°SÉ«°ùdG ´ÉªàLG ‘ Qôb ɪc ,%0^1 – 0^0 ÚH ìhGÎj ¥É£f ‘ (¿Éª°V the size of its asset purchase program by JPY 10 trillion - from JPY 55 trillion to JPY 65 trillion – in its monetary ∫ƒ°UC’G AGô°T èeÉfôH ºéM IOÉjR 2012 ôjGÈa ‘ √ó≤Y …òdG ájó≤ædG policy meeting in February 2012 (Chart 1-2). The interest 65 ¤EG ÊÉHÉj øj ¿ƒ«∏jôJ 55 øe) ÊÉHÉj øj ¿ƒ«∏jôJ 10 ƒëæH ¬jód rates of major central banks appear to have moved QÉ©°SCG ácôM âæeGõJ óbh .(2-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) (ÊÉHÉj øj ¿ƒ«∏jôJ in tandem, primarily after post-Lehmann period, as ‘ á°UÉN ,¢†©ÑdG É¡°†©H ™e iÈμdG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG iód IóFÉØdG evidenced from the positive (and statistically significant) ÖLƒŸG •ÉÑJQ’G øe ∂dP í°†àjh ,¿Éª«d ∂æH QÉ«¡fG âÑ≤YCG »àdG IÎØdG correlations among the policy rates (Table 1-1). .(1-1 ∫hóL) (É«FÉ°üMk EG ájƒæ©e ád’O äGP) IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ÚH Foreign exchange markets witnessed a depreciation of äÓª©dG πHÉ≤e hQƒ«dG ᪫b ¢VÉØîfG á«ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdG ¥Gƒ°SCG äó¡°T the Euro against other major currencies, caused mainly á≤£æe ‘ áeRC’G óYÉ°üJ ¤EG »°ù«FQ πμ°ûH ∂dP ™Lôjh ,iôNC’G á«°ù«FôdG by the intensification of the Eurozone crisis. The Euro .…ô°ùjƒ°ùdG ∂fôØdGh ÊÉHÉ«dG ÚdG πHÉ≤e hQƒ«dG ¢†ØîfG å«M ,hQƒ«dG declined against the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc. ô©°ùd fOC’G ó G â«ÑãJ …õcôŸG Gô°ùjƒ°S æH Qôb ,ȪàÑ°S ájGóH ‘h At the beginning of September, the Swiss central bank ≈ ◊ ∂ q decided to fix the minimum exchange rate between the ´É£b ºYO ±ó¡H 1^20 óæY …ô°ùjƒ°ùdG ∂fôØdGh hQƒ«dG ÚH ±ô°üdG Euro and the Franc at 1.20, in order to support the ex- ∫ÓN øe ô©°ùdG Gòg ≈∏Y ®ÉØë∏d √OGó©à°SG øY ø∏YCG ɪc ,ôjó°üàdG port sector and declared its willingness to protect this ᪫b â°†ØîfG óbh .á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©∏d IOhóëŸG ÒZ AGô°ûdG äÉ«∏ªY rate by unlimited foreign currency purchases. The Euro ,ô°û©dG áYƒª› ∫hO ÚH øe ¬fCG ÚM ‘ ,»μjôeC’G Q’hódG πHÉ≤e hQƒ«dG depreciated against the US Dollar. The Euro only ap- .ájójƒ°ùdG Éfhô dG HÉ e iƒ°S ÉYÉØJQGk hQƒ«dG ó¡°ûj ⁄ preciated against the Swedish krona, among the G-10 μ π ≤ currencies.

25 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Chart 1-2: Interest rates of major central banks iÈμdG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG iód IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG :2-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

Table 1-1: Correlation matrix of interest rates of iód IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG •ÉÑJQG :1-1∫hóL major central banks iÈμdG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG

2008:10 – 2011:12 2006:01 – 2008:09 2006:01 – 2011:12

BoJ ECB Fed BoJ ECB Fed BoJ ECB Fed

FED ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G ¢ù∏› 0.777 -0.554 0.747 ECB …õcôŸG »HhQhC’G ∂æÑdG 0.820 0.906 0.968 -0.480 0.869 0.454 BoJ …õcôŸG ¿ÉHÉ«dG ∂æH

All the correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01 level .0^01 iƒà°ùe óæY á«FÉ°üMEG ájƒæ©e ád’O äGP •ÉÑJQ’G äÓeÉ©e ™«ªL

As in the previous year, government bond markets ≈æëæe OGóàeG ≈∏Y á«eƒμ◊G äGóæ°ùdG ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ äGóFÉ©dG â©LGôJ were characterized by a drop in yields all along the in- ™LGôJ ∂dP ™ÑJ óbh .á«°VÉŸG áæ°ùdG ‘ ¬«∏Y ∫É◊G ¿Éc ɪc πNódG come curve. This followed a decline in economic activ- á« jôeC’Gh á«fÉŸC’G äGóæ°ùdG Y Ö£dG IOÉjRh …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ity and stronger demand for German and US bonds as μ ≈∏ ∏ the Eurozone crisis intensified (Chart 1-3). Demand for ™ØJQG óbh .(3-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ áeRC’G óYÉ°üJ ÖÑ°ùH US bonds increased, notwithstanding the major debate ∫ƒM ÒÑμdG ∫ó÷G øY ô¶ædG ±ô°üH á«μjôeC’G äGóæ°ùdG ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG over the future course of US fiscal policy and the rat- ™LGôJh πÑ≤à°ùŸG ‘ á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒ∏d á«dÉŸG á°SÉ«°ùdG QÉ°ùe ings downgrade by Standard and Poor’s in August. The â∏°UGh óbh .¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ∫ÓN RQƒH ófCG OQófÉà°S ádÉch äÉØ«æ°üJ problems in the PIGS continued to weigh on the Euro hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ≈∏Y ÉgÒKCÉJ PIGS `dG ∫hO É¡¡LGƒJ »àdG äÓμ°ûŸG Area as reflected in the widening dispersion of spreads »àdG äGóæ°ùdG ÚH ìÉHQC’G ¢ûeGƒg âà°ûJ ójGõJ ∫ÓN øe í°†àj ɪc between relatively safe-haven bonds (e.g., Germany) as k k k compared to bonds of troubled Eurozone economies. äGóæ°S ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH (á«fÉŸC’G äGóæ°ùdG πãe) É«Ñ°ùf ÉæeBG GPÓe Èà©J .áHô£°†ŸG hQƒ«dG á≤£æe äGOÉ°üàbG

Global stock markets entered 2011 with positive mo- ºYódG óYÉ°S å«M á«HÉéjEG Iƒ≤H 2011 ΩÉY á«ŸÉ©dG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG â∏NO mentum as pro-active government support in devel- OÉ°üàb’G ƒ‰ ºYO ‘ áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ »bÉÑà°S’G »eƒμ◊G oped economies helped buttress global growth, and ±hÉfl ¤EG Gô¶fhk .…ƒb ™°Vh ‘ ÉeƒªYk äÉcô°ûdG NO X ɪc ,»ŸÉ©dG corporate earnings generally remained robust. Driven π π primarily by sovereign debt concerns in the Eurozone, º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°SCG äô°ùN ,∫hC’G ΩÉ≤ŸG ‘ hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG global stock markets lost over USD 6 trillion in value, ∫ÓN ɪ«°S’ ,ɡફb øe »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏jôJ 6 øe ÌcCG á«ŸÉ©dG primarily in the second half of 2011. Markets also be- Ö∏≤à∏d á°VôY ÌcCG ¥Gƒ°SC’G âëÑ°UCG ɪc .2011 ΩÉY øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG came increasingly volatile (Chart 1-4). Over the course GóædôjGh ∫ɨJÈdGh ¿Éfƒ«dG â∏Ñb ,ΩÉ©dG QGóe ≈∏Yh .(4-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) of the year, Greece, Portugal and Ireland accepted äGAGôLEG äÉeƒμ◊G øe ójó©dG ¢Vôa ÖfÉL ¤EG ,‹ÉŸG PÉ≤fE’G äÉ«∏ªY bailouts and several governments imposed austerity ºéM ™aQ Y äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ƒ©fÉ°U aGh , É©dG ájÉ¡f ƒ ëHh .á«Ø°û J measures. Towards the end of the year, policymakers ≈∏ ≥ Ω ∫ ∏ ≤

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 26 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Chart 1-3: Yields on 10-year government bonds in 10 πLC’G á∏jƒW á«eƒμ◊G äGóæ°ùdG ≈∏Y äGóFÉ©dG :3-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ 2011 (monthly averages) (ájô¡°ûdG äÉ£°SƒàŸG) 2011 ΩÉY ‘ äGƒæ°S

35 44.0.0 30 33.5.5 25 33.0.0 22.5.5 20 22.0.0 15 Percent 11.5.5 Percent 10 11.0.0 5 00.5.5 0 0.00.0 Jan Febb Mar Apr May Jun Jull Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

US (right scale) Germany Portugal Ireland Greece Spain agreed to increase the size of the European Financial ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG ºYód ¢ü°üîŸG) »HhQhC’G ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G äÓ«¡°ùJ Stability Facility – intended to support the region’s fi- ‹ÉŸG ºYódG Ëó≤J ÖfÉL ¤EG ,hQƒj ¿ƒ«∏jôJ 1 ¤EG π°üàd (á≤£æª∏d nancial system – to 1 trillion Euro and provide financing Gòg ºgÉ°S óbh .á≤£æŸG ‘ •ƒ¨°†∏d Ú°Vô©àŸG Ú°Vô≤ª∏d ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQh and capital to stressed regional lenders. These policy ÓN ÒÑc óM ¤EG º¡°SC’G •É°ûf IOÉ©à°SG ‘ äÉ°SÉ«°ùdÉH Gõàd’G commitments helped stocks to rebound sharply in ∫ Ω the latter half of the year, aided by benign economic ≈∏Yh .á«JGƒŸG ájOÉ°üàb’G äÉfÉ«ÑdG É¡ªYóJ ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG data. However, for 2011 as a whole, global stocks, as »àdGh ,’ɪLk EG 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN á«ŸÉ©dG º¡°SC’G â©LGôJ ,∂dP øe ºZôdG measured by the MSCI All Country Index, declined as ,(MSCI) ⁄É©dG ∫hO ™«ª÷ »∏fÉà°S ¿ÉZQƒe ô°TDƒe ᣰSGƒH É¡°SÉ«b ” investors favored asset classes such as gold, reserve ,ÖgòdG :πãe ÉgÒZ ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°UC’G äÉÄa ¢†©H ¿hôªãà°ùŸG π°†aq å«M currencies and higher-quality fixed income securities. .âHÉãdG óFÉ©dG äGP IOƒ÷G á«dÉY á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’Gh ,á«WÉ«àM’G äÓª©dGh US stocks as a whole delivered the best performance AGOCG iƒà°ùe °†aCG ÉeƒªYk á« jôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG º¡°SCG äô¡XCG óbh among G-20 members, up 2% as compared to the UK π μ (-2.5%), Canada (-12.2%) and Japan (-14.2%), as mea- áÑ°ùæH AGOCG iƒà°ùe â≤≤M å«M ,øjô°û©dG áYƒª› ∫hO AÉ°†YCG ÚH sured by the MSCI country-specific indices. Meanwhile, ¿ÉHÉ«dGh ,(%12^2-) Góæch ,(%2^5-) IóëàŸG áμ∏ªŸÉH áfQÉk ≤e %2 the MSCI Emerging markets index returned -18.2% for ,ádhO πμd á°ü°üîŸG »∏fÉà°S ¿ÉZQƒe äGô°TDƒŸ Ék ≤ah ∂dPh (%14^2-) the year. Some of the steepest declines were witnessed ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN áÄ°TÉædG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd »∏fÉà°S ¿ÉZQƒe ô°TDƒe ≥≤M âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘h in economic powerhouses such as China and India: ájOÉ°üàb’G ãdG õcGôe äó¡°T ɪc .%18^2- QGó à ÖdÉ°S ƒ‰ ó©e the MSCI China index fell more than 18% for the year, π≤ ≤ ∫ whereas the MSCI Indian index lost more than a third »∏fÉà°S ¿ÉZQƒe ô°TDƒe §Ñg å«M ;IOÉM äÉ©LGôJ óæ¡dGh Ú°üdG πãe of its value. ó≤a ÚM ‘ ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %18 øY ójõj Éà ڰüdG ‘ º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SC’ .¬àª«b å∏K øe ÌcCG óæ¡dG ‘ º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SC’ »∏fÉà°S ¿ÉZQƒe ô°TDƒe

Chart 1-4: Performance of stock markets in äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG AGOCG :4-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ major economies á«°ù«FôdG

20.0 33.0 15.0 22.5 10.0 22.0 5.0 11.5 0.0

(percent) 11.0 -5.0 JanJan F Febeb M Marar AprApr M Mayay JunJun JulJul AugAug SepSep OctOct NovNov DecDec index (in logs) (in index -10.0 00.5

Monthly change in index change in Monthly -15.0 0.00 Standard deviation of monthly deviation monthly of Standard

SD (S&P) - right scale SD (FTSE) - right scale SD (Nikkei) -right scale Monthly change (%)-S&P Monthly change (%)-FTSE Monthly change (%)-Nikkei

27 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) have not been »àdG äÉjóëàdG øY iCÉæà áÄ°TÉædG ¥Gƒ°SC’G äGOÉ°üàbG ™«ªL øμJ ⁄ altogether immune to the headwinds emanating in the Éjƒbk πX ™°SƒàdG ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G É¡¡LGƒJ Advanced Economies, although the expansion remains ∫hO ‘ ôªà°ùe Oƒ©°U ‘ ƒªædG ∫ó©e πX óbh .á«°ù«FôdG ∫hódG ‘ É«Ñ°ùfk relatively robust in key countries. Growth in the BRICS "BRICS" remained bullish, with most of these countries ending ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH ∫hódG √òg º¶©e â≤≤M å«M , `dG the year with strong growth (Chart 1-5), although their ´ÉØJQG QGôªà°SG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y (5-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ájƒb ƒ‰ ä’ó©e policy rates remain elevated (Chart 1-6). The correlation ∫hó÷G ô¡XCGh .(6-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) É¡jód á«°ù«FôdG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG matrix of policy rates of the central banks of Advanced ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG iód ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG IóFÉa QÉ©°SCG •ÉÑJQÉH ¢UÉÿG Economies and BRICS appears to indicate positive and hPh ÉÑLƒek ÉWÉÑJQGk "BRICS" `dG ∫hOh áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ statistically significant correlation for the entire period IÎØdG ‹ÉªLE’ áÑ°ùædÉH á«FÉ°üME’G äÉfÉ«ÑdG Ö°ùM á«FÉ°üMEG ájƒæ©e (Panel C), although several of the correlations are negative and significant, primarily in the pre-Lehmann äÉWÉÑJQ’G √òg øe ójó©dG ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,(ê »YôØdG ∫hó÷G) period (Panel A). China appears to be a stand-out in the ∂æH QÉ«¡fG áeRCG â≤Ñ°S »àdG IÎØdG ∫ÓN IRQÉH á«Ñ∏°S èFÉàf äô¡XCG post-Lehmann period, in the sense that it policy rates, ∫ÓN ôjɨe ™°Vh ‘ Ú°üdG äóH óbh .(CG »YôØdG ∫hó÷G) ¿Éª«d unlike the other BRICS economies, are not in sync with IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG øμJ ⁄ å«M ,¿Éª«d ∂æH QÉ«¡fG áeRCG âÑ≤YCG »àdG IÎØdG those of the advanced economies (Panel B) (Table 1-2).2 ,áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G iód IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ácôM ™e áæeGõàe É¡jód As compared to the previous year, monetary policy no (Ü »YôØdG ∫hó÷G) "BRICS" `dG ∫hO äGOÉ°üàbG »bÉH ±ÓN ≈∏Y longer appears to be in tightening mode, with several 2 EMEs opting for a lowering them in several instances. ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG ó©J ⁄ ,≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH .(2-1 ∫hóL) While the downside risks to growth remain high owing ¤EG áÄ°TÉædG ¥Gƒ°SC’G äGOÉ°üàbG øe ójó©dG Aƒ÷ ™e ,ójó°ûàdG ™°Vh ‘ to geopolitical risks and weaker external demand, this á«Ñ∏°ùdG ôWÉîŸG ∫GõJ ’h .IójóY ∞bGƒe ‘ IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†«ØîJ could be offset by stronger domestic demand, fuelled á«°SÉ«°ùdG ´É°VhC’ÉH á£ÑJôŸG ôWÉîŸG ¤EG Gô¶fk á©ØJôe ƒªædÉH á£ÑJôŸG by accommodative policies (Table 1-3). ∫ÓN øe ¬æ«°ù– øμÁ …òdG ôeC’G ,»LQÉÿG Ö∏£dG ∞©°Vh á≤£æŸG ‘ .(3-1 ∫hóL) Ò°ù«àdG äÉ°SÉ«°S ºYO ÖfÉL ¤EG ,»∏ëŸG Ö∏£dG õjõ©J

`dG hO ‘ » « G ‹ÉªLE’G » ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ :5-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 1-5: Real GDP growth in the BRICS ∫ ≤ ≤◊ ∏ "BRICS"

15

10

5

0 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 : : : : : : : : : : : : 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5 0 2011:4 2 2011:3 2 2011:2 2 2011:1 2 2010:4 2 2010:3 2 2010:2 2 2010:1 2 2009:4 2 2009:3 2 2009:2 2 2009:12

-10 BrazilBrazil RussiaRussia SouthSouth AfricaAfrica IndiaIndia ChinaChina

Chart 1-6: Central bank policy rates in `dG ∫hO ‘ ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG iód IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG :6-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ the BRICS (%) (%) "BRICS"

2 2 The central bank policy rates are the following: Brazil = Selic Rate; Russia=Refinancing ,πjƒªàdG IOÉYEG ô©°S = É«°ShQ ,IóMGh á∏«∏d ¢VGôbE’G ô©°S ∫ó©e = πjRGÈdG :ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG iód IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG »∏j ɪ«a Rate; India=Repo Rate; China=One-year lending rate; South Africa=Repo rate. .AGô°ûdG IOÉYEG ô©°S = É«≤jôaCG ܃æL ,áæ°S IóŸ ¢VGôbE’G ô©°S = Ú°üdG ,AGô°ûdG IOÉYEG ô©°S = óæ¡dG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 28 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-2: Correlation matrix of central bank iód ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG IóFÉa QÉ©°SCÉH ¢UÉÿG •ÉÑJQ’G :2-1 ∫hóL policy rates - Advanced Economics and BRICS "BRICS" `dG ∫hOh áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG ܃æL ܃æL πjRGÈdG É«°ShQ óæ¡dG Ú°üdG É«≤jôaCG πjRGÈdG É«°ShQ óæ¡dG Ú°üdG É«≤jôaCG Brazil Russia India China South Brazil Russia India China South Africa Africa Panel A 2008:9 – 2006:1 :(CG) »YôØdG ∫hó÷G Panel B 2011:12 – 2008:10 :(Ü) »YôØdG ∫hó÷G

0.344 0.210 -0.666 -0.768 -0.815 0.451 0.273 0.297 0.597 »WÉ«àM’G ¢ù › Fed 0.192 (0.24) ∏ (0.05) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) ‹GQó«ØdG

-0.906 -0.861 0.898 0.900 0.922 0.740 0.585 0.365 0.803 »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG æÑdG ECB 0.229 (0.16) ∂ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

-0.916 -0.881 0.839 0.869 0.861 0.426 0.415 0.169 0.735 …õcôŸG ¿ÉHÉ«dG æH BoJ 0.081 (0.62) ∂ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00)

Brazil πjRGÈdG

0.953 0.209 É«°ShQ Russia (0.00) (0.00)

-0.653 -0.592 0.711 -0.306 óæ¡dG India (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)

-0.833 -0.739 0.809 0.543 -0.360 0.919 Ú°üdG China (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

-0.769 -0.682 0.907 0.956 0.354 0.849 -0.194 É« jôaCG ܃æL South Africa -0.334 (0.03) ≤ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.23)

Panel C 2011:12 – 2006:1 :(ê) »YôØdG ∫hó÷G πjRGÈdG É«°ShQ óæ¡dG Ú°üdG É«≤jôaCG ܃æL Brazil Russia India China South Africa Fed 0.624 (0.00) 0.449 (0.00) 0.413 (0.00) 0.354 (0.00) 0.333 (0.00) ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G ¢ù∏› ECB 0.482 (0.00) 0.486 (0.00) 0.689 (0.00) 0.759 (0.00) 0.807 (0.00) »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG BoJ 0.064 (0.59) 0.219 (0.06) 0.614 (0.00) 0.788 (0.00) 0.811 (0.00) …õcôŸG ¿ÉHÉ«dG ∂æH Brazil πjRGÈdG

Russia 0.527 (0.00) É«°ShQ

India 0.481 (0.00) 0.003 (0.97) óæ¡dG

China 0.201 (0.09) 0.0002 (0.99) 0.862 (0.00) Ú°üdG

South Africa 0.211 (0.07) 0.616 (0.00) 0.385 (0.00) 0.537 (0.00) É«≤jôaCG ܃æL

P-Values in parentheses p-Ú°Sƒ≤dG ÚH ∫ɪàM’G ᪫b

29 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-3: Policy rate changes by major EME ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG πÑb øe IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG äGÒ¨J :3-1 ∫hóL central banks in 2011 áÄ°TÉædG ¥Gƒ°SC’G äGOÉ°üàb’

ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺍﳌﺌﻮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﺩﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ﻧﻮﻓﻤﺒﺮ ﺃﻛﺘﻮﺑﺮ ﺳﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ ﺃﻏﺴﻄﺲ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ ﺃﺑﺮﻳﻞ ﻣﺎﺭﺱ ﻓﺒﺮﺍﻳﺮ ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ /Country ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﺔ / ﺍﻟﺸﻬﺮ (٪) Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Rate at end of year (%)

Argentina 9.00 ÚàæLQC’G

Brazil +50 +50 +25 +25 +25 -50 -50 -50 10.75 πjRGÈdG

Chile +25 +50 +50 +50 +25 3.25 »∏«°ûJ

China +25 +25 +25 5.81 Ú°üdG

Czech Rep. 0.75 ∂«°ûàdG ájQƒ¡ªL

Hungary +25 +50 +50 5.75 ÉjQɨæg

India +25 +25 +50 +25 +50 +25 +25 6.25 óæ¡dG

Indonesia +25 -25 -50 6.5 É«°ù«fhófEG

Malaysia +25 4.00 Éjõ«dÉe

Mexico 4.50 ∂«°ùμŸG

Philippines +25 +25 7.75 򄸯dG

Poland +25 +25 +25 +25 3.50 GóædƒH

Russia +25 +25 -25 2.00 É«°ShQ

South Africa 5.50 É«≤jôaCG ܃æL

South Korea +25 +25 +25 6.50 á«dɪ°ûdG ÉjQƒc

Thailand +25 +25 +25 +25 +25 +25 -25 2.50 ófÓjÉJ

Turkey -25 -50 2.75 É«côJ

Number in each cell indicates an increase (+) or decrease (-) in basis ¢SÉ°SC’G •É≤f ‘ (-) ¢VÉØîf’G hCG (+) IOÉjõdG ¤EG ∫hó÷G ‘ á«∏N πc ‘ ΩÉbQC’G Ò°ûJ points

GCC developments »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ äGQƒ£àdG

The uncertainty caused by the recent spell of regional á«°SÉ«°ùdG äÉHGô£°V’G áLƒe øY áªLÉædG Ú≤«dG ΩóY ádÉM äCGóH political turmoil – the Arab spring - appears to be on the ôJƒàdG πeGƒY ¿CG ºZQh .QÉ°ùëf’ÉH (»Hô©dG ™«HôdG) IÒNC’G ᫪«∏bE’G wane. Although regional stress points remain in several §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe äGOÉ°üàbG øe OóY ‘ áªFÉb ∫GõJ ’ ᫪«∏bE’G MENA economies, the GCC economies have largely ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO äGOÉ°üàbG âë‚ ,(MENA) É« jôaCG ɪ°Th managed to overcome investor concerns through a ∏ ∫ ≤ ∫ combination of policy initiatives. With crude oil prices ∫ÓN øe øjôªãà°ùŸG ±hÉfl ≈∏Y Ö∏¨àdG ‘ ÒÑc óM ¤EG »é«∏ÿG remaining elevated and supporting the plethora of ΩÉÿG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG AÉ≤H πX ‘h .á«°SÉ«°ùdG äGQOÉÑŸG øe áYƒª› new government spending, the GCC experienced a ‘ ƒªædG ∫ó©e ó¡°T ,»eƒμ◊G ¥ÉØfE’G IOÉjR øe ºYóHh ,á©ØJôe clear improvement in their growth. Kingdom of Bahrain øjôëÑdG áμ∏‡ Èà©Jh .ÉXƒëk ∏e Éæ°ù–k »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO appears to be the only GCC economy whose growth â©LGôJ »àdG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO äGOÉ°üàbG ÚH øe Ió«MƒdG outlook has been severely dented by the crisis. The IMF ‹hódG ó ædG ¥hóæ°U ™bƒJ óbh .áeRC’G AGôL øe Ió°ûH ƒªædG äÉ©bƒJ É¡«a has projected real GDP growth in the MENA region at ≤ 3.2% in 2011 and a slightly higher 3.6% in 2012; for É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ GCC countries, real GDP growth for 2011 and 2012 ¤EG π°üJ Ó«k ∏b ≈∏YCG áÑ°ùæHh 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %3^2 áÑ°ùæH (MENA) have been placed at 8.0% and 5.3%, respectively. ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ »≤«≤◊G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ôjó≤J ”h ,2012 ΩÉY ‘ %3^6 The GCC growth in 2011 will be led by Qatar, with .‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y %5^3h %8^0 ƒëæH 2012h 2011 »eÉ©d »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG estimated real GDP expansion in excess of 14.1% and ÓN »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO Y ƒªædG å«M øe ô£b ádhO ó àJ Saudi Arabia, with real GDP growth of close to 7%. ∫ ∏ ∏ ∫ ≈∏ Ω ≤ In case of the latter, much of the expansion will be Éà ɡ«a »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ôjó≤J ™e ,2011 ΩÉY ôjó≤J ” »àdG ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ÖfÉL ¤EG ,%14^1 øY ójõj

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 30 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J driven by strong growth in the oil economy, thanks to ™Lôj å«M ,%7 ÜQÉ≤j Éà ɡ«a »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ the prospects of high prices and significant increases in ‘ …ƒ≤dG ƒªædG ¤EG ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ‘ ƒªædG Gòg øe ÒÑc AõL production, in part a response to offset the production áXƒë ŸG IOÉjõdGh QÉ©°SC’G ´ÉØJQG äÉ©bƒJ °†ØH dPh ,§ØædG OÉ°üàbG shortfall in some of the strife-torn regional economies. ∏ π ∂ According to IMF (2012), the combined current ‘ êÉàfE’G ¢ü≤f ¢†jƒ©àd áHÉéà°S’G ¤EG ¬æe AõL ™Lôj ɪc ,êÉàfE’G ‘ account surplus of oil exporters (comprising Algeria, ≈∏Y AÉæHh .á≤£æŸG ‘ äÉYGõædG ICÉWh â– á©bGƒdG äGOÉ°üàb’G ¢†©H Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and GCC countries) äÉHÉ°ùë∏d ™ªéŸG ¢†FÉØdG ≠∏H ,2012 ΩÉ©d ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ôjô≤J approached USD 400 billion in 2011, almost double ,¥Gô©dGh ,¿GôjEGh ,ôFGõ÷G :πª°ûJ »àdG) §Øæ∏d IQó°üŸGq ∫hó∏d ájQÉ÷G the 2010 level.3 ÜQÉ≤j Ée (»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hOh ,øª«dGh ,¿GOƒ°ùdGh ,É«Ñ«dh ¢†FÉØdG ∞©°V ≠∏ÑJ IOÉjõH …CG ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 400 3 .2010 ΩÉY ‘ As oil exports constitute the bulk of the exports in ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ äGQOÉ°üdG øe ÈcC’G Aõ÷G πã“ §ØædG äGQOÉ°U ¿CG Éà the GCC region, there is an increasing tendency for äGÒ¨àdG ÖcGƒàd ójGõàe πμ°ûH π«“ ∂dòH É¡fEÉa ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG total exports to mirror changes in oil prices (Chart á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ¿CG ’EG .(7-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) §ØædG QÉ©°SCG Y CGô£J »àdG 1-7). However, the financial crisis had severely eroded ≈∏ exports for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 2009 as oil prices á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸGh âjƒμdG øe πc ‘ äGQOÉ°üdG ‘ ójó°T QƒgóJ ¤EG äOCG declined in the wake of the global slowdown. Over DƒWÉÑàdG ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ §ØædG QÉ©°SCG ™LGôJ ¤EG Gô¶fk 2009 ΩÉY ‘ ájOƒ©°ùdG the years, Qatar and UAE have successfully managed äGQÉeE’Gh ô£b ÉàdhO âë‚ ,äGƒæ°ùdG ióe ≈∏Yh .»ŸÉ©dG …OÉ°üàb’G to lower their dependency on hydrocarbon revenues øe RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£b äGOGôjEG ≈∏Y ɪgOɪàYG π«∏≤J ‘ IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG through expansion of the non-hydrocarbon sector. IQÉ°TE’G QóŒ ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .»£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG ‘ ™°SƒàdG ∫ÓN Contextually, it may be mentioned that Qatar relies ÖÑ°ùdG ãÁ …òdGh ,RɨdG äGQOÉ°U Y ÌcCG óªà©J ô£b ádhO ¿CG ¤EG much more on gas exports, which largely accounts for π ≈∏ the decline in the share of oil exports in its total export äGQOÉ°üdG ‹ÉªLEG á∏°S ‘ §ØædG äGQOÉ°U á°üM ™LGôJ ‘ »°ù«FôdG basket (Table 1-4). .(4-1 ∫hóL)

Chart 1-7: Proportion of oil exports to total exports äGQOÉ°üdG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG §ØædG äGQOÉ°U áÑ°ùf :7-1 ¿É«H º°SQ

100 90 80 70 60 50 Percent 40 30 20 10 1 0 8 6 4 2 2011 2010 2008 2006 2004 2002

Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

Robust oil prices have boosted the fiscal and current áeÉ©dG áfRGƒŸG ‘ ¢†FÉØdG õjõ©J ¤EG §Øæ∏d á©ØJôŸG QÉ©°SC’G äOCG account surpluses of GCC countries over the past äGƒæ°S IóY ióe ≈∏Y »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hód …QÉ÷G ÜÉ°ù◊Gh several years. With oil prices averaging roughly USD π«eÈ∏d »μjôeCG Q’hO 100 ‹GƒM §ØædG QÉ©°SCG ∫ó©e ƃ∏H ™eh .á«°VÉe 100/barrel in 2011 (Chart 1-8), the GCC region is – expected to post both a budget and a current account ≥≤– ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ¬fEÉa ,(8 1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ΩÉY ‘ óMGƒdG surplus. The IMF (2011) estimates a current account ÜÉ°ù◊Gh áfRGƒŸG ‘ É°†FÉak »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO á≤£æe surplus of USD 238 billion in 2011, while the estimated π°üj ¿CG 2011 ΩÉ©d √ôjô≤J ‘ ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U Qóbq óbh .…QÉ÷G fiscal surplus is placed at around USD 117 billion. ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 238 ƒëf ¤EG …QÉ÷G ÜÉ°ù◊G ¢†FÉa ‹GƒM â¨∏H áeÉ©dG áfRGƒŸG ‘ ¢†FÉØdÉH á°UÉÿG äGôjó≤àdG ¿CG ÚM ‘ .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 117

3 3 International Monetary Fund (2012). Middle East and North Africa: Historic transitions .•ƒ¨°†dG πX ‘ á«îjQÉJ á«dÉ≤àfG πMGôe :É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe .(2012) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U :Qó°üŸG under strain. IMF: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U

31 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-4: Proven oil and gas reserves in GCC ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ RɨdGh §ØædG øe ócDƒŸG »WÉ«àM’G :4-1 ∫hóL at end-2010 2010 ájÉ¡f ‘ »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG §ØædG »©«Ñ£dG RɨdG Country (Ö©μe Îe ¿ƒ«∏jôJ) (π«eôH QÉ«∏e) Natural gas ádhódG Oil (billion barrels) (trillion cu. m) GCC 495.1 42 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO MENA 752.5 75.8 É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe World 1383.2 187.1 ⁄É©dG ∫hO hO ¤EG »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO ‘ »WÉ«àM’G áÑ°ùf GCC/MENA (%) 65.8 55.4 ∫ ∏ ∏ ∫ (%) É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ⁄É©dG ∫hO ¤EG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ »WÉ«àM’G áÑ°ùf GCC/World (%) 35.8 22.4 (%)

Source: BP Statistical Review BP á«fÉ£jÈdG ∫hÎÑdG ácô°T äGAÉ°üMEG :Qó°üŸG

Chart 1-8: Oil and gas prices RɨdGh §ØædG QÉ©°SCG :8-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

120 101

95 7 70

USD/barrel 4 45 USD/ mn. Btu

20 1 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000

Henry Hub(USD/ mn. Btu) (Right scale) Dubai (USD/bbl) Brent (USD/bbl)

In the short-term, the prolonged instability owing ájÉØc ΩóY ¤EG Gô¶fk ôªà°ùŸG QGô≤à°S’G ΩóY πμ°ûj ,Ò°ü≤dG ióŸG ≈∏Yh to inadequate social and economic opportunities ÈcCG »°SÉ«°ùdG 샰VƒdG ¤EG QÉ àa’Gh ,ájOÉ°üàb’Gh á«YɪàL’G ¢UôØdG and the lack of political clarity are the two biggest ≤ domestic challenges confronting MENA economies. ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe äGOÉ°üàbG ¬LGƒJ »àdG á«∏ëŸG äÉjóëàdG The lingering unrest could also threaten the design ™°Vh É°†jk CG Oó¡J ób »àdG Iôªà°ùŸG äÉHGô£°V’G ÖfÉL ¤EG .É«≤jôaCG of developmental expenditures, as governments Gòg øe óë d ájQÉ÷G äÉ ØædG IOÉjõH äÉeƒ G É«b ™e á«FɉEG á£N increase current expenditures to rein in the situation. ∏ ≤ μ◊ Ω As a response,several countries have introduced ÒHGóàdG øe á©°SGh á∏°ù∏°S ∫hO IóY âKóëà°SG ,∂dòd áHÉéà°SGhk .™°VƒdG a wide gamut of measures aimed at protecting the ¢ù∏› ∫hO ¿CÉH ɪk ∏Y .ô£î∏d á°VôY ÌcC’G ∫hódG ájɪM ¤EG ±ó¡J »àdG most vulnerable. The oil exporting GCC countries are QÉ£NC’G øY ÉeÉ“k iCÉæà â°ù«d §Øæ d IQó°üŸGq »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG not totally immune to the impending risks. Indeed, ∏ ∏ increased spending in these countries has necessitated IQhô°V ∫hódG √òg ‘ äÉ≤ØædG IOÉjR âYóà°SG ,™bGƒdG ‘h .ábóëŸG an increasing oil price to support the budget. The §Øæ∏d ∫OÉ©àdG ô©°S ó¡°ûj å«M .áfRGƒŸG ºYód §ØædG QÉ©°SCG IOÉjR break-even oil price (that allows the country to achieve Úàæ°ùdG ióe Y ÉYÉØJQGk (‹ÉŸG ¿RGƒàdG « – ádhó d í«àj …òdG) fiscal balance) has been increasing over the past ≈∏ ≥ ≤ ∏ couple of years, mainly owing to the various stimulus ájõ«ØëàdG ÒHGóàdG ¤EG ∂dP ‘ »°ù«FôdG ÖÑ°ùdG ™Lôjh ,Úà«°VÉŸG measures undertaken by the government in response á«YɪàL’Gh á«°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒã d áHÉéà°SGk äÉeƒ G É¡àæÑJ »àdG áØ àîŸG 4 ∏ μ◊ ∏ to the political and social uprisings (Table 1-5). 4.(5-1 ∫hóL)

4 4 According to World Bank (2011) estimates, the break-even oil prices (in USD/barrel) áμ∏‡ :‹ÉàdÉc (óMGƒdG π«eÈ∏d »μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH) §Øæ∏d ∫OÉ©àdG QÉ©°SCG â¨∏H ,(2011) ‹hódG ∂æÑdG äGôjó≤àd Ék ≤ah were as follows: Bahrain (100), Kuwait (45), Oman (80), Qatar (55), Saudi Arabia (80) and á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G (80) ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ,(55) ô£b ádhO ,(80) ¿ÉªYo áæ£∏°S ,(45) âjƒμdG ádhO ,(100) øjôëÑdG UAE (70). .(70) IóëàŸG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 32 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-5: Social measures in GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ á«YɪàL’G ÒHGóàdG :5-1 ∫hóL

ÒHGóàdG ¢†«ØîJ œÉædG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG áÑ°ùf Measure QƒLC’G äÉfÉYE’G ÖFGô°†dG äÓjƒëàdG á«àëàdG á«æÑdG ∞FÉXƒdG ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG ádhódG Wages Subsidies Transfers Infrastructure Jobs Cost Country Tax cuts (% to GDP)

øjôëÑdG √√√ √ √ 1.5 Bahrain

âjƒμdG √ √ √ Above 2.5 Kuwait

¿ÉªYo √ √ √ 1.25 Oman

ô£b √ N.A. Qatar

ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG √ √ √ √ 16-25 Saudi Arabia

IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G √ √ √ 0.5 UAE

Source: IMF (2011) and World Bank (2011) 2011 ΩÉ©d ‹hódG ∂æÑdG ôjô≤Jh 2011 ΩÉ©d ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ôjô≤J :Qó°üŸG

The correlation matrix of deposit rates of GCC ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ …QÉ«©ŸG •ÉÑJQ’G ∫hóL ôaƒj countries for the period 2001-11 provides interesting ,ΩɪàgÓd IÒãe iDhQ 2011 ¤EG 2001 øe IÎØ∏d »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG insights. For most countries, highly correlated values ᫪gCG ô¡¶Jo hódG º¶©e ‘ GÒÑck ÉWÉÑJQGk É¡°†©H ™e á£ÑJôŸG º« dÉa appear to exhibit greater significance. For example, the ∫ ≤ correlation between Bahrain and Kuwait and between ÚHh âjƒμdGh øjôëÑdG ÚH ∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y •ÉÑJQ’G áLQO ≠∏ÑJh .ÈcCG Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are over 80% and significant ájƒæ©e äGP »gh %80 øe ÌcCG ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸGh øjôëÑdG at 0.01 levels. The interest rates of Kuwait are strongly âjƒμdG ‘ IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG §ÑJôJ ɪc .0^01 iƒà°ùe óæY á«FÉ°üMEG correlated with those of all other GCC economies, ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO »bÉH ‘ IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ™e ÒÑc óM ¤EG notwithstanding their slightly different exchange rate ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG äÉ°SÉ«°S ‘ «Ø£dG ±ÓàN’G øY ô¶ædG ±ô°üH 5 ∞ policy of the country. Except Saudi Arabia, the deposit Éjƒbk ÉWÉÑJQGk ô£b ádhóH ™FGOƒdG Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG §ÑJôJh 5.ádhO d rate of Qatar is strongly correlated with all other GCC ≈∏ πμ countries (Table 1-6).6 ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG GóY Ée ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ™«ªéH 6.(6 – 1 ∫hóL) Subsequent to the Dubai World episode in 2009 when ¢ûeGƒg ´ÉØJQG äó¡°T »àdG 2009 ΩÉY ‘ á«ŸÉ©dG »HO ácô°T áeRCG ó©H CDS spreads of Dubai surged, these spreads have since .Ú◊G ∂dP òæe ¢ûeGƒ¡dG √òg â°ü∏≤J ,»HO ‘ äGóæ°ùdG ôWÉfl narrowed. However, the lingering political concerns in some of the regional economies have widened äGOÉ°üàb’G ¢†©H ‘ á«°SÉ«°ùdG ±hÉîŸG QGôªà°SG iOCG ó≤a ∂dP ™eh their spreads again. For example, the CDS spread of âØYÉ°†J ,∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏©a .ójóL øe ¢ûeGƒ¡dG √òg IOÉjR ¤EG ᫪«∏bE’G Bahrain, which was around 170 basis points (bps) at ΩÉY ájGóH ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 170 ‹GƒM â¨∏H »àdG øjôëÑdG ‘ ¢ûeGƒ¡dG the beginning of 2011 more than doubled to reach ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .ȪàÑ°S 30 ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 377 ¤EG π°üàd 2011 377 basis points on December 30. Although spreads for Dubai still remain elevated, they are much lower ¢ûeÉ¡dG øe ÒãμH πbCG Èà©J É¡fCG ’EG ,á©ØJôe ∫GõJ ’ »HO ‘ ¢ûeGƒ¡dG than the over 900 basis points prevalent in early 2009 ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 900 øe ÌcCG ≠∏H …òdG 2009 ájGóH ‘ óFÉ°ùdG following the Dubai World episode (Chart 1-9). .(9–1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«ŸÉ©dG »HO ácô°T áeRCG

5 5 The Kuwaiti Dinar fluctuates in a band of 3.5% around the central rate. As a result, øe á°ùªN ÚH ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ äÉÑ∏≤J óLƒJ ’ ,∂dòd áé«àfhk .»°SÉ°SC’G ô©°ùdG ∫ƒM %3,5 ¥É£f ‘ »àjƒμdG QÉæjódG Ö∏≤àj there are no exchange rate fluctuations between five of the GCC countries and only limited »àjƒμdG QÉæjódGh ¢ùªÿG ∫hódG √òg äÓªY ±ô°U QÉ©°SCG ÚH §≤a IOhófi äÉÑ∏≤J ÖfÉL ¤EG ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO fluctuations between those five and the Kuwaiti Dinar (M.Strum and N.Siegfried, 2005, N.Siegfried h M.Strum ᣰSGƒH á°SGQO - »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › ‘ AÉ°†YC’G hódG ÚH »ª« bE’G …ó ædG eÉ àdG) Regional monetary integration in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. ECB ∏ ∏ ∫ ∏ ≤ π μ Occasional Paper No. 31. ECB: Frankfurt). .(äQƒØμfGôa :»HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG .(31 ºbQ) »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑ∏d …QhódG ôjô≤àdG .2005 ΩÉ©d 6 6 Employing a consistent policy rate for the GCC countries that peg their exchange rates »μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH É¡jód ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG §ÑJôJ »àdG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hód IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ áàHÉK á°SÉ«°S ≥«Ñ£J §ÑJôj to the US Dollar is compounded by several factors. First, there is the lack of a consistent QÉ©°SC’ á°SÉ«°S äôaƒJ ¿EGh ≈àM ,É«fÉKhk ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Égô≤j áàHÉK á°SÉ«°S ’hk CG óLƒJ ’ å«M ,πeGƒY Ió©H central bank policy rate and second, even if such a policy rate is available, in many cases, it á«eƒμ◊G øjódG äGhOC’ (QGó°UE’G ΩóY hCG) IOhóëŸG äGQGó°UE’G πX ‘h .áKóëà°ùe ¿ƒμJ ä’É◊G º¶©e ‘ É¡fEÉa ,IóFÉØdG is of recent origin. With limited (or, no) issuances of government debt instruments in several k k countries, the use of the treasury bill rate is also ruled out. Under these circumstances, ¿Éª°V π«Ñ°S ‘h ,±hô¶dG √òg πX ‘h .É°†jCG Gó©Ñà°ùe áæjõÿG äGóæ°S ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ΩGóîà°SG ¿ƒμj ,∫hO IóY ‘ in order to ensure a uniform metric of policy indicator, we employ the nominal deposit É¡eGóîà°SG ” »àdG ,᫪°S’G ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ ᫪°S’G ᪫≤dG ΩGóîà°SÉH Ωƒ≤f ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ô°TDƒŸ óMƒe ¢SÉ«b rate, which has also been used in recent studies (R.Al-Mashat and A.Billmeier 2007, The R.Al-Mashat `d á°SGQO ,"ô°üe ‘ ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG QÉKBG π≤f á«dBG" ¿Gƒæ©H GôNk Dƒe âjôLCG »àdG äÉ°SGQódG ¢†©H ‘ ∂dòc monetary transmission mechanism in Egypt. IMF Working Paper 285. IMF: Washington :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U – 285 ºbQ ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U øY IQOÉ°U πªY ábQh - 2007 ΩÉY ÉgOGóYEG ” A.Billmeier h DC). .(᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh

33 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-6: Correlation matrix of deposit rates7of IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCÉH ¢UÉÿG (Matrix) …QÉ«©ŸG •ÉÑJQ’G :6-1 ∫hóL GCC countries – 2001 to 2011 (2011-2001) – »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hód7 ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G Country øjôëÑdG âjƒμdG ¿ÉªYo ô£b ájOƒ©°ùdG ádhódG Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi IóëàŸG UAE Arabia

Bahrain øjôëÑdG

Kuwait 0.81 (0.00) âjƒμdG

Oman 0.42 (0.19) 0.73 (0.01) ¿ÉªYo

Qatar 0.63 (0.03) 0.68 (0.02) 0.71 (0.01) ô£b

Saudi Arabia 0.89 (0.00) 0.87 (0.00) 0.47 (0.14) 0.49 (0.12) ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG

UAE 0.64 (0.04) 0.57 (0.08) 0.75 (0.01) 0.85 (0.00) 0.45 (0.19) IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G

p -Values within brackets p- Ú°Sƒ≤dG ÚH ∫ɪàM’G º«b

Chart 1-9: Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads in ¢ù∏› ∫hO á≤£æe ‘ äGóæ°ùdG ôWÉfl ¢ûeGƒg :9-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ the GCC region »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG

600 1501

500 1201 400 909 300 606

Basis pointsBasis 200 Basis pointsBasis 100 303

0 0

DUBAI SAUDI ARABIA (Right scale) BAHRAIN ABU DHABI

Total assets of banks in the six GCC countries stood at â°ùdG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ±QÉ°üŸG äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H around USD 1,329 billion in 2011, representing a growth ^ 8 ‹GƒM ≠∏H ƒ‰ ∫ó©Ã ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 1 329 ‹GƒM of around 8.5% over the previous year. This overall 8 k ^ increase masks the wide variation across countries. ÒÑμdG øjÉÑàdG á«dɪLE’G IOÉjõdG »ØîJh .á≤HÉ°ùdG áæ°ùdÉH áfQÉ≤e %8 5 Bank asset growth was the highest in Qatar and the ádhO ‘ ¬d iƒà°ùe ≈∏YCG ±QÉ°üŸG äGOƒLƒe ƒ‰ ≥≤M å«M ,∫hódG ÚH lowest in Bahrain. Notwithstanding a 4% increase, UAE IOÉjõdG øY ô¶ædG ±ô°üHh .øjôëÑdG áμ∏‡ ‘ iƒà°ùe ≈fOCGh ô£b banks still accounted for over one-third of the asset å∏K øe ÌcCG πμ°ûJ IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ∑ƒæH ∫GõJ ’ ,%4 áÑ°ùæH share in 2011, although this has declined marginally as k compared to 2010; the share of Oman was the lowest É«°ûeÉg á°ü◊G √òg ™LGôJ øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ ∫ƒ°UC’G á°üM at around 4% (Chart 1-10). Total credits and deposits á°üM øe áÑ°ùf ≈fOCG ¿ÉªYo áæ£∏°S â≤≤M óbh ,2010 ΩÉY ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH in 2011 have been estimated to be around USD 750 ¿ÉªàF’G ‹ÉªLEG ôjó≤J ” óbh (10– 1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) %4 â¨∏H ∫ƒ°UC’G billion and USD 850 billion, respectively. Although bank Q’hO QÉ«∏e 850h »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 750 ƒëæH Ω2011 ΩÉY ‘ ™FGOƒdGh credit has exhibited signs of improvement, it remains sluggish by historical standards, especially in real terms, ,ø°ù– äÉeÓY ô¡XCG ‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ¿CG ºZQh .‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y »μjôeCG due to risk aversion in the face of unusual global and ,á«∏©ØdG ΩÉbQC’ÉH ɪ«°S’h ,á«îjQÉàdG ÒjÉ©ŸG Ö°ùM ÉÄ«£Hk πX ¬fCG ’EG regional uncertainties. After experiencing negative á«ŸÉ©dG Ú≤«dG ΩóY ä’ÉM ΩÉeCG ôWÉîŸG πª– øY ±hõ©dG ÖÑ°ùH

7 7 Deposit rate data are extracted from Institute for International Finance (IIF) website. .(IIF) á«dhódG πjƒªàdG á°ù°SDƒŸ ÊhÎμdE’G ™bƒŸG øe ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCÉH á°UÉÿG äÉfÉ«ÑdG êGôîà°SG ºàj 8 8 Figures are computed based on data sourced from respective central bank websites. .á«æ©ŸG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üª∏d á«fhÎμdE’G ™bGƒŸG ≈∏Y áMÉàŸG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ΩÉbQC’G ÜÉ°ùM ºàj

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 34 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

credit growth in 2010, credit growth turned positive íÑ°UCG ,2010 ΩÉY ‘ »Ñ∏°ùdG ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ ó©Hh .IOÉà©ŸG ÒZ ᫪«∏bE’Gh in Bahrain and UAE. Saudi Arabia and Oman, on the ,IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’Gh øjôëÑdG áμ∏‡ ‘ É«HÉéjk EG ÊɪàF’G ƒªædG other hand, are experiencing a positive momentum. ¿Gó¡°ûJ iôNCG á¡L øe ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸGh ¿ÉªYo áæ£∏°S ¿CG ’EG Notwithstanding the unsettled outlook, GCC banks ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ™°Vh hóÑj ,Iô≤à°ùŸG ÒZ äÉ©bƒàdG AÉæãà°SÉHh .É«HÉéjk EG ÉWÉ°ûfk appear to be well placed in terms of efficiency (Box 1-1). .(1–1 QÉWEG) IAÉØμdG å«M øe Gó«Lk »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO

¢ù › hO ‘ ƒæÑdG iód ƒ°UC’G á°üM :10-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 1-10: Asset share of GCC banks ∏ ∫ ∑ ∫ »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG

40 35 30 25 20

Percent 15 10 5 0 BBHH K KWW O OMM Q QRR S SAA A AEE

2010 2011

Box 1-1: Cost-income ratios πNódG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG Ö°ùf :1–1 QÉWEG The cost-income ratios (CIR) of banks is a good indicator of its ΩÉ«b πX ‘h .É¡JAÉØc ≈∏Y Gó«Lk Gô°Tk Dƒe ∑ƒæÑdG iód πNódG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG Ö°ùf Èà©J efficiency. With banking systems across the world rebuilding ‘ ähÉØàdG íÑ°UCG ,á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ó©H ⁄É©dG ∫ƒM É¡°ùØf AÉæH IOÉYEÉH á«aô°üŸG ᪶fC’G themselves after the financial meltdown, the regional differences in CIR are proving more indicative of banking π«Ñ°S ≈∏©a .‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG IAÉØc ≈∏Y ád’O ÌcCG É«ª«k ∏bEG πNódG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG Ö°ùf system efficiency. In Africa for example, CIR has declined IOÉ©à°SG ¤EG IQÉ°TEG ∂dP ¿Éc óbh ,É«≤jôaCG ‘ πNódG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG áÑ°ùf â°†ØîfG ,∫ÉãŸG significantly, reflecting the recovery of their banking systems. á©ØJôe GõJ ’ NódG ¤EG áØ àdG áÑ°ùf ¿CG øe ºZôdG Yh .•É°ûæ d ‘ô°üŸG É¡eɶf Although CIR in Western Europe remains high, they have ∫ π ∏μ ≈∏ ∏ managed to substantially contain operating costs. Although ºZQh .ÒÑc óM ¤EG 𫨰ûàdG ∞«dÉμJ øe ó◊G ‘ âë‚ É¡fCG ’EG ,á«Hô¨dG ÉHhQhCG ‘ US banks have by far the highest CIRs, these have stayed at ¢ùØf â≤≤M É¡fCG ’EG ,á«μjôeC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ‘ ≈∏YC’G Èà©J πNódG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG Ö°ùf ¿CG the same level as in the previous year, notwithstanding the increase in operating costs. .á«∏«¨°ûàdG ∞«dÉμàdG IOÉjR øY ô¶ædG ±ô°üH ,≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ ɪc iƒà°ùŸG

75 252

65 202 55 151 45 Percent 101 Percent 35

25 5

15 0 Africaf Asia Eastern Western Latin Middleddl Northh PaciĮc Europe Europe America East America Cost/income 2010 Cost/income 2009 Operating cost (% change in 2010) (Right scale)

35 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Banks appear to be benefiting from declining loan loss »àdG IOÉjõdG ôKEG ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üfl ™LGôJ øe ∑ƒæÑdG ó«Øà°ùJ provisions following an initial surge in delinquent loans, QÉ«¡fG ÒÑc óM ¤EG ¢ùμ©j …òdG ôeC’G ,OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‘ âKóM reflecting in large part, the crash in regional property ‘ äÓà àdG ÓN øe ¿ƒjódG á «g IOÉYEGh á £æŸG ‘ äGQÉ ©dG QÉ©°SCG prices, debt restructurings by conglomerates in some μ ∫ ∏μ ≤ ≤ of the regional economies, the Dubai debt crisis and »àdG äÉHƒ©°üdGh »HO ‘ ¿ƒjódG áeRCGh ,᫪«∏bE’G äGOÉ°üàb’G ¢†©H difficulties surrounding investment companies in some ‹ÉªLEG ™LGôJ óbh .äGOÉ°üàb’G ¢†©H ‘ Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°ûH §«– economies. Total loan loss provisions, which were ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 10 â¨∏H »àdG ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üfl around USD 10 billion in 2010 has declined to around â¨∏H óbh 9 .2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 8^5 ƒëf ¤EG π°ü«d 2010 USD 8.5 billion in 2011.9 Impaired loans in GCC banks Q’hO QÉ«∏e 38 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ áÄjOôdG ¢Vhô≤dG ᪫b are placed at around USD 38 billion in 2011. Out of øe %80 ‹GƒM ájó« àdG ƒæÑdG á°üM ã“h .2011 ÉY ‘ » jôeCG this amount, commercial banks account for around ∏≤ ∑ π Ω μ 80% and Islamic banks account for the remaining. .á«bÉÑdG áÑ°ùædG πãªàa á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ÉeCG ,᪫≤dG √òg ‹ÉªLEG

The GCC Sukuk market has been growing rapidly ∫ÓN É©jô°Sk Gƒ‰k »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ∑ƒμ°üdG ¥ƒ°S ó¡°T over the past couple of years. The value of new issues ¤EG π°üàd Iójó÷G äGQGó°UE’G ᪫b â°†ØîfG óbh .Ú«°VÉŸG ÚeÉ©dG declined to around USD 22 billion in 2008 following ø dh ,á«dÉŸG áeRC’G Ö Y 2008 ÉY ‘ » jôeCG Q’hO QÉ« e 22 ‹GƒM the financial crisis, but interest in the market has μ ≤ Ω μ ∏ revived thereafter and the region has established itself ÉgQÉÑàYÉH É¡àfÉμe á≤£æŸG âî°SQhq Égó©H ¥ƒ°ùdÉH Ωɪàg’G ¢û©àfG as a major source of Sukuk issuance globally. .⁄É©dG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ∑ƒμ°üdG QGó°UE’ »°ù«FôdG Qó°üŸG

In 2011, the total value of GCC bonds and Sukuk ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ∑ƒμ°üdGh äGóæ°ùdG øe äGQGó°UE’G ᪫b ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H issued reached USD 33.4 billion, a decline of 6% as ¢VÉØîfÉH ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 33^4 »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG compared to USD 35.6 billion issued during 2010 Q’hO QÉ« e 35^6 â¨H »àdGh 2010 ÉY ‘ ɡફ H áfQÉk e %6 Qób (Chart 1-11). Corporate issuances dominated the ∏ ∏ Ω ≤ ≤ √ market, with total value amounting to USD 26 billion; ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉcô°ûdG äGQGó°UEG äOÉ°S óbh .(11–1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) »μjôeCG sovereign issuances accounted for roughly one-fifth of ájOÉ«°ùdG äGQGó°UE’G â∏μq °Th ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 26 â¨∏H á«dɪLEG ᪫≤H total amount raised. .á«dɪLE’G ᪫≤dG ¢ùªN ÉÑjôk ≤J In terms of geographical distribution, UAE entities ᪫b ≈°übCG IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G â≤≤M ,‘Gô¨÷G ™jRƒàdG å«M øe raised the maximum amount (USD 22.2 billion), whereas ᪫b ≈fOCG ¿ÉªYo áæ£∏°S â≤≤M ÚM ‘ ,(»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 22^2) the amount raised by Oman was the least at USD 2.8 ™jRƒàdG Ò°ûjh .(12–1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) » jôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ« e 2^8 â¨H million (Chart 1-12). The currency-wise distribution μ ∏ ∏ indicates that USD denominated issuances were ,IóFÉ°ùdG »g âfÉc Q’hódÉH áeƒq ≤ŸG äGQGó°UE’G ¿CG ¤EG äÓª©dG Ö°ùM predominant, accounting for 60% of the total amount; ∫ÉjôdGh hQƒ«dG á°üM â¨∏H ɪc ;᪫≤dG ‹ÉªLEG øe %60 â∏μq °T å«M the share of Euro and Saudi Riyal were around 17% .‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y %8 h %17 ƒëf …Oƒ©°ùdG and 8%, respectively.

Chart 1-11: Debt/Sukuk issuance by GCC ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ∑ƒμ°üdGh øjódG äGQGó°UEG :11-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ countries10 10 »é«∏ÿG

80 70 60 50 40 30 USD billion USD 20 10 0 2200500 2 2006006 2 200700 2 2008008 2 2009009 2 20100 0 2 20110

Corporate Sovereign

9 9 Based on data on 79 GCC (46 commercial and 33 Islamic) banks extracted from áLôîà°ùŸG (»eÓ°SEG ∂æH 33 h …QÉŒ ∂æH 46) »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ∑ƒæH øe Ék μæH 79 `H á°UÉÿG äÉfÉ«ÑdG :Qó°üŸ Bankscope. The total assets of these 80 banks is USD 1,144 billion (or, around 86%) of the ‹ÉªLEG øe (%86 ‹GƒM …CG) »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 1,144 ∑ƒæÑdG √òg ∫ƒ°UCG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H ,Bankscope äÉfÉ«H IóYÉb øe total assets of all GCC banks. .»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ∑ƒæH ™«ªL ∫ƒ°UCG 10 10 Based on data sourced from Financial Flagship Report for the MENA Region (World âjƒμdG õcôeh (2011 ‹hódG ∂æÑdG) É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æà ¢UÉÿG óFGôdG πjƒªàdG ôjô≤J :Qó°üŸG Bank, 2011) and Markaz Analysis (Kuwait). Information for 2010 and 2011 might not be k k strictly comparable with previous years, owing to different data sources. ¤EG Gô¶f á≤HÉ°ùdG ΩGƒYC’ÉH á°UÉÿG äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ÉeÉ“ á∏Kɇ ÒZ 2011h 2010 »eÉY øe πμd äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ¿ƒμJ óbh .‹ÉŸG .äÉeƒ∏©ŸG QOÉ°üe ±ÓàNG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 36 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Chart 1-12: Issuance of bonds/Sukuk by GCC ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ∑ƒμ°üdGh äGóæ°ùdG äGQGó°UEG :12-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ countries in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG 1.70341.7034 0.70140.7014 00.003.003

55.2104.2104

22.22 33.5738.5738

BH KW OM

QA SA UAE

Although Murabaha, Ijara and Musharaka are the most ÌcCG Èà©J ácQÉ°ûŸGh IQÉLE’Gh áëHGôŸG äÓeÉ©e ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y common Sukuk structures, a prominent feature of the 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ¥ƒ°ù∏d á«°ù«FôdG Iõ«ŸG ¿CG ’EG ,ÉYƒ«°Tk ∑ƒμ°üdG πcÉ«g market in 2011 was the rise of the Wakala issuance q – (Box 1-2). The year began with the Qatar Central Bank ΩÉ©dG π¡à°SG óbh .(2 1 QÉWEG) ádÉcƒdG ó≤Y äGQGó°UEG IOÉjR âfÉc issuing USD 13.7 billion worth of bonds and Sukuks. Q’hO QÉ«∏e 13^7 ¬àª«b Ée …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe QGó°UEÉH ¬WÉ°ûf Later in the year, Malaysia set the tone with a sovereign âYô°T ,ΩÉ©dG øe ≥M’ âbh ‘h .∑ƒμ°üdGh äGóæ°ùdG øe »μjôeCG issue under the name Wakala global Sukuk, which ,á«ŸÉ©dG ádÉcƒdG ∑ƒμ°U ≈ª°ùe â– ájOÉ«°ùdG ∑ƒμ°üdG QGó°UEÉH Éjõ«dÉe was issued in US Dollars aggregating USD 2 billion. ºK ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 2 ᪫≤H »μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH ÉgQGó°UEG ” »àdGh Indonesia then followed suit with a USD-denominated QÉ« e 1 ɡફb Q’hódÉH áeƒq e ƒ °U QGó°UEÉH ÉghòM É«°ù«fhófEG äòM Sukuk worth USD 1 billion. The year 2012 has ∏ ≤ ∑ μ witnessed the launch of Saudi Arabia’s first sovereign Iôe ∫hC’ ájOÉ«°ùdG ∑ƒμ°üdG ¥ÓWEG 2012 ΩÉY ó¡°T óbh .»μjôeCG Q’hO Sukuk, which augurs well for the development of the á≤£æe ‘ ¥ƒ°ùdG ´É°VhCG ø°ùëàH ô°ûÑJ »àdGh ,ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ‘ market in the GCC region. .»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO Box 1-2: Some common Sukuk structures á©FÉ°ûdG ∑ƒμ°üdG πcÉ«g ¢†©H :2–1 QÉWEG IIjarah: An arrangement under which an Islamic bank leases hCG ≈æÑe hCG IGOCG ÒLCÉàH É¡ÑLƒÃ »eÓ°SE’G ∂æÑdG Ωƒ≤j ó≤Y ᨫ°U »g :IQÉLE’G equipment, a building or other facility for a specified period .¬«∏Y ≥Øàe ô©°Sh IOófi IÎØd iôNCG äBÉ°ûæe for an agreed rental.

Murabaha: A contract of sale with an agreed profit mark-up .áØ∏μàdG ¤EG ±É°†e Ωƒ∏©e íHôH ™«H ó≤Y »g :áëHGôŸG on the cost.

Mudarabah: A form of contract in which one party brings ôNB’G ±ô£∏d ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ∫hC’G ±ô£dG É¡ÑLƒÃ ™aój ó≤Y ᨫ°U »g :áHQÉ°†ŸG capital and the other (mudarib) party contributes through …CG OƒLh ∫ÉM ‘ øμdh ,Úaô£dG ÚH É¡«∏Y ≥Øàe íHQ áÑ°ùf ≈∏Y ¬H 𪩫d (ÜQÉ°†ŸG) personal effort. The profit share is decided by mutual consent, but the loss, if any, is borne by the owner of the ÜQÉ°†ŸG ∫ɪgEG ƒg IQÉ°ùÿG ÖÑ°S øμj ⁄ Ée ,É¡∏ªëàj ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ∂dÉe ¿EÉa ,IQÉ°ùN capital, unless the loss is caused by negligence or violation .ó≤©dG •hô°ûd ¬àØdÉfl hCG of the terms of the contract by the mudarib.

Musharakah: An agreement under which an Islamic bank ∫GƒeCÉH §∏àîŸG πjƒªàdG íæà »eÓ°SE’G ∂æÑdG ¬ÑLƒÃ Ωƒ≤j ó≤Y »g :ácQÉ°ûŸG provides funds which are mingled with the funds of an ácQÉ°ûŸG πjƒªà∏d áëfÉŸG ±GôWC’G ™«ª÷ ≥ëjh .(∂dòc iôNCG äÉ¡L hCG) äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG enterprise (and maybe, others as well). All providers of capital are entitled to participate in the management, but ÚH Ék ≤Ñ°ùe OóëŸG íHôdG ™jRƒJ ºàjh .∂dòH áeõ∏e ÒZ É¡æμdh ´hô°ûŸG IQGOEG ‘ not necessarily obliged to do so. The profit is distributed ±GôWC’G É¡∏ªëàj »àdG (äóLh ¿EG) ôFÉ°ùÿG øY ô¶ædG ±ô°üH áμjô°ûdG ±GôWC’G among the partners in a pre-determined fashion, although .±ôW c É¡H ºgÉ°S »àdG ÉŸG ¢SCGQ áÑ°ùf Ö°ùM the losses, if any, are borne by the partners in proportion to π ∫ their capital contribution.

Istisna: A contract for sale of specified goods to be É¡ª«∏°ùàH ™fÉ°üdG ±ô£dG ó¡©J ™e É¡©æ°U ºàj IOófi ™∏°S ™«H ó≤Y ƒg :´Éæ°üà°S’G manufactured with an obligation on the manufacturer to ™«æ°üJ ∞«dÉμJ πª– hCG ΩÉÿG OGƒŸG ÒaƒàH ™FÉÑdG ±ô£dG Ωƒ≤j å«M ,AÉ¡àf’G óæY deliver them upon completion. The raw materials or the cost of manufacturing the goods is provided by the seller. .™∏°ùdG

37 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Wakala: An agency contract where the investment account π«ch Ú«©àH (πcƒŸG) Qɪãà°S’G ÜÉ°ùM ÖMÉ°U ¬ÑLƒÃ Ωƒ≤j ó≤Y »g :ádÉcƒdG ó≤Y holder (principal) appoints an agent (typically, an Islamic hCG HÉ Ã ÉeEG ¬æY áHÉ«f Qɪãà°S’G IQGOE’ (á«eÓ°SEG á«dÉe á°ù°SDƒe ¿ƒ J Ée IOÉY)k financial institution) to carry out an investment on this behalf π ≤ μ either for or without a fee. .πHÉ≤e ¿hóH

References ™LGôŸG H van Greuning and Z.Iqbal (2008). Risk Analysis for Islamic ∑ƒæÑdG iód ôWÉîŸG π«∏–" ôjô≤J .(2008) Z.Iqbal h H van Greuning Banks. The World Bank: Washington DC. .ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ∂æÑdG ."á«eÓ°SE’G Standard and Poor’s (2009). Islamic Finance Outlook. πjƒªàdÉH á°UÉÿG äÉ©bƒàdG .(2009) ÊɪàF’G ∞«æ°üà∏d RQƒH ófCG OQófÉà°S ádÉch .πÑ≤à°ùŸG ‘ »eÓ°SE’G

A prominent feature of banking in the GCC countries is ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG õ«“ »àdG IRQÉÑdG ᪰ùdG ¿EG the presence of Islamic banks. According to available ,áMÉàŸG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .á«eÓ°SE’G ±QÉ°üŸG OƒLh »g »é«∏ÿG data, total Islamic assets in 2010 amounted to USD ΩÉY ∫ÓN Q’hO QÉ«∏e 596 »eÓ°SE’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∫ƒ°UCG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H 596 billion, of which the share of Middle East was the q highest at 38%. Pre-tax profits for the year amounted áÑ°ùæH ᪫b ≈∏YCG É¡æe §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe á°üM â∏ãe »àdGh ,2010 to USD 7.4 billion, yielding a return on asset of 1.2%. QÉ«∏e 7^4 ΩÉ©dG Gòg ∫ÓN ÖFGô°†dG πÑb ìÉHQC’G ᪫b â¨∏H ɪc .%38 The box item below briefly summarizes the broad GõLƒek √ÉfOCG QÉWE’G ¢Vô©jh .%1^2 ≠∏H ∫ƒ°UC’G ≈∏Y óFÉ©H »μjôeCG Q’hO trends in Islamic banking in 2010 (Box 1-3). ∫ÓN á«eÓ°SE’G á«aô°üŸG äÉeóÿG ∫É› ‘ áeÉ©dG äÉgÉŒ’G øY .(3-1QÉWEG) 2010 ΩÉY

Box 1-3: Islamic banking trends ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ »eÓ°SE’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äÉgÉŒG :3–1 QÉWEG in GCC in 2010 2010 ΩÉY ∫ÓN »é«∏ÿG Islamic banking has spread rapidly throughout the world. äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .⁄É©dG AÉëfCG ™«ªL ‘ É©jô°Sk á«eÓ°SE’G ±QÉ°üŸG â«°U ´GP According to available data, out of total Islamic banking π°UCG øe »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 229 §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe á°üM â∏μq °T ,áMÉàŸG assets of USD 596 billion in 2010, Middle East accounted for USD 229 billion. The total deposits amounted to QR 150 óbh .2010 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∫ƒ°UCG ‹ÉªLEG øe »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 596 billion, whereas total financing under Islamic modes stood ¥ô£dÉH πjƒªàdG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H ÚM ‘ ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 150 ™FGOƒdG ´ƒª› ≠∏H at QR 132.4 billion. According to the Financial Times, the Financial áØ«ë°U ‘ OQh Ée ≈∏Y AÉæHhk .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 132^4 á«eÓ°SE’G assets under Sharia-compliant management in the region is ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ,á £æŸG ‘ á«eÓ°SE’G á©jô°ûdG ™e á aGƒàe IQGOEG X ‘ ¬fEÉa Times forecasted to increase to USD 990 billion by 2015. ≤ ≤ π .2015 ΩÉY ∫ƒ∏ëH »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 990 ¤EG π°üàd ∫ƒ°UC’G ᪫b ™ØJôJ

SA 770.840.84 AE 558.498.49 KW 449.489.48 BH 330.450.45 QA 19.2419.24

0 2 204060800 40 60 80 Islamic financing Deposits Assets USD billion

In terms of financing across countries, Qatar accounts for πjƒªàdG ´ƒª› øe %8 ÜQÉ≤j Ée ô£b ádhO πã“ ,∫hódG ÈY πjƒªàdÉH ≥∏©àj ɪ«ah roughly 8% of total Islamic finance, whereas the share of â¨∏H óbh .%33 â¨∏H á°üM ≈∏YCG ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG â≤≤M ÚM ‘ ,»eÓ°SE’G Saudi Arabia is observed to be the highest at 33%. The shares of UAE and Kuwait are around 30% and 21%, respectively. .‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y %21h %30 ‹GƒM âjƒμdGh IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G øe πc ¢ü°üM

As regards profitability, the total income of Islamic banks ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 10 á«eÓ°SE’G ±QÉ°üŸG πNO ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H ,á«ëHôdG ¢üîj ɪ«ah amounted to USD 10 billion and total expenses (including áé«àfh .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 8 (äÉ°ü°üîŸG øª°†àJ) äÉahô°üŸG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏Hh provisions) were USD 8 billion. As a result, the net inerest k margin, defined as income net of expenses scaled by total ¤EG É°SÉ«b äÉahô°üŸG ìôW ó©H ‘É°üdG πNódG …CG) IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg ‘É°U ≠∏H ,∂dòd assets was 0.91% as a whole. Country-wise, margins were ≈∏YCG ô£b ádhO â≤≤M ó≤a ,∫hódG ó«©°U ≈∏Y ÉeCG .πμc %0^91 (∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG the highest for Qatar (2.74%) and the lowest for Bahrain á«MÉf øeh .(%3^8-) áÑ°ùf ≈fOCG øjôëÑdG áμ∏‡ â≤≤Mh (%2^74) ¢ûeGƒg áÑ°ùf (-3.8%). In terms of liquidity ratio (defined as cash and cash ‹ÉªLE’G §°Sƒàe ™e áfQÉk e ( ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ¬gÉÑ°TCGh ó ædG …CG) ádƒ«°ùdG áÑ°ùf equivalents to total asset), as compared to an overall average ≤ ∫ ≤ of 18.8% for Middle East banks, the highest was observed to ô£b ádhO â≤≤M ,%18^8 ≠∏H …òdG §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ¬à≤≤M …òdG be for Qatar (29.1%) and the lowest for Bahrain (14.1%). .(%14^1) ádƒ«°S áÑ°ùf ≈fOCG øjôëÑdG áμ∏‡ â≤≤Mh (%29^1) ádƒ«°S ∫ó©e ≈∏YCG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 38 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Country ∫ƒ°UC’G /IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg ‘É°U (%) Net interest income/Asset (%) ádhódG

BH -3.8 øjôëÑdG

KW 0.6 âjƒμdG

AE 1.0 IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G

SA 2.6 ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG

QA 2.7 ô£b

Region 0.9 á≤£æŸG

BH KW AE Region SA QA

5 1015202530

Percent

References ™LGôŸG Financial Times (2012). Arab World: Banking and Finance á«dÉŸGh á«aô°üŸG äÉeóÿG :»Hô©dG ⁄É©dG .(2012) Financial Times áØ«ë°U (Special Report), March 27. Available at www.ft.com :‹ÉàdG ™bƒŸG IQÉjR ≈Lôj ôjô≤àdG ≈∏Y ´ÓWEÓd .¢SQÉe 27 ‘ QOÉ°U (¢UÉN ôjô≤J) www.ft.com Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions Information. Available IQÉjR ≈Lôj É¡«∏Y ´ÓWEÓd .á«eÓ°SE’G á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh ±QÉ°üŸÉH á°UÉN äÉeƒ∏©e at

After gaining USD 90 billion in market capitalization ∫ÓN ¥ƒ°ùdG á∏ª°SQ ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 90 ᪫≤H Ö°SÉμe ≥«≤– ó©H during 2010, GCC bourses plunged in 2011 with §ÑJôe 2011 ΩÉY ‘ á«é«∏ÿG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G á∏ª°SQ QƒgóJ ,2010 ΩÉY combined losses in their market capitalization in excess of USD 50 billion. The largest bourse in the Arab world, äô°ùN óbh .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 50 äRhÉŒ á«bƒ°ùdG ᪫≤dG ‘ ôFÉ°ùîH - Tadawul – shed around USD 14.6 billion of its market øe Q’hO QÉ«∏e 14^6 ‹GƒM (∫hGóJ) »Hô©dG ⁄É©dG ‘ á«dÉe ¥ƒ°S ÈcCG capitalization, in tandem with losses in international ɪc .á«ŸÉ©dG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ ôFÉ°ùÿG ™e øeGõàdÉH á«bƒ°ùdG ɡફb equity markets. Abu Dhabi and Dubai together lost âfÉch .» jôeCG Q’hO QÉ« e 14 ‹GƒM É©ek »HOh »ÑXƒHCG øe c äô°ùN nearly USD 14 billion. The Qatari bourse was the sole μ ∏ π gainer, adding USD 2 billion to its market capitalization, ¤EG »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 2 â¨∏H IOÉjõH ó«MƒdG íHGôdG »g ô£b á°UQƒH fuelled by robust growth and strong fundamentals. øjôëÑdG äó¡°T óbh .áæ«àŸG õFÉcôdGh …ƒ≤dG ƒªæ∏d áé«àf á«bƒ°ùdG ɡફb Bahrain witnessed around 18% drop in its market 4 ƒëf ɡફb IQÉ°ùN OÉ©j Ée …CG ,á«bƒ°ùdG ɡફb øe %18 ƒëæH É©LGôJk capitalization equivalent to a loss of nearly USD 4 ∫ billion on the back of political concerns (Table 1-7). .(7 – 1 ∫hóL) á«°SÉ«°ùdG ±hÉîŸG á«Ø∏N ≈∏Y »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e

39 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-7: Index values and market capitalization á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«bƒ°ùdG á∏ª°SôdG ᪫bh ô°TDƒŸG º«b :7-1 ∫hóL of GCC bourses á«é«∏ÿG á«bƒ°ùdG á∏ª°SôdG (%) Ò¨àdG (»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏ŸÉH) ¥ÓZE’G ᪫b Change (%) Market capitalization Closing value (USD million) ¥ÓZE’G ᪫b á«bƒ°ùdG á∏ª°SôdG Closing 2011 2010 2011 2010 Market capitalization value -17.4 -20.1 16,572 20,060 1144 1432 Bahrain øjôëÑdG -10.3 -16.4 102,099 113,883 5814 6956 Kuwait âjƒμdG -40.4 -15.7 16,886 28,309 5695 6754 Oman ¿ÉªYo 1.6 1.1 125,593 123,641 8779 8682 Qatar ô£b

-4.1 -3.1 338,780 353,400 6418 6621 Saudi Arabia ájOƒ©°ùdG

-8.3 -11.7 70,681 77,081 2402 2720 Abu Dhabi »ÑXƒHCG

-13.6 -17.0 47,262 54,692 1353 1631 Dubai »HO

A major concern of GCC stock markets is the extent .á«é«∏ÿG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG iód »°ù«FôdG πZÉ°ûdG »g õcÎdG áLQO Èà©J of its concentration. In 2010 for example, over 90% of ‘ áLQóe äÉcô°T ô°ûY ÈcCG âfÉc ,∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y ,2010 ΩÉY »Øa the market capitalization of Greece was from the top Yh .¿Éfƒ«dG ‘ ¥ƒ°ùdG á ª°SQ ᪫b øe %90 øe ÌcCG °ûJ ¥ƒ°ùdG 10 listed companies. At the other end, in the US, the ≈∏ ∏ πμ 10 largest firms contributed less than 20% of the stock äÉcô°T 10 ÈcCG âªgÉ°S ,á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG ‘ ôNC’G ÖfÉ÷G market capitalization (Box 1-4). .(4-1 QÉWEG) º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S á∏ª°SQ ᪫b øe %20 øe πbCÉH

Box 1-4: Stock market concentration º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ õcÎdG áLQO :4–1 QÉWEG in GCC countries 2010»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ Concentration in the GCC stock markets remained high. óbh .á©ØJôe »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ õcÎdG áLQO â∏X The market capitalization (m-cap) of the top 10 companies á∏ª°SQ ´ƒª› øe %80 – 60 ‹GƒM äÉcô°T 10 ≈∏YC’ á«bƒ°ùdG á∏ª°SôdG ᪫b â∏μ°T account for around 60-80% of the total m-cap of listed – companies; the share of top 5 listed companies is around .%65 45 ‹GƒM äÉcô°T ¢ùªN ≈∏YCG á°üM â¨∏H å«M ;áLQóŸG äÉcô°û∏d ¥ƒ°ùdG 45-65%.

100 4400 3350 3300 75 2250 2200

Percent 1150

50 billion USD 1100 505 25 0 BahrainB h i OmanO DubaiD b i AbuAb KuwaitK i QatarQ S Saudidi Dhabi Arabia M-cap of top 10 firms Total M-cap (right scale)

On top of that, the distribution of listed companies is highly å«M ,óMGh ´É£b ‘ ÒÑc óM ¤EG áLQóŸG äÉcô°ûdG ™jRƒJ õcôJq ,∂dP ≈∏Y IhÓYh skewed, with an overwhelming proportion of companies Ée ¿EÉa ,∂dP ¿É«Ñdh .äÉcô°ûdG √òg øe á≤MÉ°ùdG á«Ñ∏ZC’G á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG â∏μ°T being financial institutions. To illustrate, as many as eight of the 10 listed entities in two countries belong to financial äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG ´É£b ¤EG »ªàæJ ÚàdhO ‘ áLQóe äÉcô°T 10 π°UCG øe äÉcô°T 8 ¤EG π°üj institutions. .á«dÉŸG

Evidence appears to suggest that the relationship between ΩÉb äÉ°SGQO) ᪡Ñe QGô≤à°S’G áLQOh õcÎdG áLQO ÚH ábÓ©dG ¿CG ¤EG ádOC’G Ò°ûJh concentration and stability is ambiguous (Beck et al, 2003; äÉ°SGQódG òg ¿CG ’EG .(2005 Boyd and De Nicolo ,2003 Beck et al É¡H Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). However, these studies are √ focused on banking systems. Cetorelli et al. (2007) examines âãëH (2007) Cetorelli et al É¡H ΩÉb á°SGQO ‘h .á«aô°üŸG ᪶fC’G ≈∏Y õcôJ trends in financial market concentration in the US and finds OƒLh ¤EG π°UƒàdG ” ,á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG ‘ á«dÉŸG ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ õcÎdG äÉgÉŒG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 40 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

increasing evidence of interlinkage between 1990 and 2004. õcôJ äÉ«YGóJ ≈∏Y ádOC’Éa ∂dP ™eh .2004 ΩÉYh 1990 ΩÉY ÚH §HGÎ∏d í°VGh π«dO However, evidence on the implications of stock market èFÉàf §Ñ°V ºàëàj ¬fEÉa ∂dòd áé«àfk íLQC’G ≈∏Yh .IOhófi Èà©J á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G concentration appear to be limited. Presumably as a result, the policy conclusions which apply to banking markets would .º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ™e Ö°SÉæààd ‘ô°üŸG πª©dG ¥Gƒ°SCG ≈∏Y ≥Ñ£æJ »àdG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG need to be suitably tailored to suit equity markets.

References ™LGôŸG T.Beck, A.Demirguc-Kunt and R.Levine (2003). Bank äÉeRC’G :¿Gƒæ©H á°SGQO .(2003) R.Levine h A.Demirguc-Kunt h T.Beck concentration and crises. NBER Working Paper 9921. ájOÉ°üàb’G çƒëÑ∏d »æWƒdG ÖàμŸG ᣰSGƒH 9921 ºbQ πªY ábQh .∑ƒæÑdG õcôJh Cambridge: MA ¢ùà°Sƒ°ûJÉ°SÉe :êOÈeÉc .(NBER) J.Boyd and G. De Nicolo (2005). The theory of bank risk ‘ ô¶ædG IOÉYEGh ôWÉîŸG πª– ájô¶f .(2005) G. De Nicolo h J.Boyd taking and competition revisited. Journal of Finance 60, .1343 – 1329 ,60Oó©dG (Journal of Finance) á«dÉŸG á∏› .¢ùaÉæàdG 1329-43.

N. Cetorelli, B.Hirtle, D.Morgan, S.Peristiani and J.Santos J.Santos h S.Peristiani h D.Morgan h B.Hirtle h N. Cetorelli (2007). Trends in financial market concentration and their QGô≤à°SG ≈∏Y É¡JÉ«YGóJh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘ õcÎdG äÉgÉŒG :¿Gƒæ©H á°SGQO .(2007) implications for market stability. FRB New York Economic ,(¢SQÉe) (FRB) Qƒjƒ«æH »WÉ«àM’G ¢ù éŸG æH øe …OÉ°üàbG ôjô J .¥ƒ°ùdG Review (March), 33-51. ∑ ∏ ∂ ≤ .51 – 33

Developments in Qatar ô£b ‘ äGQƒ£àdG With real GDP growth of 14.1% in 2011, Qatar will be ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN %14^1 áÑ°ùæH »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ™e among the fastest growing economies in 2011 (Chart º°SQ) 2011 ÉY ‘ Gƒ‰k äGOÉ°üàb’G ´ô°SCG ÚH øe ô£b ádhO ¿ƒ à°S 11 Ω μ 1-13). The cumulative average growth has been %19 ‹GƒM »ªcGÎdG ƒªædG ∫ó©e §°Sƒàe ≠∏H óbh 11 .(13–1 ÊÉ«H around 19% over the last seven years. A significant RɨdG êÉàfEG ‘ ÒÑ dG ƒªædG ¿CG ɪc .á«°VÉŸG ™Ñ°ùdG äGƒæ°ùdG ióe Y increase in natural gas production, timely intervention μ ≈∏ in the banking system and continuing large public ÖfÉL ¤EG ,‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ Ö°SÉæŸG âbƒdG ‘ πNóàdGh ,»©«Ñ£dG investments in infrastructure have kept growth rates πc ,á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ‘ á©°SGƒdG ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG äGQɪãà°SG QGôªà°SG high and resulted in the accumulation of large surpluses IÒÑc ¢†FGƒa ºcGôJ ¤EG iOCGh ƒªædG ä’ó©e ´ÉØJQG ≈∏Y ßaÉM ∂dP in the fiscal and current accounts. The composition of ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG äÉfƒμe RÈJh .ájQÉ÷Gh á«dÉŸG äÉHÉ°ù◊G ‘ GDP highlights the overwhelming importance of the oil ÉÑjôk ≤J %54 ¬à°üM §°Sƒàe ≠∏Ñj) RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£≤d iÈμdG ᫪gC’G and gas sector (average share of roughly 54% during ‘ äÉeóÿG ´É£b á°üM âfÉch ,(2010 – 2006 øe IÎØdG ∫ÓN 2006-10); the share of services has, on average, been 12 less than 10% during this period (Chart 1-14).12 .(14–1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) IÎØdG √òg ∫ÓN %10 øe πbCG §°SƒàŸG

Chart 1-13: Fastest growing economies in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN kGƒ‰ äGOÉ°üàb’G ´ô°SCG :13-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

Eritrea Laos Papua New Guinea China Iraq Turkmenistan Panama Ghana Qatar Mongolia

48 1 122 1 166 2 200 Percent

11 11 Data for Qatar from Qatar Statistics Authority; for others, the Central Intelligence äGQÉÑîà°S’G ádÉch ƒg iôNC’G ∫hó∏d äÉfÉ«ÑdG Qó°üeh ,AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L ƒg ô£b ádhóH á°UÉÿG äÉfÉ«ÑdG Qó°üe Agency (World Factbook). .(⁄É©dG ∫ƒM ≥FÉ≤M) á«μjôeC’G 12 12 The hydrocarbon sector comprises of mining and quarrying; the non-hydrocarbon ,áYGQõdG :»g »£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG É¡∏ª°ûj »àdG ᣰûfC’Gh ,ôLÉëŸG ∫Ó¨à°SGh øjó©àdG ᣰûfCG RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£b πª°ûj sector comprises of agriculture and fishing, manufacturing, electricity and water, building πjƒªàdG äÉeóN ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ºYÉ£ŸGh ¥OÉæØdG ,IQÉéàdG ,ó««°ûàdGh AÉæÑdG ,AÉŸGh AÉHô¡μdG ,á«∏jƒëàdG áYÉæ°üdG ,∑ɪ°SC’G ó«°U and construction, trade, hotels & restaurants and finally, finance, insurance, real estate & business services. The remaining is classified as services. .∫ɪYC’G äÉeóNh ájQÉ≤©dG äÉeóÿGh ÚeCÉàdGh

41 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

‹ÉªLE’G » ëŸG œÉæ d »YÉ£ dG øjƒ àdG 14-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 1-14: Sectoral composition of Qatar’s GDP ∏ ∏ ≤ μ ô£b ádhód

100

80

60

Percent 40

20

0 19811981 1 1991991 2 2001001 2 2006006 2 2007007 2 2008008 2 2009009 2 2010010 2 2011011

services non-hydrocarbon hydrocarbon

An important feature of Qatar’s hydrocarbon reserve ±ÓîH ,ô£b ádhóH RɨdGh §ØædG »WÉ«àMG õ«Á Ée ºgCG øe is that, unlike several other regional economies, Qatar ≈∏Y ÈcCG πμ°ûH ô£b ádhO OɪàYG ƒg ,iôNC’G ᫪«∏bE’G äGOÉ°üàb’G relies more on gas, as opposed to oil. To illustrate, §ØædG »WÉ«àMG øe %5 ô£b ádhO ã“ å«M ;§ØædG HÉ e ‘ RɨdG Qatar accounts for 5% of GCC oil reserves, but 60% of π π ≤ GCC gas reserves; it accounts for a seventh of global »WÉ«àMG øe %60 πã“ É¡fCG ÚM ‘ ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO iód proven gas reserves (Table 1-8). However, the long-term RɨdG øe ócDƒŸG »ŸÉ©dG »WÉ«àM’G ™Ñ°S πã“ »gh ,∫hódG √òg iód RɨdG correlations indicate a relatively stronger association of ≈∏Y •ÉÑJQ’G äÓeÉ©e Ò°ûJ ,∂dP øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y .(8-1 ∫hóL) Qatar’s real GDP growth with oil price, as opposed to »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e ÚH É«Ñ°ùfk ájƒb ábÓY OƒLh ¤EG πjƒ£dG ióŸG gas price. A disaggregated decadal picture suggests Ò°ûJ ɪc ,RɨdG QÉ©°SCG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH §ØædG QÉ©°SCGh ô£b ádhód »≤«≤◊G limited correlation with gas prices in either of the sub- ™e OhóëŸG •ÉÑJQ’G ¤EG á«Yôa äGÎa Y É¡ª«°ù J ” »àdG äÉWÉÑJQ’G periods (Table 1-9). ≈∏ ≤ .(9-1 ∫hóL) á«YôØdG äGÎØdG øe …CG ∫ÓN RɨdG QÉ©°SCG Table 1-8: Proven oil and gas reserves of Qatar RɨdGh §ØædG øe ô£b ádhód ócDƒŸG »WÉ«àM’G :8-1 ∫hóL (end-2010) (2010 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f)

(Ö©μe Îe ¿ƒ«∏jôJ) »©«Ñ£dG RɨdG (π«eôH QÉ«∏e) §ØædG ádhódG Natural gas (trillion cu. m) Oil (billion barrels) Country

0.2 0.4 Bahrain øjôëÑdG

1.8 101.5 Kuwait âjƒμdG

0.7 5.5 Oman ¿ÉªYo

25.3 25.4 Qatar ô£b

8.0 264.5 Saudi Arabia ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG

6.0 97.8 UAE IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G

60.2 5.1 Qatar / GCC(%) (%) »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO /ô£b 33.4 3.4 Qatar / MENA(%) (%) É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe /ô£b 13.5 1.8 Qatar / World(%) (%) ⁄É©dG ∫hO /ô£b

Source: BP Statistical Review BP á«fÉ£jÈdG ∫hÎÑdG ácô°T äGAÉ°üMEG :Qó°üŸG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 42 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

The winning of the bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup OGR 2022 ΩÉ©d Ωó≤dG Iôμd ⁄É©dG ¢SCÉc áaÉ°†à°SG ‘ ô£b ádhO ìÉ‚ ¿EG has added to the sheen and is expected to ensure that ¿Éc »àdG ,ƒªædG ácôM ∫GóÑà°SG ∂dP øª°†j ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øeh ,É¡≤dCÉJ øe the growth momentum, previously being driven by the á«æÑdG ôjƒ£J äÉ« ª©H ,Ék HÉ°S É¡WÉ°ûf ‘ °†ØdG RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£ d hydrocarbon sector, will be replaced by infrastructure ∏ ≤ π ≤ development and continue in the medium-term. The QÉ°TCG óbh .§°SƒàŸG ióŸG ≈∏Y ∂dP QGôªà°SG ÖfÉL ¤EG ,á«°SÉ°SC’G Qatar Investment Fund (www.qatarinvestmentfund. ¤EG (www.qatarinvestmentfund.com) Qɪãà°SÓd ô£b ¥hóæ°U com) has observed that out of the total expenditure ≈∏Y IQô≤ŸG äÉahô°üŸG ´ƒª› øe »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 225 π°UCG øe ¬fCG of USD 225 billion planned over the next five years, QÉ«∏e 95 ƒëæH áeƒμ◊G äGQɪãà°SG Qóq ≤Jo ,áeOÉ≤dG ¢ùªÿG äGƒæ°ùdG ióe the government investment is estimated at USD 95 ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 23 `H RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£b äGQɪãà°SGh ,»μjôeCG Q’hO billion, hydrocarbon investment at USD 23 billion and ‘ » jôeCG Q’hO QÉ« e 107 ÑJ »àdGh á«bÉÑdG ᪫ dG Qɪãà°SG ºà«°Sh the remaining USD 107 billion is to be invested in the μ ∏ ≠∏ ≤ non-hydrocarbon sector. It’s credit rating is presently ™e iƒà°ùŸG ¢ùØf ≈∏Y ÊɪàF’G É¡Ø«æ°üJ »JCÉjh .»£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG on par with regional economies (Table 1-10). The É«aÉ°Vk EG ɪYOk OÉ°üàb’G ó¡°Th .(10–1 ∫hóL) ᫪«∏bE’G äGOÉ°üàb’G economy received a further boost in July 2010 when RQƒH ófCG OQófÉà°S ÊɪàF’G ∞«æ°üàdG ádÉch â©aQ ÉeóæY 2010 ƒ«dƒj ‘ Standard & Poor’s – the international rating agency – ¢ûeÉg Èà©jh .AA ¤EG AA- øe πLC’G πjƒW …OÉ«°ùdG ô£b ∞«æ°üJ raised its long-term sovereign rating for Qatar from ¢SÉ«≤e ƒgh) äGƒæ°S ¢ùªN IóŸ ÊɪàF’G Ì©àdG ôWÉfl πHÉ≤e QGó°UE’G “AA-“ to “AA”. The 5-year credit default swap (CDS) ô£b ádhO ‘ (ádhódG øe IQOÉ°üdG ¿ƒjódG ¿Éª°†d ´ƒaóŸG ÑŸÉH ¢UÉN spread (a measure of the price paid to insure debt ≠∏ issued by the country) of Qatar is presently among ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ä’ó©ŸG ≈fOCG ÚH øe ô°VÉ◊G âbƒdG ‘ the lowest for GCC countries. These spreads, which âfÉch ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO 30 ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 130 ¢ûeGƒ¡dG √òg â¨∏H å«M were around 83 basis points at the beginning of 2011, ∫ÓN ¬fCG ™bGƒdG ‘h .2011 ΩÉY ™∏£e ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 83 ƒëf â¨∏H ób stood at 130 basis points as on December 30, 2011. øY (CDS) ÊɪàF’G Ì©à∏d QGó°UE’G ¢ûeGƒg ¢SÉ«≤e ÚH ΩÉ©dG Gòg In fact, during the year, CDS spreads of Saudi Arabia ɇ ,ô£b ádhO øe ájOƒ©°ùdGá«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG iód ≈∏YCG äÉjƒà°ùe OƒLh were often higher than that of Qatar, reflecting the .(11–1 hóL) ôWÉîª d ¥ƒ°ùdG GQOEG ‘ øjÉÑàdG ¢ù ©j differential market perception of risks (Table 1-11). ∫ ∏ ∑ μ

Table 1-9: Long-term correlations (1981-2011)13 13 (2011-1981)πjƒ£dG ióŸG ≈∏Y äÉWÉÑJQ’G :9-1 ∫hóL

1981-2011 2001-2011 1991-2000 1981-1990 `H »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ •ÉÑJQG Correlation of real GDP growth with

0.455 (0.01) 0.619 (0.04) 0.168 (0.64) -0.689 (0.02) Log (oil price) (§ØædG QÉ©°SCG) ºàjQÉZƒd

0.506 (0.01) 0.353 (0.28) 0.311 (0.38) .. Log (gas price) (RɨdG QÉ©°SCG) ºàjQÉZƒd

p-Values in brackets p-Ú°Sƒ≤dG ÚH ∫ɪàM’G º«b

¢ù › hód jƒ£dG ióŸG Y ÊɪàF’G «æ°üàdG:10-1 hóL Table 1-10: GCC long-term ratings in 2011 ∏ ∫ π ≈∏ ∞ ∫ 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ûà«a ádÉch õjOƒe á°ù°SDƒe RQƒH ófCG OQófÉà°S ádÉch ádhódG Fitch Moody’s S&P Country

BBB Baa1 BBB Bahrain øjôëÑdG AA Aa2 AA Kuwait âjƒμdG .. A1 A Oman ¿ÉªYo .. Aa2 AA Qatar ô£b AA- Aa3 AA- Saudi Arabia ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG AA Aa2 AA UAE IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G

13 13 Oil price=Dubai spot crude prices (in USD per barrel); Gas price=US Henry Hub QÉ©°SCG ô°TDƒe = RɨdG QÉ©°SCG ,(óMGƒdG π«eÈ∏d »μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH) »HóH ΩÉÿG §Øæ∏d ájQƒØdG ™«ÑdG QÉ©°SCG = §ØædG ô©°S prices (in USD/ million Btu). Gas price is available for the year beginning 1989. QÉ©°SCÉH á°UÉÿG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ôaƒàJ .(á«fÉ£jôH ájQGôM IóMh ¿ƒ«∏e /»μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH) á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdÉH "Ög …Ôg" .1989 ΩÉY øe AGóàHGk RɨdG

43 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-11: Credit Default Swap spreads ÊɪàF’G Ì©àdG ôWÉfl ¢ûeGƒg :11-1 ∫hóL (5-year maturities, basis points) (¢SÉ°SCG •É≤f ,äGƒæ°S ¢ùªN É¡Jóe ¥É≤ëà°SG ∫ÉLBÉH) 2011 πjôHCG 29 ïjQÉàdG »°SÉ«≤dG ΩÉ©dG 2011 Ȫ°ùjO 31 ádhódG April 29, 2011 Date Peak Dec 31, 2011 Country

94 March 15 119 94 Abu Dhabi »ÑXƒHCG

94 March 17 120 88 Qatar ô£b 111 February 21 143 75 Saudi Arabia ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG 266 March 15 359 186 Bahrain øjôëÑdG

351 January 28 450 243 Egypt ô°üe

350 February 28 460 415 Dubai »HO

661 January 10 674 609 Ireland GóædôjG 649 April 26 681 501 Portugal ∫ɨJÈdG 1300 April 26 1356 1010 Greece ¿Éfƒ«dG

Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA) published the results ΩÉ©d á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG áæ«Y í°ùe èFÉàf (QSA) AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L ô°ûf of the Labor Force Sample Survey 2011. The major .á°SGQódG √ò¡d á«°ù«FôdG èFÉàædG √ÉfOCG (5–1 QÉWEG) í°Vƒj .2011 findings are highlighted in (Box 1-5).

Box 1-5: Labor Force Sample Survey á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG í°ùe :5 – 1 QÉWEG A survey of labor force characteristics in Qatar was 6^920 πª°ûj ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ ô£b ádhO ‘ á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG ¢üFÉ°üÿ í°ùe AGôLEG ” conducted in 2011, comprising of 6,920 households and .GOôak 35^839 h Iô°SCG 35,839 individuals.

Overall findings: The total working age population (aged ÚH ºgQɪYCG ìhGÎJ øjòdG) πª©dG ø°S ‘ ¿Éμ°ùdG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H :á«dɪLE’G èFÉàædG 15-64) stood at 1.47 million (86% of total population) ¿ƒ«∏e 1^17 º¡æe ,(¿Éμ°ùdG ´ƒª› øe %86 …CG) Oôa ¿ƒ«∏e 1^47 (áæ°S 64–15 comprising of 1.17 million males and the remaining females. k The economically active population amounted to 1.28 million ÉjOÉ°üàbG Ú£°ûædG ¿Éμ°ùdG OóY ≠∏Hh .çÉfE’G áÄa øe »bÉÑdG Oó©dGh ,QƒcòdG áÄa øe (1.12 million males and 158,188 females). The economically iƒ≤dG OóY ≠∏H ɪc .(158^188 çÉfE’Gh ,¿ƒ«∏e 1^12 QƒcòdG) Oôa ¿ƒ«∏e 1^28 active Qatari labor force was 77,410 whereas the non-Qatari ÒZ ¿Éμ°ùdG OóY ≠∏H ÚM ‘ ,GOôak 77^410 ÉjOÉ°üàbGk ᣫ°ûædG ájô£≤dG á∏eÉ©dG economically active population was 1.20 million. .GOôak ¿ƒ«∏e 1^20 ÉjOÉ°üàbGk Ú£°ûædG Újô£≤dG Participation rate: The participation rate amounted to ÚH ´RƒàJ ,%86^7 ájOÉ°üàb’G ácQÉ°ûŸG ∫ó©e ≠∏H :ájOÉ°üàb’G ácQÉ°ûŸG ∫ó©e 86.7%. Out of this, the rates were 95.7% for males and .%52^1 çÉfE’Gh ,%95^7 QƒcòdG 52.1% for females.

Occupation-wise status: Professionals comprise 9% of ÚM ‘ ,á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG øe %9 Ú«°UÉ°üàN’G áÑ°ùf ≠∏ÑJ :»æ¡ŸG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ™°VƒdG the labor force, whereas the share of craft workers and áÑ°ùf â¨∏H óbh .%60 â¨∏H áÑ°ùf ≈∏YCG ájOÉ©dGh á«aô◊G ø¡ŸG ‘ ádɪ©dG áÑ°ùf â∏é°S elementary occupation is the highest at 60%. The share of non-Qatari professionals in total economically active non- Ú£°ûædG Újô£≤dG ÒZ ¿Éμ°ùdG OóY ‹ÉªLEG øe %8 Újô£≤dG ÒZ Ú«°UÉ°üàN’G Qatari population was 8%, while the share of craft and trade â¨∏H áÑ°ùf ≈∏YCG ájQÉéàdGh á«aô◊G ø¡ŸG ‘ ádɪ©dG áÑ°ùf â∏é°S ÚM ‘ ,ÉjOÉ°üàbGk workers was the highest at around 40%. Among economically ºg %64 øe ÜQÉ≤j Ée ¿EÉa ,ÉjOÉ°üàbGk Ú£°ûædG Újô£≤dG ¿Éμ°ùdG ÚH øeh .%40 ƒëf active Qataris, nearly 64% comprised of professionals and .áÑà dGh Ú«°UÉ°üàN’G øe clerks. μ

Economic activity-wise status: Construction, trade ádɪ©dGh IQÉéàdGh ó««°ûàdG ᣰûfCG ‘ ádɪ©dG áÑ°ùf πμ°ûJ :…OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ádÉM and domestic-help related workers comprise 61% of the ‘ á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG áÑ°ùf â∏μ°T ɪc .ÉjOÉ°üàbGk Ú£°ûædG ¿Éμ°ùdG øe %61 á«dõæŸG economically active population. The share of workforce in finance and insurance is less than 1%. Among economically Ú£°ûædG Újô£≤dG ¿Éμ°ùdG ÚH øeh .%1 øe πbCG ÚeCÉàdG ᣰûfCGh á«dÉŸG ᣰûfC’G active Qataris, nearly 60% are in public administration %42 πª©j ÚM ‘ ;´ÉaódGh áeÉ©dG IQGOE’G ‘ %60 øe ÜQÉ≤j Ée πª©j ,ÉjOÉ°üàbGk and defence; whereas among non-Qataris, 42% of the áÑ°ùf πã“h .ó««°ûàdG ᣰûfCG ‘ ÉjOÉ°üàbGk Ú£°ûædG Újô£≤dG ÒZ ¿Éμ°ùdG ÚH øe economically active were in construction. Employment in ¿É °ùdG øe ‹GƒàdG Y %3^3 h %0^7 ÚeCÉàdG ᣰûfCGh á«dÉŸG ᣰûfC’G ‘ «XƒàdG finance and insurance comprised 0.7% and 3.3% of the μ ≈∏ ∞ economically active population for non-Qataris and Qataris, ádɪ©dG OóY ‹ÉàdG ∫hó÷G í°Vƒjh .ÉjOÉ°üàbGk Ú£°ûædG Újô£≤dGh Újô£≤dG ÒZ respectively. The actively employed population by sector in .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ´É£b πc Ö°ùM ÉjOÉ°üàbGk ᣰûædG 2011 is provided in the table.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 44 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Újô£≤dG Újô£≤dG ÒZ Sector Qataris Non-Qataris ´É£≤dG Government (Gov.) 55,170 46,395 »eƒμ◊G Gov. institutions/companies 9,017 35,375 á«eƒμM äÉ°ù°SDƒe /äÉcô°T Mixed 4,134 34,693 §∏àîŸG Private 6,279 946,374 ¢UÉÿG Diplomatic 16 1,558 »°SÉeƒ∏HódG Non-profit 64 484 »ëHôdG ÒZ

Domestic 0 131,515 ‹õæŸG

Total 74,680 1196,394 ´ƒªéŸG

Wages and working hours: Average monthly wages for all ∫ÉjQ 7^401 Ú∏eÉ©dG ™«ª÷ ájô¡°ûdG QƒLC’G §°Sƒàe ≠∏H :πª©dG äÉYÉ°Sh QƒLC’G workers was QR 7,401, while in government departments/ 18^000–15^000 ÚH äÉcô°ûdG /á«eƒμ◊G äGQGOE’G ´É£b ‘ ìhGôJ ÚM ‘ ,…ô£b companies, it ranged between QR 15,000-18,000. The average salary of Qatari males was the highest at nearly QR ƒëf â∏é°S áÑ°ùf ≈∏YCG QƒcòdG øe Újô£≤∏d ÖJGôdG §°Sƒàe ≠∏H óbh .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ 21,000, while non-Qatari females earned the lowest monthly ≈fOCG πé°S äÉjô£≤dG ÒZ çÉfEÓd ÖJGôdG §°Sƒàe ¿CG ÚM ‘ ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ 21^000 wage, on average, at around QR 3600. .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ 3600 ƒëf â¨∏H §°SƒàŸG ‘ áÑ°ùf Work hours are the lowest in government departments at áYÉ°S 39 ⨠H É¡d iƒà°ùe fOCG á«eƒ G äGQGOE’G ´É£b ‘ ª©dG äÉYÉ°S â é°S ɪc 39 hours a week, while domestic and construction have the ∏ ≈ μ◊ π ∏ maximum working hours. .AÉæÑdG ´É£bh ‹õæŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ É¡d iƒà°ùe ≈∏YCG â∏é°S ÚM ‘ ,É«YƒÑ°Sk CG

Unemployment rate: Overall unemployment rate was 0.6%, 1^2 π°UCG øe 7200 ƒëf ∫OÉ©J ,%0^6 »∏μdG ádÉ£ÑdG ∫ó©e ≠∏H :ádÉ£ÑdG ∫ó©e comprising of 7200 (out of the 1.2 million) economically .ÉjOÉ°üàbGk Ú£°ûædG Ú∏eÉ©dG ¿Éμ°ùdG øe ¿ƒ«∏e active workers.

References ™LGôŸG Qatar Statistics Authority. Labor Force Sample Survey .ô£b ádhO .(2011 Ȫaƒf) á∏eÉ©dG iƒ≤dG í°ùe .AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L (November 2011). Qatar.

As a move towards better measurement of international ¿hÉ©àdÉH ,á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG äÓeÉ©ª∏d ¢SÉ«b π°†aCG ≥«≤– ƒëf Iƒ£N ‘ financial transactions, in collaboration with the central ¢UÉN í°ùe ∫hCG AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L ≥∏WCG ,…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ™e bank, the Qatar Statistics Authority launched its first ôjGÈa ‘ á«∏«°üØàdG èFÉàædG QGó°UEG ” å«M ,á«ÑæLC’G äGQɪãà°S’ÉH foreign investment survey. The detailed results were .á°SGQódG ò¡d á«°ù«FôdG èFÉàædG ÉfOCG (6 – 1 QÉWEG) í°Vƒj .2012 released in February 2012. The major findings are √ √ summarized below (Box 1-6).

Box 1-6: Foreign Investment Survey ¢UÉÿG í°ùª∏d á«FÉ¡ædG èFÉàædG :6 – 1 QÉWEG in Qatar (Final Results) ô£b ‘ á«ÑæLC’G äGQɪãà°S’ÉH The total inward foreign investment in Qatar stood at QR ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 171^4 ƒëf 2009 ΩÉY ‘ ô£b ¤EG IOQGƒdG á«ÑæLC’G äGQɪãà°S’G ´ƒª› ≠∏H 171.4 billion in 2009 (roughly 48% of GDP), an increase of ƒëæH IOÉjR πãÁ Ée ƒgh ,(‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG øe %48 ¬àÑ°ùf Ée πμ°ûJ ) …ô£b 36.4% over 2008 figures of QR 125.6 billion. .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 125^6 â¨∏H »àdGh 2008 ΩÉY äÉfÉ«ÑH áfQÉk ≤e %36^4 Foreign direct investment (FDI) at QR 94.3 billion in 2009 …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 94^3 ¤EG π°üj Ée êQÉÿG ¤EG ô°TÉÑŸG »ÑæLC’G Qɪãà°S’G πé°S showed a growth of 45.7% over 2008 numbers of QR 64.7 64^7 â¨∏H »àdGh 2008 ΩÉY äGQɪãà°SG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH %45^7 ≠∏Ñj ƒªæH ,2009 ΩÉY ‘ billion. .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e Four economic sectors – mining (crude oil and natural RɨdGh ΩÉÿG §ØædG) øjó©àdG ´É£b »gh – á©ªà› ájOÉ°üàbG äÉYÉ£b á©HQCG â∏μ°T gas), manufacturing, finance and, construction – together ÜQÉ≤j Ée – ó««°ûàdG ´É£bh ,πjƒªàdG ´É£bh ,á«∏jƒëàdG áYÉæ°üdG ´É£bh ,(»©«Ñ£dG accounted for nearly 95% of Qatar’s total inward FDI by Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ ô£b ádhO ¤EG OQGƒdG ô°TÉÑŸG »ÑæLC’G Qɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG øe %95 end-December 2009. Out of the total inward FDI of QR 94.3 billion, the share of mining was the highest at QR 48 øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 48 ᪫≤H É¡d áÑ°ùf ≈∏YCG øjó©àdG ´É£b á°üM â¨∏H óbh .2009 billion (51% of total inward FDI). %51 …CG) OQGƒdG ô°TÉÑŸG »ÑæLC’G Qɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 94^3 π°UCG .(OQGƒdG ô°TÉÑŸG »ÑæLC’G Qɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG øe The major countries contributing to inward FDI in Qatar äÉj’ƒdG »g ô£b ádhóH OQGƒdG ô°TÉÑŸG »ÑæLC’G Qɪãà°S’G ‘ áªgÉ°ùŸG á«°ù«FôdG ∫hódG were United States (26%), Netherlands (26%), United äGQÉeE’Gh ,(%11^3) IóëàŸG áμ∏ªŸGh ,(%26) Góædƒgh ,(%26) á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG Kingdom (11.3%) and United Arab Emirates (7.8%). .(%7^8) IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG

45 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

The Qatari private sector invested mainly in four sectors Ió«Øà°ùŸG á«°ù«FôdG ∫hódG Èà©J ,êQÉÿG ¤EG ô°TÉÑŸG »ÑæLC’G Qɪãà°S’G á«MÉf øe – Finance and related (57%), Mining and quarrying (20%), äGQÉeE’Gh ,(%23) ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸGh ,(%24) á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG :»g Construction (16%) and manufacturing (5.4%). In terms of outward FDI, the three major recipient countries .(%12) IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG were United States (24%), Saudi Arabia (23%) and UAE (12%).

References ™LGôŸG Qatar Statistics Authority (2012). Foreign Investment .ô£b ádhO .(2010) á«ÑæLC’G äGQɪãà°S’G í°ùe .(2012) AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L Survey, 2010. Qatar.

For the year 2011 as a whole, a total of nearly 2500 IOÉ¡°T 2500 ‹GƒM ¤EG π°üj Ée QGó°UEG ” ,πμc 2011 ΩÉ©d áÑ°ùædÉH construction completion certificates for over 13,000 ÚàæKG ‘ É¡æe %75 ™≤j »àdGh ,Ó«ah á≤°T 13^000 øe ÌcC’ AÉæÑdG ΩÉ“EG apartments and villas were issued, of which 75% are øe ÌcCG QGó°UEG ” ,AGƒ°S óM Yh ,ádhódG ‘ á«°ù«FôdG äÉjó ÑdG øe in the two major municipalities. Likewise, over 3000 ≈∏ ∏ permits have been issued during the year 2011 for ‘h .Ó«ah á≤°T 12^000 øe ÌcC’ 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN AÉæH ¢ü«NôJ 3000 over 12,000 apartments and villas. In effect, this would ,äGQÉ≤©dG ¥ƒ°S ‘ øcÉ°ùŸG øe ÒÑc OóY ∫ƒNO ¤EG ∂dP Ò°ûj ôeC’G ™bGh suggest that a significant volume of housing supply ¿Éμ°SE’G äÉeóNh ≥aGôŸGh QÉéjE’G" óæH ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G ¬«∏Y ÖJÎj Ée ƒgh would be entering the real estate market, so as to .ádƒ ©e äÉjƒà°ùe øª°V ºî°†àdG ô°TDƒe ‘ "á °üdG äGP keep the “Rent, utilities and related housing services” ≤ ∏ component of inflation within manageable levels.

The World Bank 2012 Doing Business ranks Qatar á°SQɇ" ôjô≤J ‘ ádhO 183 ´ƒª› øe 36 áÑJôŸG ô£b ádhO â∏àMG 36 out of 183 economies as compared to a rank of áfQÉ≤ŸÉH 2012 ΩÉ©d ‹hódG ∂æÑdG √Qó°UCG …òdG "ájQÉéàdG ∫ɪYC’G 38 in 2011. Among the Middle East and North Africa ádhO 20 °UCG øe 3 áÑJôŸG ô£b à–h ,2011 ÉY ‘ 38 áÑJôŸG ™e (MENA) countries, Qatar ranks 3 out of 20 countries. π π Ω The comparative picture is presented in (Table 1-12). ¬Lh √ÉfOCG ∫hó÷G í°Vƒjh .É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ In 2012, Qatar has exhibited improvement in several ä’É› IóY ‘ Éæ°ù–k ô£b ádhO äó¡°T óbh .(12–1 ∫hóL) áfQÉ≤ŸG areas, perhaps the most significant of which has ,¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G á«fÉμeGE Ú°ù– ÉgRôHCG π©d ,2012 ΩÉY ∫ÓN been improving access to credit. The overall rank in 2011 ÉY ‘ 138 øe ¿ÉªàF’G Y ƒ°üë d á« dG áÑJôŸG â©ØJQG å«M terms of access to credit improved from 138 in 2011 Ω ≈∏ ∫ ∏ ∏μ to 98 in 2012. A major reason for this has been the ø°ùëàdG Gòg ‘ á«°ù«FôdG ÜÉÑ°SC’G óMCGh ,2012 ΩÉY ‘ 98 ¤EG π°üàd inauguration of Qatar Credit Bureau as a department ô£b ±ô°üŸ ™HÉJ õcôªc á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ô£b õcôe Ú°TóJ ƒg housed within the central bank in 2011. In an rapidly ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ójGõJh ƒªædG ™jô°S OÉ°üàbG πX ‘h .2011 ΩÉY ‘ …õcôŸG growing economy with increasing demand for credit, ƒæÑdG ójhõJ ‘ á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ ©ª d ô£b õcôe QhO ãªàj ,¿ÉªàF’G the role of the Credit Bureau will be to provide the ∑ ∏ ∏ π banks, corporate and financial institutions with credit Ëó≤J ‘ É¡JóYÉ°ùŸ á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸÉH á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh äÉcô°ûdGh information to assist them in the provision of credit øjÉÑJ (CG) :»g ±GógCG á©HQCG ∂dP ≥≤ëj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øeh .¿ÉªàF’G äÉeóN services. This is expected to serve a four-fold purpose: Ú°Vô≤ª∏d ìɪ°ùdG (Ü) ,Ú°Vô≤ŸGh Ú°VÎ≤ŸG ÚH äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ‘ πbCG (a) lower information asymmetries between borrowers ¢†ØN (ê) ,á¶ØëŸG IOƒL Ú°ù– ‹ÉàdÉHh ÈcCG ábóH ôWÉîŸG º«« àH and lenders; (b) allow lenders to evaluate risks more ≤ accurately and thereby improve portfolio quality; (c) (O) GÒNk CGh ,á«fɪàF’G IQGó÷G …hP øe Ú°VÎ≤ŸG ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’G áØ∏μJ lower the cost of credit for creditworthy borrowers and .ᩪ°ùdÉH á£ÑJôe äÉfɪ°V ≥∏N finally; (d) create reputational collateral. It would be á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG õcGôe ¤EG RÉéjÉHE Oó°üdG Gòg ‘ IQÉ°TE’G øe óH ’h useful in this context to briefly document the credit .(7–1 QÉWEG) »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO ‘ bureaus in operation in GCC countries (Box 1-7). ∏ ∏ ∫

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 46 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Table 1-12: World Bank’s Ease of ádƒ¡°S ∫ƒM ‹hódG ∂æÑdG ôjô≤J :12-1 ∫hóL Doing Business 2012 2012 ΩÉ©d ájQÉéàdG ∫ɪYC’G á°SQɇ

IQƒaɨæ°S IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ô£b Singapore á«μjôeC’G ájOƒ©°ùdG Qatar USA Saudi Arabia Paying tax 4 72 10 2 ÖFGô°†dG ™aO

Construction permits 3 17 4 24 AÉæÑdG ¢ü«NGôJ Trading across borders 1 20 18 57 Ohó◊G ÈY IQÉéàdG Registering property 14 16 1 37 á«μ∏ŸG π«é°ùJ Protecting investors 2 5 17 97 øjôªãà°ùŸG ájɪM Enforcing contracts 12 7 138 95 Oƒ≤©dG ò«ØæJ Starting business 4 13 10 116 ∫ɪYC’G AóH Getting credit 8 4 48 98 ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G Overall rank 1 4 12 36 á«∏μdG áÑJôŸG

Source: World Bank ‹hódG ∂æÑdG :Qó°üŸG

Chart 1-15: Doing business – Change in Qatar’s áÑJôŸ »æeõdG Ò¨àdG – ájQÉéàdG ∫ɪYC’G á°SQɇ :15-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ rank over time ô£b ádhO

Overall rank Starting business Getting credit Protecting investors Enforcing contracts Trading across borders Registering property Construction permit Paying tax 2010 2011 05 500 1 10000 1 15050 2012

Box 1-7: Credit Bureaus in GCC countries ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG õcGôe :7- 1 QÉWEG »é«∏ÿG Bahrain: Bahrain Credit Reference Bureau was been â– 2005 ΩÉY ‘ ¬∏ªY øjôëÑdG ‘ á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG õcôe ô°TÉH :øjôëÑdG in operation since 2005. It is regulated jointly by the ≈∏Y Ú©àjh .IQÉéàdGh áYÉæ°üdG IQGRh ™e ¿hÉ©àdÉH …õcôŸG øjôëÑdG ±ô°üe IQGOEG Central Bank of Bahrain and the Ministry of Industry and k Commerce. All financial institutions providing consumer ‘ áªgÉ°ùŸG ÊɪàF’G πjƒªàdGh Úμ∏¡à°ùª∏d É°Vhôb íæ“ »àdG á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG ™«ªL loans and credit financing are required to participate in .á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dÉH á∏°üàŸG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG π≤æH áeõ∏e äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG √òg ¿ƒμJ å«M ,õcôŸG the Bureau and it is mandatory for these institutions to ó«YGƒeh ,¿ÉªàF’G á«bÉØJG Ióeh ,ºFÉ dG ¿ÉªàF’G ‹ÉªLEÉH áMÉàŸG äÉeƒ ©ŸG ¢üàîJh relay information relevant to personal credit. The available ≤ ∏ information pertains to total outstanding credit, duration of .2011 ΩÉY ‘ %40 (Ú¨dÉÑdG áÑ°ùf) õcôŸG »£¨jh .™aódG ádÉMh ,™aódG credit agreement, payment frequency and payment status. The coverage of the Bureau (percentage of adults) was 40% in 2011.

47 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Kuwait: Ci-Net Credit Information Network has been in ¢üàîJ å«M ,2002 ΩÉY òæe É¡∏ªY á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG áμÑ°T ácô°T äô°TÉH :âjƒμdG operation since 2002 that collects and maintains data for ™≤Jh .âjƒμdG ‘ á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d ádOÉÑàŸG IóFÉØdG ≥«≤ëàd É¡¶ØMh äÉfÉ«ÑdG ™ªéH the mutual benefit of the financial institutions in Kuwait. These institutions are under the supervision of the Central .áYÉæ°üdGh IQÉéàdG IQGRhh …õcôŸG âjƒμdG ∂æH ±Gô°TEG â– äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG √òg Bank of Kuwait and The Ministry of Commerce and á«°üî°ûdG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG :»g äÉfÉ«H óYGƒb çÓãH á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG áμÑ°T ßØà–h Industry. It maintains three databases: customers personal É¡MôW ºàj »àdG äGQÉ°ùØà°S’G ™«ªL «é°ùJ ºàj) á HÉ°ùdG åëÑdG äÉeƒ ©eh ;AÓª© d information; previous search information (all enquiries π ≤ ∏ ∏ made during a credit application process are recorded in ábÉ£ÑdG äÉeƒ∏©eh ¢Vhô≤dG ÜÉ°ùMh (ΩɶædG ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G Ö∏W Ëó≤J á«∏ªY ∫ÓN the system) and loan account and card information (both ‘ %29 (Ú¨dÉÑdG áÑ°ùf) áμÑ°ûdG á«£¨J áÑ°ùf â¨∏Hh .(á«Ñ∏°ùdGh á«HÉéjE’G äÉfÉ«ÑdG) positive and negative data). The coverage of the Bureau (percentage of adults) was 29% in 2011. .2011 ΩÉY

Oman: The credit bureau, named National Bureau "ájQÉéàdG äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d »æWƒdG ÖàμŸG" `H ≈ª°ùŸG á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG õcôe ô°TÉH :¿ÉªYo Commercial Information was launched in 2008. Having ‘ IóFGQ á«ŸÉY ácô°T) Experian ácô°T ¤EG ¬eɪ°†fG ó©Hh .2008 ΩÉY ‘ ¬∏ªY teamed up with Experian, a leading global consumer credit rating agency, it collates, validates, pools and generates ôjQÉ≤àdÉH á°UÉÿG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ™ªéH ÖàμŸG Ωƒ≤j ,(»cÓ¡à°S’G ¿ÉªàF’G ∞«æ°üJ credit reports on individuals, SMEs on a real-time, web- ôjQÉ≤àdGh OGôaC’ÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ∂dPh ÉgQGó°UEGh É¡àë°U øe ≥≤ëàdGh á«fɪàF’G based platform for consumers and companies. âfÎf’G ÈY èeGÈdG ôjQÉ≤Jh ºé◊G ᣰSƒàŸGh IÒÑμdG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øY ájQƒØdG .äÉcô°ûdGh Úμ∏¡à°ùŸG ΩGóîà°S’ áMÉàŸG

Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Credit Bureau, operational ,á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ájOƒ©°ùdG ácô°ûdG Èà©J :ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG since 2004, is the sole licensed national credit bureau É¡d ¢üNôŸG Ió«MƒdG ácô°ûdG »g ,2004 ÉY òæe É«k ©a É¡ ªY äô°TÉH »àdGh offering consumer and commercial credit information Ω ∏ ∏ services to members in the country. It is regulated by the á°UÉÿG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG äÉeóN ÒaƒJ øY ádƒÄ°ùŸG ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ‘ central bank and is owned by the major banks in the country. ó≤ædG á°ù°SDƒe á∏¶e â– ácô°ûdG πª©Jh .…QÉéàdG ¿ÉªàF’Gh »cÓ¡à°S’G ¿ÉªàF’ÉH The providers of information to the Bureau include banks, financial and investment companies, real estate companies »àdG äÉ¡÷G πãªàJh .áμ∏ªŸG ‘ iÈμdG ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe ácƒ∏‡ »gh …Oƒ©°ùdG »Hô©dG and telecom companies. The coverage of the Bureau ájQÉ≤©dG äÉcô°ûdGh ájQɪãà°S’Gh á«dÉŸG äÉcô°ûdGh ∑ƒæÑdG ‘ ácô°û∏d äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ôaƒJ (percentage of adults) was 16% in 2011. ΩÉY ‘ %16 ¤EG (Ú¨dÉÑdG áÑ°ùf) ácô°ûdG á«£¨J áÑ°ùf π°üJh .ä’É°üJ’G äÉcô°Th United Arab Emirates: Constituted in 2006, the Emirates .2011 Credit Information Company (EmCredit) is the information á«JGQÉeE’G á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ ©ŸG ácô°T âÄ°ûfCG :IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G services company that provides a full range of credit- ∏ checking solutions and information services, including credit á©°SGh áYƒª› Ωó≤J äÉeƒ∏©e äÉeóN ácô°T Èà©J »gh ,2006 ΩÉY (EMCredit) information reports, cheque-honoring reports, business äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ôjQÉ≤J πª°ûJ ,äÉeƒ∏©ŸG äÉeóN Ëó≤Jh á«dÉŸG IAÓŸG ¢üëØd ∫ƒ∏◊G øe background profiles and other risk assessment solutions that improve business decision-making process. It is ∫ƒ∏Mh ájQÉéàdG á«Ø∏ÿGh äÉμ«°ûdG OGó°ùH ≥∏©àj ɪ«a á°UÉÿG ôjQÉ≤àdGh á«fɪàF’G incorporated as a private entity in the Dubai International á°UÉÿG äGQGô≤dG PÉîJG á«∏ªY ø°ù–q ¿CG É¡fCÉ°T øe »àdGh ,ôWÉîŸG º««≤àd iôNCG Financial Centre. The coverage of the Bureau (percentage ,»ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG »HO õcôe á∏¶e â– πª©J á°UÉN ácô°T »gh .ájQÉéàdG ∫ɪYC’ÉH of adults) was 29.2% in 2011. .2011 ΩÉY ‘ %29^2 ¤EG (Ú¨dÉÑdG áÑ°ùf) ácô°ûdG á«£¨J ¥É£f π°üjh References ™LGôŸG International Finance Corporation. Private credit bureaus ´ÓWÓd .⁄É©dG ∫ƒM á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d á°UÉÿG õcGôŸG .á«dhódG πjƒªàdG á°ù°SDƒe around the world. www.ifc.org :ÊhÎ dE’G ™bƒŸG IQÉjR Lôj ,äÉeƒ ©ŸG Y World Bank database on credit indicators. μ ≈ ∏ ≈∏ .¿ÉªàF’G äGô°TDƒe ∫ƒM ‹hódG ∂æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG äÉfÉ«ÑdG IóYÉb

With a score of 47.74, Qatar has been ranked 26 47^74 ó«°UôH (ádhO 125 ´ƒª› øe) 26 áÑJôŸG ô£b ádhO äRôMCG (out of 125 countries) in the recently released Global áÑJôŸÉH áfQÉk ≤e ,GôNk Dƒe QOÉ°üdG 2011 ΩÉ©d »ŸÉ©dG QÉμàH’G ô°TDƒe Ö°ùM Innovation Index 2011, up from 35 in the previous year, (29) Ú°üdG ãe "BRICS" `dG hO Y áeók àe ,»°VÉŸG É©dG ‘ 35 ahead of the BRICS, such as China (29), Brazil (47), π ∫ ≈∏ ≤ Ω Russia (56) and India (62). Among GCC countries, Qatar ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÚH øeh .(62) óæ¡dGh (56) É«°ShQh (47) πjRGÈdGh ranks well ahead its nearest rival, UAE with a score of ¢ùaÉæe ÜôbCG ≈∏Y ÒÑc ¥QÉØH ô£b ádhO Ωó≤àJ ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG 41.99 (Chart 1-16). Globally, Switzerland ranks at the º°SQ) 41^99 Égó«°UQ ≠∏H »àdG IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ádhO »gh É¡d top with of 63.82 (out of a maximum possible score ∫hódG áeó≤e ‘ Gô°ùjƒ°S »JCÉJ ,»ŸÉ©dG ó«©°üdG ≈∏Yh .(16–1 ÊÉ«H of 100), whereas Algeria is the lowest-placed economy ,(É¡∏«é°ùJ øμÁ áLQO ≈°übCG »gh 100 ´ƒª› øe) 63^82 ó«°UôH with a score of 19.79. ⁄É©dG ‘ äGOÉ°üàb’G ™«ªL ÚH øe áÑJôe ≈fOCG ôFGõ÷G â∏é°S ÚM ‘ .19^79 ó«°UôH

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 48 Macroeconomic Developments »∏μq dG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J

Chart 1-16: Global Innovation Index »ŸÉ©dG QÉμàH’G ô°TDƒe :16-1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

125 885 100 770

75 555 Rank Score 50 440

25 225

0 101 a E d A A i H M W SA A BH QA KW OM UAE Algeria Switzerland 2010 2011 Score in 2011 (Right scale)

Concluding remarks á«eÉàÿG äɶMÓŸG Real GDP growth in the GCC is expected to be ∫hO ‘ »≤«≤◊G ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e π°üj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe 7.2% in 2011 on the back of soaring oil revenues ´ÉØJQ’G á«Ø∏N ≈∏Y 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %7^2 ¤EG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› emanating from elevated oil prices. While fiscal stimuli by governments will provide a boost to the non-oil âbƒdG ‘h .á©ØJôŸG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG øY ºLÉædG §ØædG äGóFÉY ‘ ójó°ûdG sector, a weak global outlook is likely to see a dip in ÒZ ´É£≤∏d ɪYOk äÉeƒμ◊G É¡eó≤J »àdG á«dÉŸG õaGƒ◊G ¬«a πã“ …òdG growth to 4% in 2012. ΩÉY ‘ %4 ¤EG É©LGôJk ƒªædG ó¡°ûj ¿CÉH äÉ©bƒJ ∑Éæg ¿CG ’EG ,»£ØædG .»ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G ∞©°V áé«àf 2012 After experiencing double-digit growth for a major ó≤©dG øe IÒÑc IÎa ∫ÓN ÉØYÉ°†ek Gƒ‰k ô£b ádhO äó¡°T ¿CG ó©H part of the last decade, growth in Qatar is expected RÉ‚EG X ‘ 2012 ÉY ‘ ƒªædG Gòg ™LGÎj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ¬fEÉa ,»°VÉŸG to abate in 2012 with the completion of major π Ω hydrocarbon projects. According to IMF estimates, ¥hóæ°U äGôjó≤J ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£b ‘ iÈμdG ™jQÉ°ûŸG total hydrocarbon export earnings approached USD ƒëf RɨdGh §ØædG ´É£b ‘ ôjó°üàdG äGóFÉY ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H ,‹hódG ó≤ædG 100 billion in 2011 and non-hydrocarbon exports, principally petrochemicals, is expected to add äGQOÉ°U ™ØJôJ ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øeh ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 100 another USD 6.4 billion. What this indicates is that QÉ«∏e 6^4 QGó≤à ,äÉjhɪ«chÎÑdG ´É£b ɪ«°S’ ,»£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG the non-hydrocarbon sector will emerge as the major Iƒ dG ¿ƒ j ±ƒ°S »£ØædG ÒZ ´É£ dG ¿CG ¤EG IQÉ°TEG dPh .» jôeCG Q’hO growth driver, supported by significant government ≤ μ ≤ ∂ μ expenditures. Indeed, over the past couple of years, óbh .ÒÑμdG »eƒμ◊G ¥ÉØfE’G É¡ªYój ,ƒªædG á∏éY ™aóJ »àdG á«°ù«FôdG the share of the non-hydrocarbon sector (excluding ´É£b (äÉeóÿG ´É£b AÉæãà°SÉH) »£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG á°üM äRhÉŒ services) has exceeded that of the hydrocarbon sector. The buoyant oil prices and large proven reserves IôgOõŸG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG ôaƒJh .Ú«°VÉŸG ÚeÉ©dG ióe ≈∏Y RɨdGh §ØædG provide the economy with sufficient headroom to ≈∏Y √QOÉ°üe ™«°Sƒàd OÉ°üàbÓd á«aÉc á°Uôa ÒÑμdG ócDƒŸG »WÉ«àM’Gh prudently deploy its resources over the longer-term. á«æWƒdG ᫪æàdG á«é«JGΰSEG äQóbq óbh . ©àe °ûH jƒ£dG ióŸG The National Development Strategy 2011-16 has π≤ πμ π estimated that 5 percentage points of additional ‘É°VE’G …Qɪãà°S’G ¥ÉØfE’G øe ájƒÄe •É≤f 5 Ωõ∏j ¬fCG 2016 - 2011 public sector investment spending would be »£ØædG ÒZ ´É£≤dG êÉàfEG ´ÉØJQG ‘ âbDƒe ´QÉ°ùJ çGóME’ ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d needed to generate 0.5 percentage point temporary acceleration of growth in non-hydrocarbon output. It is ´É£≤dG êÉàfEG ƒ‰ ¿CG ¤EG äGôjó≤àdG Ò°ûJ ɪc .ájƒÄe •É≤f 0^5 QGó≤à also estimated that growth in non-hydrocarbon output ºàjh .2016 – 2011 øe IÎØdG ∫ÓN %9 ¤EG π°ü«°S »£ØædG ÒZ will average around 9% during 2011-16. Downside äÉ« ªY õjõ©J ÓN øe Ék Ñ°ùe ƒªædÉH á£ÑJôŸG á«Ñ °ùdG ôWÉîŸG á÷É©e risks to growth are being proactively addressed ∏ ∫ ≤ ∏ by fostering improvements in human capital and ™°†J ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øeh .á«°ùaÉæàdG IQó≤dG ºYOh …ô°ûÑdG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ôjƒ£J reinforcing competitiveness. All these improvements ó«÷G ´ƒæàdGh Iƒ≤dÉH ™àªàj OÉ°üàb’ ¢SÉ°SC’G ôéM äGQƒ£àdG √òg ™«ªL are expected to lay the foundation of a robust and well-diversified economy over the longer-run. .πjƒ£dG ióŸG ≈∏Y

49 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J

اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ CHAPTER TWO

اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ّﺗﻄﻮرات اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ ّاﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ واﻟﺴﻴﻮﻟﺔ MONETARY AND LIQUIDITY DEVELOPMENTS

Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

INTRODUCTION áeóq ≤ŸG The global economy faced new and complex áÄ«H ‘ 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN Ió≤©eh IójóL äÉjó– »ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G ¬LGh challenges during 2011 in an increasingly uncertain ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ô¡¶J äCGóH »àdG ±hÉîª∏d ÉaÓîak .Ú≤«dG ΩóY É¡«a ójGõJ economic environment. However, contrary to fears ‘h .A»£H πμ°ûH ɉ øμdh »ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G ƒ‰ ∞bƒàj ⁄ ôNB’ ÚM øe that came to the fore repeatedly during the course k k of the year, growth did not stall but continued on ,2011 ΩÉY ájGóH ‘ Gó«L É°TÉ©àfG áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G äô¡XCG ÚM the path of slow recovery. The recovery in Advanced »àdG ¿ƒjódG áeRCG áé«àf ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ™e â©LGôJ ób Égƒ‰ ä’ó©e ¿EÉa Economies (AEs) that seemed to be shaping well at ™LGôJ øe ¬æY èàf Éeh ‹ÉŸG AGOC’G ∞©°Vh hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ ÉgóeCG ∫ÉW the start of 2011 lost momentum towards the end of äGOÉ°üàb’G äôKq CÉJ ó≤dh .AGƒ°S óM ≈∏Y Úμ∏¡à°ùŸGh ∫ɪYC’G ∫ÉLQ á≤K the year as the protracted debt crisis in the Euro Area ¿CG ó©H 2011 ΩÉY øe ÒNC’G Aõ÷G ‘ ÉÑk ∏°S ÉgQhóH á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG and fiscal fragilities dampened business and consumer hC’G °üædG ÓN »ŸÉ©dG …OÉ°üàb’G DƒWÉÑàdG øY É«Ñ°ùfk ádhõ©e â X confidence. Reflecting the knock on effects, emerging ∫ ∞ ∫ ∏ and developing economies (EDEs) got adversely ™LGQ) áæ°ùdG ájÉ¡f ‘ Égƒ‰ DƒWÉÑJ ¤EG iOCG …òdG ôeC’G ,ΩÉ©dG øe affected in the later part of 2011 after remaining .(π«°UÉØàdG øe ójõŸ ∫hq C’G π°üØdG relatively insulated from the global slowdown during the first half. As a result, growth in major EDEs decelerated towards the end of the year (See Chapter 1 for details).

Although weak growth momentum kept global ôWÉfl ≈≤HCG ób »ŸÉ©dG ó«©°üdG ≈∏Y ƒªædG ∞©°V ¿q CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y inflation risk under check, inflation between AEs and ÚH âJhÉØJ ób ºî°†àdGq ä’ó©e ¿CG ’EG ,Iô£«°ùdG â– ºî°†àdGq EDEs exhibited divergent trends during 2011. In the .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’Gh áeóq ≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G later part of the year, inflation rose in AEs, while EDEs q generally witnessed stabilization of prices. For instance, äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e ™ØJQG ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÒNC’G Aõ÷G »Øa annual CPI inflation in the US at the end of 2011 at GQGôk ≤à°SG ÉeƒªYk á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G äó¡°T ÚM ‘ áeóq ≤àŸG 3.0% was twice that of the previous year, while those …ƒæ°ùdG ºî°†àdGq ∫ó©e ∞YÉ°†J ∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Yh .QÉ©°SC’G äÉjƒà°ùe ‘ in the Euro Area and the UK were higher and above ájÉ¡f ‘ IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG ‘ ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdÉH É°SÉk ≤e their respective inflation targets. In these economies, ,á≤HÉ°ùdG áæ°ùdÉH ¢UÉÿG ¬∏«ãe ∞©°V πãÁ Ée ƒgh %3^0 ¤EG 2011 ΩÉY the main driver of inflation was higher energy prices YCG âfÉc IóëàŸG á ªŸGh hQƒ«dG á £æe ‘ á é°ùŸG ÉbQC’G ¿CG ÚM ‘ arising from cyclical pressures and geopolitical ≈∏ μ∏ ≤ ∏ Ω tensions – the latter keeping global crude prices at an QÉ©°SCG ´ÉØJQG ¿Éc óbh .ºî°†à∏d áaó¡à°ùŸG äÉjƒà°ùŸG äRhÉŒ å«M elevated level throughout the year. In contrast, major äGôJƒàdGh ᫪°SƒŸG •ƒ¨°†dG øY ºLÉædG -äGOÉ°üàb’G ∂∏J ‘ ábÉ£dG EDEs such as China and Russia witnessed a softening â∏X å«M ,ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e ´ÉØJQ’ »°ù«FôdG ÖÑ°ùŸG ƒg -á«°SÉ«°ùdG of inflation pressures although several others faced ,πHÉ≤ŸG ‘h .ΩÉ©dG á∏«W ™ØJôe iƒà°ùe óæY á«ŸÉ©dG ΩÉÿG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG higher risks. This divergence among EDEs was due to É©LGôJk É«°ShQh Ú°üdG πãe iÈμdG á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G äó¡°T several factors viz., domestic business cycles, external ôWÉfl iôNCG hO IóY ¬«a äó¡°T âbh ‘ ᫪àdGq •ƒ¨°†dG ‘ demand and imported pressures from higher crude oil ∫ prices. äGOÉ°üàb’G ÚH ºî°†àdG äÉjƒà°ùe ‘ ±ÓàN’G Gòg Oƒ©jh .ÈcCG á«q ∏ëŸG ájOÉ°üàb’Gq äGQhódG É¡æe IóYq πeGƒY ¤EG á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG ´ÉØJQG øY áŒÉædG IOQƒà°ùŸG ᫪àdG •ƒ¨°†dGh »LQÉÿG Ö∏£dGh .ΩÉÿG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG

Against the above backdrop, the chapter presents á°UÉÿG á«°ù«FôdGq äGQƒ£àdGq π°üØdG Gòg ¢Vô©j ,≥Ñ°S Ée Aƒ°V ‘ the major developments in global monetary policy in ÒHGóàd Ó«k ∏– Ωóq ≤j ɪc .‹ÉàdG º°ù≤dG ‘ á«ŸÉ©dGq ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH the next section. In this context, the monetary policy .2011 ÉY ÓN …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÉgòîJGq »àdG ájó ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG measures taken by the Qatar Central Bank (QCB) Ω ∫ ≤ during 2011 are analyzed in the following section. The ,ô£b ‘ …ó≤ædG ´É£≤dG ‘ á«°ù«FôdGq äGQƒ£àdGq á≤MÓdG ΩÉ°ùbC’G ¢ûbÉæJh key developments in the monetary sector of Qatar, πÑb øe ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG äÉ«∏ªYh ,ºî°†àdG èFÉàf º««≤J ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH an assessment of the inflation outcome, liquidity äɶMÓŸG OôJh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á«∏ëŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG äÉgÉŒGh ±ô°üŸG management operations of the QCB and trends in .ÒNC’G º°ù≤dG ‘ á«eÉàÿG domestic interest rates during the year are discussed in the subsequent sections. The concluding observations are presented in the final section. Global Monetary Policy á«ŸÉ©dG ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG Reflecting their growth - inflation dynamics, the monetary ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG õ«côJ Ò¨Jq ¿CG ƒªædGh ºî°†àdG äÉÑ∏≤J áé«àf øe ¿Éc policy focus on both AEs and EDEs changed course Gk Ò¨Jq á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’Gh áeóq ≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G øe πc ‘ significantly during 2011. In this regard, the shifting É¡Jó¡°T »àdG ∫ƒëàdG íeÓe âÑ©d óbh .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ÉXƒëk ∏e

53 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG contours of the Eurozone crisis played a key role. The ÚH á∏°VÉØŸG â≤dCG óbh .QÉWE’G Gòg ‘ É«°ù«FQk GQhOk hQƒ«dG á≤£æe áeRCG trade-off between managing inflation expectations and ≈∏Y á¶aÉëŸG πLCG øe ƒªæ∏d á©aGO Iƒb ÒaƒJh ºî°†àdG äÉ©bƒJ IQGOEG providing an impetus to growth in order to sustain the recovery increasingly weighed on the policy calculus ÚM ‘h .ájõcôŸGq ±QÉ°üŸG á°SÉ«°S ≈∏Y ójGõàe πμ°ûH É¡∏≤ãH ¢TÉ©àf’G of central banks. While inflation concerns generally ‘ ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG ójó°ûJ ¤EG ΩÉY πμ°ûH ºî°†àdG øe ±hÉîŸG äOq CG prompted monetary tightening in the first half, many Oƒ«≤dG ∞«ØîJ ƒëf ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG øe ÒãμdG â¡ŒG ,∫hC’G ∞°üædG central banks shifted to policy easing by reducing rates õjõ©Jh IóFÉØdG ä’ó©e ¢†ØN ∫ÓN øe ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG and enhancing liquidity to address growth concerns, particularly with the intensification of the sovereign ¿ƒjódG áeRCG OGóà°TG ™e ɪ«°S’ ,ƒªædG ™LGôJ ôWÉfl á¡LGƒŸ ádƒ«°ùdG debt crisis in the later part of the year. .ΩÉ©dG øe ÒNC’G Aõ÷G ‘ ájOÉ«°ùdG

At the beginning of 2011, global monetary policy á∏Môe øe É«éjQóJk á«ŸÉ©dGq ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG âdƒ–q ,2011 ΩÉY ájGóH ‘ stance gradually shifted from being accommodative ”q óbh .᫪àdGq •ƒ¨°†dG ójGõJ ™e ójó°ûàdG á∏Môe ¤EG Ò°ù«àdG to a calibrated phase of tightening in the wake of rising inflation pressures. Much of the policy tightening áÄ°TÉædG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘ ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG ójó°ûJ äGAGôLEG øe ÒãμdG ≥«Ñ£J were in emerging markets where inflation ruled above ´ÉØJQG ÖÑ°ùH áaó¡à°ùŸG äÉjƒà°ùŸG ¥ƒa ºî°†àdG ä’ó©e â©ØJQG å«M announced or indicative targets due to rising global IOÉjR …CG) »∏ëŸG …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG Iƒbhq ΩÉÿG §Øæ∏d á«ŸÉ©dG QÉ©°SC’G crude oil prices and strong domestic economic activity ,á«°ù«FôdGq áeóq ≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G øª°V øeh .(∞«dÉμàdG ´ÉØJQGh Ö∏£dG (i.e. both demand pull and cost push). Among the major AEs, the European Central Bank (ECB) raised its πc ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 25 QGó≤à IóFÉØdG ô©°S »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ™aQ policy rate by 25 basis points each in April and July, OÉjORG ¤EG GÒ°ûek 2009 ƒjÉe øe ôªà°SGq äÉÑK ó©H 2011 ƒ«dƒjh πjôHCG øe 2011 after a pause since May 2009 citing growing äGOÉ°üàb’G äôªà°SG ÚM ‘h .QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°S’ IOó¡ŸG ôWÉîŸG upside risks to price stability. While major EDEs such as êÉ¡àfG ‘ ΩÉY øe ÌcC’ óæ¡dGh Ú°üdG πãe á«°ù«FôdG á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG China and India had been tightening monetary policy for more than a year, several other central banks also πãe) iôNC’G ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG øe ójó©dG ¿EÉa ,IOó°ûàe ájó≤f á°SÉ«°S raised rates (e.g., South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Sweden, (∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y Éjõ«dÉeh ójƒ°ùdGh πjRGÈdGh É«°ShQh á«Hƒæ÷G ÉjQƒc Malaysia). The US Fed and the Bank of Japan (BoJ), ∂æH ¿EÉa iôNCG á«MÉf øe .IóFÉØdG ä’ó©eq ™aôH iôNC’G »g âeÉb however, continued with accommodative monetary á°SÉ«°S ´ÉÑJEG ‘ Gôªà°SGq ¿ÉHÉ«dG ∂æHh »μjôeC’G ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G policy in view of the existing slack in domestic economic activity. Similarly, the Reserve Bank of New ɪc .»∏ëŸG …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ‘ ºFÉ≤dG DƒWÉÑàdG Aƒ°V ‘ áfôe ájó≤f Zealand (RBNZ) acted pre-emptively by reducing the ¢†«ØîJ ≥jôW øY á«FÉbhq äGAGôLEG …óæ∏jRƒ«ædG »WÉ«àM’G ∂æH òîJG Official Cash Rate (OCR) in March by 50 basis points ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 50 QGó≤à ¢SQÉe ‘ »ª°SôdG IóFÉØdG ô©°S following a fatal earthquake in February 2011. .2011 ôjGÈa ‘ çóM …òdG ôeóŸG ∫GõdõdG Several factors such as intensifying concerns over the ∞°üædG ∫ÓN á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ≈∏Y É¡∏≤ãH πeGƒY IóY â≤dCG global recovery and debt sustainability, challenges ¢TÉ©àf’G ¿CÉ°ûH ±hÉîŸG ≥ª©J :πeGƒ©dG √òg øeh 2011 ΩÉY øe ÊÉãdG involved in meeting fiscal austerity targets and European banks’ high balance sheet exposure to á°UÉÿG äÉjóëàdGh ¿ƒjódG πª– ≈∏Y IQó≤dGh »ŸÉ©dG …OÉ°üàb’G troubled sovereign debt instruments loomed large ∑ƒæÑdG äÉ«fGõ«Ÿ ÒÑμdG ±É°ûμf’Gh ‹ÉŸG ∞°û≤àdG ±GógCG ≥«≤ëàH over global financial markets during the second äÉHGô£°V’G äOógq ɪc .ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG äGhOCG ≈∏Y á«HhQhC’G half of 2011. The financial turmoil arising from the ¢TÉ©àf’G á∏bô©H ¿Éfƒ«dG ‘ ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG áeRCG øY áªLÉædG á«dÉŸGq Greek sovereign debt crisis threatened to derail the sustainability of global recovery. Amidst increasing •É°ûædG ‘ ÒÑc ™LGôJ øe ±hÉîŸG ójGõJ §°Shh .»ŸÉ©dG …OÉ°üàb’G fears of a major downturn in economic activity, çhóM ∂dP Ωõ∏à°SGh »°ù«FôdG ±ó¡dG ƒªædG AÉ«MEG íÑ°UCG ,…OÉ°üàb’G reviving growth became the paramount objective of á≤£æe É¡Jó¡°T »àdG áeRC’G ÜÉ≤YCG »Øa .äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ùcÉ©e Ò«¨J policy necessitating a reversal of the policy stance. ÚH áfRGƒŸG ¬àdhÉfi ‘ GÒÑck ÉbRk CÉe »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ¬LGh ,hQƒ«dG In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the ECB faced major policy dilemmas as it tried to balance diverse ¢ûjÉ©àdGh ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’Gh QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°SG øe πμd á°VQÉ©àŸG ±GógC’G objectives of price stability, financial stability and .(1-2 QÉWEG) ájOÉ«°ùdGq ¿ƒjódG ™e sovereign debt sustainability (Box 2-1).

Box 2-1: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability and ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’Gh ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG :1-2 QÉWEG Sovereign Debt Sustainability – Feedback Loops áZôØŸG á≤∏◊G – ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG πª– ≈∏Y IQó≤dGh The sovereign debt crisis suggests that policies in pursuit QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°SG ≥«≤– ¤EG áaOÉ¡dG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ¿CG ¤EG ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG áeRCG Ò°ûJ of price stability, financial stability and debt sustainability ‘h .IOƒ°ü e ÒZh Ióq ©e ¥ô£H YÉØàJ Ée ÉÑdÉZk ¿ƒjódG á¡LGƒeh ‹ÉŸG QGô à°S’Gh often interact in complex and unintended ways. While ≤ ≤ π ≤ sometimes they are supportive of each other, they can .iôNCG ¿É«MCG ‘ ¢VQÉ©àJ ób É¡fCG ’EG ,ÉfÉ«Mk CG ¢†©ÑdG É¡°†©H äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG √òg ºYóJ ÚM also run contrary at other times. Paradoxically, the tensions äÉbhC’G ‘ É¡æY äÉeRC’G äÉbhCG ‘ ∞∏àîJ ób äÓ°VÉØŸGh äGôJƒàdG ¿CG äÉbQÉØŸG øeh and trade-offs may be different in crisis times from normal .ájOÉ©dG times.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 54 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Price Stability ↔ Financial Stability: A recent example of ∂æÑdG ΩÉ«b ¢VQÉ©àdG Gòg ≈∏Y ∫Éãªch :‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ↔ QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°SG this conflict was when the ECB raised interest rates twice ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ƒ«dƒjh πjôHCG …ô¡°T ‘ ÚJôe IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG IOÉjõH »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG during April-July in the wake of emerging inflationary pressures, only to reverse it later in November-December Ȫ°ùjOh Ȫaƒf ‘ IOÉjõdG √òg ≥«Ñ£J øY ¬«∏îJ ºK IóYÉ°üàŸG ᫪àdGq •ƒ¨°†dG in order to restore financial stability. On the other hand, ájó≤ædG äÉ©°SƒàdG øe ±ó¡dG ¿Éc ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ≥«≤– πLCG øe the extraordinary monetary expansion undertaken by the Ò°ù«àdG" øe ÚàdƒL ÈY ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G ¢ù∏› ÉgGôLCG »àdG ájOÉ©dG ÒZ Fed through two rounds of ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE) ô£î d QÉ©°SC’G QGô à°SG ¢Vô©j ób ¬fq CG ’EG ,‹ÉŸG QGô à°S’G « – ‘ øª j "»ª dG were aimed at restoring financial stability but may actually ∏ ≤ q ≤ ≥ ≤ μ μ jeopardize price stability in future. .πÑ≤à°ùŸG ‘

Financial Stability ↔ Debt Sustainability: The crisis ¿CG √OÉØe ÉeÉgk É°SQOk áeRC’G ôaƒJq :¿ƒjódG πª–q ≈∏Y IQó≤dG ↔ ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G provides an important lesson on how fiscal expansion in GPEÉa .ájOÉ«°ùdGq ¿ƒjódG πª–q ≈∏Y IQó≤dG Oó¡j ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ºYód ,‹ÉŸG ™°SƒàdG support of financial stability can threaten sovereign debt k sustainability. If the sovereign is already highly indebted áÑ°ùædÉH ∫É◊G ¿Éc ɪc) Éjƒbq …OÉ°üàb’G ¢TÉ©àf’G øμj ⁄h ¿ƒjódÉH á∏≤ãe ádhódG âfÉc and the economic recovery is not robust (as was the case IƒéØdG ó°ùdq ¢VGÎb’G ¤EG êÉàëà°S äÉeƒμ◊G ¿EÉa ,(á«HhQhC’G ∫hódG øe ójó©dG ¤EG with several European countries), governments will need É¡°ùØf äÉeƒμ◊G óŒ ób ,ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG Gòg πãe ‘h .π«NGóŸG ™LGôJ øY áªLÉædG á«dÉŸGq to borrow to bridge the fiscal gap arising out of the dip in revenue earnings. In such a scenario, they may potentially É¡JQób ¢Vô©jq ɇ ,¬≤«≤– ∫hÉ– …òdG »JGòdG ‹ÉŸG õjõ©àdG ¢ùcÉ©J áZôØe á≤∏M ‘ get trapped in a self-reinforcing adverse fiscal feedback- ∫Éãe í°VhCG ¿Éfƒ«dG å«M -á«°ùμ©dG ádÉ◊G ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ÉeCG .ô£î∏d ¿ƒjódG πª–q ≈∏Y loop which will, eventually, jeopardize the sustainability QGô≤à°S’G ¢†jô©J ¤EG …ODƒj ¿ƒjódG πª– ≈∏Y IQó≤dÉH Ωɪàg’G ¿EÉa -∂dP ≈∏Y of debt. For the reverse causality i.e., debt sustainability ,áeƒ G PÉ fE’ øjódG AÖY º°SÉ J á«fÉfƒ«dG ƒæÑdG øe Ö Wo ó a .,ô£î d ‹ÉŸG threatening financial stability, the Greek situation is clearly μ◊ ≤ ≤ ∑ ∏ ≤ ∏ the most glaring example. Greek banks were asked to share Gòg ¿q CG ’EG ,É¡∏ª–q øμÁ ádƒ≤©e äÉjƒà°ùe ¤EG ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG ¢†ØN øμÁ å«ëH the burden of bailing out the government, so that sovereign .ÉbÉ£fk ™°ShC’G ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G Oó¡jhq ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«dÉŸG õcGôŸG ≈∏Y ôKDƒj ±ƒ°S ôeC’G debt could be brought down to sustainable levels. This, however, will affect their collective balance sheet viability and potentially threaten broader financial stability.

Debt Sustainability ↔ Price Stability: The most obvious ÉMƒ°Vhk ÌcC’G πNóŸG øªμj :QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°SG ↔ ¿ƒjódG πª–q ≈∏Y IQó≤dG route for sovereign debt concerns impinging on price .»eƒμ◊G øjódG π««°ùJ ‘ QÉ©°SC’G QGô≤à°SG ≈∏Y ôKDƒJ »àdG ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG ±hÉîŸ stability is through the monetization of government debt. q If open market operations (OMOs) are conducted to bail øe óë∏d hCG á«dÉŸGq äÉHƒ©°üdG ¬LGƒJ ádhO PÉ≤fE’ áMƒàØŸG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«q ∏ªY AGôLEG ” GPEGh out a fiscally vulnerable sovereign or to reduce its cost of QGô≤à°S’G ™°Vh ¤EG »¡àæJ ób ájõcôŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ¿EÉa ,É¡H á°UÉÿG ¢VGÎb’G ∞«dÉμJ borrowing, central banks could end up holding price stability ±ó¡J »àdG äÉ°SÉ«°ù∏d øμÁ ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG ±hÉîŸ áæ«gQ ‹ÉŸG hostage to sovereign debt concerns. On the other hand, ™aQ …ODƒjh .ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG ª– IQób Y ôKq DƒJ ¿CG QÉ©°SC’G QGô à°SG « – ¤EG policies aimed at price stability can influence sovereign π ≈∏ ≤ ≥ ≤ debt sustainability. Higher interest rates, necessitated to ≈∏Y øjódG áØ∏μJ IOÉjR ¤EG ,ºî°†àdG áëaÉμŸ Ék jQhô°Vq Èà©j …òdG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG combat inflation, raise the government’s cost of debt. Also, ∫É◊G »g ɪc ,É¡JÉfRGƒe ∫ÓN øe ÒÑc ºYO Ωó≤J äÉeƒμ◊G âfÉc GPEGh .áeƒμ◊G if the government has large subsidies on its budget, as ¤EG …ODƒj ¿CG ºî°†àq ∏d øμÁ ,á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G øe ójó©dG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH do many EDEs, inflation could raise the cost of subsidies thereby raising the borrowing need of the government. In ,ádÉ◊G √òg πãe ‘ .¢VGÎb’G ¤EG áeƒμ◊G áLÉM IOÉjR ‹ÉàdÉHh ºYódG áØ∏μJ IOÉjR such situations, governments with large debt burden may AÖ©dG øe π∏≤q j ¬fC’ ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e ´ÉØJQG πª– ¿ƒjódÉH á∏≤ãŸG äÉeƒμ◊G π°†ØJ ób actually tolerate high inflation as it reduces the real burden .øjó∏d »≤«≤◊G of the debt.

References ™LGôŸG D. Schoenmaker (2009). A new financial stability framework º¶æŸG .ÉHhQhCG ‘ ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°SÓd ójóL QÉWEG .(2009) D. Schoenmaker for Europe. The Financial Regulator 13 available at framework%2024-11.pdf>

As intensified sovereign debt concerns continued to •É°ûædG íÑc ‘ ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódÉH á°UÉÿG ±hÉîŸG äôªà°SG ɪæ«H dampen economic activity in the Euro Area, the ECB QÉ©°SCG »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ¢†ØNq ,hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ …OÉ°üàb’G reduced its key policy rate cumulatively by 50 basis k points to 1% during November-December 2011. With Ȫaƒf ∫ÓN %1 ¤EG ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 50 QGó≤à ɫªcGôJq á«°ù«FôdG IóFÉØdG the crisis intensifying, some central banks opted to cut QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØN ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG ¢†©H äQÉàNG óbh .2011 Ȫ°ùjO - interest rates (e.g. Australia, Norway as a precautionary âeÉb ɪ«a ,»bÉÑà°SG hCG »FÉbh AGôLEÉc èjhÔdGh É«dGΰSG πãe) IóFÉØdG or pre-emptive move and Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, ,(ƒªædG õ«Øëàd ófÓjÉJh É«°ShQh É«°ù«fhófGh πjRGÈdG ±QÉ°üe ∂dòH Thailand to stimulate growth) while China reduced q the required reserve ratio. The Federal Reserve ¢ù∏› QÉ°TCG ɪc .»eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G áÑ°ùf Ú°üdG â°†ØN ÚM ‘ also indicated that economic conditions warrant á¶aÉëŸG »Yóà°ùJ ájOÉ°üàb’G ±hô¶dG ¿CG ¤EG ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G exceptionally low policy rates at least till the middle of ∞°üàæe ≈àM πbC’G ≈∏Y »FÉæãà°SG πμ°ûH á°†Øîæe IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ≈∏Y 2013 (subsequently extended to 2014). .(2014 ΩÉY ¤EG Ék ≤M’ äOóe)q 2013 ΩÉY

55 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Besides policy rate changes, many central banks ±QÉ°üŸG øe ójó©dG π°UGh ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ äGÒ¨àdGq ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH continued to undertake large unconventional measures. ∫GõdõdG ÜÉ≤YCG »Øa .ájó«∏≤àdG ÒZ ᪡ŸG ÒHGóàdG PÉîJG ájõcôŸG In particular, following the devastating earthquake in ™°SƒàdG ÊÉHÉ«dG …õcôŸG æÑdG ø YCG ,¢SQÉe ô¡°T ‘ ™bh …òdG ôeóŸGq March, the BoJ announced an expansion in its asset ∂ ∏ purchase program and launched a loan program for á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d ¢Vhô≤dG èeÉfôH ¥ÓWEGh ∫ƒ°UC’G AGô°T èeÉfôH ‘ affected financial institutions. In September, the Federal ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G ¢ù∏› ìôW ,»°VÉŸG ȪàÑ°S ô¡°T ‘h .IQô°†àŸGq Reserve introduced “Operation Twist” whereby it ±ó¡H πLC’G á∏jƒ£dG á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G AGô°T ÉgÉ°†à≤à ” á«°ùμY á«∏ªY bought long-dated securities in order to push down …ô°ùjƒ°ùdG »æWƒdG ∂æÑdG ø∏YCGh .πjƒ£dG ∫ÉLBÓd IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØN long term interest rates. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) ó©H ȪàÑ°S ‘ hQƒ«dG πHÉ≤e …ô°ùjƒ°ùdG ∂fôØdG ±ô°U ô©°S ¢†ØN announced a hard floor on the EUR/CHF exchange QÉ°TCG ,2011 ÉY øe ÒNC’G Aõ÷G ‘h .á«°Tɪq f’G •ƒ¨°†dG óYÉ°üJ rate in September following rising deflation pressures. Ω μ Towards the later part of 2011, the ECB signalled an ø∏YCGh á«dÉŸGq ¥GQhC’G ¥ƒ°S èeÉfôH ™«°SƒJ ¤EG »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG expansion of its securities market program (SMP) and ∂æH øe πc ™e »μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH ádƒ«°ùdG ï°†d ácΰûe äÉ«∏ªY øY announced joint USD liquidity operations with the ∂æÑdGh ÊÉHÉ«dG …õcôŸG ∂æÑdGh GÎ∏‚EG ∂æHh ‹GQó«ØdG »WÉ«àM’G Fed, Bank of England, BoJ, and SNB to enhance US ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ »μjôeC’G Q’hódG ádƒ«°S õjõ©àd …ô°ùjƒ°ùdG »æWƒdG Dollar liquidity in the European banking system. .»HhQhC’G

Monetary policy measures ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGAGôLEG In the backdrop of growing concerns about the ¥Gƒ°SC’G â©°Vh »àdG hQƒ«dG á≤£æe áeRCG ¿CÉ°ûH ±hÉîŸG ójGõJ á«Ø∏N ≈∏Y Eurozone crisis that put global financial markets …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ôªà°SGq ,ÜGô£°V’G øe ádÉM ‘ á«ŸÉ©dGq á«dÉŸG in turmoil, the QCB continued to achieve its main §HQ Y ®ÉØ G ‘ ãªàŸG »°ù«FôdG ¬aóg « – ‘ 2011 ÉY ‘ objective of maintaining the exchange rate peg during ≈∏ ◊ π ≥ ≤ Ω 2011, while achieving monetary and financial stability. äôahq ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .‹ÉŸGh …ó≤ædG QGô≤à°S’G ≥«≤–h ±ô°üdG ô©°S In this regard, a benign domestic inflation environment ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ù∏d ÈcCG áë°ùa »∏ëŸG ºî°†àq ∏d á°†ØîæŸG äÉjƒà°ùŸG provided greater leeway to monetary policy in …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG ÒZq ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .ô°ù«eq IóFÉa ô©°S Ωɶf ≥«Ñ£àd signalling a soft interest rate regime. Accordingly, the …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG õ«Ø– LCG øe ájó ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH ¢UÉÿG ¬Øbƒe QCB changed its monetary policy stance in order to π ≤ stimulate domestic economic activity. .»∏ëŸG

The QCB reduced its key policy rate – the QMR IóFÉØdG ô©°S - »°ù«FôdG IóFÉØdG ô©°S …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ¢†ØNq Lending Rate – by 50 basis points from 5.5% to 5.0% in á£≤f 50 QGó≤à - …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ≈∏Y ¢VGôbEÓd April and further by 50 basis points to 4.50% in August ^ ^ 2011. The reductions were driven by the weight of ¤EG π°ü«d ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 50h πjôHCG ô¡°T ‘ %5 0 ¤EG %5 5 øe ¢SÉ°SCG global developments and domestic considerations, á«ŸÉ©dGq äGQƒ£àdGq áé«àf ¢†«ØîàdG Gòg AÉLh .2011 ¢ù£°ùZCG ‘ %4^50 including, among others, low policy rates being ójó©dG πÑb øe IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØN ∂dP ‘ Éà ,á«q ∏ëŸG äGQÉÑàY’Gh pursued by several AE central banks, providing a á©aO ôahq …òdG ôeC’G ,áeóq ≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ ájõcôŸGq ±QÉ°üŸG øe boost to investment spending and encouraging the flow of credit to the private sector. .¢UÉÿG ´É£≤∏d ¿ÉªàF’G íæe ™«é°ûJh Qɪãà°S’G ≈∏Y ¥ÉØfEÓd ájƒb

During 2011, effective liquidity management was of áÑ°ùædÉH iƒ°üb ᫪gCG 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ádƒ«°ù∏d ádÉ©ØdGq IQGOE’G â∏μq °T paramount importance to the QCB, while sustaining ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .ƒªædG ºNR ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G ™e ,…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ¤EG the growth momentum. In this regard, the liquidity q management strategy focused on moderating liquidity ∫ÓN øe ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°VhCG ∞«ØîJ ≈∏Y ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG á«é«JGΰSEG äõcQ conditions by (i) putting a cap on the total placement ±ô°üŸG iód ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe ∫GƒeC’G ´GójEG ´ƒªéŸ ∞≤°S ™°Vh (CG) of funds by banks with the QCB; (ii) lowering the QMR ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¢†ØN (Ü) ,…ô£≤dG ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°S á«dBG ÖLƒÃ …õcôŸG deposit rate and the QCB repo rate; and (iii) through .áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ìôW (ê)h ,ƒÑjôdG ô©°Sh …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh introduction of Treasury Bills (T-bills).

In order to discourage banks from passively parking ¬jód ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉØH ®ÉØàM’G ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG ™«é°ûJ ΩóY πLCG øe ≈∏Y their surplus liquidity under the QMR deposit facility äGOÉ¡°T πμ°T ≈∏Yh ´GójEÓd …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG á«dBG QÉWEG øª°V and in certificates of deposit (CDs), the QCB imposed k a ceiling where each bank’s total holding of CDs plus ’CÉH »°†≤j ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y ÉØ≤°S …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ™°Vh ,´GójE’G QMR deposits cannot exceed its reserve requirement ,…ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH äGOÉ¡°ûdG ‹ÉªLEG RhÉéàj maintained with the QCB in January 2011. øe GQÉÑàYGk ∂dPh ∂æH …CG øe ¬jód ¬H ßØàëŸG »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G .2011 ôjÉæj ô¡°T The QCB reduced the QMR deposit rate by 50 basis ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG áÑ°ùf …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ¢†ØN points from 1.5% to 1.0% in April and subsequently πjôHCG ô¡°T ‘ %1^0 ¤EG %1^5 øe ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 50 ™bGƒH …ó≤ædG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 56 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG by 25 basis points from 1.0% to 0.75% in August ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ‘ %0^75 ¤EG %1^0 øe ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 25 QGó≤à Ék ≤M’h 2011. With the narrowing of the differential with ∫É› ¢†ØîfG ,á«ŸÉ©dGq IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ™e ¥QÉØdG ≥««°†J ™eh .2011 international interest rates, this reduced the scope of carry trade (interest arbitrage) activities by curbing ∫GƒeC’G ¢ShDhQ ≥aóJ øe ó◊G ”h IóFÉØdG ä’ó©e äÉbhôa ≈∏Y áHQÉ°†ŸG the inflow of speculative capital, while incentivizing .¿ÉªàF’G íæe ¢Uôa ±É°ûμà°SG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG åM Éà ,áHQÉ°†ŸG banks to become more proactive in exploring credit opportunities.

At the same time, the QCB repo rate was also reduced ±ô°üŸÉH ¢UÉÿG (ƒÑjôdG) AGô°ûdG IOÉYEG ô©°S ¢†ØN ”q ,¬°ùØf âbƒdG ‘ by 55 basis points from 5.55% to 5.0% in April and Ék ≤M’h πjôHCG ô¡°T ‘ %5^0 ¤EG %5^55 øe ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 55 QGó≤à subsequently by 50 basis points from 5.0% to 4.5% ^ ^ in August 2011, thus making it at par with the QMR ,2011 ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ‘ %4 5 ¤EG %5 0 øe ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 50 QGó≤à lending rate. .¢VGôbE’G IóFÉa ô©°ùd ÉjhÉ°ùek ¬∏©L ɇ

In order to facilitate the emergence of a short-term ∫ƒ°ü◊Gh ∫ÉŸG ¥ƒ°S ¤EG πLC’G Ò°üb óFÉY ≈æëæe êGôNEG πLCG øe yield curve in the money market and have an additional ,…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Qó°UCG ,á«q ∏μ«¡dG ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ á«aÉ°VEG IGOCG ≈∏Y instrument for management of structural liquidity, the k QCB, in consultation with the Government, issued ‘ IójGõe ∫ÓN øe Éeƒj 91 IóŸ áfGõN ¿hPCG ,áeƒμ◊G ™e QhÉ°ûàdÉH T-bills of 91-day maturity through a price-based 273h 182 IóŸq áfGõÿG ¿hPCÉH äGójGõe ìôW ”q ,∂dP ó©H .2011 ƒjÉe auction in May 2011. Subsequently, auctions of 182 AɨdEG øμªŸG øe äÉH ,áfGõÿG ¿hPCG QGó°UEG ™eh .¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ‘ Éeƒjk and 273 day T-bills were introduced in August. With á«fGõ«e øe ádƒ«°ùdG º«≤©J áØ∏μJ πjƒ– ºK øeh É«éjQóJk ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T the issuance of T-bills, CDs could be phased out gradually, thereby shifting the cost of sterilization of äGhOC’G Ò©°ùàd QÉ«©e ÒaƒJ ÖfÉL ¤EGh .áeƒμ◊G á«fGõ«eq ¤EG ±ô°üŸG liquidity from the balance sheet of the QCB to that of á°SÉ«°ù∏d π°†aCG Ék ≤«°ùæJ áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ìôW øª°†j ,iôNC’G á«dÉŸG the Government. Besides providing a benchmark in the .ΩÉY πμ°ûH »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G IQGOEG øe Aõéc á«dÉŸGh ájó≤ædG pricing of other financial instruments, the introduction of T-bills would ensure better coordination of monetary and fiscal policy as part of overall macroeconomic management.

In addition, the QCB enhanced the resilience of áfhôe 2011 ΩÉY ‘ …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe RõYq ,∂dP ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH the financial system through several precautionary ≥∏N ¤EG äOq CG á«HÉbQh ájRGÎMG ÒHGóJ IóY ∫ÓN øe ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG and supervisory measures in 2011, which created a level playing field in the domestic banking system ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«dÉŸG õcGôŸG õjõ©Jh »∏ëŸG ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ áÄaÉμàe ¢Uôa and strengthened the balance sheet of banks while ≥«≤– ¤EG …ODƒJ ¿CG äGÒ«¨àdG √òg ¿CÉ°T øeh .∂∏¡à°ùŸG ájɪM ¿Éª°V ™e ensuring consumer protection. These changes would »àdG ôWÉîŸG øe ∞«ØîàdGh »ª«¶æàdG QÉWE’G ‘ 샰VƒdG øe ÈcCG Qób bring greater clarity to the regulatory framework, ƒªædG ™«é°ûJh »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ¿ƒjO ƒ‰ ó««≤Jh ,‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ¬LGƒJ mitigate risks in the banking system, restrict the growth q of household debt and encourage orderly growth of .¬JOƒéH ¢SÉ°ùŸG ¿hO ¿ÉªàFÓd º¶æŸG credit without compromising its quality.

In order to have better regulation and risk management ∑ƒæÑdG »YÉ£b ÚH π°†aCG πμ°ûH É¡JQGOEGh ôWÉîŸG º«¶æJ ±ó¡Hh among the domestic Islamic and conventional ôjGÈa ‘ …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Qó°UCG ,ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdGh á«∏ëŸG á«eÓ°SE’G banking segments, the QCB issued instructions to á«aô°üŸG É¡JÉ« ªY á«Ø°üàH »°† J ájó« àdG ƒæÑdG ¤EG äɪ« ©J 2011 conventional banks in February 2011 to wind up their ∏ ≤ ∏≤ ∑ ∏ Islamic banking operations by the end of 2011. The iOCG ¿CG ó©H äɪ«∏©àdG √òg äAÉL óbh .2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH á«eÓ°SE’G overlapping nature of non-Islamic and Islamic activities ôWÉîŸG IQGOEG π©L ¤EG á«eÓ°SE’G ÒZh á«eÓ°SE’G ᣰûfC’G ÚH πNGóàdG made banks’ risk management and compliance with .Gó«k ≤©Jh Ék μHÉ°ûJ ÌcCG á«dÉŸG ᣫ◊G äÉÑ∏£àŸ ∫Éãàe’Gh ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe prudential requirements more complex. Therefore, ihó©dG AGƒàMGh á°ùaÉæŸG OÉ«M ¿Éª°V AGôLE’G Gòg AGQh øe ±ó¡dG ¿Éch the thrust of this measure was to ensure competitive neutrality and contain contagion that might have ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG "á«eÓ°SE’G òaGƒædG" øe çó– ¿CG øμªŸG øe ¿Éc »àdG occurred from the “Islamic windows” of conventional ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG á«dÉ©a Ú°ù– ¤EG AGôLE’G Gòg ±óg ɪc .ájó«∏≤àdG banks. It was also aimed at improving the effectiveness .´É£b πc ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ á∏°üØæe äGhOCG Ëó≤J øe ±ô°üŸG Úμªàd of monetary policy, as it would enable the QCB to introduce separate liquidity management instruments for each segment.

The QCB also imposed certain exposure limits and §HGƒ°V ™°Vhh ôWÉîª∏d ¢Vô©àq ∏d áæ«©eq GOhóMk ±ô°üŸG ¢Vôa ɪc credit controls on commercial banks in order to .∂∏¡à°ùŸG ájɪM ¿Éª°V πLCG øe ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’ÉH á°UÉN ensure consumer protection. In April 2011, the QCB ≈∏Y áªFÉ≤dG Ohó◊G ≈∏Y Gójó°ûJk ±ô°üŸG ¢Vôa ,2011 πjôHCG ‘h

57 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG tightened its existing limits on personal loan amounts IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ Éaƒk ≤°S ™°Vhh ¢VÎ≤e πμd á«°üî°ûdGq ¢Vhô≤dG ≠dÉÑe per borrower and introduced a ceiling on interest rates Éà ,¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ¢Vhôb ≈∏Yh ÖJGôdG πHÉ≤e áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y on salary-assigned and credit card loans, including for q existing loans. In addition, stipulations were set out á°UÉN •hô°T ™°Vh ” ,∂dP ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,áªFÉ≤dG ¢Vhô≤dG ∂dP ‘ for the maximum period of loan. Similarly, maximum ,¿ÉªàF’G ábÉ£H øe Öë°ù∏d ≈°übC’G óq ◊G ójó–h ,¢Vhô≤dG ∫ÉLBÉH credit card withdrawal limit and the maximum rate of á«fƒjóe øe ó◊G ±ó¡H ∂dPh ,É¡«∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ ≈°übCG óMhq interest were also specified. Therefore, by imposing ,âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘ . Ñ à°ùŸG ‘ IÌ©àŸG ¿ƒjódG ºcGôJ ™æeh » FÉ©dG ´É£ dG limits on both interest rates and loan amount, the idea π ≤ ∏ ≤ was to limit household debt and prevent the build-up ÒZ Ωƒ°SôdG áaÉc AɨdEGh ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¢†ØN iOq CG of future non-performing loans. At the same time, by ´Éæàe’Gh á«q ∏©ØdG É¡MÉHQCG øY ìÉ°üaE’G ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG åMq ¤EG ájQhô°†dG lowering the interest rate on credit cards and removing .(5 π°üØdG ô¶fG) ºFÓe ÒZ πμ°ûH ∂∏¡à°ùŸG πgÉc ∫É≤KEG øY all unnecessary fees, banks were nudged to disclose their actual profits and refrain from unduly burdening customers (see Chapter 5). Monetary developments during 2011 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ájóq ≤ædG äGQƒ£àdGq Reserve money …ó≤ædG »WÉ«àM’Gq During 2011, base money or reserve money (M0) (M0) á«WÉ«àM’G Oƒ≤ædG hCG ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG â∏é°Sq ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN recorded a sharp decline in contrast to the doubling .(1-2 hóL) 2010 ÉY ‘ É¡ØYÉ°†J øe ¢†« ædG Y GOÉMk É©LGôJk of the monetary base in 2010 (Table 2-1). The year- ∫ Ω ≤ ≈∏ on-year growth of M0 steadily decelerated from the ájGóH òæe GOôk £eq Gk DƒWÉÑJ …óq ≤ædG »WÉ«àMÓdq …ƒæ°ùdG ƒªædG ó¡°T óbh beginning of the year – turning negative in March ∫ÓN √ÉŒ’G Gòg ‘ ôªà°SGhq -¢SQÉe ô¡°T ‘ É«Ñk ∏°S ∫ƒ–q - áæ°ùdG and continuing with that trend throughout the rest of the year with the decline peaking in December. The ¿Éc óbh .Ȫ°ùjO ‘ ¬JhQP ™LGÎdG Gòg ƃ∏H ™e ΩÉ©dG øe á«q ≤ÑàŸG IÎØdG decline was reflective of both the high base of M0 in ÒHGóàdGh ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG ´ÉØJQ’ É°SÉk μ©fG ¢VÉØîf’G the previous year and the QCB measures taken during . É©dG ÓN ±ô°üŸG ÉgòîJGq »àdG the year. Ω ∫

Table 2-1: Components of Reserve Money …ó≤ædG »WÉ«àM’G äÉfƒq μe :1-2 ∫hóL (QR million) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e)

Change Ò¨àdG

2011/2010 2010/2009 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ ɪc As on end-Dec 2011 ᪫≤dG % ᪫≤dG % Amount Amount (I) Currency issued 9092 1118 14.0 783 10.9 Qó°üŸG ó≤ædG (II) Total reserves (a + b) 21608 1820 9.2 7459 60.5 (Ü+CG) äÉ«WÉ«àM’G ´ƒª› a. Required reserves 16433 1822 12.5 2819 23.9 »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G -CG b. Excess reserves 5175 -2 0.0 4640 864.3 á«WÉ«àM’G Ió°UQC’G ¢†FÉa -Ü (III) Others 485 -63561 -99.2 37663 142.8 iôNC’G OƒæÑdG (IV) M0 [(I)+(II)+(III)] 31186 -60623 -66.0 45905 100.0 …ó≤ædG »WÉ«àM’G

In the component side, the shrinking of the monetary §≤a iõ©j ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG ‘ OÉ◊G ¢ü∏≤àdG ¿EÉa äÉfƒμŸG ÖfÉL ‘h base was solely due to the sharp decline in Others – i.e., …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh …CG "iôNC’G OƒæÑdG" ‘ OÉ◊G ¢VÉØîfÓd QMR deposits placed by banks with the QCB (Table ¢†ØîfG óbh .(1-2 hóL) ±ô°üŸG iód ƒæÑdG É¡H ßØà– »àdG 2-1). The outstanding stock of QMR deposits declined ∫ ∑ from QR 64 billion at end-December 2010 to a mere ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 64 øe ™FGOƒdG ∂∏J øe ºFÉ≤dG ó«°UôdG QR 0.5 billion at end-December 2011. This reflected, .2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 0^5 ¤EG 2010 Ȫ°ùjO inter alia, the QCB measure of imposing a quantity …òdG AGôLE’G ,iôNCG QƒeCG á∏ªL øª°V AÉL …òdGh ôeC’G Gòg ¢ùμY óbh ceiling on funds placed by banks with the QCB and πÑb øe ¬jód áYOƒŸG ∫GƒeC’G ᫪c ≈∏Y ∞≤°S ¢VôØH ±ô°üŸG √òîJG the reduction in QMR deposit rates, which reduced ɇ …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØNh ∑ƒæÑdG arbitrage opportunities prompting banks to reduce ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ« ªY ™FGOh ¢†ØN Y ƒæÑdG åMhq áëLGôŸG ¢Uôa ¢üq b QMR holdings. Among other components, While ∏ ≈∏ ∑ ∏ currency issued recorded a higher increase reflecting Qó°üŸG ó≤ædG πé°Sq ÚM ‘ ¬fCG ó‚ ,iôNC’G äÉfƒq μŸG ÚH øeh .…ó≤ædG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 58 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG heightened economic activity during the year, total ƒ‰ CÉWÉÑJ ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ójGõJ â°ùμY ≈∏YCG IOÉjR reserves decelerated due to (a) lower increase in »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G ‘ IOÉjõdG ¢VÉØîfG (CG) ÖÑ°ùH äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq ´ƒª› required reserves and (b) a sharp turnaround in excess iõ©j ÚM ‘h .á«WÉ«àM’Gq Ió°UQC’G ¢†FÉa ‘ ¢VÉØîfG çhóM (Ü) reserve holdings. While the lower increase in required reserves is attributed to lower deposit growth during ∫ÓN ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ ¢VÉØîf’ »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G ‘ IOÉjõdG ¢VÉØîfG the year, excess reserves came down marginally. äÉjƒà°ùe ¤EG ÉØ«ØWk É°VÉØîfGk á«WÉ«àM’Gq Ió°UQC’G ¢†FÉa ó¡°T ,ΩÉ©dG Excess reserves, as a proportion of required reserves, áÑ°ùæc ,á«WÉ«àM’Gq Ió°UQC’G ¢†FÉa ¢†ØîfG ,∂dòd áé«àf .á«°ûeÉg declined to 31.5% at the end of 2011 from 35.4% at the ≠∏H ¿CG ó©H 2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ %31^5 ¤EG ,»eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G øe end of 2010. The modest increase in currency issued Qó°üŸG ó≤ædG ‘ á©°VGƒàŸG IOÉjõdG øμJ ⁄h .2010 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ %35^4 and total reserves were not adequate to overcome äÉ«q ∏ªY ™FGOh ‘ ÒÑμdG ¢VÉØîf’G á«£¨àd á«aÉc äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq ´ƒª›h the huge decline in QMR deposits, consequently, the q monetary base shrank considerably during 2011. ∫ÓN ÒÑc óMq ¤EG ájóq ≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG â°ü∏≤J ‹ÉàdÉHh ,…ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG .2011 ΩÉY Among the drivers of reserve money, the decline is ™LGÎdG iõ©«a ,…ó≤ædG »WÉ«àM’G ≈∏Y IôKq DƒŸG πeGƒ©dG å«M øe ÉeCG explained by the sharp decline in net foreign assets ±ô°üŸÉH á°UÉÿG á«ÑæLC’G äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U ‘ OÉ◊G ¢VÉØîf’G ¤EG (NFA) of the QCB (Chart 2-1). Among NFA, QCB’s â°†ØîfG ,á«ÑæLC’G äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U øª°Vh .(1-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) holding of foreign securities came down by QR 60 billion during the year. It may be recalled that QÉ«∏e 60 QGó≤à …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üà á°UÉÿG á«ÑæLC’G á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G borrowings from foreign banks by domestic banks á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ¢VGÎbG ¿CG ¤EG IQÉ°TE’G QóŒh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN …ô£b ∫ÉjQ had increased significantly during 2010 in view of the ¢ûeÉ¡d Gô¶fk 2010 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ®ƒë∏e πμ°ûH OGR á«ÑæLq C’G ∑ƒæÑdG øe existing high interest rate differential between Qatar ,¬fq CG ÒZ .iôNC’G äÓª©dGh …ô£≤dG ∫ÉjôdG ÚH ™ØJôŸG IóFÉØdG ä’ó©e and international interest rates. Since August 2010, Oƒ«b ¢Vôa ”hq ,ÒÑc πμ°ûH ¢ûeÉ¡dG ¢ü∏≤q J ,2010 ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T òæe however, the interest rate differential has narrowed ƒæÑdG â°†ØN , dòd áé«àfh .±ô°üŸG iód áYOƒŸG GƒeC’G Y ᫪cq significantly and quantitative restrictions were imposed ∑ ∂ ∫ ≈∏ on funds placed with the QCB. As a result, banks äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U ™LGôJ ¢ùμ©jh .…ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh ÒÑc πμ°ûH substantially reduced their QMR holdings. The decline ájQÉéàdGq ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe á«q ∏ëŸG á∏ª©dÉH »ÑæLC’G ó≤ædG ádOÉÑe á«ÑæLq C’G in NFA reflects the swapping of foreign exchange with .êQÉÿG ‘ ÓLk CG ∫ƒWC’G äGQɪãà°S’G πjƒªàd local currency by commercial banks to finance longer- term investments abroad.

Chart 2-1: Drivers of Reserve Money …ó≤ædG »WÉ«àM’G ≈∏Y IôKq DƒŸG πeGƒ©dG :1-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

49 42 35 445.15.1 28 21 14 7 0 -7 00.9.9 -14 --8.28.2 -21 -28 QR billion -35 -42 -52.5-52.5 -49 -56 20112011 2 2010010 NFA NDA

As a result of the decline in NFA, QCB’s net international ‘É°U ≠∏H ,á«ÑæLC’G äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U ≈∏Y CGôW …òdG ¢VÉØîf’G áé«àf reserves stood at QR 59.3 billion at the end of 2011 ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 59^3 …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üà á°UÉÿG á«dhódGq äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq as compared with QR 111.8 billion in 2010. Traditional ÉY ‘ …ô£b ÉjQ QÉ« e 111^8 ™e áfQÉ ŸÉH 2011 ÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b measures of reserve adequacy also suggest that it has Ω ∫ ∏ ≤ Ω come down in 2011 (Table 2-2). Generally, in a pegged â°†ØîfG É¡fCG ¤EG äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq ájÉØμd ájó«q ∏≤àdG ¢ù«jÉ≤ŸG Ò°ûJh .2010 exchange rate regime, foreign currency reserves must ,±ô°üdG ô©°S §HQ Ωɶf πq X ‘h .(2-2 ∫hóL) 2011 ΩÉY ‘ É°†jk CG be sufficient to cover 100% of the currency issued or, á«£¨àd »ØμJ ¿CG ΩÉY πμ°ûH á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH äÉ«WÉ«àM’G ≈∏Y Ú©àjq in a broad sense, reserve money (M0). As evident from øe í°†àjhq .ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG ,™°ShCG ≈æ©Ã ,hCG Qó°üŸG ó≤ædG øe %100 the table, reserves are much higher indicating that the ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG ¿CG ¤EG Ò°ûj ɇ ,ÒãμH ≈∏YCG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G ¿q CG ∫hó÷G monetary base is fully backed by the holding of reserves.

59 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Other yardsticks, however, reflect the decline in iôNC’G ¢ù«jÉ≤ŸG ¿CGq ÒZ .äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq πÑb øe πeÉc πμ°ûH áeƒYóe reserve adequacy. For example, as a proportion ¢VôY øe áÑ°ùæch ∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏©a .äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq ájÉØc ¢VÉØîfG ¢ùμ©J of broad money (M2), which captures the extent to ‘ô°üŸG ɶædG äÉeGõàdG ºYO ióe ¤EG Ò°ûj …òdG (M2) ™°SGƒdG ó ædG which liabilities of the banking system are backed Ω ≤ by reserves, the ratio has come down despite lower ¢VÉØîfG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y áÑ°ùædG â°†ØîfG ó≤a ,äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq πÑb øe monetary growth in 2011. Similarly, import cover has äGOQGƒdG á«£¨J ∫ó©eq ¢†ØîfG ɪc .2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ó≤ædG ƒªædG ä’ó©e come down from about 18 months in 2010 to around .2011 ΩÉY ‘ ô¡°TCG 7 ƒëf ¤EG 2010 ΩÉY ‘ Gô¡°Tk 18 ƒëf øe 7 months in 2011.

Table 2-2: Reserve Adequacy Indicators äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq ájÉØc äGô°TDƒe :2-2 ∫hóL

Ratio 2009 2010 2011 áÑ°ùædG

Reserves/M0 (%) 145.5 121.8 190.3 (%) ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG/äÉ«WÉ«àM’G Reserves/Currency issued (%) 928.9 1402.3 652.7 (%)Qó°üŸG ó≤ædG/äÉ«WÉ«àM’G Reserves/M2 (%) 31.1 42.2 19.1 (%) ™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY/äÉ«WÉ«àM’G Reserves/GDP (%) 18.8 24.1 9.4 (%) »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG/äÉ«WÉ«àM’G Reserves/Imports (months) 9.8 17.6 7.3 (ô¡°TCG) äGOQGƒdG/äÉ«WÉ«àM’G

Money supply ó≤ædG ¢VôY During 2011, growth in money supply as represented áfQÉ≤e É©LGôJk (M1)≥«°†dGq ó≤ædG ¢VôY ƒ‰ ó¡°T ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN by narrow money (M1) decelerated from 2010 (Table ¤EG ≥«°†dGq ó≤ædG ¢VôY ƒ‰ ¢VÉØîfG Oƒ©jh .(3-2 ∫hóL) 2010 ΩÉ©H 2-3). The lower growth of M1 was on account of ∫hGóàŸG ó≤ædG ‘ ƒªædG ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG â– ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ ™LGôJ lower growth in demand deposits although growth in k currency in circulation was higher. The higher currency •É°ûædG ójGõJ ¤EG ∫hGóàŸG ó≤ædG ‘ ≈∏YC’G ƒªædG Ò°ûjh .ÉYÉØJQG ÌcCG ¿Éc growth was indicative of heightened economic activity .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN …OÉ°üàb’G during the year.

Table 2-3: Components of Money Supply ó≤ædG ¢VôY äÉfƒq μe :3-2 ∫hóL (QR million) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e)

Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ ɪc 2011/2010 2010/2009 Components 2011 äÉfƒq μŸG As on end-Dec ᪫≤dG áÑ°ùædG ᪫≤dG áÑ°ùædG 2011 Amount % Amount % (I) Currency in Circulation 7013 918 15.1 442 7.8 ∫hGóàŸG ó≤ædG (II) Demand Deposits 74834 12592 20.2 14779 31.1 Ö∏£dG â– ™FGOƒdG (III) M1 [(I) + (II)] 81847 13510 19.8 15221 28.7 ≥«°†dGq ó≤ædG ¢VôY (IV) Quasi Money (a + b) 228119 31740 16.2 34414 21.2 (Ü+CG) ó≤ædG ¬Ñ°T a. Time Deposits 168866 1871 1.1 33802 25.4 πLC’ ™FGOƒdG b. Deposits in Foreign Currencies 59252 29868 101.6 611 2.1 á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG M2 [(III)+(IV)] 309966 45250 17.1 49634 23.1 ™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY

Domestic liquidity growth, as captured by broad money ‘ ,(M2) ™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY É¡°ùμ©j ɪc ,á«∏ëŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ƒ‰ ™LGôJ (M2), also decelerated in 2011 from 2010 (Table 2-3). áé«àf ¢VÉØîf’G Gòg AÉLh .(3-2 ∫hóL) 2010 ΩÉ©H áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY The lower growth in M2 was the net outcome of two œÉædG ÒKCÉàdG (Ü)h ájó ædG IóYÉ dG ‘ OÉ G ¢Tɪ f’G (CG) :Ú eÉ©d factors; (i) the sharp contraction in base money and (ii) ≤ ≤ ◊ μ ∏ the higher base effect of 2010. The income velocity áÑ°ùf …CG- ó≤ædG ∫hGóJ áYô°S â©ØJQGh .2010 ΩÉY IóYÉ≤dG ´ÉØJQG øY

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 60 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG of circulation of money − the ratio of nominal GDP ΩÉY ‘ 2^0 ¤EG -™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY ¤EG »ª°S’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG to M2 − increased to 2.0 in 2011 from 1.8 in 2010 on œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ‘ IOÉ◊G IOÉjõdG ÖÑ°ùH 2010 ΩÉY ‘ 1^8 øe 2011 account of the sharp increase in nominal GDP during ó ædG ¢VôY áÑ°ùf â©LGôJ , dòd áé«àfh . É©dG ÓN »ª°S’G » ëŸG the year. Consequently, M2 as a proportion of nominal ≤ ∂ Ω ∫ ∏ GDP declined to 49.1% at the end of 2011 from 57.1% 2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ %49^1 ¤EG »ª°S’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ™°SGƒdG at the end of 2010. .2010 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ %57^1 øe

The contraction in M0 vis-a-vis M2 growth was ´ÉØJQG ¤EG ™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY ƒ‰ ™e ájó≤ædG IóYÉ≤dG ¢TɪμfG iOCG reflected in the broad money multiplier (M2/M0), which OÉM πμ°ûH ™ØJQG …òdG (M0/M2) ™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY ∞YÉ°†ep increased sharply to 9.94 at the end of 2011 from 2.88 .2010 ÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ 2^88 H ¿CG ó©H ,2011 ÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ 9^94 ¤EG at the end of 2010. In terms of the behavioural ratios, Ω ≠∏ Ω the decline can be attributed to a sharp decline in ™LGÎdG ¤EG Oƒ©j ¢VÉØîf’G ¿EÉa ≥HÉ°ùdG ‘ Ö°ùædG AGOCG ΩGóîà°SÉHh the others-deposit (O/D) ratio and the total reserve- ¤EG »WÉ«àM’G ´ƒª›h ,™FGOƒdG ¤EG iôNC’G OƒæÑdG áÑ°ùf :øe πc ‘ OÉ◊G deposit (TR/D), despite the currency-deposit (C/D) áfQÉ≤e É¡dÉM ≈∏Y ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ó≤ædG áÑ°ùf AÉ≤H øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,™FGOƒdG ratio remaining unchanged from 2010. While the iôNC’G OƒæÑdG áÑ°ùf ‘ OÉ◊G ¢VÉØîf’G ¢ùμY ÚM ‘h .2010 ΩÉ©H precipitous decline in others-deposit (O/D) ratio (to ¢ü∏≤q J (2011 ΩÉY ‘ 0^002 ¤EG 2010 ΩÉY ‘ 0^25 øe) ™FGOƒdG ¤EG 0.002 in 2011from 0.25 in 2010) was reflective of the òîJG …òdG AGôLE’G áé«àf ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG …ó ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ« ªY ™FGOh purging of QMR deposits by banks in lieu of the QCB √ ∑ ≤ ∏ measure of January 2011, the reduction in the total ´ƒª› áÑ°ùf ‘ ¢VÉØîf’G iõ©j ,2011 ôjÉæj ‘ …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe reserve-deposit ratio (to 0.7 in 2011 from 0.8 in 2010) (2011 ΩÉY ‘ 0^7 ¤EG 2010 ΩÉY ‘ 0^8 øe) ™FGOƒdG ¤EG »WÉ«àM’G was attributed to the drawdown of excess reserves by øjòg ôaÉ°†J iOCGq óbh .∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe á°†FÉØdG äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gq Öë°S ¤EG banks. Cumulatively, these two factors magnified the .2011 ΩÉY ‘ »©LQ ôKCÉH Oƒ≤ædG ∞YÉ°†ep ´ÉØJQG ¤EG Ú∏eÉ©dG ex-post money multiplier in 2011.

Among the components of M2, the lower growth ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG ¢†ØîæŸG ƒªædG iõ©jo ,™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY äÉfƒμe ÚH øe was attributed to lower growth in both M1 and quasi- .(3-2 ∫hóL) ó≤ædG ¬Ñ°Th ≥«°†dGq ó≤ædG ¢VôY øe πc ‘ ƒªædG ä’ó©e money (Table 2-3). The moderation in quasi money ∫ÉjôdÉH πLC’ ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ DƒWÉÑJ ¤EG ÒÑc óMq ¤EG ó≤ædG ¬Ñ°T ƒ‰ Oƒ©jh growth was largely on account of the lower accretion ÓN á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG YÉ°†J øe ºZôdG Y ,…ô£ dG in Riyal-denominated time deposits, although foreign ∫ q ∞ ≈∏ ≤ currency deposits more than doubled during the year. ¤EG »°ù«FQ πμ°ûH á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG ‘ IOÉjõdG iõ©Jh .ΩÉ©dG The increase in foreign currency deposits was mainly É«FõLk ¢ùμ©j ɇ ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh ƒ‰ driven by the growth in public sector deposits in the .hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ áeRC’G OGóà°TG ó©H ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉfl øe •ƒëàdGq second half of the year, partly reflecting the hedging ó≤ædG ¢VôY ‘ á«ÑæLC’Gq äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG áÑ°ùf äó¡°T ,∂dòd áé«àfh of exchange rate risk after the intensification of the %11^1 `H áfQÉ≤e 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ %19^1 ¤EG π°üàd IÒÑc IOÉjR ™°SGƒdG euro zone crisis. As a result, the “dollarization ratio” − ratio of foreign currency deposits in broad money .2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ − increased significantly to 19.1% in December 2011 from 11.1% at end-December 2010.

Among the drivers of M2, net foreign assets (NFA) äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U ó¡°T ,™°SGƒdG ó≤ædG ¢VôY ≈∏Y IôKDƒŸGq πeGƒ©dG ÚH øe declined sharply by QR 46.4 billion (72.5%) during the ∫ÓN (%72^5) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 46^4 QGó≤à GOÉMk É°VÉØîfGk á«ÑæLC’Gq year − solely due to the sharp decline in net foreign äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U ‘ OÉ G ¢VÉØîf’G ¤EG Oƒ©j ó«Mh ÖÑ°ùd - É©dG assets of QCB – in contrast to the increase of QR 16.8 ◊ Ω billion (35.7%) in 2010. On the other hand, net domestic â¨∏H »àdG IOÉjõdG πHÉ≤e - …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üà á°UÉÿG á«ÑæLC’G assets (NDA) of the banking system increased by QR ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .2010 ΩÉY ‘ (%35^7) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 16^8 91.6 billion (45.6%) as compared with the much lower QÉ«∏e 91^6 QGó≤à ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ á«q ∏ëŸG äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U ™ØJQG increase of QR 32.8 billion (19.5%) in 2010. 32^8 â¨∏H »àdG É°VÉØîfGk πbCG IOÉjõH áfQÉ≤e (%45^6) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ .2010 ΩÉY ‘ (%19^5) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e In terms of the composition of NDA, both net claims on äÉÑdÉ£ŸG ‘É°U øe πq c πé°Sq ,á«q ∏ëŸG äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U äÉfƒq μŸ áÑ°ùædÉHh government and domestic claims (credit plus financial IOÉjR (á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G óFGR ¿ÉªàF’G) á«q ∏ëŸG äÉÑdÉ£ŸGh áeƒμ◊G ≈∏Y securities) registered significant increases during the ≈∏Y äÉÑdÉ£ŸG ‘É°U ™ØJQG ɪc .(2-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN IÒÑc year (Chart 2-2). Net claims on Government increased ᪫ H äGóæ°S QGó°UEG ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ɶædG ÜÉààcG ÖÑ°ùH OÉMq °ûH áeƒ G sharply reflecting the subscription of the banking ≤ Ω πμ μ◊ system to the QR 50 billion bond issuance in January. 81^4 QGó≤à á«∏ëŸG äÉÑdÉ£ŸG â©ØJQG ɪc .ôjÉæj ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 50 Domestic claims increased by QR 81.4 billion (30.0%) .»∏ëŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ IOÉq ◊G IOÉjõdG áé«àf (%30^0) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e mainly due to the sharp increase in domestic credit.

61 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Chart 2-2: Net Domestic Assets á«∏ëŸG äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U :2-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

100 78.378.3 80

60 37.937.9 40.440.4 40

20 9.0990.0 6.26.2

QR billion 3.13.1 0

-20 -27.7-27.7 -22.8-22.8 -40 NetNet CClaimslaims o onn CCreditredit F Financialinancial OOthersthers ((net)net) Govt. Securities

2011 2010

In 2011, there has been a significant change in the .¿ÉªàF’ÉH á°UÉÿG äÓª©dG áÑ«côJ ≈∏Y ÒÑc Ò¨J CGôW ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ currency composition of credit. As foreign currency á∏ª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G øe πbCG á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G áØ∏μJ ¿C’ Gô¶æak credit is cheaper than domestic credit, there was a sharp spurt in demand for foreign currency credit, á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ‘ IÒÑc IôØW âKóM ,á«q ∏ëŸG from both the public and the private sector, even as á∏ª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G ¬«a ™LGôJ âbh ‘ ,¢UÉÿGh ΩÉ©dG ÚYÉ£≤dG πÑb øe local currency credit declined during the year (Chart á°üM â©ØJQG ,∂dòd áé«àfh .(3-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á«q ∏ëŸG 2-3). As a result, the credit-dollarization ratio (share of ¤EG °üàd OÉM °ûH ¿ÉªàF’G ‹ÉªLEG ‘ á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G foreign currency credit in total credit) increased sharply π πμ to 46.7% in 2011 from 22.2% in 2010. In this context, ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘ .2010 ΩÉY ‘ %22^2 `H áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %46^7 international experience suggests that higher deposit Ée ÉÑdÉZk á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG ´ÉØJQG ¿q CG ¤EG á«dhódG ÜQÉéàdG Ò°ûJ dollarization often leads to higher credit dollarization, óLh ó dh .2011 ÉY çóM ɪc äÓª©dG àH ¿ÉªàF’G ´ÉØJQG ¤EG …ODƒj as evident during 2011. It has been found that the ≤ Ω ∂∏ access of banks to foreign funds and interest rate IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ ¥hôa OƒLh ™e »ÑæLCG πjƒ“ ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG ∫ƒ°ü◊ ¿CG differentials between local and foreign currency IôdhódG OGóàeG ‘ √QÉKBG á«ÑæLC’Gh á«∏ëŸG äÓª©dÉH á«dÉŸG äGhOC’G ÚH instruments affects the extent of financial dollarization .(2-2 QÉWEG) áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ á«dÉŸG in emerging economies (Box 2-2).

Chart 2-3: Currency composition of credit ¿ÉªàF’ÉH á°UÉÿG äÓª©dG áÑ«côJ :3-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

135 120 1118.518.5 105 90 75 60 45 30 25.425.4 18.618.6 15

QR billion 0 -15 -29.4-29.4 -30 -45 20112011 20102010 QR credit FC credit

Box 2-2: Financial Dollarization á«dÉŸG IôdhódG :2-2 QÉWEG Financial dollarization (FD) refers broadly to the holding of äÓª©dÉH áeƒ≤ŸG) á«dÉŸG äÉHƒ∏£ŸGh äGOƒLƒŸG ¤EG áeÉY IQƒ°üH á«dÉŸG IôdhódG Ò°ûJ financial assets and liabilities (denominated in foreign currency, ójõJh .Ée ó∏H ‘ Úª«≤ŸÉH á°UÉÿG (»μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH IQhô°†dÉH ¢ù«dh ,á«ÑæLC’G not necessarily the US Dollar) by a country’s residents. FD k q increases the exposure of agents to exchange rate risk and can GQó°üe ‹ÉàdÉH πμ°ûJ ¿CG øμÁh ,±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉîŸ AÓcƒdG ¢Vô©J øe IôdhódG therefore become a potential source of macroeconomic and .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ΩóYh ,»∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G QGô≤à°SG Ωó©d Óªàk fi financial instability.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 62 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

FD explicitly recognizes how competition among banks for äÓª©dGh á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dG ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥hôa ≈∏Y ÒKCÉàdÉH áMGô°U IôdhódG ô≤Jh mobilization of resources, and the fact that banks often have ¿CG á≤«≤M ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,OQGƒŸG áÄÑ©àd ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH á°ùaÉæŸG ΩÉ«b áé«àf á«ÑæLC’G an open facility to increase funds by accumulating foreign k liabilities, may affect local currency and foreign currency interest ™«ªŒ ∫ÓN øe ∫GƒeC’G IOÉjõd áMƒàØe äÓ«¡°ùJ É¡jód ¿ƒμj Ée ÉÑdÉZ ∑ƒæÑdG rate differentials. International experience shows that banks ™«ªéàH Ωƒ≤J ¿CG øμÁ ∑ƒæÑdG ¿CG á«dhódG ÜQÉéàdG ô¡¶Jh .á«ÑæLC’G äÉHƒ∏£ŸG can accumulate large foreign liabilities, particularly, when many ∑ƒæÑd á©HÉJ ∑ƒæÑdG √òg øe ójó©dG ¿ƒμj ÉeóæY ɪ«°S’h ,IÒÑμdG á«ÑæLC’G äÉHƒ∏£ŸG banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks and have ample access ÉÃh . C’G ƒæÑdG øe á«ÑæLCG jƒ“ QOÉ°üe Y ƒ°ü G ádƒ¡°ùH É¡æ Áh á«ÑæLCG to foreign sources of funding from their parent bodies. As Ω ∑ π ≈∏ ∫ ◊ μ banks are allowed to borrow abroad for funding domestic credit πμq °ûJ ,»∏ëŸG ¿ÉªàF’G äÉÑ∏£àe πjƒªàd êQÉÿG øe ¢VGÎb’ÉH ∑ƒæÑ∏d íª°ùj ¬fq CG requirements, interest rate differentials between loans in foreign ÓeÉYk á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dGh á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dG ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥hôa and local currency are a key factor behind credit dollarization. õcGôŸG ‘É°U ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq ¬fq CG ÉÃh .¿ÉªàF’G IôdhO AGQh Ék «°ù«FQq Since banks have to keep net open positions under a limit, they lend in foreign currency to domestic borrowers thereby increasing Ú°VÎ≤ª∏d á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢VGôbE’ÉH Ωƒ≤J »¡a ,Ú©eq iƒà°ùe øe πbCG áMƒàØŸG dollarization of their credit portfolio. .º¡H á°UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G á¶Øfi IôdhO øe ójõJ ‹ÉàdÉHh Ú«∏ëŸG FD has several characteristics. First, access to foreign funds øe ójõj ’hk CG á«ÑæLCG ∫GƒeCG ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊Éa ,¢üFÉ°üN Ió©Hq á«dÉŸGq IôdhódG º°ùàJh increases credit dollarization but it decreases the dollarization ºcGôJ ¿CG ¤EG »°SÉ°SC’G ¢Só◊G Ò°ûjh .™FGOƒdG IôdhO øe π∏≤q j ¬æμdh ¿ÉªàF’G IôdhO of deposits. The underlying intuition is that the accumulation of foreign liabilities seen in emerging countries results in currency äÓª©dÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ≥HÉ£àdG ΩóY ¤EG …ODƒj áÄ°TÉædG ∫hódG ‘ á«ÑæLC’G äÉHƒ∏£ŸG mismatches in the portfolios of market participants. Second, ,É«fÉKk ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥hôa ´É°ùJG ¿q CG ɪc .¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûŸÉH á°UÉÿG ßaÉëŸG ‘ a wider interest rate differential on loans in domestic currency ‘ ¢Vhô≤dG IôdhO øe ójõj á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dGh á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dG ÚH compared to loans in foreign currency increases loan dollarization k k q while a wider interest rate differential on deposits has a negative .™FGOƒdG IôdhO ≈∏Y É«Ñq ∏°S GôKCG ∑Îj ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥hôa ´É°ùJG ¿CG ÚM effect on the extent of deposit dollarization. Third, the trade-off óYÉ°ùj ÉeÉgk ÓeÉYk »≤«≤◊G ±ô°üdG ô©°S äÉÑ∏≤Jh ºî°†àdG ÚH á∏°VÉØŸG Èà©J ,ÉãdÉKk between inflation and real exchange rate variability is found to ¢Vhô≤dG IôdhO ‘ OÉ°üàb’G ìÉàØfG áLQO ™aQ º¡°ùj ,É©HGQk .á«dÉŸG IôdhódG Ò°ùØJ ≈∏Y be a significant factor explaining financial dollarization. Fourth, .(2008 ,Luca and Petrova) äÉcô°ûdÉH á°UÉÿG a higher degree of openness of an economy contributes to loan dollarization of firms (Luca and Petrova, 2008).

References ™LGôŸG H.S.Basso, O.Calvo-Gonsalez and M. Jurgilas (2007). Financial .(2007) M. Jurgilas h H.S.Basso, O.Calvo-Gonsalez dollarization – The role of banks and interest rates. ECB Working ,748 »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG πªY ábQh .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCGh ∑ƒæÑdG QhO - á«dÉŸG IôdhódG Paper 748, ECB: Frankfurt. .äQƒØμfGôa :»HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG A. Luca and I.Petrova (2008). What drives credit dollarization in ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G IôdhóH IôKDƒŸG πeGƒ©dG »g Ée .(2008) A. Luca and I.Petrova transition economies?. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 858-69. .69-858 ,32 á«aô°üŸGh á«dÉŸG Ωƒ∏©dG á∏› ?á«dÉ≤àfG á∏Môà ô“q »àdG äGOÉ°üàb’G

Disaggregated data shows that within the public sector, ¿ÉªàF’G OGR ,ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ,¬fq CG á∏°üØŸGq äÉfÉ«ÑdG ô¡¶J foreign currency credit to government institutions QÉ«∏e 75^3 QGó≤à á«eƒq μ◊G äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d á«ÑæLq C’G äÓª©dÉH ìƒæªŸG increased by QR 75.3 billion in 2011 accounting ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G øe %95 øe ÌcCG πãÁ Ée 2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ for more than 95% of foreign currency credit to the ájQÉéàdG ɪYC’G ¥É£f ™«°Sƒàd dPh ,á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ´É£ dG Gò¡d sector, mainly for business expansion and overseas ∫ ∂ q ≤ acquisitions. In the private sector, the largest recipient âfÉc ó≤a ,¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ‘ ÉeCG .»°SÉ°SCG πμ°ûH »LQÉÿG PGƒëà°S’Gh of such credit was the real estate and consumption ¢Vhô≤dGh …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG øe πq c Ö«°üf øe ¿ÉªàF’G øe ÈcC’G á°ü◊G sectors for project development and settlement of real ‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y ,ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG ájƒ°ùJh ™jQÉ°ûŸG ôjƒ£àd á«cÓ¡à°S’G estate loans, respectively (see Chapter 3 for details). .(π«°UÉØàdG øe ójõŸ 3 π°üØdG ô¶fG) Inflation ºî°†àdGt After experiencing deflation for two consecutive ºî°†Jq ∫ó©eq ô£b ádhO â∏é°S ,Úà«dÉààe Úàæ°S IóŸ ¢Tɪμf’G ó©H years, Qatar recorded positive inflation in 2011, with ∞°üædG ‘ ºNõdG ¢†©H ºî°†àdGq Gòg ÜÉ°ùàcG ™e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ »HÉéjEG inflation gaining momentum in the second half of the »°SÉ« dG ºbôdG ™ØJQG ,…ƒæ°ùdG §°SƒàŸG ¢SÉ°SCG Yh . É©dG øe ÊÉãdG year. On an annual average basis, the CPI increased ≤ ≈∏ Ω by 1.9% during the year in contrast to a decline of ¬∏é°Sq …òdG ¢VÉØîf’G πHÉ≤e ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %1^9 áÑ°ùæH ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ 2.4% in 2010. Inflation in Qatar, however, was much ÒãμH πbCG ä’ó©e πé°Sq ô£b ‘ ºî°†àdGq ¿q CG ’EG .%2^4 áÑ°ùæH 2010 ΩÉY lower compared to other GCC countries and global âfÉc å«M á«ŸÉ©dG äÉgÉŒ’Gh iôNC’G »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO øe trends where inflationary pressures were higher in á«ŸÉ©dGq AGò¨dG OGƒŸG QÉ©°SCG ´ÉØJQG ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ÈcCG ᫪àdGq •ƒ¨°†dG the wake of rising international food and oil prices. ÉgóYq CG »àdG á«ŸÉ©dGq á«°ù«FôdGq ™ °ùdG QÉ©°SCG äGô°TDƒŸ Ék ahh .§ØædGh According to the international primary commodity ∏ ≤ price indices compiled by the IMF (Base 2005=100), OGƒŸG QÉ©°SCG §°Sƒàe ™ØJQG ,(100 = 2005 ¢SÉ°SCG) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U average global food prices increased by 19.7% ∫GóàY’G ¢†©H äó¡°Th 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN %19^7 áÑ°ùæH á«ŸÉ©dG á«FGò¨dGq during 2011 moderating somewhat towards the year- QGóe ≈∏Y á©ØJôe á«ŸÉ©dG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG â∏X ,πHÉ≤ŸG ‘ .ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ‘ end. In contrast, global oil prices remained elevated .É¡°VÉØîfG á«fÉμeEG ¤EG IQÉ°TEG …CG ¿hO øe áæ°ùdG throughout the year without any signs of abatement.

63 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

The increase in the overall index was attributed to Ée ,OƒæÑdG ™«ªL ‘ IOÉjõdG ¤EG ΩÉ©dG »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG ‘ IOÉjõdG iõ©J the increase in all categories, except “Rent, Fuel â°ù ©fGh .(4-2 hóL) "ábÉ£dGh OƒbƒdGh QÉéjE’G"`d »YôØdG óæÑdG GóY and Energy” (Table 2-4). In particular, noticeable μ ∫ increases were reflected in “Garments and Footwear”, "ájòMC’Gh ¢ùHÓŸG" OƒæH ‘ ¢Uƒ°üÿG ¬Lh ≈∏Y áXƒë∏ŸG äGOÉjõdG “Transport and Communication”, “Miscellaneous á«FGò¨dGq OGƒŸG"h "áYƒæàŸGq äÉeóÿGh ™∏°ùdG"h "ä’É°üJ’Gh π≤ædG"h Goods and Services” and in “Food, Beverages and øe ÌcCÉH ÒNC’G óæÑdG Gòg OÉjORG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh ."≠ÑàdGh äÉHhô°ûŸGh Tobacco”. The increase in the latter category, although ´ÉØJQG øe Òã H bCG ´ÉØJQ’G Gòg ¿Éc , HÉ°ùdG É©dÉH áfQÉ e ©°†dG more than double of the previous year, was much μ π ≥ Ω ≤ ∞ lower than international food prices, implying a muted "ábÉ£dGh OƒbƒdGh QÉéjE’G" óæH π°UGhh .á«ŸÉ©dGq á«FGò¨dGq OGƒŸG QÉ©°SCG pass-through. The index of “Rent, Fuel and Energy”, ¬«∏Y ¿Éc ɇ ÒãμH πbCG ¿Éc ¢VÉØîf’G Gòg ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ¬°VÉØîfG however, continued to fall although the extent of ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ¢†FÉa OƒLh QGôªà°SG ¤EG ™LGÎdG Gòg Ò°ûjh .2010 ΩÉY ‘ decline was much lower than in 2010. The decline is .øcÉ°ùª d » ëŸG indicative of the persistence of excess capacity in the ∏ ∏ domestic housing market.

Table 2-4: Annual average CPI inflation (%) QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG ºî°†àdq …ƒæ°ùdG §°SƒàŸGq :4-2 ∫hóL (Base 2007 = 100) (100=2007 ¢SÉ°SCG) (%) ∂∏¡à°ùŸG

Item 2010 2011 óæÑdG

Food, Beverages and Tobacco 2.1 4.3 ≠ÑàdGh äÉHhô°ûŸGh á«FGò¨dG OGƒŸG Garments and Footwear -1.3 7.5 ájòMC’Gh ¢ùHÓŸG

Rent, Fuel and Energy -12.8 -4.8 ábÉ£dGh OƒbƒdGh QÉéjE’G Furniture, Textiles and Home Appliances 4.1 2.8 á«dõæŸGq Iõ¡LC’Gh äÉLƒ°ùæŸGh çÉKC’G Medical Care and Medical Services 3.5 2.6 á«ë°üdGq äÉeóÿGh á«Ñ£dGq ájÉæ©dG Transport and Communications 2.6 6.4 ä’É°üJ’Gh π≤ædG Entertainment, Recreation and Culture 2.9 2.0 áaÉ≤ãdGh ¬«aÎdGh á«∏°ùàdG Miscellaneous Goods and Services 4.7 5.6 ábôØàeq äÉeóNh ™∏°S Household Consumption (CPI) -2.4 1.9 (∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG) »∏FÉ©dG ∑Ó¡à°S’G

Source: Qatar Statistics Authority AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L :Qó°üŸG

While increase in the major indices indicates pressures óæH πc øY áªLÉædG •ƒ¨°†dG ¤EG á«°ù«FôdG á«°SÉ«≤dG ΩÉbQC’G Ò°ûJ ÚM ‘ emanating from each category, the weighted ºî°†àdGq QOÉ°üe øY í°VhCG IQƒ°U 14áëLôŸG áªgÉ°ùŸG »£©J ,OƒæÑdG øe 14 q contribution of each index provides better insight πeÉ©dG "ä’É°üJ’Gh π≤ædG" πμq °T ,2011 ΩÉY »Øa .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á«q ∏©ØdG on the drivers of the actual inflation outcome. In 2011, k q the single largest driver of inflation was “Transport and Ó°†a ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ô°TDƒŸG IOÉjR ¢ùμ©j ɇ ,ºî°†à∏d ó«MƒdG »°ù«FôdG Communications” reflecting both increase in the index º°SQ) ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG á∏°S ‘ É«Ñ°ùfk ≈∏YC’G ¬fRh øY during the year as well as its relatively higher weight ”q ,2011 ôjÉæj ‘ ¬fCG ¤EG IQÉ°TE’G øμÁ ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .(4-2 ÊÉ«H in the CPI basket (Chart 2-4). In this regard, it may be ≈∏Y ¢ùμ©fG …òdG ôeC’G ,%25 §°SƒàÃq ô£b ‘ äÉbhôëŸG QÉ©°SCG IOÉjR noted that in January 2011 oil prices in Qatar were QÉ©°SCG ´ÉØJQG ôKq CG ,∂dP ÖfÉL ¤EG .ä’É°üJ’Gh π≤æ∏d »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG increased by an average 25% which got reflected in IOÉjR øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .á«FÉ¡ædGq ΩÉbQC’G ≈∏Y GÒÑck GÒKk CÉJ á«FGò¨dG OGƒŸG the index of Transport and Communication. Besides, k k k increasing food prices also had a substantial impact óæH ≈∏Y GÒÑc GôKCG IOÉjõdG √òg ∑ÎJ ⁄ ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN É°†jCG P’ƒØdG QÉ©°SCG on the overall outcome. Although steel prices were »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG á∏°S ‘ ¬fRh ¿q C’ "á«dõæŸGq Iõ¡LC’Gh äÉLƒ°ùæŸGh çÉKC’G" also increased during the year, it did not have a major ôKq CG …òdG ó«MƒdG ∞∏àîŸG πeÉ©dG ¿Éc óbh .GÒÑck ¢ù«d ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ impact on “Furniture, Textiles and Home Appliances” á«Ñq ∏°S áªgÉ°ùe ™e "ábÉ£dGh OƒbƒdGh QÉéjE’G" óæH ºî°†àdG OƒªL ≈∏Y as its weight in CPI basket is not significant. The sole .IÒÑc dampener on the inflation inertia was “Rent, Fuel and Energy” with a large negative contribution.

14 14 {(Inflation of each sub-group x Weight of the sub-group)/overall inflation} expressed in .ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædÉH |ΩÉ©dG ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e /(á«YôØdG áYƒªéŸG ¿Rh x á«Yôa áYƒª› πc ‘ ºî°†àdG ∫ó©e)} % age terms.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 64 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Chart 2-4: Inflation drivers in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ºî°†àdG äÉÑÑ°ùe :4-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

Misc. Goods & serv.

Enter., Rec. & Cul.

Trans. & Comm.

Medical & Health

Furn., Text. & Home App.

Rent, Fuel & Energy

Garments & Footwear

Food, Bev. & Tob.

-100100 -8080 -6060 -4040 -2020 0 2 200 4 400 6 600 8 800 1 10000 (percent)

As monetary policy focuses on demand management, ¢ù«jÉ≤e ôjƒ£J ” ,Gòd ,Ö∏£dG IQGOEG ≈∏Y ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG õcôJq demand-driven inflation measures have been OÉ©Ñà°SG (CG) ÒjÉ©e ΩGóîà°SÉH Ö∏£dG ´ÉØJQG øY Å°TÉædG ºî°†à∏d developed using the criteria of (i) excluding “Rent, Fuel áq °S ‘ ÈcC’G ¿RƒdG q °ûJ »àdG "ábÉ£dGh OƒbƒdGh QÉéjE’G" áYƒª› and Energy”, which has the largest weight in the CPI ∏ πμ basket; (ii) excluding “Food, Beverages and Tobacco” á«FGò¨dGq OGƒŸG" áYƒª› OÉ©Ñà°SG (Ü) ,∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG which is prone to imported shocks; and (iii) excluding (ê)h ,CÉ°ûæŸG á«LQÉÿGq äÉeó°ü∏d á°VôY Èà©J »àdG "≠ÑàdGh äÉHhô°ûŸGh both items which cumulatively have a weight of more á∏q °S ‘ %45 øe ÌcCG É©ek ɪ¡fRh πμq °ûj Úà∏dG ÚàYƒªéŸG Óc OÉ©Ñà°SG than 45% in the CPI basket. All exclusion-based ≈∏Y áªFÉ≤dG ¢ù«jÉ≤ŸG ™«ªL âfÉc óbh .∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdG measures of CPI inflation were positive and higher in ‘ á«HÉéjEG ¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ »°SÉ« dG ºbôdG ºî°†àHq á°UÉÿGh OÉ©Ñà°S’G 2011 indicating the exit from the deflationary phase of q ∂∏ ≤ the previous two years (Table 2-5). »àdG …OÉ°üàb’G ¢Tɪμf’G á∏Môe øe êhôÿG ≈∏Y ∫q ój ɇ 2011 ΩÉY .(5-2 ∫hóL) Ú«°VÉŸG ÚeÉ©dG É¡H º°ùJGq

Table 2-5: Exclusion Based Measures of ô°Tq Dƒe ºî°†Jq ∫ó©Ÿq OÉ©Ñà°S’G ≈∏Y á«æÑŸGq äÉ°SÉ«≤dG :5-2 ∫hóL CPI Inflation (%) (%) ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SCG

Measures 2009 2010 2011 äÉ°SÉ«≤dG

Excluding Rent, Fuel & Energy -1.0 2.7 4.7 ábÉ£dGh OƒbƒdGh QÉéjE’G OÉ©Ñà°SG

Excluding Food, Beverages & -5.7 -2.9 1.7 Tobacco ≠ÑàdGh äÉHhô°ûŸGh á«FGò¨dG OGƒŸG OÉ©Ñà°SG Excluding both Rent & Food -1.6 2.8 4.8 á«FGò¨dG OGƒŸGh QÉéjE’G øe πc OÉ©Ñà°SG

The sobering impact of the decline in rental prices on ∫GƒW »∏μdG ºî°†àdGq ≈∏Y Éë°VGhk GôKk CG äGQÉéjE’G QÉ©°SCG ¢VÉØîfG ∑ôJ overall inflation was evident throughout 2011. While »°SÉ«≤dG ºbôdÉH ¢UÉÿG ºî°†àdGq ∫ó©eq ìhGôJ ÚM ‘h .2011 ΩÉY CPI inflation (excluding rent) ruled within 4-6%, the ¢VÉØîfG QGôªà°SG ≈≤HCG ,%6h 4 ÚH (QÉéjE’G AÉæãà°SÉH) ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SC’ persistent decline in the index of rent kept headline q inflation under 2.5% during the year (Chart 2-5). Thus, ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %2^5 øe πbCG »∏μdG ºî°†àdG QÉéjE’G ô°TDƒe benign inflation situation provided the QCB greater á°Uôa …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üŸ ∫óà©ŸG ºî°†àdG ádÉM äôahq ,Gòμgh .(5-2 room for manoeuvrability in lowering interest rates .ƒªædG õ«Ø–h IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†Øÿ ÈcCG and stimulating growth.

65 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Chart 2-5: Year-on-Year CPI inflation in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ∂∏¡à°ùŸG QÉ©°SCG ô°Tq DƒŸ …ƒæ°ùdG ºî°†àdGq :5-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

7

6

5

4

3 (percent)

2

1

0 l r t r c n y n g v p b c u a p e a e e a u u o Jul J Jan Jun Oct O Sep Feb Apr Dec Mar M Aug Nov May

CPI (excluding rent) CPI

Liquidity management ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG The liquidity management framework of the QCB áKÓK …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üà ¢UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ ΩÉ©dG QÉWE’G πª°ûj encompasses three policy rates, viz., QCB Deposit ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°Sh ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S »g ä’ó©eq Rate (QCBDR), QCB Lending Rate (QCBLR), and QCB AGô°ûdG IOÉYEG äÉ«bÉØJG äÉ«∏ªY ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°Sh ¢VGôbEÓd Repurchase Rate (QCB Repo or QCBRR). QCBDR and q QCBLR are the interest rates announced by the QCB on ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°Sh ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S πμ°ûjh .(ƒÑjôdG) overnight deposit and loan transactions, respectively, äÉ«∏ªY ≈∏Y …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe áæ∏©ŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢VGôbEÓd between the QCB and local banks through the Qatar á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdGh …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÚH IóMGh á∏«∏d ¢VGÎb’Gh ´GójE’G Money Market Rate (QMR) standing facility. At the end ¥ôØdG ≠∏H ,2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘h .…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG á«dBG ∫ÓN øe of 2011, the gap between QCBLR and QCBDR stood ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°Sh ¢VGôbEÓd ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S ÚH at 375 basis points – down from 400 basis points at .2010 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 400 øe É°†Øîæek ¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 375 the end of 2010. As mentioned earlier, the QCB also k introduced Treasury Bills (T-Bills) to manage structural ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ áfGõN ¿hPCG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ìôW ,ÉØfBG ÉfôcP ɪch liquidity in the banking system from May 2011 (Box ¢VôØj ɪc .(3-2 QÉWEG) 2011 ƒjÉe øe ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ á«q ∏μ«¡dG 2-3). The QCB also prescribes a reserve requirement, òæe %4^75 óæY Ò«¨J ¿hO »≤H …òdG »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G É°†jk CG ±ô°üŸG which has remained unchanged at 4.75% since May .2008 ƒjÉe ô¡°T 2008.

Box 2-3: Treasury Bills as instruments äGhOCÉc áfGõÿG ¿hPCG :3-2 QÉWEG of liquidity management ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ Treasury Bills (T-Bills) are preferred over central bank paper ≈∏Y ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ IGOCÉc …õcôŸG ∂æÑ∏d á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ≈∏Y áfGõÿG ¿hPCG π°†ØJq as an instrument for liquidity management based on three ™«é°ûàdG (Ü) ;ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d á∏eÉμàe ájDhQ òNCG (CG) »gh ’CG ,äGQÉÑàYG áKÓK ¢SÉ°SCG considerations, viz., (i) taking an integrated perspective of the public sector; (ii) promoting the development of money .πμc OÉ°üàbÓd áÑ°ùædÉH á«HÉéjEG á«LQÉN πeGƒY ó«dƒJ (ê)h ,∫ÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCG ôjƒ£J ≈∏Y markets; and (iii) generating positive externalities for the áeƒμ◊Gh …õcôŸG ∂æÑ∏d ΩÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG ™°VƒdG ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d á∏eÉμàŸG ájDhôdG Èà©Jh whole economy. The integrated view of the public sector ÖJÎj Éeh …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG Égô°ûæj »àdG ôFÉ°ùÿG ™°VƒJ ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .GóMGhk ÉfÉ«ck considers the overall financial position of the central bank and the government as one entity. Accordingly, losses »©aGO ÜÉ°ùM ≈∏Y ,‹ÉàdÉHh ,áeÉ©dG äÉ≤ØædG ÜÉ°ùM ‘ á∏ª°SôdG IOÉYEG äÉ«∏ªY ≈∏Y posted by the central bank and any need for recapitalization πμ°ûH Égô¡¶Jh º«≤©àdG äÉ«∏ªY áØ∏μàH ±Î©J ¿CG ÉeEG äÉeƒμë∏d øμÁ ,Gòd .ÖFGô°†dG are a charge on public accounts and, by extension, on the ¿CG øμÁ å«M ájõcôŸG ∑ƒæÑdG äÉ«fGõ«e ‘ ô°TÉÑe ÒZ πμ°ûH hCG É¡JÉ«fGõ«e ‘ í°VGh tax payer. Therefore, governments can either choose to á«fGõ«ŸG ©°†J ôFÉ°ùN ¤EG hCG/h áeƒ ë d ìÉHQC’G ™jRƒJ ¢†ØN ¤EG ôeC’G Gòg …ODƒj recognize the cost of sterilization operations explicitly in their ∞ μ ∏ budgets or indirectly in the balance sheets of the central .…õcôŸG ∂æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG banks where it can result in reduced profit distribution to the government and/or losses that impair the balance sheet of the central bank.

In thin financial markets where secondary markets are not ¿CG øμÁ ,Qƒ£àdGhq ƒªædG ¤EG ájƒfÉãdG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ô≤àØJ å«M á≤«°†dGq á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘h fully developed, T-Bills can be an effective instrument for IQGOEG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH á«∏μ«¡dG ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa IQGOE’ ádÉ©a IGOCG áfGõÿG ¿hPCG πμq °ûJ the management of structural excess liquidity in addition to debt management. Large volumes in the T-Bills market can á≤«ªY ¥ƒ°S ôjƒ£J áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ¥ƒ°S ‘ IÒÑμdG äÉ«ªμdG π¡°ùJq ¿CG øμÁh .øjódG facilitate the development of a deep and liquid market. The øY º«≤©àdG äÉ«∏ªY ™«ªL ∫õY (CG) ≈∏Y áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ΩGóîà°SG óYÉ°ùj ɪc .á∏FÉ°Sh use of T-Bills would be helpful in (i) insulating all sterilization øμÁ »àdG äÉÑ∏≤àdG ≈∏Y AÉ°†≤dG hCG/h ¢†«ØîJ (Ü) ,á«eƒ«dGq ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG äÉ«∏ªY operations from normal day-to-day liquidity management; IÒ°ü dG á«dÉŸG äGhOC’G Góîà°SG (ê) ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ eÉ dG ¥É£ædG ó°ùØJ ¿CG (ii) reducing and/or eliminating volatility which can vitiate the ≤ Ω π μ

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 66 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

entire spectrum of interest rates; (iii) making effective »¨Ñæjh .ᣰûf ájƒfÉK ¥ƒ°ùd ¢SÉ«≤e ™°Vh (O)h ,§Ñ°†dG äÉjɨd ’É©ak ÉeGóîà°SGk πLC’G use of short-term instruments for fine-tuning; and (iv) ádƒ«°ùdG º«≤©J QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNCÉJ á≤jô£H áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ¥ƒ°S πμ«g º«ª°üJ ºàjq ¿CG developing a benchmark for a vibrant secondary market. The structure of the T-Bill market should be designed with .¥Gƒ°SC’G ôjƒ£J ‘ áªgÉ°ùŸGh áØ∏c πbC’G ƒëædG ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d á«∏μ«¡dG a view to sterilizing the structural liquidity of the banking sector in the cheapest possible way and contributing to the development of markets.

The existence of a deep and liquid financial market is a ‘ QGô≤à°S’G ≥«≤ëàd áeÉ©dG á°SÉ«°ùdG º¡Jq ádCÉ°ùe á∏FÉ°Sh á≤«ªY á«dÉe ¥ƒ°S OƒLh πμq °ûj matter of public policy interest for financial sector stability, ádƒ«°ùdG ≥aGƒàJ ’CG øμÁ ÚM ‘h .øjódG IQGOEGh ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG IQGOEGh ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG the conduct of monetary policy and debt management. While market liquidity may not meet the strict criteria of a »àdG á«HÉéjE’G á«LQÉÿG πeGƒ©dG Ò°ûJ ,áeÉ©dG á©Øæª∏d áeQÉ°üdG ÒjÉ©ŸG ™e ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ pure public good, the positive externalities that it generates ¤EG ±ó¡J áeÉ©dG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ¿q CG ¤EG OÉ°üàb’G äÉYÉ£b á«≤Hh ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤∏d É¡≤≤q – for the financial sector and the rest of the economy argue ±QÉ°üŸGh äÉeƒμ◊G ≈∏Y ™ØædÉH á∏FÉ°ùdG ¥ƒ°ùdG Oƒ©J ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .ádƒ«°ùdG õjõ©J for public policy directed at enhancing liquidity. As such, a ¿hPCG ìôW ¡°ùj ɪc .» FÉ©dG ´É£ dGh á°UÉÿG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh áeÉ©dG äÉÄ«¡dGh ájõcôŸG liquid market benefits governments, central banks, public πq ∏ ≤ entities, private entities and households. Introduction of ≈æëæe ™°Vh ≈∏Y óYÉ°ùj …òdG »°SÉ«≤dG óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ™°Vh ∫ÉŸG ¥ƒ°S ‘ áfGõÿG T-Bills in the money market facilitates the development of .¥ƒ°ùdG ≈∏Y áªFÉ≤dG ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGhOC’ ∫É©ØdG ΩGóîà°S’Gh ,πeÉ°ûdG ¿ÉªàF’G a benchmark yield curve that helps to establish the overall credit curve and enable the effective use of market-based instruments of monetary policy.

Fiscal surpluses, the availability of alternative sources ≥∏≤dG ôYÉ°ûeh á∏jóÑdG πjƒªàdG QOÉ°üe ôaƒJhq ,á«dÉŸG ¢†FGƒØdG πμq °ûJ ¿CG øμÁ of financing and concern about budgetary costs can be .áfGõÿG ¿hPCG QGó°UEG øY áeƒμ◊G ±hõY AGQh ÉHÉÑ°Sk CG á«fGõ«ŸG ∞«dÉμJ ¿CÉ°ûH reasons for a government’s reluctance to issue T-Bills. Nevertheless, issuances of T-Bills even in times of fiscal ¤EG á«dÉŸG ¢†FGƒØdG äÉbhCG ‘ ≈àM áfGõÿG ¿hPCG QGó°UEG …ODƒj ’ ,∂dP ™eh surpluses not only promote market development but can º«gÉØe øY Gó«Øek É°SÉ«k ≤e É°†jk CG πμq °ûj ¿CG øμÁ πH Ö°ùëa ¥ƒ°ùdG ôjƒ£J õjõ©J also serve as a useful barometer of market perceptions .»∏μdG OÉ°üàb’ÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ áeƒμ◊G äÉ°SÉ«°S áªFÓeh áeÓ°ùH á°UÉÿG ¥ƒ°ùdG on the soundness of the government’s macroeconomic policies.

References ™LGôŸG O.Nyawata (2012). Treasury bills and/or central bank bills ¢UÉ°üàe’ …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG äGóæ°S hCG/h áfGõÿG ¿hPCG (2012) O.Nyawata for absorbing surplus liquidity: The main considerations. ¥hóæ°U .40 ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U πªY ábQh .á«°ù«FôdG äGQÉÑàY’G :ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa IMF Working Paper 40. IMF: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG

In Qatar, domestic liquidity position is influenced by (CG) »g ,áØ∏àfl πeGƒY áKÓãH ô£b ádhO ‘ á«q ∏ëŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°VhCG ôKq CÉàJ three distinct factors, namely (i) foreign exchange ‘ IOÉjõdG (ê) ,»eƒμ◊G ¥ÉØfE’G ‘É°U (Ü) ,»ÑæLC’G ó≤ædG äÉ≤aóJ flows; (ii) net government spending; and (iii) the increase in credit off-take. Foreign inflows are largely ´ÉØJQG áé«àf ÒÑc óMq ¤EG á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH äÉ≤aóàdG Èà©Jh .¿ÉªàF’G the result of higher export earnings, which was §ØædG QÉ©°SCG ´ÉØJQG ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ 2011 ΩÉY ‘ äOGORG »àdG ôjó°üàdG óFGƒY higher in 2011 due to higher international oil prices. -2011 á«dÉŸG áæ°ùdG ‘ »eƒμ◊G ¥ÉØfE’G iƒà°ùe ´ÉØJQG ¿q CG ɪc .á«dhódG Second, providing a major boost to investments in äGQó dG AÉæHh á«àëàdG á«æÑdG ‘ äGQɪãà°SÓd ájƒb á©aO q °T …òdG 2012 infrastructure and capacity creation, the high level of ≤ πμ government spending in the fiscal year 2011-12 was ‘h ,GÒNk CG .OÉ°üàb’G ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ±hô¶d Ék «°ù«FQq GóYÉ°ùek É°†jk CG ¿Éc a key facilitator of liquidity conditions in the economy. §ØædG ´É£b øe πc ‘ 2011 ΩÉY ‘ …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG óYÉ°üJ Aƒ°V Finally, given heightened economic activity in 2011 Ék «°ù«FQq ÓeÉYk ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG πμq °T ,á«£ØædGq ÒZ äÉYÉ£≤dGh RɨdGh in both the hydrocarbon and the non-hydrocarbon sectors, credit demand was a prime determinant of øe ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G πé°Sq ,≥HÉ°S âbh ‘ Éfô°TCG ɪch .ádƒ«°ùdG äÉ≤aóàd liquidity flows. As noted earlier, credit off-take from .2010 ΩÉ©H áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ≈∏YCG äÉjƒà°ùe ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb banks was much higher in 2011 than in 2010.

A host of measures introduced by the QCB …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÉgòîJG »àdG ÒHGóàdG øe IÒÑc áYƒª› äRõY strengthened liquidity management during 2011 ¢Vôa ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .ÉØfk BG ÉfôcP ɪc 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG as discussed earlier. In this regard, the QCB put ɪc , ƒæÑdG Ñb øe ¬jód GƒeC’G ´GójEG Y ᫪c GOƒ«bk ±ô°üŸG quantitative restrictions on placement of funds ∑ π ∫ ≈∏ q by banks as well as lowered policy rates which ô£b ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥ôa ¢ü∏q b ɇ ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†«ØîàH ΩÉb considerably reduced the interest differential between iOq CG óbh .(6-2 ∫hóL) ™FGOƒdÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ɪ«°S’hq ,IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdGh Qatar and the US, particularly on deposits (Table 2-6). áëLGôe) IôHÉ©dG ájQÉéàdG ᣰûfC’G ¥É£f ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG ¥QÉØdG ≥««°†J The narrowing differential significantly reduced the ∫ƒ°ü◊G ¢Uôa ±É°ûμà°SG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG åMhq ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG ‘ (óFGƒØdG scope of interest rate arbitrage/carry trade activities in IóFÉØdG AÖY áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ìôW ¢†ØNq , dP ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH .¿ÉªàF’G Y the financial system and encouraged banks to explore ∂ ≈∏ credit opportunities. In addition, the introduction QGó°UEG iOq CG ɪc .Ék «éjQóJq ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T AɨdEG ÈY ±ô°üŸG πgÉc øY

67 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG of T-bills reduced the interest burden of the QCB »àdGh ,2011 ôjÉæj ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 50 ᪫≤H á«eƒμ◊G äGóæ°ùdG through gradual phasing out of CDs. Furthermore, ¢UÉ°üàeG ¤EG á«eÓ°SEG ∑ƒμ°U πμ°T ≈∏Y …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 33 πª°ûJ the issue of government bonds worth QR 50 billion in January 2011, including QR 33 billion through Islamic .ΩɶædG øe ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa Sukuk instruments, also mopped up surplus liquidity from the system.

Table 2-6: Policy rate differential between äÉj’ƒdGh ô£b ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥ôa :6-2 ∫hóL Qatar and US (%) (%) IóëàŸG

Dec Aug Dec Apr Aug Dec 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011

1.QCB Lending Rate 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.00 4.50 4.50 ¢VGôbEÓd ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S-1

2.Fed Discount Window Rate 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 ‹GQóØdG »WÉ«àM’G iód º°üÿG IòaÉf ô©°S-2

3.Differential (1- 2) 5.00 4.75 4.75 4.25 3.75 3.75 (2-1) ¥ôØdG-3

4.QCB Deposit Rate 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.00 0.75 0.75 ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ∫ó©e -4 »WÉ«àM’G iód ±ó¡à°ùŸG IóFÉØdG ∫ó©e-5q 5.Fed Target Funds Rate 0-0.25 0-0.25 0-0.25 0-0.25 0-0.25 0-0.25 ‹GQó«ØdG 1.75- 1.25- 1.25- 0.75- 0.50- 0.50- 6.Differential (4- 5) 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.00 0.75 0.75 (5-4) ¥ôØdG-6

In view of the above measures, surplus liquidity position ΩɶædG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa ¢†ØîfG ,√ÓYCG IQƒcòŸG ÒHGóàdG Aƒ°V ‘h in the financial system reduced substantially towards ájÉ¡f ‘ áMÉàŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ´ƒª› ≠∏H óbh .ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ‘ ÒÑc πμ°ûH ‹ÉŸG the end of the year. As of end-2011, total available ájÉ¡f ‘ ÉjQ QÉ« e 73^2 `H áfQÉ e …ô£b ÉjQ QÉ« e 0,6 ƒëf 2011 ÉY liquidity was only QR 5.8 billion as compared with QR ∫ ∏ ≤ ∫ ∏ Ω 73.2 billion at end-2010 (Table 2-7). The outstanding äGOÉ¡°T øe áªFÉ≤dG Ió°UQC’G â°†ØîfG óbh .(7-2 ∫hóL) 2010 ΩÉY balances of CDs declined sharply at end-2011 from its ájÉ¡f ‘ ¬à∏é°Sq …òdG iƒà°ùŸG øY 2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ OÉM πμ°ûH ´GójE’G level at end-2010 as the amount of maturing CDs were äGQGó°UE’G ᪫b OGó°ùdG á≤q ëà°ùŸG äGOÉ¡°ûdG ᪫b âbÉa å«M 2010 ΩÉY more than that of fresh issuances during the year. .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN Iójó÷G

Table 2-7: Liquidity position (QR million) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e) ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh :7-2 ∫hóL

äÉ«WÉ«àM’G äÉ«∏ªY ‘É°U äGOÉ¡°T »WÉ«àM’G ádƒ«°ùdG ‹ÉªLEG áMÉàŸG ádƒ«°ùdG * á«aÉ°VE’G ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ¥ƒ°ùdG ´GójE’G »eGõdE’G q Gross Liquidity Available Liquidity Year-end QMR (net)* CDs RR ER 1 2 3 4 5 = (1+2+3+4) 6 = (5-3)

2009 26383 6100 11792 537 44812 33020

2010 64046 4010 14611 5177 87844 73233

2011 485 146 16433 5175 22239 5806

RR: required reserves ER: excess reserves RR: áHƒ∏£ŸG äÉWÉ«àM’G ER: á°†FÉØdG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G *: QMR Deposit - QMR Lending *¢VGôbE’G äÉ«∏ªY – ´GójE’G äÉ«∏ª Y

In view of the imposition of ceiling and reduction in IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¢†ØNh …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe ∞≤°ùdG ¢Vôa Aƒ°V ‘ QMR deposit rate, QMR deposit transactions declined πμ°ûH äÉ«∏ª©dG √òg â°†ØîfG ,…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOh ≈∏Y sharply during the year. Daily average deposit transactions declined sharply from QR 16.0 billion in πμ°ûH ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ«∏ªY ™FGOƒd »eƒ«dG §°SƒàŸG ™LGôJ ɪc .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN OÉM January to QR 0.5 billion in December 2011 (Chart …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 0^5 ¤EG ôjÉæj ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 16^0 øe OÉM 2-6). However, banks did not avail the QMR lending øe ∑ƒæÑdG óØà°ùJ ⁄ ,∂dP ™eh .(6-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 68 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

(including auto-clearing loan) facilities in any significant ¢Vhôb ∂dP ‘ ÉÃ) …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG á«dBG ÈY áMÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG äÓ«¡°ùJ manner, although it increased somewhat towards the ‘ Ée óM ¤EG äOGR É¡fCG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,ÒÑc πμ°ûH (á«fhÎq μdE’G á°UÉq ≤ŸG year-end. Banks also did not take any recourse to the k repo window during the year. (ƒÑjôdG) AGô°ûdG IOÉYEG äÉ«∏ªY ¤EG É°†jCG ∑ƒæÑdG CÉé∏J ⁄ ɪc .ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f .áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN Chart 2-6: Daily averages of QMR ¥ƒ°ùdG äÓeÉ©Ÿ á«eƒ«dGq äÉ£°SƒàŸG:6-2q ÊÉ«H º°SQ transactions in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ó≤ædG

18000 707

16000 606 14000 505 12000 10000 404 8000 303 QR Million QR Million 6000 202 4000 2000 101 0 0 JanJan FebFeb MarMar AprApr MayMay JunJun JulJul AugAug SepSep OctOct NovNov DecDec

Avg. Deposit (Left scale) Avg. Lending (Right sca le)

During 2011, QR 63.6 billion was released from the …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG á«dBG øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 63^6 êôN ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN QMR facility as against the absorption of QR 37.7 ÖÑ°ùH 2010 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 37^7 ¢UÉ°üàeG πHÉ≤e …ô£≤dG billion in 2010 due to the January measure restricting k placement of funds (Table 2-8). This liquidity was largely ∫hóL) ∫GƒeC’G ´GójEG ≈∏Y GOƒ«b ¢Vôa …òdG ôjÉæj ‘ òîàŸG AGôLE’G absorbed through issue of government bonds worth QGó°UEG ∫ÓN øe ÒÑc óMq ¤EG ádƒ«°ùdG √òg ¢UÉ°üàeG ”q óbh .(8-2 QR 50 billion in January 2011. In addition, about QR 1.8 áaÉ°VE’ÉH .2011 ôjÉæj ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 50 ᪫≤H á«eƒμM äGóæ°S billion was impounded through reserve requirements »WÉ«àM’G ∫ÓN øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 1^8 ‹GƒM õéM ”q ,∂dP ¤EG in 2011 as compared with QR 2.8 billion in 2010. ^ Furthermore, introduction of T-Bills during the year .2010 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 2 8 ™e áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ »eGõdE’G mopped up QR 14 billion from the banking system. As 14 ¢UÉ°üàeG ¤EG ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN áfGõÿG ¿hPCG QGó°UEG iOCG ,∂dP ≈∏Y IhÓY maturing CDs were higher than fresh issuances, there á≤q ëà°ùŸG ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T ¿q CG ÉÃh .‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e was also net injection of liquidity amounting to QR 3.9 QÉ«∏e 3^9 ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ IOÉjõdG ‘É°U ≠∏H ,Iójó÷G äGQGó°UE’G äRhÉŒ billion during the year. .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN …ô£b ∫ÉjQ Table 2-8: Liquidity management by QCB ádƒ«°ù∏d …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe IQGOEG :8-2 ∫hóL (QR million) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e) ∫ÓN øe (+) IOÉjõdG/(-) ¢UÉ°üàe’G ‘É°U Net absorption (-)/release (+) through IÎØdG …ô£≤dG ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°S á«dBG ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T áfGõÿG ¿hPCG »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G Period QMR CDs TBs Required Reserves

2010 -37,663 2,246 .. -2,819

2011 63,561 3,932 -14,000 -1,822

Interest rates IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG Notwithstanding lower monetary expansion and óYÉ°S ,ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa ¢VÉØîfGh …ó≤ædG ™°SƒàdGq ™LGôJ øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y the reduction in surplus liquidity, the reduction in ±ô°üe ÉgòîJGq »àdG iôNC’G ᫪«¶æàdG ÒHGóàdGh IóFÉØdG ä’ó©eq ¢†ØN policy rates and other regulatory measures by the ¥ƒ°ùdG øe áØ∏àfl äÉYÉ£b ‘ IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØN ≈∏Y …õcôŸG ô£b QCB helped in softening of interest rates in various q segments of the financial market during 2011. In ∫óà©ŸG ºî°†àdG ™°Vh óYÉ°S ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ‹ÉŸG this regard, the benign inflation situation helped in IóFÉØdG ä’ó©eq ¢VÉØîfG π¡°Sq …òdG ôeC’G ,ºî°†àdG äÉ©bƒJq ∫GóàYG ≈∏Y sobering of inflation expectations, which facilitated .᫪°S’Gq lower nominal interest rates.

69 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

In the money market, interbank interest rates eased ∫ÉLBG ¥É£æH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG â©LGôJ ,∫ÉŸG ¥ƒ°S ‘ across the maturity spectrum. Interbank interest ¥É£f øª°V ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG âMhGôJ ó≤a .áØ∏àîŸG ¥É≤ëà°S’G rates moved in a lower range across all maturities in 2010 ΩÉ©H áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG ™«ªL ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH πq bCG 2011 as compared with 2010 (Table 2-9). Specifically, k the overnight rate was placed in a narrow range of Gójó– IóMGh á∏«∏d ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ìhGôJ óbh .(9-2 ∫hóL) 0.21−1.29% as compared with the range of 1.30−2.03% ΩÉY %2^03h %1^30 ¥É£æH áfQÉ≤e %1,29h %0^21 ÚH ≥«°Vq ¥É£f ‘ in 2010, although it witnessed higher volatility in 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN Égó¡°T »àdG á«dÉ©dG äÉÑ∏≤àdG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ∂dPh 2010 than in the previous year. .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉ≤e 2011 Table 2-9: Inter-bank market indicators ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG äGô°Tq Dƒe :9-2 ∫hóL (Average of the months) (…ô¡°ûdG §°SƒàŸG)q

Indicator 2010 2011 ô°Tq DƒŸG

Average Overnight Rate (%) 1.70 0.46 (%) IóMGh á∏«∏d IóFÉØdG ô©°S §°Sƒàe Overnight Rate Range (%) 1.30-2.03 0.21-1.29 (%) IóMGh á∏«∏d IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¥É£f Volatility in Overnight Rate* 15.2 68.7 *IóMGh á∏«∏d IóFÉØdG ô©°S ‘ äÉÑ∏≤àdG Inter-bank Rate Range (%) 1.10-3.66 0.21-2.67 (%) ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¥É£f

*=Coefficient of variation ±ÓàN’G πeÉ©e =*

The low interbank rate prevailing during the major ÒÑc AõL ‘ äOÉ°S »àdGh ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG ô©°S ä’ó©e ¢VÉØîfG Oƒ©j part of 2011 was explained by comfortable liquidity á°UÉÿG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØNh Ió«÷Gq ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°VhCG ¤EG 2011 ΩÉY øe conditions and the reduction in QCB policy rates. As a result, the overnight rate generally remained IóMGh á∏«d IóŸ IóFÉØdG ô©°S »≤H ,∂dòd áé«àf .…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üà substantially lower than the QCBDR during the first half ΩÉ©dG øe ∫hq C’G ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S øe πq bCG of the year (Chart 2-7). The overnight rate, however, 2011 ΩÉY øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ ™ØJQGh OÉY ¬fq CG ’EG (7-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) increased in the second half of 2011 – hovering around áé«àf áæ°ùdG ájÉ¡f ‘ ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S iƒà°ùe ¤EG π°ü«d the QCBDR towards the end of the year – as a result of reduction in surplus liquidity conditions and greater ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG IOÉjRh ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa ‘ ¢VÉØîf’G demand for funds in the interbank market. .∑ƒæÑdG

Chart 2-7: Policy rates and the overnight rate IóMGh á∏«∏d IóFÉØdG ∫ó©ehq IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG :7-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

6

5

4

3

(percent) 2

1

0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-11 Jan-10 Sep-10 Sep-11 Mar-10 Mar-11 Nov-10 Nov-11 May-10 May-11

QMRL QMRD Overnight

The lower policy rates also had a signaling impact on ÒÑc AõL ‘ äOÉ°S »àdGh ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG ô©°S ä’ó©e ¢VÉØîfG Oƒ©j the cost of deposits and on the lending rate of banks. á°UÉÿG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢†ØNh Ió«÷Gq ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°VhCG ¤EG 2011 ΩÉY øe Barring 1-year maturity, weighted average interest rates on customer deposits for all other maturities came IóMGh á∏«d IóŸ IóFÉØdG ô©°S »≤H ,∂dòd áé«àf .…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üà down at the end of 2011 from the level prevailing at ΩÉ©dG øe ∫hq C’G ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S øe πq bCG the end of 2010 - the decline ranging from 0.80-0.74 2011 ΩÉY øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ ™ØJQGh OÉY ¬fq CG ’EG (7-2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) percentage points (Table 2-10). Deposit interest rates, áé«àf áæ°ùdG ájÉ¡f ‘ ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ô©°S iƒà°ùe ¤EG π°ü«d however, had declined by a higher magnitude in 2010 than in 2011. ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG IOÉjRh ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa ‘ ¢VÉØîf’G .∑ƒæÑdG Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 70 Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Table 2-10: Weighted average interest rates on ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ íLôŸGq §°SƒàŸGq :10-2 ∫hóL customer deposits (%) (%) AÓª©dG ™FGOh

á∏LB’G ™FGOƒdG ¥É≤ëà°SG IÎa Time deposit maturities Period IÎØdG ô¡°T ô¡°TCG 3 ô¡°TCG 6 áæ°S áæ°S øe ÌcCG 1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year Greater than 1 year

Dec-09 3.59 3.20 3.77 4.33 2.76 2009 Ȫ°ùjO

Dec-10 2.31 1.94 2.32 1.74 2.04 2010 Ȫ°ùjO

Dec-11 1.59 1.62 1.58 1.94 1.96 2011 Ȫ°ùjO Change during 2010 -1.28 -1.26 -1.45 -2.59 -0.72 2010 ∫ÓN Ò¨àdGq Change during 2011 -0.72 -0.32 -0.74 0.20 -0.08 2011 ∫ÓN Ò¨àdGq

In contrast to deposit rates, weighted average QÉ©°SC’ íLôŸGq §°SƒàŸG ¢†ØîfG ,™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ±ÓîHh interest rates on credit facilities declined by a greater ¬«∏Y âfÉc ɪY 2011 ΩÉY ÈcCG áÑ°ùæH á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG magnitude in 2011 than in 2010 (Table 2-11). Besides the signalling impact of lower policy rates, the decline ¬côJ …òdG ÒÑμdG ÒKCÉàdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉÑa .(11-2 ∫hóL) 2010 ΩÉY is also reflective of QCB’s regulatory measures of April »àdG á«HÉbôdGq ÒHGóàdG É°†jCk G ™LGÎdG Gòg ¢ùμY ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢VÉØîfG 2011 whereby banks were instructed, inter alia, that, ∑ƒæÑ∏d äɪ«∏©J Qó°UCG å«M 2011 πjôHCG ‘ …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÉgòîJG (i) the maximum rate of interest or return on credit IóFÉØdG ∫ó©Ÿ ≈°übC’G ó◊G ¿CÉHq (CG) ,iôNCG QƒeCG á∏ªL øª°V ,»°†≤J facilities on salary were stipulated to be QCB lending rate plus 1.5%; and (ii) the maximum rate of interest on ô©°S …hÉ°ùj ÖJGôdG πHÉ≤e áMƒæªŸG á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG hCG credit card loans were fixed at a monthly rate of 1%. ∫ó©Ÿq ≈°übC’G óq ◊G ¿CGq (Ü)h ,%1^5 óFGR ¢VGôbEÓd ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa .Ék jô¡°Tq %1 ≠∏Ñj ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ¢Vhôb ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG

Table 2-11: Weighted average interest rates on äÓ«¡°ùàdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ íLôŸGq §°SƒàŸGq :11-2 ∫hóL credit facilities (%) (%) á«fɪàF’Gq ¢Vô≤dG áÄa Loan category Period IÎØdG áæ°S øe πbCG äGƒæ°S çÓK ¤EG áæ°S øe ÌcCG hCG äGƒæ°S çÓK Less than 1 year and above but Greater than / äGQÉ«°ùdGq á«fɪàF’Gq äÉbÉ£ÑdG Cars Credit cards 1 year less than 3 yrs equal to 3 yrs

Dec-09 6.98 9.45 9.20 8.48 20.00 2009 Ȫ°ùjO

Dec-10 7.34 8.68 8.00 8.02 19.92 2010 Ȫ°ùjO

Dec-11 5.28 6.65 5.03 6.18 10.69 2011 Ȫ°ùjO Change during 2010 0.36 -0.77 -1.20 -0.46 -0.08 2010 ∫ÓN Ò¨àdGq Change during 2011 -2.06 -2.03 -2.97 -1.84 -9.23 2011 ∫ÓN Ò¨àdGq

The QCB policy rates and interest rates on CDs, ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCGh ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa ä’ó©eq Èà©J interbank rate, 1-year deposit rate and 1-year lending ô©°Sh IóMGh áæ°ùd ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°Sh ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG ô©°Sh rate were found to be highly correlated implying for a áLQO OƒLh »æ©j ɇ ,Ék «Kh ÉWÉÑJQGk á£ÑJôe IóMGh áæ°ùd ¢VGôbE’G high degree of integration between the policy rates ≤ and short-term interest rates in different segments of IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCGh ±ô°üŸÉH á°UÉÿG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ÚH πeÉμàdG øe á«dÉY the financial system (Table 2-12). Based on monthly .(12-2 ∫hóL) ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG øe áØ∏àfl äÉYÉ£b ‘ πLC’G IÒ°ü≤dG data for 2010 and 2011, the correlation coefficients äÓeÉ©ep âfÉc ,2011h 2010 »eÉ©d ájô¡°ûdG á∏°ù∏°ùdG ≈∏Y AÉæHh were very high among the policy rates, interbank rate ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG ô©°Sh ±ô°üŸG IóFÉa QÉ©°SCG ÚH GóLk á«dÉY •ÉÑJQ’G and the weighted average CDs rate implying smooth »æ©j …òdG ôeC’G ,´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°ùd íLôŸGq §°SƒàŸGhq transmission of monetary policy impulses to the short- .á«dÉŸGq ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ IÒ°ü dG ÉLB’G ƒëf ájó ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQÉ°TEG ƒ–q end of the market. ≤ ∫ ≤ ∫

71 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Monetary and Liquidity Developments ádƒ«°ùdGh ájóq ≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq ÊÉãdG π°üØdG

Table 2-12: Correlation among short-term IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ÚH •ÉÑJQ’G :12-2 ∫hóL interest rates πLC’G IÒ°ü≤dG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S äÉ« ªY ™FGOh ¢VGôbE’G äÉ« ªY IóFÉØdG ô©°S IóFÉØdG ô©°S IóFÉØdG ô©°S IóFÉØdG ô©°S ∏ ∏ äGOÉ¡°T ≈∏Y ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y ¢VGôbE’G ≈∏Y …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ¥ƒ°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH INTBNK ´GójE’G IóMGh áæ°ùd IóMGh áæ°ùd …ô£≤dG …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG CD RATE DEP1YR LEN1YR QMRDEP QMRLEN ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ« ªY ™FGOh Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S QMRDEP 1.00 ∏ ≈∏ …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG á°UÉÿG ¢VGôbE’G äÉ« ªY Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S QMRLEN 0.89 (0.00) 1.00 ∏ ≈∏ …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdÉH INTBNK 0.85 (0.00) 0.66 (0.00) 1.00 ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH IóFÉØdG ô©°S CD RATE 0.98 (0.00) 0.84 (0.00) 0.84 (0.00) 1.00 ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S DEP1YR 0.72 (0.00) 0.44 (0.03) 0.80 (0.00) 0.76 (0.00) 1.00 IóMGh áæ°ùd ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S LEN1YR 0.80 (0.00) 0.68 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.76 (0.00) 0.63 (0.00) 1.00 IóMGh áæ°ùd ¢VGôbE’G ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S

Figures in brackets are probabilities. .ä’ɪàM’G »g Ú°Sƒb ÚH IOQGƒdG ΩÉbQC’G

Concluding remarks á«eÉàÿGq äɶMÓŸG The heightened pace of economic activity in 2011 ≈∏Y 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ójGõàŸG …OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG IÒJh á∏bôY ºàJq ⁄ was not hampered despite deceleration in monetary ºî°†àdG ádÉM äôahq ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .…ó≤ædG ƒªædG DƒWÉÑJ øe ºZôdG growth. In this regard, the benign inflation situation k provided greater flexibility to the QCB to change its ¢UÉÿG ¬Øbƒe Ò«¨àd …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üŸ áfhôŸG øe ÈcCG GQób ∫óà©ŸG monetary policy stance and signal a soft interest rate øeGõàdÉHh .á°†Øîæe IóFÉa QÉ©°SCG Ωɶf ¤EG IQÉ°TE’Gh ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH regime. In conjunction with appropriate prudential ,±ô°üŸG ÉgòîJG »àdG áªFÓŸG ᫪«¶æàdGh ájRGÎM’G ÒHGóàdG ™e and regulatory measures, the policy stimulus resulted á«LÉàfE’G äÉYÉ£≤dG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G ≥aóJ IOÉjR ¤EG õ«ØëàdG á°SÉ«°S äOCG in higher flow of credit to the productive sectors of the economy, which sustained the growth momentum. äGAGôLE’G äóYÉ°S ,∂dP ≈∏Y IhÓY .ƒªædG ºNR ≈∏Y ®ÉØë∏d OÉ°üàbÓd Moreover, proactive liquidity management measures äÉ≤aóJ ôWÉfl øY ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG ∫õY ≈∏Y ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ á«bÉÑà°S’Gq helped in insulating the financial system from the risks …CG ¢Vôa ¿hO âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘ á«∏μ«¡dG ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEGh ÜQÉ°†ŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ of speculative capital inflows while managing structural .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ≈∏Y §¨°V liquidity without any pressure on interest rates.

Nevertheless, some challenges remain in the way á≤£æe ó¡°ûJ ¿CÉH äÉ©bƒàdGq πq X »Øa .≥aC’G ‘ ìƒ∏J äÉjóëàdG ¢†©H ∫GõJ ’ ahead. With the euro area expected to go into a …òdG ƒªædG DƒWÉÑJ ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,2012 ÉY ‘ OƒcôdG øe ádÉM hQƒ«dG mild recession in 2012 and growth in emerging and Ω developing economies already showing signs of äGQƒ£àdGq ôWÉfl øª°†àJq ,á«eÉædGh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ ô¡¶j CGóH slowdown, the downside risk is lower oil and gas »ŸÉ©dG Ö∏£dG ¢VÉØîfG áé«àf RɨdGh §ØædG äGóFÉY ¢VÉØîfG á°ùcÉ©ŸG receipts as a result of a decline in global demand OÉjOR’ Gô¶fk É°ùŸG »©«Ñ£dG RɨdG f ‘ äÉHGô£°VG çhóM ɪàMGh and potential disruption in transportation of LNG ∫ π≤ ∫ due to increased geopolitical tensions. Furthermore, πq M ¤EG π°UƒàdG ºàj ɪãjQh ,∂dP ≈∏Y IhÓY .á«°SÉ«°ùdGq äÉHGô£°V’G pending a successful resolution of the sovereign debt ádƒ«°ùdG ±hôX ó¡°ûJ ¿CG øμÁ ,ÉHhQhCG ‘ ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG πcÉ°ûŸ íLÉf problems in Europe, global liquidity conditions could ɇ ,ôWÉîŸG ª–q øY ±hõ©dG ójGõJ AGôLq øe ójó°ûàdG ¢†©H á«ŸÉ©dG tighten from increased risk aversion, which could have π an impact on investments and project financing in ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘h .ô£b ádhO ‘ ™jQÉ°ûŸG πjƒ“h äGQɪãà°S’G ≈∏Y ôKq Dƒj ób Qatar. In this context, sustaining the regime of soft ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG ∫ÓN øe á°†Øîæe IóFÉa QÉ©°SCG Ωɶf ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G ∫Gõj ’ interest rates through proactive liquidity management ô£b ±ô°üe Ñjh .ƒªædG ºYód á«°ù«FQ ájƒdhq CG q °ûj »bÉÑà°SG °ûH continues to remain a key priority for supporting ≈≤ πμ πμ growth. The QCB, however, stands ready to meet ∞bGƒŸG ∫ÓN øe äÉjóëàdG √òg á¡LGƒŸ OGó©à°S’G áÑgCG ≈∏Y …õcôŸG these challenges through an appropriate stance of ᫪«¶æàdG ÒHGóàdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG áÑ°SÉæŸG monetary policy complemented by prudential and Y á¶aÉëŸGh ‹ÉŸG ´É£ d áeÉ°ûdG ᫪æàdG õjõ©J ¤GE ©°ùJ »àdG regulatory measures, which seek to promote overall ≈∏ ≤∏ ∏ ≈ financial sector development while preserving financial .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G stability.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 72 اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ CHAPTER THREE

ﺗﻄﻮرات اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﻲ BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS

Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

INTRODUCTION áeóq ≤ŸG Strong growth of the Qatari economy and a continued ƒªædG øe á«HÉéjE’G Iô¶ædG QGôªà°SGh …ô£≤dG OÉ°üàbÓd …ƒ≤dG ƒªædG RõYq positive outlook underpinned a healthy growth for the banking sector. The asset growth of the domestic øe ºYóH á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe ≠óbh .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d º«∏°ùdG banks was mostly supported by public sector credit ¥É£f ≈∏Y áHƒ∏£ŸG äGQɪãà°S’G á∏HÉ≤Ÿ ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG Ö∏W demand on account of large scale investments for ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe ,¢UÉÿG ´É£ dG OÉØà°SGh .á«àëàdG á«æÑdG ôjƒ£àd ÒÑc infrastructure developments. The private sector, on ≤ the other hand, benefited from the feedback effect of ¢UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G Ú°ù– ¤EG iOCG πμ°ûH ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ¥ÉØfEG ÒKCÉJ øe public sector spending, in turn, improving their credit ´É£ dG äGOƒLƒŸ (» « G) …ƒæ°ùdG §°SƒàŸG é°Shq . É©dG ÓN ¬H off-take during the year. Supported by both public ≤ ≤ ≤◊ π Ω ∫ and private sector credit demand, the annual average ¢UÉÿGh ΩÉ©dG ÚYÉ£≤dG πÑb øe ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG øe ºYóH ,‘ô°üŸG (real) asset of the banking sector recorded a growth of ¬fCG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN %19^7 áÑ°ùæH Gƒ‰k ,AGƒ°S óMq ≈∏Y 19.7% during 2011, even though it declined around 5 percent points over the growth recorded last year â¶aÉMh .(1-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e øY %5 ‹GƒëH π≤j (Chart 3-1). The asset of Islamic bank groups as well as ≈∏Y á«∏ëŸG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdGh á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG äÉYƒª› äGOƒLƒe the domestic commercial banks continued to maintain their growth momentum, while the asset of the foreign .á«ÑæLq C’G ∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe â©LGôJ ÚM ‘ ,Égƒ‰q ºNR banks, in fact, declined.

Chart 3-1: Asset growth of the banking sector ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGOƒLƒe ƒ‰q :1-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ (real annual; in percent) (áÄŸG ‘ ,»≤«≤◊G …ƒæ°ùdG)

40

30

20 Percent 10

0 20092009 20102010 20112011

-10

-20 IslamicIslamic CommercialCommercial ForeignForeign AllAll

The banking sector remains highly concentrated, ¤hC’G çÓãdG ∑ƒæÑdG ∂∏“ å«M õcÎdGq ‹ÉY ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∫Gõj ’ with the top 3 banks accounting for over 60% of total .(2-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«aô°üŸG äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %60 øe ÌcCG banking assets (Chart 3-2). In order to streamline the functioning of Islamic and conventional banks (and òaGƒædG ɪ«°S’h) ájó«∏≤àdGh á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG πªY º«¶æJ πLCG øeh especially, the Islamic windows of conventional banks), ‘ …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Qó°UCG ,(ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á©HÉàdG á«eÓ°SE’G in February 2011, QCB instructed conventional banks á«aô°üŸG É¡JÉ«∏ªY ±É≤jE’ ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d äɪ«∏©J 2011 ôjGÈa ô¡°T to gradually phase out their Islamic banking operations k by the end of 2011. Partly as a response to this äGóFÉY âbÉa ,∂dòd áé«àfh .2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH É«éjQóJq á«eÓ°SE’G measure, the market-adjusted returns of Islamic banks ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG øe ÉgôFɶf äGóFÉY á«eÓ°Sq E’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d ádó©ŸG ¥ƒ°ùdG outstripped those of commercial banks (Box 3-1). .(1-3 QÉWEG)

Chart 3-2: Cumulative distribution of banking äGOƒLƒŸ »ªcGÎdG ™jRƒàdG :2-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ sector assets ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG 100 90 80 70

60 2011 Asset (%) Asset 50 2010 40 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161710 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 No. banks

75 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Box 3-1: The response of the banking sector to policy øY IQOÉ°üdGh áæ∏©ŸG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG π©a OQ :1-3 QÉWEG announcement …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG On February 10, 2011 QCB issued directives to conventional »àdG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d äɪ«∏©J …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Qó°UCG ,2011 ôjGÈa 10 ‘ banks that have Islamic branches to stop opening any such Ö Wo , dP ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH .IójóL ´hôa …CG íàa ó©H »°† J á«eÓ°SEG ´hôa É¡jód new branches. In addition, it also advised them against ∏ ∂ Ω ≤ accepting Islamic deposits and dispensing new Islamic »eÓ°SEG πjƒ“ äÉ«∏ªY …CÉH ΩÉ«≤dG hCG á«eÓ°SE’G ™FGOƒdG ∫ƒÑb ΩóY ∑ƒæÑdG √òg øe finance operations. Banks were provided a time frame up .¢Vô¨dG Gò¡d 2011 Ȫ°ùjO 31 ≈àM á«æeR IÎa ∑ƒæÑdG ±ô°üŸG íæe óbh .IójóL to Dec 31, 2011 for this purpose.

To ascertain the impact of this policy directive on the returns ,á«eÓ°SE’Gh ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG º¡°SCG óFGƒY ≈∏Y äɪ«∏©àdG √òg ÒKCÉJ øe ócCÉà∏dh of conventional and Islamic banks shares, we compute the äÉfÉ«ÑdG ΩGóîà°SÉH ¥ƒ°ùdG Ö°ùëH ádó©ŸG ®ÉØàM’Gh AGô°ûdG äGóFÉY ÜÉ°ùàMÉH Ωƒ≤f market-adjusted buy-and hold returns (BHR) using daily 15 data for 2010-11 for listed Qatari banks.15 The BHR is ÜÉ°ùàMG ºàj .á°UQƒÑdG ‘ áLQóŸG ájô£≤dG ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG 2011-2010 á«eƒ«dG computed over different time frames, excluding the date ¢üî∏àJh .º«ª©àdG ïjQÉJ AÉæãà°SÉH ,áØ∏àfl á«æeR ôWCG ‘ ®ÉØàM’Gh AGô°ûdG äGóFÉY of the circular. The results are summarized in the table. :‹ÉàdG ∫hó÷G ‘ èFÉàædG

ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG Conventional Islamic

Days (range) …QÉ«©ŸG ±Gôëf’G §°SƒàŸG …QÉ«©ŸG ±Gôëf’G §°SƒàŸG (¥É£ædG) ÉjC’G Mean SD Mean SD Ω POST [1,3] 0.0002 0.014 0.012 0.015 (3-1) ó©H PRE [1,3] -0.003 0.009 0.012 0.014 (3-1) πÑb POST [1,7] 0.011 0.034 0.033 0.028 (7-1) ó©H PRE [1,7] -0.005 0.023 0.028 0.025 (7-1) πÑb POST [1,14] 0.026 0.056 0.068 0.038 (14-1) ó©H PRE [1,14] 0.008 0.079 0.045 0.036 (14-1) πÑb POST [1,21] 0.008 0.059 0.082 0.043 (21-1) ó©H PRE [1,21] 0.021 0.087 0.064 0.037 (21-1) πÑb POST [1,30] 0.015 0.301 0.094 0.353 (30-1) ó©H PRE [1,30] -0.019 0.020 0.075 0.064 (30-1) πÑb

The table indicates that, over comparable periods, the BHR ®ÉØàM’Gh AGô°ûdG äGóFÉY äRhÉŒ ,áfQÉ≤ŸG äGÎa ióe ≈∏Y ,¬fCG ¤EG ∫hó÷G Ò°ûj for Islamic banks exceeded that of conventional banks. For ióe ≈∏Yh ,∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏©a .ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG äGóFÉY á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG example, over the 1-3 days after the date of the circular, i.e., POST(1,3), the average BHR for Islamic banks was ®ÉØàM’Gh AGô°ûdG äGóFÉY §°Sƒàe ¿Éc ,(3-1) ó©H …CG º«ª©àdG ïjQÉJ øe ΩÉjCG 3-Ωƒj higher by 1.2% as compared to the market; for conventional ,ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d áÑ°ùædÉHh ,¥ƒ°ùdG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH %1^2 áÑ°ùæH ≈∏YCG á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d banks, this figure was 0.02. Over slightly longer frames – ó©H – Ée óM ¤EG ∫ƒWC’G á«æeõdG äGÎØdÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG .0^02 ºbôdG Gòg ≠∏H for example, POST (1,21) - the average BHR for Islamic and conventional banks was higher by 8.2% and 0.8%, ∑ƒæÑ∏d áÑ°ùædÉH ®ÉØàM’Gh AGô°ûdG äGóFÉY §°Sƒàe ¿Éc - ∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y (21-1) respectively as compared to the market. Considering the ‘h .¥ƒ°ùdG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH ‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y %0^8h %8^2 áÑ°ùæH ≈∏YCG ájó«∏≤àdGh á«eÓ°SE’G same time period prior to the circular - PRE(1,21) - these ≈∏YCG óFGƒ©dG √òg âfÉc – (21-1) πÑb - º«ª©àdG â≤Ñ°S »àdG É¡°ùØf á«æeõdG IÎØdG returns were 6.4% and 2.1% higher as compared to the ^ ^ market for Islamic and conventional banks, respectively. In ≈∏Y ,ájó«∏≤àdGh á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d áÑ°ùædÉH ¥ƒ°ùdG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH %2 1h %6 4 áÑ°ùæH effect, a possible salutary impact of the circular on Islamic óFGƒ©dG ´É°ùJG ‘ á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y º«ª©àdG ÒKCÉJ ™bGƒdG ‘ ≈∏Œ óbh .‹GƒàdG banks was manifested in a widening of the returns for .ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH Islamic banks as compared to conventional banks. References ™LGôŸG Brad, M. Barber and John D. Lyon (1997). Detecting ÒZ óFGƒ©dG ±É°ûàcG .(1997) Brad, M. Barber and John D. Lyon long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power Journal .QÉÑàN’G äÉØ°UGƒeh »ÑjôéàdG ÒKCÉàdG :πjƒ£dG πLC’G ‘ º¡°SCÓd á«©«Ñ£dG and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial .72-341 ,43 of Financial Economics Economics 43, 341-72. k The Banker The Banker (2011). Conventional banks face Sharia ‘ á©jô°ûdÉH ≥∏©àJ GOƒ«b ¬LGƒJ ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG .(2011) á∏› restrictions in Qatar (February 21). .(ôjGÈa 21) ô£b Qatar Central Bank (2011). Islamic branches of conventional .("ájQÉéàdG") ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«eÓ°SE’G ´hôØdG .(2011) …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe (“commercial”) banks. QCB: Doha. .áMhódG :…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe

15 15 This is computed as where ER = market- äGóFÉ©dG ER πμ°ûj å«M ƒëædG Gòg ≈∏Y ÜÉ°ùàM’G ºàj adjusted returns, R=the firm’s daily stock price returns; MR=market’s daily index returns ô°TDƒe Ö°ùëH) ¥ƒ°ù∏d »eƒ«dG ô°TDƒŸG äGóFÉY MRh ácô°û∏d á«eƒ«dG º¡°SC’G QÉ©°SCG äGóFÉY Rh ¥ƒ°ùdG Ö°ùëH ádó©ŸG (captured by the Qatar Exchange Index) and t (a to b) = time frame. .»æeõdG QÉWE’G (a to b t)h (ô£b á°UQƒH

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 76 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Notwithstanding this instruction, conventional banks ßaÉ– ¿CG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG âYÉ£à°SG ,äɪ«∏©àdG √òg øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y could maintain their asset share, while foreign bank’s øe á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG á°üM â©LGôJ ÚM ‘ ,äGOƒLƒŸG øe É¡à°üM ≈∏Y share of assets declined by 2.5%. On the other hand á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ¿q CG ÚÑJ ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .%2^5 áÑ°ùæH äGOƒLƒŸG Islamic banks appeared to benefit by increasing their äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ‘ É¡à°üM äOGR å«M ôeC’G Gòg øe äOÉØà°SG share in the total banking sector asset (Box 3-2). .(2-3 QÉWEG) á«aô°üŸG

Box 3-2: The structure of Islamic banking »eÓ°SE’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG πμ«g :2-3 QÉWEG Capitalizing on the trade flows and driven by infrastructure á«æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG äGQɪãà°S’Gh IQÉéàdG äÉ≤aóJ øe …ô£≤dG OÉ°üàb’G OÉØà°SG related investments, the Qatari economy recorded ó¡°T ɪc .á«°VÉŸG á∏«∏≤dG äGƒæ°ùdG ∫GƒW ºbôdG êhOõe Gƒ‰k πé°ùa á«àëàdG continuous double digit growth during the last several years. k k k Along with the growth in the real economy, the banking sector óbh .»≤«≤◊G OÉ°üàb’G ‘ ƒªædG ™e ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæL GÒÑc Gƒ‰ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG also grew substantially. The increase in per capita income ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ´ÉØJQG ¤EG ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ᣰûfCG OÉjORGh OôØdG πNO ‘ IOÉjõdG äOCG and a surge in private sector activity increased the demand äóàeG »àdG IÎØdG ∫ÓNh .»eÓ°SE’G πjƒªàdG äÉéàæe ɪ«°S’h ,‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G for bank credit, in particular Islamic finance products. During ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒŸ ÖcôŸG ƒªædG §°Sƒàe H ,2011 ¤EG 2002 ÉY øe äGƒæ°S ô°ûY the 10 year period, 2002-11, the compound average growth ∑ ≠∏ Ω (CAGR) of assets of Islamic banks was around 33%, while the .%25 ƒëf ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe §°Sƒàe ≠∏H ɪæ«H ,%33 ‹GƒM á«eÓ°SE’G same for conventional bank was lower at around 25%.

However, lack of standardization of Islamic financial contracts äÉéàæŸGh á«eÓ°SE’G á«dÉŸG Oƒ≤©dÉH á°UÉÿG IóMƒŸG ÒjÉ©ŸG ¤EG QÉ≤àa’G ¿q CG ’EG and products across various banks became a key concern. ójó©dG äQÉKCG ó≤a .»°ù«FQ ≥∏b Qó°üe πμ°ûj íÑ°UCG ∑ƒæÑdG ∞∏àfl ÚH á«eÓ°SE’G Many of the innovations in Islamic products, which have a thin boundary vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts increased ájó«∏≤àdG É¡JGÒ¶f ™e ¬HÉ°ûàJ »àdG á«eÓ°S’GE äÉéàæŸG ∫É› ‘ äGQÉμàH’G øe the regulatory concerns. Besides, there were also concerns ôWÉîŸG ádCÉ°ùe É°†jk CG ±hÉîŸG â檰†J ,∂dP ÖfÉL ¤EG .᫪«¶æàdG ±hÉîŸG ‘ related to risks, reporting, capital adequacy standards as well á°SÉ«°ùdG ò«ØæàH á≤∏©àŸG πFÉ°ùŸG øY Ó°†ak ,∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ÒjÉ©eh ÆÓHE’Gh as issues relating to implementation of monetary policy. .ájó≤ædG In order to address these concerns, in February 2011, 2011 ôjGÈa ô¡°T ‘ …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ≠∏HCG ,QƒeC’G ∂∏J á÷É©e πLCG øe QCB advised conventional banks that have Islamic á«eÓ°SEG ´hôa íàa ΩóY ܃Lh øY á«eÓ°SEG ÉYhôak É¡jód »àdG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG branches to stop opening new Islamic branches, accepting Islamic deposits and dispensing new Islamic óbh .IójóL »eÓ°SEG πjƒ“ äÉ«∏ªY AGôLEG hCG á«eÓ°SE’G ™FGOƒdG ∫ƒÑb hCG IójóL finance operations. These instructions were issued after a ∑ƒæÑdG ™e ájÒ°†ëàdG äÉYɪàL’G øe á∏°ù∏°S ó≤Y ó©H äɪ«∏©àdG √òg äQó°U series of preparatory meetings with banks in order to sensitize them of these relevant concerns. Conventional banks have ‘ ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG â°ü∏b óbh .QƒeC’G √ò¡H ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ »YƒdG ô°ûf πLCG øe subsequently reduced their Islamic banking activities during óbh .(ÊÉ«ÑdG º°SôdG) áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN á«eÓ°SE’G á«aô°üŸG ɡࣰûfCG ≥M’ âbh the year (Chart). The transition has taken place in a smooth äGOƒLƒŸG ≈∏Y ¢Sƒª∏e ÒKCÉJ …CG ¿hO øe á°ù∏°S á≤jô£H á«dÉq ≤àf’G á∏MôŸG äôeq fashion without any perceptible impact on the aggregate asset of the conventional banks. .ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d ᩪéŸGq

Chart: Structure of Islamic banking in Qatar ô£b ‘ »eÓ°SE’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG πμ«g :ÊÉ«H º°SQ

Reflecting the strong demand for Sharia-compliant ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ GÒÑck Gƒ‰k á«eÓ°SE’G á«aô°üŸG äÉeóÿG äó¡°T products, Islamic banking has grown substantially in ™e á≤aGƒàŸG äÉéàæŸG ≈∏Y …ƒ≤dG Ö∏£dG ¢ùμ©j …òdG ôeC’G ,»é«∏ÿG GCC countries (See Chapter 1 for details). An IMF Ò°ûjh .(π«°UÉØàdG øe ójõª∏d 1 π°üØdG ô¶fG) á«eÓ°SE’G á©jô°ûdG report observes that, the profitability of GCC banks

77 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

declined in 2008 after the financial crisis.16 The Report â°†ØîfG á«é«∏ÿG ∑ƒæÑdG á«ëHQq ¿CG ¤EG ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ôjô≤J also notes that, reflecting variations in exposures to ≈∏Y ôKC’G ¿q CG ¤EG ôjô≤àdG Ò°ûj ɪc 16.á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ó©H 2008 ΩÉY ‘ risky assets, the impact on Islamic banks was uneven ‘ äÉaÓàN’G ¢ùμ©j πμ°ûH ¿Gó∏ÑdG ÚH ÉJhÉØàek ≈JCG á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG cross countries. It therefore, remains a moot question, á°UÉÿG ádCÉ°ùŸG GõJ ’ , dòd .ôWÉîŸÉH áaƒØëŸG äGOƒLƒª d ¢Vô©àdG as to how far Islamic banks have rebounded from the ∫ ∂ ∏ crisis (Box 3-3).17 á«aÓNq ádCÉ°ùe á«dÉŸG áeRC’G äÉ«YGóàd á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG »£îJ ióà 17.(3-3 QÉWEG) Box 3-3: Performance of Islamic banks, 2009-11 2011-2009 ,á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG AGOCG :(3-3) QÉWEG In 2011, at the GCC level, the asset share of Islamic á°üM â¨∏H ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO iƒà°ùe ≈∏Yh ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ banks stood at around 21%. Islamic bank assets grew by »gh .∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG øe %21 ‹GƒM á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe around 9% as compared to 6% for the banking system as 18 -2009 IÎØdG ∫ÓN πμc ‘ô°üŸG Ωɶæ∏d %6 áÑ°ùæH áfQÉ≤e %9 ƒëæH ≠ób a whole during 2009-11. Islamic banks asset growth 18 was the highest for Qatar, in part, reflecting the phasing out πμ°ûH ¢ùμYh ,ô£b ‘ ≈∏YC’G á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe ƒ‰ ¿Éch .2011 of Islamic windows of conventional banks. However, the á«ëHQq ¿q CG ÒZ .ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á©HÉàdG á«eÓ°SE’G òaGƒæ∏d »éjQóàdG ¥ÓZE’G »FõL profitability of Islamic banks was lower than that for the Ée ‘h . c ‘ô°üŸG ɶædG á«ëHQ øe bCG âfÉc á«eÓ°SE’G ƒæÑdG banking system as a whole. Among countries, profitability πμ Ω q π ∑ of Islamic banks was the highest in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, ô£b ‘ ≈∏YC’G á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG á«ëHQ âfÉc ,iôNC’G ¿Gó∏ÑdÉH ≥∏©àj while it was the lowest in Bahrain.19 19.øjôëÑdG ‘ áÑ°ùf ≈fOCG â∏é°S ÚM ‘ ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸGh

äGOƒLƒe á°üM äGOƒLƒe ƒ‰ Y óFÉ©dG Y óFÉ©dG á«eÓ°SE’G ƒæÑdG á«eÓ°SE’G ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe ƒ‰ ≈∏ ≈∏ ∑ ∑ ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG (%) ∑ƒæÑdG) äGOƒLƒŸG ΩɶædG) äGOƒLƒŸG Country 2011 ΩÉY ‘ (%) (%) Banking system ó ÑdG Islamic banks Asset growth 2011 á«eÓ°SE’G, %) 2011 ‘ô°üŸG, %) ∏ asset growth RoA (Islamic RoA (banking asset share in of Islamic banks (%) banks 2011, %) system 2011, %) 2011 (%) (%) BH 28.5 3.5 -1.4 -1.6 0.3 øjôëÑdG KW 37.6 8.5 2.5 0.6 1.2 âjƒμdG OM* .. .. 2.9 .. 1.9 *¿ÉªYo QA 13.5 22.9 20.9 2.8 2.5 ô£b

SA 18.6 9.2 4.6 3.0 2.0 ájOƒ©°ùdG

UAE 17.9 8.1 7.1 0.8 1.3 äGQÉeE’G GCC 20.6 8.8 6.0 1.1 1.6 ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO

*An Islamic bank has been licensed by the Central Bank of Oman as .OÓÑdG ‘ ¬Yƒf øe ∂æH ∫hCÉc Êɪ©dG …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG πÑb øe »eÓ°SEG ∂æÑd ¢ü«NÎdG ” * the first such bank to become operational in the country References ™LGôŸG International Monetary Fund (2010). Impact of the global ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ≈∏Y á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ÒKCÉJ .(2010) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U financial crisis on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .á«q ∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG äÉjóëàdGh »é«∏ÿG and challenges ahead. IMF: Washington DC.

16 16 International Monetary Fund (2010). Impact of the global financial crisis on the Gulf .á«q ∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG äÉjóëàdGh »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ≈∏Y á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ÒKCÉJ .(2010) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U Cooperation Council countries and challenges ahead. IMF: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U 17 17 For brevity, the following notations have been used in the text, as appropriate, QA ,¿ÉªYo OM ,âjƒμdG KW ,øjôëÑdG BH :AÉ°†àb’G Ö°ùM ¢üædG ‘ á«dÉàdG RƒeôdG âeóîà°SG ,RÉéjE’G ±ó¡H BH=Bahrain; KW=Kuwait, OM=Oman, QA=Qatar, SA=Saudi Arabia and UAE=United .IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’GUAEh ,ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG SA ,ô£b Arab Emirates 18 18 The analysis is based on Bankscope database for 79 banks across the six GCC countries. .â°ùdG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ Ék μæH 79 Oó©d Bankscope ܃μ°S ∂æH äÉfÉ«H IóYÉb ≈∏Y π«∏ëàdG Gòg óæà°ùj The sample break-up is as follows: :»∏j ɪc áæ«©dG áé«àf âJCG óbh

á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG á«Hô©dGq äGQÉeE’G øjôëÑdG âjƒμdG ¿ÉªYo ô£b ´ƒªéŸG BH KW QM QA ájOƒ©°ùdG IóëàŸG Total SA UAE

Conventional ájó«∏≤J ∑ƒæH 10 4 6 5 8 13 46 Islamic á«eÓ°Sq EG ∑ƒæH 17 4 0 2 3 7 33

Total ´ƒªéŸG 27 8 6 7 11 20 79

19 19 Figures for Islamic banks reported here might not necessarily match with that elsewhere ¤EG Gô¶fk ôjô≤àdG øe iôNCG øcÉeCG ‘ ô¡¶J »àdG ΩÉbQC’G ™e IQhô°†dÉH Éæg IQƒcòŸG á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ΩÉbQCG ≥HÉ£àJ ’ ób in the Report owing to different data sources. .äÉfÉ«ÑdG QOÉ°üe ±ÓàNG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 78 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Financial depth and intermediation á«dÉŸGq áWÉ°SƒdGh ‹ÉŸG ≥ª©dG All indicators of financial intermediation declined ,∂dP í«°Vƒàdh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á«dÉŸG áWÉ°SƒdG äGô°TDƒe ™«ªL â°†ØîfG during the year. To illustrate, the loan-to-GDP ratio ÚM ‘ %9 ƒëæH » ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ¢Vhô dG áÑ°ùf â°†ØîfG declined by around 9%, while loan-to-deposit declined ∏ ≤ by around 6%. A low ratio, however points to the fact á°†ØîæŸG áÑ°ùædG Ò°ûJh .%6 áÑ°ùæH ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf â©LGôJ that the banking sector has sufficient headroom for øeh .(1-3 ∫hóL) ™°Sƒà∏d ±Écm ∫Ééà ™àªàjq ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¿CG ¤EG expansion (Table 3-1). In physical terms, the banking sector expanded moderately during the year with an ™e áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN ∫óà©e πμ°ûH ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¥É£f ™°ùJG ,ΩÉbQC’G á«MÉf addition of 41 bank branches and 142 ATMs across .OÓÑdG AÉëfCG ™«ªL ‘ ‹B’G ±Gô°üq ∏d RÉ¡L 142h ∑ƒæÑ∏d ´ôa 41 áaÉ°VEG the country. As a result, the demographic penetration q d ƒæÑdG ´hôa OóY …CG - ‘GôZƒÁódG ¥GÎN’G ¿Éc , dòd áé«àfh – the number of bank branches per 10,000 persons πμ ∑ ∂ – stood at 1.8 at end-December 2011, whereas the QÉ°ûàf’G ≠∏H ÚM ‘ 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ 1^8 ≠∏H ób - ¢üî°T 10^000 geographic penetration – number of bank branches ∫ÓN 26^5 ™Hôe Îeƒ∏«c 1^000 πμd ∑ƒæÑdG ´hôa OóY …CG - ‘Gô¨÷G per 1,000 square kilometers was 26.5 during the same 20 period.20 On the other hand, the geographic and ‘GôZƒÁódGh ‘Gô¨÷G QÉ°ûàf’G ¿Éc ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .IÎØdG ¢ùØf demographic ATM penetration during the same period ≠∏H å«M ÒãμH ∂dP øe ≈∏YCG IÎØdG ¢ùØf ∫ÓN ‹B’G ±Gô°üdG Iõ¡LC’ 21 was much higher – at 5.7 and 84.5 - respectively. The ‘ %12 áÑ°ùæH ´GójE’G äÉHÉ°ùM OóY ™ØJQGh 21.‹GƒàdG Y 84^5h 5^7 number of deposit accounts grew by 12%, whereas ≈∏ the number of credit accounts declined by around 2% ™jRƒJ õcôJh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %2 áÑ°ùæH ¿ÉªàF’G äÉHÉ°ùM OóY ™LGôJ ÚM during the year. The frequency distribution of both ¿ÉªàFÓd %70 ¥ƒa) ¥É£f ≈fOCG ‘ ¿ÉªàF’Gh ´GójE’G äÉHÉ°ùM øe πc credit and deposit accounts were concentrated in the lowest range (above 70% for credit and above 90% AÉæHh .≈∏YC’G á≤Ñ£dG ‘ äÉ«ªq μdG ™jRƒJ õcôJq ÚM ‘ (´GójEÓd %90 ¥ƒah for deposit), while the amount-wise distribution is øe ÌcCG ¿ÉªàF’Gh ´GójE’G äÉHÉ°ùM OóY øe %2 øe πbCG πμq °T ,∂dP ≈∏Y concentrated in the higher class. Consequently, below .(3-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ¿ÉªàF’Gh ´GójE’G Ñe ‹ÉªLEG øe %80 2% number of deposit as well as credit accounts ≠∏ constitutes more than 80% of the total deposit and credit amount (Chart 3-3).

Table 3-1: Indicators of financial depth and ‹ÉŸG ≥ª©dG äGô°Tq Dƒe :1-3 ∫hóL intermediation (%)* *(%) áWÉ°SƒdGh

¬æ°ùdG »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ™FGOƒdG ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG Year Loan / GDP Deposit / GDP Loan / deposit

2009 68.3 62.9 108.7

2010 64.4 61.2 105.2

2011 55.0 54.6 100.7

*Average loan and deposit during the year ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG §°Sƒàeq *

20 20 According to Qatar Statistics Authority, the total population was 1,707,756 at end- .2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ 1^707^756 ¿Éμ°ùdG ´ƒª› ≠∏H ,AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L ≥ah December 2011. 21 21 T.Beck, A.Demirguc-Kunt and M.S.Martinez Peria (2007). Reaching out: Access to and á«aô°üŸG äÉeóÿG ΩGóîà°SG :∫ƒ°UƒdG .(2007) M.S.Martinez Peria h T.Beck,A.Demirguc-Kunt use of banking services across countries. Journal of Financial Economics 85, 234-66. .66-234 ,85 ‹ÉŸG OÉ°üàb’G á∏› .¿Gó∏ÑdG ÈY

79 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

22™FGOƒdGh ¿ÉªàF’G äÉHÉ°ù◊ …QGôμàdG ™jRƒàdG :CG3-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ™FGOƒdG /¿ÉªàF’G äÉHÉ°ùM ≠dÉÑe ™jRƒJ :Ü3-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-3A: Frequency distribution of Chart3-3B:Amount distribution of credit/deposit accounts22 credit/deposit accounts

AboveAbove 50005000 AboveAbove 55000000

> 10001000 toto 50005000 > 10001000 toto 55000000

> 500500 toto 11000000 > 500500 ttoo 11000000

Amount (QR Amount 000s) > 100100 toto 550000 > 100100 ttoo 550000

UptoUpto 110000 (QR Amount 000s) UUptopto 110000

-10001000 - -700700 - -400400 - -100100 2 20000 -200200 -100100 0 1 10000 2 20000 3 30000 4 40000 No. of accounts (in 000s) Amount outstanding (QR billion)

Deposit Credit Deposit Credit

Balance sheet developments á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸGq äGQƒ£J The balance sheet structure of the banking sector .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN Ék «q ∏μ«g Gk Ò¨Jq ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸGq πμ«g ô¡XCG exhibited a structural change during the year. In January °übC’G ó G Y ÉØk °S …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ¢Vôa ,2011 ôjÉæj »Øa 2011, QCB imposed a cap on the maximum amount ≈ ◊ ≈∏ ≤ that the banks can deposit with the central bank as ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh πμ°T ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG iód É¡YGójEG ∑ƒæÑ∏d øμÁ »àdG ≠dÉѪ∏d QMR deposits.23 In order to mop up the sudden influx ”q ,ádƒ«°ù∏d ÅLÉØŸG ≥aóàdG øe ¢ü∏îàdG πLCG øeh 23.…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG of liquidity, a new series of government bonds worth ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 50 ᪫≤H á«eƒq μ◊G äGóæ°ùdG øe IójóL áYƒª› QGó°UEG QR 50 billion were issued along with the imposition of ó ædG ¥ƒ°S á«dBG ™FGOh Y iƒ°üb OhóM ¢Vôa ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,…ô£b maximum limits on QMR deposits. As a consequence, ≤ ≈∏ banking sector asset with the central bank declined, ±ô°üŸG iód ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGOƒLƒe â°†ØîfG ,∂dòd áé«àf .…ô£≤dG along with a corresponding increase in investments in ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«eƒμ◊G á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ‘ äGQɪãà°S’G â©ØJQGh …õcôŸG government securities (Chart 3-4A). Activities in the ¤EG iOCG ɇ ,á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ᣰûfC’G âæ°ù–hq .(CG4-3 domestic interbank market also improved, resulting ™FGOh Y °übCG óM ¢Vôa iOCG ɪc . ƒæÑdG ÚH äGOƒLƒŸG á°üM ø°ù–q in an improvement in the interbank asset share. The ≈∏ ≈ ∑ re-introduction of maximum limits on QMR deposits, ¿q C’ ,äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG ájGóÑdG ‘ …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG initially led to a decline in overall assets as the volatile ¿q CG ’EG .ΩɶædG øe âLôN ób ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ áHQÉ°†ŸG ∫GƒeCG ‘É°U capital funds in the banking sector found its way out of ´É£≤dG óYÉ°S ób ΩÉ©dG øe ÒNC’G Aõ÷G ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ´ÉØJQG the system. However, higher credit demand towards .%22 ≠∏H ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ‘ äGOƒLƒŸG ‘ …ƒæ°S ƒ‰q π«é°ùJ ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG the latter part of the year enabled the banking sector ‹ÉªLEG ‘ ¬à°üM ™aQ ób %28 …ƒæ°S ó©Ãq ɉ …òdG ¿ÉªàF’G ¿q CG ɪc to post a year-end annual asset growth of 22%. Credit, ∫ which recorded an annual growth of 28%, increased its .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉ≤e %2^5áÑ°ùæH äGOƒLƒŸG share in total assets by around 2.5% over the previous year.

∑ƒæÑdG äGOƒLƒe πμ«g :CG4-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ∑ƒæÑdG äÉHƒ∏£e πμ«g :Ü4-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-4A: Asset structure of banks Chart 3-4B: Liability structure of banks

9.8 15.11 6.9 9.4 8.2 7.5 8.9889 7.47 4 5.65 4.64.6 10.2101 2 3.63366 15.111551 1 10.7110077 6.2622 12.41 4 7.07700 7.27.7.22 4.9494 9 4.14 1 8.88 8 7.57755 7.077.0 10.51 5 8.688..6. 9.39.9.33 7.47.44 13.613.1 .6612.3112..33 12.81 8 2.22.222.22 2.32233 2.0220 2009 2010 2010 2009 57.8 52.8 55.455 4 20112 54.1554 1 58.158 1 52.4552 2011

Loans Deposit with QCB QCB/Gov. Sec Other Investments Deposits Equity Capital To Domestic FIs With Domestic FIs With Foreign FIs Other Assets To Foreign FIs To HO/Branches Other liabilities

22 22 Non-government deposits and credits; deposits are indicated with negative sign, credit .á«HÉéjEG áeÓ©H ¢Vhô≤dGh á«Ñ∏°S áeÓ©H ™FGOƒdG ¤EG QÉ°ûj ;á«eƒμ◊G ÒZ ¢Vhô≤dGh ™FGOƒdG is indicated with a positive sign. 23 23 Refer Chapter 2 for details. .π«°UÉØàdG øe ójõŸ 2 π°üØdG ô¶fG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 80 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

On the liability side, the major funding sources á«°ù«FôdG πjƒªàdG QOÉ°üe â«≤H ó≤a ,äÉHƒ∏£ŸÉH ¢üàîjq Ée ‘ ÉeCG continued to be deposits and equity capital, even ób ™FGOƒdG á°üM ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤Mh ,™FGOƒdÉH á∏ãªàeq though the share of deposits declined by the end of the year. In the run-up to meet the Basel III requirements, ¿q CG hóÑj ,3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe á«Ñ∏J QɶàfG ‘h .ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH â°†ØîfG the banking sector appears to have improved their ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤M â©ØJQGh .∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ IóYÉb ø°ùMq ób ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG capital base. Equity capital increased by around ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ø°ù–q ™aOh .(Ü4-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %1^3 ƒëæH 1.3% during the year (Chart 3-4B). Improved demand OɪàY’G ¤EG ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh ƒ‰ ∞©°V ™e øeGõàdÉH ,¿ÉªàF’G for credit, coupled with lackluster deposit growth k compelled the banking sector to rely on funds from πjƒªàdG ≈∏Y OɪàY’G OGR ,∂dòd É≤ah .á«LQÉN QOÉ°üe øe ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y external sources. Accordingly, dependence on funds ™eh .á«°ù«FôdG õcGôŸGh á«LQÉÿG ´hôØdGh á«ÑæLC’G á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe from foreign financial institutions and foreign branches º°†N ‘ ≈àM á«ŸÉ©dG ∑ƒæÑdG øe á«dÉ©dG πjƒªàdG áÑ°ùf Ò°ùØJ øμÁ ,∂dP and head offices increased. Nonetheless, the high á≤ãdG QGôªà°SÉH á«HhQhC’G ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe ¿ƒjódÉH πjƒªàdG ¢†ØN ójGõJ share of funding from international banks even in the midst of increased deleveraging by European banks ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘h .á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ‘ ¿ƒ«dhódG ¿hôªãà°ùŸG É¡©°†j »àdG can be interpreted as the continuation of confidence of πμq °ûj á«ÑæLC’G äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ≈∏Y ójGõàŸG OɪàY’G ¿CG ¤EG IQÉ°TE’G øμÁ international investors in domestic banks. Contextually, QÉWEG) »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO øe Òãc ‘ AÉæãà°S’G ¢ù«dh IóYÉ≤dG it may be mentioned that the increased dependence .(4-3 on foreign liabilities is a norm rather than an exception in many of the GCC countries (Box 3-4).

Box 3-4: GCC banking sector – - »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG :4-3 QÉWEG Dependence on foreign liabilities á«ÑæLC’G äÉeGõàd’G ≈∏Y OɪàY’G The volatility observed in the financial market associated with QƒgóJh hQƒ«dG á≤£æe áeRCG ™e á≤aGΟG ,á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘ äÉÑ∏≤q àdG äô¡XCG the Eurozone crisis and deteriorating outlook of the global ¢Vô©J ≈∏Y IOó°ûe áHÉbQ ¢Vôa ¤EG áLÉ◊G ,»ŸÉ©dG ƒªædÉH á°UÉÿG äÉ©bƒàdG growth, emphasized the need to have a close monitoring of the domestic banking sector’s exposure to international ΩÉ©d ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ¿Éch .á«dhódG ∫GƒeC’G ôWÉîŸ »∏ëŸG ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG funds. The Financial Stability Review 2010 by Qatar á«∏ëŸG ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑdG ¿CG ¤EG QÉ°TCG ób …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe √Qó°UCG …òdG 2010 Central Bank had noted that domestic commercial banks å«M) ™FGOƒdG êQÉN äÉ«∏ª©dG √Qó°üe …òdG πjƒªàdG ≈∏Y GÒÑck GOɪàYGk óªà©J exhibit higher dependence on non-deposit funds (where k k q liabilities to international banks are a major component) as .äÉHƒ∏£ŸG á«≤H ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH (É«°ù«FQ Gô°üæY á«ŸÉ©dG ∑ƒæÑdG äÉHƒ∏£e πμ°ûJ compared to other bank ownership categories.

Even though higher revenues from oil income is expected ¤EG §ØædG äGóFÉY øe äGOGôjE’G IOÉjR …ODƒJ ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ¬fq CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh to increase the deposit base of the banking sector in the øμÁ ’ ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh IóYÉb IOÉjR GCC countries, leakage of liquidity cannot be ruled out on account of higher dependence on imported goods, AGô°Th ,™∏°ùdG OGÒà°SG ≈∏Y ÒÑμdG OɪàY’G ÖÑ°ùH ádƒ«°ùdG Üô°ùJq OÉ©Ñà°SG purchase of foreign assets and international deposits by .ïdG... Úª«≤ŸÉH á°UÉÿG á«dhódG ™FGOƒdGh ,á«ÑæLC’G äGOƒLƒŸG residents, etc.

Higher credit to deposit ratio in most of the GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO º¶©e ‘ ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G áÑ°ùf ´ÉØJQG »Ø°†j lends credence to this argument. Given this higher ratio, ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq ,áÑ°ùædG √òg ´ÉØJQG ¤EG Gô¶æak .√ôcP ≥Ñ°S Ée ≈∏Y á«bGó°üe the banking sector has to depend either on equity capital or funds from abroad. It is observed that in Bahrain, Qatar and .êQÉÿG øe IOQGƒdG ∫GƒeC’G hCG ºgÉ°ùŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y ÉeEG óªà©j ¿CG ‘ô°üŸG UAE, where the domestic financial sector has higher linkage §ÑJôj å«M ,IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’Gh ô£bh øjôëÑdG ‘ ,¬fCG ßMƒd óbh to the international financial system through on-shore/off- õcGôŸG ∫ÓN øe ‹hódG ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædÉH GÒÑck ÉWÉÑJQGk »∏ëŸG ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG shore financial centers, the proportion of foreign liabilities is higher (Table). Among the GCC countries, the banking .(∫hó÷G) ≈∏YCG áÑ°ùf á«ÑæLC’G äÉeGõàd’G πé°ùJq ,á«LQÉÿGhq á«∏NGódG á«dÉŸGq sector in Qatar appears to have higher dependence on ô£b ádhO ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¿CG hóÑj ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÚH øeh foreign liabilities to fund its credit demand (a higher credit- áÑ°ùf) ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG πjƒªàd á«ÑæLq ’GC äÉeGõàd’G ≈∏Y ÈcCG GOɪàYGk óªà©j to-deposit ratio coupled with higher foreign liability ratio). Although the central bank has several tools to mitigate .(á«ÑæLC’G äÉeGõàd’G áÑ°ùf ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ôeC’G ∂dòch ≈∏YCG ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G possible systemic risks, which can arise on account of ôWÉîŸG ∞«Øîàd äGhOC’G øe ójó©dG ¬jód …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh external factors, there is a need for the banking sector to ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq ,á«LQÉÿG πeGƒ©dG ÖÑ°ùH CÉ°ûæJ ¿CG øμÁ »àdG á∏ªàëŸG á«eɶædGq develop strategies to improve its retail deposit base. .OGôaC’G ™FGOh IóYÉb Ú°ùëàd IOóq fi äÉ«é«JGΰSG ™°Vh ‘ô°üŸG

81 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table: GCC banking sector’s exposure to foreign ôWÉîŸ »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¢Vô©Jq :∫hóL liabilities – December 2011 2011 Ȫ°ùjO – á«ÑæLq C’G äÉHƒ∏£ŸG 1 2 2 2 2 ¿ÉªàF’G ™FGOƒdG á«ÑæLq C’G äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤M á«ÑæLq C’G äGOƒLƒŸG Credit1 Deposit2 Foreign Liabilities2 Equity2 Foreign Assets2

Bahrain 54.0 47.1 44.5 7.6 44.5 øjôëÑdG

Kuwait 86.2 69.4 7.2 13.7 18.5 âjƒμdG

Oman 99.5 68.4 10.0 11.1 12.6 ¿ÉªYo

Qatar 111.0 52.4 20.1 13.6 13.1 ô£b á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG Saudi Arabia 77.6 71.5 4.9 14.3 13.5 ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G UAE 102.6 58.1 17.4 16.9 15.5 IóëàŸG

1- Ratio to deposits; 2- Ratio to total liabilities äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ´ƒª› ¤EG áÑ°ùædG -2 ,™FGOƒdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædG -1

Bank credit and deposit ™FGOƒdGh ‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G

The banking sector recorded an average credit and %21^6 h %16^4 ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ™FGOhh ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ §°Sƒàe H deposit growth of 16.4% and 21.6% respectively ≤ ≠∏ during 2011. Even though the average deposit growth ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ §°Sƒàe ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y outpaced the average credit growth, the second half É©LGôJk ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ó¡°T , ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ §°Sƒàe ¥Éa of the year witnessed a decline in deposits as against ƒªædG ≠∏H ,∂dòd áé«àf .¿ÉªàF’G ‘ IÒÑc IOÉjR πHÉ≤e ™FGOƒdG ‘ a considerable increase in credit. This resulted in a §‰ Ò°ûjh .™FGOƒ d %19h ¿ÉªàFÓd %28 É©dG ájÉ¡f ‘ …ƒæ°ùdG year-end annual growth of 28% for credit, while the ∏ Ω deposit growth stood at 19%. The pattern of credit øe ∫hC’G ™HôdG ∫ÓN ,äó¡°T ™FGOƒdG ¿CG ¤EG ™FGOƒdGh ¿ÉªàF’G ™°SƒJq and deposit expansion indicates that, during the first óMq ¤EG ¬dÉM ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’G »≤H ÚM ‘ ,GOÉMk É°VÉØîfGk ,2011 ΩÉY quarter of 2011, deposits declined sharply, while âbh ‘ ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ OÉjORG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .(CG5-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) Ée credit remained more or less stagnant (Chart 3-5A). ¿ÉªàF’G ô¡XCG ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .Öq àdG Iójó°T â X É¡fCG ’EG , M’ Although deposit growth picked up thereafter, it ∏≤ ∏ ≥ remained highly volatile. On the other hand, credit π°ü«d ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ™HôdG øe AGóàHG ôªà°ùeq πμ°ûH É«HÉéjk EG Gƒ‰k showed persistent positive growth from the second .(Ü5-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) áæ°ùdG ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 404 ¤EG quarter onwards to reach QR 404 billion by the end of the year (Chart 3-5B).

…ô¡°T ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ™FGOƒdGh ¿ÉªàF’G :CG5-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ™FGOƒdGh ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ äGÒ¨àdGq :Ü5-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-5A: Monthly credit and deposit Chart 3-5B: Change in credit and deposit

420 10

400 8 6 380 4

360 2 0 QR billion JanJ J July Apr A D Dec O Oct

340 a u p e c n -2 l y c t r -4

320 Percent (M-o-M) -6 300 JanJ JulJ A Apr O D Oct Dec -8 a u -10 Credit Deposit Credit Deposit

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 82 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Credit to public sector continued to be the major ¿ÉªàF’G ƒªæd »°ù«FôdG ∑ôëŸGq ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ôªà°SG driver for the growth observed in overall credit. For ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %20 ƒëf ∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y √ƒ‰ §°Sƒàe ≠∏H ó≤a .ΩÉY πμ°ûH example, credit to public sector averaged around 20% during the year, over and above the very high growth ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ %85 ¥Éa …òdGh ÒÑc óMq ¤EG ™ØJôŸG ƒªædG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH of over 85% recorded in the previous year (Chart 3-6). ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ §°Sƒàe ¿q CG ’EG .(6-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) The average growth in private sector credit, in contrast .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ ¬∏«ãe øe ≈∏YCG ¿Éc ¿EGh ,%15 ≠∏H å«M ∂dP øe πq bCG ¿Éc was lower at 15%, albeit higher than the previous year’s ∫ÓN GóMƒek É£‰k ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ ƒªædG ô¡XCG óbh numbers. Growth in private sector credit followed a uniform pattern across all the four quarters, whereas πμ°ûH ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ɉ ÚM ‘ ,áØ∏àîŸG áæ°ùdG ´ÉHQCG public sector credit growth basically occurred in ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ó¡°T ɪc .ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ »°SÉ°SCG the second half of the year. Foreign currency credit IOÉjR – ¢UÉÿGh ΩÉ©dG ÚYÉ£≤dG øe πq c πÑb øe – á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH demand - both from the public and private sectors - .(2-3 ∫hóL) áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN IÒÑc increased substantially during the year (Table 3-2).

äÉYÉ£≤dG Ö°ùëH ¿ÉªàF’G §°Sƒàeq ƒ‰ :6-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ äÉYÉ£≤dG Ö°ùëH ¿ÉªàF’G §°Sƒàe ƒ‰ :2-3 ∫hóL (…ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y) Table 3-2: Growth in average sectoral credit Chart 3-6: Average sectoral credit growth (Y-o-Y)

Cross border Private sector Public sector All (Q-o-Q; in percent)total liabilities (áÄŸG ‘ ;»©HQ ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y) ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG 22011011 Public sector Private sector á∏ª©dG äÓª©dG á∏ª©dG äÓª©dG 2011 ´ƒªéŸG ´ƒªéŸG á«∏ëŸG á«ÑæLC’G Total á«∏ëŸG á«ÑæLC’G Total LC FC LC FC 22010010 ∫hC’G ™HôdG -38.1 88.9 -6.4 -8.6 76.1 3.7 Q1

ÊÉãdG ™HôdG -21.9 21.9 0.2 1.6 17.5 5.5 22009009 Q2

ådÉãdG ™HôdG 6.1 26.6 18.7 5.0 5.1 5.0 Q3 -20-20 0 2020 4 400 6 600 8 800 1 10000 ™HGôdG ™HôdG 0.4 32.7 21.6 4.4 4.0 4.3 Growth (%) Q4

Bank lending surveys conducted during the year indicate ∫ÓN âjôLCG »àdG ‘ô°üŸG ¢VGôbE’ÉH á°UÉÿG í°ùŸG äÉ°SGQO Ò°ûJ an easing of supply-side factors to credit growth, while ÚM ‘ ,¿ÉªàF’G ƒªæH á°UÉÿG ¢Vô©dG πeGƒY ‘ Ò°ù«J çhóM ¤EG ΩÉ©dG demand for credit appears to be recovering in a hesitant .(5-3 QÉWEG) A§ÑH ≈aÉ©àj ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ¿CG GóH manner (Box 3-5).

Box 3-5: Bank Lending Survey ‘ô°üŸG ¢VGôbE’G í°ùe :5-3 QÉWEG

Quarterly bank lending surveys conducted by QCB is äGP äÉ°SGQO …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe É¡jôéj »àdG á«∏°üØdG í°ùŸG äÉ°SGQO Èà©J qualitative in nature and is aimed at ascertaining the ‘ ôKq DƒJ »àdG á«°SÉ°SC’G ¢üFÉ°üÿGh äGQƒ£àdG øe ≥≤ëàdG ¤EG ±ó¡J á«Yƒfq á©«ÑW developments and underlying characteristics driving the demand for, and supply of, credit in the economy. The ¢VGôbE’G ‹ƒÄ°ùe QÉÑc AGQBG í°ùŸG ™ªéjh .OÉ°üàb’G ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G øe ¢Vhô©ŸGh Ö∏£dG survey collates the opinion of senior bank lending officials ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .√ô°ûf ºàjq ô°TDƒe ™°Vh ∫ÓN øe º¡JGQƒ°üJ QÉ¡XEG ºàjhq ‘ô°üŸG and their perceptions are codified through a diffusion ¿ÉªàF’G •ƒ£Nh ÒjÉ©e iƒà°ùe í°ùŸG ¢SQój ,É¡©°Vh ”q »àdG äGô°TDƒŸG ∞∏àfl index. Based on the various indices developed, the . °üa c ‘ É¡H á°UÉÿG äGQƒ£àdGh ¿ÉªàF’G íæà á°UÉÿG á aGƒŸG Y ƒ°üë d survey examines the level of credit standards and lines for π π ≤ ≈∏ ∫ ∏ approval for credit and their progress in each quarter. The πμd ¢Vhô≤dG íæà ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G ÒjÉ©e ‘ ÉeÉYk GÒ°ù«Jk ÒNC’G í°ùŸG ô¡XCG óbh latest survey indicates a general easing of credit standards í°ùŸG äÉ°SGQód á«°ù«FôdG •É≤ædG RôHCG ¢ü«î∏J øμÁh .»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dGh äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe in providing credit to enterprises and household sectors. :‹ÉàdG ƒëædG ≈∏Y 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN âjôLCG »àdG á«∏°üØdG The major highlights of the quarterly surveys conducted during 2011 can be summarized as follows: • All the four quarterly surveys during 2011 indicated πeGƒ©dG ¿CG 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN á©HQC’G á«∏°üØdG í°ùŸG äÉ°SGQO áaÉc äQÉ°TCG • that the demand-side factors for credit were sluggish as .¢Vô©dG πeGƒY ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH Gk DƒWÉÑJ äó¡°T ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dÉH á°UÉÿG compared to the supply-side factors. • Overall index of credit demand was slightly lower 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ÉØ«ØWk É°VÉØîfGk ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£∏d ΩÉ©dG ô°TDƒŸG ó¡°T • in 2011 as compared to the 2010 index. Nevertheless, it .2011 ΩÉY øe ÒNC’G π°üØdG ∫ÓN ø°ù–hq OÉY ¬fq CG ’EG .2010 ΩÉY ô°TDƒe ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH improved during the last quarter of 2011.

83 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

• Credit demand from the household sector was better ´É£b øe π°†aCG »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG πÑb øe ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ¿Éc • than the enterprise sector. .äÉcô°ûdG • An upward movement is observed in the index for ôªà°SG óbh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ájóYÉ°üJq ácôM ¿ÉªàF’G ¢VôY ô°Tq Dƒe ó¡°T • credit supply during the year. The upward trend continued in .á©HQC’G ∫ƒ°üØdG ™«ªL ‘ …óYÉ°üàdG √ÉŒ’G all the four quarters. • At the same time ‘approval of loans to household ¬°ùØf âbƒdG ‘ "»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ¢Vhô≤dG íæe ≈∏Y á≤aGƒŸG" äó¡°T ɪc • sector’ maintained a ‘relaxed’ behavior. ."Éëjôek "Écƒk ∏°S • Credit lines and standards for lending to household ΩÉY ‘ »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ¢VGôbE’G ÒjÉ©eh ¿ÉªàF’G •ƒ£N âæ°ù– • sector improved in 2011. .2011 • In case of enterprise sector, “approval of credits” íæe ≈∏Y á≤aGƒŸG" âæ°ù– ó≤a ,äÉcô°ûdG ´É£≤H ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG • seems to have improved during the second half of the year ÓN ÉgÒjÉ©e DƒWÉÑJ ™e áfQÉ ŸÉH É©dG øe ÊÉãdG °üædG ÓN "¢Vhô dG as compared to the sluggish standards observed during the ∫ ≤ Ω ∞ ∫ ≤ first half. .ΩÉ©dG øe ∫hC’G ∞°üædG • The survey results also indicate a positive outlook for ¢Vô©dG πeGƒY øe πμd á«HÉéjEG Iô¶f í°ùŸG èFÉàf äô¡XCG ɪc • both supply and demand side factors of credit growth. .¿ÉªàF’G ƒªæH á°UÉÿG Ö∏£dGh

Bank lending surveys point to the fact that both Ö∏£dG πeGƒY ¿CG ¤EG ‘ô°üŸG ¢VGôbE’ÉH á°UÉÿG í°ùŸG äÉ°SGQO Ò°ûJ demand and supply side factors were important ´É£≤dG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G ≥aóJ ≈∏Y ÒKCÉàdG ‘ ɪ¡ek GQhOk âÑ©d ¢Vô©dGh in influencing the flow of credit to the household ƒ‰ ´ÉØJQG AGQh áæeÉμdG ÜÉÑ°SC’G óMCG ôeC’G Gòg πμq °T ÉÃQh .»∏FÉ©dG sector. This might have been one of the reasons for ¢ùØf ‘ .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN äGQÉ≤©dGh ∑Ó¡à°S’ÉH ¢UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G the higher credit growth observed for consumption äÉcô°ûdG πÑb øe ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ‘ á∏«Ä°†dG IOÉjõ∏d øμÁ ,âbƒdG and real estate during 2011. At the same time, a slow ¢UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y CGôW …òdG »°ûeÉ¡dG ø°ùëàdG Ò°ùØJ ≈∏Y óYÉ°ùJ ¿CG pickup in the demand for credit from enterprises ¿ÉªàF’G ¢VÉØîfG øY Ó°†ak ,áeÉ©dG IQÉéàdGh äÉeóÿGh áYÉæ°üdÉH could help explain the marginal improvement in credit off-take by industry, services and general trade, as á°UÉÿG á∏°üØŸG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ô¡¶Jh .(CG7-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ÚdhÉ≤ª∏d ìƒæªŸG well as a decline in credit to contractors (Chart 3-7A). øe IÒÑc á°üM πμq °ûJ ∫GõJ ’ ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG äÉ°ù°SDƒe ¿q CG ¿ÉªàF’ÉH Disaggregated data on credit shows, public sector á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dGh äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b É¡«∏j ‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‹ÉªLEG institutions continue to account for a major share of .(Ü7-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) aggregate bank credit followed by real estate sector and consumer loan (Chart 3-7B). äÉYÉ£≤dG Ö°ùëH ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ (§°Sƒàe) :CG7-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¿ÉªàFG ™jRƒJ :Ü7-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-7A: Sectoral credit(average) growth Chart 3-7B: Distribution of banking sector credit

120 Govt. 25 100 Cross-border 20 Govt-Inst. 80 15 60 10 Other sectors Industry 5 t 40 n

e 0

rc 20

Pe Consumptio 0 Gen.trade Cross ConsumptionConsumpt Contractor Contracto Industry Govt G Services Govt. G Gen.Trade Other Sec Sector Real Estat Estate

ndust n -20 ervic - - Inst. Sect -40 border Real Estate Services t -60 r Contractor -80

2010 2011 2010 2011

As at end December 2011, real estate sector recorded ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ Gƒ‰k …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG πé°Sq ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ a year-on-year credit growth of around 49%, while the »cÓ¡à°S’G ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ ≠∏H ÚM ‘ ,%49 ‹GƒM ≠∏H …ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG growth in consumption credit was around 20%. Taken ‹ÉªLEG øe %63^4 ƒëæH Ú©ªà› ¿ÉYÉ£ dG ¿Gòg ºgÉ°Sh .%20 ‹GƒM together, these sectors contributed 63.4% of the total ≤ private sector credit. Credit to real estate increased …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G OGRh .¢UÉÿG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G considerably during the first three quarters of the ∫GóàY’G ¢†©H ó¡°Th ΩÉ©dG øe ¤hC’G áKÓãdG ∫ƒ°üØdG ∫ÓN ÒÑc óM ¤EG year, with some moderation, primarily during the final ádhO ìÉ‚ ¿CG hóÑjh .(CG8-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) áæ°ùdG øe ÒNC’G π°üØdG ‘ quarter (Chart 3-8A). The successful bid for the FIFA ôYÉ°ûŸG øe √ÓJ Éeh 2022 Ωó≤dG Iôμd ⁄É©dG ¢SCÉc áaÉ°†à°SG ‘ ô£b World Cup football 2022 and the ensuing wave of …ƒ dG ƒªædG ‘ É«°ù«FQk GQhOk Ö©d ób OÓÑdG Y äô£«°S »àdG á«HÉéjE’G positive sentiments appears to have played a major role ≤ ≈∏ in the buoyant growth in real estate sector (Box 3-6). .(6-3 QÉWEG) …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG √ó¡°T …òdG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 84 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Box 3-6: Real Estate Price Index äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG ô°Tq Dƒe :6-3 QÉWEG The real estate sector witnessed rapid growth during ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæLk 2008-2005 IÎØdG ∫ÓN É©jô°Sk Gƒ‰k äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b ó¡°T 2005-08 in tandem with the booming domestic economy. IOÉjRh ¿Éμ°ùdG OóY ‘ ™ØJôŸG ƒªædG πμq °T óbh .»∏ëŸG OÉ°üàb’G QÉgORG ™e The high growth in population, increasing levels of per capita income and a well-targeted public spending have πeGƒ©dG ºgCG ºFÓŸG πμ°ûdÉH ¬LƒŸG ΩÉ©dG ¥ÉØfE’Gh …OôØdG πNódG äÉjƒà°ùe been some of the important factors driving the growth ô£b ádhO RhôH iOCG óbh .…QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG ƒ‰ ‘ »HÉéjEG πμ°ûH äôKCG »àdG in real estate sector. The emergence of Qatar as an ‘ QÉ©°SC’G IOÉjR ¤EG OÓÑdG ‘ ájQÉéàdG ᣰûfC’G IOÉjRh »YÉæ°U õcôªc industrial hub and the increased commercial activities É¡Jó¡°T »àdG áeRC’Gh »ŸÉ©dG …OÉ°üàb’G QÉ«¡f’G ¿q CG ’EG .É°†jk CG »æ °ùdG ÒZ ´É£ dG in the country has increased the prices in the non- μ ≤ residential sector as well. However, the global economic ádhO øμJ ⁄h .»ŸÉ©dG ó«©°üdG ≈∏Y äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b ≈∏Y äôKCG á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G meltdown and the crisis in the global financial markets äÉ¡L É¡JôLCG »àdG äÓ«∏ëàdG äQÉ°TCG óbh .á°ùcÉ©ŸG OƒcôdG ìÉjQ øY øeCÉà ô£b impacted the real estate sector globally. Qatar was not ájÉ¡f ‘ äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG äÉ°SGQódG ‘ IQƒcòŸG ádOC’Gh á°UÉÿG π«∏ëàdG totally immune to these recessionary headwinds. Analysis by private analysts as also anecdotal evidence indicated ’ ,ábƒKƒe äÉfÉ«H IóYÉb ÜÉ«Z πX ‘h ,≥FÉ≤◊G √òg øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .2008 ΩÉY a decline in real estate prices by the end of 2008. πμ°ûH …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG ™°Vhh QÉ©°SC’G äÉjƒà°ùe ‘ á«∏©ØdG äÉaÓàN’G ¢SÉ«b øμÁ Notwithstanding these facts, in the absence of a reliable .≥«bO database, the actual variations in the price levels and accordingly the status of the real estate sector could not be accurately measured.

Considering the fact that domestic banks have significant äÉÑ∏≤àdGh äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b ôWÉîŸ ÒÑc πμ°ûH ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG ¢Vô©àdq Gô¶fhk exposure to the real estate sector, and a potential volatility , á«dÉŸG ÉgõcGôe ≈∏Y ÒÑc πμ°ûH ôKDƒJ ¿CG øμÁ »àdGh QÉ©°SC’G iƒà°ùe ‘ á∏ªàëŸG in the real state price level may seriously impact their balance sheet, it becomes important for the banking sector º««≤àd ∂dPh äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SC’ ¥ƒKƒe ¢SÉ«≤e ≈∏Y OɪàY’G ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq to rely on a reliable measure of real estate prices for valuing QGòfEÓd Gô°Tk Dƒe πμ°ûj ¿CG äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG ô°TDƒŸ øμÁ ɪc .…QÉ≤©dG ¿ÉªàF’G ßaÉfi and assessing their real estate credit portfolios. As well, an áæeÉμdG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ΩGóîà°SG ¤EG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG äQOÉH ,áeRC’G ÜÉ≤YCG ‘h .ôμÑŸG index of real estate price can also serve as an early warning .ájó ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG ™°Vƒd Nóªc äGQÉ ©dG QÉ©°SGC ‹ÉªLEG ‘ indicator. In the aftermath of the crisis, central banks have q ≤ π ≤ been utilizing information inherent in aggregate real estate prices as an input for monetary policy making.

Against this backdrop, QCB, started to collate information ™«H äÓeÉ©e ∫ƒM äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ™ªéH …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe CGóH ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h on sale transaction of real estate properties from the Ministry ájQÉ≤©dG äÓeÉ©ŸÉH á°UÉÿG) äÉfÉ«ÑdG √òg ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .∫ó©dG IQGRh øe äGQÉ≤©dG of Justice (MoJ). Based on this data (suburb-level real estate q transactions data) a monthly series of Real Estate Index Oƒ«≤dG ¤EG ô¶ædÉHh .äGQÉ≤©dG ô°TDƒŸ ájô¡°T á∏°ù∏°S ™°Vh ” ,(äÉjó∏ÑdG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y (REI) has been developed. Given the inherent limitations OóYh ,≈æÑŸG ôªYh ¿Éμà á°UÉÿG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ¢ü≤f πãe) äÉfÉ«ÑdG √ò¡H á≤∏©àŸG of the data (e.g., lack of information on the location and ‘ äÉeƒ∏©ŸG πjó©J ” ,(∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y √ÒZ hCG ¢TôØdÉc áMÉàŸG ≥aGôŸGh ,±ô¨dG age of building, number of rooms, available amenities …QÉ Y ¢SÉ« e ™°Vh ” , M’ âbh ‘h .¢ùfÉéàdG óYh áaô£àŸG º« dG ÖÑ°ùH ájGóÑdG such as furnished or unfurnished), the information was ≤ ≤ ≥ Ω ≤ first adjusted for outliers and heterogeneity. Subsequently, .᫪°SƒŸG äÉgÉŒ’G QÉKBG ∫õ©d »ª°Sƒe πμ°ûH äÉfÉ«ÑdG π«∏– ó©H èjõŸG Ö°ùëH ∫ó©eq a mix-adjusted real estate measure was developed, after ™e QhÉ°ûàdG ó©H ,¢SÉ°SC’G áæ°ùc (¢SQÉeh πjôHCG) 2010-2009 ΩÉY QÉ«àNG ”q óbh seasonally decomposing the data to isolate the effects ájÉ¡f ‘ ,¬fCG ∫hó÷G ÚÑjh .ÊÉ«ÑdG º°SôdG ‘ ájô¡°ûdG á∏°ù∏°ùdG √òg ô¡¶Jh .IQGRƒdG of seasonal trends. The year 2009-10 (April-March) was chosen as base year, after consultations with the Ministry. .2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡æH áfQÉ≤e %20 ‹GƒëH QÉ©°SC’G ô°TDƒe ™ØJQG ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO The monthly series so developed is provided in Chart. The ø°ù– ¤EG Ò°ûj Ée ,™«ÑdG äÉ«∏ªY OóY É°†jk CG OGORG ,QÉ©°SC’G ‘ IOÉjõdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉHh table indicates, as at end-December 2011, the price index äÓ«ØdGh »°VGQC’ÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ɪ«°S’h ,ájóYÉ°üàdG QÉ©°SC’G ácôM ¿q CG hóÑjh .Ö∏£dG grew by around 20% over end-December 2010. Along ¢SCÉc áaÉ°†à°SG ‘ ô£b Rƒa øY áŒÉædG á«HÉéjE’G ôYÉ°ûŸG ¤EG Oƒ©J 2010 Ȫ°ùjO ó©H with the increase in price, the number of sale transactions also increased, indicating improvement in demand. The .2022 ΩÉY Ωó≤dG Iôμd ⁄É©dG upward movement in prices, especially in land and villa after December 2010 appears to emanate from the positive sentiments from winning the FIFA 2022 bid.

2011 Ȫ°ùjO – äGQÉ≤©dG ô°Tq Dƒe äGQƒ£Jq :∫hóL Table : Developments in REI – December 2011

Real Estate (2011) Oƒ≤©dG OóY (2010) Oƒ≤©dG OóY (2011 Ȫ°ùjO) ô°TDƒŸG (%) …ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y Ò¨àdGq No. of contracts No. of contracts Category REI (Dec - 11) Y-o-Y change (%) äGQÉ≤©dG áÄa (2011) (2010) Overall 148.59 19.70% 6409 5159 ´ƒªéŸG

Villa 158.01 12.40% 2003 2008 äÓ«ØdG

Land 137.89 33.70% 4134 2962 »°VGQC’G Residential 160.13 14.30% 2241 2185 á«æμ°ùdG ≥≤°ûdG

85 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG ô°Tq DƒŸ ájô¡°ûdGq á∏°ù∏°ùdG :ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart: Monthly series of Real Estate Price Index

After a lull during 2010 and in the first half of 2011, ΩÉY øe ∫hC’G ∞°üædG ‘ äôªà°SGh 2010 ΩÉY Égó¡°T Ahóg IÎa ó©H consumption credit improved considerably in the ∞°üædG ‘ ÒÑc óMq ¤EG ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ø°ù–q ,2011 second half of 2011(Chart 3-8B). .(Ü8-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ΩÉY øe ÊÉãdG Considering the importance of real estate sector and Qó°UCG ,∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£bh …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ᫪gC’ Gô¶fk consumption credit, QCB has issued revised guidelines äɪ« ©àdG õcôJhq . É©dG ÓN ádó©e äɪ« ©J …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe during the year. The guidelines on real estate finance ∏ Ω ∫ ∏ focus on the need for proper classification and Ëó≤Jh í«ë°üdG ∞«æ°üàdG ¤EG áLÉ◊G ≈∏Y …QÉ≤©dG πjƒªàdÉH á°UÉÿG submission of relevant information on a regular basis. ôeC’G Gòg …ODƒj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øeh .º¶àæe ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y á∏°üdG äGP äÉeƒ∏©ŸG This is expected to provide the necessary checks and balances as regards credit flow to real estate sector. At ¿ÉªàF’G ≥aóàH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ áeRÓdG äÉfRGƒàdGh äGQÉÑàN’G ÒaƒJ ¤EG the same time, by imposing limits on both price and øe πc ≈∏Y Oƒ«b ¢Vôa ∫ÓN øeh ,âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘ .…QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG ¤EG quantity, the guidelines on personal loans are aimed øe ó G ¤EG á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô dG ¿CÉ°ûH äɪ« ©àdG ±ó¡J ,᫪ dGh ô©°ùdG at limiting over extension of household debt and ◊ ≤ ∏ μ prevent future build-up of delinquent loans (Box 3-7). OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ºcGôJ ™æeh •ôØe πμ°ûH ô°SC’G ¿ƒjO ójGõJ The rationale behind these guidelines was to enable øe ∑ƒæÑdG Úμ“ ‘ äɪ«∏©àdG √òg AGQh ≥£æŸG øªμjh .(7-3 QÉWEG) banks to continue lending to creditworthy borrowers, while at the same time, ensure that individuals’ debt ΩóY ¿Éª°Vh á«fɪàF’G IQGó÷G …hP øe Ú°VÎ≤ª∏d ¢VGôbE’G á∏°UGƒe servicing capacity is not impaired. .âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘ øjódG áeóN ≈∏Y OGôaC’G IQób ábÉYEG

´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ ájô¡°ûdG äÉÑ∏≤àdG :CG8-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ á«cÓ¡à°S’Ghq ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG :Ü8-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£bh …QÉ≤©dG (…ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ,Ò¨àdGq áÑ°ùf) Chart 3-8A: Monthly volatility in credit to real Chart 3-8B: Real estate and consumption credit estate and consumption (Percent change, Y-o-Y)

14 100 12 80 10 8 60 6 40 4 Percent

QR billion 2 20 0 Jul Ju Jan Ja Jun Ju Oct Oc O Feb Fe F SepSe S Apr Ap A DecDe D MarM Aug Au A Nov No N MayM ul un ep e eb e pr p ug u ct c ec e ov o

n 0 n ar ay p b t c r g -2 v l t r r c g v y n b p n c u a p a e u a o e e u J Jul Jan J J Jun Oct O A Apr Feb F Sep S Dec D Aug A Nov N M Mar M -4 -20 May Real Estate Consumption -6 Real Estate Consumption

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 86 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Box 3-7: Credit Boom ¿ÉªàF’G IôØW :7-3 QÉWEG

In the absence of reliable data on real estate credit øμÁ ,»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG …QÉ≤©dG ¿ÉªàF’G ¿CÉ°ûH ábƒKƒŸG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ÜÉ«Z πX ‘ to households, credit to consumption sector can be .OGôaCÓd ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ ƒªædG π«∏ëàd ÓjóHk ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G QÉÑàYG considered as a proxy to analyze the growth in household credit. The banking sector credit for consumption grew IóટG IÎØdG ∫ÓN áYô°ùH ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ɉ ó≤a rapidly during 2005-08 and ebbed thereafter, coinciding …OÉ°üàb’G DƒWÉÑàdG ™e øeGõàdÉH ,∂dP ó©H ™LGôJ ¿CG åÑd Éeh 2008 ¤EG 2005 øe with the global economic slowdown. Consumption credit Gƒ‰k πé°Sh 2009 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ™LGôJ ɪc .»ŸÉ©dG also decelerated during 2009 and recorded a negative «é°ùJ ÓN øe ¿ÉªàF’G IÒJh âYQÉ°ùJ ó a ,2011 ÉY ‘ ÉeCG .2010 ÉY ‘ ÉÑdÉ°Sk growth in 2010. During 2011, such credit gathered pace π ∫ ≤ Ω Ω by registering double-digit growth. The guidelines by QCB º«¶æàd …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÉgQó°UCG »àdG á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG ¿ƒμJ óbh .êhOõe ºbQ to streamline the price and volume of consumption credit óMCG 2011 ΩÉY øe ¤hC’G ô¡°TC’G ‘ ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ºéMh ô©°S in the early months of 2011 could be one among various .´ÉØJQ’G Gòg AGQh áæeÉμdG ÜÉÑ°SC’G reasons behind this observed pickup.

As per extant definition, a credit boom is an episode of §ÑJôj …òdG OÉ◊G ™°SƒàdGq øe IÎa É«dÉMk óªà©ŸG ∞jô©àdG ≥ah ¿ÉªàF’G IôØW Èà©J sharp and above trend expansion, generally associated πμq °ûj ,∞jô©àdG Gòg Ö°ùëHh .…OÉ°üàb’G •É°ûædG ‘ ƒªædG ä’ó©e ´ÉØJQÉH ÉeƒªYk with high growth in economic activity. Following from this definition, the unprecedented growth in consumption credit ∫ÓN %60-30 ≠∏H …òdGh ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ ¥ƒÑ°ùŸG ÒZ ƒªædG of 30-60% during 2005-08 appears to be a prime candidate »Ø°†jh .¿ÉªàF’G IôØ£d É«°ù«FQk ÉÑÑ°Sk 2008 ΩÉY ¤EG 2005 ΩÉY øe IóટG IÎØdG for a credit boom. The subsequent slowdown in economic IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG äÉjƒà°ùe ‘ ≥M’ âbh ‘ ≈∏Œ …òdG …OÉ°üàb’G ƒªædG DƒWÉÑJ growth and its manifestation in the levels delinquent loan .(1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) Ñ°S Ée Y á«bGó°üe Ó¡à°S’G ´É£b ‘ OGó°ùdG numbers in the consumption sector also lends credence to ≥ ≈∏ ∑ this assertion (Chart1)

Following the methodology employed by Mendoza and ΩGóîà°SÉHh (2008) Mendoza and Terrenes É¡ØXh »àdG á«é¡æŸG ´ÉÑJEÉH Terrenes (2008) and using quarterly time-series data on øe ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ∫ƒM ájƒæ°ùdG ™HQ á«æeõdG π°SÓ°ùdG äÉfÉ«H credit to consumption sector for 2004:1 to 2011:4, It was examined whether a boom period exist and is identifiable. IÎa âfÉc GPEG Ée ¢üëa ” ,2011 ΩÉY øe ™HGôdG ™HôdG ¤EG 2004 ΩÉ©d ∫hC’G ™HôdG Quarterly data is used to represent a cyclical series, á∏°ù∏°S π«ãªàd á«∏°üØdG äÉfÉ«ÑdG Ωóîà°ùJh .É¡«∏Y ±ô©àdG øμÁh IOƒLƒe IôØ£dG considering the fact that the consumption behavior of ó¡°ûj á≤£æŸG ‘ »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d »cÓ¡à°S’G ∑ƒ∏°ùdG ¿CG QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e ,ájQhO households in the region changes during festival periods. πjƒ£dG ióŸG ≈∏Y √ÉŒ’G Gòg Ö°ùëjh .äÉÑ°SÉæŸGh OÉ«YC’G äGÎa ∫ÓN äGÒ¨Jq The long term trend in the logarithm of per capita real 24 credit to consumption24 (PCRC) is calculated using (᫪àjQÉZƒd ádGóc) ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£b ‘ OôØ∏d »≤«≤◊G ¿ÉªàF’G Ò¨àe ΩGóîà°SÉH Hodrick- Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing parameter 1600 (parameter) áª∏©ŸG ó«¡“ ™e Hodrick- Prescott IGOCG ΩGóîà°SÉH 1600 (for quarterly series). A credit boom is identified øY ±Gôëf’G RhÉéàj ÉeóæY ¿ÉªàF’G IôØW ≈∏Y ±ô©àdG ºàjh .(á«∏°üØdG á∏°ù∏°ù∏d) when the deviation from the long term trend exceeds by a k factor (ø) of the volatility in the deviation measured by the .(σ) …QÉ«©ŸG ±Gôëf’ÉH É°SÉ≤e ±Gôëf’G Ö∏≤J (ø) πeÉ©H ióŸG πjƒ£dG √ÉŒ’G standard deviation (σ). Thus, during a credit boom period, ,¿ÉªàF’G IôØW IÎa ∫ÓN ,¿ÉªàF’G √ÉŒG øY äÉaGôëf’G RhÉéàJ ,∂dòd É©ÑJhk the deviations from trend in credit exceed the typical á«é¡æŸG Ö°ùëHh .ÌcCG hCG πeÉ©H ájOÉ°üàbG IQhO ióe ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàFÓd »£ªædG ™°SƒàdG expansion of credit over the business cycle by a factor or .(2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ‘ ±Gôëf’G ô¡¶jh .1^75 (ø) eÉY Ñj ,IQƒcòŸG more. Following from the literature, the factor (ø) is taken π ≠∏ as 1.75. The deviation is plotted in (chart 2).

Ó¡à°S’G ´É£ d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ :1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ øY ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ±GôëfG :2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ∑ ≤ ióŸG πjƒ£dG óFÉ°ùdG √ÉŒ’G IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dGh Chart 2: Deviation from long-term trend in Chart 1: Consumption credit growth and NPL consumption credit

The data suggest that during the last two quarter of 2008, √ÉŒ’G øY ±Gôëf’G RhÉŒ ,2008 ΩÉY øe ÒNC’G ™HôdG ∫ÓN ¬fCG ¤EG äÉfÉ«ÑdG Ò°ûJ the deviation from the long term trend exceeds the 1.75σ ^ σ level, possibly indicative of evidence in support of credit ≥Ñ£æJ ɪc .¿ÉªàF’G IôØW ºYóJ ádOCG ôaƒj ób ɇ ,1 75 iƒà°ùe ióŸG πjƒ£dG boom. The results also hold true for 1.5σ level; however, çhóM ≈∏Y π«dO øe Ée ,2σ iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y øμdh ,1^5σ iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y É°†jk CG èFÉàædG

24 24 Annual midyear population data sourced from QSA. .AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L Ö°ùëH ΩÉ©dG ∞°üàæe ‘ ¿Éμ°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG ájƒæ°ùdG äÉfÉ«ÑdG

87 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

at the 2σ level, no evidence of credit boom is observed. ‘ ™°SƒàdG ¿CG ÉgOÉØe á°UÓN ¤EG ∫ƒ°UƒdG øμÁ ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .¿ÉªàF’G ‘ IôØW Accordingly it may be concluded that the consumption ‘ øªμj 2008 ΩÉY øe øjÒNC’G Ú©HôdG ∫ÓN ∑Ó¡à°S’G ´É£≤d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G credit expansion during the last two quarters of 2008 lie in the boundary level of a credit boom and the current levels √ÉŒ’G Gòg øe πbCG Èà©J á«dÉ◊G äÉjƒà°ùŸG ¿q CGh ,¿ÉªàF’G IôØ£d …ó◊G iƒà°ùŸG are below the long-term trend. .ióŸG πjƒ£dG References ™LGôŸG E.G.Mendoza and M.E.Terrones (2008). An anatomy of :¿ÉªàF’G äGôØW íjô°ûJ .(2008) E.G.Mendoza and M.E.Terrones credit booms: Evidence from macro aggregates and micro ÖàμŸG πªY ábQh .»Fõ÷G OÉ°üàb’G äÉfÉ«Hh »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G ™«eÉ› øe πF’O data. NBER Working Paper 14049. Cambridge:MA. .¢ùJƒ°TÉ°SÉe :êOÈeÉc .14049 ájOÉ°üàb’G çÉëHCÓd »æWƒdG I. Bunda and C.Michele (2010). Signals from housing and .¢VGôbE’Gh ¿É °SE’G IôØW øe äGQÉ°TEG .(2010) I. Bunda and C.Michele lending booms. Emerging Markets Review 11, 1-20. μ Qatar Statistics Authority. Mid-year population of Qatar. .20-1 ,11 áÄ°TÉædG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ôjô≤J .ô£b ‘ ΩÉ©dG ∞°üàæe ‘ ¿Éμ°ùdG OóY .AÉ°üMEÓd ô£b RÉ¡L

In 2011, deposits grew by around 19% in real terms ∂dP Oƒ©jh á«≤«≤◊G ΩÉbQC’ÉH %19 ƒëæH ™FGOƒdG ≠,2011 ΩÉY ‘ supported primarily by growth in public sector deposits ™FGOh ¿q CG ÒZ .(%35 ‹GƒM) É©dG ´É£ dG ™FGOh ƒ‰ ¤EG »°ù«FQ °ûH (around 35%). Private sector deposits however, lagged Ω ≤ πμ behind at 19%, much lower than previous year’s ≠∏H å«M »°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉ≤e %19 ≠∏H πq bCG ∫ó©Ãq ≠¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG number of 34%. The growth in public sector deposits ÚM ‘ ,á«aô°üŸG äÉYƒªéŸG ™«ªL ‘ ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh ≠óbh .%34 permeated all bank groups, whereas deposit growth in Islamic banks more than doubled (Table 3-3). .(3-3 ∫hóL) ∞©°†dG øe ÌcCÉH á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ‘ ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ OGORG

Table 3-3: Bank group wise growth in deposits á«aô°üŸGq äÉYƒªéŸG Ö°ùëH ™FGOƒdG ƒ‰ :3-3 ∫hóL (real annual; in percent) (áÄŸG ‘ ,…ƒæ°S »≤«≤M ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y) á«eÓ°SEG ∑ƒæH ájó«∏≤J ∑ƒæH á«ÑæLq CG ∑ƒæH ´ƒªéŸG Islamic conventional Foreign Overall ΩÉY ¢UÉN ΩÉY ¢UÉN ΩÉY ¢UÉN ΩÉY ¢UÉN Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private

2009 32 34 1 15 -49 -6 3 15

2010 -4 60 17 31 -39 8 15 34

2011 109 26 27 20 65 -7 35 19

Foreign currency (FC) deposits by public sector was ∫ÓN Iójó°T äÉÑ∏≤J á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh äó¡°T highly volatile during the year. It surged in the second Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ äOGRh ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ â©ØJQG ó≤a .ΩÉ©dG half of the year, being nearly 4-times higher by end- December 2011 over the previous year. In case of ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ ¬«∏Y âfÉc Ée ±É©°VCG á©HQCG ƒëæH 2011 private sector, FC deposits witnessed a declining ∫ÓN É°VÉØîfGk á«ÑæLq C’G äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG äó¡°T ó≤a ,¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dÉH trajectory during the second half of 2011, after having ∫hC’G ∞°üædG ‘ äGOÉjR â∏é°S ¿CG ó©H 2011 ΩÉY øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG registered increases during the first half of the year. At the same time, domestic currency deposits by á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dÉH ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh â«≤H ,âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘ .ΩÉ©dG øe the private sector remained almost stagnant, while óbh .äÉÑ∏≤àdG ¢†©H ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh äó¡°T ɪæ«H ÉÑjôk ≤J É¡dÉM ≈∏Y deposit from public sector was volatile. High demand Öë°S ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,á«ÑæLC’G á∏ª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG OÉjORG iOCG for foreign currency credit, coupled with withdrawal of foreign currency deposits increased the reliance of ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG OɪàYG IOÉjR ¤EG ,á«ÑæLC’G á∏ª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG the banking sector on external interbank funds (Chart .(Üh CG 9-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée äÉ«∏ªY ∫ÓN øe á«LQÉÿG 3-9 A and B).

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 88 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ™FGOƒdG Qƒ£Jq :CG9-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ …ô£≤dG ∫ÉjôdÉH ™FGOƒdG Qƒ£Jq :Ü9-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-9A: Progress of FC deposit Chart 3-9B: Progress of QR deposit

70 300 80 60 280 260 60 50 240

40 220 billion QR 200 40 30 180 QR billion QR billion 20 160 20 10 140 120 0 100 0 Apr-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Nov-11 A J A N O Oct-11 Dec-10 D D Dec-11 J M M Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 F J S Feb-11 Jul-11 Sep-11 u a u

Non-Resident Public Private Non-Resident(RHS) Private Public(RHS)

The maturity pattern of deposits remained more or ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN Ée óMq ¤EG Gk ôq ≤à°ùe ™FGOƒdG ¥É≤ëà°SG §‰ »≤H less stable during the year (Chart 3-10). Even though Ée ‘ AÓª©dG ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ™LGôJ øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .(10-3 the interest rate on customer deposits across all â¨∏H ,2010 ΩÉ©H áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG ™«ªéH ≥∏q ©àj maturities declined in 2011 as compared to 2010, 25 the share of demand deposits stood around 40% of ⁄ ɪc .™FGOƒdG ‹ÉªLEG øe %40 ‹GƒM Ö∏£dG â– ™FGOƒdG á°üM total deposits.25 The same insensitivity to interest rate »àdG á∏LB’G ™FGOƒdÉH á°UÉÿG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ≈∏Y ôcòJ äGÒ¨J CGô£J changes observed for the term deposit up to 3 months ™≤J »àdG ™FGOƒdG á°üM ™bGƒdG ‘ â©ØJQG óbh .ô¡°TCG 3 ¤EG É¡Jóe π°üJ as well. The share of deposits in this maturity bucket actually increased, notwithstanding the decline in âbƒdG ‘ .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¢VÉØîfG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ¥É£ædG Gòg øª°V interest rates. At the same time, deposit mobilization É¡dÉM ≈∏Y ≈∏YC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G äGÎa äGP ™FGOƒdG ácôM â∏q X ó≤a ,¬°ùØf in the higher maturity buckets remained sticky, .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ∫GóàYG ™e ∂dP øeGõJh coinciding with the moderation in interest rates.

Chart 3-10: Maturity distribution of deposits and ô©°ùdG §°Sƒàeh ™FGOƒdG ¥É≤ëà°SG äGÎa ™jRƒJ :10-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ weighted average interest rate IóFÉØ∏d íLôŸG

55 3.5 50 45 3.0 40 2.5 35 30 2.0 25 1.5

Share (%) 20

15 1.0 Percent 10 0.5 5 0 0.0 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jul-11 Sep-11 Nov-11

Demand Term (Up to 3M) Term (3M to 1 YR)

Term (Above 1 YR) Int. Rate (Demand) (Right scale) Int. Rate (3M) (Right scale)

Int. Rate (1 YR) (Right scale) Int. Rate (> 1 YR) (Right scale)

Liquidity and funding πjƒªàdGh ádƒ«°ùdG As discussed in Chapter 2, with a view to strengthen ΩÉY ‘ ,…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe òîJGq ,ÊÉãdG π°üØdG ‘ ¬à°ûbÉæe ” ɪc the liquidity management in the banking sector, QCB õjõ©J ±ó¡H ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH á°UÉN á«°ù«FQ äGQOÉÑe çÓK ,2011 had undertaken three major monetary policy initiatives Éb ,ôjÉæj 17 øe GQÉÑàYÉak .‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ‘ ájó ædG ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG in 2011. Firstly, effective January 17, it introduced a Ω ≤ ≤ ceiling on each bank’s total holding of certificates of ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T ´ƒªéà ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ∑ƒæÑ∏d ∞≤°S ™°VƒH ±ô°üŸG

25 25 The weighted average interest rates on demand deposits were 1.4% in 2010 and 0.6% in QÉ©°SCG â¨∏H ɪc .2011 ΩÉY ‘ %0,6 h 2010 ΩÉY ‘ %1,4 Ö∏£dG â– ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØ∏d íLôŸG ô©°ùdG §°Sƒàe ≠∏H 2011. Likewise, the rates on savings deposits during the same period were 1.6% and 1.1%, IÎa) %1,6 h %2,3 πLC’ ™FGOƒdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ≠∏H ÚM ‘ ,%1,1h %1,6 É¡°ùØf IÎØdG ∫ÓN QÉNO’G ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG while that on time deposits were 2.3% and 1.6% (for 1 month maturity) and 2.04% and 1.96% .(áæ°ùdG ¥ƒØJ ¥É ëà°SG IÎa) %1,96 h %2,04 h (óMGh ô¡°T ¥É ëà°SG (for greater than one year maturity). ≤ ≤

89 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J deposit (CDs) plus QMR deposits equal to the ,…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh É¡«dEG ÉaÉ°†ek ,äGOÉ¡°ûdG √òg ∫OÉ©J å«ëH corresponding reserve requirement maintained by .…õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG iód æH c ¬H ßØàëj …òdG »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G each with the QCB. Simultaneously, the government ∂ π issued domestic bonds worth QR 50 billion to manage ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 50 ᪫≤H á«∏fi äGóæ°S áeƒμ◊G äQó°UCG ,¬°ùØf âbƒdG ‘ the liquidity. Secondly, the central bank reduced the ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG ¢†ØNq ɪc .ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ …ô£b QMR deposit rates. Accordingly, the QMR deposit ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ¢VGôbE’G / ´GójE’G äÉ«∏ªY rate reduced to 0.75% in two stages from a high of %0^75 ¤EG …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¢†ØîfG 2% prevailing since August 2010. Thirdly, auction of ¿hPCG ìôW ”hq .2010 ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T òæe %2 ¿Éc ¿CG ó©H Úà∏Môe ≈∏Y treasury Bills for 91, 182, 273 days were introduced ɶædG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOE’ ƒjÉe ô¡°T òæe Éeƒjk 273h 182 h 91 IóŸ áfGõN since May to manage liquidity in the banking system. Ω These policy changes appear to have impacted the ≈∏Y ÉgôKCG âcôJ ób á°SÉ«°ùdG ‘ äGÒ«¨àdG √òg ¿q CG hóÑjh .‘ô°üŸG liquidity position of the banking sector. The excess á°†FÉØdG ádƒ«°ùdG äCGóH ó≤a .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh liquidity which normally gets parked with QCB as …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh πμ°T ≈∏Y ±ô°üŸG iód IOÉY ≈≤ÑJ »àdG QMR deposits, gradually drained out of the system ¥QÉØd »éjQóàdG ¢†ØÿG ™e 2011 ôjGÈa øe ΩɶædG øe É«éjQóJk êôîJ from February 2011, with the gradual lowering of á«£¨J ¥É£f ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ¢†ØîfGh .(CG11-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) IóFÉØdG ô©°S the interest rate differential (Chart 3-11A). During the (óMGh ô¡°T àM) LC’G IÒ°ü dG GƒeC’ÉH á°UÉÿG á FÉ°ùdG äGOƒLƒŸG year, liquid assets coverage of short-term funds (up to ≈ π ≤ ∫ ∏ 1 month) declined from a high of 55% in December %48 ¤EG π°ü«d 2010 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ %55 â¨∏H á©ØJôe áÑ°ùf πé°S ¿CG ó©H 2010 to 48% as at end December 2011. .2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘

Despite the outflow of capital funds during the first ΩÉY øe ∫hC’G ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ∫GƒeC’G ¢ShDhQ êhôN øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y half of 2011, there was no liquidity shortage for the â«≤H ó≤a .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤f ∑Éæg øμj ⁄ ,2011 banking sector. A broad indicator of liquidity - deposit óæY ádƒ«°ù d ¥É£ædG ™°SGh Gô°Tk Dƒe Èà©J »àdGh ¢Vhô dG ¤EG ™FGOƒdG áÑ°ùf to loan ratio-remained comfortable below 100% during ∏ ≤ this period with a stable stock of external finance. Iôq ≤à°ùe Ió°UQCG ™e IÎØdG √òg ∫ÓN %100 RhÉéàJ ⁄ áëjôe äÉjƒà°ùe However, in the latter half of the year, high demand Ö∏£dG ´ÉØJQG iOCG ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ ,¬fq CG ’EG .»LQÉÿG πjƒªà∏d from public sector credit coupled with a decline in ™FGOƒdG ácôM ¢VÉØîfG ÖfÉL ¤EG ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG πÑb øe ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y deposit mobilization resulted in loan to deposit ratio ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ≈°übC’G óq ◊G ¤EG ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf ∫ƒ°Uh ¤EG reaching its maximum (Chart 3-11B). The resultant ƒ‰ ¤EG iOCG ɇ á«LQÉN QOÉ°üe øe πjƒªàdG Ö∏ZCG ≈JCG óbh .(Ü11-3 stress on funding was financed mostly by funds from .(8-3 QÉWEG) %36 áÑ°ùæH …ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG Y GƒeC’G òg external sources leading to year-on-year growth of ≈∏ ∫ √ these funds by 36% (Box 3-8).

ádƒªŸG äÉeGõàd’Gh ájó ædG ¬Ñ°T ádƒ«°ùdG : (CG 11-3) ÊÉ«H º°SQ ≤ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d á«LQÉÿG ¢Vhô≤dG :Ü11-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ πLC’G IÒ°ü≤dG Chart 3-11B: Banking sector’s Chart 3-11A: Near-cash liquidity and short-term external borrowings funded liabilities

160 60 160 11811 140 50 140 120 11411 120 100 40 11011 80 30 100 10610

Percent 80 60 20 11020 Percent QR billion QR 40 QR billion 60 9988 20 10 40 9944 0 0 Feb'11 Jul'11 Jun'11 Dec'11 Oct'11 Dec'10 Aug'11 Jan'11 Sep'11 May'11 Nov'11 Apr'11 Mar'11 20 9090 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Jan-10J Mar-10M May-10M J M M J S J S Jul-11 Sep-11 Jul-10 Sep-10 N N Nov-11 Nov-10 a a u u

Liquid Assets Liquid assets/Short-term Funds (Right Scale) Fund from External Sources Loan/Deposit (Right scale)

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 90 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Box 3-8: Possible repercussions of the Eurozone crisis á≤£æe ‘ áeRCÓd á∏ªàëŸG äÉ«YGóàdG :8-3 QÉWEG on domestic banks á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y hQƒ«dG The deteriorating global financial outlook and the Eurozone äÉÑ∏≤àdG iƒà°ùe ´ÉØJQG ¤EG hQƒ«dG á≤£æe áeRCGh á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG äÉ©bƒàdG QƒgóJ iOCG crisis led to high levels of volatility in the global financial øe á«HhQhC’G ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe á«dÉŸG á©aGôdG IOÉjR äOCG ɪc .á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘ markets. Increased deleveraging by European banks also k added to the woes. Given this scenario we analyze the ôWÉfl ¤EG ájô£≤dG ∑ƒæÑdG ¢Vô©J ióe π«∏– ºàj ,ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG Gò¡d Gô¶fh .πcÉ°ûŸG exposure of Qatari banks to European countries. .á«HhQhC’G ∫hódG

The total exposure of domestic Qatari banks sector to øe %5 ‹GƒM ÉHhQhCG ôWÉîŸ á«∏ëŸG ájô£≤dG ∑ƒæÑdG ´É£b ¢Vô©J ´ƒª› ≠∏Ñj Europe is around 5% of their aggregate asset. Out of this, ájOÉ«°ùdG äGóæ°ùdG ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG Qɪãà°SG ´ƒª› ≠∏Ñjh .ᩪéŸG É¡JGOƒLƒe the banking sector’s total investment in sovereign bonds and treasury bills is less than QR 1 billion. As a result, the ô°TÉÑŸG ôKC’G Èà©j ,∂dòd áé«àf .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 1 øe πbCG áfGõÿG äGóæ°Sh direct impact arising from possible sovereign debt default GOhók fi hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ ájOÉ«°ùdG ¿ƒjódG OGó°S øY ∞∏îàdG á«fÉμeEG øY Å°TÉædG in Eurozone is negligible. However, domestic banks have ÚH Ée äGOƒLƒŸG πãe iôNCG áeÉg ôWÉîŸ á°VôY Èà©J á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ¿q CG ’EG .GóLk other significant exposures, such as inter-bank assets. As a share of total assets, it contributes around 4% of domestic äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG øe %4 ‹GƒëH ºgÉ°ùJ ,äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe áÑ°ùæch .∑ƒæÑdG banks’ assets; however, the direct impact in case of any ô£N …CG OƒLh ∫ÉM ‘ ô°TÉÑŸG ÒKCÉàdG ¿CG ¤EG Ò°ûJ äGôjó≤àdG ¿q CG ÒZ á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG counterparty risk (75% of the exposure become illiquid) is %20 ‹GƒM ¿ƒμj (ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤æd ¢Vô©àdG øe %75) πHÉ≤ŸG ±ô£dG ôWÉfl øe estimated to be around 20% of the liquid asset held by òg ¥É ëà°SG «g Ò°ûjh .á« ëŸG ƒæÑdG É¡H ßØà– »àdG á FÉ°ùdG äGOƒLƒŸG øe domestic banks. The maturity structure of this asset class √ ≤ πμ ∏ ∑ ∏ indicates that over 90% of the funds placed with European á«HhQhC’G ∑ƒæÑdG iód áYOƒŸG ∫GƒeC’G øe %90 øe ÌcCG ¿CG ¤EG äGOƒLƒŸG øe áÄØdG banks are short-term (i.e., with maturity upto 3 months) in .(ÊÉ«H º°SQ) É¡à©«ÑW ‘ (ô¡°TCG 3 ¤EG ¥É≤ëà°S’G πLCG π°üj …CG) πLC’G IÒ°üb nature (Chart).

In addition to the asset side exposures, the direct impact á≤£æe ‘ áeRCÓd ô°TÉÑŸG ôKC’G π°üj ób ,äGOƒLƒŸG ôWÉîŸ ¢Vô©àdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH of the Eurozone crisis and the deleveraging of European äÉ«fGõ«ŸG ‘ äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ¤EG á«HhQhC’G ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe á«dÉŸG á©aGôdG ¢†ØNh hQƒ«dG banks can also work its way through the liability side of the balance sheet via a stress on wholesale funding. Banks in πjƒªàdG ´ƒª› øe %13 ‹GƒM »JCÉjh .IÒÑμdG äÉ«∏ª©∏d πjƒªàdG ¢†«ØîJ ≥jôW øY Qatar source around 13% of its total non-equity funding ∫ƒ°ü◊G ºàjh .á«dhódG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S øe á«μ∏ŸG QOÉ°üe ±ÓîH ô£b ‘ ∑ƒæÑ∏d from international interbank market. A quarter of this IÒ°üb ∫GƒeC’G √òg øe IÒÑc áÑ°ùf ¿q CG ÉÃh .á«HhQhC’G ∑ƒæÑdG øe ≠∏ÑŸG Gòg ™HQ ≈∏Y amount is sourced from European banks. Considering that a significant proportion of these funds are of short-term in ôKDƒj ¿CG á«dhódG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤f …C’ øμÁ ,É¡à©«ÑW ‘ πLC’G nature, any liquidity dry up in the international interbank .á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh ≈∏Y ÉÑk ∏°S market might adversely affect the liquidity position of the domestic banks. á«HhQhq C’G ∑ƒæÑdG ôWÉîŸ ájô£≤dG ∑ƒæÑdG ¢Vô©àHq á°UÉÿG ¥É≤ëà°S’G äGÎa πμ«g :ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart: Maturity structure of Qatari banks’ exposure with European banks

100

80

60

Percent 40

20

0 up to 3 M > 3 M < 1Yr > 1 Yr up to 1 M >1 M < 3 M Above 3 M

Assets LiabiliƟes

Off-balance sheet activities á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸGq êQÉN ᣰûfC’G Off-balance sheet activities of the banking sector áÑ°ùæH Gƒ‰k ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN ᣰûfC’G äó¡°T grew by 13.3% during the year (Table 3-4). Except êQÉN äÉfƒμŸG ™«ªL äô¡XCG óbh .(4-3 ∫hóL) áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN %13^3 investment activities, all other components of off- ÉeCG .É«HÉéjk EG Gƒ‰k ájQɪãà°S’G ᣰûfC’G AÉæãà°SÉH á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG balance sheet showed positive growth. In terms of share to total assets, foreign bank group dominate the ∑ƒæÑdG áYƒª› ¿EÉa ,äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ‘ É¡à°üM ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH off-balance sheet activities. However, judged in terms ,ƒªædG å«M øeh .á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN ᣰûfC’G ≈∏Y ô£«°ùJ á«ÑæLq C’G of growth, Islamic banks have posted considerable øeh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %44 ƒëf ≠∏H GÒÑck Gƒ‰k á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG â≤≤q M ó≤a growth of around 44% during the current year. From á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN ᣰûfC’G øY áªLÉædG ôWÉîŸG ¿CG hóÑj ,ôWÉîŸG å«M a risk perspective, it appears that the risks from off- á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG øe á«dÉ©dG á°ü◊G øª°†àJ å«M IOhófi á«eƒª©dG balance sheet activities are limited, in view of the fact

91 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J that a high share of indirect credit facilities (over 75%) ¿Éª°†dG äÉHÉ£Nh AGOC’G ø°ùM äÉfɪ°V (%75 øe ÌcCG) Iô°TÉÑŸG ÒZ are in the nature of performance bonds, bid bonds or .¢†Øîæe IôWÉfl eÉY Y …ƒ£æJ »àdG áeóq ŸG äÉ©aódG äÉfɪ°V hCG advance payment bonds all of which carry a low risk π ≈∏ ≤ factor. The credit equivalent of the off-balance sheet %22 ‹GƒëH á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN ᣰûfC’ÉH á≤∏©àŸG ¿ÉªàF’G Qó≤jh activities are calculated at around 22% of the total off- .á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN ᣰûfC’G ´ƒª› øe balance sheet exposure.

Table 3-4: Off-balance sheet exposures of banks ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸGq QÉWEG êQÉN äÉeGõàd’G :4-3 ∫hóL

Item äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG áÑ°ùædG óæÑdG Ratio to total assets (%) ƒªædG (%) Growth(%) ∑ƒæÑdG ™«ªL á«eÓ°SE’G ájó«∏≤àdG á«ÑæLC’G All Banks Islamic conventonal Foreign

Indirect credit facilities 18.1 10.1 12.0 144.4 10.0 Iô°TÉÑŸG ÒZ á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG

Financial obligations 8.6 7.9 7.1 33.4 56.3 á«dÉŸG äÉeGõàd’G

Investment activities 9.3 5.2 9.9 20.2 -5.7 ájQɪãà°S’G ᣰûfC’G

Others 2.0 1.8 1.6 8.3 17.8 iôNCG

Total 37.9 24.9 30.6 206.4 13.3 ´ƒªéŸ

Profitability á«ëHôdG The banking sector recorded high growth in profit øe ºYóH %22 ÜQÉb ìÉHQC’G ‘ GÒÑck Gƒ‰k ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG πé°Sq of around 22% supported by a substantial decline øe πNódG ‘ IÒÑμdG IOÉjõdGh óFGƒØdG äÉahô°üe ‘ ÒÑμdG ¢VÉØîf’G in interest expense and an extraordinary growth in k trading incomes. Total income grew by 7% on top of a ÉÑjô≤J %10 áÑ°ùæH áfQÉ≤e %7 áÑ°ùæH äGOGôjE’G ‹ÉªLEG ™ØJQGh .IôLÉàŸG nearly 10% growth last year (Table 3-5). Even though äÉfƒq μe º¶©e ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .(5-3 ∫hóL) »°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dG ‘ most components of non-interest expense increased ¢VÉØîf’G ¿EÉa ,IÒÑc IOÉjR äó¡°T ób óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe äÉahô°üŸG considerably, significant decline in the major expense Oƒ©j …òdG óFGƒØdG äÉahô°üe …CG-äÉahô°üª d »°ù«FôdG ¿ƒ ŸG ‘ ÒÑ dG component, i.e., interest expense, on account of a low ∏ μ μ interest regime enabled the banking sector to curtail øe ó◊G øe øμe ób - ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ á°†ØîæŸG IóFÉØdG Ωɶf ¤EG its overall expense by 5%. Interest income continues to ¿ƒμŸG πμq °ûj óFGƒØdG øe πNódG ∫Gõj ’h .%5 áÑ°ùæH äÉ≤ØædG ‹ÉªLEG be the major contributor to total income, although its ‹ÉªLEG ‘ ¬à°üM ™LGôJ øe ºZôdG Y NódG ‹ÉªLEG ‘ »°ù«FôdG share in total income has declined (around 5 percent ≈∏ π points), paving way for the growing importance for ÒZ øe πNó∏d á«eÉæàŸG ᫪gCÓd ≥jô£dG ó¡Á ɇ ,(%5 ‹GƒM) πNódG 26 the non-interest income. We compute a diversification ᪫≤dG Ò°ûJh .á°SGQódG Ö°ùëH ™jƒæàdG ô°TDƒe ÜÉ°ùàMÉH Ωƒ≤fh .óFGƒØdG index, following from the literature.26 A higher value OƒLh ΩóY ¤EG ôØ°üdG Ò°ûj ɪæ«H – ÉYƒæJk ÌcCG èjõe OƒLh ¤EG ≈∏YC’G indicates a more diversified mix - zero indicates no ^ diversification, while 0.5 is an even split between net πNódGh óFGƒØdG øe πNódG ‘É°U ÚH ∫OÉ©J ¤EG 0 5 áÑ°ùf Ò°ûJh ™jƒæJ interest income and non-interest income (complete ∑ƒæÑ∏d áÑ°ùædÉH ™jƒæàdG ô°TDƒe ø°ù–q óbh .(πeÉc ™jƒæJ) óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe diversification). Reflecting the growing income diversity, 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y 0^44h 0^43 ≠∏H å«M á«eÓ°SE’Gh ájó«∏≤àdG the diversification index for conventional and Islamic ¢ù ©j …òdG ôeC’G , HÉ°ùdG É©dG ‘ ‹GƒàdG Y 0^39h 0^42 `H áfQÉ e banks improved to 0.43 and 0.44 respectively in 2011 μ ≥ Ω ≈∏ ≤ from 0.42 and 0.39, respectively in the previous year. .πNódG ´ƒæJ ‘ ´ÉØJQG

Bank group-wise analysis of the structure of the income äGOGôjE’G πμ«¡H ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ á«aô°üŸG äÉYƒªéŸG π«∏– Ò°ûj and expense shows domestic banks have more or πμ«g ‘ §ªædG ¢ùØf ÉÑjôk ≤J ™ÑàJ á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ¿q CG ¤EG äÉahô°üŸGh less the same pattern in their income and expense structure, although it is different for foreign banks áÑ°ùædÉH ∞∏àîj ¬fCG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,É¡H á°UÉÿG äÉahô°üŸGh äGOGôjE’G ,Gójó–k ÌcCG πμ°ûHh .(Üh CG12-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ¤EG

26 26 K.J.Stiroh and A. Rumble (2006). The dark side of diversification: The case of US financial á∏› .á°†HÉ≤dG á«dÉŸG á«μjôeC’G äÉcô°ûdG ádÉM :™jƒæà∏d º∏¶ŸG ÖfÉ÷G (2006) A. Rumble h K.J.Stiroh holding companies. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2131-61. .61-2131 ,30 á«dÉŸGh á«aô°üŸG äÉ°SGQódG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 92 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

(Chart 3-12A and B). More specifically, foreign banks äGOGôjEG »JCÉJ ÚM ‘ ,ÉYƒæJk ÌcCG á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG äGOGôjEG äÉgÉŒG Èà©J income streams are more diversified, while domestic »àdG äGOƒLƒŸG øe ÉgÒZh ¢Vhô≤dG øY »°ù«FQ πμ°ûH á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG banks income generated from loans and other interest äÉahô°üe á°üM RhÉéààa ,äÉahô°üŸÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG .óFGƒØdG ódƒJq providing assets. On the expense side, the share of q interest expense of the domestic commercial banks πμ°ûJ ɪæ«H ,%50 áÑ°ùæH á«∏ëŸG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG óFGƒØdG is over 50%, while for foreign banks, overhead cost ‘h .»°ù«FôdG ô°üæ©dG á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH áeÉ©dG äÉ≤ØædG comprise the major component. In case of Islamic ™e áfQÉ≤e ÉYƒæJk ÌcCG äÉahô°üŸG πμ«g Èà©j ,á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ádÉM banks, the expense structure is more diversified .ÚJôNC’G Úà«aô°üŸG ÚàYƒªéŸG compared to the other two bank groups.

Table 3-5: Structure of income and expense äÉahô°üŸGh äGOGôjE’G πμ«g :5-3 ∫hóL

2010 2011 2010 áfQÉ≤e 2011 % (2011 over 2010, percent)

Item á°ü◊G ƒªædG Share Growth óæÑdG Total income 100.0 100.0 7.0 πNódG ‹ÉªLEG Interest income 79.3 74.3 0.2 óFGƒØdG øe πNódG Trading income 1.8 3.8 130.4 IôLÉàŸG øe πNódG Forex income 2.9 3.0 12.9 »ÑæLC’G ó≤ædG äÉ«∏ªY øe πNódG Commission received 10.9 11.6 13.3 á∏°üëŸG ä’ƒª©dG Others 5.1 7.3 52.8 iôNCG

Total expenses 100.0 100.0 -5.2 äÉahô°üŸG ‹ÉªLEG

Interest expenses 55.8 43.0 -26.9 óFGƒØdG äÉahô°üe

General & administrative expenses 26.8 31.5 11.3 ájQGOE’Gh á«eƒª©dG äÉahô°üŸG Provisions for loans 12.2 18.8 46.3 ¢Vhô≤dG äÉ°ü°üfl Commission paid 1.6 2.0 16.6 áYƒaóŸG ä’ƒª©dG

Others 3.6 4.7 24.4 iôNCG Net Income 22.3 πNódG ‘É°üd

á«aô°üŸGq äÉYƒªéŸG Ö°ùëH äGOGôjE’G πμ«g :CG12-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ á«aô°üŸGq äÉYƒªéŸG Ö°ùëH äÉahô°üŸG πμ«g :Ü12-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-12A: Bank group-wise Chart 3-12B: Bank group-wise structure of income structure of expense

80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40

percent 30 30 Percent t Percent 20 20 10 10 0 C Comm Islamic I F Foreign

s 0 F Foreign C Comm Islamic I s

Interest income Trading income Forex income Interest expense General and adm. expense Provision for loans Commission paid Commission received Others Others

93 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Although interest income remained stagnant, the óYÉ°S ,óFGƒØdG øe πNódG ≈∏Y ô£«°S …òdG Oƒª÷G øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y substantial decline in interest expense helped the øe óq ◊G ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG óFGƒØdG äÉahô°üe ‘ ÒÑμdG ¢VÉØîf’G banking sector to arrest the decline in net interest margin (NIM). As a result, NIM remained robust at IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg ‘É°U »≤H ,∂dòd áé«àf .IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg ‘É°U ™LGôJ 2.8% in 2011, as compared to 2.9% in 2010. The non- .2010 ΩÉY ‘ %2^9 ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ %2^8 ≠∏H å«M Ék jƒbq traditional source of revenue, namely the non-interest óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe πNódG á°UÉNh äGOGôjEÓd …ó«∏≤àdG ÒZ Qó°üŸG πé°Shq income, recorded a high growth of 33% while the non- ¿EGh óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe äÉahô°üŸG äOGORG ÚM ‘, %33 ≠∏H GÒÑck Gƒ‰k interest expense also grew, albeit at a slower pace " " of 22%. This resulted in a decline in the “burden” ±ô©ŸG) AÖ©dG ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG ∂dP iOCGh .%22 â¨∏H CÉ£HCG IÒJƒH ¿Éc (defined as non-interest expense minus non-interest ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe πNódG É°übÉf óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe äÉahô°üŸÉH income scaled by total assets) from 0.24% to 0.13%. Gô¶æak ,πÑ≤à°ùŸÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG .%0^13 ¤EG %0^24 øe (äGOƒLƒŸG Going forward, given the announced policy stance by øe ,á«°ù«FôdGq ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG É¡àæ∏YCG »àdG á°SÉ«°ùdG ∞bGƒe ¤EG major central banks, global interest rates are expected to remain benign. This is likely to influence interest Gòg ôKDƒj ¿CG πªàëŸG øeh .ádóà©e á«ŸÉ©dG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG π¶J ¿CG ™bƒàŸG rates domestically as well, which might exert pressure ‘É°U ≈∏Y §¨°†dG ¢†©H ¢SQÉ“ ób »àdG á«∏ëŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ≈∏Y ôeC’G on NIMs. Banks will need to explore non-traditional ájó«∏≤J ÒZ QOÉ°üe ±É°ûμà°S’ ∑ƒæÑdG êÉà– ±ƒ°Sh .IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg sources of income so as to sustain and augment .É¡JOÉjRh á«ëHôdG ºYód ∂dPh äGOGôjEÓd profitability.

In order to assess the profitability of the banking á«ëHôdG äGô°TDƒe π«∏– ” ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG á«ëHQ ióe º««≤J πLCG øe sector, conventional profitability measures have been Gôk ≤à°ùe äGOƒLƒŸG §°Sƒàe ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG πq X ó≤a .(6-3 ∫hóL) ájó«∏≤àdG analyzed (Table 3-6). The Return on Average Asset (RoAA) remained stable, whereas Return on Tier-I ¢SCGQ IóYÉb IOÉjR ÖÑ°ùH »°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG ¢†ØîfG ɪæ«H Capital (RoTC) declined on account of an increase ≥aóJ ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG 𫨰ûàdG äGOGôjEG ‘É°U ‘ ¢VÉØîf’G Ò°ûjh .∫ÉŸG in the capital base. The decline in Net Operating äÉahô°üe ‘ ¢VÉØîf’G ¿CG ÚM ‘ ,á«aô°üŸG ᣰûfC’G øe äGOGôjE’G Income (NOI) indicates a decline in revenues stream QÉWEG) ´É£≤dG IAÉØc ø°ù–q ¤EG Ò°ûj äGOƒLƒŸG §°Sƒàe ¤EG 𫨰ûàdG from banking activities, while the drop in operating expense to average asset (OE) suggests improvements .(9-3 in the efficiency of the sector (Box 3-9).

Table 3-6: Indicators of bank profitability (%) (%) ∑ƒæÑdG á«ëHQ äGô°TDƒe:6-3 ∫hóL

áæ°ùdG äGOƒLƒŸG §°Sƒàe ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG »°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG óFGƒØdG äGOGôjEG ‘É°U 𫨰ûàdG äGOGôjEG ‘É°U 𫨰ûàdG äÉahô°üe Year RoAA RoTC NIM NOI OE

2008 2.9 21.5 2.5 2.4 1.2

2009 2.6 19.9 2.7 2.4 1.1

2010 2.6 21.2 2.9 2.5 1

2011 2.6 18.5 2.8 2.4 0.9

Box 3-9: Cost efficiency of GCC banks á«é«∏ÿG ∑ƒæÑdÉH ∞«dÉμàdG IAÉØc :9-3 QÉWEG Recent studies on the cost efficiency of GCC banks covering IÎØdG ∫ÓN á«é«∏ÿG ∑ƒæÑdÉH ∞«dÉμàdG IAÉØc ∫ƒM áãjó◊G äÉ°SGQódG äô¡XCG the period 1998-2009, employing a non-parametric DEA §°Sƒàe ¿CG ájQÉ«©ŸG ÒZ äÉfÉ«Ñ∏d »≤«Ñ£àdG π«∏ëàdG á«é¡æe ΩGóîà°SÉH 2009-1998 estimation approach, finds that the average cost efficiency of GCC banks to be 67.12%. Efficiency is observed to have ßMƒd óbh .%67^12 ≠∏Ñj »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ∑ƒæÑdÉH ∞«dÉμàdG IAÉØc increased from 58.8% in 1998 to 71.93% in 2009. .2009 ΩÉY ‘ %71^93 ¤EG 1998 ΩÉY ‘ %58^8 øe á«∏YÉØdG √òg OÉjORG Among countries, it is observed that there is wide disparity ìhGÎj IAÉØμdG äÉLQO §°Sƒàe ‘ ÒÑc ähÉØJ ßMƒd ó≤a ,¿Gó∏ÑdÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG in average efficiency scores, ranging from 63.65% in Qatar .ájOƒ©°ùdGq á«Hô©dGq áμ∏ªŸG ‘ %74^18h ô£b ‘ %63^65 ÚH and upto 74.18% in Saudi Arabia.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 94 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

We also examine the relation between efficiency and ΩGóîà°SÉH QGô≤à°S’G ¢SÉ«b ºàj å«M QGô≤à°S’Gh IAÉØμdG ÚH ábÓ©dG É°†jk CG Èàîf ɪc stability, where the latter is measured using the natural á«°SÉ°SC’G äÉWÉÑJQ’G Ò°ûJh .Z-score QÉ«©Ÿ »©«Ñ£dG (logarithm) ºàjQÉZƒ∏dG logarithm of the Z-score. The raw correlations appear to indicate limited evidence of any association between these ó∏ÑdG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y äGÒ¨àŸG √òg ÚH •ÉÑJQG …CÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ IOhófi ádOCG ¤EG variables, at the country level (except for Oman) and at the ßMÓj ,(»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO) »∏μdG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ÉeCG .(¿ÉªYo AÉæãà°SÉH) aggregate (GCC) level, the correlation is observed to be . «©°V •ÉÑJQ’G ¿CG weakly signifcant. ∞

øjôëÑdG âjƒμdG ¿ÉªYo ô£b ájOƒ©°ùdG äGQÉeE’G ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO BH KW OM QA SA UAE GCC äGQÉ≤©dG áÄa

Corelation 0.26 -0.29 -0.93 -0.33 0.32 -0.20 -0.21 •ÉÑJQ’G p-Value 0.50 0.38 0.07 0.31 0.30 0.52 0.10 á∏ªàëŸG ᪫≤dG

References ™LGôŸG A.I.Maghyereh and B.Awartani (2012). Financial integration ¥Gƒ°SCÓd ‹ÉŸG πeÉμàdG .(2012) A.I.Maghyereh and B.Awartani of GCC banking markets: A non-parametric bootstrap DEA »≤«Ñ£àdG π«∏ëà∏d ájQÉ«©e ÒZ á«é¡æe :»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ á«aô°üŸG approach. Research in International Business and Finance 26, 181-95. .95-181 ,26 ‹hódG πjƒªàdGh á«dhódG ∫ɪYC’G IQGOEG ‘ åëH .äÉfÉ«Ñ∏d L.Laeven and R.Levine (2009). Bank governance, regulation .IôWÉîŸGh º«¶æàdGh ∑ƒæÑdG áªcƒM .(2009) L.Laeven and R.Levine and risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics 93, 259-75. .75-259 ,93 Journal of Financial Economics T. Beck, A. Demirguc Kunt and R. Levine (2000). A New T Beck A Demirguc Kunt and R Levine Database on Financial Development and Structure. World äÉfÉ«H IóYÉb .(2000) . , . . Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605 (Updated November ,14 ,‹hódG ∂æÑ∏d …OÉ°üàb’G ôjô≤àdG .‹ÉŸG πμ«¡dGh á«dÉŸG ᫪æàdG ∫ƒM IójóL 2010). World Bank: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ∂æÑdG .(2010 Ȫaƒf ‘ áë≤æe áî°ùf) 605-597

Stability Analysis QGô≤à°S’G π«∏– The analysis regarding the balance sheet and income- ´É£≤dG ‘ ¥ÉØfE’Gh πNódG äGQƒ£Jhq á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG π«∏– expenditure developments in banking set out earlier ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,¬FGOCG IOƒLh ´É£ dG dP áeÓ°S ¤EG Ò°ûj,‘ô°üŸG appears to indicate a healthy and well-performing ≤ ∂ sector with comfortable capital and liquidity position. ÒKCÉJ åëÑf »∏j ɪ«ah .ádƒ«°ùdGh ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGôH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ áëjôe äÉjƒà°ùe In what follows, we investigate the impact of various ’hk CG Ωƒ≤f ,∂dòd Ék ≤ahh .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y áØ∏àîŸG ôWÉîŸG πeGƒY risk factors on the banking sector. Accordingly, we first äÉHGô£°V’G âYóà°SG ó≤a .á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe øe áYƒª› π«∏ëàH analyze a set of financial soundness indicators. The »àdG á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG FÉ°ùe ‘ ô¶ædG »ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG ´É£ dG Égó¡°T »àdG turbulence in the global financial sector necessitated π ≤ the need to look into the systemic risk issues which may π«∏– á°SGQO ºàj ,¢Vô¨dG Gò¡d .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ §HGÎdG øY CÉ°ûæJ ób arise from interconnectedness in the banking sector. πª– äGQÉÑàNG AGôLEÉH á°SGQódG √òg ∫ɪμà°SG ºàjhq ,∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S For the purpose, network analysis of the interbank äÉeó°üdG πª– ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG IQób øe ócCÉà∏d ∂dPh §¨°†dG market is studied. This is complemented by forward .á©bƒàŸGq ÒZ looking stress tests so as to ascertain the resilience of the banking system to withstand unexpected shocks.

A general assessment of banking sector stability is áWQÉN ™°Vh ≥jôW øY ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG QGô≤à°S’ ΩÉY º««≤J AGôLEG ºàjq conducted by constructing a banking stability map and .‘ô°üŸG QGô≤à°S’G ô°Tq Dƒe ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG QGô≤à°SG a corresponding banking stability index. The map is constructed based on five indices, which encapsulate QGô≤à°S’G »£¨J äGô°TDƒe á°ùªN ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y áWQÉÿG ™°Vh ºàjh the overall stability of the banking sector viz., fragility, ádƒ«°ùdGh IAÉØμdG ΩóYh á«ëHôdGh ∞©°†dG »gh ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d πeÉ°ûdG

95 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J profitability, inefficiency, liquidity and soundness.27 á°†ØîæŸG ᪫≤dG ¿CG ≈æ©Ã ,É«Ñ°ùfk É°SÉ«k ≤e ô°TDƒŸG Èà©jh 27.áeÓ°ùdGh The index is a relative measure in the sense that a low hCG) ¢†Øîæe ó©ÑdG ∂dP ‘ ô£ÿG ∫ó©e ¿CG ≈∏Y ∫óJ (á©ØJôŸG hCG) (resp., high) value means that the risk in that dimension ÉgòNCG ” »àdG iôNC’G äGÎØdG ™e áfQÉ ŸÉH IÎØdG òg ÓN (™ØJôe is low (resp., high) during the period as compared to ≤ √ ∫ other periods considered for the construction of the ô°TDƒŸG ᪫b ‘ IOÉjõdG Ò°ûJ ∂dòd .QGô≤à°S’G áWQÉN ™°Vƒd QÉÑàY’G ‘ stability map. Therefore, an increase in the value of the ‘ ó©ÑdG ∂dP ‘ ô£ÿG ∫ó©eq IOÉjR ¤EG OÉ©HC’G øe ó©H …CG ¢üîj Ée ‘ index in any particular dimension indicates an increase ´É£≤dG QGô≤à°SG áWQÉN Ò°ûJh .iôNC’G äGÎØdG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH IÎØdG ∂∏J in risk in that dimension for that period as compared ∞∏àîà ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ÒÑc πμ°ûH ô£ÿG πeGƒY áaÉc ™LGôJ ¤EG ‘ô°üŸG to other periods. The banking stability map indicates .(13-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN OÉ©HC’G that dimensionally, all the risk factors have declined considerably during the year. (Chart 3-13).

Chart 3-13: Banking Stability Map (2009-11) (2011-2009) ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG QGô≤à°SG áWQÉN :13-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

Fragility index 100 80 60

ProĮtbaility 40 Ineĸciency index index 20 0

Liquidity Soundness index index Dec-11 Dec-10 Dec-09

As discussed in the previous Financial Stability Review, ájô¡°ûdG á∏°ù∏°ùdG ™°Vh ”q ,≥HÉ°ùdG ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ‘ Éfô°TCG ɪc a monthly series of the Banking Stability Index (BSI) is ¢ùªÿG á«YôØdG äGô°TDƒŸG ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG QGô≤à°SG ô°TDƒŸ constructed based on the above five sub-indices to ìhGÎjh . É©dG ÓN ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ‘ á eÉ°ûdG ôWÉîŸG º«« àd á HÉ°ùdG assess the overall risks of the banking sector during Ω ∫ ≤ ∏ ≤ ≤ the year. The index lies between zero (no risk) and 100 .(ô£î∏d ≈°übC’G ó◊G) 100h (ô£N óLƒj ’) ôØ°U ÚH ô°TDƒŸG ¥É£f (maximum risk). The overall risk index which increased ΩÉY øe ÒNC’G ™HôdG ∫ÓN ÉYÉØJQGk ó¡°T …òdG ΩÉ©dG ô°TDƒŸG ¢†ØîfG óbh during the last quarter of 2010 declined sharply during Ò°ûj ɇ ,Ω2011 ΩÉY øe ∫hC’G ∞°üædG ∫ÓN GOÉMk É°VÉØîfGk Ω2010 the first half of 2011 indicating improvements in overall Gôk ≤à°ùe ô°TDƒŸG πX óbh .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ΩÉ©dG QGô≤à°S’G ø°ù– ¤EG stability of the banking sector. The index remained ™HôdG ‘ ÉØ«ØWk ÉjóYÉ°üJk ÉgÉŒGk ó¡°Th ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ mostly stagnant in the second half with a slight .(14-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ÉY øe ÒNC’G upward trend in the last quarter of 2011 (Chart 3-14). Ω

Chart 3-14: Monthly banking stability ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d …ô¡°ûdG QGô≤à°S’G ô°TDƒe :14-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ index (2010-11) (2011-2010)

49.5 45.0 40.5 36.0 31.5 27.0

BSI 22.5 18.0 13.5 9.0 4.5 0.0 Dec-09ec-09 M Mar-10ar-10 J Jun-10un-10 S Sep-10ep-10 Dec-10Dec-10 Mar-11Mar-11 J Jun-11un-11 S Sep-11ep-11 Dec-11Dec-11

Monthly BSI Average BSI -2010 Average BSI -2011

27 27 Qatar Central Bank (2009). Financial Stability Review provides the details. Available at ≈∏Y ôaƒàŸGq ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ‘ ¿CÉ°ûdG Gò¡H á°UÉÿG π«°UÉØàdG ≈∏Y ´ÓW’G øμÁ .(2009 )…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe www.qcb.gov. qa ÊhÎμd’G ™bƒŸG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 96 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

To facilitate a detailed analysis and to capture the •É≤fh ôWÉîŸG ∞∏àfl ó°UQh π°üØe π«∏– ¤EG π°UƒàdG π«¡°ùJ πLCG øe different risks and vulnerabilities of the banking sector, äGô°TDƒe øe áYƒª› á°SGQO â“ ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dÉH á°UÉÿG ∞©°†dG a set of financial stability indicators have been examined äÉÑ £àe á«Ñ J Ñ°ùJ »àdG IÎØdG ‘h .(7-3 hóL) ‹ÉŸG QGô à°S’G (Table 3-7). In the run up to Basel III requirements, the ∏ ∏ ≥ ∫ ≤ banking sector has enhanced the capital levels (Box .(10-3 QÉWEG) ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉjƒà°ùe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG RõY ,3 ∫RÉH 3-10). The capital adequacy ratios increased by more âæ°ù– ɪc .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %4 øe ÌcCÉH ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc áÑ°ùf äOGRh than 4% points during the year. The leverage ratio also Oƒ©j ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc Ö°ùf ´ÉØJQG ¿q CG ¤EG Ò°ûj ɇ á«dÉŸG á©aGôdG áÑ°ùf improved, indicating the increase in capital adequacy ∫ó©e ¢†ØîfGh .»°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ iƒà°ùe ´ÉØJQG ¤EG »°SÉ°SCG πμ°ûH ratios are mainly on account of the increase in core ¤EG É«FõLk ¢VÉØîf’G Gòg iõ©jh ,%1^7 ¤EG OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¿ƒjódG Tier-I capital. Delinquency rate declined to 1.7%. The ɇ áehó©ŸG ¿ƒjódG ¿CÉ°ûH ƒæÑ d ±ô°üŸG ÉgQó°UCG »àdG äɪ« ©àdG decline in delinquency rates are partially attributed ∑ ∏ ∏ to the instructions to the banks on bad debts which ,äɪ«∏©àdG √òg ÖLƒªÑa .¬JÉ«fGõ«e ∞«¶æàH ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d íª°S allowed the banking sector to clean up their balance IóŸ É¡JÉ«fGõ«e ±ƒ°ûc ‘ ô¡¶J »àdG áehó©ŸG ¿ƒjódG Ö£°T ∑ƒæÑ∏d øμÁ sheet. Consequent to these instructions, banks could ºàjq ¿CG ≈∏Y ,áehó©e ¿ƒjóc É¡Ø«æ°üJ ºàj ¿CG ó©H IóMGh áæ°S øe ÌcCG write off their bad debts which exist in their balance Ò°ûj ,ΩÉY πμ°ûHh .¿ƒjódG √òg πHÉ≤e %100 áÑ°ùæH äÉ°ü°üfl ÒaƒJ sheet for more than one year after it is classified as bad, ¤EG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ iƒà°ùe ´ÉØJQGh OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf ¢VÉØîfG provided a provision of 100% is made against these ¬àæ«H ÉŸ Ék ah É©dG ÓN ÒÑc °ûH ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG áeÓ°S ø°ù–q debts. Overall, low delinquent loan ratio and a high ≤ Ω ∫ πμ ≤ level of capital appear to suggest that, soundness of .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG QGô≤à°SG áWQÉN the banking sector improved considerably during the year as underlined by the banking stability map.

Controlled growth in operating expenses has enabled øe ∑ƒæÑdG øμe 𫨰ûàdG äÉahô°üe ƒ‰ ä’ó©e ‘ ºμëàdG ¿CG ‘ ∂°T’h banks to remain efficient, although their reliance ÒZ GƒeC’G Y ÉgOɪàYG OÉjORG øe ºZôdG Y É¡JAÉØc Y ®ÉØ G on volatile funds to finance asset growth appears to ∫ ≈∏ ≈∏ ≈∏ ◊ have increased in 2011. Notwithstanding the marginal ¢VÉØîf’G øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .2011 ΩÉY ‘ äGOƒLƒŸG ƒ‰ πjƒªàd Iôq ≤à°ùŸG decline in net-interest margin, the profitability Éæ°ù–k á«ëHôdG äGô°TDƒe äó¡°T ,IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg ‘É°U ‘ »°ûeÉ¡dG indicators improved on account of improvements in Ióæà°ùŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°VhCG ¿CG hóÑjh .óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe πNódG ø°ù– π°†ØH non-interest income. Liquidity conditions based on , LC’G ᣰSƒàŸG ádƒ«°ùdG áÑ°ùfh ,™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô dG áÑ°ùf øe c ¤EG both loan-to-deposit ratio and medium term liquidity π ≤ π ratio appears to have weakened as compared to the ,»YÉ£≤dG õcÎdG ó¡°T óbh .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH âØ©°V É¡fCG GóH ób previous year. Sectoral concentration, particularly to .Ú«°VÉŸG ÚeÉ©dG ióe ≈∏Y IOÉjR …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ ɪ«°S’q the real estate sector has been increasing over the past OƒLh ™e ÒÑc óM ¤EG á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH áMƒàØŸG õcGôŸG ‘É°U ™ØJQGh couple of years. Net open position in foreign exchange É°SÉ°Sk CG ôeC’G Gòg Oƒ©jh .äGOƒLƒŸG ÖfÉéH ¢üàîj Ée ‘ »HÉéjEG õ«– increased considerably with a positive bias on asset q side. This was mainly on account of the increase in Q’hódÉH Ωƒq ≤e ¬ª¶©e ¿CÉH ɪk ∏Y ,á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G IOÉjR ¤EG foreign currency credit which is denominated mostly in á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH áMƒàØŸG õcGôŸG ‘É°U ´ÉØJQG ¿q CG ºZQh ,»cÒeC’G US Dollar. Accordingly, even though the high net open ájOhófi ¿q CG ’EG ,±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG äÉÑ∏≤q J ÖÑ°ùH ∞©°V •É≤f ¤GE Ò°ûj position appears to suggest vulnerabilities on account .GOhók fi ©°†dG Gòg ©éj » jôeC’G Q’hódÉH …ô£ dG ÉjôdG §HQ of exchange rate fluctuations, in practice however, this ∞ π μ ≤ ∫ seems to be limited due to the fixed peg of Qatari Riyal to the US Dollar . The financial soundness analysis discussed above Ö°ùf π«∏ëàH √ÓYCG â°ûbƒf »àdG á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG π«∏– ∫ɪμà°SG ºàj is complemented by an analysis of banks’ coverage äÉ°ü°üîŸG ácôM ≈∏Y ±ƒbƒdG ∫ÓN øªa .∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG á«£¨àdG ratios. By providing the movement in provisions during IÌ©àŸGq ¢Vhô≤dG ¬àμ∏°S …òdG ≥jô£dG øY Iôμa øjƒμJ øμÁ ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN the year, it is able to offer an idea of the path of non- k performing loans (Table 3-8). At the aggregate level, Éæ°ù– á«£¨àdG áÑ°ùf äó¡°T ,∑ƒæÑdG ™«ªL iƒà°ùe ≈∏Yh .(8-3 ∫hóL) the coverage ratio of banks appears to have improved .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH 2011 ΩÉY ‘ in 2011 as compared to the previous year.

97 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table 3-7: Financial stability indicators (%) (%) ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G äGô°TDƒe :7-3 ∫hóL

Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 ô°Tq DƒŸG Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 15.7 16.1 20.6 ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc áÑ°ùf Tier-I capital/ Asset 11.5 11.1 12.6 äGOƒLƒŸG /»°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ Non-performing loans (NPLs)/Total loans 1.7 2.0 1.7 ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG / IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG Net NPLs to Tier-I capital 1.3 1.5 1.0 »°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ¤EG IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‘É°U Return on Average Asset (RoAA) 2.5 2.6 2.6 äGOƒLƒŸG §°Sƒàe ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG Net Interest Margin (NIM) 2.7 2.9 2.8 IóFÉØdG ¢ûeÉg ‘É°U Cost Income Ratio (CIR) 22.0 21.7 19.8 πNódG ¤EG áØ∏μàdG áÑ°ùf Funding Volatility Ratio (FVR) 59.6 50.8 54.7 πjƒªàdG ‘ äÉÑ∏≤àdG ∫ó©e Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) 109.6 102.5 111.0 ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf Assets (< 3 months)/ Liabilities äÉHƒ £ŸG / (Qƒ¡°T 3 øe bCG ) äGOƒLƒŸG 72.5 75.7 46.8 ∏ π (< 3 months) ( Qƒ¡°T 3 øe πbCG) Net open position in foreign currency/ Tier-I ÉŸG ¢SCGQ /á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH áMƒàØŸG õcGôŸG ‘É°U -3.3 -6.8 46.0 ∫ Capital »°SÉ°SC’G Consumption loans/ Private sector loans 30.0 29.7 29.9 ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ¢Vhôb / á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dG Real estate loans/ Private sector loans 22.8 26.7 33.5 ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ¢Vhôb / ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG

Table 3-8: Coverage ratio of banks in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG á«£¨àdG áÑ°ùf :8-3 ∫hóL (QR billion) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e) ™«ªL ƒæÑdG ƒæÑdG ∑ ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG ∑ Indicator ∑ƒæÑdG á«eÓ°Sq E’G Conventional á«ÑæLq C’G ô°Tq DƒŸG All banks Islamic Foreign

Provisions at beginning of the year 6.09 0.68 4.18 1.24 ΩÉ©dG ájGóH ‘ äÉ°ü°üîŸG Provisions during the year É©dG ÓN äÉ°ü°üîŸG (including foreign currency 3.83 0.29 3.14 0.39 Ω ∫ translations) (»ÑæLC’G ó≤ædG äÉ«∏ªY ∂dP ‘ ÉÃ)

Recoveries and write-offs 2.03 0.19 1.78 0.04 áehó©ŸG ¿ƒjódGh IOΰùŸG ¿ƒjódG

Provisions at end of the year 7.89 0.78 5.54 1.58 ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ‘ äÉ°ü°üîŸG

Coverage ratio (%)28 13.7 14.7 13.5 12.9 28 (%) á«£¨àdG áÑ°ùf

Box 3-10: Basel III – Preparedness of ájô£≤dG ∑ƒæÑdG OGó©à°SG ióe :10-3 QÉWEG Qatari banks 3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe ≥«Ñ£àd The Basel Committee in December 2010 issued a rule text á«ŸÉ©dG ᫪«¶æàdG ÒjÉ©ŸG π°üØJ »àdG óYGƒ≤dG 2010 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ ∫RÉH áæ÷ äQó°UCG which presents the details of global regulatory standards on ,2011 ƒ«fƒj ô¡°T ‘ ,≥M’ âbh ‘ ”q ɪc .á«aô°üŸG ádƒ«°ùdGh ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ∫ƒM bank capital adequacy and liquidity. Later in June 2011, a revised rule text has been issued taking into consideration ≈∏Y âjóHCG »àdG äɶMÓŸGh π©ØdG OhOQ QÉÑàY’G ÚY ‘ òNCÉJ áë≤æe óYGƒb QGó°UEG the feedback on the original text. The rule text, widely known πªY QÉWEG º°SÉH ™°SGh ¥É£f ≈∏Y ±ô©j …òdG - ¢üædG Gòg »£¨jh .»∏°UC’G ¢üædG as the Basel III framework, covers both micro-prudential •É≤ædG πª°ûJh .»∏μdGh »Fõ÷G OÉ°üàb’G iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ájRGÎM’G ô°UÉæ©dG ,-3 ∫RÉH and macro- prudential elements. The major highlights of

28 28 Coverage Ratio = (Equity capital + Loan loss reserves – NPLs)/Asset. .äGOƒLƒŸG/(IÌ©àŸGq ¢Vhô≤dG – ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN »WÉ«àMG + ¬H ºgÉ°ùŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ) = á«£¨àdG áÑ°ùf

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 98 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

the Basel III framework include higher and better-quality ,ôWÉîª∏d ÈcCG á«£¨Jh ,π°†aCG á«Yƒf GP ≈∏YCG ∫Ée ¢SCGQ 3 ∫RÉH πªY QÉWE’ á«°ù«FôdGq capital, better risk coverage, and introduction of two global .(∫hóL) á«ŸÉ©dG ádƒ«°ùdG ÒjÉ©e øe øjQÉ«©e ≥«Ñ£Jh liquidity standards (Table).

In February 2011, QCB advised the domestic banks to ÇOÉÑe á°SGQO á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG øe …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Ö∏W ,2011 ôjGÈa ô¡°T ‘ study the principles and standards of Basel III and furnish ∂dPh É¡«∏Y ¢Uƒ°üæŸG á∏¡ŸG øª°V ±ô°üŸG ¤EG º¡JɶMÓe ™aQh 3 ∫RÉH ÒjÉ©eh their comments to the central bank within a stipulated time so as to enable QCB to coordinate with domestic banks in Ée áaô©e πLCG øeh .É¡≤«Ñ£J á«Ø«c ‘ É¡©e ≥«°ùæàdG øe …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Úμªàd this respect. In order to examine whether banking sector ∫RÉH óYGƒb É¡JOóM »àdG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ÒjÉ©e á«Ñ∏J ≈∏Y GQOÉbk ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¿Éc GPEG could meet the capital standards set out by Basel III rule ƒëædG ≈∏Y á«dhC’G èFÉàædG ¢ü«î∏J øμÁh .Oó°üdG Gòg ‘ á°SGQO ±ô°üŸG iôLCG ,3 text, an in-house study was conducted. The preliminary :‹ÉàdG findings can be summarized as follows:

1. Overall, all the domestic banks are in a position to ‘ 3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe á«Ñ∏J ≈∏Y IQOÉb ΩÉY πμ°ûH á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ™«ªL Èà©J .1 meet the Basel III requirements on common equity capital ¢SCGQ iƒà°ùe ´ÉØJQ’ Gô¶fk 2012 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH …OÉ©dG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ Ö°ùæH ≥∏©àj Ée ratios by end 2012, owing to high level of common equity capital of the banking sector. .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ …OÉ©dG ∫ÉŸG

2. By end-2015, assuming a static scenario of capital ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGôH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ôq ≤à°ùe ƒjQÉæ«°S ¢VGÎaÉHh ,2015 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH.2 (i.e., capital remains at December 2011 levels while there ƒ°UC’G ‘ ƒ‰ ™e 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ ¬ é°S …òdG iƒà°ùŸG Y ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ßaÉëj …CG) is a 10% asset growth), out of 10 local banks, one bank’s ∫ ∏ ≈∏ ∫ total capital ratio appears to decline below the prescribed ¢UÉÿG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ‹ÉªLEG áÑ°ùf ¿q CG hóÑj ,á«∏fi ∑ƒæH 10 π°UCG øeh ,(%10 ≠∏Ñj total capital ratio of 10.625% (10% by QCB plus the capital %10^625 ≠∏ÑJ »àdGh IQô≤ŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ‹ÉªLEG áÑ°ùf øe πbCG â°†ØîfG ób óMGh ∂æÑH conservation buffer of 0.625%). …òdG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ßØM »WÉ«àMG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG øe IQô≤ŸG %10) .(%0^625 ≠∏Ñj 3. In a dynamic scenario (i.e., where banks contribute É¡MÉHQCG øe %10 áÑ°ùæH ∑ƒæÑdG ºgÉ°ùJ å«M) »μ«eÉæjO ƒjQÉæ«°S ¢VGÎaÉHh .3 10% of their profit as retained earnings, with a RoA as at æH ô¡XCG ,(‹É G âbƒdG ‘ ƒg ɪc ƒ°UC’G Y óFÉ©dG ¿ƒ jh Iõéàfi ìÉHQCÉc present), stress to maintain the minimum capital level of ∂ ◊ ∫ ≈∏ μ 11.25% was observed only for one bank by end 2016. %11^25 ≠∏Ñj …òdG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGôd ≈fOC’G iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G ‘ áHƒ©°üdG ¢†©H óMGh Judged from this standpoint, the recent trend by the .2016 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ banking sector to improve the capital base by rights issues GôNk Dƒe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG óªàYG …òdG ÉŒ’G …ODƒj ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe , Ñ°S ɇ ÉbÓ£fGk and increasing the proportion of retained earnings is ≤ √ √ ≥ expected to provide all domestic banks with a comfortable ¤EG ,IõéàëŸG ìÉHQC’G áÑ°ùf IOÉjRh ¥ƒ≤◊G QGó°UEG ∫ÓN øe ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ IóYÉb Ú°ùëàd capital cushion to meet the Basel III standards. .3 ∫RÉH ÒjÉ©e á«Ñ∏àd ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGôH ≥∏q ©àj Ée ‘ á«aÉμdG ájɪ◊ÉH á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG áaÉc ójhõJ References ™LGôŸG Bank for International Settlements (2011). Basel III: A global á«aô°üe º¶fh ƒæÑd »ŸÉY »ª«¶æJ QÉWEG :3 RÉH .(2011) á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG æH regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking ∑ ∫ ∂ systems. BIS: Basel [June] . ƒ«fƒj] ∫RÉH :á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH .áfhôe ÌcCG

Table: Basel II and Basel III capital requirements 3 ∫RÉHh 2 ∫RÉH Ö°ùëH ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àe :∫hóL (Percent of risk weighted assets) (ôWÉîŸG ¿GRhCÉH áëLôŸG ∫ƒ°UCÓd ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG) »∏μdG •ƒëàq ∏d ‘É°VE’G πNGóàdG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àe Additional macro-pruden- Capital requirements tial overlap äÉÑ àdG á¡LGƒŸ »WÉ«àMG …OÉ©dG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ´ƒª› ∏≤ Common equity Tier-I capital Total capital ájQhódG Counter cyclical buffer ßØM »WÉ«àMG ≈fOC’G ó◊G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »eGõdE’G ≈fOC’G ó◊G »eGõdE’G ≈fOC’G ó◊G »eGõdE’G »eGõdE’G Minimum Conservation Required Minimum Required Minimum Required Required buffer Basel II 2 ∫RÉH 2.0 .. .. 4.0 .. 8.0 .. .. Basel III 3 ∫RÉH 4.5 2.5 7.0 6.0 8.5 8.0 10.5 0 – 2.5

In December 2011, Qatar Central Bank raised the risk ôWÉîŸG »WÉ«àMG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ™aQ ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ reserve (a general provision on standard loans to non- π°ü«d (áeÉ©dG ÒZ äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d ájQÉ«©ŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ∫ƒM ΩÉY ¢ü°üfl) public entities) to 2% as at end-December 2012 and óbh .2013 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ %2^5 h ,2012 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ %2 ¤EG further to 2.5% as at end-December 2013. It would be instructive in this context to examine the provisioning äÉ°ü°üîŸÉH á°UÉÿG äÉ°SQɪŸG á°SGQO ¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘ ó«ØŸG øe ¿ƒμj practices in GCC countries (Box 3-11). .(11-3 QÉWEG) »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘

99 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Box 3-11: Loan loss provisioning in ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üq fl :11-3 QÉWEG GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ The loan loss provisioning norms in GCC are based ≈∏Y »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üq fl ÒjÉ©e õμJôJ on international best practices, with certain country- .(∫hóL) ¿Gó∏ÑdG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y äÉaÓàN’G ¢†©H OƒLh ™e á«dhódGq äÉ°SQɪŸG π°†aCG level variations (Table). Specific and general provisions for loan losses are made on the basis of a continuous ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùîH á°UÉÿG áeÉ©dGh IOóëŸGq äÉ°ü°üîŸG ™°Vh ºàjh appraisal of the lending portfolio in most cases, taking IÈÿG QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e ,ä’É◊G º¶©e ‘ ¢VGôbE’G á¶ØëŸ ôªà°ùŸG º««≤àdG into account historical experience and current economic äGQÉeE’Gh âjƒμdG πãe) ¿Gó∏ÑdG ¢†©H iódh .‹É◊G …OÉ°üàb’G ™°VƒdGh á«îjQÉàdG situation. Some countries (Kuwait and UAE) also have an IOóëŸG) iƒà°ùŸG ¿hO ¢Vhô dGh ájQÉ«©ŸG ¢Vhô dG ÚH ìhGÎJ áÄa (IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG in-between category between standard and sub-standard ≤ ≤ loans (labeled as “special mention” in case of Kuwait and á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ádÉM ‘ "áÑbGôŸG áªFÉb"h âjƒμdG ádÉM ‘ "¢UÉN ¬jƒæJ" É¡fCG ≈∏Y “watch-list” in case of UAE), provisioning for which is at the ∫É◊G ƒg ɪc) IQGOEÓd ájôjó≤àdG á£∏°ùdG Ö°ùëH äÉ°ü°üîŸGq ¿ƒμJ å«M (IóëàŸG discretion of management (e.g., Kuwait) or not warranting äGQÉeE’Éc) äÉ°ü°üfl …CG É¡jód ¢ù«d »àdG hCG (∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y âjƒμdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH any provisioning at all (e.g., UAE). Specific provisions ¢Vhô dÉH á°UÉÿG IOóëŸGq äÉ°ü°üîŸG ìhGÎJh .( ÉãŸG «Ñ°S Y IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG for impaired loans varies generally varies from 20-50% ≤ ∫ π ≈∏ depending on the periodicity for which a loan is non- Oó–h Ì©àŸGq ¢Vô≤∏d ájQhódG äGÒ¨àdG Ö°ùëH %50-20 ÚH ΩÉY πμ°ûH ¬ÄjOôdG performing; for doubtful as well as loss loans, provisions are ÚH Iô°SÉÿG ¢Vhô≤dGh É¡∏«°ü– ‘ ∑ƒμ°ûŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH äÉ°ü°üîŸG specified at 50-100%. Most countries also have a system ¢†©H ™e %2-1 ÚH ìhGÎJ áeÉY äÉ°ü°üfl Ωɶf ∫hódG º¶©e iódh .%100-50 of general provisions, ranging from 1-2%, with exceptions being allowed for government loans (as in Qatar) as well ,(ô£b ‘ ∫É◊G ƒg ɪc) á«eƒq μ◊G ¢Vhô≤dG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH É¡H íª°ùj »àdG äGAÉæãà°S’G as differential (general) provisions for personal and non- ɪc) á«°üî°ûdG ÒZh á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dÉH ≥∏©àJ »àdG áeÉ©dG äÉ°ü°üîŸG øY Ó°†ak personal loans (as in Oman). .(¿ÉªY áæ£∏°S ‘ ∫É◊G ƒg References ™LGôŸG M.Hussain, M.M.Islam, A. Gunasekaran and K. Moskooki .(2002) K. Moskooki h M.Hussain, M.M.Islam,A. Gunasekaran (2002). Accounting standards and practices of financial .»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d á«Ñ°SÉëŸG äÉ°SQɪŸGh ÒjÉ©ŸG institutions in GCC countries. Managerial Auditing Journal 17, 350-62. .62-350 ,17 ájQGOE’G á©LGôŸG á∏› T. Beck, A. Demirguc Kunt and R. Levine (2000). A New IójóL äÉfÉ«H IóYÉb .(2000) R. Levineh T. Beck, A. Demirguc Kunt Database on Financial Development and Structure. World 605-597 ,14 ,‹hódG ∂æÑ∏d …OÉ°üàb’G ôjô≤àdG .‹ÉŸG πμ«¡dGh á«dÉŸG ᫪æàdG ∫ƒM Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605 (Updated November .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG æÑdG .(2010 Ȫaƒf ‘ áë æe áî°ùf) 2010). World Bank: Washington DC. ∂ ≤ T.A.Zoubi and O. Al-Khazali (2007). Empirical testing of ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üîŸ »ÑjôŒ QÉÑàNG .(2007) O. Al-Khazali h T.A.Zoubi the loss provisions of banks in the GCC region. Managerial .11-500 ,33 …QGOE’G πjƒªàdG .»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG Finance 33, 500-11. .á«æ©ŸG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üª∏d á«fhÎμd’G ™bGƒŸG Websites of respective central banks. World Bank (2002). Bank loan loss and provisioning ¿Gó∏H ‘ äÉ°ü°üîŸG äÉ°SQɇh ∑ƒæÑdG ¢Vhôb ôFÉ°ùN .(2002) ‹hódG ∂æÑdG practices in selected countries. Finance Forum (June), .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh ,(ƒ«fƒj) ‹ÉŸG ióàæŸG .IQÉàfl Washington DC.

Ω óæÑdG øjôëÑdG âjƒμdG ¿ÉªY ô£b ájOƒ©°ùdG äGQÉeE’G No Item Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE ¢Vhô≤∏d »ª°SQ ∞jô©J IÌ©àŸG º©f º©f º©f º©f º©f º©f 1 Formal definition of Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes non-performing loans ¢Vhô≤dG ∞«æ°üàd ‹hCG Ωɶf (ΩÉjC’G OóY) 2 Primary system for loan classification (number of days) áÑbGôe áªFÉb / ¢UÉN ¬jƒæJ º©f º©f Special mention / watch ...... Yes Yes list ; iƒà°ùŸG ¿hO OGôaCG (äÉ°ù°SDƒe) 90 90 90 90 90-179 90 (individuals Sub-standard 180 (corporate É¡ «°ü– ‘ ƒ °ûe á£∏°ùdG Ö°ùëH ájôjó àdG ᣠ°ùdG Ö°ùëH ∏ ∑ μ ájôjó àdG 180 270 180 180-364 ≤ ∏ Doubtful ≤ Discretion Discretion IQÉ°ùN á£∏°ùdG Ö°ùëH ájôjó àdG ᣠ°ùdG Ö°ùëH ájôjó àdG 360 360 360 365 ≤ ∏ Loss ≤ Discretion Discretion

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 100 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Ω óæÑdG øjôëÑdG âjƒμdG ¿ÉªY ô£b ájOƒ©°ùdG äGQÉeE’G No Item Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G ó◊G (%) ¢Vhô dG äÉ°ü°üfl 3 ≤ Minimum provisioning requirements for loans iƒà°ùŸG ¿hO 50 20 25 5-25 25 25 Sub-standard É¡ «°ü– ‘ ƒ °ûe ∏ ∑ μ »eGõdE’G 50 50 25-60 50 50 Doubtful Required IQÉ°ùN »eGõdE’G 100 100 60-100 100 100 Loss Required áeÉY É MCG º©f º©f º©f º©f º©f º©f 4 Ω μ General provisions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ¢Vhô≤dG) 2 á«°üî°ûdG %1^5 øY π≤j ’ Ée áÑ°ùædÉH) 2 (AGOC’G á≤ëà°ùŸG äÓ«¡°ùàdG øe 2 á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùà∏d á«fɪàF’G (outstanding AÉæãà°SÉH ,Iô°TÉÑŸG performing äÓ«¡°ùàdG AGƒ°S ,ájOÉ©dG ƒ°UC’G øe %1^5 personal áMƒæªŸG á«fɪàF’G ∫ ÒZ hCG ájó ædG ôWÉîŸG ¿GRhCÉH áëLôŸG (%) ÑŸG ≤ loans) áeƒ ë d ≠∏ .. (ájó ædG μ ∏ 1% (2 RÉH Ö°ùëH) Amount (percent) ≤ Not less ∫ 2 (for regular 1.5% of RWA (as ¢Vhô dG) 1 than 1.5% of credit fa- ≤ per Basel II) iôNC’G direct credit cilities, both (AGOC’G á ëà°ùŸG facilities, except cash and ≤ 1 credit facili- non-cash) (outstanding ties granted to performing government other loans)

“..” not applicable/ not available ôaƒàeq ÒZ/≥Ñ£æj ’ ".."

As part of the Basel III implementation, the Bank for ábQh á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH ô°ûf ,3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe ò«ØæJ øe Aõéc International Settlements (BIS) published a working äÉÑ∏≤àdG á¡LGƒŸ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »WÉ«àMG ≥«Ñ£J ∫ƒM äÉ¡«LƒJ øª°†àJq πªY paper providing guidance for implementing a countercyclical capital buffer (CCB), an idea which has ∂dP ‘ Éà ,á«dhódG äɪ¶æŸG øe ójó©dG É¡MÎbG Iôμa »gh ,ájQhódG been proposed by several international organizations, áHÉbôdG áÄ«g) ±Gô°TE’G AÉ°SDhQh ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG »¶aÉfi áYƒª› including the Group of Central Bank Governors and ¢SCGQ äÉ«WÉ«àMGq ±ó¡Jh .ÉgÒZh øjô°û©dG áYƒª›h (∫RÉH áæ÷ ‘ Heads of Supervision (the oversight body of the Basel ôFÉ°ùÿG øe ‘ô°üŸG RÉ¡÷G ájɪM ¤EG ájQhódG äÉÑ∏≤àdG á¡LGƒŸ ∫ÉŸG Committee) and the Group of Twenty (G-20), among others. In effect, CCBs are intended to protect the äGÎa ∫ÓN ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ AÉæÑH ∑ƒæÑdG ΩGõdEG ∫ÓN øe á∏ªàëŸG á«∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG banking system against future potential losses by äÉYÉ≤a ,áeÉî°V πbC’G ≈∏Y hCG ,∫ɪàMG AGƒàM’ ∂dPh ,…OÉ°üàb’G ™°SƒàdG requiring banks to build capital during periods of ‘ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ IOÉjR ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG Èéj ’ »WÉ«àM’G Gòg ¿q CG ɪc .¿ÉªàF’G economic expansion, so as to contain the likelihood, or ó◊ÉH ΩGõàd’G ºàj ’CG íLôjq ÉeóæY á«JGƒŸG ÒZ ájOÉ°üàb’G ´É°VhC’G πX at least the magnitude, of credit bubbles. Further, the q buffer would not compel banks to raise capital under »WÉ«àMÉH ¢UÉÿG ‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG ôaƒjh .∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G unfavorable economic situations when minimum capital áaÉ°VE’ÉH) ájɪ◊G øe áãdÉK á≤ÑW ájQhódG äÉÑ∏≤àdG á¡LGƒŸ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ requirements are most likely to be violated. The CCB »WÉ«àMGh ,(¤hC’G á≤Ñ£dG) ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àe øe ≈fOC’G ó◊G ¤EG add-on provides a third layer of protection (in addition ≈fOC’G ó◊ÉH ΩGõàd’G ΩóY …ODƒj óbh .(á«fÉãdG á≤Ñ£dG) ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ßØM to the minimum capital requirement (first layer) and q the conservation buffer (second layer). A violation of ¢SCGQ IOÉjR πãe »∏«¨°ûJ πNóJ ¤EG (¤hC’G á≤Ñ£dG) ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ the minimum capital requirement (the first layer) could ¤hC’G á≤Ñ£dÉH Ωõà∏J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG ¿ƒμJh .»eGõdEG πμ°ûH ádƒ«°ùdG hCG ∫ÉŸG trigger operational intervention, such as mandated øμdh ,ìÉHQC’G ™jRƒJ ≈∏Y IQó≤dG IOhófi ,á«fÉãdG á≤Ñ£dÉH Ωõà∏J ’h Ö°ùëa capital raises or even a forced liquidity event. Banks Ö∏≤q àj ,Ú«dhC’G Úà≤Ñ£∏d ÉaÓNh .á«∏«¨°ûàdG á«MÉædG ≈∏Y ôKq Dƒj ’ ∂dP in violation of the second layer, but in compliance with the first layer, would be limited in their ability to ¢VôØjh OÉ°üàb’ÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ájQhódG äÉÑ∏≤àdG á¡LGƒŸ »WÉ«àM’G Gòg

101 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

distribute earnings, but not otherwise operationally …OÉ°üàb’G ¢TÉ©àf’G äGÎa ∫ÓN ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGôH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ É«aÉ°Vk EG ÉWô°Tk restricted. Unlike the first two layers, this buffer would ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGôd ≈fOC’G ó◊G ™e ±hô¶dG øe ±ôX …CG ‘ ¢VQÉ©àj ’h ,Ö°ùëa fluctuate counter-cyclically in relation to the economy …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe iôLCG óbh .Úà HÉ°ùdG Úà Ñ£dG Ö°ùëH ܃ £ŸG and would impose an additional capital requirement ≤ ≤ ∏ only during an economic upswing. Under no ¢SCGQ »WÉ«àMG √ôaƒj …òdG ‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG ádCÉ°ùe ∫ƒM á«∏NGO á°SGQO circumstance it is likely to interfere with the minimum ´ÓW’G øμÁh ,ô£b ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d ájQhódG äÉÑ∏≤àdG á¡LGƒŸ ∫ÉŸG capital otherwise required by the previous two layers. .12-3 QÉWE’G ‘ á°SGQódG èFÉàf ≈∏Y The QCB conducted an in-house study to explore the issue of CCB add-on for the banking sector in Qatar and the results are set out in Box 3-12.

Box 3-12: Countercyclical capital buffer á¡LGƒŸ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »WÉ«àMG √ôaƒjq …òdG ‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG :12-3 QÉWEG ájQhódGq äÉÑ∏≤q àdG We proceed on the lines indicated by the BIS (2010) .(2010) á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH á≤«Kh É¡JOóMq »àdG äGƒ£ÿÉH Éæ∏ªY ‘ ó°Tΰùf document. First, we calculate the aggregate private sector credit-to- »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‹ÉªLEG áÑ°ùf ÜÉ°ùàMÉH ’hk CG Ωƒ≤æa GDP ratio, where both variables are expressed in nominal .᫪°S’G ᪫≤dÉH ∂dPh ,‹ÉªLE’G terms. Second, we calculate the private credit-to-GDP gap. The »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G Iƒéa ÜÉ°ùàMÉH É«fÉKk Ωƒ≤f ºK gap is calculated as :‹ÉàdG ƒëædG ≈∏Y IƒéØdG ÜÉ°ùàMG ºàjh .‹ÉªLE’G , where Trend is a simple way of Ée A»°T ôjó≤àd ᣫ°ùH á∏«°Sh √ÉŒ’G Èà©j å«M √ÉŒ’G - áÑ°ùædG = IƒéØdG approximating something that can be seen as sustainable »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G áÑ°ùæd ΩGóà°ùe §°Sƒàe ¬fCG ≈∏Y ¬«dEG ô¶æj ¿CG øμÁ average of the ratio of credit-to-GDP, based on the k historical experience of the given economy. The Hodrick ∂jQOƒg" Î∏a Ωóîà°ùjh .Ú©ŸGq OÉ°üàbÓd á«îjQÉàdGq áHôéàdG ¤EG GOÉæà°SG ,‹ÉªLE’G Prescott (HP) filter is employed to calculate the trend, using .( ) áÑ°SÉæe áª∏©e ΩGóîà°SÉH ∂dPh √ÉŒ’G ÜÉ°ùàM’("äƒμ°ùjôH a suitable smoothing parameter ( ).

Third, we transform the credit-to-GDP gap into the guide ‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG ¤EG ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G Iƒéa πjƒëàH ÉãdÉKk Ωƒ≤fh buffer add-on (BUF). The size of the BUF, as percent of risk- ƒ°UC’G øe ájƒÄe áÑ°ùf QÉÑàYÉH ,BUF Ñjh .(BUF) »WÉ«àM’G ôaƒj …òdG weighted assets, is zero, when the Gap is below a certain ∫ √ ≠∏ √ threshold (L). It then increases with the Gap until the buffer ™e OGOõj ºKq ,(L) Ú©e óMq øe πbCG IƒéØdG ¿ƒμJ ÉeóæY ôØ°U ,ôWÉîŸÉH áëLôŸG reaches its maximum level, when the Gap exceeds the ≈∏YC’G óq ◊G IƒéØdG RhÉéàJ ÉeóæY ≈°übC’G ó◊G ¤EG »WÉ«àM’G π°üj ¿CG ¤EG IƒéØdG upper threshold (H). The lower and upper thresholds, L and áYô°Sh â«bƒJ ójó– ‘ äGQÉÑàY’G ºgCG øe (H) h (L) ¿Gó◊G Èà©jh .(H) H, are the most important considerations in determining H L k the timing and speed of the adjustment of the guide 10 = h 2 = ôaƒj ,á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æÑd É≤ahh .‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG Gòg πjó©J buffer add-on. According to BIS, L=2 and H=10 provide a .ájƒbh ádƒ≤©e äÉØ°UGƒe reasonable and robust specification.

Therefore, setting L=2 means that when: :ÉeóæY ¬fCG 2 = L ójó– »æ©j ,∂dòd

.ôØ°U = BUF ,%2> (√ÉŒ’G) – 100 * ¿ÉªàF’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG Likewise, setting H=10 means that when: :ÉeóæY ¬fCG 10 = H ójó– »æ©jh .≈°übC’G ó◊G= BUF ,%10< (√ÉŒ’G) – 100 * ¿ÉªàF’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG

Based on these considerations, we compute the BUF for .ô£b ádhO ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d BUF ÜÉ°ùàMÉH Ωƒ≤f ,äGQÉÑàY’G √òg ≈∏Y AÉæH the banking sector in Qatar.

As regards in the HP filter, for quarterly data - the »gh – á«∏°üØdG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH HP Î∏a ‘ `H ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG frequency most often used for business-cycle analysis - »æª°V ´ÉªLEG ∑Éæg - ájOÉ°üàb’G äGQhódG π«∏ëàd ÉÑdÉZk áeóîà°ùŸG IÎØdG there is an implicit consensus in employing the value of ÚH º« dG ìhGÎJ ,ájƒæ°ùdG äÉfÉ«Ñ d áÑ°ùædÉHh .1600 ᪫b Góîà°SG Y 1600. For annual data, values range from 6.25 (Ravn ≤ ∏ Ω ≈∏ and Uhlig, 2002) to 400 (Backus and Kehoe, 1992; Baxter ,1992 ,Kehoeh Backus) 400 ¤EG (2002 ,Uhlig h Ravn) 6^25 and King, 1999; European Central Bank 2000). For the ¢VGôZC’h .(2000 ,»HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ,1999 ,Kingh Baxter purposes of our analysis, we compute the gap using two º«b øe Úફb ΩGóîà°SÉH IƒéØdG ÜÉ°ùàMÉH Ωƒ≤f ,¬H Ωƒ≤f …òdG π«∏ëàdG values of (i.e., 6.25 and 100), since most other proposed äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH áMÎ≤ŸG iôNC’G º«≤dG º¶©e ¿CG Éà (100h 6^25 …CG) values for annual data lie within this range. .¥É£ædG Gòg øª°V ™≤J ájƒæ°ùdG The analysis covers the period 1981-2010. This is because äɶMÓŸG ΩAÓj ’ HP Î∏a ¿CG ±hô©ŸG øe ¬fC’ 2010-1981 IÎa π«∏ëàdG »£¨jh the HP filter is often known to have a bad fit for the first and á °ù °S ¢SÉ°SCG Y Î ØdG á °ù °S ™°VƒH Éæªb ,á °ûŸG òg Öæéàdh .IÒNC’Gh ¤hC’G last observations. To circumvent this problem, we construct ∏ ∏ ≈∏ ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏μ √ the filtered series on the basis of a longer series (1980- .áæ«©dGq IÎa øª°†àJq (2011-1980) ∫ƒWCG á«æeRq 2011) subsuming the sample period.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 102 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

The charts indicate that there are several years when the ìhGÎjh IOóëŸGq Ohó◊G øY IƒéØdG É¡«a ójõJ äGƒæ°S IóY ¤EG ÊÉ«ÑdG º°SôdG Ò°ûjh gap would be in excess of the defined thresholds and Gòg ∞bƒàjhq ôWÉîŸG ¿GRhCÉH áëLôŸGq ∫ƒ°UC’G øe %2^5 h ôØ°U ÚH ∂dòd Ék ≤ah BUF accordingly, the BUF would range from 0-2.5% of risk weighted assets (RWA), depending on the magnitude of â¨∏Hh 6^25 = â¨∏H ,∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y 2010 ΩÉY »Øa .IƒéØdG √òg ºéM ≈∏Y ôeC’G the gap. For example, in 2010 with =6.25, the gap is ∂dòd Ék ≤ah ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »WÉ«àMG √ôaƒjq …òdG ‘É°VE’G ¿Éª°†dG πé°Shq %4^2 IƒéØdG 4.2% and accordingly, the CCB add-on would be 0.56% of .ôWÉîŸÉH áëLôŸG ƒ°UC’G øe %0^56 risk-weighted assets. ∫

References ™LGôŸG Bank for International Settlements (2010). Countercyclical á¡LGƒŸ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ »WÉ«àMÉH ¢UÉÿG ìGÎb’G .(2010) á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH capital buffer proposal: Consultative Document BIS; Basel .(ƒ«dƒj) 1 ∫RÉH ;á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH ,ájQÉ°ûà°S’G á≤«KƒdG :ájQhódG äÉÑ∏≤àdG (July). P.J. Kehoe D.K.Backus D.K.Backus and P.J. Kehoe (1992). International evidence á«îjQÉàdG ¢üFÉ°üÿG ≈∏Y ‹hódG π«dódG .(1992) h on the historical properties of business cycles. American .88-864 ,82 ,»μjôeC’G …OÉ°üàb’G ôjô≤àdG .ájOÉ°üàb’G äGQhó∏d Economic Review, 82, 864-88. …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG .(ôHƒàcCG) ájô¡°ûdG Iô°ûædG ,(2000) »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG European Central Bank (2000), Monthly Bulletin (October). .äQƒØ fGôa :»HhQhC’G ECB: Frankfurt. μ M. Ravn and H. Uhlig (2002). On adjusting the HP-filter for ôjô≤J .äɶMÓŸG ôJGƒàd HP Î∏a §Ñ°V ∫ƒM .(2002) H. Uhligh M. Ravn the frequency of observations. Review of Economics and .80-371 ,84 AÉ°üME’Gh OÉ°üàb’G Statistics 84, 371-80. á«Ñjô≤àdG äGÎ∏ØdG :ájOÉ°üàb’G äGQhódG ¢SÉ«b .(1999)R.G.King h M.Baxter M.Baxter and R.G.King (1999). Measuring business cycles: Approximate band-pass filters for economic time series. .93-575 ,81 AÉ°üME’Gh OÉ°üàb’G ôjô≤J .ájOÉ°üàb’G á«æeõdG π°SÓ°ù∏d Review of Economics and Statistics 81, 575-93.

In order to complement the regular assessments of QGô≤à°S’ÉH á°UÉÿG ±hÉîª∏d ᪶àæŸG º««≤àdG äÉ«∏ªY ∫ɪμà°SG πLCG øeh financial stability concerns based on balance sheet äGP á«FÉ°üME’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG øe ÉgÒZh á«fGõ«ŸG äÉfÉ«H ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk ‹ÉŸG data and other relevant statistical information, a Risk ƒæÑdG ô¶f äÉ¡Lh øe ócCÉà d "ôWÉîŸG GQOEG í°ùe" AGôLEG ”q ,á °üdG Perception Survey was conducted to ascertain the ∑ ∏ ∑ ∏ views of commercial banks regarding the system-wide á°UÉÿG äÉ©bƒàdGh πμc ΩɶædG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ôWÉîŸG ¿CÉ°ûH ájQÉéàdG risks and prospects for financial stability in Qatar. The ‘ èFÉàædG ¢üî∏e ≈∏Y ´ÓW’G øμÁ .ô£b ádhO ‘ ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’ÉH summary results are provided in (Box 3-13). .(13-3 QÉWEG)

Box 3-13: Risk Perception Survey ôWÉîŸG ∑GQOEG í°ùe :13-3 QÉWEG The survey was conducted among all the 18 banks ≠∏Ñj »àdGh …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe á°üNôŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ™«ªL ≈∏Y í°ùŸG AGôLEG ” (including the development bank) licensed and supervised .(᫪æàdG ∂æH É¡«a ÉÃ) Ék μæH 18 ÉgOóY by Qatar Central Bank.

A set of 12 major macroeconomic risks, which could have a »àdG á«°ù«FôdG »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G ôWÉfl øe Gô£Nk 12 øe áfƒμe áYƒª› ójó– ” negative impact on the domestic economy were identified. √òg ∞«æ°üJ ∑ƒæÑdG øe Ö∏Wo ºK øeh .…ô£≤dG OÉ°üàb’G ≈∏Y ÉÑk ∏°S ôKq DƒJ ¿CG øμÁ Banks were advised to rank these risks in increasing order of severity. In addition, views were also elicited from banks ôWÉîŸG √òg âfÉc GPEG Ée ∫ƒM É¡jCGQ AGóHEG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,IQƒ£ÿG å«M øe ôWÉîŸG on whether these risks would increase, decrease or remain ‹É◊G ΩÉ©dGh (2013) ΩOÉ≤dG ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN Ò«¨J ¿hO ≈≤ÑJ hCG ¢†ØîæJ hCG OGOõJ ±ƒ°S the same during the next year (2013), current year (2012) ´É£ dG AGQBG dòc á°SGQódG â ª°T ɪc .(2011) »°VÉŸG É©dG ™e áfQÉ e (2012) vis-à-vis last year (2011). The survey also elicited the views ≤ ∂ ∏ Ω ≤ of the banking sector on individual risks like credit, liquidity, á«∏«¨°ûàdG ôWÉîŸGh ¥ƒ°ùdGh ádƒ«°ùdGh ¿ÉªàF’ÉH á°UÉÿG ôWÉîŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ‘ô°üŸG market and operational risk during the three year time èFÉàædG ¢üî∏e √ÉfOCG Oôjh .2013 ΩÉY ¤EG 2011 ΩÉY øe äGƒæ°S çÓãdG IÎa ∫ÓN period, 2011-13 at a disaggregated level. The key findings of the survey are summarized below and the results are set ‹É◊G ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á«°ù«FQ ôWÉfl çÓK ºgC’ ‹RÉæàdG Ö«JÎdÉH í°ùª∏d á«°ù«FôdG out in decreasing order of participants perceiving the risk .ácQÉ°ûŸG ∑ƒæÑdG É¡JCÉJQG ɪc to be one of the three major risks during the current year.

103 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

• Systemic risk from regional unrest is opined to be ÉgQÉÑàYÉH ᫪«∏bE’G äÉHGô£°V’G øY áªLÉædG á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG ¤EG ô¶fo • the major factor impacted the banking sector during 2011. áÑ°ùf ¿CG ºZQh .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y ôKq CG …òdG »°ù«FôdG πeÉ©dG Even though the percentage of respondents ranking this risk factor among the top three risks declined as compared çÓãdG ôWÉîŸG ÚH øe πeÉ©dG Gòg ∞«æ°üàH GƒeÉb øjòdG ´Ó£à°S’G ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûŸG to 2011, it was still rated as a major risk, both this year and øe ô£ÿG Gòg ∞«æ°üJ ” ób ¬fCG ’EG ,2011 ΩÉY ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH â°†ØîfG ób ,á«°ù«FôdGq the next. .AGƒ°S óM ≈∏Y πÑ≤ŸG ΩÉ©dGh ΩÉ©dG Gò¡d á«°ù«FôdG ôWÉîŸG ÚH • Although deterioration in credit quality was rated á«°ù«FôdG çÓãdG ôWÉîŸG øª°V ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL QƒgóJ ô£N ∞«æ°üJ ºZQ• among the three prominent risks during 2012 and 2013, ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ‹ÉªLEG ¿CG ∑ƒæÑdG á«ÑdÉZ äCGQ ó≤a ,2013h 2012 »eÉY ∫ÓN the majority of the banks however felt that overall credit risk in 2012 and 2013 would be lower as compared to 2011. .2011 ΩÉY ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH πbCG ¿ƒμà°S 2013h 2012 »eÉY

• Regarding liquidity risks, funding issues arising from á∏b øY áªLÉædG πjƒªàdG πFÉ°ùe »JCÉJ ,ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉîà ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ÉeCG• liquidity dry up in foreign interbank market tops the major "IOÉjR" ™e á«°ù«FôdG ô£ÿG πeGƒY ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG risk factors with an ‘increase’ among banks regarding the perception of the risk, going forward. .πÑ≤à°ùŸG ‘ ô£ÿG Gòg ∑GQOEÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH

• At the disaggregated level, respondents still ¿q CG ¿hôj ´Ó£à°S’G ‘ ¿ƒcQÉ°ûŸG ∫Gõj ’ ,»∏«°üØàdG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ÉeCG• perceive domestic interest rate shock as one of the major É¡¡LGƒj »àdG á«°ù«FôdG ôWÉîŸG óMCG πμ°ûJ á«∏ëŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCÉH á°UÉÿG áeó°üdG risks confronting the banking system, although subsequent to the interest rate policy pronouncements by Advanced IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG á°SÉ«°ùH á°UÉÿG äÉëjô°üàdG ¿q CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG Economies central banks, interest rate shock appears to be á°UÉÿG áeó°üdG ¿CG Èà©J áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸÉH á°UÉÿG of limited concern. .ÒÑc ≥∏b Qó°üe πμ°ûJ ’ IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCÉH • Credit default by top borrowers, which was one of πμ°ûj ¿Éc …òdGh Ú°VÎ≤ŸG ºgCG πÑb øe ¿ÉªàF’G OGó°S øY õé©dG ¿q CG hóÑj • the major concerns of banks last years, appears to have ¬JóM â©LGôJ ób IÒNC’G äGƒæ°ùdG ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH á«°ù«FôdG ±hÉîŸG óMCG subsided. .A»°ûdG ¢†©H • Overall, the respondents felt that the risk assessment äÉ«æ≤Jh ôWÉîŸG º««≤J ¿CG ΩÉY πμ°ûH ´Ó£à°S’G ‘ ¿ƒcQÉ°ûŸG ô©°T• and mitigation techniques have improved, along with an ´É£ dG QGô à°SG ø°ù– ™e ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæLk ,âæ°ù– ób ÉgQÉKBG øe «ØîàdG improvement in the stability of the banking sector. ≤ ≤ ∞ .‘ô°üŸG

* * (2012) ‹É◊G ΩÉ©dG * ôWÉîŸG áÄa IôWÉîŸG ´ƒf (2011) ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG Current Year* (2013) ΩOÉ≤dG ΩÉ©dG Risk Category Type of risk Last Year* (2011) Next year* (2013) (2012) ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á £æe ‘ á«°SÉ«°ùdG äÉHGô£°V’G á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG ∫ ≤ É« jôaEG 66.7 55.6 44.4 Systemic risk ≤ Political unrest in the MENA region ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL ™LGôJ 38.9 55.6 61.1 Credit risk Decline in credit quality á« dG ôWÉîŸG §ØædG QÉ©°SCG ‘ äGÒ¨àdG ∏μ 38.9 38.9 38.9 Macro risk Oil price changes á« dG ôWÉîŸG äGQÉ ©dG QÉ©°SCG ¢VÉØîfG ∏μ ≤ 33.3 38.9 33.3 Macro risk Decline in real estate prices á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG »ŸÉ©dG DƒWÉÑàdG 27.8 33.3 33.3 Systemic risk Global slowdown ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl ádƒ«°ùdGh jƒªàdG cÉ°ûe π π 27.8 27.8 33.3 Liquidity risk Funding and liquidity problems á« «¨°ûàdG ôWÉîŸG á«àëàdG á«æÑdG «£©J ∏ π 16.7 16.7 16.7 Operational risk Infrastructure disruption á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG hQƒ«dG á £æe áeRCG ≤ 22.2 11.1 11.1 Systemic risk Eurozone crisis á« «¨°ûàdG ôWÉîŸG á«Ñ°SÉëŸGh ᫪«¶æàdG äGÒ¨àdG ∏ 22.2 11.1 5.6 Operational risk Regulatory and accounting changes á« «¨°ûàdG ôWÉîŸG á« «¨°ûàdG áØ àdG ‘ IOÉjõdG ∏ ∏ ∏μ 11.1 5.6 11.1 Operational risk Increase in operational cost ¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉfl º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ ™LGÎdG 0 5.6 5.6 Market risk Decline in equity markets

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 104 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

* * (2012) ‹É◊G ΩÉ©dG * ôWÉîŸG áÄa IôWÉîŸG ´ƒf (2011) ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG Current Year* (2013) ΩOÉ≤dG ΩÉ©dG Risk Category Type of risk Last Year* (2011) Next year* (2013) (2012) ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉfl á°ùaÉæŸG IOÉjR 0 5.6 5.6 Interest rate risk Increase in competition

Select disaggregated á Ä°SCG questions ∏ ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl á«ÑæLC’G ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¢ü f ∑ ≤ 38.9 27.8 27.8 Liquidity risk Liquidity dry-up in foreign interbank market ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl Ú«°ù«FôdG Ú°VÎ ª d ¢Vhô dG ™aO øY õé©dG ≤ ∏ ≤ 33.3 22.2 27.8 Credit risk Default on credit to top borrowers ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉfl á« ëŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG áeó°U ∏ 38.9 44.4 44.4 Interest rate risk Domestic interest rate shock ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉfl áeó àŸG hódG ‘ IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG äÉeó°U ≤ ∫ 11.1 11.1 11.1 Interest rate risk Interest rate shocks in developed countries á« «¨°ûàdG ôWÉîŸG É«àM’G äÉ« ªY øY áŒÉædG ôWÉîŸG ∏ ∫ ∏ 38.9 44.4 44.4 Operational risk Risk due to frauds

*Percentage of respondents citing the given risk among three major çÓãdG ôWÉîŸG øª°V πNój QƒcòŸG ô£ÿG ¿CG GƒHÉLCG øjòdG ´Ó£à°S’G ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûª∏d ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG* risks in that year áæ°ùdG ∂∏J ‘ á«°ù«FôdG

Risks in banking ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ôWÉîŸG In the analysis and management of financial stability, ‘ ÒÑc ≥∏b Qó°üe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ôWÉîŸG ¢SÉ«bh ójó– Èà©j identifying and measuring risk in the banking sector ÒHGóJ ájCG OƒLh ΩóY øe ºZôdG ≈∏©a .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G IQGOEGh π«∏– is an important concern. Although, there does not exist any specific measure to pinpoint the existence OóY áÑbGôà äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ƒ©°VGh Ωƒ≤j ,ôWÉîŸG OƒLh ójóëàd IOófi of risks, policymakers keep a watch on a multitude IQÉ°TEG πμ°ûj ¿CG øμÁ »©«ÑW ÒZ ∑ƒ∏°S …CG ¿É«Ñàd äGô°TDƒŸG øe ÒÑc of indicators to discern any abnormal behaviour as »àdG á«°ù«FôdG ôWÉîŸG ¢†©H ≈∏Y á≤MÓdG á°ûbÉæŸG õcôJh .ôjò– possible warning signs. The subsequent discussion ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉflh ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl É¡æeh ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG É¡¡LGƒj focuses on some of the major risks in banking, viz., ôWÉîŸGh õcÎdGhq ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCGh IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ãe ¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉflh credit risk, liquidity risk, market risks, such as interest π and exchange rates as also concentration, cross- .á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸGh á«LQÉÿG border and systemic risks.

Credit risk ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl As observed earlier, the non-performing loan (NPL) ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG IÌ©àŸGq ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf â°†ØîfG ,Ék ≤HÉ°S Éfô°TCG ɪc ratio of banks declined to 1.7% during the year as Oƒ©jh .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ %2 ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %1^7 ¤EG π°üàd compared 2% a year ago. The observed decline was °üædG ÓN ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ ™ØJôŸG ƒªædG ¤EG »°ù«FQ °ûH ¢VÉØîf’G Gòg mainly on account of high growth in credit during the ∞ ∫ πμ second half of the year as well as a possible write- äɪ«∏©J Ö°ùëH OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¿ƒjódG Ö£°T øY Ó°†ak ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG off of delinquent loans as per the instructions of IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG ™ØJQG ,áæ°ùdG ájÉ¡f ‘h .…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe QCB. On an end-of-year basis, gross NPLs grew by ¢VÉØîfG ¿CG ¤EG ¢ü∏îf ¿CG øμÁ ’ ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h .ÉÑjôk ≤J %10 áÑ°ùæH around 10%. In that sense, it cannot be concluded ’EG .(14-3 QÉWEG) ¿ÉªàF’G á«Yƒf ø°ù– »æ©j IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô dG áÑ°ùf that a reduction in the NPL ratio is tantamount to an ≤ äÉ°ü°üîŸG øe ∫ÉY iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G π°UGƒj ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¿q CG improvement in credit quality (Box 3-14). However, 29 the banking sector continue to maintain high level of IQÉ°ùN …CG IóM øe ∞«Øîà∏d IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf ¤EG á«∏μdG aggregate provision29 to NPL ratio to mitigate any .á∏ªàfi possible ultimate loss.

Box 3-14: Analysis of credit quality in the ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL π«∏– :14-3 QÉWEG banking system

The quality of the banking sectors’ credit portfolio is äÉjƒà°ùe ∫ÓN øe ΩÉY πμ°ûH á«aô°üŸG äÉYÉ£≤∏d á«fɪàF’G á¶ØëŸG á«Yƒf ¢SÉ≤J generally measured by the levels of non-performing É°SÉ«k e Èà©J »àdG áÑ°ùædG òg ¿ƒ J ¿CG ø Áh .¢Vhô dG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô dG loans to gross loans (NPL ratio). The NPL ratio, being a ≤ √ μ μ ≤ ≤ backward-looking measure, could at times be misleading ¢UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒ÷ ¢SÉ«≤ªc ¿É«MC’G ¢†©H ‘ á∏∏°†e á≤HÉ°ùdG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ≈∏Y É«æÑek

29 29 Aggregate of provisions and interest suspense. .á≤∏©ŸG IóFÉØdG äÉHÉ°ùMh äÉ°ü°üîŸG ‹ÉªLEG

105 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

as a measure of bank’s credit quality. In order to get a ¿CG ó«ØŸG øe ,¿ÉªàF’G á¶Øfi á«Yƒæd π°†aCG º¡a ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G πLCG øeh .∑ƒæÑdÉH better understanding of the quality of the credit portfolio, π«∏– ádhÉfi ºàJ ,äÉeƒ∏©ŸG √òg πãe ÜÉ«Z »Øa .¿ÉªàF’G ∫ƒ– áaƒØ°üe π«∏– ºàj it will be useful to analyze the credit transition matrix. In the absence of such information, an attempt is made to analyze ,IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG äÉÄa øe áÄa πc á°üM ‘ äÉcô◊G ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL ∫ƒ–q the transition of the credit quality based on the movements ∫ó©e ´ÉØJQG Ò°ûjh .(∫hóL) IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG øe áÄa πc ‘ ƒªædG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH in the share of each category of the non-performing loans as well as the growth in each category of non-performing »æ©j ɇ IÌ©àe ¢Vhôb ¤EG áéàæŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ∫ƒ– ¤EG iƒà°ùŸG ¿hO ¢Vhô≤dG ‘ ƒªædG loans (Table). High growth in sub-standard loan indicates ¢Vhô≤dG ¢VÉØîfG ™e øeGõàdÉH Iô°SÉÿG ¢Vhô≤dG ƒ‰ ¿q CG ɪc .¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL QƒgóJ a transition of performing loans to nonperforming loan ”q »àdG ¢Vhô≤dG Òª©J ÖÑ°ùH ¿ÉªàF’G áÄa ∫ƒ– ¤EG Ò°ûj É¡∏«°ü– ‘ ∑ƒμ°ûŸG implying deterioration in credit quality. The growth in loss loans along with a simultaneous decline in doubtful loan ∑ƒæÑdG øe Iô°SÉÿG ¢Vhô≤dG ‘ IOÉjõdG Ö∏£àJ ɪc .OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàe ¢Vhô≤c É¡Ø«æ°üJ indicates shift in credit category due to aging of already .%12^5 áÑ°ùæH äÉ°ü°üîŸG ‘ IOÉjõdG øe í°VGh ƒg ɪc ≈∏YCG äÉ°ü°üfl ÒaƒJ classified delinquent loans. The increase in loss loans also necessitates banks to provide higher provisioning. This is evident from the increase in provisions by 12.5%.

IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG iƒà°ùŸG ¿hO ¢Vhô≤dG É¡∏«°ü– ‘ ∑ƒμ°ûŸG ¢Vhô≤dG Iô°SÉÿG ¢Vhô≤dG äÉ°ü°üîŸG Gross NPL Substandard loans Doubtful loans Loss loans Provision IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG áÑ°ùædG (%) Ratio to Gross NPL (%)

Dec-11 2011 Ȫ°ùjO 23.5 12.5 64.1 87.3

Dec-10 2010 Ȫ°ùjO 21.1 17.0 61.9 85.2

Growth ƒªædG 9.7 21.9 -19.4 13.6 12.5

The decline in the share of NPLs from consumption ¤EG ∑Ó¡à°S’G ¢Vhôb øe IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG á°üMq ¢VÉØîfG Ò°ûj loan indicates a decline in credit risk emanating from ÊÉ«H º°SQ) » FÉ©dG ´É£ dG øY áªLÉædG ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ¢VÉØîfG household sector (Chart 3-15). The overall positive ∏ ≤ sentiments on account of the recent salary hike for π°†ØH ΩÉY πμ°ûH äô£«°S »àdG á«HÉéjE’G ôYÉ°ûŸG ¿ƒμJ ÉÃQh .(15-3 nationals as well as QCB’s supervisory guidelines on »àdG á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG øY Ó°†ak ÚæWGƒŸG ÖJGhQ ‘ IÒNC’G IOÉjõdG personal loan might have contributed to this outlook. ób á«°üî°ûdGq ¢Vhô≤dÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÉgQó°UCG The share of delinquent loans from real estate ´É£b øe OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG á°üM â«≤Hh .QÉWE’G Gòg ‘ âªgÉ°S segment remained the same as in previous year, ¢Vhô≤dG äó¡°T ÚM ‘ ,≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉ≤e É¡dÉM ≈∏Y äGQÉ≤©dG while that from industry and general trade declined ¢Vhô dG ¿q CG hóÑjh .GÒÑck É°VÉØîfGk áeÉ©dG IQÉéàdGh áYÉæ°üdÉH á°UÉÿG considerably. NPLs from ‘other sector’ including the ≤ credit provided to outside Qatar appears to be one êQÉN ¤EG áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ∂dP ‘ Éà "iôNC’G äÉYÉ£≤dG" øe IÌ©àŸG of the major contributers to current year’s aggregate IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG ‘ áªgÉ°ùŸG äÉÄØdG ÈcCG ióMEG â∏μ°T ób ô£b NPLs. The assessment of credit risk is supplemented ¢VGÎaÉH ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl º««≤J á«∏ªY πªμà°ùJh .‹É◊G ΩÉ©dG ‘ by assuming some plausible credit risk scenarios and √ò¡d πªàëŸG ÒKCÉàdG IôjÉ©eh ádƒ≤©ŸG á«fɪàF’G ôWÉîŸG äÉ«°Vôa ¢†©H calibrating the potential impact of these scenarios on .(15-3 QÉWEG) É¡MÉHQCGh ∑ƒæÑdG ∫Ée ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y äÉgƒjQÉæ«°ùdG the bank capital and profits (Box 3-15).

Chart 3-15: Sectoral distribution of NPLs IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤∏d »YÉ£≤dG ™jRƒàdG :15-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

6% Industry & general trade

15% 15% 12% 36% Real estate & contractors 15%

2010 Consumption

58% Others

43% 2011

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 106 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Box 3-15: Credit risk stress test ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ≈∏Y §¨°†dG QÉÑàNG :15-3 QÉWEG

Three scenarios were considered: (a) an increase in Qƒ£J (Ü) IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‘ IOÉjR (CG) :QÉÑàY’G ‘ äÉgƒjQÉæ«°S áKÓK òNCG ” NPLs; (b) devolvement of indirect facilities; and, (c) a high drawdown from loan commitments. In addition, the â檰†Jh .¢Vhô≤dG äÉeGõàdG øe á«dÉY äÉHƒë°S (ê) Iô°TÉÑŸG ÒZ äÓ«¡°ùàdG íæe following assumptions were employed: :á«dÉàdG äÉ«°VôØdG É°†jk CG äGQÉÑàN’G √òg 1. A certain percentage of performing loans becomes áÑ°ùædG ∞∏àîJ .IÌ©àe ¢Vhôb ¤EG áéàæŸG ¢Vhô≤dG øe áæ«©eq áÑ°ùf ∫ƒ–q .1 non-performing. The assumed percentage varies across ´É£b ‘ ≈∏YC’G Ì©àdG áÑ°ùf ¢VGÎaG ™e ájOÉ°üàb’G äÉYÉ£≤dG ∞∏àfl ÚH á°VÎØŸG economic sectors with the highest being for the consumption sector (10%) and 5% for other sectors (excluding public .(ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG AÉæãà°SÉH) iôNC’G äÉYÉ£≤∏d (%5)h (%10) ∑Ó¡à°S’G sector).

2. Banks make a provision of 75% on the additional IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG øe %75 ∫OÉ©J äÉ°ü°üfl õéëH ∑ƒæÑdG ΩÉ«b.2 NPLs .á«aÉ°VE’G 3. The risk weight assigned to devolved indirect øe ¨à°ùŸG Aõ÷Gh Iô°TÉÑŸG ÒZ äÓ«¡°ùà d %100 ôWÉîŸG ¿Rh ¿ƒ j .3 facilities as well as the drawdown committed credit π ∏ μ facilities is 100% .Ióªà©ŸG á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG 30 The impact of the stress on the capital adequacy ratio å«M á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG øe …C’ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc áÑ°ùf ôKCÉJ ΩóY §¨°†dG QÉÑàNG ô¡¶jo 30 (CAR) of domestic banks shows that, none of the bank’s …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe Qô≤ŸG ≈fOC’G ó◊G øY ∂æH …C’ áÑ°ùædG √òg π≤q J ⁄ capital adequacy ratio declined below the QCB prescribed minimum level. However, the CAR ratios reduced ÚH øeh ∑ƒæÑdG ¢†©H ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ÒÑc πμ°ûH â°†ØîfG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc áÑ°ùf ¿q CG ’EG substantially for some banks. Out of the 10 domestic ójõJ áÑ°ùæH ∑ƒæH á©HQCG ‘ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc áÑ°ùf â°†ØîfG á«æWƒdG ô°û©dG ∑ƒæÑdG banks, CAR for 4 banks declined by more than 3 percentage %1^8h °übCG óëc %4^7 ÚH ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc áÑ°ùf ‘ ¢VÉØîf’G ìhGôJh .%3 øY points. The maximum decline in CAR was 4.7 while the ≈ ∫ minimum reduction was 1.8 percent points. .≈fOCG óëc

The impact of the stress on the profitability of the banking ‘ ÒÑμdG ¢VÉØîf’G ¤EG ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG á«ëHQ ≈∏Y §¨°†dG QÉÑàNG ÒKCÉJ Ò°ûjh sector indicate considerable reduction in RoA; a reduction QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ó©H ájƒÄe ᣠf 1^7 ƒëæH ¢†ØîfG â«M ƒ°UC’G Y óFÉ©dG ó©e of around 1.7 percentage points after the assumed stress ≤ ∫ ≈∏ ∫ conditions .§¨°†dG QÉÑàNG ‘ á°VÎØŸG ä’ɪàM’G

Credit risk assessment is also carried out under the óæY §¨°†dG" `H ±hô©ŸG è¡æŸG QÉWEG ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl º««≤J É°†jk CG ”q ɪc approach of ‘stressing to breaking point’. In essence, the IOÉjõdG ôKCG « – ‘ »°SÉ°SCG °ûH è¡æŸG Gòg Iô a øª Jh ." OÉ©àdG ᣠf idea underlying this approach is to analyze the effect of an π ∏ πμ μ μ ∫ ≤ incremental increase in the stress conditions and its impact äGô°TDƒe øe ÌcCG hCG óMGh ≈∏Y ÉgÒKCÉJh §¨°†dG ±hôX ‘ á«éjQóàdGq on one or more of the financial soundness indicator of .(16-3 QÉWEG) ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ™°Vh πãe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG the banking sector such as its capital position (Box 3-16).

Box 3-16: Stressing to breaking point ∫OÉ©àdG á£≤f óæY §¨°†dG :16-3QÉWEG The approach of stressing to breaking point deals with ájÉØc ∫ó©e)q á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG ô°TDƒe ∑ƒ∏°S ∫OÉ©àdG á£≤f óæY §¨°†dG á«é¡æeq ∫hÉæàJ the behavior of the target financial soundness indicator ¬Lh ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ≈∏Y õ«cÎdG ™eh .§¨°†dG IóMq IOÉjR ™e (∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ (capital adequacy ratio, CAR) as the severity of the stress is increased. Focusing on credit risk in particular, the äGQÉ≤©dG øª°†àJ)q ¢Vhô≤dG á¶Øfi øe áæ«©e áÑ°ùf ¿CG á«é¡æŸGq ¢VÎØJ ,¢Uƒ°üÿG approach assumes that a certain percentage of the loan ∑ƒæÑdG Ωƒ≤Jh IÌ©àeq ¢Vhôb ¤EG ∫ƒëàJq (ÚdhÉ≤ª∏d áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤dGh ∑Ó¡à°S’Gh portfolio (comprising of real estate, consumption and loans .á«aÉ°VE’G IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô dG øe %75 OÉ©J äÉ°ü°üfl õéëH to contractors) becomes non-performing and banks make ≤ ∫ a provision of 75% on the additional NPLs.

30 30 The foreign banks operating in Qatar are not considered while assessing the impact on ™°†îJ ’ É¡fC’ ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ∫ó©e ≈∏Y ôKC’G º««≤J óæY QÉÑàY’G ‘ ô£b ádhO ‘ á∏eÉ©dG á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG òNCG ºàj ⁄ CAR, since they are not subject to CAR maintenance locally .∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ∫ó©Ã á°UÉÿG á«∏ëŸG äÉÑ∏£àª∏d

107 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG øe áØ∏àfl äÉjƒà°ùe óæY ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ∫ó©eq Capital adequacy ratio at various levels of NPLs

25 Islamic banks Conventional banks 20

15

10 CAR (%) CAR

5

0 2 7 9 1217202224273237 NPL (%)

The approach identifies at which level of NPLs the capital of ájÉØc ∫ó©e ¢†Øîæj IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG øe iƒà°ùe …CG óæY ∂dP ó©H á«é¡æŸGq Oó– the bank breaches the QCB stipulated minimum ratio. The ,¬fCG π«∏ëàdG ô¡¶jh .…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe OóëŸG ≈fOC’G ó◊G øY ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ analysis shows that, for Islamic banks, the minimum QCB norms for CAR is breached only when the NPLs from the ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe Qô≤ŸG ≈fOC’G ó◊G ¥ôN ” ,á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH combined portfolio reaches 27%. In case of conventional á«dɪLE’G ¿ÉªàF’G á¶Øfi ‘ IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf â∏°Uh ÉeóæY §≤a …õcôŸG banks, it breaches the limit only when the NPLs from the äRhÉŒ ÉeóæY ≈fOC’G ó◊G ¥ôN ” ó≤a ,ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑdG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ÉeCG .%27 ¤EG combined loan portfolio exceed 39%. This testifies to IQób Y ôeC’G Gòg ój .á«dɪLE’G ¿ÉªàF’G á¶Øfi øe %39 IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô dG áÑ°ùf the resilience of the banking sector to a significant stress ≈∏ ∫ ≤ in credit portfolio. A bottom-up approach shows, among …òdG è¡ædG ô¡¶jh .á«fɪàF’G á¶ØëŸG ‘ IÒÑc •ƒ¨°V πª– ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG individual banks, the CAR of only one bank declines below ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ∫ó©eq ¢†Øîæj ,ájOôØdG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH øe ,¬fq CG IóYÉ≤dG øe ≥∏£æj the minimum prescribed level when its NPLs reach 10%. ÉeóæY ±ô°üŸG πÑb øe OóëŸG ≈fOC’G ó◊G iƒà°ùe â– §≤a óMGh ∂æÑH ¢UÉÿG The next occurrence of CAR dipping below the minimum k prescribed level happens only when the NPL reaches 20%, É°†jCG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ájÉØc ∫ó©eq ¢VÉØîfG çóëjh .%10 ¤EG IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf π°üJ which is highly extreme. IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô≤dG áÑ°ùf π°üJ ÉeóæY §≤a ¬«∏Y ¢Uƒ°üæŸG ≈fOC’G ó◊G iƒà°ùe â– .áaô£àeq áÑ°ùædG √òg Èà©Jh %20 ¤EG

Liquidity and funding risks πjƒªàdGh ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl The international framework for liquidity risk QOÉ°üdG ,É¡àÑbGôeh ÉgÒjÉ©eh ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl ¢SÉ«≤d ‹hódG QÉWE’G ™°†j measurement, standards and monitoring set out by á°†jô©dG •ƒ£ÿG ,2010 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ á«aô°üŸG áHÉbô∏d ∫RÉH áæ÷ øY the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in Dec 2010 outlines a set of two ratios. The first is a short- (ádƒ«°ùdG á«£¨J áÑ°ùf) πLC’G IÒ°üb áÑ°ùf ¤hC’G .ÚàÑ°ùf øe áYƒªéŸ term ratio - the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) – which ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G øe á«aÉc äÉjƒà°ùà ßØà– ∑ƒæÑdG ¿CG øe ócCÉàdG ¤EG ±ó¡J aims to ensure that banks maintain adequate levels ájó≤ædG äÉ≤aóàdG ‘É°U πHÉ≤e (§°ùÑdG) á«dÉ©dG IOƒ÷G äGP áfƒgôŸG of unencumbered high quality assets (numerator) áÑ°ùædGh .ÒÑμdG OÉ¡LE’G øe Éeƒjk 30 IÎa ióe ≈∏Y (ΩÉ≤ŸG) êQÉÿG ¤EG against net cash outflows (denominator) over a 30 day significant stress period. The other is a long-term ¤EG ±ó¡Jh (ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf »gh) ióŸG á∏jƒW iôNC’G ratio – the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) – which ádƒ«°ùdG ¢üFÉ°üN ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ôq ≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG øe ∫ƒÑ≤e ≈fOCG óM áeÉbEG aims to establish a minimum acceptable amount of »∏j Ée ‘ ¢SQóf .IóMGh áæ°S ióe ≈∏Y ɡࣰûfCGh á°ù°SDƒŸG ∫ƒ°UCÉH á°UÉÿG stable funding based on the liquidity characteristics ≈∏Y »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ¢UÉÿG ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf of an institution’s assets and activities over a one year horizon. In what follows, we examine the NSFR .(17-3 QÉWEG) ¬©ÑàJ …òdG §ªædG øe ócCÉà∏d á∏jƒW á«æeR IÎa ióe for GCC countries over an extended time horizon to ascertain its behaviour (Box 3-17). Box 3-17: Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf :17-3 QÉWEG Under the NSFR, the amount of stable funding available ∫ÓN øe ìÉàŸG ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ≠∏Ñe ÜÉ°ùM ºàjq ,ôq ≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf Ö°ùëH is calculated through applying weightings to different ≠∏Ñà ∂dP ó©H É¡àfQÉ≤e ºàJ »àdG äÉHƒ∏£ŸG øe áØ∏àfl äÉÄa ≈∏Y ¿GRhC’G ≥«Ñ£J categories of liability which is then compared with the amount of stable funding required, calculated by applying ∫ƒ°UCG ≈∏Y ¿GRhC’G ≥«Ñ£J ≥jôW øY ¬HÉ°ùàMG ºàj …òdG ܃∏£ŸG ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG weightings to the institutions assets and off-balance sheet ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉîŸ ¢Vô©àdG ∂dP ‘ Éà ,á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN OƒæÑdGh äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG items, including potential liquidity exposure. As the Basel ó G «Ñ£J á«dBG" áHÉãà ¿ƒ «d QÉ«©ŸG º«ª°üJ ” , RÉH áæ÷ Ö°ùëHh .á ªàëŸG Committee acknowledge, the standard is designed to act ◊ ≥ μ ∫ ∏ as a “minimum enforcement mechanism” ….and promote Gó«©Hk äÉ°ù°SDƒŸÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl ‘ á«∏μ«¡dG äGÒ¨àdG" ™«é°ûJh "≈fOC’G

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 108 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

“structural changes in the liquidity risk profiles of institutions ≈∏Y ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG øe ójõŸG ƒëfh ,πLC’G Ò°ü≤dG πjƒªàdG ‘ ≥HÉ£àdG ΩóY øY away from short-term funding mismatches and toward ."ájQÉéàdG ᣰûfC’Gh ∫ƒ°UC’ÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ πjƒ£dG ióŸG more stable, longer-term funding of assets and business activities”.

Employing Bankscope database on 79 banks (46 commercial ∂æH 33h …QÉŒ ∂æH 46) Ék μæH 79 Oó©d ܃μ°ùμæH äÉfÉ«H IóYÉb ΩGóîà°SG and 33 Islamic) across the six GCC countries (See Box 3-3 øe ójõª∏d 3-3 QÉWEG ô¶fG) â°ùdG »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ (»eÓ°SEG for details), we compute the NSFR for the period 2007-11 ÉY øe IóટG IÎØ d ô à°ùŸG jƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf ÜÉ°ùàMG ” ,( «°UÉØàdG to ascertain the behaviour of this ratio before, during and Ω ∏ q ≤ π π after the financial crisis using weights as proposed by the á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ó©Hh AÉæKCGh πÑb áÑ°ùædG √òg ∑ƒ∏°S øe ócCÉà∏d 2011 ¤EG 2007 IMF (2011) and Vasquez and Federico (2012). Across all (2011) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ¬MÎbG …òdG ƒëædG ≈∏Y ¿GRhC’G ΩGóîà°SÉH banks, the ratio appears to have declined marginally, from â°†ØîfG ,∑ƒæÑdG áaÉμH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘h .(2012) Federicoh Vasquez h 0.998 in 2007 to 0.985 in 2011, and a minimum of 0.915 in óMh 2011 ÉY ‘ 0^985 ¤EG 2007 ÉY ‘ 0^998 øe «ØW °ûH áÑ°ùædG 2009. Without loss of generality, the ratio appears to have Ω Ω ∞ πμ dipped significantly in 2009 for most countries. Among ‘ ®ƒë∏e πμ°ûH â©LGôJ áÑ°ùædG √òg ¿CG hóÑj ɪc .2009 ΩÉY ‘ 0^915 ≠∏H ≈fOCG countries, the ratio is observed to be uniformly the highest É¡à∏é°S ≈∏YC’G áÑ°ùædG ¿CG ßMÓj ,¿Gó∏ÑdG ÚH øeh .¿Gó∏ÑdG º¶©Ÿ áÑ°ùædÉH 2009 ΩÉY for Saudi Arabia for all the years. .äGƒæ°ùdG ™«ªL ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG We also examine the impact of the crisis on the NSFR. áeRC’G Èà©Jh ,ôq ≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf ≈∏Y áeRC’G ÒKCÉJ ¢üëa ” ∂dòc The crisis, following from the literature, is a dummy ‘ ôØ°Uh 2009h 2008 Úàæ°ù∏d óMGh ∫OÉ©j »ªgh Ò¨àeq ´ƒ°VƒŸG äÉ«HOCG Ö°ùëH which equals one for the years 2008-09, else zero. The raw correlations indicate a differential impact of the crisis ádƒ«°S ≈∏Y áeRCÓd ähÉØàŸG ôKC’G ¤EG •ÉÑJQ’G äÓeÉ©e Ò°ûJh .iôNC’G äGƒæ°ùdG on banks liquidity, measured by the NSFR. Although the áeRC’G ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .ôq ≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf Ö°ùëH ¢SÉ≤J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG crisis led to a decline in NFSR, it appears that the impact ‘ ÉMƒ°Vhk ÌcCG ¿Éc ÒKCÉàdG ¿EÉa ,ôq ≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG äOCG was much more pronounced on Bahrain and Saudi Arabia eÉc ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉHh .iôNC’G ¿Gó ÑdG ™e áfQÉ ŸÉH ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG á ªŸGh øjôëÑdG as compared to others. For the entire period across all π ∏ ≤ μ∏ countries, the correlation is -0.271, but not statistically á«MÉædG øe …ƒæ©e ÒZ ¬æμdh 0^271- •ÉÑJQ’G πeÉ©e ≠∏H ,¿Gó∏ÑdG ™«ªL ‘ IÎØdG significant at conventional levels. .á«FÉ°üME’G

(᪫≤dG) •ÉÑJQ’G Correlation (p-Value)

BH -0.843 (0.07) øjôëÑdG KW -0.119 (0.84) âjƒμdG OM 0.043 (0.94) ¿ÉªYo QA -0.688 (0.19) ô£b SA -0.873 (0.05) ájOƒ©°ùdG UAE -0.605 (0.27) IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G GCC -0.271 (0.14) »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏›

References ™LGôŸG F.Vazquez and P.Federico (2012). Bank funding structures :ôWÉîŸGh ∑ƒæÑdÉH ¢UÉÿG πjƒªàdG πcÉ«g .(2012) P.Federicoh F.Vazquez and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis. IMF ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .29 ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U πªY ábQh .á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG áeRC’ÉH ≥∏©àJ πF’O Working Paper 29. IMF: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG International Monetary Fund (2011). Global Financial Stability Report (Ch 2: How to address the systemic part of á«Ø«c :2 π°üØdG) »ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J .(2011) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U liquidity risk). IMF: Washington DC. ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .(ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl øe »eɶædG Aõ÷G á÷É©e M.M.Cornett. J.J.McNutt and P.E Strahan and H.Tehranian .᪰UÉ©dG (2011). Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the .(2011) H.Tehranianh P.E Strahan hJJMcNutt h M.M.Cornett financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 101, 297- 312. ,101 ‹ÉŸG OÉ°üàb’G á∏› .á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G ÒaƒJh ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl IQGOEG V.Ivashina and D.Scharfstein (2011). Bank lending during .312-297 the financial crisis of 2008. Journal of Financial Economics á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ∫ÓN ‘ô°üŸG ¢VGôbE’G .(2011) D.Scharfsteinh V.Ivashina 97, 319-38. .38-319 ,97 ‹ÉŸG OÉ°üàb’G á∏› .2008 ΩÉY

109 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Issues of liquidity and bank funding have come to the IÒNC’G áfhB’G ‘ IQGó°üdG áÑJôe ∑ƒæÑdG πjƒ“h ádƒ«°ùdG πFÉ°ùe â∏àMG fore in recent times, more so in view of the ongoing ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG É¡æe ÊÉ©j »àdG Iôªà°ùŸGq ∞©°†dG •É≤f Aƒ°V ‘ weaknesses in the banking sector in the Eurozone and Qó°üªc ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ¥Gƒ°SCG ≈∏Y OɪàY’G ójGõJ ™eh .ÉgÒZh hQƒ«dG á≤£æe elsewhere. With increasing reliance on capital markets »°ù«FQ b Qó°üe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh íÑ°UCG , jƒªà d as a source of funding, the liquidity position of the ≥∏ ≤ π ∏ banking sector becomes a key concern for market πLCG øeh .‘ô°üŸG QGô≤à°S’G õjõ©àH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûª∏d participants in reinforcing banking stability. In order to äÉÑ∏£àŸG á«Ñ∏àdh πjƒªàdG ∑ƒæH πÑb øe ∑ƒæÑdG øe Öë°S …CG ÖæŒ avoid any run on the banks by funding counterparties .á∏FÉ°ùdG ∫ƒ°UC’G øe IÒÑc ᫪μH ®ÉØàM’G ¤EG ∑ƒæÑdG π«“ ,᫪«¶æàdG as well as to meet the regulatory requirements, banks ¿CG PEG ,É¡à«ëHQ ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG iód ádƒ«°ùdG IÌc ôKq DƒJ ób ,¬°ùØf âbƒdG ‘ tend to keep a significant quantum of liquid assets. At ‘h .ôØ°U (∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y ó≤ædÉc) áàëÑdG á∏FÉ°ùdG ∫ƒ°UC’G ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG the same time, too much liquidity with banks might ɪFGOk Éjó–k ádƒ«°ùdG øe ãeC’G iƒà°ùŸG Y á¶aÉëŸG q °ûJ ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg impinge on their profitability, since the return on π ≈∏ πμ purely liquid assets (e.g., cash) is zero. Viewed in this .(18-3 QÉWEG) ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d context, maintaining an optimum level of liquidity is a perennial challenge for the banking sector (Box 3-18).

Box 3-18: New metrics for measuring ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¢SÉ«≤d IójóL ¢ù«jÉ≤e :18-3 QÉWEG banking sector liquidity

The importance of liquidity for a financial institution was âKóM »àdG á«dÉŸG áeRC’G πÑb á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ádƒ«°ùdG ᫪gCG πgÉŒ ” mostly ignored prior to the 2008 financial crisis. However, ô¶ædG IOÉYE’ äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG »©fÉ°U â©aO á«dÉŸG áeRCÓd ácôëŸG iƒ dG ¿q CG ’EG ,2008 ÉY the dynamics of the financial crisis made the policymakers ≤ Ω to rethink and recognize the central role of liquidity in óbh .á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG º««≤J ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¬Ñ©∏J …òdG …õcôŸG QhódG ≈∏Y ±ô©àdGh evaluating systemic risk. The Basel Committee on Banking øe ≈fOC’G óë∏d øjQÉ«©e âMÎbGh ÉjÉ°†≤dG √òg á«aô°üŸG áHÉbô∏d ∫RÉH áæ÷ âdhÉæJ Supervision has addressed these issues and suggested two minimum global regulatory standards viz Liquidity Coverage .ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG ‘É°U áÑ°ùfh ,ádƒ«°ùdG á«£¨J áÑ°ùf ɪg á«ŸÉ©dG ᫪«¶æàdG ÒjÉ©ŸG Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR á∏FÉ°ùdG ∫ƒ°UC’G øe ±Écm »WÉ«àMG ≈∏Y ®ÉØë∏d ∑ƒæÑdG ádƒ«°ùdG á«£¨J áÑ°ùf ƒYóJh calls for banks to maintain a sufficient buffer of liquid assets ‘É°U áÑ°ùf Ö∏£àJ ÚM ‘ ,á«dÉàdG ÚKÓãdG ΩÉjC’G ∫ÓN IQOÉ°üdG äÉ≤aóàdG á«£¨àd to cover outflows over the next thirty days, while NSFR requires banks to have longer term high quality funds to ºYód á«dÉY IOƒL äGP πLC’G á∏jƒW ∫GƒeCÉH ®ÉØàM’G ∑ƒæÑdG øe ô≤à°ùŸG πjƒªàdG support its operation over one year period. Towards the øe ≈fOC’G ó◊G ≈∏Y ®ÉØë∏d OGó©à°S’G πLCG øeh .IóMGh áæ°S IÎa ∫ÓN É¡JÉ«∏ªY run-up to maintain these minimum global standards, as ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG Ö© J ,á«eɶædG ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl Y AÉ°† dGh á«ŸÉ©dG ÒjÉ©ŸG òg well as to eliminate systemic liquidity risks, central banks ∏ ≈∏ ≤ √ across the globe are playing a key role in improving the ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEÉH á°UÉÿG äÉ°SQɪŸG Ú°ù– ‘ É«°ù«FQk GQhOk ⁄É©dG AÉëfCG ™«ªL ‘ liquidity management practices in their banking systems. .á«aô°üŸG ɡશfCG

The recent literature on banking has also identified various ádƒ«°ùdG øe áØ∏àfl ÖfGƒL á«aô°üŸG äÉeóÿG ∫ƒM áãjó◊G äÉ«HOC’G äOóMq ó≤d aspects of liquidity that are important during periods of IÒ°ü≤dG ¿ƒjódG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG OɪàYG øe GAóHk ,äÉeRC’G äGÎa ∫ÓN ᪡e Èà©J crises, ranging from a bank’s reliance on short-term debt, the availability of funding liquidity, the market liquidity of its .∂dP ¤EG Éeh ,∫ƒ°UC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ¥ƒ°ùdG ádƒ«°Sh ,πjƒªà∏d ádƒ«°ùdG ôaGƒJh ,πLC’G assets, etc. Some of the studies have examined the issue of :ó©ÑdG á«FÉæK á«é¡æe øe á«aô°üŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ádCÉ°ùe äÉ°SGQódG ¢†©H âãëH óbh banking liquidity from a two-dimensional approach: asset ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ¿EG É jh . ƒ°üÿÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdGh ƒ°UC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG side liquidity and liability side liquidity. The banking sector ≤ ∫ ≤ Ω ∫ is said to have a strong liquidity position, if they increase á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG â°†ØîfGh ∫ƒ°UC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG äOGR GPEG ájƒb ádƒ«°ùH ™àªàj their asset side liquidity, while reducing the liability side ¿q C’ á«ëHôdG ≈∏Y ÉÑk ∏°S ôKq DƒJ ∫ƒ°UC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG iƒà°ùe ´ÉØJQG ¿q CG ’EG .Ωƒ°üÿÉH liquidity. However, this higher level of asset side liquidity has negative impact on profitability as the liquid assets ìÎbG ,IÒNC’G áfhB’G ‘h .ΩÉY πμ°ûH (ôcòj ’ hCG) ¢†Øîæe á∏FÉ°ùdG ∫ƒ°UC’G óFÉY generally have low (or, negligible) returns. Recently, the ádƒ«°ùH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ÒHGóàdG ¢†©H …óæ¡dG …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG Indian central bank has suggested some stock measures for ≈∏Y AÉæHh .‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG º««≤J ¿CÉ°ûH á≤HÉ°ùdG ôjQÉ≤àdG ≈∏Y AÉæH ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG the banking sector liquidity, building on of their previous Reports on financial sector assessment. Following from ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl iƒà°ùe ¢SQófh á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ádƒ«°ùH á°UÉN ¢ù«jÉ≤e 4 Oóëf ,∂dP that, we define four metrics of stock liquidity and examine .…ô£≤dG ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ‘ the level of liquidity risk in the Qatari banking system.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 110 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

áMÎ≤ŸG ájQÉ«©ŸG IóYÉ≤dG ¢SÉ«≤ŸG ∞°UƒdG Suggested Measure Description Benchmark ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y §¨°†dG áÑ°ùf ¢ù«≤J (LSR) .πNó∏d IQóŸGq ∫ƒ°UCÓd áªYGódG ÓLk CG ô°übC’G Ωƒ°üÿG ‘É°U áÑ°ùf ôWÉîŸG ÜÉÑ°SCG øª°†àJh .πLC’G IÒ°ü≤dG ∫GƒeC’G äÉÑ∏≤àH á°UÉÿG ôWÉîŸG OÉjORG ¤EG áÑ°ùædG √òg ´ÉØJQG Ò°ûjh ≈∏Y §¨°†dG áÑ°ùf á°UÉÿG á«ëHôdGh ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y ôKDƒJ »àdG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉflh øjódG ójóŒ ôWÉflh Öë°ùdG ôWÉfl á«dÉ©dG æÑdÉH. (≈°übC’G ó◊G) ádƒ«°ùdG ∂ 40-45% (Cap) LSR Liquidity Stress Ratio (LSR) measures the proportion of net shortest-term liability supports the earning assets. Higher this ratio indicates a higher risk to volatilities in the short-term funds. Reason of high risk includes, withdrawal risk, rollover risk and interest rate risk affecting liquidity, profitability of the bank »°SÉ°SC’G πjƒªàdG áÑ°ùf ¢ù«≤J (CFR) ´ƒª›) ádƒªŸG ∫ƒ°UC’G ´ƒª› πjƒªàd áMÉàŸG á«°SÉ°SC’G ∫GƒeC’G áÑ°ùf jƒªàdG áÑ°ùf π ´É£≤dG ádƒ«°S ø°ù– ¤EG áÑ°ùædG ´ÉØJQG Ò°ûjh .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ (∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ/∫ƒ°UC’G. (≈fOC’G ó◊G) »°SÉ°SC’G Core Funding Ratio (CFR) measures the proportion of core funds available to fund the 40-45%(Floor) CFR total funded assets (total assets- equity) of the banking sector. Higher the ratio indicates improvements in liquidity of the sector. á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G áÑ°ùf ¢ù«≤J (IAR) ´ÉØJQG Ò°ûjh .‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ∫ƒ°UCG ¤EG á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G iƒà°ùe ÒZ ƒ°UC’G áÑ°ùf ∫ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∫ƒ°UCG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ∫ó©eq ´ÉØJQG ¤EG áÑ°ùædG. % (≈°übC’G ó◊G) á∏FÉ°ùdG Illiquid Asset Ratio (IAR) measures the level of illiquid asset to the banking system assets. 70-75% (Cap) IAR A higher ratio indicates higher degree of illiquidity in the banking system assets Common equity á FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ƒ°UC’G ‘É°U jƒ“ áÑ°ùf ¢SQóJ (NIFR) ‘É°U jƒªàd á«aÉc á«°SÉ°SC’G ™FGOƒdG GƒeCG âfÉc GPEG Ée ‘É°U πjƒ“ áÑ°ùf ∏ ∫ π π q ∫ á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G. (≈°übC’G ó◊G) á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G Net Illiquid assets Funding Ratio (NIFR) examines whether the core deposits funds are 120-130% (Cap) NIFR sufficient enough to fund the net illiquid assets

Net Shortest term liability = liability less assets up to 1 month; ,óMGh ô¡°T ÉgÉ°übCG IóŸ ∫ƒ°UC’G ¢übÉf Ωƒ°üÿG = ÓLk CG ô°übC’G Ωƒ°üÿG ‘É°U Earning Assets = Total assets less sum of Net Fixed Assets, Other iôNC’G ∫ƒ°UC’Gh áàHÉãdG ∫ƒ°UC’G ‘É°U ´ƒª› ¢übÉf ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG = πNó∏d IQóŸGq ∫ƒ°UC’G assets, Require Reserve and Cash & metal ,¿OÉ©ŸGh ó≤ædGh »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’Gh Core fund = Deposits less estimated volatility component of (%20) á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dÉH ™FGOƒdÉH á°UÉÿGh á©bƒàŸG äÉÑ∏≤àdG ô°üæY ¢übÉf ™FGOƒdG = á«°SÉ°Sq C’G ∫GƒeC’G domestic currency deposit (20%) and foreign currency (40%) ,(%40) á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dGh Illiquid assets = Sum of loan above 1 month, long term investments, äGQɪãà°S’Gh óMGh ô¡°T øY É¡bÉ≤ëà°SG IÎa ójõJ »àdG ¢Vhô≤dG ´ƒª› = á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G net fixed assets, other assets , ƒ°UC’G øe ÉgÒZh áàHÉãdG ƒ°UC’G ‘É°Uh LC’G á jƒ£dG Net illiquid assets = Illiquid asset less the equity contribution ∫ ∫ π ∏ .∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ á°üM ¢übÉf á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G = á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G ‘É°U The evolution of the metrics as defined above is presented §¨°†dG áÑ°ùf Ò°ûJh .√ÓYCG OóëŸGq ƒëædG ≈∏Y ¢ù«jÉ≤ŸG Qƒ£Jq ÊÉ«ÑdG º°SôdG ô¡¶j in the Chart. The LSR, which provides a measure for the ¤EG Ωƒ°üÿÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG OɪàYG ¢ù«≤J »àdG ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y banking sector’s dependence on the liability side liquidity, indicates that it is well below the suggested cap. Even ¤EG OɪàY’G Gòg OÉjORG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .ìÎ≤ŸG ≈°übC’G ó◊G øe ÒãμH πbCG É¡fCG though the severity of dependence has increased during ÒNC’G ™HôdG ‘ â∏é°S »àdG äÉjƒà°ùŸG ¿hO »≤H ¬fCG ’EG ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ÒÑc óM 2011, it remained below the levels observed in the last .2008 ΩÉY øe quarter of 2008.

The CFR examines the availability of stable funds. The ratio áÑ°ùædG √òg â∏X óbh .Iô≤à°ùŸG ∫GƒeC’G ôaGƒJ ióe »°SÉ°SC’G πjƒªàdG áÑ°ùf ¢üëØJh remained range-bound, even though it declined towards .ΩÉ©dG ájÉ¡f ‘ É¡°VÉØîfG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y É¡°ûeÉg øª°V ∑ôëàJ the end of the year.

The IAR looks into the asset side liquidity of banks. The ratio Ò°ûJh .∑ƒæÑdG ‘ ∫ƒ°UC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG ,á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G áÑ°ùf ô¶æJ ɪc indicates a comfortable outlook for asset side liquidity of ô°üæY ¿q CG ’EG . ƒæÑdG ‘ ƒ°UC’ÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ù d áëjôe äÉ©bƒJ OƒLh ¤EG áÑ°ùædG banks. However the illiquidity component which declined ∑ ∫ ∏ during 2010, appears to have increased during the current .‹É◊G ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ™ØJQGh OÉY ,2010 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ¢†ØîfG …òdG ádƒ«°ùdG á∏b year.

NIFR examines the banking sector relative dependence on ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d »Ñ°ùædG OɪàY’G á∏FÉ°ùdG ÒZ ∫ƒ°UC’G ‘É°U πjƒ“ áÑ°ùf åëÑJh stored (ratio less than 100%) versus purchased (ratio above øe ≈∏YCG áÑ°ùf) IGΰûŸG ádƒ«°ùdG πHÉ≤e (%100 øe πbCG áÑ°ùf) áfõîŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y 100%) liquidity. The evolution of this ratio indicates that the stored liquidity position of banks, which was comfortable â∏é°S »àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d áfõîŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh ¿CG ¤EG áÑ°ùædG √òg Qƒ£Jq Ò°ûjh .(%100 till the beginning of 2011, appears to have been declining .2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH ¢VÉØîf’ÉH äCGóH 2011 ΩÉY ájGóH ≈àM áëjôe äÉjƒà°ùe by end 2011.

In summary, all the four stock liquidity measures indicate ’ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh ¿CG ¤EG á©HQC’G ádƒ«°ùdG ¢ù«jÉ≤e Ò°ûJ ,QÉ°üàNÉH that the liquidity position of the banking sector does not ¢†©H ™°VƒdG Gòg QƒgóJ Y ádOC’G ¢†©H Qƒ¡X øe ºZôdG Y , b Qó°üe °ûj provide cause for concern, even though some evidence of ≈∏ ≈∏ ≥∏ πμ deterioration was visible in 2011. .2011 ΩÉY ‘ A»°ûdG

111 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

References ™LGôŸG M.K.Brunnermeier and L.H.Pedersen (2009). Market ádƒ«°ùdGh ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG .(2009) L.H.Pedersen h M.K.Brunnermeier liquidity and funding liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 22, 2201-38. .38-2201 ,22 á«dÉŸG äÉ°SGQódG ôjô≤J .πjƒªàdÉH á°UÉÿG M.K.Brunnermeier, A. Krishnamurthy and G.G.Gorton (2012). ¢SÉ«b .(2012) G.GGortonhA. Krishnamurthy h MKBrunnermeier Liquidity mismatches measurement. In M.K.Brunnermeier A.Krishnamurthyh MKBrunnermeier .ádƒ«°ùdÉH ¢UÉÿG ≥HÉ£àdG ΩóY and A.Krishnamurthy (Eds.) Systemic Risk and Macro çÉëHCÓd »æWƒdG ÖàμŸG ,»∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G êPƒ‰h á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG .(¿GQôfi) Modeling, NBER: MA. .¢ùà°Sƒ°TÉ°SÉe :ájOÉ°üàb’G Reserve Bank of India (2009). Report of the Committee hC’G ó éŸG) ‹ÉŸG ´É£ dG º«« J áæ÷ ôjô J .(2009) …óæ¡dG »WÉ«àM’G æH on Financial Sector Assessment (Vol. I – Financial stability ∫ ∏ ≤ ≤ ≤ ∂ assessment and stress testing). RBI: Mumbai. :…óæ¡dG »WÉ«àM’G ∂æH .(§¨°†dG πª– äGQÉÑàNGh ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G º««≤J - Reserve Bank of India (2012). Liquidity risk management and .…ÉÑeƒe Basel III framework on liquidity standards (draft guidelines). ∫ƒM 3 ∫RÉH πªY QÉWEGh ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl IQGOEG .(2012) …óæ¡dG »WÉ«àM’G ∂æH RBI: Mumbai. .…ÉÑeƒe :…óæ¡dG »WÉ«àM’G ∂æH .(á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG IOƒ°ùe)q ádƒ«°ùdG ÒjÉ©e

‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ádƒ«°ùH á°UÉÿG ¢ù«jÉ≤ŸG :ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart: Metrics of banking sector liquidity

35 60 30 55 25 50 20 45 15 40 10 5 08 11 09 10 11 10 10 09 0 08 Jan- 10 Jun- 10 Oct- 08 Apr- 11 Sep- 11 Dec- 07 Aug- 09 Nov - 10 7 9 0 1 0 1 8 8 9 Mar - 09 May - 08 Jun-08 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-09 Dec -07 Dec -09 Dec -10 Dec -11 Dec -08

LSR CFR

60 102 96 55 90 50 84 78 45 72 40 66 60

IAR NIFR

An assessment of liquidity risk in the banking sector øe áYƒª› ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl º««≤J …ôéj is conducted, based on a set of financial stability Ò°ûJh .á«aGô°ûà°S’Gq §¨°†dG äGQÉÑàNG É¡∏ªq μJ ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G äGô°TDƒe indicators, supplemented by a forward looking stress ´É£ dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe ™«ªL test. All the financial soundness indicators appear to ≤ É¡eƒ¡Øà ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ OÉ◊G ¢VÉØîf’G Oƒ©jh .2011 ΩÉY ‘ ‘ô°üŸG indicate a decline in liquidity position for the banking 31 sector in 2011. The sharp decline in narrow liquidity31 Éfô°TCG ɪc …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh ≈∏Y ∞≤°S ≥«Ñ£J ¤EG ≥«°†dGq is solely on account of a reintroduction of cap on QMR ™Lôj Éà 32™°SGƒdG É¡eƒ¡Øà ádƒ«°ùdG â°†ØîfG óbh .≥HÉ°ùdG º°ù≤dG ‘ deposits as discussed in the previous section. Broad IOÉjõdG HÉ e áFÉ°ùdG ÒZ ƒ°UC’G ‘ á«éjQóàdG IOÉjõdG ¤EG É°SÉ°Sk CG 32 π ≤ ∏ ∫ liquidity declined mainly due to high incremental ¥É£f ´É°ùJG iOCG óbh .(9-3 hóL) á FÉ°ùdG ƒ°UC’G ‘ á«éjQóàdG increase in illiquid assets vis-à-vis incremental increase ∫ ∏ ∫ in liquid assets (Table 3-9). Widening asset-liability ióŸG ≈∏Y ádƒ«°ùdG ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G ÚH ≥HÉ£àdG ΩóY 33 mismatch led to drop in medium term liquidity33. ‘ Iô≤à°ùe á©«Ñ£H ™àªàj ô£b ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∫Gõj ’h . §°SƒàŸG Conventionally, the banking sector in Qatar continues IÒÑμdG äÉÑ∏≤àdG ¿q CG ’EG .ô°übC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG äGP ™FGOƒdÉH ≥∏q ©àj Ée to enjoy the stable nature of deposits in the shorter-

31 31 Assets with QCB including required reserves. .á«eGõdE’G äÉ«WÉ«àM’G ∂dP ‘ Éà …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe iód ∫ƒ°UC’G 32 32 Narrow liquidity plus investment assets in government/QCB bonds, treasury bills and áfGõÿG ¿hPCGh …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe / áeƒμ◊G äGóæ°S ‘ ájQɪãà°S’G ∫ƒ°UC’G ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ≥«°†dG É¡eƒ¡Øà ádƒ«°ùdG CDs. .´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°Th 33 33 Ratio of assets with maturity less than 3 months to liabilities with maturity less than 3 .ô¡°TCG 3 øY É¡bÉ≤ëà°SG IÎa π≤J »àdG Ωƒ°üÿG ¤EG ô¡°TCG 3 øY É¡bÉ≤ëà°SG IÎa π≤J »àdG ∫ƒ°UC’G áÑ°ùf months.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 112 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J term maturity buckets. However, a high volatility ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ô°übC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG äGP ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh ‘ in the public sector deposits in shorter-term time ≈∏Yh .Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G ÚH IƒéØdG ´É°ùJG ¤EG äOCG ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG bucket during the second half of the year aggravated k the asset-liability gap. Even though the evidence of ,ÉÑjô≤J ôØ°üdG ∫OÉ©J øjódG ójóŒ ôWÉîà á°UÉÿG ádOC’G ¿CG øe ºZôdG rollover risk is almost nil, the asset liability mismatch ,¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G ÚH ≥HÉ£àdG ΩóY πμq °ûj in the maturity buckets, especially at the shorter end, øeh .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ±hÉîŸG óMCG ,ô°übC’G ∫ÉLB’G ɪ«°S’q is one of the concerns for the banking sector. In order ójó©dG ¿CG ,IÒNC’G áfhB’G ‘ ßMƒd ,±hÉîŸG √òg IóM øe ∞«ØîàdG πLCG to mitigate this, it is observed that of late, many of the ≥jôW øY πLC’G πjƒ£dG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ¥ƒ°S øe IOÉØà°S’G ∫hÉ– ∑ƒæÑdG øe banks are tapping long term capital market by issuing .øjódG äGóæ°S QGó°UEG debt securities.

ádƒ«°ùdG äGô°TDƒe :9-3 ∫hóL (%) ádƒ«°ùdG äÉgÉŒG :16-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Table 3-9: Liquidity indicators (%) Chart 3-16: Trends in liquidity

BroadBroad lliquidityiquidity 779 26 Medium-termMedium-term lliquidityiquidity ((RightRight sscale)cale) 776 Measure 2010 2011 ¢SÉ« ŸG 24 773 2010 2011 ≤ 770

22 percent 667 É¡eƒ¡Øà ádƒ«°ùdG 20 664 Narrow liquidity 15.1 3.6 661 18 558 ≥«°†dG percent 16 555 É¡eƒ¡Øà ádƒ«°ùdG 552 Broad liquidity 23.5 19.6 ™°SGƒdG 14 449 446 12 443 Medium-term ióŸG ≈∏Y ádƒ«°ùdG 10 404 Apr-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Nov-11 A J A N Dec-10D O D Oct-11 Dec-11 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 J M M F J S Feb-11 75.7 46.8 Jul-11 Sep-11 u a u liquidity §°SƒàŸG e e

The customer funding gap34 provides a better IƒéØdG ∫ƒM π°†aCG ɪ¡ak 34AÓª©dÉH á°UÉÿG á«∏jƒªàdG IƒéØdG ôaƒJq understanding about the asset-liability gap in various .(10-3 ∫hóL) áØ∏àîŸG ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG äGP Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G ÚH maturity buckets (Table 3-10). The negative gap in ßØà– ∑ƒæÑdG ¿CG ô°übC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG ‘ á«Ñ∏°ùdG IƒéØdG ô¡¶Jh the shorter-term maturity buckets shows that banks IƒéØdG â« H óbh .ô°übC’G ÉLB’G äGP ™FGOƒdG øe ™ØJôe ºéëH continue to hold high volume of deposit at the shorter ≤ ∫ end. The positive funding gap in the higher end ‘ Ò«¨J ¿hO ≈∏YC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ á«HÉéjE’G á«∏jƒªàdG remained unaltered, while in the medium-term, the ¢SQÉÁ óbh .§°SƒàŸG ióŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ IÒÑc IOÉjR IƒéØdG äó¡°T ÚM gap increased substantially. Indeed, the increasing ≈∏Y §¨°†dG ¢†©H §°SƒàŸG ióŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ™bGƒdG ‘ óYÉ°üdG √ÉŒ’G trend in the medium term maturity bucket may put ¢UÉÿG ≥aGƒàdG ΩóY §Ñ°†H ∑ƒæÑdG Ωƒ≤J ÉeóæY ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG á«ëHQ some pressure on the banking sector profitability, when .πLC’G á∏jƒ£dG äÉHƒ∏£ŸG IOÉjR ≥jôW øY ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBÉH banks adjust their maturity mismatch by increasing their long term liabilities.

Table 3-10: Quarterly funding gap (%) (%) ájƒæ°ùdG ™HQ á«∏jƒªàdG IƒéØdG :10-3 ∫hóL

Maturity bucket Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 ¥É≤ëà°S’G IÎa

Overnight -524.9 -1205.4 -521.2 -641.9 -596.5 IóMGh á∏« d Less than 1 month (M) -5.2 -123.7 -194.3 -180.8 -109.5 óMGh ô¡°T øe πbCG Greater than 1M and up to 3M -113.5 -58.2 -26.2 -21.9 -157.2 Qƒ¡°T 3 ¤EG ô¡°T øe ÈcCG

Greater than 3M and up to 6M -27.3 -18.3 -25.6 32.8 -52.3 Qƒ¡°T 6 ¤EG 3 øe ÈcCG

Greater than 6M and up to 12M 1.8 -35.8 -126.3 10.7 40.7 Gô¡°Tk 12 ¤EG Qƒ¡°T 6 øe ÈcCG

Greater than 12M and up to 2 years 25.4 63.9 79.7 86.4 89.5 Úàæ°S ¤EG IóMGh áæ°S øe ÈcCG

Above 2 years 99.7 98.5 99.8 99.6 99.6 Úàæ°S øe ÌcCG

34 34 Defined as (Credit - Deposit)/ Credit .¿ÉªàF’G/(™FGOƒdG/¿ÉªàF’G) É¡fCG ≈∏Y áaô©ŸGq

113 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

To supplement the aforesaid analysis, a liquidity ±ó¡H ádƒ«°ù∏d QÉÑàNG AGôLEG ”q ,√ÓYCG OQGƒdG π«∏ëàdG ∫ɪμà°SG πLCG øe scenario test is conducted to assess the impact of a Öë°S §¨°†dG ƒjQÉæ«°S øª°†àjhq .ádƒ«°ùdG §¨°V ≈∏Y πªàëŸG ôKC’G º««≤J plausible liquidity stress. The stress scenario involves a deposit withdrawal and a non- roll-over of funded π«∏ëàdG Ò°ûjh .(19-3 QÉWEG) ádƒªŸGq äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ójóŒ ΩóYh ™FGOƒdG liabilities (Box 3-19). The analysis indicates varying ∑ƒæÑdG øe Éjk CG ¿CG hóÑj Óa .á«aô°üŸG äÉYƒªéŸG ÈY áJhÉØàe èFÉàf ¤EG results across bank groups. None of the Islamic banks AÉæãà°SÉH ,ä’É◊G ™«ªL ‘ ¢VÎØŸG §¨°†dÉH ôKCÉJ ób á«eÓ°SE’G appear to be affected by the assumed stress under ∑ƒμ°üdG) á«∏ëŸG á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒμ°üdG QGó°UEG iOCG ó≤a .¤hC’G á«°VôØdGq all scenarios, except for the first scenario. Issuance of domestic Islamic bonds (government bonds) during äGhOCÉH á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ®ÉØàMG Ú°ù– ¤EG ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN (á«eƒμ◊G the year improved the holding of Islamic bank’s liquid ,πHÉ≤ŸG ‘ .∑ƒæÑdG √òg πÑb øe ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG iƒà°ùe ø°ù–h ádƒ«°ùdG instruments resulted in an improvement in liquidity ∫ÉM ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ É°ük ≤f ¿É¡LGƒj ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑdG øe ÚæKG ¿q CG hóÑj management by these banks. On the contrary, two .¢VÎØŸG §¨°†dG QÉÑàN’ ɪ¡Yƒ°†N conventional banks appear to face liquidity shortage in case they subject to the assumed stress conditions.

Box 3-19: Risk of roll-over and premature withdrawal – ôμÑŸG Öë°ùdGh øjódG ójóŒ ôWÉfl : 19-3 QÉWEG - Implications for bank liquidity á«aô°üŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y áÑJΟG QÉKB’G The liquidity of the banking sector is subject to a stress ô¡°T É¡Jóe á«æeR IÎØd §¨°†dG øe ádÉ◊ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ´É°†NEG ºàj condition for a time span of a month. The following :á«dÉàdG äÉ°VGÎa’G Góîà°SG ÓN øe óMGh assumptions have been utilized. Ω ∫ 1. Non rollover of a certain percentage of customer á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ∫GƒeC’Gh AÓª©dG ™FGOh øe áæ«©e áÑ°ùf ójóŒ ΩóY.1 deposits and foreign inter-bank funds due for renewal .óMGh ô¡°T ∫ÓN ójóéà∏d á≤ëà°ùŸG during the course of a month. 35 2. Withdrawal of a certain percentage of time deposits . áæ«©e ¥É≤ëà°SG äGÎa ∫ÓN ≥ëà°ùJ »àdG πLC’ ™FGOƒdG øe áÑ°ùf Öë°S .2 35 across maturity buckets . .èFÉàæ∏d ¢ü«î∏J »∏j Ée ‘h .»∏ëŸG œÉædÉH Ü ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ πªàëŸG ¢ü≤ædG §HQ ” The possible liquidity shortfall is linked to GDP. The results are summarized as under. ∑ƒæÑdG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG á«eÓ°SE’G Commercial Foreign Islamic

ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤f øe ÊÉ©J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG OóY 366 ∫hC’G Number of banks short of liquidity Scenario (2011 ΩÉ©d »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG) ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤ædG 1.69 5.48 0.33 1 Shortfall in liquidity (% to 2011 GDP)

ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤f øe ÊÉ©J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG OóY 031 ÊÉãdG Number of banks short of liquidity Scenario (2011 ΩÉ©d »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG) ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤ædG 0.00 0.30 0.01 2 Shortfall in liquidity (% to 2011 GDP)

ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤f øe ÊÉ©J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG OóY 021 ådÉãdG Number of banks short of liquidity Scenario (2011 ΩÉ©d »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG) ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤ædG 0 0.23 0.01 3 Shortfall in liquidity (% to 2011 GDP)

ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤f øe ÊÉ©J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG OóY 011 ™HGôdG Number of banks short of liquidity Scenario (2011 ΩÉ©d »∏ëŸG œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG) ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢ü≤ædG 0.00 0.03 0.01 4 Shortfall in liquidity (% to 2011 GDP)

Scenario1: Liquidity available only from cash balances with the .…õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG iód ájó≤ædG ™FGOƒdG øe §≤a áMÉàe ádƒ«°ùdG :∫hC’G ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG central bank IOÉYEG äÉ«∏ªY ∫ÓN øe ∑ƒæÑ∏d ádƒ«°ùdG ôaƒàJ ,¤hC’G á«°VôØdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH :ÊÉãdG ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG Scenario2: In addition to scenario 1, liquidity is available to the banks .AGô°ûdG through Repo operations Scenario 3: In addition to scenario 2, liquidity is available through ∫ƒ°UCÓd äÉHƒë°ùdG ‘É°U ∫ÓN øe ádƒ«°ùdG ôaƒàJ ,á«fÉãdG á«°VôØdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH :ådÉãdG ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG net domestic inter-bank asset withdrawals .∑ƒæÑdG ÚH á«∏ëŸG Scenario 4: In addition to scenario 3, liquidity available through ÈY ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ∫ƒ°UC’G ∫ÓN øe ádƒ«°ùdG ôaƒàJ ,áãdÉãdG á«°VôØdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH :™HGôdG ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG cross-border interbank asset (up to 1 month) with a 25% haircut. .%25 º°üN áÑ°ùf ™e (óMGh ô¡°T ≈àM) Ohó◊G

35 35 The three major assumptions underlying the stress test are as follows. First, a high ºàj ’ óMGh ô¡°T ∫ÓN á≤ëà°ùŸG AÓª©dG ™FGOh øe IÒÑc áÑ°ùf ¿CG ,’hk CG :»∏j Ée á«°ù«FôdG çÓãdG äÉ°VGÎa’G πª°ûJ percentage of customer deposits with maturity up to 1 month are not rolled over during ,¢UÉÿG ,º« ŸG ÒZ ãe) ÚYOƒŸG äÉÄa Ö°ùM IOóéŸG ÒZ ™FGOƒdG áÑ°ùf ähÉØàJh .(§¨°†dG IÎa) ô¡°ûdG ÓN ÉgójóŒ the month (stress period). The percentage of deposit not rolled over varies across the ≤ π ∫ categories of depositors (e.g., non-resident, private, government, etc). Second, a certain 3 ¤EG óMGh ô¡°T) ∫ÓN á≤ëà°ùŸGh ,ô¡°ûdG ∫ÓN ™FGOƒdG øe áæ«©e áÑ°ùf Öë°S ºàj ,É«fÉKk .(äÉÄØdG øe ÉgÒZh ,»eƒμ◊G percentage of deposits with maturity (1-3 months, 3-6 months, and 6 months to 1 year) are áÑ°ùf ¿EG ,ÉãdÉKk .¥É≤ëà°S’G IÎa äOGR ɪ∏q c Öë°ùdG áaÉãc ¢VÉØîfG ™e (IóMGh áæ°S ¤EG Qƒ¡°T 6h ,Qƒ¡°T 6 ¤EG Qƒ¡°T 3 ,Qƒ¡°T withdrawn during the month with a decrease in the intensity of withdrawal as the maturity á«∏fi ∑ƒæH iód á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh ∑ƒæÑdG É¡àYOhCG »àdGh ,óMGh ô¡°T ¬Jóe ¥É≤ëà°SG πLCG äGP ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ∫GƒeC’G øe áæ«©e duration increases. Third, a certain percentage of inter-bank funds with maturity up to 1 .ô¡°ûdG ÓN ÉgójóŒ ºàj ’ ô£b ádhO êQÉN IOƒLƒe month placed by banks and financial institutions outside Qatar with domestic banks are ∫ not rolled over during the month.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 114 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

The increase in demand for foreign currency credit OɪàYG ójGõJ ¤EG á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ‘ IOÉjõdG äOq CG resulted in an increased dependence by the banking ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«dhódG ∑ƒæÑdG øe á∏ª÷ÉH ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG sector on wholesale funds from international banks ∫ÓN á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©∏d ájΰûŸG äÉÄ«¡dG ∑ƒæÑdG âëÑ°UCGh .(17-3 (Chart 3-17). Banks became net purchasers of foreign k currency during almost all the months of 2011 (See ¿q CG ¤EG Ò°ûj ɇ ,(5 π°üØdG ô¶fG) 2011 ΩÉY øe ÉÑjô≤J É¡∏c ô¡°TC’G Chapter 5) indicating banks might have swapped a Ö∏£dG á«Ñ∏àd á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dÉH É¡àdƒ«°S øe AõL ádOÉÑà âeÉb ób ∑ƒæÑdG portion of their domestic currency liquidity to meet Ωɶf ≥«Ñ£J πX ‘ ,¬fq CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dG ≈∏Y ójGõàŸG the increased demand for foreign currency. Even á«≤H ™e á«dÉŸG äÓeÉ©ŸG øe ÒÑc AõL OGó°S ºàj å«M) á∏ª©dG §HQ though in a pegged regime (with major portion of ¬fCG ’EG ,IOhófi ±ô°üdG ô©°S ôWÉfl Èà©J (á£ÑJôŸG á∏ª©dÉH ⁄É©dG the financial transactions with rest of the world being á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH É¡jód ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl áÑbGôe ƒæÑdG Y Ú©àjq ób settled through the pegged currency) exchange rate ∑ ≈∏ Gòg ‘ .á«ÑæL’GC äÓª©dG ≈∏Y Ö∏£dÉH AÉaƒdG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG IQób - risk is limited, banks might have to monitor their foreign 36 currency liquidity risk – the ability of the banks to meet ≈∏Y QOÉb ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ¿CG ßMƒd , §¨°†dG ƒjQÉæ«°S πX ‘h QÉWE’G their foreign currency demand. In that context, under á∏FÉ°ùdG äGOƒLƒŸG øe á«ÑæLq C’G äÓª©dG øe á«aÉ°Vq E’G äÉÑ∏q £àŸG á«Ñ∏J a stressed scenario36, it is observed that the banking .á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH system is able to meet the additional requirements of foreign currency from their liquid foreign currency assets.

Chart 3-17 : Foreign currency credit and reliance ≈∏Y OɪàY’Gh á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dG :17-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ on foreign banks37 37 á«ÑæLq C’G ∑ƒæÑdG

200 180 160 140 120 100 80 QR Billion QR 60 40 20 0 J N D J N D Jul-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jul-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-10 J Jun-10 J A Aug-10 Sep-10 S Jan-11 J Jun-11 J Aug-11 A Sep-11 S M A M O M A M O Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Oct-10 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Oct-11 Feb-10 Feb-11 F F u u a u a u e e u e u e p p o e o e

FC credit Assets with foeign banks Liability to foreign banks

Market risk (Interest rate) (IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG) ¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉfl As discussed earlier, the banking sector has higher Ωƒ°üÿG øe ≈∏YCG ∫ó©e ,≥HÉ°S âbh ‘ Éæ°ûbÉf ɪc ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG iód rate-sensitive liabilities at shorter end of the maturity ‘ ô°übC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G ïjQÉJ äGP IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ äGÒ¨à∏d á°SÉ°ù◊G bucket, while they have higher rate-sensitive assets at the longer end. Accordingly, an increase in interest IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ äGÒ¨à∏d á°SÉ°ù◊G ∫ƒ°UC’G øe ≈∏YCG ∫ó©e ¬jód ÚM rate at the shorter end might negatively affect the ô©°S ‘ IOÉjõdG ∑ÎJ ób ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .∫ƒWC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G ïjQÉJ äGP profitability of the sector, since surplus liabilities are IOÉYEG ºàJ å«M ´É£≤dG á«ëHQ ≈∏Y É«Ñk ∏°S GôKk CG ô°übC’G ióŸG ‘ IóFÉØdG re-priced faster than assets, owing to the increase in IOÉjõdG ÖÑ°ùH ∂dPh ,∫ƒ°UC’G øe ´ô°SCG πμ°ûH á°†FÉØdG Ωƒ°üÿG Ò©°ùJ interest rates. However, the current global scenario and the monetary policy initiatives taken by QCB during äGQOÉÑŸGh ‹É◊G »ŸÉ©dG ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG Ò°ûj ,∂dP ™eh .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ the year appear to suggest a low interest rate regime ∫ÓN …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ÉgòîJG »àdG ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG in the medium term (See Chapter 2). The extant data ô¶fG) §°SƒàŸG ióŸG ≈∏Y ΩɶædG ‘ IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG ΩÉ©dG suggest that average interest spread declined during äÉbhôØdG §°Sƒàe ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG á«dÉ◊G äÉfÉ«ÑdG Ò°ûJ ɪc .(2 π°üØdG the year, impacting the profitability of banks (Table 3-11). During 2011, the marginal cost of deposits has ∫hóL) ∑ƒæÑdG á«ëHQ ≈∏Y ôKDƒj ɇ ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ÚH fallen by a magnitude that is greater than the marginal ÈcCG πμ°ûH ™FGOƒ∏d ájó◊G áØ∏μàdG â°†ØîfG ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓNh .(11-3

36 36 30% increase in foreign currency credit, assuming the banking system liquid foreign ∫ƒ°UC’G) á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH á∏FÉ°ùdG ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ∫ƒ°UCG ¿CG ¢VGÎaG ≈∏Y ,á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dG ‘ IOÉjR %30 currency assets( assets with foreign banks branches) remains at levels. .Iô≤à°ùe ≈≤ÑJ (á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ´hôa ™e 37 37 Foreign banks include international banks and branches and head office outside Qatar .ô£b ádhO êQÉN á«°ù«FôdGq ÖJÉμŸGh ´hôØdGh á«dhódG ∑ƒæÑdG á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG πª°ûJ

115 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J return on loans. Considering the present deposit ™e ™FGOƒ∏d ‹É◊G ƒªædG ¤EG ô¶ædÉHh .¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y …ó◊G óFÉ©dG øe growth, as credit growth improves, banks might need ÜòL πLCG øe AÓª©dG õ«Ø– ¤EG ∑ƒæÑdG êÉà– ób ,¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ ø°ù–q to incentivize customers in order to attract deposits, leading to an increase in domestic interest rates, and ≈∏Y ÒKCÉàdG ,‹ÉàdÉHh ,á«∏ëŸG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG IOÉjR ¤EG …ODƒj ɇ ,™FGOƒdG in turn, impinge on bank profitability. .∑ƒæÑdG á«ëHQq

Table 3-11: Implicit deposit and lending rates (%) (%) á«æª°†dG ¢VGôbE’Gh ´GójE’G ä’ó©eq :11-3 ∫hóL

áæ°ùdG ™FGOƒdG áØ∏μJ ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG ¥ôØdG Year Cost of deposit Return on credit Spread

2008 3.17 7.12 3.95

2009 3.56 7.26 3.70

2010 2.63 6.71 4.08

2011 1.50 5.31 3.81

In order to investigate the impact of an adverse π«∏– AGôLEG ”q ,IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ á«Ñq ∏°ùdG ácô◊G ÒKCÉJ á°SGQO πLCG øe movement in interest rates, Earnings at Risk (EAR) ¢SÉ°SCG ᣠf 100 QGó à IOÉjR c HÉ ªa . 38ôWÉîª d á°Vô©ŸGq ìÉHQCÓd 38 ≤ ≤ π π ≤ ∏ exercise has been conducted. For a 100 basis points øe πNódG ‘É°U ‘ ™LGôJ ßMƒd ,»∏μdG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ increase in interest rates, at the aggregate level, net ¿q CG ÉÃh .2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b ÉjQ QÉ« e 2^3 ᪫ H IóFÉØdG interest income (NII) of banks was found to decline ∫ ∏ ≤ by QR 2.3 billion at end-December 2011. Since the ´ÉØJQG …ODƒj ,Ò°ü≤dG ióŸG ‘ "áÑdÉ°S" Iƒéa ô¡¶j ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG banking system exhibits ‘negative’ gap at the shorter- ‘ ´ÉØJQ’G ¥ƒØj QGó≤à áYƒaóŸG óFGƒØdG ´ÉØJQG ¤EG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG end, the rise in interest rate leads to a rise in interest .áé«àædG √òg ô°ùØjq …òdG ôeC’G ,á°VƒÑ≤ŸG óFGƒØdG øe πNódG expense that outpaces the rise in interest income, which explains this result. Market risk (investment portfolio) (ájQɪãà°S’G ßaÉëŸG) ¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉfl Increased opportunities on account of large-scale ìôWh ™°SGh ¥É£f ≈∏Y äGóæ°ùdG QGó°UEG π°†ØH áMÉàŸG ¢UôØdG OÉjORG øμq e bond issuance and introduction treasury bills have ájQɪãà°S’G ¬à¶Øfi á«Ñq ∏ZCG ™°Vh øe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG áfGõÿG ¿hPCG enabled the banking sector to hold a majority of its äGóæ°ùdG â °Uh , dòd áé«àfh .ôWÉîŸG á°†ØîæŸG ƒ°UC’G äÉÄa øª°V investment portfolio under these low-risk categories of ∏ ∂ ∫ assets. Consequently, bank’s holding of government/ ∑ƒæÑdG É¡H ßØà– »àdG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe äÉfhPCG /á«eƒq μ◊G QCB bills reached around 70% of total investments %50 ƒëæH áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ äGQɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG øe %70 ƒëf ¤EG in 2011 from less than 50% in 2010. Even though IÒ°ü≤dG äGQɪãà°S’G á°üM ´ÉØJQG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .2010 ΩÉY ‘ the share of short-term investments increased from ¤EG É°SÉ°So CG Oƒ©j ´ÉØJQ’G Gòg ¿Éc ,%13^1 ¤EG %10 ‹GƒM øe πLC’G around 10% to 13.1%, this was mainly on account âeÉb óbh .(Ü h CG 18-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ‘ äGQɪãà°S’G of investments in treasury bills (Chart 3-18A & B). Reflecting the unsettled situation in equity markets, ¢†ØîH ,º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ Iô≤à°ùŸG ÒZ ádÉ◊G ¢ùμ©j πμ°ûH ,∑ƒæÑdG banks lowered their share of investments in equities: Ȫ°ùjO ‘ %20 ‹GƒM øe ∂dPh º¡°SC’G ‘ äGQɪãà°S’G øe É¡à°üMq from around 20% in December 2010 to below 10% by ‘ ôeC’G Gòg iOq CG óbh .2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ %10 ¿hO Ée ¤EG 2010 end December 2011. This, in effect, also lowered the »Ø°†jh .º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S ™LGôJ øY áªLÉædG ôWÉîŸG ¢†ØN ¤EG ™bGƒdG risk emanating from a decline in the equity market. A Gòg ≈∏Y á«bGó°üe º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S ô°TDƒe ‘ %75 áÑ°ùæH ¢VÉØîf’G §¨°V stress of 75% decline in the equity market index lends Ée ¢SCGQ á«©°Vh Y Ó«Ä°Vk Gô°TÉÑek GÒKk CÉJ §¨°†dG °T å«M ,ôeC’G credence to this fact. The stress is found to exert a ∫ ≈∏ πμ negligible direct impact on the capital position of .á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG domestic banks.

38 38 Earnings at risk (EAR), which provides a short-term (usually up to 1 year) view of interest ióe IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉîŸ (IóMGh áæ°S ¤EG IOÉYk π°üJ) πLC’G IÒ°üb ájDhQ Ωó≤J »àdGh ôWÉîª∏d á°Vô©ŸGq ìÉHQC’G ¢ù«≤J rate risk, measures the extent by which net income might change in the event of an adverse .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ »Ñ∏°ùdG Ò¨àdGq ∫ÉM ‘ πNódG ‘É°U Ò¨Jq change in interest rates.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 116 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

ájQɪãà°S’G á¶ØëŸG ‘ ájô¡°ûdG äGÒ¨àdGq :CG18-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ äGQɪãà°S’G ¤EG º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S äGQɪãà°SG :Ü18-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d πLC’G IÒ°ü≤dG (%) Chart 3-18A: Monthly changes in banking Chart 3-18B: Equity market investment to sector investments short-term investment (% share)

180 220 25 160 118 140 116 20 120 114 121 100 101 15 80 8 QR billion QR 60 6 percent 10 40 4 20 2 5 0 0 Jul-11 Ju Jan-11 Ja Jun-11 Ju Oct-11 Oc Feb-11Fe Apr-11 Ap Sep-11Se Dec-10 De Dec-11 De Mar-11M Aug-11 Au Nov-11 No May-11M 0 A J A N Nov'11 Apr'11 Jun'11 Aug'11 Dec'10D Oct'11 O Dec'11D J F M M J S Jan'11 Feb'11 Mar'11 May'11 Jul'11 Sep'11 u a u e e

Investments share of short-term investments (Right Scale)

Market risk (exchange rate) (±ô°üdG ô©°S) ¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉfl Net open positions of the banking sector increased IƒéØdG ´É°ùJG ™e ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d áMƒàØŸG õcGôŸG ‘É°U ™ØJQG during the year with a widening of the positive gap ô©°S ôWÉfl ¿q CG ’EG .á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G ÚH á«HÉéjE’G between foreign currency assets and foreign currency liabilities. However with around 80% of foreign á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ∫ƒ°UC’G øe %80 ‹GƒM ¿q C’ IOhófi hóÑJ ±ô°üdG currency assets and nearly 90% of foreign currency .»μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH áeƒ≤e á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH Ωƒ°üÿG øe %90 ‹GƒMh liabilities being denominated in US Dollars, the ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæLk á«ŸÉ©dG IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ‘ πªàëŸG ø°ùëàdG ¤EG ô¶ædÉHh exchange rate risk appears to be limited. Considering ,iôNC’G á«°ù«FôdG äÓª©dG HÉ e » jôeC’G Q’hódG ᪫b ¢VÉØîfG ™e a possible upturn in the global interest rate scenario π ≤ μ along with a depreciation of the USD against other …ô£≤dG ∫ÉjôdG ᪫b ™ØJôJ ¿CG Ò°ü≤dG ióŸG ‘ íLôŸG ÒZ øe ¿EÉa major currencies, an appreciation of the Qatari Riyal in á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G πμq °ûJh .»μjôeC’G Q’hódG πHÉ≤e the near-term does not appear likely. Foreign currency %10 øe bCG ÊÉHÉ«dG ÚdGh hQƒ«dGh »æ«dΰSE’G ¬«æ÷Éc iôNC’G á«°ù«FôdG assets and liability in other major currencies including π GB Pound, Euro and JP Yen is well below 10% of total ∫ƒ°UC’G ™jRƒJ ô¡¶jh .á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLGE øe foreign currency assets/liabilities. The distribution of "¿ÉªàF’G" ¿CG »μjôeC’G Q’hódG ÒZ çÓãdG äÓª©dG √òg ÚH Ωƒ°üÿGh assets and liabilities in these three non-US Dollar √òg øjƒμJ ‘ ÈcC’G á°ü◊G ¿ÓãÁ "á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG iód ∫ƒ°UC’G"h currencies shows that ‘credit’ and ‘assets with foreign " " " " banks’ account for the major share in the asset á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d äÉHƒ∏£ŸG h AÓª©dG ™FGOh ¿CG ÚM ‘ ∫ƒ°UC’G composition, whereas ‘deposit from customers’ and º°SQ) á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH Ωƒ°üÿG øe ÈcC’G á°ü◊G ≈∏Y äPƒëà°SG ‘liabilities to foreign banks’ constitute the major share .(Üh CG 19-3 ÊÉ«H in their foreign currency liabilities (Chart 3.19A & B).

á«ÑæLq C’G äÓª©dÉH ∫ƒ°UC’G øjƒμJ :CG19-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ á«ÑæLq C’G äÓª©dÉH Ωƒ°üÿG øjƒμJ :Ü19-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 3-19 A: Composition of FC Asset Chart 3-19 B: Composition of FC Liabilities

120 70

100 60 50 80 40 60

percent 30 percent 40 20

20 10

0 0 USDUSD GBPGBP EUREUR USDUSD GBPGBP EUREUR

Credit Due from banks Securities protfolio Customer deposit Due to banks Debt securities

117 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Concentration risk õcÎdGq ôWÉfl Concentration risk in the banking sector is monitored ᫪«¶æàdG íFGƒ∏dG ∫ÓN øe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ õcÎdGq ôWÉfl áÑbGôe ºàJq through prudential regulations. Accordingly, the óMGƒdG 𫪩dG ¢Vô©àdq ≈°übC’G ó◊G Oóëjq ,∂dòd Ék ≤ahh .á«WƒëàdGq maximum limit for a single customer exposure (the áYƒªéŸ É¡ëæe ø Á »àdG á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdGh äGQɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG) total investments and credit facilities that can be μ granted to his borrower group) is capped at 25% of ≈∏Yh .¬JÉ«WÉ«àMGh ∂æÑdG ∫ɪ°SCGQ øe %25 ƒëæH (¬H á°UÉÿG ¢VGôbE’G the bank's capital and reserves. Notwithstanding OóY ‘ ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ¢Vhôb õcÎJq ,᫪«¶æàdGq Oƒ«≤dG √òg øe ºZôdG these regulatory limits, private sector credit remains ´É£≤dG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ≥∏b Qó°üe ™FGOƒdG õcôJq ≈≤Ñjh .AÓª©dG øe π«∏b concentrated among few customers. Deposit AÓªY øe ™FGOh /¢Vhôb AÓªY 10 ºgCG á°üM ™jRƒJ Ò°ûjh .‘ô°üŸG concentration also remains a concern for the banking sector. The frequency distribution of the share of top á°ü◊G ¿q CG ¤EG ,∑ƒæÑdG øe ÒÑc OóY ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ,¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG 10 private sector credit/deposit customers indicates, ∫hóL) ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ™FGOh /¢Vhôb ‹ÉªLEG øe %40 øe ÌcCG πμ°ûJ for a large number of banks, the share constitutes ¢SÉ≤J »àdG – ¿ÉªàF’G õcôJq ôWÉfl áÑ°ùf äó¡°T ,∂dP ™eh .(13-3 more than 40% of their total private sector credit/ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ d »°SÉ°SC’G ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ¤EG ÒÑ dG ¢Vô©àdG øe áÑ°ùæc deposits (Table 3-13). However, credit concentration ≤∏ ∫ μ risk - measured as a ratio of large exposure (total credit 10 ºgC’ áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEÉH ¢SÉ≤j ÒÑμdG ¢Vô©àdG ¿CG ɪk ∏Y) provided to top 10 private sector customers in each ‘) %111 øe É°VÉØîfGk (∂æH πc ‘ ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG AÓªY øe AÓªY bank) to tier-1 capital - of the banking sector declined .(2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘) %107 ¤EG (2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f from 111% (at end-December 2010) to 107% (at end- December 2011).

Table 3-13: Concentration of private sector credit q and deposit ¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG ™FGOhh ¢Vhôb õcôJ :13-3 ∫hóL

õcÎdGq áÑ°ùæH á°UÉÿG äGÎØdG Class interval of percentage share of concentration

%10 øe πbCG 10%- 20% 20%-40% 40%-60% %60 øe ÌcCG Below 10% Above 60% ∑ƒæÑdG OóY Number of banks Credit ¢Vhô≤dG 12464 Deposit ™FGOƒdG 21365

Systemic Risk á«eɶædGq ôWÉîŸG The Bank of International Settlements defines systemic π°ûa ô£N" É¡fCG ≈∏Y á«eɶædG ôWÉîŸG á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH ±ô©jq risk as “the risk that the failure of a participant to meet õéY ¤EG …ODƒj ób ɇ ájóbÉ©àdG ¬JÉeGõàdÉH AÉaƒdG ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûŸG óMCG its contractual obligations may in turn cause other »àdG ©ØdG OhOQ øe á °ù °S øª°V øjódG OGó°S øY øjôNB’G ÚcQÉ°ûŸG participants to default with a chain reaction leading π ∏ ∏ to broader financial difficulties”. Recent studies on »àdG äÉ°SGQódG â°ûbÉf óbh ."¥É£ædG á©°SGh á«dÉe äÉHƒ©°U ¤EG …ODƒJ systemic risk in the banking sector have also discussed ihó©dG ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ á«eɶædGq ôWÉîŸG ∫ƒM GôNk Dƒe âjôLCG the contagion that arises from the interconnectedness äÉ°SGQódG √òg Ωóîà°ùJh .∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ §HGÎdG øY áªLÉædG in the interbank market. In order to understand the ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°ù d Ió ©ŸG á©«Ñ£dG º¡a LCG øe áMÉàŸG äÉ«é¡æŸG complex nature of the interbank market, these studies ∑ ∏ ≤ π used methodologies available for analyzing the network .(20-3 QÉWEG) äÉμÑ°ûdG á«æH π«∏ëàd topologies (Box 3-20).

Box 3-20: Network topology of domestic inter-bank á«q ∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ôWÉîª∏d ¢Vô©àdGq áμÑ°T Ö«côJ :20-3 QÉWEG exposure

Network maps the chains of inter-bank claims. In normal …ODƒj ,…OÉ©dG ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG ‘ .∑ƒæÑdG ÚH äÉÑdÉ£ŸG π°SÓ°S áμÑ°ûdG §FGôN πã“ scenario, a high interconnectedness in the network çhóM ÉM ‘h .ádƒ«°ùdG Y ƒ°ü G ¢Uôa Ú°ù– ¤EG á Ñ°ûdG ‘ ‹É©dG §HGÎdG improves access to liquidity. During a stressed condition ∫ ≈∏ ∫ ◊ μ however, the interconnections can amplify shocks and QGô≤à°SG áYõYRh äÉeó°üdG º«î°†J ¤EG §HGÎdG …ODƒj ¿CG øμÁ ,Iójó°T •ƒ¨°V destabilize the financial system. Following well-defined ¢üëa ” ,áμÑ°ûdG Ö«cÎH ¢üàîj Ée ‘ ⁄É©ŸG áë°VGh ÒHGóJ ´ÉÑJEÉHh .‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG measures of network structure, we have examined the

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 118 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

topology of the domestic inter-bank structure of all the ºàJh .Ék μæH 17 ÉgOóY ≠∏Ñj »àdG á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ôWÉîª∏d ¢Vô©àdG áμÑ°T Ö«côJ 17 banks. We consider only the net exposure of a bank øe ’óHk §≤a áμÑ°ûdG ‘ iôNCG Ió≤©d (Ió≤©dG) ∂æÑ∏d ‘É°üdG ¢Vô©àdG á°SGQO (node) to another node in the network rather than the cross exposures and liabilities among two individual nodes. ÊÉ«ÑdG º°SôdG á£jôN ™°Vh ó©Hh .ÚàjOôa ÚJó≤Y ÚH Ωƒ°üÿGh »©WÉ≤àdG ¢Vô©àdG After mapping the directed graph of the network topology áμÑ°ûdG Ö«côJ 39 ¢üFÉ°üN á°SGQO ºàJ ,(1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) áμÑ°ûdG Ö«cÎd á¡LƒŸG (Chart 1), the characteristics39 of the network structure such eigenvector h in-degree, out-degree, cluster coefficient ãe as in-degree, out-degree, cluster coefficient, eigenvector π centrality, etc are examined for the domestic inter-bank .(∫hóL) á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH √ôNBG ¤EGcentrality market (Table).

– ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ôWÉîª∏d ¢Vô©àdG áμÑ°T Ö«côJ ¢üFÉ°üN :∫hóL 2011 Ȫ°ùjO áμÑ°ûdG πμ«g :ÊÉ«H º°SQ Table: Characteristics of interbank Chart: Network structure – December 2011 network topology

Min Max. Average Median

In-degree 0.0 7.0 2.9 3.0

Out-degree 0.0 6.0 2.9 3.0

Eigenvector 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 centrality

Clustering 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.4 coefficient

The network map suggests that, banks with high exposure ,∫ÉŸG õcGôe) ôWÉîª∏d ™ØJôŸG ¢Vô©àdG äGP ∑ƒæÑdG ¿CG ¤EG áμÑ°ûdG á£jôN Ò°ûJ (money centers, colored red) have their exposure ¿CG »æ©j …òdG ôeC’G ,ó ©dG øe ójó©dG Y ÉYRƒek É¡°Vô©J ¿ƒ j (ôªMC’G ¿ƒ dÉH distributed across many nodes, implying the risk is less ≤ ≈∏ q μ ∏ concentrated. However, some of these money centers have ¢Vô©àdGq øe á«dÉY áÑ°ùf É¡jód √òg ∫ÉŸG õcGôe ¢†©H ¿q CG ’EG .GõcôJk πbCG ô£ÿG high exposure (red arrows) to banks with low exposure, Ú°VÎ≤ŸG øe ¿ƒμJ Ée IOÉY »àdG ¢†ØîæŸG ¢Vô©àdG äGP ∑ƒæÑ∏d (AGôª◊G º¡°SC’G) which are typically borrowers in the system. The measures k of characteristics of the network topology also suggest Èà©jh .A»°ûdG ¢ùØf ¤EG É°†jCG áμÑ°ûdG Ö«côJ ¢üFÉ°üN ¢ù«jÉ≤e Ò°ûJh .ΩɶædG ‘ the same. The distribution of in-degree as well as out- /äÉeGõàdG ºéæJ ,§°SƒàŸG ‘h .¬à©«Ñ£H ÉjOÉYk out-degreeh in-degree ™jRƒJ degree is normal in nature. On an average, banks haves ¢SÉ«≤e ∫ójh .ihó©dG ô£N øe óëj ɇ ∑ƒæH 3 øe ÌcCG øY ∑ƒæÑdG ¢Vô©J their liabilities/exposures stemming from more than 3 banks, limiting the contagion risk. Eigenvector centrality É¡JÉeGõàdG / É¡°Vô©J å«M øe ∑ƒæÑdG ᫪gCG ≈∏Y Eigenvector centrality measure indicates the importance of banks in terms of their øe Qó≤dG ¢ùØf É¡jód áμÑ°ûdG ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ¿q CG ¤EG ᪫≤dG ¢VÉØîfG Ò°ûjh .áμÑ°ûdG ‘ exposure/ liability in the network. A low value indicates ¿CG ¤EG clustering coefficient - §HGÎdG ¢SÉ«b ™jRƒJ Ò°ûjh .ÉÑjôk J ᫪gC’G banks in the network have more or less equal importance. ≤ The distribution of the measure of inter-connectedness – .¢†©ÑdG É¡°†©H ™e ∫óà©e πμ°ûH á£HGÎe ó≤©dG º¶©e ‘clustering coefficient’ indicates that, most of the nodes are moderately interconnected among each other.

Cross-border risks á«LQÉÿGq ôWÉîŸG Banks widen their outreach by establishing footprints êQÉN É¡d ´hôa AÉ°ûfEG ∫ÓN øe ÉgQÉ°ûàfG ¥É£f ™«°SƒàH ∑ƒæÑdG Ωƒ≤J outside the country’s borders. Cross-border banking ™jƒæJ Y ƒæÑdG Ohó G ÈY á«aô°üŸG äÉeóÿG óYÉ°ùJh .OÓÑdG OhóM helps banks to diversify their balance sheet, in turn, ≈∏ ∑ ◊ enabling them to benefits from diversification. However, ájOÉ°üàb’G ±hô¶dG ¿q CG ’EG .™jƒæàdG øe IOÉØà°S’G øe É¡æμq “h É¡JÉ«fGõ«e adverse economic and financial conditions of the rest »∏ëŸG ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y ôKDƒJ ¿CG øμÁ êQÉÿG ‘ á°ùcÉ©ŸG á«dÉŸGh of the world can affect the domestic banking sector through negative spillover effects. This contagion effect ≥FGƒ©dG ºgCG øe ihó©dG ôKCG Èà©jh .á«Ñ∏°ùdG á«ÑfÉ÷G QÉKB’G ∫ÓN øe is considered as the most important disadvantage of .á«LQÉÿGq á«aô°üŸGq äÉeóÿÉH á°UÉÿG á«JGƒŸG ÒZ ´É°VhC’Gh cross-border banking. 39 39 In-degree=Number of net exposures to an individual bank. Out-degree= Number of Ωƒ°üÿG ‘É°U OóY = Out-degree .óMGh ∂æH ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ôWÉîª∏d ¢Vô©àdG ‘É°U ä’ÉM OóY = In-degree net liability of an individual bank. Cluster coefficient= Clustering in networks measures how Eigenvector centrality .Ió Y c •ÉÑJQG ióe äÉ Ñ°T øª°V ™«ªéàdG ¢ù« j = Cluster coefficient .óMGh æÑd interconnected each node is. Eigenvector centrality= Measure of the importance of a node ≤ π μ ≤ ∂ in a network. It assigns relative score to all nodes in the network based on the principle that á«dÉ©dG ó≤©dÉH •ÉÑJQ’G ¿CG CGóÑe ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y áμÑ°ûdG ‘ ó≤©dG πμd á«Ñ°ùf áLQO »£©j ƒgh .áμÑ°ûdG ‘ Ió≤Y OƒLh ᫪gCG ¢SÉ«b = connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node in question .∞«æ°üàdG á°†ØîæŸG ó≤©dÉH •ÉÑJQ’G øe Ió≤©dG áLQO ‘ ÈcCG πμ°ûH º¡°ùj ∞«æ°üàdG than equal connections to low-scoring nodes.

119 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Out of 10 Qatari banks, only two banks have cross- ɪæ«H ,êQÉÿG ‘ ÉYhôak §≤a ÚμæH iód ,ájô£b ∑ƒæH 10 π°UCG øeh border branch presence, while all the other banks Ò°ûjh .ô£b ‘ É¡Yhôa ∫ÓN øe á«LQÉÿG ɡࣰûfCG ∑ƒæÑdG á«≤H ôjóJ conduct cross-border activities through their branches ´É£ dG ¿CG ¤EG á«LQÉÿG ôWÉîª d á«ëŸG ƒæÑdG ¢Vô©J ‹ÉªLEG in Qatar. The aggregate cross-border exposure of the ≤ ∏ ∏ ∑ domestic banks indicates, the banking sector in Qatar 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ÒÑc πμ°ûH ¢Vô©àdG Gòg øe OGR ób ô£b ‘ ‘ô°üŸG 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ÒÑc πμ°ûH ¢Vô©àdG Gòg øe OGR ób ô£b ‘ ‘ô°üŸG has increased their exposure considerably during 40 2011(Table 3-14). Overall cross-border assets40 of the ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh .(14-3 ∫hóL) domestic banks stood at QR 113.2 billion, an increase ΩÉbQC’ÉH áfQÉ≤e %28^5 ÉgQób IOÉjõH ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 113^2 á«∏ëŸG of 28.5% over end-December 2010 figures. As in the ΩÉ©dG ‘ ∫É◊G âfÉc ɪch .2010 ΩÉY øe Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ á∏é°ùŸG previous year, a sizable portion of the cross-border .AÓª©∏d ¢Vhôb πμ°T ≈∏Y á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G øe ÒÑc AõL ¿Éc ,≥HÉ°ùdG assets are in the form of customer credit. Placement/ k lending with foreign financial institutions also increased IOÉjR É°†jCG á«ÑæLC’G á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG iód ¢VGôbE’G /´GójE’G OGORG ɪc significantly during the year. .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN IÒÑc

Table 3-14: Cross-border assets of domestic á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G :14-3 ∫hóL banks (QR billion) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e) 2009 Ȫ°ùjO 2010 Ȫ°ùjO 2011 Ȫ°ùjO 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ÚH áfQÉ≤e (%) ƒªædG December December December Ȫ°ùjOh 2009 2010 2011 Growth (%) (Dec-11 over Dec-10) Total cross-border asset 83.4 97.1 113.2 á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG »μæÑdG ´É£≤dG ∫ƒ°UCG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG á°ü◊G (%) Share to total banking sector asset (%) Total cross-border assets 19.2 16.8 17.2 28.5 á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG Cross-border credit 4.3 3.9 4.0 29.1 »LQÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G Assets with foreign banks 9.0 7.4 8.4 41.8 á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG iód ∫ƒ°UC’G Investments ¤EG IÒ°ü dG) äGQɪãà°S’G 0.2 0.2 0.2 29.8 ≤ (Short-to medium-term) (πLC’G ᣰSƒàŸG Investments (Long-term) 5.8 5.2 4.6 9.3 (πLC’G á∏jƒ£dG) äGQɪãà°S’G

In terms of regional diversification, the GCC and other ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO á°üM ≠∏ÑJ ,»ª«∏bE’G ´ƒæàdÉHq ¢üàîjq Ée ‘ ÉeCG MENA region account for around 50% of the total ‹GƒM É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe øe ÉgÒZh »é«∏ÿG cross-border assets, whereas the share of Europe is Üô≤j Ée ÉHhQhCG á°üM ≠∏ÑJ ÚM ‘ ,á«LQÉÿGq ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG øe %50 roughly 33% (Chart 3.20A). In particular, cross border ádhO ¤EG Ohó G ÈY ƒ°UC’G Èà©Jh .(CG20-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) %33 øe assets to UAE is the highest at around 22%. Funds ◊ ∫ with financial institution comprise the major portion of ∫GƒeC’G πμ°ûJh .%22 ‹GƒM πμ°ûJ å«M ≈∏YC’G IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G assets in Europe and North American regions, while a ∫ɪ°Th ÉHhQhCG ‘ ∫ƒ°UC’G øe ÈcC’G Aõ÷G á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸÉH á°UÉÿG diversified distribution of cross border assets in GCC ¢ù∏› ∫hO á≤£æe ‘ á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G ™jRƒJ Èà©j ÚM ‘ ,ÉμjôeCG region is in evidence (Chart 3.20B). .(Ü20-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ÉYƒæàek »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG In order to estimate the potential losses in case of an ,IOÉM á«dÉe äÉHGô£°VG çhóM ∫ÉM ‘ á∏ªàëŸG ôFÉ°ùÿG º««≤J πLCG øe extreme financial distress situation, the cross-border øe á«q ëŸG ƒæÑ d á«LQÉÿG ƒ°UC’G Y 41§¨°V QÉÑàNG AGôLEG ºàj 41 ∏ ∑ ∏ ∫ ≈∏ assets of local banks are subjected to a stress condition äGQɪãà°S’Gh ¿ÉªàF’ÉH ≥∏©àJ á∏ªàfi ∞©°V øWGƒe ¢VGÎaG ∫ÓN by assuming vulnerabilities in the credit, investments OÉ©j Éà äÉ°ü°üfl ôaGƒJ ¢VGÎaÉHh .á«ÑæLC’G ƒæÑdG iód ƒ°UC’Gh and the assets with foreign banks. Assuming a ∫ q ∑ ∫ requirement of 75% provisioning for the observed loss, ìÉHQCG øe %50 øY ójõJ áÑ°ùf ôKCÉàJ ¿CG ™bƒàjq ,IQÉ°ùÿG ºéM øe %75 it is estimated that a more than 50% of 2011 profits ¿ƒμj ,™ØJôŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ™°Vƒd Gô¶fk øμdh .2011 ΩÉ©d ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG of the banking sector will be affected. However, given §¨°†dG ádÉM øY áªLÉædG IQÉ°ùÿG IôjÉ©e â“ GPEG GOhók fi ÒKCÉàdG the high capital position, the impact is limited if the .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∫Ée ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y ójó°ûdG loss due to extreme stress condition is calibrated on banking sector capital.

40 40 Cross border transactions of domestic local banks (branches of foreign banks in Qatar .(á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«ÑæLC’G ´hôØdGh ô£b ‘ á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ´hôa πª°ûJ ’) á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«LQÉÿG äÓeÉ©àdG and foreign branches of local banks are not included). 41 41 Assuming 15% of cross-border credit turns non-performing, 10% of inter-bank asset ôFÉ°ùN % á∏FÉ°S ÒZ âëÑ°UCG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ∫ƒ°UC’G øe %10h IÌ©àe ¿ƒjO ¤EG ∫ƒ–q »LQÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G øe %15 ¿CG ¢VGÎaÉH become illiquid and there is a 20% value loss in the investment assets. .Iôªãà°ùŸG ∫ƒ°UC’G ᪫b ‘

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 120 Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Ö°ùM á«LQÉÿG ƒ°UC’G ™jRƒJ :Ü20-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ¿Gó∏ÑdG Ö°ùM á«LQÉÿG ∫ƒ°UC’G ™jRƒJ :CG20-3 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ∫ Chart 3-20A: Country-wise distribution of ∫ƒ°UC’G áÄah ¿Gó∏ÑdG Chart 3-20 B: Country and asset class-wise cross-border asset (%) distribution of cross- border assets

100 13.5 90 80 8.8 39.0 70 60 5.9 50

Percent 40 30 20 32.8 10 0 GGCCCC EuropeEurope OthersOthers

GCC Europe N. America Other MENA Others Credit Due from FIs Investments

Concluding remarks á«eÉàÿGq äɶMÓŸG With strong macroeconomic environment underpinned ájƒ≤dG »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G áÄ«H π°†ØH ó«Lq ƒ‰ ∫ó©eq ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ó¡°T by growing export revenues, banking sector experienced ™jƒæàd áeƒμ◊G É¡dòÑJ »àdG Oƒ¡÷G ¿q CG hóÑjh .ôjó°üàdG äGóFÉY ´ÉØJQGh a healthy growth. The Government’s efforts to diversify äôah ób á«àëàdG á«æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ᣰûfC’G ≈∏Y ¥ÉØfE’G IOÉjRh OÉ°üàb’G the economy and increase spending in infrastructure- ÉŸG ¢SCGQ IóYÉb â ©Lh .2011 ÉY ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ¢VGôbEÓd ájƒb á©aO related activities appear to have provided a boost to ∫ ∏ Ω bank lending in 2011. The solid capital base of banks IOÉØà°S’G ¬∏gDƒj ó«L ™°Vh ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG áÑ∏°üdG has made the sector well-positioned to take advantage Ωó≤dG Iôμd ⁄É©dG ¢SCÉc º«¶æJ ≥Ñ°ùJ »àdG IÎØdG ‘ áMÉàŸG ¢UôØdG øe of the ensuing opportunities in the run-up to FIFA World õFÉcôH ∑ƒæÑdG áÑ∏°üdG IóYÉ≤dG √òg OhõJq ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘h .2022 ΩÉY Cup 2022. Contextually, it also provides banks with a .3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe á«Ñ∏àd ájƒbq strong footing in meeting the Basel III requirements.

The strong macroeconomic fundamentals of Qatar have øe ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ô£b ‘ »∏μdG OÉ°üàbÓd ájƒq ≤dG õFÉcôdG âæμq e also enabled the banking sector to source wholesale IóYÉb äóYÉ°S ,∂dòdh .á«dhódG ∑ƒæÑdG øe á∏ª÷ÉH ∫GƒeCG ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G funds from international banks. Overall therefore, the ÖfÉL ¤EG ΩÉY πμ°ûH πjƒªàdG ™°Vhh áëjôŸG ádƒ«°ùdGh ájƒ≤dG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ strong capital base, comfortable liquidity and funding .´É£ dG á«ëHQq ø°ù– ¤EG OGó°ùdG IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô dG iƒà°ùe ¢VÉØîfG position coupled with low levels of delinquent loans ≤ q ≤ improved the profitability of the sector.

Although the low interest rate regime lowered interest øe πNódG ¢†ØN ¤EG iOCG á°†ØîæŸG IóFÉØdG ô©°S Ωɶf ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y incomes, profitability improved on account of strong .óFGƒØdG ÒZ øe πNódG ‘ …ƒ≤dG ƒªædG π°†ØH á«ëHôdG âæ°ù– ,IóFÉØdG growth in non-interest income. Notwithstanding this ôWÉîŸG ó°V Éæ°ük fi ´É£≤dG Èà©j ’ ,ájƒ≤dG áÄ«ÑdG √òg øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh robust environment, the sector is not fully immune to the plausible risks. By way of example, on the liquidity OɪàY’G áÑbGôe Ú©àjq ,Óãek ádƒ«°ùdG ó«©°U ≈∏©a .ΩÉJ πμ°ûH ádƒ≤©ŸG front, excessive reliance on wholesale funds from ºàj ¬fCG QÉÑàYG ≈∏Yh .á«dhódG ∑ƒæÑdG øe á∏ª÷ÉH πjƒªàdG ≈∏Y •ôØŸG international banks needs to be monitored. Considering ƒæÑdG øe á«dhódG ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée GƒeC’G øe IÒÑc áÑ°ùf Y ƒ°ü G that a substantial share of international interbank funds ∑ ∑ ∫ ≈∏ ∫ ◊ is sourced from European banks, a drying up of funds ∑ƒæÑdG √òg øe ∫GƒeC’G ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G ∞bƒJ …ODƒj ¿CG øμÁ ,á«HhQhC’G from these banks, due to increased deleveraging, can .∑ƒæÑdG ádƒ«°S ≈∏Y ÉÑk ∏°S ÒKCÉàdG ¤EG ,‹ÉŸG ™aôdG øe ó◊G IOÉjR ÖÑ°ùH adversely impact bank liquidity profile. In that scenario, banks may have to look elsewhere for such funds, or ‘ ∫GƒeC’G √òg øY åëÑdG ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq ób ,ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG Gòg QÉWEG ‘h have to adopt policies to improve their funding mix in πjƒªàdG èjõe Ú°ùëàd áæ«©eq äÉ°SÉ«°S »æÑJ ¤EG ô£°†J ób hCG ôNBG ¿Éμe favour of low-cost funds. .áØ∏μàdG á°†ØîæŸG ∫GƒeC’G ídÉ°üd

121 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Banking Sector Developments ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

The public sector continues to be the main driver of …Oq Dƒj ɇ ,¿ÉªàF’G ƒªæd »°ù«FôdG ∑ôëŸG πμq °ûj ΩÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ∫Gõj ’ credit growth. In a way, this insulates the funds from äÉfɪ°†dG ÖÑ°ùH ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl øY GƒeC’G õY ¤EG Ée °ûH credit risk owing to implicit government guarantee ∫ ∫ πμ and ensures a stable asset quality. Any setback to the ájCG ôKDƒJ ¿CG øμÁh .∫ƒ°UC’G IOƒL QGô≤à°SG øª°†jh á«æª°†dG á«eƒμ◊G macroeconomic environment however, may adversely ‹ÉàdÉHh ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ ≈∏Y É«Ñk ∏°S GÒKk CÉJ »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G áÄ«H ‘ á°SÉμàfG affect credit growth and in turn profitability. Maintaining credit quality in a delicate operating environment is áØ«©°V 𫨰ûJ áÄ«H ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G IOƒL ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G πμ°ûjh .á«ëHôdG ≈∏Y another challenge, taking into account aggressive äÉYÉ£b ‘ ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ ÒÑμdG ƒªædG QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e ,ôNBG Éjó–k growth in credit in certain segments as has been the •ÉÑæà°SG ƒæÑdG Y Ú©àjq ɪc .IÒNC’G áfhB’G ‘ É G âfÉc ɪc áæ«©e case in recent times. As well, banks need to devise ∑ ≈∏ ∫ ◊ ways to diversify their operations. The geographic ∑ƒæÑ∏d É«aGô¨Lk ∫ƒ°UC’G ™jƒæJ »≤H óbh .É¡JÉ«∏ªY ™jƒæàd áØ∏àfl ¥ôW asset diversification of domestic banks has remained ÖbGôjh . 42Ú«°VÉŸG ÚeÉ©dG ióe ≈∏Y 0,33 ƒëf óæY Ò«¨J ¿hO á«∏ëŸG unchanged at around 0.33 over the past two years42. The central bank is keeping a close watch on the PÉîJÉH ΩÉb óbh ,çhó◊G áμ«°TƒdG äGQƒ£àdGq Öãc øY …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG impending developments and has been responding .ôeC’G ≈°†àbG ɪ∏c áÑ°SÉæŸG ÒHGóàdG with appropriate measures, as and when the situation warrants.

42 42 Calculated as where Region is the share of asset of region/country i ih óÑdG/á £æŸG ƒ°UCG á°üM (á £æŸG) Region q °ûJ å«M ‹ÉàdG ƒëædG Y áÑ°ùàëŸG ∏ ≤ ∫ ≤ πμ ≈∏ and N is the total number of regions/countries. The regions/countries include Qatar, Other ∫ɪ°Th ÉHhQhCGh iôNC’G »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hOh ô£b ¿Gó∏ÑdG/≥WÉæŸG πª°ûJh .¿Gó∏ÑdG/≥WÉæª∏d ‹ÉªLE’G Oó©dG Nh GCC, Europe, North America and Others. .ÉgÒZh ÉμjôeCG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 122 اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ CHAPTER FOUR

ﺗﻄﻮرات اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻄﺎق أوﺳﻊ DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BROADER FINANCIAL SECTOR

Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

INTRODUCTION áeóq ≤ŸG The broader financial sector in Qatar comprises of OóYh ᫪æà∏d Ék μæH ô£b ádhO ‘ ™°SGƒdG ¬eƒ¡Øà ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG øª°†àj a development bank and other non-bank financial ,Qɪãà°S’Gh πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T πãe ,á«aô°üŸG ÒZ á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe institutions, such as finance and investment companies, Gòg 43äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG H óbh .ÚeCÉàdG ´É£bh ,áaGô°üdG Éfih exchange houses and the insurance sector. The total ≠∏ ∫ assets43 of this segment at end-December 2011 was áfQÉ≤e) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 24^5 ƒëf 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ ´É£≤dG roughly QR 24.5 billion (around QR 25 billion in 2010), øe %3^5 πã“ »gh ,(2010 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 25 ‹GƒëH comprising 3.5% of total banking sector assets and ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG øe %4 ƒëfh ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG äGOƒLƒe ´ƒª› about 4% of 2011 GDP (Chart 4-1). .(1–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ΩÉ©d

Chart 4-1: Asset share of non-banking sector ‘ô°üŸG ÒZ ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ äGOƒLƒŸG á°üM :1-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

15.2

17.8

60.8 QDB 2.4 Finance cos 3.7 Investment cos

Exchange houses

Insurance cos

Qatar Development Bank (QDB) ᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æH Qatar Development Bank (QDB) was established in á«YÉæ°üdG ™jQÉ°ûŸG ᫪æJ ±ó¡H 1997 ΩÉY ‘ ᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æH AÉ°ûfEG ” 1997 with a view for development, promotion and ájDhQ ™e ≈°Tɪààd ¬JÉ«dhDƒ°ùe ¥É£f ™«°SƒJ ” óbh ,É¡∏jƒ“h É¡H ¢Vƒ¡ædGh financing of industrial projects. Subsequently, its remit ¥É£f Y …OÉ°üàb’G ´ƒæàdG íÑ°üj ¿CG LCG øe 2030 á«æWƒdG ô£b was broadened in line with Qatar’s National Vision ≈∏ π 2030 to foster broader economic diversification with äÓ«¡°ùàdG RôHCG ÚH øe Èà©J »àdG ¿Éμ°SE’G ¢Vhôb ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,™°ShCG housing loans now prominent among the facilities it óM ¤EG ᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æH ∫Ée ¢SCGQ áeƒμ◊G â©aQ óbh .É¡eó≤j »àdG offers. The government sharply increased QDB’s capital ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 10 ¤EG π°üàd …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 200 øe ÒÑc from QR 200 million to QR 10 billion in 2008. Based on ßMÓf ,2011 ΩÉ©d ∂æÑdG á«fGõ«Ÿ á«dhC’G äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .2008 provisional balance sheet data for 2011, it is observed ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤M πμ°ûJh .ΩÉ©dG Gòg ∫ÓN %7 ƒëæH â°ü∏≤J ób É¡fCG that QDB’s balance sheet shrunk roughly 7% during the ‘ É¡à°üM â©ØJQG å«M , æÑ d jƒªàdG QOÉ°üe øe áÑdɨdG á°ü G year. Equity dominates the funding source with its share ∂ ∏ π ◊ in total liabilities having increased to 80%. On the uses ¤EG ô¶ædÉHh ,äÉeGóîà°S’G ÖfÉL ‘h .%80 ¤EG äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ‹ÉªLEG side, given the slew of new schemes launched over the á°üM â©ØJQG ó≤a ,»°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN IójóL ™jQÉ°ûe áYƒª› ¥ÓWGE past year, the share of credit has increased significantly; óM ¤EG Qɪãà°S’G á¶Øfi á°üM âæ°ù– ɪc ,®ƒë∏e πμ°ûH ¿ÉªàF’G among others, the share of investment portfolio has .(2–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) IÎØdG √òg ∫ÓN ÒÑc improved sharply over the period (Chart 4-2).

43 43 Comprising of exchange houses, finance and investment companies, listed insurance .᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æHh áLQóŸG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°Th Qɪãà°S’Gh πjƒªàdG äÉcô°Th áaGô°üdG ∫Éfi º°†J companies and Qatar Development Bank.

125 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Chart 4-2: Major sources and uses of funds of ᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æH ∫GƒeC’ á«°ù«FôdG QOÉ°üŸG :2-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ QDB (percent to total asset) (äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG) É¡JÉeGóîà°SGh

100

80

60

40 Percent

20

0 SecuritiesS iti DueD fromf CreditC dit facilitiesf iliti EquityE it ProvisionsP i i banks/FIs

2010 2011

Affordable housing is a major concern for GCC ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hód »°ù«FôdG πZÉ°ûdG áØ∏μàdG ô°ù«ŸG ¿Éμ°SE’G Èà©j countries. However, a comparison of countries á∏Môà ô“ ádhO πc ¿CÉH ∫hódG ÚH áfQÉ≤ŸG ô¡¶Jo ∂dP ™eh ,»é«∏ÿG reveals that countries are at different stages in terms âeÉb å«M ,Éeók J ÌcCG hO Éægh .¥ƒ°ùdG Qƒ£J å«M øe áØ àfl of market development. Several countries are much ≤ ∫ ∑ ∏ advanced, having introduced mortgage regulations, ÖfÉL ¤EG ,≥jQƒà∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdGh …QÉ≤©dG øgôdG ᪶fCG çGóëà°SÉH securitization infrastructure and even opening up to ∫ÓN øe ±ÓàN’G Gòg í°†àjh ,á«ÑæLC’G ácQÉ°ûª∏d ∫ÉéŸG ìÉ°ùaEG 44 foreign participation. The Mortgage Market Index Ö©∏j ,ô£b ádhO ‘h . (3-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) …QÉ≤©dG øgôdG ¥ƒ°S ô°TDƒe clearly brings out this difference (Chart 4-3)44. In å«M ,ÚæWGƒª∏d øcÉ°ùŸG á«μ∏e õjõ©J ‘ ɪ¡ek GQhOk ᫪æà∏d ô£b ∂æH Qatar, QDB has been playing an important role in 2030 á«æWƒdG ô£b ájDhôd á«YɪàL’G ájƒªæàdG ±GógC’G QÉWEG ‘ Ωƒ≤j promoting home ownership by Qataris. As part of the .áeƒ G É¡dƒ“h ÉgÉYôJ »àdG ¿É °SE’G ¢Vhôb IQGOEÉH social development targets of the 2030 vision, QDB μ◊ μ manages government–funded housing loans.

Central banks have an inherent interest in the housing ,áKÓK ÜÉÑ°SC’ ¿Éμ°SE’G ¥ƒ°S ‘ á∏°UCÉàe áë∏°üe ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üª∏d market for three reasons. First, the housing market is a ôKDƒJ »àdG çGóMC’G á∏°ù∏°S ‘ π°UƒdG á≤∏M ƒg ¿Éμ°SE’G ¥ƒ°S ¿CG :É¡dhCG key link in the chain of events through which monetary IOÉYk ¬fCG å«Mh .» « G OÉ°üàb’G Y ájó ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG É¡dÓN øe policy impacts the real economy. Since housing is ≤ ≤◊ ≈∏ ≤ typically constructed or purchased using borrowed áØ∏μJ ¿EÉa ,á°VÎ≤ŸG ∫GƒeC’G ΩGóîà°SÉH ÉgDhGô°T hCG øcÉ°ùŸG ó««°ûJ ºàj funds, the cost of borrowing is a major part of the overall ójó°ûJ …ODƒjh .øμ°ùŸG áØ∏μJ ‹ÉªLEG øe É«°SÉ°Sk CG GAõLk πμ°ûJ ¢VGÎb’G cost of housing. A monetary tightening increases these Ö∏£dG øe ó◊G ‹ÉàdÉHh ∞«dÉμàdG √òg IOÉjR ¤EG ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG costs and therefore moderates housing demand, ᣰûfCGh äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG ≈∏Y ôKDƒj ±ƒ°S √QhóH …òdGh ,øcÉ°ùŸG ≈∏Y which in turn affects property prices and construction ióMEG πã“ Ée ÉÑdÉZk ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG ¿CG :É«fÉKk .áeÉY áØ°üH ó««°ûàdG activity, in general. Second, mortgages are often the Èà©j …QÉ≤©dG ¢VGôbE’G ¿CG ɪc ,»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ‘ á«dÉŸG äÓeÉ©ŸG ÈcCG single biggest financial transaction for households. k k Property lending is a major component of households’ øe IÒÑc áÑ°ùf πãÁh »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG äÉeGõàdG øe É«°SÉ°SCG Gô°üæY liabilities and an important exposure of mortgage á¡Lh øeh ∂dòd .…QÉ≤©dG øgôdG ¿Éª°†H ¢VGôbE’G äÉ°ù°SDƒe ¢Vhôb lenders. From the regulatory standpoint therefore, it ∑ƒæÑdG ≥«Ñ£J ¿Éª°V ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG áë∏°üe øe ¬fEÉa ,᫪«¶æJ ô¶f is in the interest of central banks to ensure that banks ‘ IGhÉ°ùŸG ≥«≤–h É¡à«fGõ«e ájɪM πLCG øe ᪫∏°S ¢VGôbEG äGQGô≤d make sound lending decisions in order to protect QÉ«¡f’G ó©jq ,‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G Qƒ¶æe øe ,GÒNk CGh .AÓª©dG ™e πeÉ©àdG their balance sheets and deal fairly with customers. ób äGQÉ ©dG QÉ©°SGC ‘ ÒÑ dG ™LGÎdG ¿CG Y É«k « M Ó«dOk ÒNC’G ‹ÉŸG Finally, from the angle of financial stability, the recent ≤ μ ≈∏ ≤ ≤ financial meltdown provides graphic evidence as to »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG Qƒ¶æe øeh .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ΩóY øe IOÉM äÉHƒf ÖÑ°ùj the fact that large declines in property prices can ,äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG Ò¨àH ôKCÉàj ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ¿EÉa ,äÉcô°ûdG ´É£bh trigger severe bouts of financial instability. From the ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°üë∏d ¿Éª°†c É¡eGóîà°SG ºàj Ée ÉÑdÉZk ¬fC’ ∂dPh perspective of households and firms, their credit äÉ«fGõ«ŸG ‘ ∞©°†dG ¬LhCG ¿EÉa ,∑ƒæÑdG ô¶f á¡Lh øe ÉeCG .á«aô°üŸG demand is affected by changes in property prices, since

44 44 S.Beidas-Strom, W.Lian and A.Maseeh (2009). The housing cycle in emerging middle á°SÉ«°S äÉ«YGóJh áÄ°TÉædG äGOÉ°üàb’G ‘ ¿Éμ°SE’G IQhO .(2009) A.Maseehh W.Lianh S.Beidas-Strom eastern economies and its macroeconomic policy implications. IMF Working Paper 288. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh: ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U.‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U øY IQOÉ°U (288) ºbQ πªY ábQh .»∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G IMF: Washington DC.

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 126 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

they are often used as collateral for bank lending. From ¬fCÉ°T øe äGQÉ≤©dG QÉ©°SCG Qƒgóàd áé«àf äÉcô°ûdG ´É£bh »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d the perspective of banks, weaknesses in the balance áé«àfh .¢VGôbE’G ≈∏Y É¡JQóbh ∑ƒæÑdG iód ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ™°Vh ≈∏Y ôKDƒj ¿CG sheets of households and firms owing to deterioration …ODƒ«°S , bƒàdÉH øcÉ°ùŸG ó««°ûJ äÉ« ªY •É°ûf CGóÑj ÉeóæY , dòd in property prices can affect their capital positions and ∞ ∏ ∂ lending capacity. As a result, when housing construction äGQÉ≤©dG …Qƒ£e ÚH ɪ«a øjódG OGó°S Ì©Jh á«dÉe •ƒ¨°V ¤EG ∂dP grinds to a halt, it triggers financial strains and defaults …ODƒj ádÉ£ÑdG ∫ó©e ´ÉØJQG ¿CG ɪc .ájQÉ≤©dG äÉcô°ûdGh AÉæÑdG äÉcô°Th among property developers, construction companies »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ‘ OGó°ùdG ‘ Ì©àdGh ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG ™aO ôNCÉJ ¤EG and real estate firms. Rising unemployment also leads to äÉ«fGõ«e ‘ OÉM QƒgóJ ¤EG ’ɪLk EG ∂dP …ODƒ«°S ¬«∏Yh ,äÉcô°ûdG ´É£bh mortgage arrears and defaults among households and ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ƒ©fÉ°U π©L ,iôNCG á¡L øeh .∑ƒæÑdG firms. The overall effect is a sharp worsening of banks’ DƒWÉÑJ ó©H ɪ«°S’ ,äÉjƒdhC’G ¢SCGQ Y ô°ù«ŸGq ¿É °SE’G ádCÉ°ùe »é« ÿG balance sheets. As elsewhere, policymakers in GCC ≈∏ μ ∏ countries have made the provision of affordable housing Gòg ‘ º¡ŸG øeh .á≤MÓdG »Hô©dG ™«HôdG çGóMCGh »ŸÉ©dG OÉ°üàb’G a top priority, especially after the global slowdown and »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ¿Éμ°SE’G ™°Vh RÉéjEÉH ¢Vô©à°ùf ¿CG ¥É«°ùdG the subsequent Arab spring. It would be instructive in .(1–4 QÉWEG) this context to briefly review the housing profile in GCC countries (Box 4-1).

Chart 4-3: Mortgage Market Index of ¢ù∏› ∫hóH …QÉ≤©dG øgôdG ¥ƒ°S ô°TDƒe :3- 4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 Index 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 QQAA B BHH S SAA U UAEAE K KWW

Box 4-1: Affordable housing in GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G :1–4 QÉWEG Bahrain: Home lending in Bahrain was initiated by the ” á£N QÉWEG ‘ á«æμ°ùdG ¢Vhô≤dG Ëó≤J øjôëÑdÉH ¿Éμ°SE’G IQGRh äCGóH :øjôëÑdG Ministry of Housing under a scheme established in 1979 ¿Éμ°SE’G ∂æH ‘ πãªàJ »gh 2005 ΩÉY Ék ≤M’ É¡à∏μ«g ó«YCG »àdGh 1979 ΩÉY É¡©°Vh which was subsequently restructured in 2005 as the k government-owned Eskan Bank. Since commencement of øe áeƒYóe ájQÉ≤Y É°Vhôb ∂æÑdG ±ô°U ,¬dɪYCG AóH òæeh .áeƒμë∏d ∑ƒ∏ªŸG operations, the Bank has disbursed government-subsidized (»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 928 ‹GƒM) »æjôëH QÉæjO ¿ƒ«∏e 350 ɡફb RhÉéàJ áeƒμ◊G mortgages of over BhD 350 million (appx. USD 928 million) ¿Éμ°SE’G Òaƒàd É¡à«é«JGΰSEG QÉWEG ‘h .á«æjôëH Iô°SCG 21^000 É¡æe äOÉØà°SGh to 21,000 Bahraini families. As part of its affordable housing 400 øY É¡ NO j »àdG ô°SC’G øe %86 ƒëæd øcÉ°ùe ÒaƒJ áeƒ G õà©J ,ô°ù«ŸG strategy, the government plans to provide housing aimed at ∏ π≤ μ◊ Ω q 86% of households earning less than BhD 400 (appx. USD ´É£≤dG »∏∏fi ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .Éjô¡°Tk (»μjôeCG Q’hO 1^060 ‹GƒM) »æjôëH QÉæjO 1,060) per month. According to private analysts, the shortfall 20^000 ƒëæH 2010 ΩÉY ‘ ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G äGóMh OóY ‘ õé©dG Qóq bo ,¢UÉÿG in affordable housing in 2010 is estimated at 20,000 units. .á«æμ°S IóMh Kuwait: The Savings and Credit Bank (SCB) remains the ¢ù°SCÉJ óbh ,âjƒμdÉH ¿Éμ°SE’G ¥ƒ°S ΩGƒb QÉNO’Gh ∞«∏°ùàdG ∂æH ó©q jo :âjƒμdG backbone of the Kuwait housing market. It was established ãe iôNC’G á«°ù«FôdG ä’ÉéŸG ÖfÉL ¤EG ¿É°SE’G ¥ƒ°S ᫪æàd 1960 ÉY in 1960 to facilitate the development of housing as also π μ Ω other key areas, such as industry and agriculture. The year …òdGh) »àjƒμdG …QÉ≤©dG ∂æÑdG AÉ°ûfEG 1973 ΩÉY ó¡°T ɪc .áYGQõdGh áYÉæ°üdG 1973 also witnessed the established of the Kuwait Real äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEÉH (‹hódG âjƒμdG ∂æÑH 2007 ΩÉY ‘ Ék ≤M’ ¬à«ª°ùJ ó«YCG Estate Bank (subsequently renamed in 2007 as Kuwait ^ International Bank) with total assets worth KwD 1.14 billion ájÉ¡f ‘ (»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 4 ‹GƒM) »àjƒc QÉæjO QÉ«∏e 1 14 ɡફb ≠∏ÑJ (appx. USD 4 billion) at end-2010. The World Bank (2011) Q’hO QÉ«∏e 4 â°ü°üN áeƒμ◊G ¿CG 2011 ‹hódG ∂æÑdG ôjô≤J OÉaCGh .2010 ΩÉY reported that the government as allocated USD 4 billion for .IójóL øcÉ°ùe AÉæH ™jQÉ°ûŸ »μjôeCG construction of new housing.

Oman: The traditional government lender for housing is …òdG Êɪ©dGo ¿Éμ°SE’G ∂æH ƒg ¿Éμ°SE’G ´É£≤d …ó«∏≤àdG »eƒμ◊G ∫ƒªŸG Èà©j :¿ÉªYo the Oman Housing Bank (OHB), established in 1977. As ájÉ¡f ‘ ÊɪYo ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 203 ∂æÑdG äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh .1977 ΩÉY ¢ù°SCÉJ at end-2010, the total assets of the bank were OmR 203 million (appx. USD 530 million) and total loans were OmR ¿ƒ«∏e 200 ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H ɪc ,(»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 530 ‹GƒM) 2010 ΩÉY

127 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

200 million (appx. USD 520 million). During the year 2011, ¿Éμ°SE’G ∂æH Ωób 2011 ΩÉY ‘h .(»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 520 ‹GƒM) ÊɪYo ∫ÉjQ OHB provided subsidized housing loans worth OmR 45 ÊɪYo ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 45 ɡફb â¨∏H áeƒμ◊G øe áeƒYóe á«æμ°S É°Vhôbk Êɪ©dGo million (appx. USD 117 million). A new mortgage lender, Alliance Housing Bank was established in 1998 (renamed ¢Vhô≤dG øY ádƒÄ°ùe IójóL á¡L ¢ù«°SCÉJ ” óbh .(»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 117 ‹GƒM) as Ahli Bank in 2008) as a private financial entity to provide ‘ »∏gC’G ∂æÑdÉH ¬à«ª°ùJ ó«YCG …òdGh) ¿Éμ°SEÓd OÉ–’G ∂æH »gh 1998 ΩÉY ájQÉ≤©dG mortgage loans, although it has subsequently diversified its ºZQ ,ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG íæe øY ádƒÄ°ùe á°UÉN á«dÉe á°ù°SDƒe √QÉÑàYÉH (2008 ΩÉY operations. At end-December 2011, its total assets stood at äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG H ,2011 ÉY Ȫ°ùjO ‘h .É¡JÉ« ªY ™jƒæJ ¤EG Ék M’ É¡gÉŒG OmR 930 million (appx. USD 2400 million) and total loans ≠∏ Ω ∏ ≤ worth OmR 769 million (appx. USD 2,000 million). As part ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏Hh (»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 2400 ‹GƒM) ÊɪYo ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 930 ∂æÑdG of its affordable housing strategy, the government plans QÉWEG ‘h .(»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 2^000 ‹GƒM) ÊɪYo ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 769 ¢Vhô≤dG to provide housing aimed at 73% of Omani households øe %73 ‹Gƒ◊ øμ°ùdG ÒaƒJ áeƒμ◊G Ωõà©J ,ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G ÒaƒàH É¡à«é«JGΰSEG earning less than OmR 450 (appx. USD 1,200) per month. k According to private analysts, the shortfall in affordable Q’hO 1^200 ‹GƒM) Éjô¡°T ÊɪYo ∫ÉjQ 450 øY É¡∏NO π≤j »àdG á«fɪ©dGo ô°SC’G housing in 2010 is estimated at 15,000 units. ¿Éμ°SE’G äGóMh OóY ‘ õé©dG Qóq bo ,¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dG »∏∏fi ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .(»μjôeCG .á«æμ°S IóMh 15^000 ƒëæH 2010 ΩÉY ‘ ô°ù«ŸGq Saudi Arabia: The country faces a pressing challenge in ,ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’ÉH ≥∏©àj ɪ«a Éëk ∏e Éjó–k ádhódG ¬LGƒJ :ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG terms of affordable housing with the shortfall in affordable IóMh 400^000 ƒëf 2010 ÉY ‘ ô°ù«ŸG ¿É °SE’G äGóMh OóY ‘ õé©dG H å«M housing in 2010 being placed at 400,000 units. As part of its Ω q μ ≠∏ affordable housing strategy, the government plans to cover %58 á«£¨J áeƒμ◊G Ωõà©J ,ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G Òaƒàd É¡à«é«JGΰSEG QÉWEG ‘h .á«æμ°S 58% of Saudi households with average monthly income ‹GƒM) …Oƒ©°S ∫ÉjQ 5^000 øY …ô¡°ûdG É¡∏NO §°Sƒàe π≤j »àdG ájOƒ©°ùdG ô°SC’G øe below SAR 5,000 (appx. USD 1,300). It is estimated that 0.5 IóMh ¿ƒ«∏e 0^5 ƒëf ó««°ûJ ºà«°S ¬fCG ¤EG äGôjó≤àdG Ò°ûJh .(»μjôeCG Q’hO 1^300 million new houses will be built with budget allocation of US 67 billion. As early as 1974, the Real Estate Development ΩÉY òæeh .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 67 ÉgQób ∂dòd á°ü°üfl á«fGõ«Ã IójóL á«æμ°S Fund (REDF) was set up to meet the needs and aspirations ™aôH ÚæWGƒŸG äÉ©∏£Jh äÉLÉ«àMG á«Ñ∏àd ájQÉ≤©dG ᫪æàdG ¥hóæ°U AÉ°ûfEG ” ,1974 of the citizens by helping to raise the quality of life through Ω2006 ΩÉY ≈àMh ¬JCÉ°ûf òæeh .IOƒ÷G á«dÉY øcÉ°ùe ÒaƒJ ∫ÓN øe á°û«©ŸG iƒà°ùe the development of high-quality housing. Since its inception …Oƒ©°S ÉjQ QÉ« e 136 ájQÉ ©dG ᫪æàdG ¥hóæ°U É¡aô°U »àdG ¢Vhô dG ´ƒª› H and until 2006, the REDF disbursed total loans amounting ∫ ∏ ≤ ≤ ≠∏ to SAR 136 billion (appx. USD 36 billion). More recently in π«Ñ°S ‘h ,2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN IÒNC’G áfhB’G ‘h .(»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 36 ‹GƒM) 2011, in order to address the burgeoning demand for new ,¿Éμ°SEÓd IQGRh AÉ°ûfEG ¤EG ádhódG äóªY ,IójóL øcÉ°ùe ≈∏Y ójGõàŸG Ö∏£∏d …ó°üàdG homes, the country has established a Ministry of Housing. ¤EG äGôjó àdG Ò°ûJh .…QÉ ©dG øgôdÉH ¢UÉN ójóL ¿ƒfÉb QGó°UEG ™bƒàŸG øe ¬fCG ɪc A new mortgage law is also expected. It is estimated that ≤ ≤ public and private developers will need to build about 275^000 ƒëf AÉæÑH ¢UÉÿGh ΩÉ©dG ÚYÉ£≤dG ‘ ¿hQƒ£ŸG Ωƒ≤j ¿CG …Qhô°†dG øe ¬fCG 275,000 new home units annually to meet the demand for äGƒæ°ùdG ∫ÓN á«æμ°S IóMh ¿ƒ«∏e 1^65 ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG á«Ñ∏àd Éjƒæ°Sk IójóL á«æμ°S IóMh 1.65 million homes over the next six years. .á∏Ñ≤ŸG â°ùdG United Arab Emirates: Government-sponsored housing ∫ÓN øe ÚæWGƒª∏d áeƒμ◊G ÉgÉYôJ »àdG øcÉ°ùŸG ôaƒàJ :IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G for nationals is available through the flagship Shk. Zayed áMÉàŸG ¢Vhô dG íæe ºàjh .1999 ÉY ¬°ù«°SCÉJ ” …òdGh ,¿É °SEÓd ójGR ï«°ûdG èeÉfôH Housing Program, which was established in 1999. Loans ≤ Ω μ under the program are available to applicants with minimum ≈fOC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñj ø‡ ¢Vôb ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G äÉÑ∏£H Úeó≤àª∏d èeÉfÈdG QÉWEG ‘ income of AED 10,000 (appx. USD 2,722) for the purpose hCG AGô°T ±ó¡H (»μjôeCG Q’hO 2^722 ‹GƒM) »JGQÉeEG ºgQO 10^000 º¡∏Nód of buying or building a new home or for maintenance / ¢ù«°SCÉJ ” óbh .AGô°ûdG /ó««°ûàdG /™°SƒàdG /áfÉ«°üdG ¢VGôZC’ hCG ójóL ø °ùe AÉæH expansion/ construction /purchase. The Mohammed bin μ Rashid Housing Establishment (MBRHE) was established ¢Vhô≤dG ±ô°U ∫É› ‘ §°ûæJ »àdGh GôNk Dƒe ¿Éμ°SEÓd ó°TGQ øH óªfi á°ù°SDƒe recently and is active in disbursing loans to UAE nationals 0^2 ‹GƒM) »JGQÉeEG ºgQO 750^000 ¤EG π°üj ≈°übCG óëH äGQÉeE’G ádhO »æWGƒŸ upto a maximum of AED 750,000 (appx. USD 0.2 million) ‘ õé©dG Qóq bo óbh .»æμ°S QÉ≤Y AGô°T hCG á°UÉÿG º¡æcÉ°ùe AÉæÑd (»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e to construct their own houses or buy a residential property. The shortfall of affordable housing in 2010 is estimated at .á«æμ°S IóMh 20^000 ƒëæH 2010 ΩÉY ‘ ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G äGóMh OóY 20,000 units.

References ™LGôŸG World Bank (2011). Regional economic update (May). The ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ∂æÑdG .(ƒjÉe) ᫪«∏bE’G ájOÉ°üàb’G ¥ÉaB’G .(2011) ‹hódG ∂æÑdG World Bank: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG Jones Lang La Salle (2011). Why affordable housing :ƒZÉμ«°T ?ô°ù«ŸGq ¿Éμ°SE’G ᫪gCG Ée .(2011) Jones Lang La Salle ácô°T matters? Chicago: IL. .…ƒæ«dEG NCBC (2012). Building mortgage markets (February). Saudi á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG .(ôjGÈa) ájQÉ≤©dG ¢Vhô≤dG ¥Gƒ°SCG AÉ°ûfEG .(2012) NCBC ácô°T Arabia. .ájOƒ©°ùdG Websites of respective banks. .âfÎf’G áμÑ°T ≈∏Y á∏°üdG äGP ∑ƒæÑdG ™bGƒe Finance companies πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T The primary business of finance companies is á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dG íæe ≈∏Y πjƒªàdG äÉcô°ûd »°ù«FôdG πª©dG õμJôj granting consumption loans for different categories of .AÓª©dG øe áØ∏àfl äÉÄØd customers.

As at end-December 2011, three such institutions were ∫É› ‘ á°üàfl äÉ°ù°SDƒe çÓK ∑Éæg âfÉc ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ≈àM licensed by the Qatar Central Bank. Commensurate with πªY á©«ÑW ™e É«°TÉ“hk .…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe á°üNôe πjƒªàdG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 128 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J their business profile, the lending is concentrated in the á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dG ∫É› ‘ ¢VGôbE’G ᣰûfCG õcÎJ ,äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG √òg form of consumption loans (car purchases, mortgages á«cÓ¡à°SG ™∏°S πjƒ“h ájQÉ≤©dG ¿ƒgôdGh äGQÉ«°ùdG AGô°T πjƒ“) and other consumables). .(iôNCG The balance sheet of these companies reveal that, as ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 4^4 ’ɪLk EG â¨∏H »àdGh äÉcô°ûdG √òg äÉ«fGõ«e ô¡¶J at end-2011, shareholders equity and borrowings from ∑ƒæÑdG øe ¢Vhô≤dGh ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤M ¿CG ,2011 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b banks and financial institutions together comprised °ûJh . jƒªàdG QOÉ°üe ´ÉHQCG áKÓK É©ek ¿Ó °ûj á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh three-fourths of funding sources out of a total balance πμ π μ sheet size of QR 4.4 billion. Loans dominate the uses %75 ‹GƒM É¡àÑ°ùf ≠∏ÑJ PEG ,äÉeGóîà°S’G øe áÑdɨdG áÑ°ùædG ¢Vhô≤dG side, accounting for nearly 75% of total assets; the share øe %11 ƒëf äGQɪãà°S’G á°üM ≠∏ÑJ ɪæ«H ,äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe of investments is roughly 11% (Chart 4-4). Roughly 99% ¢Vhô≤dG á¶Øfi áÑ°ùf â¨∏H óbh .(4–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG of the loan portfolio is inside Qatar. .%99 ‹GƒM ô£b ádhO πNGO Chart 4-4: Major balance sheet items of finance äÉcô°ûd á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ª∏d á«°ù«FôdG OƒæÑdG :4-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ companies πjƒªàdG 100

80

60

Percent 40

20

0 Due from Investments Consumer Due to Shareholders 2011 banks/FIs loans QCB/banks/ FIs equity 2010

Interest income on customer loans represents the main πNód »°ù«FôdG Qó°üŸG AÓª©dG ¢Vhôb ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG øe πNódG πãÁ source of income for these institutions. As of the end of .¬æe %90 øe ÌcCG 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëH πμ°T å«M ,äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG √òg December 2011, this constituted over 90% of their total .äÉahô°üŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %40 ‹GƒM πã“ áYƒaóŸG IóFÉØdG ¿EÉa ,πãŸÉHh income. Likewise, interest expenses constituted about (áYƒaóŸG IóFÉØdGh IóFÉØdG øe NódG ÚH ¥ôØdG …CG) ¢ûeÉ¡dG H óbh 40% of their total expenses. The spread – the difference π ≠∏ between interest income and interest expense - was %5^5 áÑ°ùæH áfQÉ≤e 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %6^5 6.5% of total assets at end-December 2011 as compared ᩪéŸG ìÉHQC’G â¨∏H ,AGOC’G iƒà°ùe ó«©°U ≈∏Yh .2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ to 5.5% at end-December 2010. Performance wise, ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 163 ƒëæH áfQÉ≤e 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 151 äÉcô°ûdG √ò¡d these institutions reported a combined profit of QR 151 .(1–4 ∫hóL) %8 ƒëæH É°VÉØîfGk πμ°ûj Ée ƒgh ,2010 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b million in 2011 as compared to QR 163 million in 2010, a decline of nearly 8% in percentage terms (Table 4-1).

A key concern for these companies has been their IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG ‘ äÉcô°ûdG √òg É¡¡LGƒJ »àdG á«°ù«FôdG á∏μ°ûŸG πãªàJh delinquent loans, which at both end-December 2010 ÌcCG 2011h 2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ÚH Ée IÎØdG ∫ÓN â¨∏H »àdGh ,OGó°ùdG and 2011, accounted for over 18% of their total loans. ‘ ¬fCG §¨°†dG äGQÉÑàNG äô¡XCG óbh .¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG øe %18 øe Stress tests reveal that if their NPLs were to rise by Ö°ùædG øY %20 ƒëæH äÉcô°ûdG òg iód IÌ©àŸG ¢Vhô dG ´ÉØJQG ÉM 20% on the present levels and these companies make √ ≤ ∫ a provision of 60%, roughly the same as at present, ‹É◊G ∫ó©ŸG ¢ùØæH …CG) %60 ∫OÉ©J äÉ°ü°üfl õéëH É¡eÉ«bh á«dÉ◊G then their profitability would be significantly impaired. ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .ÒÑc óM ¤EG äÉcô°ûdG √òg á«ëHQ ∞©°†J ±ƒ°S ,(ÉÑjôk ≤J Although their systemic importance remains low, they ¬H ¿É¡à°ùj ’ ÉWÉÑJQGk äÉcô°ûdG √òg ô¡¶J ,á«eɶædG ɡ૪gCG ÊóJ øe exhibit non-negligible linkage with banks, which makes Gòg ‘ ÅLÉØŸG ∞©°†∏d á°VôYk ΩɶædG π©éj …òdG ôeC’G ,∑ƒæÑdG ™e the system susceptible to sudden weaknesses in this .´É£≤dG sector.

129 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table 4-1: A snapshot of finance companies πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T øY IõLƒe áëŸ :1-4 ∫hóL

2010 2011

Number of institutions 3 3 äÉcô°ûdG OóY Total loans (QR billion) 3.60 3.28 (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏ŸÉH) ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG Total equity (QR billion) 1.98 2.01 (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏ŸÉH) ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤M ‹ÉªLEG Total asset (QR billion) 5.11 4.37 (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏ŸÉH) äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG Return on Asset (%) 3.19 3.45 (%) äGOƒLƒŸG ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG Total assets/Bank asset (%) 0.9 0.6 (%) ±QÉ°üŸG äGOƒLƒe /äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG Total assets/ GDP (%) 1.1 0.7 (%) ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG / äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG

Investment companies Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T A total of 3 investment companies are presently øe á©°SGh áYƒª› Ωó≤J Qɪãà°SG äÉcô°T 3 É«dÉMk ô£b ádhO ‘ πª©J operating in Qatar. These companies offer a wide range áWÉ°SƒdG äÉeóNh ,ájQÉ≤©dG äGQɪãà°S’Gh ßaÉëŸG IQGOEG πª°ûJ äÉeóÿG of services such as portfolio management, real estate .ájQÉ°ûà°S’G äÉeóÿGh investments as well as brokerage and advisory services.

Assets held by the investment companies amounted to ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 587 Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T É¡μ∏“ »àdG äGOƒLƒŸG ᪫b â¨∏H QR 587 million in 2011(Table 4-2). Nearly 95 percent of ‹ÉªLEG øe %95 á«∏ëŸG á∏ª©dG πμ°ûJ å«M ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b assets is in local currency, which implies limited market á©«ÑW ™e É«°TÉ“hk .¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉfl ájOhófi »æ©j Ée ƒgh ,äGOƒLƒŸG exchange risk. In line with their business profile, the largest asset base of these companies is the financial ÒZh ádhGóàŸG äGOƒLƒŸG) á«dÉŸG äGQɪãà°S’G πμ°ûJ ,äÉcô°ûdG √òg πªY investments (both current and non-current categories). √òg á°üM â¨∏H óbh .É¡JGOƒLƒŸ IóYÉb ÈcCG (AGƒ°S óM ≈∏Y ádhGóàŸG The share of such investments remained at 50% of total º°SQ) 2011h 2010 »eÉY ‘ äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %50 äGQɪãà°S’G assets in both 2010 and 2011 (Chart 4-5). Presumably øe äÉcô°ûdG √ò¡d á∏FÉ°ùdG äGOƒLƒŸG á°üM ´ÉØJQG ¢ùμ©jh .(5–4 ÊÉ«H reflecting the unsettled global economic environment and lack of productive investment opportunities, the ΩóY ,íLQC’G ≈∏Y 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %36 ¤EG π°üàd 2010 ΩÉY ‘ %30 ‹GƒM share of liquid assets for these companies increased ájQɪãà°S’G ¢UôØdG ¤EG QÉ≤àa’Gh á«ŸÉ©dG ájOÉ°üàb’G áÄ«ÑdG QGô≤à°SG from around 30% in 2010 to 36% in 2011. These ∂dòd áé«àfh ,á¶ØëŸG ôjóe QhO ∂dòc äÉcô°ûdG √òg Ö©∏Jh .áéàæŸG companies also function as a portfolio manager and ≈∏YCG (É¡JQGOGE ºàj »àdG äGOƒLƒŸG) á«fGõ«ŸG êQÉN OƒæÑdG ᣰûfCG hóÑJ as a result, their off-balance sheet item - ‘managed 692 ƒëf Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T ôjóJh .á«fGõ«ŸG NGO OƒæÑdG ´ƒª› øe assets’ - appears to be higher than their on-balance π sheet total. The entities managed about QR 692 øe ∞dCÉàj É¡æe ∞°üædG ‹GƒM ,AÓª©dG Ió°UQCG øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e million of customer balances, out of which nearly half .äÉcô°ûdG √òg ÉgôjóJ »àdG ájQɪãà°S’G ßaÉëŸG comprised of managed portfolio.

Table 4-2: A snapshot of investment companies Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T øY IõLƒe áëŸ :2-4 ∫hóL

2010 2011

Number of companies 3 3 äÉcô°ûdG OóY Total financial investments (QR million) 308 299 (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏ŸÉH) á«dÉŸG äGQɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG Total equity (QR million) 529 586 (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏ŸÉH) ÚªgÉ°ùŸG ¥ƒ≤M ‹ÉªLEG Total asset (QR million) 617 587 (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏ŸÉH) äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG Total assets/Bank asset ( % ) 0.11 0.08 (%) ±QÉ°üŸG äGOƒLƒe /äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG Total assets/ GDP ( % ) 0.13 0.09 (%) ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG /äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 130 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

The composition of their liabilities is not as diverse as the Gô¶fk áYƒæàe ÒZ äÉcô°ûdG √òg äÉHƒ∏£e hóÑJ ,äGOƒLƒŸG ±ÓN ≈∏Y assets because the business model of these companies É¡dGƒeCG ¢ShDhQ Qɪãà°SG ≈∏Y áeÉY áØ°üH óªà©j …òdG πª©dG ‘ É¡Hƒ∏°SCG ¤EG is generally based on investing their own capital. Equity ɪæ«H ,äÉHƒ∏£ŸG øe ÈcC’G áÑ°ùædG á«μ∏ŸG ¥ƒ≤M πã“h .É¡H á°UÉÿG comprises the overwhelming portion of liabilities; the ÉeCG .á«bÉÑdG áÑ°ùædG ádhGóàŸG ÒZ iôNC’G äÉHƒ £ŸGh äÉ°ü°üîŸG ã“ remaining comprise of provisions and other non-current ∏ π liabilities. Their debt levels and especially, bank debt is .á∏«Ä°V áÑ°ùf πμ°ûàa ,á«aô°üŸG ¿ƒjódG á°UÉNh ,¿ƒjódG negligible.

Chart 4-5: Asset share of various items of investment companies Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T OƒæH ∞∏àîŸ äGOƒLƒŸG á°üM :5-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

60

50

40

30 Percent 20

10

0 Cash & bank Receivables Financial Property and Other assets balances investments equipment

2010 2011

The investment companies exhibited poor overall .2011 ΩÉY ‘ á«∏μdG É¡à«ëHQ ‘ ÉØ©°Vk Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T äó¡°T profitability in 2011. As compared to a combined profit, 5^4 äÉcô°ûdG òg IQÉ°ùN ‹ÉªLEG H ,ᩪéŸG ìÉHQC’G ™e áfQÉk eh their total profits were QR (-)5.4 million in 2011. In effect, √ ≠∏ ≤ the net profit of one company was overwhelmed by the äÉcô°T ióMEG ‘ íHôdG ‘É°U øμj ⁄h .2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e combined losses of the other two. A closer look at their É¡à≤≤M »àdG ᩪéŸG ôFÉ°ùÿG ¬«∏Y â£Z å«M ,GôgÉXk çÓãdG Qɪãà°S’G income profile indicates that income is fairly diversified äÉcô°T πNO äÉfÉ«H øY á°üMÉØdG Iô¶ædGh .ÚJôNC’G Qɪãà°S’G »àcô°T and coming from different pools (Chart 4-6). ≥aóJ ä’É› Oó©àJ å«M »Ñ°ùf ´ƒæàH ™àªàJ É¡fCG ¤EG Ò°ûJ Qɪãà°S’G .(6–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) äGOGôjE’G

Chart 4-6: Share of income from different sources in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ áØ∏àîŸG QOÉ°üŸG øe πNódG á°üM :6-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

0.7 9.3 4.3 2.8

82.9

Gains on sale of investments Fees and commission income Dividend income

Interest income Other income

131 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

The total (non-current) investments of these companies ‘ äÉcô°ûdG √ò¡d (ádhGóàŸG ÒZ) äGQɪãà°S’G ‹ÉªLEG ∞«XƒJ ºàj have been placed in different regions and industries. As hCG ∫ÉéŸG Ö°ùM Qɪãà°S’G ó«©°U ≈∏Yh .ä’ÉéŸGh ≥WÉæŸG ∞∏àfl regards investment by industry/region, the table shows ãÁ äGQÉ ©dGh jƒªàdG »YÉ£b ‘ Qɪãà°S’G ¿CG hó÷G ô¡¶j ,á £æŸG that finance and real estate account for nearly three-fifths π ≤ π ∫ ≤ of the total; around 60% of the investments are placed äGQɪãà°S’G øe %60 ‹GƒMh ,äGQɪãà°S’G ´ƒª› ¢SɪNCG áKÓK ‹GƒM domestically (Table 4-3). Clearly, the amounts placed ádhO ‘ Iôªãà°ùŸG ≠dÉÑŸG ºéM ¢ùμ©jh .(3–4 ∫hóL) É«k ∏fi É¡Ø«XƒJ ºàj in Qatar could be reflective of the preference for this .á«ŸÉ©dG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ™e áfQÉk ≤e AGOC’G å«M øe ¥ƒ°ùdG √òg á«∏°†aCG ô£b market due to its performance relative to international counterparts.

Table 4-3: Investment profile of investment Qɪãà°S’G äÉcô°T iód Qɪãà°S’G ™jRƒJ :3-4 ∫hóL companies in 2011 (%) (%) 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ô£b §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG iôNCG ´ƒªéŸG Qatar Middle East Others Total

Banking/Finance 20.1 18.1 0.0 38.2 πjƒªàdG äÉcô°Th ∑ƒæÑdG Real estate 14.6 1.8 0.4 16.8 äGQÉ≤©dG Industry 7.6 0.0 0.0 7.6 á«∏jƒëàdG äÉYÉæ°üdG

Others 16.8 0.6 20.1 37.4 iôNCG

TOTAL 59.1 20.5 20.5 100.0 ´ƒªéŸG

Exchange houses áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T Exchange houses play an important role. More á«∏ëŸG äÉLÉ«àM’G á«Ñ∏J ‘ ɪ«°S’ ,ɪ¡ek GQhOk áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T Ö©∏J specifically, they help in meeting the local needs for áeRÓdG á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dG πμ°ûJh .á櫪ãdG ¿OÉ©ŸGh á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dG øe foreign currencies and precious metals. For example, ÚHΨŸG πÑb øe á«°üî°ûdG äÓjƒëàdGh º«∏©àdGh áMÉ«°ùdG ¢VGôZC’ foreign currencies needed for purposes of tourism, k education and personal transfers by expatriates are .äÉcô°ûdG √òg É¡eó≤J »àdG äÉeóÿG øe GAõL among the services provided by these companies.

As at end 2011, 20 exchange houses were operating in 20 ô£b ádhO ‘ á∏eÉ©dG áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T OóY ≠∏H ,2011 ájÉ¡f ∫ƒ∏ëHh the State of Qatar with assets equal to QR 913 million, %0^1 °ûjÉe ƒgh ,…ô£b ÉjQ ¿ƒ« e 913 É¡JGOƒLƒe ᪫b ÑJ ,ácô°T comprising around 0.1% of banking assets. The top 10 πμ ∫ ∏ ≠∏ exchange houses accounts for over 80% of the total %80 øe ÌcCG áaGô°U äÉcô°T 10 ÈcCG πμ°ûJh .±QÉ°üŸG äGOƒLƒe øe assets of all exchange houses, taken together. The á«fGõ«ŸG äô¡XCG ɪc .á©ªà› áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG øe balance sheet of the exchange houses reveals that ∞°üf ¿Óμ°ûj »WÉ«àM’Gh ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ¿CG áaGô°üdG äÉcô°ûd á«eƒª©dG capital and reserves accounts for half of their funding iód Ió°UQC’Gh ájó≤ædG πμ°ûJ ,äGOƒLƒŸG ÖfÉL øeh .πjƒªàdG QOÉ°üe sources. On the asset side, cash and balances with ∫hóL) äGOƒLƒŸG øe %75 ‹GƒM iôNC’G áaGô°üdG äÉcô°Th ∑ƒæÑdG banks and other exchangers accounted for nearly 75% .(4–4 of their assets (Table 4-4).

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 132 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table 4-4: Profile of exchange houses in 2011 2011 ΩÉY ‘ áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T äÉfÉ«H :4-4 ∫hóL

áÑ°ùædG áÑ°ùædG äGOƒLƒŸG ᪫≤dG ¤EG äÉHƒ∏£ŸG ᪫≤dG ¤EG Assets á«dɪLE’G Liabilities á«dɪLE’G % to total % to total Cash & metals á櫪ãdG ¿OÉ©ŸGh ó≤ædG 20 Due to banks ∑ƒæÑ∏d ≥ëà°ùŸG 8

Due to other exchange áaGô°üdG äÉcô°ûd ëà°ùŸG Investments in Qatar ô£b ‘ äGQɪãà°S’G 0.3 ≥ 15 houses iôNC’G

Due to off-shore Balances with banks 44 0 ∑ƒæÑdG iód Ió°UQCG branches á«LQÉÿG ´hôØ∏d ≥ëà°ùŸG

Balances with Cheques/ remittances to ÖLGƒdG äÓjƒëàdG /äÉ «°ûdG áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T iód Ió°UQCG 9 μ 1 exchangers be paid É¡©aO Balances with off-shore 0.0 Provisions 2 branches á«LQÉÿG ´hôØdG iód Ió°UQCG äÉ°ü°üîŸG

Purchased cheques IGΰûŸG äÉμ«°ûdG 0.01 Other liabilities iôNCG äÉHƒ∏£e 21 Net fixed assets áàHÉãdG äGOƒLƒŸG ‘É°U 5 Capital and reserves äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gh ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ 52

Other assets iôNCG äGOƒLƒe 22

Due to the nature of their business, exchange houses ≈∏Y IOhófi ÉgôWÉfl ¿EÉa ,áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T πªY á©«ÑW ¤EG Gô¶fk appear to pose limited threats to financial stability. øe %10 øe πbCG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á≤ëà°ùŸG ≠dÉÑŸG ‹ÉªLEG πãÁh .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G The total amount due to banks comprised less than ≥ëà°ùe ≠∏Ñe ÈcCG πãÁ å«M ,áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG ᪫b 10% of their total assets. In fact, the largest amount øe %28 ‹GƒM ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ d áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T øe ácô°T …CG Ñb øe due by any exchange house to the banking sector was ≤∏ π roughly 28% of the total amount due by all exchange ≠dÉÑŸG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏Ñjh ,áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T ™«ªL øe á≤ëà°ùŸG ≠dÉÑŸG ´ƒª› houses; the total due amount of top 5 (in terms of ‹GƒM (äGOƒLƒŸG å«M øe) áaGô°U äÉcô°T ¢ùªN ≈∏YC’ á≤ëà°ùŸG assets) exchange houses is roughly 65% of total dues to .∑ƒæÑ∏d áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T ™«ªL øe á≤ëà°ùŸG ≠dÉÑŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %65 banks by all exchange houses. Hence, there exists some ¿EÉa ,á≤∏£ŸG º«≤dG ¤EG ô¶ædÉH ¬fCG ’EG ,õcÎdG ôWÉfl ¢†©H ô¡¶J ∂dòd concentration risks; given the magnitudes involved .IOhófi Èà©J ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ≈∏Y äÉcô°ûdG √òg ¢SÓaEG äÉ«YGóJ however, the possible repercussions of their failure on the banking sector appears limited.

In 2011, the total outgoing remittance by the exchange 32^3 áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T ≥jôW øY IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H houses amounted to QR 32.3 billion, equal to 5% of »∏ëŸG œÉædG øe %5 ∫OÉ©j Ée …CG ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 2011 GDP. This represented a 3% decrease over previous Ò°ûjh .»°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉk ≤e %3 √Qób ¢VÉØîfÉH ,2011 ΩÉ©d ‹ÉªLE’G year’s numbers. We arrange the regions/countries in IOQGƒdGh IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG Ö°ùM É«dRÉæJk ÉÑ«JôJk hódG / WÉæŸG Ö«JôJ decreasing order of outgoing and incoming remittances ∫ ≥ in 2011. In terms of outgoing remittances, 60% were to ∫hódG ¤EG â¡ŒG IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG øe %60 ¿CG ¤EG 2011 ΩÉY ‘ Asian countries as compared to around 50% in 2010; ∫hO á°üM äó¡°T óbh ,2010 ΩÉY ‘ %50 ‹GƒM ™e áfQÉk ≤e ájƒ«°SB’G the share of GCC countries has dropped sharply to %20 ≈∏Y ójõj Ée â≤≤M ¿CG ó©H GOÉMk É©LGôJk »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› 12% from over 20% in the previous year. Interestingly, äÓjƒëàdG ¿CG √ÉÑàfÓd âØ∏ŸG øeh .%12 ¤EG π°üàd á«°VÉŸG áæ°ùdG ‘ the top 5 regions/ countries accounted for three-fifths ‹ÉªLEG ¢SɪNCG áKÓK â¨∏H ób IQó°üàŸG ¢ùªÿG ∫hódG /≥WÉæŸG ¤EG of total remittances (Chart 4-7A). On the other hand, äÓjƒëàdG â¨∏H ,iôNCG á«MÉf øeh .(CG7–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) äÓjƒëàdG nearly 70% of incoming remittances, both in 2010 and ‹GƒM »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO øe 2011h 2010 »eÉY ‘ IOQGƒdG 2011, were from GCC countries, and the top 5 regions/ ¢ùªÿG WÉæŸG / hódG øe IOQGƒdG äÓjƒëàdG ‹ÉªLEG °T ɪc ,%70 countries accounted for 83% of total remittances in ≥ ∫ πμ 45 – 4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ΩÉY ‘ äÓjƒëàdG ‹ÉªLEG øe %83 IQó°üàŸG 2011 (Chart 4-7B) . 45(Ü7

45 45 Europe and North America = Canada, France, Germany, Spain, UK and USA; GCC ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ,á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdGh IóëàŸG áμ∏ªŸGh É«fÉÑ°SCGh É«fÉŸCGh É°ùfôah Góæc = á«dɪ°ûdG ÉμjôeCGh ÉHhQhG = Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE; Asia = Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, É«°ù«fhófEGh óæ¡dGh ¢ûjOÓ¨æH = É«°SBG hO ,IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’Gh ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG á ªŸGh ¿ÉªYho âjƒ dG = »é« ÿG Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. ∫ μ∏ μ ∏ .ófÓjÉJh ÉμfÓjô°Sh ÚÑ∏ØdGh ¿Éà°ùcÉHh ∫ÉÑ«ædGh

133 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T øe IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG :CG7-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T ¤EG IOQGƒdG äÓjƒëàdG :Ü7-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 4-7A: Outgoing remittances by Chart 4-7B: Incoming remittances by exchange houses exchange houses

100 100

80 80

60 60 Percent 40 Percent 40

20 20

0 0 i a . n a C d n i r l d a g C c a o s l C r i N e ) e r s C Asia a GCC Asia GCC on Top 5 Top 5 GCC) America than GCC) than Rest of World

2010 2011 Europe & N. MENA (other

Rest World of 2010 countries/regi countries/region MENA (otherMENA than

2011 Europe & N. America

The total foreign currency sales and purchases by the É¡H Ωƒ≤J »àdG á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH AGô°ûdGh ™«ÑdG äÉ«∏ªY ‹ÉªLEG π°Uh exchange houses during 2011 approximated QR 27 …CG ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 27 ‹GƒM ¤EG 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN áaGô°üdG äÉcô°T billion, or around 4.3% of 2011 GDP. In terms of amounts , dÉÑŸG á«MÉf øeh .2011 É©d ‹ÉªLE’G » ëŸG œÉædG øe %4^3 ‹GƒM involved, the top 5 exchange houses accounted for 52% ≠ Ω ∏ of total sales and 44% of purchases. %44 h äÉ©«ÑŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %52 áaGô°U äÉcô°T ¢ùªN ≈∏YCG á°üM â∏μ°T .AGô°ûdG äÉ«∏ªY øe Although several Asian countries account for a äÓjƒëàdG øe IÒÑc áÑ°ùæH ôKCÉà°ùJ ájƒ«°SBG ∫hO IóY ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y significant proportion of outgoing remittances judged ∫hOh á«≤jôaCG ∫hO IóY ¿CG ¤EG Ò°ûJ ádOC’G ¿CG ’EG ,óMGƒdG OôØ∏d IQOÉ°üdG in terms of absolute numbers, in per capita terms, the hódG øe Òã H YCG áÑJôe â M ób áeó àe hOh ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › evidence appears to suggest that several African and ∫ μ ≈∏ ≤≤ ≤ ∫ ∏ GCC countries, including developed nations, rank much OôØdG Ö«°üf ‹ÉàdG ÊÉ«ÑdG º°SôdG í°Vƒjh .(8-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ájƒ«°SB’G higher (Chart 4-8). The chart provides the per capita øe É«dRÉæJk ÉÑ«JôJk áÑJôe ,2011 ΩÉ©d ádhO πc Ö°ùM äÓjƒëàdG øe óMGƒdG remittance by country for 2011 ranked in decreasing IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG) Ú¨dÉÑdG ¿Éμ°ùdG OGôaCG øe Oôa πc äÓjƒ– å«M order of per capita remittance by adult population (pc ÜÉ°ùàMG óæY ¬fCG ¤EG IQÉ°TE’G QóŒh . 46(Ú¨dÉÑdG OGôaC’G πÑb øe outgoing-adults)46. When we consider the per capita ‹ÉªLEG øe óMGƒdG OôØdG Ö«°üf) äÓjƒëàdG øe óMGƒdG OôØdG Ö«°üf remittance (pc outgoing – all) or only the adult male QƒcòdG øe Ú¨dÉÑdG ¿É °ùdG äÓjƒ– ÜÉ°ùàMG hCG (IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG population (pc outgoing-men adults), the evidence is μ more or less unaltered. Ú¨dÉÑdG πÑb øe IQOÉ°üdG äÓjƒëàdG øe óMGƒdG OôØdG Ö«°üf) §≤a .Ée óM ¤EG áàHÉK ä’’óà°S’G π¶J ,(QƒcòdG

Chart 4-8: Per capita remittance by major á∏°SôŸG ∫hódG ºgCG äÓjƒ– øe OôØdG á°üM :8-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ remitting countries á«dÉŸG äÓjƒëà∏d 175000 150000 125000 100000 75000 Qatari Riyal Qatari 50000 25000 0 l . t s s h n a a n a n a p p e k e India Egypt Nepal Jordan lebanon Pakistan Sri Lanka Sri Philippines Bangladesh Saudi Arabia Saudi United StatesUnited Syrian Arab Rep. Arab Syrian pc outgoing (all) pc outgoing (men adults) pc outgoing (adults)

46 46 Based on population data as on December 8, 2011. .2011 Ȫ°ùjO 8 ‘ »g ɪc ¿Éμ°ùdG äÉfÉ«H ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 134 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Insurance sector ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b The GCC insurance market is fragmented with large øe ÒÑc OóY »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ÚeCÉàdG ¥ƒ°S ‘ ¢ùaÉæàj number of domestic and foreign players. Non-life ÚeCÉàdG ±ÓîH iôNC’G äÉæ«eCÉàdG øª«¡J .á«ÑæLC’Gh á«∏ëŸG äÉcô°ûdG dominates the market with approximately 85-90% of ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG øe ÉÑjôk J %90-85 ¿CG å«ëH ¥ƒ°ùdG Y IÉ« G Y the premiums being generated from this segment in ≤ ≈∏ ◊ ≈∏ both 2009 and 2010. The industry is also undergoing äÉ«∏ªY ÚeCÉàdG áYÉæ°U ó¡°ûJh .2010h2009 ‘ ´É£≤dG Gòg øY CÉ°ûæJ significant reforms, with regulatory frameworks being .(2–4 QÉWEG) É¡d »ª«¶æàdG QÉWE’G õjõ©J ∂dP ‘ Éà IRQÉH ìÓ°UEG enhanced (Box 4-2).

Box 4-2: Profile of GCC insurance sector »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b øY áëŸ :2–4 QÉWEG

Bahrain: The insurance sector is regulated by the Central π«dO ΩÉμMC’ ™°†îj …òdG ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b …õcôŸG øjôëÑdG ±ô°üe ôjój :øjôëÑdG Bank of Bahrain and the governing law is the Insurance äÉcô°T ∫Ée ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñjh .2005 ΩÉY ‘ QOÉ°üdG ÚeCÉàdG óYGƒb Rulebook of 2005. The minimum capital requirements for direct insurers is BhD 5 million (appx. USD 13 million). The ÚeCÉàdG πμ°T óbh .(»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 13 ‹GƒM …CG) »æjôëH QÉæjO ¿ƒ«∏e 5 ÚeCÉàdG major portion of the revenues in 2010 was from property …ôëÑdG ÚeCÉàdG ¬«∏j ,(%70 ‹GƒM) 2010 ΩÉY ‘ äGóFÉ©dG øe ÈcC’G Aõ÷G …QÉ≤©dG segment (around 70%), with marine being the second largest áÑ°ùæH á°ùaÉæe ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°T çÓK ≈∏YCG ôKCÉà°ùJh .(%14 ‹GƒM) á«fÉãdG áÑJôŸG ‘ (around 14%). The top 3 players accounting for 30% of the market and there are a total of 38 insurers in the market. .ácô°T 38 ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T OóY ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏Ñj å«M ,ÚeCÉàdG ¥ƒ°S øe %30 The total profits of 4 insurance companies stood at USD 2.3 ΩÉY ájÉ¡f ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 2^3 ƒëf ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°T ™HQCG ìÉHQCG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh million at end-2011. .2011 Kuwait: The insurance sector is regulated by the Kuwait ΩÉμMCG πX ‘ ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b âjƒμdG ádhóH áYÉæ°üdGh IQÉéàdG IQGRh ôjóJ :âjƒμdG Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the governing ´ƒaóŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñjh .1961 áæ°ùd 24 ºbQ ÚeCÉàdG ¿ƒfÉb legislation is Insurance Law 24 of 1961. The minimum paid- up capital requirement for Kuwaiti insurance companies is Q’hO 538^500 ‹GƒM …CG) »àjƒc QÉæjO 150^000 á«àjƒμdG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûH ¢UÉÿG KwD 150,000 (appx. USD 538,500) and that of a foreign ‹GƒM …CG) »àjƒc QÉæjO 225^000 á«ÑæLC’G ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûd áÑ°ùædÉH ≠∏Ñjh ,(»μjôeCG insurance company is KwD 225,000 (appx. USD 807,750). ácô°T 31 ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T ´ƒª› ≠∏Ñj ɪc .(»μjôeCG Q’hO 807^750 There are a total of 31 insurers in the market. Information ^ available for 8 insurers indicate a net loss of USD 10.2 10 2 √Qób IQÉ°ùN ‘É°U ¤EG ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°T 8 øY áMÉàŸG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG Ò°ûJh ,ÚeCÉJ million in 2011. .2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e

Oman: The insurance sector in Oman is regulated by the ΩÉμMC’ ™°†îj …òdG ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b ¿ÉªYo áæ£∏°ùH ∫ÉŸG ¥ƒ°ùd áeÉ©dG áÄ«¡dG ôjóJ :¿ÉªYo Oman Capital Market Authority and is governed by the ∫Ée ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñjh .1979 áæ°ùd ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûH ¢UÉÿG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG Insurance Companies Law of 1979. The minimum capital requirement for insurers is USD 13 million. There are a ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ á°ùaÉæŸG äÉcô°ûdG ´ƒª› ≠∏Ñj ɪc ,»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 13 ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T total of 23 players in the market. The major portion of the ≈∏Y ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b øe ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T äGóFÉY øe ÈcC’G º°ù≤dG »JCÉjh .ácô°T 23 revenues comes from motor segment (around 60%) and the ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh .%25 áÑ°ùæH É«fÉKk äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b »JCÉjh ,(%60 ‹GƒM) äÉÑcôŸG other dominant segment is property (around 25%). The total .2011 ÉY ‘ » jôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ« e 1^8 ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°T çÓK ìÉHQCG profits of 3 insurers in 2011 was USD 1.8 million. Ω μ ∏

Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) ádƒÄ°ùŸG á¡÷G »g …Oƒ©°ùdG »Hô©dG ó≤ædG á°ù°SDƒe Èà©J :ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG is the regulator of the insurance sector and the sector is äÉcô°T áÑbGôe Ωɶf ΩÉμMCG ÖLƒÃ ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ‘ ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b øY governed by the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control law of 2003. The minimum capital requirement for locally ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T ∫Ée ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñjh .2003 áæ°ùd ÊhÉ©àdG ÚeCÉàdG domiciled insurer is USD 27 million for direct insurance »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 53h ô°TÉÑŸG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûd »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 27 á«∏ëŸG and USD 53 million for reinsurers. Presently 26 insurance iód á∏é°ùe ÚeCÉJ ácô°T 26 ô°VÉ◊G âbƒdG ‘ óLƒJh .ÚeCÉàdG IOÉYEG äÉcô°ûd companies are registered with SAMA. Health insurance dominates the segment, accounting for around 44% of øe ÈcC’G Aõ÷ÉH »ë°üdG ÚeCÉàdG ôKCÉà°ùj å«M ,…Oƒ©°ùdG »Hô©dG ó≤ædG á°ù°SDƒe business and motor is the second largest class, accounting áÑJôŸG ‘ äGQÉ«°ùdG ÚeCÉJ »JCÉjh ,´É£≤dG Gòg ∫ɪYCG øe %44 áÑ°ùæH ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b for around 23% of market premiums. The total profits for 30 ìÉHQCG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh .¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG øe %23 ‹GƒM πμ°ûj å«M ,á«fÉãdG insurers was USD 116.5 million in 2011 as compared to USD Q’hO ¿ƒ« e 154 ™e áfQÉk e 2011 ÉY ‘ » jôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ« e 116^5 ÚeCÉJ ácô°T 30 154 million in 2010. ∏ ≤ Ω μ ∏ .2010 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG United Arab Emirates: The UAE insurance market is split á«∏fi ÚeCÉJ ¥ƒ°S ¤EG á«JGQÉeE’G ÚeCÉàdG ¥ƒ°S º°ù≤æJ :IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G between onshore (domestic) and offshore, with the former ‘ á«fÉã∏d »°ù«FôdG ô≤ŸG ™≤jh ,OÉ°üàb’G IQGRh ¤hC’G ôjóJ ,á«LQÉN ÚeCÉJ ¥ƒ°Sh governed by the Ministry of Economy and the latter based in the Dubai International Financial Center. (DIFC) The sector is (9) ºbQ …OÉ–’G ¿ƒfÉ≤dG ΩÉμMC’ ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b ™°†îj .»ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG »HO õcôe governed by Federal Law No.9 of 1984 and Federal Law No.6 ¿ƒfÉb ΩÉμMCG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH) 2007 áæ°ùd (6) ºbQ …OÉ–’G ¿ƒfÉ≤dGh 1984 áæ°ùd of 2007 (and the DIFC law No.1 of 2004). The market is split áfhB’G ‘ ÉeÉ°ùk ≤fG ¥ƒ°ùdG ó¡°ûJh .(2004 áæ°ùd (1) ºbQ »ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG »HO õcôe Recently, the minimum capital requirement for establishing an insurance company has been raised to USD 27 million ácô°T AÉ°ûfE’ ¢ü°üîŸG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àŸ ≈fOC’G ó◊G IOÉjR ” å«M ,IÒNC’G and for reinsurance companies, to USD 68 million. The äÉcô°T AÉ°ûfE’ »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 68h ,»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 27 ¤EG π°ü«d ÚeCÉJ market is diversified with a total of 57 players. Around 40% øe äGóFÉ©dG áÑ°ùf ≠∏ÑJh .áYƒæàe ácô°T 57 ÚeCÉàdG ¥ƒ°S ‘ ¢ùaÉæàJh .ÚeCÉàdG IOÉYEG of the revenue derives from marine and aviation, followed by

135 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

property segment contributing another 20%. The reported .%20 áÑ°ùæH äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b øe äGóFÉ©dG É¡«∏J ,%40 ‹GƒM …ƒ÷Gh …ôëÑdG ÚeCÉàdG profits of 28 insurers in 2011 at USD 212 million was 1.8% ¢VÉØîfÉH ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏e 212 ÚeCÉJ ácô°T 28 ìÉHQCG â¨∏H óbh lower as compared to previous year’s numbers. .2010 ΩÉY ìÉHQCG øY %1^8 áÑ°ùæH References ™LGôŸG Alpen Capital (2011). GCC Insurance Industry. August. .»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ ÚeCÉàdG •É°ûf .(2011) Alpen Capital .¢ù£°ùZCG R. Lester (2010). The insurance sector in the Middle East and .É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b .(2010) R. Lester North Africa. Financial Flagship Report, World Bank. .‹hódG ∂æÑdG .»°ù«FôdG ‹ÉŸG ôjô≤àdG Thomson Reuters. Datastream. .âfÎf’G áμÑ°T ≈∏Y äÉfÉ«ÑdG Ωɶf .Thomson Reuters Swiss Re (2011). Global Insurance Review 2011 and outlook iDhôdGh 2011 ΩÉ©d »ŸÉ©dG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ¿ÉªàF’ÉH ¢UÉN ôjô≤J .(2011) Swiss Re for 2012/13. .2013–2012 á«dÉŸG áæ°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG

At present, there are 9 insurance companies operating äÉcô°T ¢ùªN ,ô£b ádhóH πª©J ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°T 9 ô°VÉ◊G âbƒdG ‘ óLƒJ in Qatar, of which 5 are national companies and 4 are ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°ûd (´hôa hCG) ä’Éch »g É¡æe ™HQCGh á«æWh äÉcô°T »g É¡æe agencies (or branches) of Arab or foreign companies. ±Gô°TEG â– πª©J iôNCG ÚeCÉJ ácô°T 13 ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,á«ÑæLCG hCG á«HôY In addition, 13 more insurance companies regulated å«M ,ádhódÉH ÚeCÉàdG äÉLÉ«àMG »Ñ Jh ɪ d ô£b õcôe º«¶æJ áÄ«g by the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority ∏ ∫ ∏ (QFCRA) are also catering to the insurance needs of ó°V ÚeCÉàdG πãe á«æ«eCÉàdG á«£¨àdG øe IOó©àe äÉÄa äÉcô°ûdG √òg Ωó≤J the country. These insurance companies offer various .ÉgÒZh »ë°üdG ÚeCÉàdGh ,…ÈdGh …ôëÑdG ÚeCÉàdGh ,≥FGô◊Gh çOGƒ◊G classes of insurance coverage such as insurance against »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH hCG) ô£b ádhóH ÚeCÉàdG π¨∏¨J áÑ°ùf Èà©Jh accidents and fire, marine and land insurance, health ,á«ŸÉ©dG ÒjÉ©ŸÉH áfQÉk ≤e Ée ó◊ á°†Øîæe (ôeC’G Gò¡H ≥∏©àj ɪ«a ÉeƒªYk insurance and others. Insurance penetration in Qatar èFÉàædG áfQÉ≤à ,IÉ«◊G ≈∏Y ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b ‘ ¬fCG ßMÓjo ,∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏©a (or, for that matter in GCC in generally) is quite low %3^98 â¨∏H »àdGh ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG áÑ°ùf ™e as compared to global standards. By way of example, øe áÑ°ùf YCG øjôëÑdG â M ó a ,»ŸÉ©dG iƒà°ùŸG Y 2010 ÉY ‘ in the life segment, as compared to a premium/GDP ≈∏ ≤≤ ≤ ≈∏ Ω of 3.98% in 2010 globally, the highest among GCC ô£b â≤≤M ÚM ‘ ,%0^62 â¨∏H »àdGh »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÚH countries was Bahrain at 0.62% and the lowest was ÚeCÉàdG ±ÓîH iôNC’G äÉæ«eCÉàdG ´É£b ‘h .%0^05 ƒëæH áÑ°ùf ≈fOCG Qatar at 0.05%. In the non-life segment as well, Bahrain ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG áÑ°ùf å«M øe áÑ°ùf ≈∏YCG øjôëÑdG â≤≤M ,IÉ«◊G ≈∏Y had the highest premium/GDP of 1.9% in 2010 and the â≤≤M ɪæ«H ,2010 ΩÉY ‘ %1^9 â¨∏H å«M ,‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG lowest was Kuwait at 0.46%; for Qatar, the number was â¨∏H ó≤a ô£b ádhO ÉeCG ,%0^46 â¨∏H ´É£≤dG Gòg ‘ áÑ°ùf ≈fOCG âjƒμdG 0.68%. This compared to a global average of 2.88% òg »JCÉJh ,%0^68 ‹ÉªLE’G » ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG É¡«a ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG áÑ°ùf during the same period47. √ ∏ ≈∏Y ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ¤EG ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG áÑ°ùf ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH èFÉàædG . 47IÎØdG ¢ùØf ∫ÓN %2^88 â¨∏H »àdGh »ŸÉ©dG iƒà°ùŸG

Due to paucity of information, we restrict our analysis on ¢ùªÿG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T ≈∏Y π«∏ëàdG ô°üà≤j ,äÉeƒ∏©ŸG á∏≤d Gô¶fk the 5 listed insurance companies. These listed insurance ‘ á«°ù«FQ áØ°üH äÉcô°ûdG √òg ∑QÉ°ûJ å«M ,á°UQƒÑdG ‘ áLQóŸG companies are primarily involved in the non-life segments ÚeCÉàdGh ,çQGƒμdG ó°V ÚeCÉàdGh äÉμ∏ટG ÚeCÉJ πãe áeÉ©dG äÉæ«eCÉàdG such as property, casualty, marine, engineering, motor ≠∏H óbh .»ë°üdG ÚeCÉàdGh ,äGQÉ«°ùdG ÚeCÉJh ,»°Sóæ¡dG ÚeCÉàdGh …ôëÑdG and medical insurance. Their total assets in 2011 stood at ^ QR 14.9 billion, equivalent to roughly 2.4% of 2011 GDP. ∫OÉ©j Ée …CG ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 14 9 ƒëf 2011 ‘ É¡JGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG The asset growth in nominal terms was 3.6% higher ƒ‰ áÑ°ùf â¨∏Hh ,2011 ΩÉ©d ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG øe %2^4 ÉÑjôk ≤J than the previous year’s numbers. The market is Èà©jh .»°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dG øY ,%3^6 ƒëf ᫪°S’G ᪫≤dG å«M øe äGOƒLƒŸG concentrated, with the largest company accounting ‹ÉªLEG øe %60 øe ÌcCG ¤EG ácô°T ÈcCG á°üM π°üJ å«M ,Gõcôek ¥ƒ°ùdG for over 60% of gross premium income and the two ÜQÉ≤j Ée ¤EG Úàcô°T ÈcCG á°üM π°üJ ɪc ,ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG øe πNódG largest for nearly 75%. Total gross premium in 2011 ÉjQ QÉ« e 3^76 ƒëf 2011 ‘ ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG H ɪc .%75 amounted to QR 3.76 billion, or less than 0.6% of 2011 ∫ ∏ ≠∏ GDP. Contextually, it may be mentioned that in 2010, QóŒh .2011 ΩÉ©d ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG øe %0^6 øe πbCG hCG ,…ô£b the total gross premiums in GCC amounted to USD ób »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG ¿CG ¤EG IQÉ°TE’G 13.6 billion (out of a total global market of USD 4,325 ‘ ᪫≤dG ‹ÉªLEG øe) »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 13^6 ƒëf 2010 ΩÉY ‘ ≠∏H billion). Segment-wise, GCC economies accounted ó«©°U ≈∏Y ÉeCG .(»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 4^325 ≠∏ÑJ »àdGh á«ŸÉ©dG ¥ƒ°ùdG for 0.07% of total life premium volumes of USD 2,508 ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù › hO ‘ IÉ« G Y ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG â °T ó a ,äÉYÉ£ dG billion, whereas their share of non-life premium volume ∏ ∫ ◊ ≈∏ ∏μ ≤ ≤ was 0.63% out of the total non-life premium volume of ⁄É©dG ‘ IÉ«◊G ≈∏Y ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG øe %0^07 ƒëf »é«∏ÿG USD 1,817 billion (Chart 4-9). •É°ùbCG ‘ É¡à°üM â¨∏H ÚM ‘ ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 2^508 â¨∏H »àdGh »àdGh áeÉ©dG äÉæ«eCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG øe %0,63 ƒëf áeÉ©dG äÉæ«eCÉàdG .(9-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 1^817 ƒëf â¨∏H 47 47 Cross-country data is sourced from Swiss Re (Global Insurance Review 2011 and World ÚeCÉàdGh 2011 ΩÉY ‘ QOÉ°U ⁄É©dG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ÚeCÉàdG ∫ƒM ôjô≤J) Swiss Re ácô°T ƒg ∫hódG ÈY äÉfÉ«ÑdG Qó°üe Insurance in 2010). Figures reported here might not necessarily match with those reported IOQGƒdG ΩÉbQC’G ™e ôjô≤àdG Gòg ‘ IOQGƒdG ΩÉbQC’G ≥HÉ£àJ ¿CG IQhô°†dÉH ¢ù«d .(2010 ΩÉY ‘ QOÉ°U ⁄É©dG ∫hO iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y elsewhere owing to different data sources. .äÉfÉ«ÑdG QOÉ°üe ±ÓàN’ Gô¶fk iôNCG ôjQÉ≤J ‘

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 136 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Chart 4-9: Life and non-life premium volumes áeÉ©dG äÉæ«eCÉàdGh IÉ«◊G ≈∏Y ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ºéM :9-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ in GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hóH 1200 66000 1000 55000 800 44000 600 33000 USD USD 400 22000 200 11000 0 0 BBHH K KWW O OMM Q QAA S SAA A AEE

Non-life premium volume (2009) -Right scale Non-life premium volume (2010) -Right scale

Life premium volume (2010)

An analysis of the development in the insurance ‹ÉªLEG ƒ‰ øY 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b ‘ Qƒ£àdG π«∏– ∞°ûμj sector during 2011 reveals that the total asset of the óbh .48(10–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉ≤e %3,6 ƒëæH äGOƒLƒŸG insurance sector grew by 3.6% over the previous year ™e áfQÉ ŸÉH ¬fCG ’EG ,%1^3 áÑ°ùæH ¬H ºgÉ°ùŸG ÉŸG ¢SCGQ áÑ°ùf â©ØJQG (Chart 4-10)48. The equity capital increased by 1.3%. ≤ ∫ However, as compared to the previous year, insurance .á∏FÉ°ùdG äGOƒLƒª∏d É¡JRÉ«M áÑ°ùf ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T â©aQ ,»°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dG companies increased their holding of liquid assets. 2011 ΩÉY ‘ %17 äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ™FGOƒdGh ó≤ædG áÑ°ùf â¨∏H ɪc The share of cash and deposits to total assets was êhOõe OƒcQ çhóM øe ±hÉîŸG äOCGh .2010 ΩÉY ‘ %15 ƒëæH áfQÉk ≤e 17% in 2011 as compared to 15% in 2010. Fears of º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ AGOC’G ∞©°V ¤EG á«HhQhC’G ¿ƒjódG áeRCG QGôªà°SGh a double-dip recession and the lingering European IOÉjR ¤EG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T ™aO ɇ ,»ª«∏bE’Gh »ŸÉ©dG øjó«©°üdG ≈∏Y debt crisis led to poor performance in equity markets, ÉgQɪãà°SG áÑ°ùf …CG ,¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉîŸ É¡°Vô©J ¢†ØNh ájó≤ædG É¡JGOƒLƒe both globally and regionally, compelling insurance k companies to increase cash holding and lower their á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ‘ äGQɪãà°S’G ™LGôJ É«∏L hóÑjh .á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ‘ market risk – the share of investment in securities. ΩÉY ‘ (äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG É¡àÑ°ùf Ö°ùMh ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG Ö°ùM) Illustratively, investments in securities declined – both .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ™e áfQÉ≤e 2011 in percentage terms and also as ratio to total assets – in 2011 as compared to the previous year.

Net premium income increased in excess of net claims ‘É°U äRhÉŒ áÑ°ùæH ÉYÉØJQGk ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG øe πNódG ‘É°U ó¡°T thereby resulting in a net increase in income and in IOÉjR ¤EG ÉgQhóH äOCG πNódG ‘ á«aÉ°U IOÉjR ¤EG iOCG ɇ ,äÉÑdÉ£ŸG turn, raising profits, albeit marginally. In fact, net ÉY ‘ %3 ƒëæH ìÉHQC’G ‘É°U ™ØJQG óbh .áØ«ØW IOÉjR âfÉc ¿EGh ìÉHQC’G profits increased by around 3% in 2011 as compared Ω to 9% in 2010. .2010 ΩÉY ‘ %9 ƒ‰ áÑ°ùæH áfQÉ≤e 2011

Chart 4-10: Growth in balance sheet of the insurance sector ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b äÉ«fGõ«e ‘ ƒªædG ∫ó©e :10-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

25 20 15 10 5 0 Percent -5 TotalTotal assetsassets EquityEquity capitalcapital investmentinvestment inin InvestmentInvestment InvestmentInvestment iinn cashcash andand -10 securitiessecurities propertiesproperties associatesassociates depositsdeposits -15 -20 GrowthG th (2010(2010 over 22009)009) GrowthG th (2011(2011 over 22010)010)

48 48 Based on the balance sheet information of 5 listed insurance companies. .á°UQƒÑdG ‘ áLQóe ÚeCÉJ äÉcô°T ¢ùªÿ á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸÉH IOQGƒdG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk

137 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

We assess the financial soundness of the listed ∫ÓN øe á°UQƒÑdG ‘ áLQóŸG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûd á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG º««≤J ºàj insurance companies through a set of indicators which ‘ ©°†dGh á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG ÖfGƒL ¢ù« J »àdG äGô°TDƒŸG øe áYƒª› measures the financial health and vulnerabilities of the ∞ ≤ sector (Table 4-5). .(5-4 ∫hóL) ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b Ratio of equity to the total assets of the insurance »àdGh ,ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T äGOƒLƒe ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG á«μ∏ŸG ¥ƒ≤M áÑ°ùf äó¡°T companies, a proxy for their capitalization, has ΩÉY ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH É«°ûeÉgk É©LGôJk ,ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°T á∏ª°Sôd Gô°Tk Dƒe ó©J declined marginally as compared to 2010. The lower ¥ƒ M Y óFÉ©dG IOÉjR ¤EG á« ŸG ¥ƒ M áÑ°ùf ¢VÉØîfG iOCG óbh ,2010 equity growth led to an increase in the Return on ≤ ≈∏ μ∏ ≤ Equity. The improvement in their cash position along ÖfÉL ¤EG ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûd …ó≤ædG ™°VƒdG ‘ Qƒ£àdG Ò°ûjh .á«μ∏ŸG with the lower outstanding claims meant that their ,äÉcô°ûdG √òg ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh ¿CG ¤EG áªFÉ≤dG äÉÑdÉ£ŸG ºéM ¢VÉØîfG liquidity position, as measured by outstanding claims Éæ°ù–k ó¡°T ób ,ájó≤ædG ¤EG áªFÉ≤dG äÉÑdÉ£ŸG áÑ°ùæH ¬°SÉ«b ºàj …òdGh to cash, improved during the year. .áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN

Table 4-5: Financial soundness indicators for the insurance sector (%) (%) ÚeCÉàdG ´É£≤d á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe :5-4 ∫hóL

December December Financial soundness indicator 2010 2011 á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe

Equity/ Total asset 50.6 49.4 äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG /á«μ∏ŸG ¥ƒ≤M

Total investment income/ Total investment asset 12.4 12.7 ájQɪãà°S’G ∫ƒ°UC’G ´ƒª› /Qɪãà°S’G øe πNódG ´ƒª›

Profit/ Shareholders equity (RoE) 12.7 12.9 (á«μ∏ŸG ¥ƒ≤M ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG) á«μ∏ŸG ¥ƒ≤M /ìÉHQC’G

Outstanding claims/ Cash or cash equivalent 150.8 120.4 ¬gÉÑ°TCGh ó≤ædG /áªFÉ≤dG äÉÑdÉ£ŸG

Net premium/ Gross premium 47.5 50.3 ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG /ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‘É°U

Net claims/ Net premium 50.3 46.8 ÚeCÉàdG •É°ùbCG ‘É°U /äÉÑdÉ£ŸG ‘É°U

Corporate and household sectors »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dGh äÉcô°ûdG ´É£b The performance of the financial sector is intricately ≈∏Y Ú°VÎ≤ŸG IQó≤H GÒÑck ÉWÉÑJQGk ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ AGOC’G §ÑJôj linked to the borrowers repayment capacity. The non- ∂dòdh .‹ÉŸG ´É£≤∏d ôXÉæŸG ´É£≤dG ‹ÉŸG ÒZ ´É£≤dG Èà©jh ,OGó°ùdG financial sector is considered the counterpart of the .á°VÎ ŸG äÉcô°û d á«dÉŸG Iƒ dG áÑbGôe ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG Y ºàëàj financial sector. As a result, it becomes necessary for ≤ ∏ ≤ ≈∏ central banks to monitor the financial strength of corporate borrowers.

Profitability of GCC49 listed corporates stood at around 53 ‹GƒM 49á«é«∏ÿG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ áLQóŸG äÉcô°ûdG á«ëHQ â¨∏H USD 53 billon in 2011, registering a rise of roughly 23% áfQÉk ≤e %23 ƒëæH ÉYÉØJQGk ∂dòH ák ∏é°ùe ,2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e over previous year’s numbers50. Among countries, Saudi ƒëf ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG á ªŸG â M hódG ÚH øeh . 50 HÉ°ùdG É©dÉH Arabia accounted for around 47% of the total profitability, μ∏ ≤≤ ∫ ≥ Ω while the share of Bahrain was the lowest at around á«ëHQ iƒà°ùe ≈fOCG øjôëÑdG â≤≤M ÚM ‘ ,á«ëHôdG ‹ÉªLEG øe %47 3.3%. In terms of growth, the growth was positive for all ™«ªL â≤≤M ó≤a ,á«ëHôdG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e å«M øe ÉeCG .%3,3 ‹GƒM â¨∏H countries, except Oman where profitability declined by iƒà°ùe É¡«a ™LGôJ »àdG ¿ÉªYo GóY ɪ«a ,á«ëHô∏d ÉÑLƒek ’ó©ek ∫hódG 21% over previous year’s numbers (Chart 4-11). .(11–4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉk ≤e %21 ƒëæH á«ëHôdG

49 49 Based on 657 companies for 2010 and 600 companies in 2011. This comprises of ô£bh ¿ÉªYho âjƒμdGh øjôëÑdG øe äÉcô°T πª°ûJ »gh ,2011 ΩÉ©d ácô°T 600h 2010 ΩÉ©d ácô°T 657 ¤EG GOÉæà°Sk companies in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Abu .(»HOh »ÑXƒHCG) IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’Gh ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG á ªŸGh Dhabi and Dubai). μ∏ 50 50 Based on information sourced from Datastream and stock exchange websites of ∫hódÉH á°UÉÿG á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ™bGƒeh âfÎf’G áμÑ°T ≈∏Y áMÉàŸG äÉfÉ«ÑdG øe Ióªà°ùŸG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk respective countries. .á«æ©ŸG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 138 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Chart 4-11: Corporate profitability shares of ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ äÉcô°ûdG á«ëHQ Ö°ùf :11-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ GCC countries »é«∏ÿG 100

80

60

Percent 40

20

0 2010 2011

UAE SA QA OM KW BH

Among sectors, banking and investment accounted ‹ÉªLEG øe %40 Qɪãà°S’Gh ∑ƒæÑdG ´É£b ≥≤M ,äÉYÉ£≤dG ÚH øeh for 40% of total profitability in 2011 (36% in 2010), ÉYÉ£b πμ°T ÚM ‘ ,(2010 ΩÉY ‘ %36) 2011 ΩÉY ‘ á«ëHôdG iƒà°ùe whereas the share of chemicals and telecom were 24% √òg â∏μ°Th ,‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y %17h %24 ä’É°üJ’Gh ájhɪ«μdG äÉYÉæ°üdG and 17%, respectively. Taken together, these three ΩÉY ‘ ìÉHQC’G ‹ÉªLEG øe %80 øe ÌcCG á©ªà› çÓãdG äÉYÉ£≤dG sectors accounted for over 80% of the total profits øe) ÉYÉ£bk 11 ¤EG π°üj Ée πé°S óbh .(2010 ΩÉY ‘ %84) 2011 in 2011 (84% in 2010). As many as 11 (out of a total 51 k k of 15) sectors registered declines in profits in 201151. ∫ó©e ´ÉØJQ’ ¿Éch . 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ìÉHQC’G ‘ É©LGôJ (ÉYÉ£b 15 π°UCG The high profit growth in banking and chemicals were ‘ ’É©ak GQhOk ájhɪ«μdG äÉYÉæ°üdG ´É£bh ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ìÉHQC’G ƒ‰ instrumental in pulling up aggregate profitability in …òdG ¢TÉ©àf’G ™e ≥°SÉæàdÉHh .2011 ΩÉY ‘ »∏μdG á«ëHôdG iƒà°ùe ™aQ 2011. In tandem with the upturn in real estate, the ΩÉY ‘ É«HÉéjk EG Gƒ‰k ´É£≤dG Gòg ìÉHQCG äó¡°T ,äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b √ó¡°T profits of the sector turned positive in 2011 from USD ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 3^6 ᪫≤H IQÉ°ùN øe â©ØJQG å«M ,2011 -3.6 billion in 2010 to USD 2.1 billion in 2011. Cyclical .2011 ΩÉY ‘ »μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 2^1 ᪫≤H ìÉHQCG ¤EG π°üàd 2010 consumer products and energy sectors were the áeó≤e ‘ ÉfÉc ó≤a ábÉ£dGh ájQhódG á«cÓ¡à°S’G äÉéàæŸG »YÉ£b ÉeCG biggest losers, with profitability declines of over 65% k over the previous year. øY ójõj Éà ɪ¡à«ëHQ â°†ØîfG å«M ,É©LGôJ â∏é°S »àdG äÉYÉ£≤dG .≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dÉH áfQÉk ≤e %65 In terms of sectors across countries, the five sectors »àdG á°ùªÿG äÉYÉ£≤dG πª°ûJ ,∫hódG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y äÉYÉ£≤dG å«M øe with major profits shares include banking, chemicals, äÉYÉæ°üdG ´É£bh ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG :ìÉHQC’G øe IÒÑc É°ü°üMk â≤≤M mineral resources, telecom and real estate. Examining .…QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dGh ,ä’É°üJ’G ´É£bh ,á«fó©ŸG IhÌdG ´É£bh ,ájhɪ«μdG the profitability growth across these sectors indicates that banking was the leader registering the highest ¿CG ¤EG èFÉàædG äQÉ°TCG ,äÉYÉ£≤dG √òg ÈY á«ëHôdG ƒ‰ ∫ó©e á°SGQóHh profitability growth across most countries in 2011. On á«ëHôdG â∏é°S å«M ,äÉYÉ£≤dG √òg áeó≤e ‘ AÉL ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG the other hand, the profitability of the telecom sector ≥≤M ,ôNBG ó«©°U ≈∏Yh ,2011 ΩÉY ∫hódG º¶©e ‘ É¡d ƒ‰ ∫ó©e ≈∏YCG was lower for all countries in 2011. The recovery in real Èà©jh .ΩÉ©dG ¢ùØf ‘ ∫hódG ™«ªL ‘ πbCG á«ëHQ iƒà°ùe ä’É°üJ’G ´É£b estate is in evidence with the profitability of the sector Ó«dOk á«ëHôdG iƒà°ùe ÖfÉL ¤EG …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG √ó¡°T …òdG ¢TÉ©àf’G turning positive in several economies. The real estate ¿CG hóÑjh .äGOÉ°üàb’G øe ójó©dG ‘ ´É£≤∏d »HÉéjE’G ∫ƒëàdG ≈∏Y sector in UAE appears to be recovering from the after- ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ¬WÉ°ûf ó«©à°ùj IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ‘ …QÉ≤©dG ´É£≤dG effects of the Dubai World episode, having registered k positive profits in 2011 after suffering massive losses ¿CG ó©H 2011 ΩÉY ‘ áÑLƒe ÉMÉHQCG Óé°ùek ,á«ŸÉ©dG »HO ácô°T áeRCG QÉKBG in the previous year (Table 4-6). .(6–4 ∫hóL) »°VÉŸG ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á∏FÉg ôFÉ°ùÿ ¢Vô©J

51 51 The sectors include applied resources, banking and investment services, chemicals, á«cÓ¡à°S’G äÉéàæŸGh ,ájhɪ«μdG äÉYÉæ°üdGh ,Qɪãà°S’G äÉeóNh ∑ƒæÑdG ,áeóîà°ùŸG OQGƒŸG äÉYÉ£≤dG √òg πª°ûJ cyclical consumer products, energy, food, industrial conglomerates, industrial goods ,äGQÉ≤©dGh ,á«fó©ŸG IhÌdGh ,ÚeCÉàdGh ,á«YÉæ°üdG äÉeóÿGh ™∏°ùdGh ,á«YÉæ°üdG äÉÑ«cÎdGh ,AGò¨dGh ,ábÉ£dGh ,ájQhódG and services, insurance, mineral resources, real estate, telecom, transport, utilities and miscellaneous (comprising of automobiles and auto parts, healthcare services, investment ¿ÉªàF’Gh ,á«ë°üdG ájÉYôdG äÉeóNh ,QÉ«¨dG ™£bh äGQÉ«°ùdG πª°ûJ) ábôØàe äÉYÉ£bh ≥aGôŸGh ,äÓ°UGƒŸGh ,ä’É°üJ’Gh trusts, personal household products, pharmaceuticals and medical research, retailers, Ö°SÉ◊G äÉ«›ôH äÉeóNh ,áFõéàdG IQÉŒh ,á«f’ó«°üdGh á«Ñ£dG çƒëÑdG ,á«°üî°ûdG ô°SC’G äÉéàæeh ,…Qɪãà°S’G software and IT services and technology equipment). .(á«æ≤àdG äGó©ŸGh ,äÉeƒ∏©ŸG É«LƒdƒæμJh

139 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table 4-6: Profitability changes across major sector (%) (%) á«°ù«FôdG äÉYÉ£≤dG ‘ á«ëHôdG iƒà°ùe ‘ äGÒ¨àdG :6-4 ∫hóL

äÉYÉæ°üdG ´É£b IhÌdG ´É£b Sector ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG á«fó©ŸG ä’É°üJ’G ´É£b äGQÉ≤©dG ´É£b ´É£≤dG Country Banking ájhɪ«μdG Mineral Telecom Real estate Chemicals ádhódG resources 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 over over over over over over over over over over 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010

Bahrain + + + + - - + - øjôëÑdG Kuwait + + - + + - + - + + âjƒμdG Oman +-+-----+- ¿ÉªYo Qatar + + + + - - - - - + ô£b Saudi Arabia - + + + - + + - - + ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG UAE ++ -----+IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G

Total profits in 2011 ‘ ìÉHQC’G ‹ÉªLEG 21.17 12.55 2.42 8.79 2.12 2011 (USD bn.) (»μjôeCG Q’hO ¿ƒ«∏ŸÉH)

Since 2006, corporate earnings of listed entities ∑ƒæÑdG GóY) ô£b ádhóH áLQóŸG äÉcô°ûdG äó¡°T ,2006 ΩÉY òæeh (except banking and insurance) in Qatar have increased QÉ«∏e 22 ¤EG π°üàd %21 ≠∏H Öcôe ∫ó©Ã É¡MÉHQCG ‘ Gƒ‰k (ÚeCÉàdGh at a compound rate of 21% to reach QR 22 billion in 52 52 ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN %32 áÑ°ùæH ìÉHQC’G ƒ‰ iõ©jh . 2011 ΩÉY ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ 2011 . The 32% increase in earnings in the current k year was mainly due to healthy earnings growth by the äÉYÉæ°üdG ´É£b √ó¡°T …òdG ó«÷G ƒªædG ∫ó©e ¤EG É°SÉ°SCG ‹É◊G industrial sector (82% increase year-on-year) reflecting ≈∏Y ád’O ƒgh ,(…ƒæ°S ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y %82 ÉgQób IOÉjõH) á«∏jƒëàdG a positive spillover from the country’s investment ≥≤M ɪæ«H ,ádhódÉH Qɪãà°S’G ácôM øY áÄ°TÉædG á«HÉéjE’G äÉ°SÉμ©f’G drive. The profits of the services sector on the other .2010 ΩÉY ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH %3 É¡àÑ°ùf â¨∏H πbCG ÉMÉHQk CG äÉeóÿG ´É£b hand, were 3% lower vis-à-vis 2010. The industrial ΩÉY ‘ ìÉHQC’G ‘É°U øe %57 πμq °T ó≤a á«∏jƒëàdG äÉYÉæ°üdG ´É£b ÉeCG sector constituted 57% of the net profits in 2011 as 53 compared to 50% in 200653. . 2006 ΩÉY %50 ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH 2011

The total assets of top 20 listed (industry and services) äÉYÉæ°üdG ´É£b ‘) 54 áLQóe ácô°T 20 ÈcCG äGOƒLƒe ´ƒª› H 54 ≠∏ companies was roughly USD 92 billion. The leverage ,á«dÉŸG á©aGôdG áÑ°ùf â¨∏Hh .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 92 ÜQÉ≤j Ée (äÉeóÿGh ratio, defined as the ratio of total interest-bearing loans and borrowings to total assets was 31% in 2011. äGOƒLƒŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG IóFÉØH ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG áÑ°ùf É¡fCÉH ±ô©J »àdGh Profitability has also been comfortable with total ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H å«M Gó«Lk iƒà°ùek á«ëHôdG äô¡XCG ɪc .2011 ΩÉY ‘ %31 profits of USD 5.9 billion. .»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 5^9 ìÉHQC’G Although interest rates remain benign at present, with ô°VÉ◊G âbƒdG ‘ áÑ°SÉæe äÉjƒà°ùe óæY IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG AÉ≤H øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y a 200 bps interest rate shock, it is observed that a GÒÑck GAõLk ¿CG ’EG ,¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 200 QGó≤à IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG áeó°U πX ‘ significant part of the interest bearing loans would be .(3- 4 QÉWEG) dòd áé«àf ôKCÉàj ±ƒ°S óFGƒa É¡« Y ÖJÎJ »àdG ¢Vhô dG øe affected (Box 4-3). ∂ ∏ ≤

Box 4-3: Corporate sector stress test äÉcô°ûdG ´É£b ≈∏Y §¨°†dG QÉÑàNG :3- 4 QÉWEG The aggregate short-term debt of the top 20 corporates ájÉ¡f ‘ (ÚeCÉàdGh ∑ƒæÑdG GóY Ée) ácô°T 20 ÈcC’ πLC’G IÒ°üb ¿ƒjódG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H (excluding banking and insurance) at end-2011 was around /ìÉHQC’G) óFGƒØdG á«£¨J áÑ°ùf â¨∏H ɪc ,»μjôeCG Q’hO QÉ«∏e 25 ‹GƒM 2011 ΩÉY USD 25 billion and the interest coverage ratio (profits/short- k term debt) equal to one. This, in effect, suggests that, on ìÉHQC’G ¿CG ¤EG ’ɪLEG ∂dP Ò°ûj å«M ,í«ë°U óMGƒd …hÉ°ùe (πLC’G IÒ°üb ¿ƒjódG aggregate, the profits of these companies is able to cover .É¡jód πLC’G IÒ°üb ¢VGÎb’G äÉ«∏ªY á«£¨J ≈∏Y IQOÉb äÉcô°ûdG √òg É¡≤≤– »àdG their short-term borrowings.

52 52 There were 23 (resp., 29) listed companies in 2006 (resp., 2011). The earnings of one IóMGh ácô°T ìÉHQCG ÜÉ°ùàMG ” óbh ,2011 ΩÉY ácô°T 29h 2006 ΩÉY ácô°T 23 á°UQƒÑdG ‘ áLQóŸG äÉcô°ûdG OóY ≠∏H services company is for the 9-month period ending December 2011, since it’s financial year ‘ É¡d á«dÉŸG áæ°ùdG ÜÉ°ùàMG ¤EG Gô¶fk ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f àM jôHCG øe AGóàHGk Qƒ¡°T ™°ùJ IÎØd äÉeóÿG äÉcô°T øe is April-March. ≈ π .¢SQÉe ≈àM πjôHCG øe IÎØdG 53 53 One finance company was delisted from the Qatar Exchange in 2011 following its .á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ióMEG πÑb øe É¡μ∏“ ó©H 2011 ΩÉY ô£b á°UQƒH ‘ πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T ióMEG êGQOEG AɨdEG ” acquisition by a domestic bank. 54 54 Including 12 companies which are part of QE-20 index. .ácô°T 20 øe ¿ƒμàj …òdG ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe øe GAõLk πã“ »àdG äÉcô°ûdG øe ácô°T 12 øª°†àJ

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 140 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

With a 200 bps interest rate shock, it is found that the »∏μdG ∫ó©ŸG ¿CG í°†àj ,¢SÉ°SCG á£≤f 200 QGó≤à IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG áeó°U çhóM πX ‘h aggregate interest coverage ratio becomes 0.92, with π°UCG øe äÉcô°T 6 øY π≤j ’ Ée ôKCÉJ ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,0^92 …hÉ°ùj óFGƒØdG á«£¨àd as many as 6 (out of the 20) companies being adversely k k affected, in the sense that their interest coverage ratio øY äÉcô°ûdG √òg iód óFGƒØdG á«£¨J ∫ó©e ™LGôJ »æ©j ɇ ,É«Ñ∏°S GôKCÉJ ácô°T 20 declines below one. .í«ë°üdG óMGƒdG

The affected borrowings of these companies comprise over iód á°VÎ≤ŸG ≠dÉÑŸG ‹ÉªLEG øe %50 øe ÌcCG äÉcô°ûdG √ò¡d IôKCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG πμ°ûJ 50% of the total borrowings of these 20 companies. .πμc ácô°T 20

Rising household debt has been a major concern for äÉ«fƒjóe ´ÉØJQG ƒg áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G ΩɪàgG π¨°ûj …òdG ôeC’G developed economies. The IMF (2012) reports that, ¤EG (2012) ΩÉ©d ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ôjô≤J Ò°ûj å«M ,»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG in the run-up to the crisis, household debt to income »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG á«fƒjóe áÑ°ùf â©ØJQG áeRC’G â≤Ñ°S »àdG IÎØdG ∫ÓN ¬fCG ratio rose by an average of 39 percentage points, to ” ¿CG òæeh .55 áFÉŸÉH 138 ¤EG °üàd ájƒÄe ᣠf 39 ƒëæH NódG ¤EG 138 percent55. Since the build-up of household debt π ≤ π is considered to be one the prime reasons for the á«°ù«FôdG ÜÉÑ°SC’G óMCG ÉgQÉÑàYÉH »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ¿ƒjO ºcGôJ ¤EG ô¶ædG recent financial meltdown in the US and subsequently ∫hódGh á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG ‘ IÒNC’G áfhB’G ∫ÓN ‹ÉŸG QÉ«¡fÓd elsewhere, countries have undertaken several ÒHGóàdG øe áYƒª› PÉîJÉH ∫hódG âeÉb ,Ék ≤M’ ∂dòH IôKCÉàŸG iôNC’G measures to strengthen mortgage market regulations ,‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U) …QÉ≤©dG øgôdG ¥ƒ°ùH á°UÉÿG ᪶fC’G õjõ©àd (IMF, 2011)56. . 56(2011 The GCC countries are no exception to this rule. GOóYk ¿CG å«M ,IóYÉ≤dG √òg øe »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ≈æãà°ùn Jo ’ Several of these countries already had limits on πÑb »∏FÉ©dG ¢VGôbE’ÉH á°UÉN §HGƒ°V Ék ≤Ñ°ùe ≥Ñ£J âfÉc ∫hódG √òg øe household lending prior to the crisis or instituted such .(7- 4 hóL) íFGƒ dG òg ™°VƒH GôNk Dƒe âeÉb É¡fCG hCG áeRC’G òg ´ƒbh regulations recently (Table 4-7). ∫ ∏ √ √ In Qatar, the operationalization of the Qatar Credit á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ô£b õcôe π«©ØJ Ö©∏j ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øe ,ô£b ádhO ‘h Bureau (hereafter, Bureau) is expected to provide á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ŸG ™ªL á«∏ªY õjõ©J ‘ GQhOk (õcôŸÉH Ék ≤M’ ¬«dEG QÉ°ûŸG) a fillip to the collation of systematic information on households. Established as a department of the Qatar á∏¶e â– πª©j õcôe √QÉÑàYÉHh .º¶àæe πμ°ûH »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dÉH á°UÉÿG Central Bank, the Bureau will help to support the ¿ÉªàFÓd ΩGóà°ùŸG ƒªædG ºYO ‘ õcôŸG ºgÉ°ùj ,…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe sustainable growth of credit in the country, relying á«æÑŸG äÉ«é¡æŸGh AÓª©dG äÉfÉ«H ≈∏Y ∂dP ‘ Góªà©ek ,ô£b ádhO ‘ on customer data and risk-based methodologies. ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dGh ±ô°üŸG ójhõJ ‘ áªgÉ°ùŸG ¤EG áaÉ°VEG ,ôWÉîŸG Y In addition, it will also provide the central bank and ≤ ≈∏ the banking sector with analytical data to support IQGOEG ‘ áeó≤àŸG Ö«dÉ°SC’G ò«ØæJ äÉ«∏ªY ºYód á«∏«∏ëàdG äÉfÉ«ÑdÉH the implementation of advanced techniques in risk äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d Gõcôek íÑ°üj ¿CG õcôª∏d á«∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG ájDhôdG πª°ûJh .ôWÉîŸG management. Going forward, the Bureau’s future ,á«æ©ŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe á« « – iDhQ Y OɪàY’G ¤EG ±ó¡j ájOÉ°üàb’G vision is to become an economic information center, ∏ ∏ ≈∏ which can draw upon the analytical inputs from the ¢ù°SCG ≈∏Y á«æÑŸG á«fɪàF’G áaÉ≤ãdG ≥«ª©àd ∂dPh ,∑ƒæÑdG ∂dP ‘ Éà relevant agencies, including banks, so as to promote .ádhódÉH ájƒb a robust credit culture in the country.

Bank credit to household sector increased by ∫ÓN %18 ƒëæH »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ºéM ™ØJQG around 18% during the year. Overall improvements ´É£ d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ …ƒ dG ƒªædG ÜÉÑ°SCG óMCG ¿ƒ j óbh ,áæ°ùdG in consumer confidence and a recent salary hike for ≤∏ ≤ μ domestic residents might be some of the reasons ÖJGhQ IOÉjR ÖfÉL ¤EG ,∂∏¡à°ùŸG á≤K ô°TDƒe ‘ ΩÉ©dG ø°ùëàdG ƒg »∏FÉ©dG for a robust growth in household credit. Credit to ∑Ó¡à°S’G ¢VGôZC’ ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G πμ°ûjh .IÒNC’G áfhB’G ‘ ÚæWGƒŸG consumption forms more than three-fourths of total π«Ñ°S ‘h .»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤∏d ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ‹ÉªLEG ´ÉHQCG áKÓK øe ÌcCG credit to households. In order to limit over-extension of consumption credit, QCB prescribed the maximum óM ™°Vh ±ô°üŸG Qôb ,á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dG íæe ‘ I’ɨŸG øe ó◊G limit banks on credit against salary as 75% of the local ÚæWGƒª∏d %75 áÑ°ùæH ÖJGôdG πHÉ≤e ìƒæªŸG ‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàFÓd ≈°übCG and 50% to expatriates in addition to a cap on amount ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 2 ÚàÄØ∏d ¿ÉªàFÓd ≈°übC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñj å«ëH ,Úª«≤ª∏d %50h as QR 2 million and QR 400,000 respectively. Likewise óM ¢Vôa ±ô°üŸG Qôb ɪc ,‹GƒàdG Y …ô£b ÉjQ 400^000h …ô£b a cap on the maximum withdrawal using credit card ≈∏ ∫ has also been prescribed. .á«fɪàF’G äÉbÉ£ÑdG ᣰSGƒH Öë°ùdG ∞≤°ùd ≈°übCG

55 55 International Monetary Fund (2012). World Economic Outlook (Ch.3: Dealing with ¥hóæ°U ,(»∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ¿ƒjO á¡LGƒe :ådÉãdG π°üØdG) ‹hódG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ƒªædG äÉ©bƒJ .(2012) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U household debt), IMF: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG 56 56 International Monetary Fund (2011). Global Financial Stability Report (Ch.3: Housing ¤EG IOƒ©dG :…QÉ≤©dG πjƒªàdG :ådÉãdG π°üØdG) »ŸÉ©dG iƒà°ùŸG ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J .(2011) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U finance: Back to basics), IMF: Washington DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ,(äÉ«°SÉ°SC’G

141 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table 4-7: Household debt and applicable ∫hO ‘ É¡H ∫ƒª©ŸG íFGƒ∏dGh »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG á«fƒjóe :7-4 ∫hóL regulations in GCC countries »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ¤EG »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG á«fƒjóe É¡H ∫ƒª©ŸG íFGƒ∏dG ≥«Ñ£àdG áæ°S ádhódG óæÑdG ‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG (%) Applicable Year country Item Household debt/GDP regulations introduced (%)

2008 2011 ∂∏¡à°ùŸG πNO øe %50 ¢Vô≤∏d ájô¡°ûdG •É°ùbC’G RhÉéàJ ’CG Öéj ¢VGôZC’ áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤dG »cÓ¡à°S’G πjƒªàdG §°ù≤d »∏°UC’G ¥É≤ëà°S’G πLCG RhÉéàj ’CG Öéj /ájQÉéàdG ∫ɪYC’ÉH á£ÑJôe äGƒæ°S 7 Ióe øjôëÑdG 20.8 21.7 2006 Bahrain á«cÓ¡à°SG ¢VGôZC’ Total monthly instalments for credit may not exceed Personal loans for 50% of a consumer’s income business/ consumption Instalment consumer finance may not have an original maturity of over 7 years á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dG íæe (¿Éμ°S’G ¢Vhôb) äÉ©aódG øe ÉgÒZh ∑Ó¡à°S’G •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ¢Vhôbh (äÉYÉ£≤à°S’G ó©H) ¢VÎ≤ŸG ÖJGQ ‘É°U øe %40 RhÉéàJ ’CG Öéj íæeh ,á°UÉÿG øcÉ°ùŸGh Öéj ɪc.øjóYÉ≤àª∏d áMƒæªŸG %30hCG ,ôªà°ùŸG …ô¡°ûdG ¬∏NO hCG á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG áÑ°ùædÉH óMGh 𫪩d áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤∏d ‹ÉªLE’G ≠∏ÑŸG ójõj’CG âjƒμdG äÉcô°T πÑb øe Úª«≤ª∏d 8.1 5.8 .âjƒc QÉæjO 70^000 øY ¢Vhô≤∏d 2004/2007 Kuwait .Qɪãà°S’G Total instalments of consumer and other instalment Consumer loans and (housing) loans may not exceed 40% of the borrower’s loans for securities and net salary (after deductions) or his continuous monthly private homes; credit income, or 30% for loans accorded to pensioners. facilities to residents by The total amount of the instalment loans granted to investment companies one customer shall not exceed KwD 70,000 øe %42,5 á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y Oƒ«≤∏d ≈°übC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñj ¿ÉªYo á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dG 15.3 18.2 .ÊɪàF’G Égó«°UQ ‹ÉªLEG 2004 Oman Personal loans Personal loans of a bank are restricted at the maximum of 42.5% of its total credit ájô¡°ûdG OGó°ùdG •É°ùbCG ‹ÉªLEG RhÉéàj ’ å«ëH ≈°übC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñj ∂dP ‘ ÉÃ) á°VÎ≤ŸG ≠dÉÑŸG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG 𫪩dG ≈∏Y á≤ëà°ùŸG .…ô¡°ûdG 𫪩dG ÖJGQ ‘É°U å∏K (¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ¢Vhôb øe %25 ¬«∏Y ¢Uƒ°üæŸG ≈°übC’G ó◊G ≠∏Ñj ,øjóYÉ≤àª∏d áÑ°ùædÉHh á ªŸG óYÉ≤àdG ¢TÉ©e. μ∏ á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô dG á«Hô©dG ≤ »cÓ¡à°S’G ¿ÉªàF’G ¥É≤ëà°SG πLC’ ≈°übC’G ó◊G RhÉéàj ’CG Öéj ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ¢Vhôbh 10.2 11.9 äGƒæ°S 5 Ióe. 2008 ájOƒ©°ùdG Consumer and credit The maximum limit would be such that the total Saudi card loans monthly repayments of the borrower on total Arabia borrowings , including credit card borrowings, should not exceed one-third of the net monthly salary. For retired persons, the limit is set at 25% of pension payments. The maximum term to maturity of a consumer credit should not exceed 5 years. IOófi ¢VGôZC’ OGôaCÓd áMƒæªŸG ¢Vhô≤dG RhÉéàJ ’CG Öéj äGQÉeE’G ¢VGôZC’ á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dG øe º¶àæe πNO …CG hCG áeóÿG ájÉ¡f äÉ≤ëà°ùeh ÖJGôdG ¿Éª°†H) á«Hô©dG /ájQÉéàdG ∫ɪYC’ÉH á£ÑJôe .’ɪLk EG »JGQÉeEG ºgQO 250^000 ᪫b (Oófi Qó°üe á«cÓ¡à°SG ¢VGôZC’ 20.5 19.0 Loans given to individuals for specific purposes, 1993 IóëàŸG Personal loans for secured by assigning salary and end of service UAE business/ consumption indemnity or any regular income from a well-defined source, shall not exceed AED 250,000 in total value.

Source: Respective central bank websites (for personal loans and íFGƒ∏dGh á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dÉH á°UÉÿG ΩÉ°ùbC’G) á«æ©ŸG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üª∏d á«fhÎμdE’G ™bGƒŸG :Qó°üŸG applicable regulations); IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook, October ôHƒàcCG ,∫hódG iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ájOÉ°üàb’G äÉ©bƒàdÉH ¢UÉÿG ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ôjô≤J ,(É¡H ∫ƒª©ŸG 2011 or the country Concluding Statement Reports, whichever is äÉeƒ∏©e ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°üë∏d) çóMC’G äÉfÉ«ÑdÉH GòNk CG ,∫hódG øY »eÉàÿG ¿É«ÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ôjQÉ≤àdG hCG 2011 later (for information on GDP). .(‹ÉªLE’G »∏ëŸG œÉædG ∫ƒM

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 142 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Real estate credit taken by individuals increased by ,áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN %10 ƒëæH OGôaCÓd ìƒæªŸG …QÉ≤©dG πjƒªàdG ºéM ™ØJQG ɪc around 10% during the year. The debt income ratio º¡Ñ∏W iƒà°ùe ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG Ú°VÎ≤ª∏d πNódG ¤EG øjódG áÑ°ùf Ò°ûJh of the borrowers appears to indicate, a low level of k vulnerability to such credit, due to factor affect the OGôaC’G πNO iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y ∂dP ÒKCÉJ ¤EG Gô¶f ,¿ÉªàF’G øe ´ƒædG Gò¡d income level of the individual borrowers. Based on áYƒªéŸ »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG øe äÉfÉ«ÑdG øe áæ«Y ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk .Ú°VÎ≤ŸG a sample data on households who have taken real ¤EG øjódG áÑ°ùf ¿CG ßMƒd ,…QÉ≤©dG ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Gƒ∏°üM øjòdG OGôaC’G estate credit, the debt income ratio is observed to be .%50 ‹GƒM ⨠H Ió«L áÑ°ùf â °T NódG comfortable at around 50%. ∏ ∏μ π

Notwithstanding the limits on maximum withdrawals ábÉ£H ΩGóîà°SÉH Öë°ùdG ∞≤°ùd Qô≤ŸG ≈°übC’G ó◊G øY ô¶ædG ±ô°üH on credit cards, the outstanding credit increased by ®ƒë∏ŸG ƒªædG ¿ƒμj óbh .%11 ƒëæH ºFÉ≤dG ¿ÉªàF’G ºéM ™ØJQG ,¿ÉªàF’G 11%. The substantial increase of around 43% in the k number of credit cards as at end December 2011 øe ÉÑÑ°S 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ %43 ƒëæH ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H OóY ‘ might has been one of the reasons for the increase in ¢Vhôb áÑ°ùf ÜÉ°ùàMÉH ¬fCG ’EG ,¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ¢Vhôb IOÉjR ÜÉÑ°SCG credit through credit cards. However, as percentage áÑ°ùf ¿CG ßMÓjo ,á«cÓ¡à°S’G ¢Vhô≤dG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H to total consumption credit, the outstanding credit NódG äÉfÉ«H « – Ò°ûjh .%5 Ñj äÉbÉ£ÑdG Y ºFÉ dG ¿ÉªàF’G through cards stood at around 5%. An analysis of the π π ∏ ≠∏ ≈∏ ≤ income profile of the credit card borrowers indicates øjòdG OGôaC’G ¿CG ¤EG ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ∫ÓN øe Ú°VÎ≤ŸÉH á°UÉÿG individuals in the low income groups (below QR (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ 10^000 øe πbCG) ¢†ØîæŸG πNódG äGP äÉÄØdG ¤EG ¿ƒªàæj 10,000) have a major share in the outstanding credit º°SQ) ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ÈY ºFÉ≤dG ¿ÉªàF’G ‘ IÒÑc áÑ°ùæH ¿ƒªgÉ°ùj provided through credit cards (Chart 4-12). .(12–4 ÊÉ«H

Chart 4-12: Share of outstanding credit through áØæ°üe áªFÉ≤dG ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£H ¢Vhôb áÑ°ùf :12-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ credit cards by income (QR ‘000) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ∞dC’ÉH) πNódG Ö°ùM

10% 3%

10% 43%

14%

20%

Upto 10 10-25 25- 50 50 - 100 100 - 200 Above 200

Equity markets º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG The equity market in Qatar comprises of the Qatar ¥GQhCÓd áMhódG ¥ƒ°S) ô£b á°UQƒH øe ô£b ádhóH º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S ∞dCÉàJ Exchange (formerly, Doha Stock Market or DSM). At á©HQCG ÈY áLQóe ácô°T 42 ô°VÉ◊G âbƒdG ‘ πª°ûJh ,(Ék ≤HÉ°S á«dÉŸG present, there are 42 listed companies across four major ´É£bh ,(äÉcô°T 8) á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh ∑ƒæÑdG ´É£b :»g á«°ù«FQ äÉYÉ£b segments: banks and finance (8 companies), insurance 7) áYÉæ°üdG ´É£bh ,(ácô°T 22) äÉeóÿG ´É£bh ,(äÉcô°T 5) ÚeCÉàdG (5 companies), services (22 companies) and industry (7 companies). The total market capitalization of these QÉ«∏e 457^4 äÉcô°ûdG √ò¡d á«bƒ°ùdG ᪫≤dG ‹ÉªLEG ≠∏H óbh .(äÉcô°T companies at end-December 2011 was QR 457.4 œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG øe %72 ∫OÉ©j Ée …CG ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ billion, equal to 72% of 2011 GDP. QE-listed companies QGó°UEG ô£b á°UQƒÑH áLQóŸG äÉcô°ûdG ≈∏Y Ú©àjh .2011 ΩÉ©d »∏ëŸG are required to publish annual audited financial results √òg ô°ûf ºàjh ,á«∏°üØdG èFÉàædG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH á≤bóe ájƒæ°S á«dÉe èFÉàf as also quarterly results. These results are published in á°UQƒÑd ÊhÎμdE’G ™bƒŸG ÈY ídÉ°üŸG ÜÉë°UCGh øjôªãà°ùª∏d èFÉàædG the QE-website for investors and other stakeholders. .ô£b The issue of stock market integration has received áfhB’G ‘ IÒÑc ᫪gCG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ÚH πeÉμàdG ≥«≤– ádCÉ°ùe âÑ°ùàcG significant attention in recent times. Using daily data ßMƒd ,2010–2001 øe IÎØ∏d á«eƒ«dG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ¤EG ô¶ædÉHh .IÒNC’G for the period 2001-2010, it was observed that the ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ áà°ùdG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ÚH •ÉÑJQ’G πeÉ©e §°Sƒàe ¿CG average correlation coefficient among the six GCC

143 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J stock markets is 0.838 for 2001-06 and 0.865 for 2007- IÎØ∏d 0^865h 2006 ¤EG 2001 øe IÎØ∏d 0^838 ≠∏Ñj »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG 10. This meant that, the extent of integration among ,º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ÚH πeÉμàdG áLQO ´ÉØJQG »æ©j ɇ ,2010 ¤EG 2007 øe the stock markets, which was already at a high level, .57π©ØdÉH á«dÉY äÉjƒà°ùe πã“ âfÉc »àdGh increased subsequently57.

In this context, given the lingering concerns in the ¢TÉ©àf’Gh hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ ±hÉîŸG QGôªà°S’ Gô¶fhk ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘ Eurozone and the hesitant recovery in the developed ¿EÉa ,(á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG á°UÉN)k áeó≤àŸG ∫hódG ‘ ô≤à°ùŸG ÒZ world, especially the US, it remains a moot question as á°SGQódh .ô¶f πfi ≈≤ÑJ äGQƒ£àdG √ò¡H ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ôKCÉJ ádCÉ°ùe to whether the QE-index reacts to these developments. ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ÚH •ÉÑJQ’G eÉ©e áaƒØ°üe ójó– ” , dP To examine this, we plot the correlation matrix of QE- π ∂ index with the indices of some leading emerging and äGOÉ°üàbG É¡«a Éà ,áeó≤àŸGh áÄ°TÉædG á«°ù«FôdG ∫hódG ¢†©H äGô°TDƒeh developed countries, including the troubled Eurozone ádÉch øe á«eƒ«dG äÉfÉ«ÑdG ΩGóîà°SÉH ∂dPh ,áHô£°†ŸG hQƒ«dG á≤£æe 58 economies, using daily data from Reuters for the year √òg πª°ûJ . (¢SQÉe ájÉ¡f ≈àM) 2012–2011 á«dÉŸG áæ°ù∏d RÎjhQ 2011-12 (upto end-March)58. We consider two sub- ≈àM ’ɪLk EG 2011 ΩÉY øe ¤hC’G IÎØdG CGóÑJ :Úà«Yôa ÚJÎa á°SGQódG periods: the first is the entire of 2011 and upto the first ∂dPh ,§≤a 2011 ΩÉY á«fÉãdG IÎØdG πª°ûJh ,2012 ΩÉY øe ∫hC’G ™HôdG quarter of 2012 and the second is only the calendar á jƒW jƒªàdG IOÉYEG äÉ« ªY øe á«fÉãdG ádƒ÷G äÉ«YGóJ ‘ ô¶ædG ±ó¡H year 2011. We do this to take on board the possible ∏ π ∏ repercussions of the ECB’s second LTRO operations on º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ≈∏Y iôNCG Iôe »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG É¡≤∏WCG »àdG πLC’G European stock markets and its possible ripple effects áaÉ°VE’ÉH .ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒÃ ≥ë∏j ób …òdG »eÉæàŸG ÉgÒKCÉJh á«HhQhC’G on the QE index. Additionally, we take into account the º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG ‘ ∫hGóàdG äÉ«∏ª©d á«æeõdG ¥hôØdG IÉYGôe ºàj ,∂dP ¤EG time differences in the operations of exchanges across äGô°TDƒª∏d áªFÓŸG äGÒNCÉàdGh äÓ«é©àdG ΩGóîà°SÉH ∂dPh ∫hódG ÈY countries, by employing suitable leads and lags of the .á∏°üdG äGP relevant indices.

The QE-index appears to display significant correlation õfƒL hGO ô°TDƒeh ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ÚH ájƒb ábÓY OƒLh í°†àj with the US (Dow Jones Industrial Index, DJIA), both in ,äGÒ¨àdGh äÉjƒà°ùŸG å«M øe á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdÉH »YÉæ°üdG levels as well as changes, irrespective of the time frame âfÉc ,∫ÉãŸG π«Ñ°S ≈∏©a ,á°SGQódG ¬dhÉæàJ …òdG »æeõdG QÉWE’G QÉÑàYG ¿hO considered. By way of example, the correlation was the highest for calendar year 2011 at 30%, when measured å«M øe ∂dPh ,%30 â¨∏H å«M ,2011 ΩÉY áæ°ùdG ‘ •ÉÑJQG áLQO ≈∏YCG in terms of changes. All the correlations with the US are á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG ™e •ÉÑJQ’G äÉbÓY áaÉc ô¡¶Jh .äGÒ¨àdG observed to be statistically significant (Table 4-8). Among äGô°TDƒŸG ÚH øeh ,(8–4 ∫hóL) á©ØJôe á«FÉ°üMEG ájƒæ©e äÉjƒà°ùe others, developments in Nikkei appear to impact Qatar ºZQ ,…ƒæ©e »FÉ°üMEG ÒKCÉJ É¡d …Éμ«f ô°TDƒe ‘ äGQƒ£àdG ¿EÉa ,iôNC’G statistically and significantly, although the correlations, hGO ô°TDƒe ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH á°†Øîæe Èà©J §°SƒàŸG ‘ •ÉÑJQ’G áLQO ¿CG on average, are lower as compared to DJIA. China, by ≈∏Y É°Sƒªk ∏e GÒKk CÉJ Ú°üdG πμ°ûJ ’ ,¢†«≤ædG ≈∏Yh .»YÉæ°üdG õfƒL contrast, does not appear to significantly influence QE- index in most cases. .ä’É◊G º¶©e ‘ ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe

Coming to European markets, in terms of changes, ™e •ÉÑJQ’G ô¡XCG ,äGÒ¨àdG å«M øe á«HhQhC’G ¥Gƒ°SC’G ¤EG ô¶ædÉH it appears that after ECB’s LTRO-II, the correlations ÒKCÉàdG Iƒbh ∫hGóàdG ºéM å«M øe ÉØ©°Vk á«HhQhC’G á«°ù«FôdG äGô°TDƒŸG with the major indices have weakened, both in terms »àdG πLC’G á∏jƒW πjƒªàdG IOÉYEG äÉ«∏ªY øe á«fÉãdG ádƒ÷G ó©H ∂dPh of magnitude and significance. In level terms, the áLQO äô¡XCG ,äÉjƒà°ùŸG å«M øe ÉeCG .»HhQhC’G …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG É¡≤∏WCG correlations with Spain and France became statistically k insignificant when the entire period is considered, IÎØdG ÜÉ°ùàMG óæY É«FÉ°üMEG á∏«Ä°V áÑ°ùf É°ùfôah É«fÉÑ°SCG ™e •ÉÑJQ’G although it was significant for the calendar year 2011. ájOÓ«ŸG áæ°ùdG ∫ÓN ÉXƒëk ∏e ÉWÉÑJQGk â≤≤M É¡fCG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Y ,πμc QE-index appears to be influenced in a limited manner º¡°SC’G ácôëH GOhók fi GôKk CÉJ ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ôKCÉàj ∂dòch ,2011 by the stock movements in Greece and Portugal. In äÉj’ƒdG πμ°ûJ ÚM ‘ ¬fCG ∫ƒ≤dG á°UÓNh .∫ɨJÈdGh ¿Éfƒ«dG øe πc ‘ sum, while US and Japan exert the strongest impact on ¿Éc ,ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ≈∏Y iƒbC’G ÒKCÉàdG ¿ÉHÉ«dGh á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG QE-index, the major European exchanges mattered for k Qatar till such time as the conditions in Europe remained ∂dP ≈àM ô£b ádhO ≈∏Y GÒKCÉJ á«HhQhC’G á«°ù«FôdG º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SC’ unsettled. After the fears of a large-scale problem in the äCGóg ¿CG ó©Hh ,Iô≤à°ùe ÒZ ÉHhQhCG ‘ ´É°VhC’G ¬«a âëÑ°UCG …òdG âbƒdG Eurozone subsided, the impact of the major European ∫AÉ°†J ,hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ áHô£°†ŸG çGóMC’G ¥É£f ´É°ùJG øe ±hÉîŸG indices on the QE-index appears to have waned. .ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ≈∏Y á«°ù«FôdG á«HhQhC’G äGô°TDƒŸG ÒKCÉJ

57 57 See Qatar Central Bank. Financial Stability Report 2010. QCB: Doha. .áMhódG :…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe øe QOÉ°üdG 2010 ΩÉ©d ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ô¶fG ,π«°UÉØàdG øe ójõŸ

58 58 The country and indices considered include Japan (Nikkei 225), China (SSE Composite), É°ùfôah ,(SSE Composite) Ú°üdGh ,(225 Nikkei ô°TDƒe) ¿ÉHÉ«dG :á«dÉàdG äGô°TDƒŸGh ∫hódG á°SGQódG πª°ûJ France (CAC 40), Germany (Frankfurt stock exchange), Greece (Athens stock exchange), ,(Euronext Lisbon á°UQƒH) ɨJÈdGh ,(Éæ«KCG á°UQƒH) ¿Éfƒ«dGh ,(äQƒØ fGôa á°UQƒH) É«fÉŸCGh ,(40 CAC) Portugal (Euronext Lisbon), Qatar (QE-20), Spain (Madrid stock exchange) and US (Dow ∫ μ Jones Industrial Average, DJIA). »YÉæ°üdG õfƒL hGO ô°TDƒe) á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdGh ,(ójQóe á°UQƒH) É«fÉÑ°SCGh ,(20-QE ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe) ô£bh .(DJIA

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 144 Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Table 4-8: Co-movement of QE-index with other äGô°TDƒŸG äÉcôëàH ô£b á°UQƒH ô°TDƒe ôKCÉJ ióe :8-4 ∫hóL leading indices á«°ù«FôdG

á«μjôeC’G IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdG Period ∫ɨJÈdG É«fÉÑ°SCG É°ùfôa É«fÉŸCG ¿Éfƒ«dG Ú°üdG ¿ÉHÉ«dG (»YÉæ°üdG õfƒL hGO ô°TDƒe) Portugal Spain France Germany Greece China Japan IÎØdG US (DJIA)

Panel A: ∫hó÷G Levels CG »YôØdG 2011:1- 0.095 0.151 0.165 0.155 0.112 -0.048 0.228 0.168 (0.00) 2011:12 (0.18) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) (0.51) (0.00)

2011:1- -0.088 -0.006 0.058 0.109 -0.065 -0.209 0.139 0.275 (0.00) 2012:3 (0.16) (0.92) (0.35) (0.08) (0.31) (0.00) (0.03)

Panel B: ∫hó÷G Change Ü »YôØdG 2011:1- 0.075 0.156 0.173 0.197 0.153 0.023 0.158 0.303 (0.00) 2011:12 (0.36) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.79) (0.06)

2011:1- 0.093 0.134 0.123 0.148 0.085 -0.009 0.131 0.272 (0.00) 2012:3 (0.20) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.25) (0.91) (0.08)

p-Values in brackets Ú°Sƒ≤dG ÚH ∫ɪàM’G ᪫b -p

To monitor the depth and resilience of the equity πHƒ«g ƒ«g áÑ°ùf ÜÉ°ùM ” ,º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S áfhôeh ≥ªY ó°UQ πLCG øe market, we have computed the Hui-Heubel ratio äÓeÉ©ŸG øe Ú©e ºé◊ áÑ°ùædÉH QÉ©°SC’G ähÉØJ πq b ɪ∏μa , 59(HHR) (HHR)59. The smaller the price change relative to k a given volume of transactions (i.e., the lower the ÒÑ©àHh ,áfhôeh É≤ªY ÌcCG ¥ƒ°ùdG ¿Éc ɪ∏c ,(ô°TDƒŸG ¢†ØîfG ɪ∏c …CG) indicator), the deeper and more resilient the market ¥ƒ°ùdG áfhôe ¢ü≤f ¤EG Ò°ûj πHƒ«g ƒ«g áÑ°ùf º«b ´ÉØJQG ¿CG ó‚ ôNBG is. In other words, higher values of the ratio indicate …CG øY Ók ≤à°ùe GOô›k GOóYk (HHR) πHƒ«g ƒ«g áÑ°ùf Èà©Jh .¬≤ªYh lack of resilience and market depth. The HHR is a pure .¢SÉ« dG äGóMh øe IóMh number, independent of any units of measurement. ≤

We computed a time-series of this indicator for the IÎØdG øY ô£b á°UQƒH ‘ ô°TDƒŸG Gò¡d á«æeõdG IÎØdG ÜÉ°ùëH Éæªb óbh Qatar Exchange (QE) for the period 2006 (June) to ∫Óîa .(13 –4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ≈àM 2006 ƒ«fƒj øe (December) 2011 (Chart 4-13). During 2011, lingering concerns in the Eurozone aggravated the extant »°ùØædG ™°VƒdGh ,hQƒ«dG á≤£æe ‘ ±hÉîŸG QGôªà°SG iOCG ,2011 ΩÉY nervousness in markets, keeping the HHR remained â©ØJQG óbh .á©ØJôe πHƒ«g ƒ«g áÑ°ùf AÉ≤HEG ¤EG ¥Gƒ°SC’G ‘ Ú∏eÉ©àª∏d at elevated levels. The HHR spiked in the early half of 6^05 iƒà°ùe óæY É¡JhQP â¨∏Hh ,ΩÉ©dG øe ∫hC’G ∞°üædG ‘ áÑ°ùædG the year, peaking at 6.05 in February, on the fear of ¿ƒjódG OGó°S øY îàdG øe ±ƒÿG Aƒ°V Y ,»°VÉŸG ôjGÈa ‘ sovereign defaults and banking sector weaknesses in ∞∏ ≈∏ several countries, especially in the Eurozone. Towards ‘ É°Uƒ°üN ,¿Gó∏ÑdG øe ójó©dG ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ∞©°Vh ,ájOÉ«°ùdG the latter half of the year, as debt concerns gradually ±hÉfl É«éjQóJk âØN ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘h .hQƒ«dG á≤£æe alleviated and the European Central Bank introduced , ƒæÑdG ºYód ióŸG á jƒW ádƒ«°S »HhQhC’G …õcôŸG æÑdG óbh ¿ƒjódG long-term liquidity support for Eurozone banks, the ∑ ∏ ∂ Ω ratio subsided, standing at 0.69 in December. For the §°SƒàÃh .Ȫ°ùjO ‘ 0,69 iƒà°ùe ¤EG áÑ°ùædG â°†ØîfG ¿CG ¿Éμa year as a whole, the HHR averaged 3.38 as compared ≥HÉ°ùdG ΩÉ©dG ‘ 4^66 ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH 2011 ΩÉ©d 3^38 to 4.66 in the previous year.

59 59 The indicator is defined as: :‹ÉàdG ƒëædG ≈∏Y ô°TDƒŸG ∞jô©J øμÁ

145 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in the Broader Financial Sector ™°ShCG ¥É£f ≈∏Y ‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG äGQƒ£J

Chart 4-13: Hui-Heubel ratio (2006-2011) (2011-2006) πHƒ«g ƒ«g áÑ°ùf :13-4 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

25

20

15

10

5

0 1 0 9 8 7 6 1 0 9 8 7 6 1 0 9 8 7 6 1 0 9 8 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Jun-11 Jun-10 Jun-09 Jun-08 Jun-07 Jun-06 Sep-11 Sep-10 Sep-09 Sep-08 Sep-07 Sep-06 Dec-11 Dec-10 Dec-09 Dec-08 Dec-07 Dec-06 Mar-11 Mar-10 Mar-09 Mar-08 Mar-07

Concluding remarks á«eÉàÿG äɶMÓŸG The non-banking sector in Qatar remains small in terms .á«eɶædG ᫪gC’Gh ºé◊G å«M øe É©°VGƒàek ‘ô°üŸG ÒZ ´É£≤dG Èà©j of systemic importance. The finance houses are saddled IôNCÉàŸG ¢Vhô≤dG øe GÒÑck ɪéMk É¡≤JÉY ≈∏Y πjƒªàdG äÉcô°T πª–h with high amount of delinquent loans, which pose a k threat to their profitability. The investment companies äÉcô°ûd áÑ°ùædÉH ÉeCG .É¡à«ëHQ iƒà°ùe ≈∏Y Gójó¡J πμ°ûj ɇ ,OGó°ùdG are facing risks emanating from limited diversification, ¿CG ¤EG Gô¶fk ,´ƒæàdG ájOhófi øY áªLÉf ôWÉfl ¬LGƒJ »¡a ,Qɪãà°S’G given that most of their investments across sectors ’ ɪc .ô£b ádhO πNGO ¿ƒμJ ∫hódGh äÉYÉ£≤dG ÈY É¡JGQɪãà°SG º¶©e and countries are inside Qatar. The insurance industry ,¢†Øîæe ¥É£f Y QÉ°ûàfG iƒà°ùe « – ™e CGõ›k ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b Gõj remains fragmented with low penetration, which ≈∏ ≥ ≤ ∫ remain well below global standards. An examination of á°SGQO ¢ùμ©J ∂dP øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh ,á«dhódG ÒjÉ©ŸG ™e ≥aGƒàj ’ Ée ƒgh the financial soundness indicators of these companies ´É£b ¿CG hóÑjh .Ió«L IQƒ°U ÚeCÉàdG äÉcô°ûd á«dÉŸG áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe however, reveal a healthy picture. The corporate sector ɪc .áeRC’G ≈∏Y áÑJΟG QÉKB’G ÜÉ≤YCG ‘ ,¢TÉ©àfG á∏Môà ôÁ äÉcô°ûdG appears to be in a recovery mode, following from k the after-effects of the crisis. The share of profits of ∫DhÉØàdG IOƒY ‘ äóYÉ°S å«ëH GóYÉ°üJ áYÉæ°üdG ´É£b ìÉHQCG äó¡°T industrial sector is on the rise, riding on the optimism ∫DhÉØàdG IOƒY ‘ äóYÉ°S å«ëH GóYÉ°üJk áYÉæ°üdG ´É£b ìÉHQCG äó¡°T and investment drive. Stress tests appear to indicate ¬LhCG ¢†©H §¨°†dG äGQÉÑàNG äô¡XCG óbh ,Qɪãà°S’G ácôM ™aOh certain weaknesses to corporate balance sheets in the ÓNh .¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉîŸ ¢Vô©àdG ÉM ‘ äÉcô°ûdG äÉ«fGõ«e ‘ ©°†dG event of a market risk. For the second consecutive ∫ ∫ ∞ year in a row, the equity market in 2011 has been iƒà°ùe π°†aCG ‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y á«fÉãdG áæ°ù∏d º¡°SC’G ¥ƒ°S äô¡XCG ,2011 ΩÉY the best performing among GCC. The market äÉLQO ¥ƒ°ùdG äô¡XCG å«M ,»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÚH ɪ«a AGOCG appears to exhibit strong linkages with the indices of IóëàŸG äÉj’ƒdÉc áeó≤àŸG ∫hódG ¥Gƒ°SCG äGô°TDƒe ™e á«dÉY •ÉÑJQG developed markets, such as US and Japan and to a k lesser extent, certain European markets. A challenge .á«HhQhC’G ¥Gƒ°SC’G ¢†©H ™e πbCG ÉWÉÑJQG äô¡XCGh ,¿ÉHÉ«dGh á«μjôeC’G for policymakers would be to keep a watch on the áÄ°TÉædG á«dhC’G ôWÉîŸG áÑbGôe ‘ øªμj Éjó–k äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ƒ©fÉ°U ¬LGƒjh incipient risks emanating from greater integration, OƒLh ¿Éª°V ≈∏Y âbƒdG ¢ùØf ‘ ¿ƒ∏ª©j º¡fCG ÚM ‘ ,πeÉμàdG IOÉjR øY while at the same time, ensuring a well-regulated, developed and diversified non-banking system. .´ƒæàdGh Qƒ£àdÉH º°ùàj º«¶æàdG ó«L ‘ô°üe ÒZ Ωɶf

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 146 اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ CHAPTER FIVE

ﺗﻄﻮرات اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

INTRODUCTION áeóq ≤ŸG Financial infrastructure including payment and õcôeh ,äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf É¡«a Éà ᫰SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdGo Èà©J settlement system, credit bureau, governance ô°UÉæY ᫪«¶æàdG á«àëàdG ≈æÑdGh ,áªcƒ◊Gh ,á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ô£b and regulatory infrastructures are vital for effective 60 financial intermediation.60 In particular, an effective äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ó©q jo ɪc , ádÉ©a á«dÉe áWÉ°Sh ≥«≤ëàd ájƒ«M payment and settlement system is crucial for äGhOC’Gh ∫GƒeC’G πjƒ– ¿Éª°†d ájOÉ°üàb’G äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d ÉjQhô°Vk ∫É©ØdG economic entities to transmit and receive money and » ëŸG ™ªàéŸG á K Y á¶aÉëŸG LCG øeh .¿ÉeCGh ádƒ¡°ùH É¡« Jh á«dÉŸG financial instruments smoothly and securely. In order ∏ ≤ ≈∏ π ≤∏ to maintain the confidence of domestic as well as áHÉbQ QGôªà°SÉH ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG òØæJ ,‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG ‘ ‹hódGh international community in the financial system, central ,∂dP ¤EG áaÉ°VEG .É¡àeÓ°Sh á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG ¿ÉeCG iƒà°ùŸ á≤«bO banks always keep a close watch on the safety and äÉ¡÷G dP ‘ Éà ,äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ɶf ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûŸG Y Ú©àj soundness of financial infrastructure. In addition, the ∂ Ω ≈∏ participants to the payment and settlement system, ±QÉ°üŸG ‘ ÉÑdÉZk πãªàJ) á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdÉH á≤∏©àŸG ∫ɪYC’G ≈∏Y áªFÉ≤dG including the facilitator of the infrastructure (mostly Ωɶf ôWÉîà Gó«Lk É«Yhk É¡jód ¿ƒμj ¿CG ,á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh (ájõcôŸG central banks) and financial institutions need to have Y É¡æe ó Gh É¡JQGOEÉH á «Ø dG FÉ°SƒdGh Ñ°ùdGh äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG clear understanding of payment and settlement risks, ≈∏ ◊ ∏ μ π π and the ways and means to manage and mitigate .∫É©a ƒëf these risks effectively.

Although there are usually basic laws affecting general ᪶fCG ≈∏Y ôKDƒJ á«°SÉ°SCG ÚfGƒb OƒLh ≈∏Y IOÉ©dG äôL ¬fCG ºZôdG ≈∏Y payments and their settlement, such as central bank ,ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG ÚfGƒ≤c á«dÉŸG É¡àjƒ°ùJ ᪶fCGh ,ΩÉY πμ°ûH äÉYƒaóŸG laws, banking laws and in some cases, even securities ™e ¬fCG ’EG ,á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ÚfGƒb ä’É G ¢†©H ‘h , ƒæÑdG ÚfGƒbh laws, specific payment systems laws are commonly ◊ ∑ not present among the payment arrangements for ÚH øe äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCÉH á°UÉN ÚfGƒb ÜÉ«Z ßMÓj ∂dP GCC countries (Box 5-1). ᪶fCÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÉgòîàJ »àdG ÒHGóàdG .(1 – 5 QÉWEG) äÉYƒaóŸG Box 5-1: Legal and regulatory framework governing äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCÉH ¢UÉÿG »ª«¶æàdGh ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G:1 – 5 QÉWEG payments systems

Bahrain: The legal framework for payments consists primarily IQÉéàdG ¿ƒfÉb øe á«°ù«FQ áØ°üH äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶæd ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G ∞dCÉàj :øjôëÑdG of the Law of Commerce, the Central Bank of Bahrain and á«YôØdG ÚfGƒ dGh 2006 É©d á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh …õcôŸG øjôëÑdG ±ô°üe ¿ƒfÉbh Financial Institutions Law (CBB Law) of 2006, and Central ≤ Ω Bank’s subordinate legislation. Central Bank regulation äÉYƒaóŸG …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Oƒ≤Yh íFGƒd ºμ– ɪc ,…õcôŸG ±ô°üŸÉH á°UÉÿG and contract also govern payments or the operation of the ájƒ°ùàdG óYƒe ójó– :á«dÉàdG πFÉ°ùŸG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG ΩÉμMCG »£¨Jh .᪶fC’G πªY Ò°S hCG systems. The following issues are covered by legal provisions: (±GôWC’G IOó©àŸG /á«FÉæãdG) á«Ø°üàdG á«bÉØJG AÉØ«à°SG ióe äÉÑKEGh ,á«FÉ¡ædG clarity of timing of final settlement; legal recognition of (bilateral and multilateral) netting arrangements. The legal ¿EGh) ¢SÉ°SCG IóYÉb OÉéjEG ≈∏Y ±ô°üª∏d »°SÉ°SC’G ΩɶædG ¢üæjh .á«fƒfÉ≤dG »MGƒæ∏d statute of the CBB provides a general, although not explicit, ΩÉμMCG óLƒJ ’ å«M ,äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCG ≈∏Y áHÉbôdG ᪡Ÿ (⁄É©ŸG áë°VGh øμJ ⁄ basis for the oversight function over the payment systems. äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûŸG iód •É°ûædG Gòg ÚeÉ°†eh áHÉbôdG ΩÉ¡e ôjƒ£àd á°UÉN There are no provisions developing the oversight function .á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ájƒ°ùJ ɶfh and the implications of this activity for the participants in Ω payment and securities settlement systems.

Kuwait: The general legal framework comprises the âjƒμdG ∂æH ¿ƒfÉbh ÊóŸGh …QÉéàdG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG øe ΩÉ©dG ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G ∞dCÉàj :âjƒμdG Commerce and Civil Code, the Central Bank Law and »£¨Jh .ájƒ°ùàdG ᪶fCÉH á°UÉÿG ÒHGóàdGh ¿ƒfÉ≤dG Iƒb É¡d »àdG ¬Jɪ«∏©Jh …õcôŸG Central Bank regulations having the Power of Law, and the settlement systems procedures. The following issues are /á«FÉæãdG) á«Ø°üàdG á«bÉØJG AÉØ«à°SG ióe äÉÑKEG :á«dÉàdG πFÉ°ùŸG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG ΩÉμMCG covered by legal provisions: legal recognition of (bilateral »MGƒæ∏d á«fhÎμdE’G ™aódG äÉ«∏ªY AÉØ«à°SGh ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG »MGƒæ∏d (±GôWC’G IOó©àŸG and multilateral) netting arrangements, recognition of .á∏Kɇ iôNCG óYGƒb …CG hCG ôØ°üdG áYÉ°S IóYÉb ≥«Ñ£J ΩóY ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG electronic processing of payments; non-existence of any âjƒ dG æH ¿ƒfÉb ÓN øe …õcôŸG æÑ d á«HÉbôdG äÉ«MÓ°üdG ¤EG ´ƒLôdG ø Á zero hour or similar rules. Central Bank’s oversight powers μ ∂ ∫ ∂ ∏ μ are to be found in the Central Bank Law. Empowerment to ™àªàj å«M ,ádhódG ‘ ™aódG ᪶fCG áÑbGôe ‹ƒJ ádCÉ°ùe ¬dÓN øe í°†àJ …òdG …õcôŸG oversee payment systems in the country is explicit, granting .É¡àÑbGôeh É¡ª«¶æJh ™aódG ᪶fCG 𫨰ûJ äÉ«MÓ°üH …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG the Central Bank powers to operate, regulate, and oversee payment systems.

Oman: The general legal framework comprises the Banking ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,IQÉéàdG ¿ƒfÉbh ,∑ƒæÑdG ¿ƒfÉb øe ΩÉ©dG ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G ∞dCÉàj :¿ÉªYo Law, the Commerce Code, and Central Bank regulations πFÉ°ùŸG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG ΩÉμMCG »£¨Jh .¿ƒfÉ≤dG Iƒb É¡d »àdG Êɪ©dG …õcôŸG ∂æÑdG äɪ«∏©J having the power of Law. The following issues are covered by AÉØ«à°SG ióe äÉÑKEGh ,QÉ°ùYE’G ä’ÉM ‘ á°UÉN á«FÉ¡ædG ájƒ°ùàdG óYƒe ójó– :á«dÉàdG

60 60 A discussion on credit bureau is contained in Chapter 1 .á«fɪàF’G äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ô£b õcôà á°UÉÿG π«°UÉØàdG ∫hC’G π°üØdG ¢ûbÉæj

149 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

legal provisions: clarity of timing of final settlement especially ¥ƒ≤M PÉØfh ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG »MGƒæ∏d (±GôWC’G IOó©àŸG /á«FÉæãdG) á«Ø°üàdG á«bÉØJG where there is insolvency; legal recognition of (bilateral and IOÉYEG äÉ«bÉØJG PÉØf ÖfÉL ¤EG ,¿Éª°†dG äÉ«bÉØJG ÖLƒÃ É¡«∏Y ¢Uƒ°üæŸG ¿Éª°†dG multilateral) netting arrangements; enforceability of security interests provided under collateral arrangements and of …CGh äÉfɪ°†dG Ëó≤àH ådÉãdG ±ô£dG äÉÑdÉ£e øe ájɪ◊Gh ,á∏°üdG äGP AGô°ûdG any relevant repo agreements; protection from third party ’k ƒq fl …õcôŸG Êɪ©dG ∂æÑdG Èà©jh .äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf øª°V áfƒgôe iôNCG äÉfɪ°V claims of security and other collateral pledged in a payment .…õcôŸG ∂æÑdG ¿ƒfÉb ÖLƒÃ á«∏ëŸG äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCG áÑbGôà system. The Central Bank Law entitles Central Bank of Oman to oversee the national payment systems.

Saudi Arabia: The legal framework for payments consists of á°ù°SDƒe ¿ƒfÉb øe äÉYƒaóª∏d ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G ∞dCÉàj :ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG law of SAMA, Banking Law, Payment Systems Law, Securities ¿ƒfÉbh ,á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ¥ƒ°S ¿ƒfÉbh ,äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ¿ƒfÉbh ,∑ƒæÑdG ¿ƒfÉbh ,ó≤ædG Market Law, Commerce Code, and other regulations. The following issues are covered by legal provisions: clarity :á«dÉàdG πFÉ°ùŸG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG ΩÉμMCG »£¨Jh .ó≤ædG á°ù°SDƒe äɪ«∏©J ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,IQÉéàdG of timing of final settlement; recognition of electronic ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG »MGƒæ∏d á«fhÎμdE’G ™aódG äÉ«∏ªY AÉØ«à°SGh ,á«FÉ¡ædG ájƒ°ùàdG óYƒe ójó– processing of payments; non-existence of any zero hour or ¿Éª°†dG ¥ƒ≤M PÉØfh ,á∏Kɇ iôNCG óYGƒb …CG hCG ôØ°üdG áYÉ°S IóYÉb ≥«Ñ£J ΩóYh similar rules; enforceability of security interests provided AGô°ûdG IOÉYGE äÉ«bÉØJG PÉØf ÖfÉL ¤EG ,¿Éª°†dG äÉ«bÉØJG ÖLƒÃ É¡« Y ¢Uƒ°üæŸG under collateral arrangements and of any relevant repo ∏ agreements; protection from third-party claims of securities äÉfɪ°†dGh ¿Éª°†dG Ëó≤àH ådÉãdG ±ô£dG äÉÑdÉ£e øe ájɪ◊Gh ,á∏°üdG äGP and other collateral pledged in a payment system. The á°ù°SDƒŸ á«HÉbôdG äÉ«MÓ°üdG ¤EG ´ƒLôdG øμÁh .äÉYƒaóŸG ΩɶæH á£ÑJôŸG iôNC’G oversight powers of SAMA are to be found in the relevant ᪶fCG áÑbGôe ‹ƒJ ádCÉ°ùe ¬dÓN øe í°†àJ …òdG ó≤ædG á°ù°SDƒe ¿ƒfÉb ∫ÓN øe ó≤ædG Law. Empowerment to oversee payment systems in the country is explicit, granting it powers to operate, regulate, É¡ª«¶æJh ™aódG ᪶fCG 𫨰ûJ äÉ«MÓ°üH ó≤ædG á°ù°SDƒe ™àªàJ å«M ,ádhódG ‘ ™aódG and oversee payment systems. .É¡àÑbGôeh

United Arab Emirates: The general legal framework ¿ƒfÉbh ,ÊóŸG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG øe ΩÉ©dG ʃfÉ≤dG QÉWE’G ∞dCÉàj :IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G comprises the Civil Code, the Central Bank Law, and ∫ÓN øe ™aódG á«∏ªY ¿É«H ºàjh .¿ƒfÉ≤dG Iƒb É¡d »àdG ¬Jɪ«∏©Jh …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG the central banks regulations having the power of law. Payment finality is covered by the legal dispositions; there /á«FÉæãdG) á«Ø°üàdG á«bÉØJG AÉØ«à°SG ióe âÑãj Ée óLƒj ’ ɪc ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG ≥FÉKƒdG is no explicit legal recognition of the netting arrangements; ™«bGƒàdGh ≥FÉKƒdG á÷É©e ºàj ’ ¬fCG ¤EG áaÉ°VEG ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG »MGƒæ∏d (±GôWC’G IOó©àŸG electronic documents and signatures are not regulated. The ÖLƒÃ á«∏ëŸG äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCG áÑbGôà ’k ƒq fl …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Èà©jh .á«fhÎμdE’G central bank law entitles the central bank to oversee the .±ô°üŸG ¿ƒfÉb payments system.

Reference ™LGôŸG M.Cirasino and M.Nicoli (2010). Payment and securities á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’Gh äÉYƒaóŸG ájƒ°ùJ ᪶fCG .(2010) M.Nicolih M.Cirasino settlement systems in the Middle East and North Africa. Financial Flagship Report (June), World Bank: Washington ∂æÑdG ,(ƒ«fƒj) »°ù«FôdG ‹ÉŸG ôjô≤àdG .É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ DC. .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG

International standard-setting bodies like Committee á«æ©ŸG áæé∏dÉc ,á«dhódG á«°SÉ«≤dG ÒjÉ©ŸG ™°VƒH á«æ©ŸG äÉ¡÷G ºgÉ°ùJ on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the (CPSS) á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG æÑd á©HÉàdG äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCÉH Bank for International Settlements and the Technical ∂ Committee of the International Organization of ∫ÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCG ≈∏Y áaô°ûŸG äÉÄ«¡∏d á«dhódG ᪶æª∏d á«æØdG áæé∏dGh Securities Commissions (IOSCO), also contribute ôjƒ£J ∫ÓN øe á«dÉŸG ¥ƒ°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG õjõ©J ‘ (IOSCO) towards strengthening the financial market infrastructure through promoting sound and efficient .(2 – 5 QÉWEG) ádÉ©ahq ᪫∏°S ¿ƒμJ å«ëH ájƒ°ùàdGh á°UÉ≤ŸGh ™aódG ᪶fCG payment, clearing and settlement systems (Box 5-2).

Box 5-2: Principles for financial market á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ÇOÉÑŸG :2 – 5 QÉWEG infrastructures

Taking cognizance of the importance of financial market ,‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G õjõ©J ‘ á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G ≈æÑdG ᫪gC’ É¡æe ÉcGQOk EG infrastructures in fostering financial stability, the Committee á©HÉàdG á«æØdG áæé dGh (CPSS) äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCÉH á«æ©ŸG áæé dG âeÉb on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the ∏ ∏ Technical Committee of the International Organization π°†aCG ¢VGô©à°SÉH (IOSCO) ∫ÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCG ≈∏Y áaô°ûŸG äÉÄ«¡∏d á«dhódG ᪶æª∏d of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) reviewed and äÉeƒ∏©ŸG çóMCG Ëó≤Jh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG ∫É› ‘ á©ÑàŸG äÉ°SQɪŸG provided an update on the best practices for financial market infrastructure (FMI). The standards in the updated õjõ©J ¤EG ôjô≤àdG øe áKóëŸGq áî°ùædG ‘ IOQGƒdG ÒjÉ©ŸG ±ó¡Jh .Oó°üdG Gòg ‘ report are intended to assist FMIs to function without ≈∏Y IÒÑc ôWÉfl πμ°ûJ ¿CG ¿hO πª©J ¿CG πLCG øe á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G ≈æÑdG posing significant risk to the financial system. The revised áYƒæàe πFÉ°ùe ∫ƒM CGóÑek 24 ¤EG ôjô≤àdG øe áë≤q æŸG áî°ùædG óæà°ùJh .‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG document is based on 24 principles on various issues covering legal risk, credit and liquidity risk management, Ωɶfh ,ájƒ°ùàdGh ,ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉflh ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl IQGOEGh ,á«fƒfÉ≤dG ôWÉîŸG πª°ûJ settlement, central securities depositories and exchange- á∏°üàŸG πFÉ°ùŸG IQGOEGh ,∫ƒ°UC’G ∫OÉÑàH ájƒ°ùàdG Ωɶfh á«dÉŸG ¥GQhCÓd …õcôŸG ´GójE’G of-value settlement systems, default management, general ÇOÉÑŸG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,á« «¨°ûàdG ôWÉîŸGh ɪYC’G ôWÉfl IQGOEGh ,OGó°ùdG ‘ Ì©àdÉH business and operational risk management, access, ∏ ∫ efficiency and transparency. The major principles which have óM ¤EG á∏°üàŸG ÇOÉÑŸG ºgCG »∏j Ée ‘h .á«aÉØ°ûdGh IAÉØμdGh ∫ƒ°UƒdG ≥ëH á≤∏©àŸG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 150 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

significant relevance to payment and settlement system :…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe √ôjój …òdG äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ΩɶæH ÒÑc managed by QCB include:

• An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, πμd ʃfÉb ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG AÉ°ûfEG Ú©àj • transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material É°SÉ°Sk CG ¿ƒμj å«ëH á∏°üdG äGP äÉ°UÉ°üàN’G áaÉc ‘ ɡࣰûfCG ÖfGƒL øe ÖfÉL aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions. .PÉØæ∏d ÓHÉbk ¿ƒμjh á«aÉØ°ûdGh 샰VƒdÉH º°ùàj Gó«Lk • An FMI should have governance arrangements that º°ùàJ áªcƒM äÉÑ«JôJ á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑ∏d ¿ƒμj ¿CG Ú©àj • are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG ¿ÉeCG õjõ©J ≈∏Y πª©J å«ëH á«aÉØ°ûdGh 샰VƒdÉH of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system. .™°SGƒdG ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG QGô≤à°SG ºYO ÖfÉL ¤EG ,É¡JAÉØc iƒà°ùeh

• An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and ¢Vô©à∏d ∫É©a ¢SÉ«≤H á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG Ωƒ≤J ¿CG Ú©àj • manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising áÄ°TÉædG á«fɪàF’G äÉ°Vô©àdG ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,¬JQGOEGh ¬àÑbGôeh ÚcQÉ°ûª∏d ÊɪàF’G from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. .ájƒ°ùàdGh á°UÉ≤ŸGh äÉYƒaóŸÉH á£ÑJôŸG äÉ«∏ª©dG øY • An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its IQGOE’ äÉfɪ°V Ö∏q £àJ »àdG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq • participants’ credit exposure should accept collateral with ôWÉfl ™e äÉfɪ°†dG ∫ƒÑb ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉîŸ É¡«a ÚcQÉ°ûŸG ¢Vô©Jq hCG É¡°Vô©Jq low credit, liquidity, and market risks. .¥ƒ°ùdG ôWÉflh ádƒ«°ùdGh ¢†ØîæŸG ¿ÉªàF’G • An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources á∏FÉ°S OQGƒe ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G á«dÉŸGq ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG ≈∏Y »¨Ñæj • in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where ∫ÓNh Ωƒ«dG ¢ùØf ‘ ™aódG äÉeGõàdG ájƒ°ùàd á∏°üdG äGP äÓª©dG ™«ªéH á«aÉc appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide QÉWEG ‘ á≤ãdG øe á«dÉY áLQO OƒLh ™e ,ôeC’G ≈°†àbG GPEG IOó©àe ΩÉjCG ∫ÓNh Ωƒ«dG range of potential stress scenarios that should include, π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y ,πª°ûJ ¿CG »¨Ñæj »àdG á∏ªàëŸG §¨°†dG äÉgƒjQÉæ«°S øe á©°SGh áYƒª› but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its ódƒj ¿CG ¬fCÉ°T øe …òdG ™aódG øY á©HÉàdG ¬JÉcô°Th ∑ΰûŸG õéY ,ô°ü◊G ’ ∫ÉãŸG affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity ¥ƒ°ùdG ±hôX X ‘ á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑ d á«dɪLE’G ádƒ«°ù d GõàdG ÈcCG obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market π ∏ ∏ Ω conditions. .ádƒ≤©ŸG øμdh áaô£àŸG

• If an FMI settles transactions that involve the øª°†àJq äÓeÉ©e ájƒ°ùàH á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG âeÉb ∫ÉM ‘ • settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities π«Ñ°S ≈∏Y »ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdG äÓeÉ©e hCG á«dÉe ¥GQhCG) Ú£ÑJôe ÚeGõàdG ájƒ°ùJ or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one AGôLEÉH »°†≤j •ô°T ™°VƒH á«°ù«FôdG ôWÉîŸG ≈∏Y AÉ°†≤dG É¡«∏Y Ú©àjq ,(∫ÉãŸG obligation upon the final settlement of the other. .ôNB’G ΩGõàd’G ájƒ°ùJ øe AÉ¡àf’G ó©H ÚeGõàd’G óMC’ á«FÉ¡ædG ájƒ°ùàdG

• An FMI should identify the plausible sources of ádƒ≤©ŸG QOÉ°üŸG ójó– á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ≈∏Y »¨Ñæj • operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate øe ÉgQÉKBG øe ∞«ØîàdGh ,»LQÉÿGh »∏NGódG øjó«©°üdG ≈∏Y ,á«∏«¨°ûàdG ôWÉîª∏d their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. .áªFÓŸG §HGƒ°†dGh äGAGôLE’Gh äÉ°SÉ«°ùdGh ᪶fC’G ΩGóîà°SG ∫ÓN

• An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and ÒjÉ©e É¡jód ¿ƒμj ¿CG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ≈∏Y »¨Ñæj • publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair íª°ùj ɇ ,ácQÉ°ûŸG ∫ƒM »æ∏Y πμ°ûH áaƒ°ûμeh ôWÉîŸG ≈∏Y áªFÉb á«Yƒ°Vƒe and open access. .íjô°üdGh í°VGƒdG ∫ƒ°UƒdÉH • An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting äÉLÉ«àMG á«Ñ∏àH á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG Ωƒ≤J ¿CG »¨Ñæj • the requirements of its participants and the markets it .»≤«≤Mh ∫É©aq πμ°ûH É¡eóîJ »àdG ¥Gƒ°SC’Gh É¡«a ÚcQÉ°ûŸG serves.

• An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, πbC’G ≈∏Y hCG ,ΩGóîà°SÉH á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG Ωƒ≤J ¿CG »¨Ñæj • relevant internationally accepted communication procedures á°UÉ≤ŸGh ™aódG π«¡°ùJ πLCG øe É«dhOk ádƒÑ≤ŸG ÒjÉ©ŸGh π°UGƒàdG äGAGôLEG ,ÜÉ©«à°SG and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording. .∫É©aq πμ°ûH π«é°ùàdGh ájƒ°ùàdGh

• An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules áë°VGh äGAGôLEGh óYGƒb á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑ∏d ¿ƒμj ¿CG »¨Ñæj • and procedures and should provide sufficient information Ωƒ°SôdGh ôWÉîŸG º¡a øe ÚcQÉ°ûŸG Úμªàd á«aÉc äÉeƒ∏©e ôaƒJ ¿CG »¨Ñæjh á∏eÉ°Th to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by ‘ ácQÉ°ûŸG ∫ÓN øe ÉghóÑμàj ¿CG øμÁ »àdG iôNC’G ájOÉŸG ∞«dÉμàdG øe ÉgÒZh participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures ™«ªL øY ∞°ûμdG »¨Ñæjh .í°VGhh ≥«bO πμ°ûH ∂dPh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG should be publicly disclosed. .»æ∏Y πμ°ûH á∏°üdG äGP á«°SÉ°SC’G äGAGôLE’Gh óYGƒ≤dG Payments and settlement infrastructure äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶæd á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG With the introduction of QATCH (a new secure ÊhÎμdEG Ωɶf) (QATCH) ô°TÉÑŸG º°üÿGh ´GójE’G Ωɶf ≥«Ñ£J ™e electronic network system introduced in April 2010) äÓeÉ©ŸG á÷É©Ÿ ºª°üŸGh (2010 πjôHCG øe GQÉÑàYGk ,(øeBGh ójóL designed to handle the financial transaction including ƒæÑdG ÚH …ô£ dG ÉjôdÉH ô°TÉÑŸG ´GójE’Gh º°üÿG dP ‘ Éà á«dÉŸG direct debit and deposit in Qatari Riyals among banks ∑ ≤ ∫ ∂ within the State of Qatar, the scope of the Payment ádhO ‘ äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóª∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ¥É£f ó¡°T ,ô£b ádhO ‘ and Settlement (P&S) infrastructure has improved. ᣰSGƒH É¡à÷É©e ºàJ »àdG äÓeÉ©ŸG ºéM OGRh .GÒÑck Éæ°ù–k ô£b

151 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

The volume of transactions processed by systemically äÓeÉ©ŸG ᪫b ¿q CG ’EG .2011 ΩÉY ‘ %46 ƒëæH 61á«d’G ™aódG ᪶fCG important payment systems (SIPS)61 grew by around .(âØjƒ°S) ƒæÑdG ÚH äÓeÉ©ŸG ¢VÉØîfG ÖÑ°ùH %19 ƒëæH â°†ØîfG 46% in 2011. However, the value of transactions ∑ declined by around 19%. This was solely on account ᪶fCG ∫ÓN øe É¡à÷É©e â“ »àdG äÓeÉ©ª∏d á«dɪLE’G ᪫≤dG â¨∏Hh of a decline in interbank transactions (SWIFT). The œÉædG ‹ÉªLEG øe %380 ‹GƒM …CG …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 2398 á«d’G ™aódG total value of the transaction processed through SIPS stood at QR 2,398 billion, or about 380% of 2011 GDP .(1-5 ∫hóL) 2011 ΩÉ©d »∏ëŸG (Table 5-1).

In addition to the QATCH system, several other PÉîJG ”q ,(QATCH) ô°TÉÑŸG º°üÿGh ´GójE’G Ωɶf ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH endeavours are taken to improve the P&S infrastructure äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóª d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG Ú°ùëàd IOó©àe iôNCG äGQOÉÑe (Box 5-3). Accordingly, an electronic payment gateway ∏ (Q-Pay) was launched in 2011. The groundwork to (Q-Pay) á«fhÎμdE’G ™aódG áHGƒH ¥ÓWEG ” ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .(3-5 QÉWEG) launch and implement a new system to process and ójóL Ωɶf ò«ØæJh ¥ÓWEÉH á°UÉÿG äÉ«°SÉ°SC’G Èà©Jh .2011 ΩÉY ‘ settle point of sale transactions between the GCC countries is at an advanced stage. Even though the »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÚH ™«ÑdG •É≤f äÓeÉ©e ájƒ°ùJh á÷É©Ÿ system is ready on a technical point of view, there are ,á«æØdG á«MÉædG øe õgÉL ΩɶædG ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .áeó≤àe á∏Môe ‘ several administrative requirements that would need °ûH ɶædG ¥ÓWEG Ñb ájQGOE’G äÉÑ £àŸG øe ójó©dG ájƒ°ùJ Ú©àjq to be settled prior to its final launch. πμ Ω π ∏ .»FÉ¡f

Box 5-3: New initiatives in the P&S á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ‘ IójóL äGQOÉÑe :3-5 QÉWEG system infrastructure äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶæd QE (DSM): A new system introduced in 2011 to settle the äÓeÉ©Ÿ ‹ÉŸG ÖfÉ÷G á÷É©Ÿ 2011 ΩÉY ‘ ójóL Ωɶf çGóëà°SG ”q :ô£b á°UQƒH financial leg of the securities transactions. An agreement has …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üŸ íª°ùJ áWÉ°SƒdG äÉcô°T ÚH á«bÉØJG ™«bƒJ ” óbh .á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G been signed between the brokerage companies authorising QCB to transfer funds between brokerage companies øe á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ™«Hh AGô°T ∫É› ‘ πª©J »àdG áWÉ°SƒdG äÉcô°T ÚH ∫GƒeC’G πjƒëàH involved in purchase and sale securities transactions through á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG iód áWÉ°SƒdG äÉcô°T äÉHÉ°ùM ÚH ájƒ°ùàdG ºàJh .ô£b á°UQƒH ∫ÓN Qatar Exchange (QE). The settlement is done between hCG º°üîH ±ô°üŸG ô£îJ ô£b á°UQƒH øe (MT198) âØjƒ°S ádÉ°SQ Óà°SG óæY brokerage companies accounts maintained with the Ω domestic banks upon receipt of a SWIFT message (MT198) :»∏j Ée ájƒ°ùàdG á«dBÉH ¢UÉÿG AGôLE’G øª°†àjhq .á«æ©ŸG äÉHÉ°ù◊G ‘ ó«b from QE advising QCB to debit or credit the respective accounts. The procedure of this settlement mechanism include:

• On T+3, QE will send QCB a MT198 which includes ≠∏Ñe øª°†àJ MT198 ádÉ°SQ ±ô°üª∏d ô£b á°UQƒH π°SôJ ,3+T ‘ • the debit/credit amount for each brokerage company. .á«dÉe áWÉ°Sh ácô°T πμd ó«≤dG / º°üÿG • As authorized by the brokerage company, QCB ÜÉ°ùM ≈∏Y á∏eÉ©ŸG ò«ØæàH ±ô°üŸG Ωƒ≤j ,áWÉ°SƒdG ácô°T á≤aGƒŸ Ék ≤ÑW • executes the transaction on the clearing account for the .»æ©ŸG ∂æÑ∏d á°UÉ≤ŸG related bank.

• QCB notifies the concerned bank regarding the type √ô£îjh äÓeÉ©ŸG ´ƒæH »æ©ŸG ∂æÑdG ΩÓYEÉH …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Ωƒ≤j • of transactions, advising them to credit /debit the concerned .¬jód áWÉ°SƒdG ácô°T ÜÉ°ùM øe º°üÿG / ó«≤dG ¿CÉ°ûH brokerage company account maintained with them

National Payment Gateway (Q-PAY): Q-PAY system ‘ á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«æWƒdG ™aódG áHGƒH Ωɶf í«àj :(Q-PAY) á«æWƒdG ™aódG áHGƒH enables domestic banks in Qatar to provide secure online äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe ójó©∏d âfÎfE’G áμÑ°T ÈY øeB’G ÊhÎμdE’G ™aódG äÉeóN ÒaƒJ ô£b e-payment services to various government and private k institutions. It is an incentive system for individuals and Ωƒ°SQ ™aód äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh OGôaCÓd GõaÉM ΩɶædG Gòg πμq °ûjh .¢UÉÿG ´É£≤dGh á«eƒμ◊G institutions to pay service fees (utility bills, purchases, and øe (ÉgÒZh ,ójóéàdG Ωƒ°SQh ,AGô°ûdG äÉ«∏ªYh ,AÉHô¡μdGh √É«ŸG ÒJGƒa) äÉeóÿG renewal fees, etc through internet), so as to avoid payment äÉ« ªY ÒaƒJ jôW øY ™aódG ‘ ÒNCÉJ …CG Öæéàd dPh ,âfÎfE’G á Ñ°T ÓN delays by providing electronically documented operations. ∏ ≥ ∂ μ ∫ Users to the payment system are able to pay online via debit ∫ÓN øe âfÎfE’G ÈY ™aódG øe ™aódG Ωɶf ƒeóîà°ùe øμq ªàjh .É«fhÎk μdG á≤Kƒe cards, credit cards, and virtual cards. .ÊhÎμdE’G ™aódG äÉbÉ£Hh ¿ÉªàF’G äÉbÉ£Hh ‹B’G Öë°ùdG äÉbÉ£H

61 61 Including SWIFT(domestic interbank transactions), NAPS (National ATMs and Point of á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωɶfh ™«ÑdG •É≤fh ‹B’G ±Gô°ü∏d á«æWƒdG áμÑ°ûdGh (á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH äÓeÉ©ŸG) âØjƒ°S ∂dP ‘ Éà Sale switch), ECC (Electronic Cheque Clearing), QE (transaction from Qatar Exchange) ô°TÉÑŸG º°üÿGh ´GójE’G Ωɶfh (ô£b á°UQƒÑH á°UÉÿG äÓeÉ©ŸG) ô£b á°UQƒHh ÊhÎμdE’G and QATCH (Qatar Automated Clearing House Solution).

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 152 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Table 5-1: Payments & Settlement Systems in Qatar ô£b ‘ äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCG :1-5 ∫hóL ᪫ dG ΩÉ©H áfQÉ≤e ƒªædG äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ᪶fCG ≤ (%)2010 ΩÉ©H áfQÉ≤e ƒªædG ºé◊G P & S Systems (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e) Growth over 2010 (%) Volume (%)2010 Value (QR billion) Growth over 2010 (%) (QPS) ô£b ‘ OGó°ùdG ᪶fCG Qatar Payment Systems (QPS)

âØjƒ°S 2,051.80 -25 182,152 -67 SWIFT

‘ô°üŸG ¿ÉªàF’G π«¡°ùJ 7.5 -71 44 -69 CDS

…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ´GójEG ô©°S 1,610.90 -67 2402 -68 QMRD

…ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ¢VGôbEG ô©°S 7.9 -65 97 -81 QMRL

ÊhÎμdE’G á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωɶf 233.7 11 3,778,890 7 ECC

ô£b á°UQƒH 13.0 1,038 QE (DSM)

ô°TÉÑŸG º°üÿGh ´GójE’G Ωɶf 38.7 2,441,400 QATCH ™«ÑdG •É≤fh ‹B’G ±Gô°ü∏d á«æWƒdG áμÑ°ûdG National ATM & POS Switch (NAPS)

»∏fi 40.5 33 60,392,438 41 Local

»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO 20.0 50 44,939,668 53 GCC

The volume of transactions through ATMs & PoS πμ°ûH ™«ÑdG •É≤fh ‹B’G ±Gô°üdG Iõ¡LCG ∫ÓN øe äÓeÉ©ŸG ºéM OGR increased substantially in value as well as in absolute ΩGóîà°SG IOÉjR ¤EG Ò°ûj ɇ ,á≤∏£ŸG ΩÉbQC’Gh ᪫≤dG å«M øe ÒÑc numbers, indicating an increase in the use of plastic money during the year. The value of transactions ∫ÓN øe äÓeÉ©ŸG ᪫b â©ØJQG ɪc .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN á«μ«à°SÓÑdG Oƒ≤ædG through cheques grew moderately, whereas currency in .ÉÑjôk ≤J %14 áÑ°ùæH ∫hGóàdG ‘ á∏ª©dG äOGORGh ∞«ØW πμ°ûH äÉμ«°ûdG circulation increased by around 14%. As noted earlier, ô£b ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH á«dÉŸG äÓeÉ©ŸG äó¡°T ,≥HÉ°S âbh ‘ Éfô°TCG ɪch financial transactions between banks in Qatar settled ¤EG Ò°ûj ɇ GÒÑck É°VÉØîfGk âØjƒ°S Ωɶf ≥jôW øY É¡àjƒ°ùJ ºàJ »àdGh through SWIFT system declined considerably indicating a low demand for interbank liquidity. .∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ™LGôJ

The real-time gross settlement system (RTGS) system á÷É©Ã §°SƒàŸG ‘ (RTGS) ájQƒØdG á«dɪLE’G ájƒ°ùàdG Ωɶf ΩÉb processed on an average 723 SWIFT transactions and ∫ÉjQ 250^000 øe ÌcCG) ᪫≤dG ™ØJôe Ék μ«°T 425h âØjƒ°S á∏eÉ©e 723 425 high value (above QR250,000) cheque transactions on a daily basis (Table 5-2). The summary statistics ¤EG äGAÉ°üME’G ¢üî∏e Ò°ûjh .(2-5 ∫hóL) »eƒj πμ°ûH (…ô£b indicates the daily volumes for both SWIFT and high ᪫≤dG á©ØJôŸG äÉμ«°ûdGh âØjƒ°S äÓeÉ©e øe πμd »eƒ«dG ºé◊G ¿CG value cheques transactions were less volatile. However, å«M øe äô¡X ádóà©ŸG äÉÑ∏≤àdG ¢†©H ¿q CG ’EG .πÑb øe πbCG äÉÑ∏≤J ó¡°T moderate volatility was observed in value terms. The ÉeƒªYk ßMÓj å«M ᫪°Sƒeq äÉμ«°ûdG ᪫b ‘ äÉÑ∏≤àdG ¿q CG hóÑjh .᪫≤dG volatility in value of cheque transactions appears to be seasonal. High volumes are generally observed towards ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ô¡°T πc øe ÒNC’Gh ∫hC’G ´ƒÑ°SC’G ‘ äÉμ«°ûdG ºéM ´ÉØJQG the last and first week of every month (Chart 5-1A). In ájGóH ‘ á©ØJôe äÉÑ∏≤àdG âfÉc ,âØjƒ°S äÓeÉ©Ã ≥∏©àj Ée ‘h .(CG1-5 case of swift transactions, the volatility was high at the ≥«Ñ£J IOÉYEG ¿ƒμj ób ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘h .(Ü1-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) áæ°ùdG beginning of the year (Chart 5-1B). Contextually, the ¥ÓWEG ¤EG iOCG ób 2011 ôjÉæj ‘ …ô£≤dG ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°S ™FGOh ≈∏Y ∞≤°S re-introduction of cap on the QMR deposit in January 2011 might have freed a large amount of liquidity into ᣰûfCG IOÉjR ¤EG iOCG ɇ ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG øe IÒÑc ᫪c the interbank market leading to an increase in interbank á°SÉ«°ùdÉH ¢UÉÿG ¬«LƒàdG Gòg ≥«Ñ£J ó©H QƒØdG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S market activities immediately after the policy directive. .ájó≤ædG

153 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Table 5-2: Summary statistics of á°UÉ≤ŸÉH ¢UÉÿG äGAÉ°üME’G ¢üî∏e :2-5 ∫hóL high-value clearing ᪫≤dG á©ØJôŸG Ò¨àdGq πeÉ©e »eƒ«dG §°SƒàŸG Coefficient of ≈°übC’G ó◊G ≈fOC’G ó◊G Daily Average Maximum Minimum variation

âØjƒ°S – Oó©dG 723 0.20 1191 414 SWIFT - Number

(…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e) âØjƒ°S - ᪫≤dG 8.1 0.5 29.5 0.7 SWIFT -Value (QR billion)

äÉμ«°ûdG OóY 425 0.18 756 271 Cheque –Number

(…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e) äÉμ«°ûdG - ᪫b 663.9 0.3 1537.7 276.4 Cheque -Value (QR million)

᪫≤dGh »eƒ«dG ºé◊G :äÉμ«°ûdG :CG1-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ᪫≤dGh »eƒ«dG ºé◊G - âØjƒ°S :Ü1-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 5-1A: Cheque - Daily volume and value Chart 5-1B: SWIFT- Daily volume and value

800 2,0000 1500 40 700 600 1,500 30 n 1000 n Q 500 Q R Millio R Billio R

f Tra 400 1,000 200 o . o

N 300 No.of Tra No.of

n 500

200 5000 10 n 100 0 0 0 0 13 2 1 1 2 19 23 15 28 8 3 1 4 26 6 2 13 1 26 2 19 1 2 17 1 19 1 23 2 15 1 28 2 8 30 3 10 1 4 26 2 6 2 3 6 9 7 5 - 9 3 8 0 0 - - 6 - - J Apr Dec A M ------a J J Apr D Ja J O A Ma Feb S M Dec A N Ma ------ug - - - - n u u a a ep Ju J Ju O Fe S Dec Ma A N M ug ct o n y l ug n ar e n a v ep y c ug c ov n y l n a b t r y Cheque-Number Cheque-Value(RHS) Swift-Number Swift-Value(RHS)

Retail cheque clearing system (below QR 250,000) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ 250^000 øe πbCG) áFõéàdÉH äÉμ«°ûdG á°UÉ≤e Ωɶf ɉ which are processed on a net basis, grew by over 6% å«M øe %6 ≈∏Y ójõJ áÑ°ùæH ±É°U ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y É¡à÷É©e ºàJ »àdGh both in terms of value and volume during the year. The distribution of cheques processed through ECC ∫ÓN øe á÷É©ŸG äÉμ«°ûdG ™jRƒJ ô¡¶jh .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ºé◊Gh ᪫≤dG system shows that more than 97% are retail in nature É¡à©«Ñ£H áFõŒ äÉμ«°T »g %97 øe ÌcCG ¿CG ÊhÎμdE’G á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωɶf in value terms (Table 5-3). .(3-5 ∫hóL) ᪫≤dG å«M øe

Table 5-3: Distribution of cheques processed during 2011 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN á÷É©ŸG äÉμ«°ûdG ™jRƒJ :3-5 ∫hóL

…ô£≤dG ∫ÉjôdÉH ∞dC’ÉH ≠∏ÑŸG Amount in QR '000 500h 250 ÚH 1^000h 500 ÚH 10^000h 1000 ÚH 250 øe ÌcCG Above 250 and upto Above 500 and upto Above 1000 and 10^000 øe ÌcCG Up to 250 Above 10000 500 1000 upto 10000

ºé◊G 97.2 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.1 Volume (%)

᪫≤dG 28.4 7.2 7.5 28.9 28.1 Value (%)

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 154 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Stability issues QGô≤à°S’ÉH á≤∏©àŸG πFÉ°ùŸG The efficiency of the financial infrastructure, in ,äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ɪ«°S’h ,á«dÉŸG á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG IAÉØc Ö©∏J particular the P&S system, plays an important role in Ωɶæd øμÁh .‹ÉŸG Ωɶæ∏d πeÉ°ûdG QGô≤à°S’G ≥«≤– ‘ ɪ¡ek GQhOk the overall stability of the financial system. An effective k P&S system can reduce the risk, specifically the ôWÉfl Gójó–h ,ôWÉîŸG øe óëjq ¿CG ∫É©ØdG äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG liquidity and counterparty risks in the financial market. π«∏– Èà©j ,‹ÉàdÉHh .á«dÉŸG ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ πHÉ≤ŸG ±ô£dG ôWÉflh ádƒ«°ùdG Analysing the risks inherent in the P&S system is π«∏– ‘ ÉeÉgk Gô°üæYk äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ‘ áæeÉμdG ôWÉîŸG therefore an important ingredient of stability analysis. .QGô≤à°S’G

Liquidity risk ádƒ«°ùdG ôWÉfl Maintaining sufficient liquidity in the clearing account ÉjQhô°Vk Ωƒ«dG ∫GƒW á°UÉ≤ŸG ÜÉ°ùM ‘ á«aÉc ádƒ«°S ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G Èà©j throughout the clearing day is necessary to avoid øe …CG Ñb øe ™aódG ‘ ôNCÉàdG …ODƒj óbh .™aódG ‘ ÒNCÉJ …CG Öæéàd payment delays. Payment delays from any one of the π participating banks (nodes in the P&S system) may ôWÉfl ¤EG (äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ‘ ó≤©dG) ácQÉ°ûŸG ∑ƒæÑdG crystallize as systemic risk through the concentration á«eɶf QÉKBG ±É£ŸG ájÉ¡f ‘ É¡æY ºéæj õcÎdGq IÉæb ∫ÓN øe á«eɶf channel and eventually have larger systemic á«dÉ©dG äÉ «°ûdÉH á°UÉÿG á°UÉ ŸG á« ªY «¡°ùJ LCG øeh .¥É£ædG á©°SGh implications. In order to facilitate timely clearing of μ ≤ ∏ π π the high-value cheques, QCB provides intraday credit ∑ƒæÑ∏d É«eƒjk ÉfɪàFGk …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ôaƒj ,Ö°SÉæŸG âbƒdG ‘ ᪫≤dG to individual banks. This helps the system to function ,∂dP ™eh .∞bƒJq ¿hO øe πª©dG ≈∏Y ΩɶædG ôeC’G Gòg óYÉ°ùjh .ájOôØdG without a gridlock. However, continuous and large ‹ÉªLEG ɡફb RhÉéàJ »àdG ¢Vhô dG øe ôªà°ùŸGh ÒÑ dG ºé G …ODƒj ób volume of credit which exceeds the total liquidity in ≤ μ ◊ the clearing system (measured by closing clearing ¤EG (»eÉàÿG á°UÉ≤ŸG ó«°UQ ∫ÓN øe ¢SÉ≤J) á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωɶf ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG balance) may destabilize the system. Throughout ∑ƒæÑ∏d ìƒæªŸG »eƒ«dG ¿ÉªàF’G ´ƒª› »≤H óbh .ΩɶædG QGô≤à°SG áYõYR the year, daily aggregate intraday credit provided to ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ÉjC’G º¶©e ‘ » dG á°UÉ ŸG ó«°UQ øe bCG áæ°ùdG QGóe Y banks stood below the aggregate clearing balance Ω ∏μ ≤ π ≈∏ on most of the days (Chart 5-2). On average, the ´ƒª› øe %5 øe ÒãμH πbCG §°SƒàŸG ‘ ìƒæªŸG ¿ÉªàF’G ¿Éch .(2-5 credit provided was well below 5% of the total .ΩÉjCG á©°†Ñd ’EG ΩɶædG ‘ á°UÉ≤ŸG ó«°UQ clearing balance in the system except for a few days.

Chart 5-2: Intra-day credit and clearing liquidity á°UÉ≤ŸG ádƒ«°Sh »eƒ«dG ¿ÉªàF’G :2-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

40 35 30 Clearing Liquidity Intra-Day Credit

n 25 20 R Billio

Q 15 10 5 0 30 28 2 27 3 31 28 1 27 1 29 31 1 0 8 7 - 1 0 8 - 7 - 1 9 - Ma J A Ma ------a Ju S N J Ja Oct Dec A Ma p n ul ep r u o r n - y n - - 11 - g v - - y 1 - - 11 - 11 - 11 11 - - 11 11 - 11 1 11 11 11 11

In order to analyze the extent of vulnerability in ÖÑ°ùH ∞©°†∏d äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ¢Vô©J ióe π«∏– πLCG øe the P&S system on account of inadequate clearing ≈fOCÉH á°UÉÿG äÉeƒ∏©ŸG á°SGQóH Ωƒ≤f ,±ÉμdG Ò¨dG á°UÉ≤ŸG ó«°UQ balance, information on the lowest level upto which the intraday clearing account balances gets depleted ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ∂æH πμd »eƒ«dG á°UÉ≤ŸG ÜÉ°ùM ó«°UQ ±õæà°ùj iƒà°ùe for each individual bank is examined (Chart 5-3). »eƒ«dG »Ñ∏°ùdG ó«°UôdG ≠∏H å«M ΩÉ©dG øe ∫hC’G ™HôdG AÉæãà°SÉÑa .(3-5 Excluding the first quarter of the year, where intraday »eƒ«dG ≈°übC’G ó◊G ≠∏H ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ äGQÉ«∏e 7 ƒëf ≠∏H ≈°übCG GóMk negative balance reached a maximum of around QR Ò°ûjh . ÉjC’G øe %80 øe ÌcC’ ÉjQ QÉ« e øe bCG »Ñ°ùdG ó«°Uô d 7 billion, the daily maximum of negative balance was Ω ∫ ∏ π ∏ ∏

155 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J less than a billion for more than 80% of the days. This ≈∏Y ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ GOÉMk É°ük ≤f ó¡°ûj ⁄ á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωɶf ¿CG ¤EG ôeC’G Gòg indicates that the clearing system did not experience äGQÉ« e 5 »eÉàÿG ó«°UôdG RhÉŒ , dP øe ¢ù ©dG Y .»eƒj ¢SÉ°SCG severe liquidity shortage on an intraday basis. On the ∏ ∂ μ ≈∏ contrary, the closing balance was over QR 5 billion ÜÉ°ùM ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG äÉÑ∏≤J ¿q CG hóÑjh .áæ°ùdG ΩÉjCG º¶©e ∫ÓN …ô£b ∫ÉjQ during most of the year. The volatility of liquidity in the áfQÉ≤ŸÉH ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ GÒÑck É°VÉØîfGk â°†ØîfG ób á°UÉ≤ŸG clearing account appears to have reduced significantly in the second half of the year as compared to the first äÓ«¡°ùàdG øe ó«Øà°ùJ ∑ƒæÑdG º¶©e ¿q CG hóÑj ɪc .∫hC’G ∞°üædG ™e half. Most of the banks appear to be making use of øe ÊÉ©J »àdG ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y Ωƒ°SQ ájCG ¢Vôa ºàj ’ ¬fC’) á«eƒ«dGq á«fɪàF’G the facility of intraday credit (since no penalty on hCG æH 11 ó¡°T ,Ék æH 17 ÚH øªa .(»eƒj ¢SÉ°SCG Y GƒeC’G ‘ ¢ü f banks is levied for being short on intra-day). Out of ∂ μ ≈∏ ∫ ≤ the 17 banks, 11 or more banks fell short of funds ∫hóL) ÉÑjôk ≤J áæ°ùdG ΩÉjCG πc ‘ »eƒj ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ∫GƒeC’G ‘ É°ük ≤f ÌcCG intraday in almost all the days of the year (Table 5-4). ó«°UQ ‘ ¢†FÉa ≈∏Y ßaÉ– ¿CG âYÉ£à°SG ∑ƒæÑdG º¶©e ¿CG ’EG .(4-5 However, most of the banks managed their clearing balance to remain surplus by the end the clearing day. .á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωƒj ájÉ¡f ‘ á°UÉ≤ŸG

»eƒ«dG á°UÉ≤ŸG ó«°UQ ‘ äÉÑ∏≤àdG :3-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ »eƒ«dG á°UÉ≤ŸG ó«°UQ Ö°ùM ∑ƒæÑ∏d QôμàŸG ™jRƒàdG:4-5 ∫hóL Chart 5-3: Volatility in the intraday Table 5-4: Intra-day clearing balance - Frequency clearing balance distribution of banks

35 »eƒ«dG »Ñ∏°ùdG ó«°UôdG ¢†FÉØdG »eÉàÿG ó«°UôdG ∑ƒæÑdG OóY Intraday negative Surplus closing 30 LowestL -negetiveg tive balbalance Number of banks Highest surplus balancebalan balance balance 25 No. of Days 20 n 15 0-5 0 0

R billio R 10 6-10 3 0 Q 5 11-13 84 0 0 18 26 10 26 16 5 29 1 23 8 31 13 3 21 - - - - Nov N JanJ OctO Dec D ------14-15 161 14 Jun Feb Sep Mar Jul Jan Apr Dec Aug -5 May g -10 y Above 15 116 350

P&S system can also experience liquidity stress from the ádƒ«°ùdÉH á°UÉN ÉWƒ¨°Vk É°†jk CG äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ó¡°ûj ¿CG øμÁ retail transactions - low value cheques and transactions ºàJ »àdG ᪫≤dG á°†ØîæŸG äÓeÉ©ŸGh äÉμ«°ûdG - áFõéàdG äÓeÉ©e øe made through ATMs & PoS. Since these transactions are netted only after business hours, large fund transfer äÓeÉ©ŸG √òg ¿CG ÉÃh .™«ÑdG •É≤fh ‹B’G ±Gô°üdG Iõ¡LCG ∫ÓN øe through ATMs & PoS can affect the liquidity if the ∫GƒeC’G äÓjƒ– ôKDƒJ ¿CG øμÁ ,πª©dG äÉYÉ°S ó©H É¡à«Ø°üJ …ôŒ banks do not have sufficient clearing balance as at the øμj ⁄ GPEG ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y ™«ÑdG •É≤fh ‹B’G ±Gô°üdG Iõ¡LCG ÈY IÒÑμdG close of the business day. To overcome such liquidity •ƒ¨°V ≈∏Y Ö∏¨à∏dh .πª©dG Ωƒj ájÉ¡f ‘ ±Écm á°UÉ≤e ó«°UQ ∑ƒæÑ∏d stress, any shortcomings are adjusted by providing an " ‘Auto loan’ facility where the concerned bank has to ¢Vhô≤dG äÓ«¡°ùJ ÒaƒJ ∫ÓN øe Qƒ°üb …CG §Ñ°V ºàj ,√òg ádƒ«°ùdG pay a penal interest of 4.5%. During the year, all banks .%4^5 áÑ°ùæH á«FGõL IóFÉa ™aO »æ©ŸG ∂æÑdG ≈∏Y Ú©àj å«M'"¬«dC’G together took auto loans only on 82 occasions. The .Ö°ùëa áÑ°SÉæe 82 ‘ ¬«dCG É°Vhôbk ∑ƒæÑdG ™«ªL äòNCG ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓNh value of such loans ranged from a minimum of QR 0.4 ¿ƒ«∏e 296^4h …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 0^4 ÚH ¢Vhô≤dG √òg ᪫b âMhGôJh million to a high of QR 296.4 million. On more than half of the occasions, the value of Auto loan taken ¬«dC’G ¢Vhô≤dG ᪫b â¨∏H ,äÉÑ°SÉæŸG ∞°üf øe ÌcCG ‘h .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ was below 10 million (Chart 5-4A). This testifies that ÊÉ«H º°SQ) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 10 øe πbCG ∑ƒæÑdG É¡«∏Y â∏°üM »àdG the P&S system does not face any liquidity stress even ¬LGƒj ’ äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ¿CG ≈∏Y ôeC’G Gòg ∫ójh .(CG4-5 after the business hours. The distribution of net low ‘É°U ™jRƒJ Ò°ûjh .πª©dG äÉYÉ°S ó©H ≈àM ádƒ«°ùdÉH á°UÉN •ƒ¨°V ájCG value transaction suggests that, it is almost normally k distributed with average zero (Chart 5-4B). ÉÑjô≤J …OÉY πμ°ûH áYRƒe É¡fCG ¤EG á°†ØîæŸG ᪫≤dG äGP äÓeÉ©ŸG .(Ü4-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ôØ°üdG ≠∏Ñj §°SƒàÃ

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 156 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

á«dB’G ¢Vhô≤dG äÓeÉ©e ™jRƒJ :CG4-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ áFõéàdG äÓeÉ©e ‘É°U ™jRƒJ :Ü4-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 5-4A: Distribution of Auto Chart 5-4B: Distribution of net loan transactions retail transactions

25 ) 35003 30003 s

n 20 o 25002

ccati 15 o 20002 0 f o 10 1501 000

Number 5 1010000

0 of no. times banks of quency(No. 5005 requency(No. of banks times no. of days) of no. times banks of requency(No. Fre Beow 1 1-10 Mio 10-25 25-50 50 -100 100 - 200 Above 0 1 1 20 3 4 - - - - - 0 5 - 40 4 30 3 20 2 1 1 5 0 5 0 0 0

Mio Mio Mio Mio Mio 200 Mio 5 0

QR Million QR Million

Liquidity concentration risk ádƒ«°ùdG õcôJq ôWÉfl

Liquidity concentration in the clearing system with ∑ƒæÑdG øe π«∏b OóY ™e á°UÉ≤ŸG Ωɶf ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG õcôJq ôKq Dƒj ¿CG øμÁ a small number of banks can affect the P&S system .OGó°ùdG ‘ ƒæÑdG òg °ûa ÉM ‘ äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG ɶf Y in the event of failure of such banks. In such a ∑ √ π ∫ Ω ≈∏ scenario, failure of these banks lowers the amount of OGó°ùdG ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG √òg π°ûa π∏≤q j ,ƒjQÉæ«°ùdG Gòg πãe ∫ƒ°üM ∫ÉM ‘h liquidity available in the payment system, impacting ᣰûfCG ≈∏Y ôKDƒj ɇ ,äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ‘ IôaGƒàŸG ádƒ«°ùdG ᫪c øe the payment activities of the remaining banks. The q liquidity concentration among the participating ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ádƒ«°ùdG õcôJ ¢üëa ºàjq .á«≤ÑàŸG ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ™aódG banks in the P&S system is examined by calculating ô°Tq Dƒe ÜÉ°ùàMG ≥jôW øY äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ‘ ácQÉ°ûŸG 62 the daily normalized Herfindahl index [H(liquidity)] ó«°Uô d [H(liquidity)] Herfindahl (ádƒ«°ù d)`g Góæ«aÒg of closing balance in the clearing account of the ∏ ∏ ∫ participating banks. The index lies between zero (no ô°TDƒŸG ìhGÎjh .ácQÉ°ûŸG ∑ƒæÑdÉH ¢UÉÿG á°UÉ≤ŸG ÜÉ°ùM ‘ »eÉàÿG concentration) and one (maximum concentration). »eƒ«dG ô°TDƒŸG »≤H óbh .(≈°übC’G õcÎdG)q óMGhh (õcôJq ’) ôØ°U ÚH The daily normalised H (liquidity) for most of the days 62 H(liquidity remained in the low concentration region (Chart 5-5). á°†ØîæŸG á≤£æŸG øª°V ΩÉjC’G º¶©e ‘ (ádƒ«°ù∏d)`g ) During January 2011, the concentration levels were äÉjƒà°ùe âfÉc ,2011 ôjÉæj ô¡°T ∫ÓNh .(5-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) õcÎdGq high, which thereafter dissipated and remained in the á°†ØîæŸG á £æŸG ‘ â« Hh â°†ØîfG ¿CG âãÑd Ée É¡fCG ’EG ,á«dÉY õcÎdGq low concentration region till August 2011. However, ≤ ≤ during August-September 2011, the P&S system again ȪàÑ°Sh ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ∫ÓN ,¬fCG ’EG .2011 ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ≈àM õcÎdG experienced some element of high concentration ‹É©dG õcÎdG ¢†©H iôNCG Iôe äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ó¡°T ,2011 (presumably due to seasonal impact of festivals) since k banks tend to maintain high levels of clearing liquidity ®ÉØ◊G ¤EG ∑ƒæÑdG π«“ å«M (äÉfÉLô¡ª∏d »ª°SƒŸG ÒKCÉà∏d Gô¶f ÉÃQ) to meet sudden and unforeseen requirement of cash äÉLÉ«àM’G á«Ñ∏àd á°UÉ≤ŸÉH á°UÉÿG ádƒ«°ùdG øe á«dÉY äÉjƒà°ùe ≈∏Y outflows. .ájó≤ædG äÉ≤aóàdG øe á©bƒàŸG ÒZh áÄLÉØŸG

62 62 Defined as óLƒj’

157 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Chart 5-5: Herfindahl index of q liquidity concentration ádƒ«°ùdG õcÎd ∫Góæ«aÒg ô°Tq Dƒe :5-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

0.55 0.5 0.45 HiHighgh ConcentrationConcentr 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 LowLi concentration 0 18 2 1 26 1 29 5 1 23 8 3 13 3 2 8 6 0 6 6 9 - - 3 - 1 3 1 - Nov Ja O D ------J F S M J Ja A Dec A Ma ct ec n u ul e e p ug n n ar p b r y

Payment concentration risk ™aódG õcôJq ôWÉfl

Another channel through which P&S system can get ôKq DƒJ »àdG πeGƒ©dG øe ôNBG ÓeÉYk äÉYƒaóŸG IÉæb ‘ õcÎdGq Èà©j ɪc affected is through the concentration in payments OóY ‘ ™aódG äÉeGõàdG äõcôJ GPEÉa .äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ≈∏Y channel. If payment obligations are concentrated in a ‘ IôNCÉàŸG hCG áë«ë°üdG ÒZ ™aódG äÉeGõàdG …ODƒJ ób , ƒæÑdG øe « b few banks, incorrect or delayed payments obligations ∑ π ∏ by these banks may directly disrupt the payment ∑ƒæÑdG ™æe ≥jôW øY ô°TÉÑe πμ°ûH ™aódG Ωɶf 𫣩J ¤EG ∑ƒæÑdG √òg system by preventing even healthy banks from Ωɶf ‘ õcÎdGq iƒà°ùe ¢üëØdh .áeRÓdG äÉYƒaóŸG AGôLEG øe ᪫∏°ùdG making necessary payments. To examine the level of ΩGóîà°SÉH »eƒ«dG ™aódG õcôJ ô°TDƒe ÜÉ°ùM ºàj ,äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG concentration in the P&S system, a daily concentration ɪch .ÊhÎ dE’G á°UÉ ŸG ɶfh ‹B’G ±Gô°ü d á«æWƒdG á Ñ°ûdG äÉfÉ«H index is calculated using the payment data from NAPS μ ≤ Ω ∏ μ and ECC. As in the case of liquidity concentration ∫Góæ«aÒg ô°TDƒe ÜÉ°ùàMÉH Éæªb ,ádƒ«°ùdG õcôJq ô°TDƒŸ áÑ°ùædÉH ∫É◊G ƒg index, we calculated the Herfindahl index of payments øe IóટG IÎØ∏d (™aódG )`g (HIPayments ™aódG õcÎHq ¢UÉÿG concentration (HIPayments) for the period January- :»∏j ɪc 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ¤EG ôjÉæj December 2011, where:

The calculated HIPayments indicates low concentration IÉæb ‘ õcÎdGq ¢VÉØîfG ¤EG ܃°ùëŸG HIPayments ô°TDƒŸG Ò°ûj in the payment channel for most of the days (Chart ‹É©dG õcÎdGq ≈∏Y π«dódG ¿q CG ’EG .(6-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ΩÉjC’G º¶©Ÿ ™aódG 5-6). However, the evidence of high concentration was k visible on some days during January (after the QCB √Qó°UCG …òdG º«ª©àdG ó©H) ôjÉæj ô¡°T ∫ÓN ΩÉjC’G ¢†©H ‘ É«∏L ô¡X circular of cap on QMR deposits) and August (QCB ‘h (…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh ∞≤°S ∫ƒM …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe policy rate change and seasonal effects). .(᫪°SƒŸG QÉKB’Gh IóFÉØdG ∫ó©Ÿ …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG ÒZ)q ¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 158 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Chart 5-6: Herfindahl index of q payment concentration ™aódG õcÎd ∫Góæ«aÒg ô°Tq Dƒe :6-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ

0.4

0.35 HigHighh concentratconcenconcentrationion 0.3

0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05 Loww concenco concentrationncentration 0 1 2 10 2 1 5 2 1 2 8 3 2 1 3 8 6 0 6 6 - 9 - 3 - 1 1 3 - N J O D ------a J F S M J Ja A Dec Ma A ov c ec n u ul eb ep t p ug n n a r r y

Each payment however, involves both a paying as well ’ ób ,∂dòdh .Gó«Øà°ùek Ék μæHh Ó°Sôek Ék μæH øª°†àJq OGó°S á«∏ªY πc ¿q CG ’EG as an acquirer bank. Therefore, the payment might º¡e æH …CG ¿CG ¤EG Ò°ûj ɇ ,Ú æÑdG øe …CG °ûa GPEG OGó°ùdG ëàj not materialise if either of the banks involved fail. This ∂ μ π ≥≤ suggests that a given bank is systemically important âfÉc GPEG ,äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH á«eɶædG á«MÉædG øe for the P&S system, if its share in the turnover of .iôNC’G ∑ƒæÑdG ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH á«dÉY OGó°ùdG äÓeÉ©e πjƒ– ‘ ¬à°üM payments transaction is high as compared to other X k banks. Accordingly, we define the Node Risk for a :»∏j ɪc ( ) Ú©e ∂æH ‘ ábÉYE’G ôWÉfl ∞jô©J øμÁ ,∂dòd É≤ahh given bank (X) equals:

The Node Risk index values suggest that three most ÉWÉ°ûfk ÌcC’G ∑ƒæH áKÓãdG ¿CG ¤EG ábÉYE’G ôWÉfl ô°TDƒe º«b Ò°ûJ active banks equal approximately 45% of the total ɪc .á«dÉŸG äÓeÉ©ª∏d á«dɪLE’G ∫hGóàdG ᪫b øe %45 ‹GƒM πμq °ûJ turnover of financial transactions. The average risk dP øe bCG ƒæÑdG á« H ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉH ôWÉîŸG ô°TDƒe ᪫b §°Sƒàe ¿q CG index value for the remaining banks is much smaller. ∂ π ∑ ≤ These results appear to suggest that almost half of OGó°ùdG •É°ûf ∞°üf øe Üô≤j Ée ¿CG ¤EG èFÉàædG √òg Ò°ûJh .ÒãμH the payment activity would be at risk if the three most .äÉHƒ©°U ÉWÉ°ûfk ÌcC’G çÓãdG ∑ƒæÑdG â¡LGh GPEG ô£N ‘ íÑ°üj ób active banks experience difficulties.

Credit risk ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl Delays in processing the cheques can lead to credit ÖÑ°ùH ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ¤EG äÉμ«°ûdG á÷É©e ‘ ÒNCÉàdG …ODƒj ¿CG øμÁ risk on account of non-availability of expected funds. ájQƒØdG á«dɪLE’G ájƒ°ùàdG ɶf ª©jh .™bƒàŸG °ûdÉH GƒeC’G ôaGƒJ óY A well-functioning RTGS system manages to optimize Ω π πμ ∫ Ω the time required to process the cheques. However, ¿q CG ’EG .äÉμ«°ûdG á÷É©Ÿ ΩRÓdG âbƒdG øe ≈∏ãŸG IOÉØà°S’G ≈∏Y (RTGS) technical issues, delays from payer bank to authorise ≈∏Y á≤aGƒŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ π°SôŸG ∂æÑdG πÑb øe ÒNCÉàdGh á«æØdG πFÉ°ùŸG the transactions, etc can delay the final settlement Gòg ‘h .á eÉ©ª d á«FÉ¡ædG ájƒ°ùàdG ÒNCÉJ ¤EG …ODƒJ ¿CG ø Á ïdG ,äÓeÉ©ŸG of the transaction. In that context, we have analyzed ∏ ∏ μ the time delays to final settlement in the electronic äÉμ«°ûdG á°UÉ≤e Ωɶf ‘ á«FÉ¡ædG ájƒ°ùàdG ‘ ôNCÉàdG π«∏ëàH Éæªb ,¥É«°ùdG cheque clearing system (Chart 5-7). More than 65% äÉμ«°ûdG øe %65 øe ÌcCG ¿CG ÚÑJ óbh .(7-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«fhÎμdE’G of the cheques are processed through the system É¡dÉ°SQEG ºàj ¿CG ó©H ÚàYÉ°S ¿ƒ°†Z ‘ ɶædG ÓN øe É¡à÷É©e ºàJ within 2 hours after it is send to the payer bank for Ω ∫ authorization. However, around 15% of the cheques äÉμ«°ûdG øe %15 ƒëf ¿CG ’EG .á≤aGƒŸG ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°üë∏d π°SôŸG ∂æÑdG ¤EG took more than 4 hours to get confirmed before the .á«FÉ¡ædG á÷É©ŸG πÑb á≤aGƒŸG ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°üë∏d äÉYÉ°S 4 øe ÌcCG âÑ∏£J final processing.

159 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Chart 5-7: Distribution of delay receiving á≤aGƒe ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G ‘ ÒNCÉàdG ™jRƒJ :7-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ authorization from payer bank π°SôŸG ∂æÑdG

7.9 15.5 10 Minutes

15.5 30 Minutes 1 hour

19.3 2 hour 2-4 hours 18.0 More than 4 hours

23.7

The percentage of bounced cheques to total cheques â“ »àdG äÉμ«°ûdG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG á©ŒôŸG äÉμ«°ûdG áÑ°ùf â°†ØîfG processed by the P&S system declined from 7.3% in ¤EG 2010 ΩÉY ‘ %7,3 øe äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ᣰSGƒH É¡à÷É©e 2010 to 7.1% in 2011. A cheque in the payment system äÉYƒaóŸG ɶf ‘ «°ûdG ´ÉŒQG ÖÑ°S Oƒ©j óbh .2011 ÉY ‘ %7,1 might bounce either from payee bank or from the Ω ∂ Ω receiving bank due to various reasons. The data reveals .áØ∏àfl ÜÉÑ°SC’ ó«Øà°ùŸG ∂æÑdG ¤EG hCG OGó°ùdÉH Ωƒ≤j …òdG ∂æÑdG ¤EG ÉeEG that around 70% of the bounced cheques were from ¤EG Oƒ©J âfÉc á©ŒôŸG äÉμ«°ûdG øe %70 ‹GƒM ¿CG ¤EG äÉfÉ«ÑdG Ò°ûJh the payee bank, while the rest were from the receiving ÉeCG .Ió«Øà°ùŸG ∑ƒæÑdG øe »bÉÑdG ¿Éc ÚM ‘ ,OGó°ùdÉH Ωƒ≤j …òdG ∂æÑdG banks. On the payment side, “insufficient funds” was "ÜÉ°ù◊G ‘ ±Éc ó«°UQ OƒLh ΩóY" πμq °T ó≤a ,äÉYƒaóŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ the major reason for bouncing of cheques, while on the ¿q CG ´GójE’G á«MÉf øe ßMƒd ÚM ‘ ,äÉμ«°ûdG ´ÉŒQ’ »°ù«FôdG ÖÑ°ùdG receipt side, “date and image mismatch” was observed 63.QÉWE’G Gòg ‘ »°ù«FôdG ÖÑ°ùdG q °T "IQƒ°üdGh ïjQÉàdG HÉ£J óY" to be the major cause.63 πμ ≥ Ω Governance infrastructure áªcƒë∏d á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG Following the recent financial crisis, regulators are ò«Øæàd ójGõàe πμ°ûH á«HÉbôdG äÉ¡÷G ≈©°ùJ ,IÒNC’G á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ó©H increasingly looking to implement initiatives across ÒjÉ©e õjõ©àd áYÉæ°üdG äÉYÉ£b øe áYƒªéà á°UÉÿG äGQOÉÑŸG a range of industry sectors to enhance the standards of corporate governance. In a move to further the ¿hÉ©àdG ᪶æe âeÉb ,á«∏ª©dG ™jô°ùàd É¡æe Iƒ£N ‘h .äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒM process, the Organization for Economic Cooperation ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG äÉeƒμM ™e IQOÉÑe »æÑàH ᫪æàdGh …OÉ°üàb’G and Development (OECD) has undertaken an initiative :≥jôW øY Qɪãà°S’G ñÉæe õjõ©àd É«≤jôaEG with MENA governments to enhance the investment climate by:

• Strengthening country capacity for designing, áÑbGôeh ò«ØæJh º«ª°üJ πLCG øe ájô£≤o dG äGQó≤dG õjõ©J • implementing and monitoring investment policy Qɪãà°S’G á°SÉ«°ùH á°UÉÿG äÉMÓ°UE’G reforms • Creating a network for policy dialogue among äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG »©°VGh ÚH äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ¿CÉ°ûH QGƒë∏d áμÑ°T AÉ°ûfEG • investment policy makers from MENA and OECD ᪶æe ¿Gó∏Hh É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe øe ájQɪãà°S’G countries ᫪æàdGh …OÉ°üàb’G ¿hÉ©àdG • Creating a favorable environment for ´É£≤dG ôjƒ£J ∫ÓN øe πª©dG ¢Uôa ≥∏ÿ á«JGƒe áÄ«H ≥∏N • employment creation through financial sector ∫ɪYC’G IOÉjQ áaÉ≤K ƒëf - ‹ÉŸG development – towards an entrepreneurship culture • Improving intra-governmental policy co ¿hÉ©àdGh äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG ¿CÉ°ûH áeƒμ◊G πNGO ≥«°ùæàdG Ú°ù– • ordination and co operation between ministries äGQGRƒdG ÚH • Reinforcing the impact of development á«dhódG ≥jOÉæ°üdG øe ºYóH ᫪æàdG äGQOÉÑe ôKCG ájƒ≤J • initiatives supported by international, regional and .á«FÉæãdGh ᫪«∏bE’Gh bilateral funds

63 63 The reasons for cheque bounce on the payment side includes no/ insufficient funds, ™«bƒàdG ±ÓàNG ,≥∏¨e ÜÉ°ùM ,ÜÉ°ù◊G ‘ ±Éc ó«°UQ OƒLh ΩóY äÉYƒaóŸG ó«©°U ≈∏Y äÉμ«°ûdG ´ÉŒQG ÜÉÑ°SCG πª°ûJ account closed, effect not cleared, drawer’s signature different, etc, while on the deposit ᪫b ‘ ±ÓàNG ,IQƒ°üdGh ïjQÉàdG ≥HÉ£J ΩóY ™FGOƒdG ó«©°U ≈∏Y ÜÉÑ°SC’G πª°ûJ ɪæ«H ,ÜÉÑ°SC’G øe ÉgÒZh ∂«°ûdG ≈∏Y side the reasons include date and image mismatch, difference in words and amount, improper presentation cycle, etc. .ïdG ,≥F’ ÒZ πμ°ûH ∂«°ûdG Ëó≤Jh ,±hô◊Gh ΩÉbQC’G ÚH ∂«°ûdG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 160 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

In this regard, to advance the corporate governance äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒM ∫ɪYCG ∫hóL ‘ Éeóbk »°†ŸG πLCG øeh ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘h agenda in the MENA region, a survey of existing áªcƒ◊G ÇOÉÑŸ í°ùe AGôLEG ”q ,É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ‘ governance principles in the MENA region was á«Yôa äÉÄa ÈY É« jôaEG ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á £æe ‘ áªFÉ dG undertaken, across various sub-categories of ≤ ∫ ≤ ≤ governance principles. A brief overview of some of the RôHCG øY IõLƒe áëŸ 5-5 ∫hó÷G øª°†àjhq .áªcƒ◊G ÇOÉÑe øe áØ∏àfl salient ones is highlighted in Table 5-5. .ÇOÉÑŸG ∂∏J

The Qatar National Development Strategy 2011- ôjƒ£J 2016 - 2011 ô£b ‘ á«æWƒdG ᫪æàdG á«é«JGΰSGq øª°†àJq 16 (QNDS) envisages the development of modern ¿ƒfÉb ò«ØæJh ™°Vh ¡°ùj ±ƒ°Sh . É©dG ´É£ d á©HÉJ áãjóM äÉ°ù°SDƒe public sector institutions. The development and πq Ω ≤∏ implementation of a standard Code of Corporate ‹ÉàdÉH …ODƒjh áªcƒ◊G Ú°ù– ô£b ‘ äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒëH ¢UÉN …QÉ«©e Governance in Qatar will facilitate better governance .ôWÉîŸG øe óq ◊Gh ƒªædGq ¢Uôa IOÉjR ¤EG and thereby increasing growth potential and reducing risks.

The three major regulatory bodies in Qatar - Qatar ô£b ±ô°üe »gh) ô£b ‘ áKÓãdG á«°ù«FôdG ᫪«¶æàdG äÉÄ«¡dG äòîJG Central Bank (QCB), Qatar Financial Market Authority ( ɪ d ô£b õcôe º«¶æJ áÄ«gh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd ô£b áÄ«gh …õcôŸG (QFMA) and the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory ∫ ∏ Authority (QFCRA) have already undertaken initiatives ™°†îJ »àdG äÉfÉ«μdÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒëH á°UÉN äGAGôLEG in corporate governance for entities under their .É¡àHÉbôd jurisdiction. a. QCB has already issued guidelines for corporate äÉ°SQɪŸÉH á°UÉN á«¡«LƒJ ÇOÉÑe …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Qó°UCG. CG governance practices in March 2008. These guidelines á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG òg óæà°ùJh .2008 ¢SQÉe ‘ äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒëH á ©àŸG are based on OECD guidelines published in 2004 √ ≤∏ .2004 ΩÉY ‘ IQƒ°ûæŸG ᫪æàdGh …OÉ°üàb’G ¿hÉ©àdG ᪶æe ÇOÉÑe ≈∏Y b. QFMA has issued corporate governance áªcƒ◊ á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd ô£b áÄ«g äQó°UCG.Ü guidelines for public and listed companies in January .2009 ôjÉæj ‘ áLQóŸGh áeÉ©dG äÉcô°û d äÉcô°ûdG 2009. ∏ c. QFCRA has issued their guidelines on corporate áªcƒM ∫É› ‘ á«¡«LƒàdG É¡FOÉÑe ∫ɪ∏d ô£b õcôe º«¶æJ áÄ«g äQó°UCG .ê governance for QFC authorized firms in January 2012. .2012 ôjÉæj ‘ ∫ɪ∏d ô£b õcôe πÑb øe á°üNôŸG äÉcô°û∏d äÉcô°ûdG A committee with members from QCB, QFMA and áÄ«gh …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe øe πc øe AÉ°†YCG º°†J áæ÷ π«μ°ûJ ” óbh QFCRA has been established and is in the process of Qô ŸGh) ¿ƒfÉb ™°Vƒd ɪ d ô£b õcôe º«¶æJ áÄ«gh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd ô£b the development of a Unified Code (expected to be ≤ ∫ ∏ ready in 2012) of Corporate Governance in Qatar by ∫ÓN øe ô£b ‘ äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒM ∫ƒM óMƒe (2012 ΩÉY ‘ IQGó°UG incorporating international best practices to ensure ìÉ°üaE’Gh á«aÉØ°ûdG øe ójõŸG ¿Éª°†d á«dhódG äÉ°SQɪŸG π°†aCG èeO increased transparency and disclosure and more uniformity in corporate governance guidelines and áªcƒëH á°UÉÿG äÉÑ∏£àŸGh á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG ‘ ¢ùfÉéàdG øe ójõŸGh requirements across the financial sector. A new law, .‹ÉŸG ´É£≤dG ÈY äÉcô°ûdG combining the separate laws of the regulatory bodies, is expected to be ready in 2012.

Table 5-6 provides some relevant indicators of ∑ƒæÑ∏d äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒëH á∏°üdG äGP äGô°TDƒŸG ¢†©H 6-5 ∫hó÷G ôaƒjq corporate governance for the domestic banks in á«eÓ°SE’G ƒæÑ d Ék ah É¡Ø«æ°üJ ºàj »àdGh ,2011 ÉY ‘ á« ëŸG 2011, classified according to Islamic and commercial, ∑ ∏ ≤ Ω ∏ respectively. Average total assets of commercial banks ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑdG ∫ƒ°UCG ´ƒª› §°Sƒàe ≠∏Ñjh .‹GƒàdG ≈∏Y ájQÉéàdGh are, on average, roughly double those of Islamic ¢ùdÉ› ΩÉéMCG ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ∫ƒ°UCG ∞©°V banks. Although board sizes are broadly comparable, Islamic banks have higher average number of executive ÈcCG OóY É¡jód á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ¿q CG ’EG ,™°SGh ¥É£f ≈∏Y áHQÉ≤àe IQGOE’G members as also a relatively higher average number ‘ IÈÿG …hP øe AÉ°†YC’G øe É«Ñ°ùfk ÈcCG OóYh Újò«ØæàdG AÉ°†YC’G øe of members with expertise in finance. Presumably ƒæÑdG ‘ IQGOE’G ¢ùdÉ› äÉYɪàLG OóY §°Sƒàe ¥ƒØjh . jƒªàdG É› reflecting their size and complexity, the average number ∑ π ∫ of board meetings in commercial banks far outweighs á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG ‘ ó≤©J »àdG äÉYɪàL’G OóY ÒÑc óM ¤EG ájQÉéàdG those of Islamic banks. .Égó«≤©J áLQOh É¡ªéM ¢ùμ©j πμ°ûH

161 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ‘ äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒëH á°UÉÿG á«°ù«FôdGq äGQOÉÑŸG :5-5 ∫hóL Table 5-5: Key initiatives in corporate governance by GCC countries ∫ÉéŸG øjôëÑdG ¿ÉªY ¿ÉªY ô£b äGQÉeE’G Area Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› AÉ°†YCG Board members

ÚªgÉ°ùŸG πÑb øe º¡HÉîàfG / º¡ë«°TôJ ºà«d IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› AÉ°†YC’ IƒYO ∑Éæg πg YESs YESs YESs YESs YESs Is there a call for board members to be nominated/elected by shareholders

Újò«ØæàdG ÒZ Ú∏≤à°ùŸG IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› AÉ°†YC’ IƒYO ∑Éæg πg YESv NO YESa NO NO Is there a call for independent non-executive board members

á«dÓq ≤à°SÓd ∞jô©J ∑Éæg πg NO NO YESr NO NO Is there a definition of independence

Ú∏≤à°ùŸG IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› AÉ°†YC’ É¡H ≈°Uƒe áÑ°ùf …CG ∑Éæg πg YESv NO NO NO NO Is there any recommended proportion of independent board members IQGOE’G ¢ù › AÉ°†YCÉH á°UÉÿG äGÈÿGh ÜQÉéàdGh äGQÉ¡ª d ójó– Éæg g ∏ ∏ ∑ π NO YESs NO NO NO Are the skills, experience and expertise of board members specified ¿ƒªgÉ°ùŸG Shareholders OÉ≤©fG πÑb ÚªgÉ°ùª∏d ¬H á≤aôŸG ≥FÉKƒdGh á«eƒª©dG á«©ª÷G ´ÉªàLÉH ¢UÉN QÉ©°TEG ∫É°SQE’ IƒYO ∑Éæg πg ´ÉªàL’G Gòg YESs YESs YESs YESs YESs Is there a call for sending the notice of the general meeting (GM) and accompanying documents to shareholders in advance of GM á«eƒª©dG á«©ª÷G ɪYCG hóL Y OƒæH ™°VƒH ÚªgÉ°ùª d íª°ùj g ∫ ∫ ≈∏ ∏ π NO YESs NO NO YESs Are shareholders allowed to place items on the agenda of the GM É¡ ªàH ÖfÉLC’G hCG Ú« ëŸG ÚªgÉ°ùª d íª°ùj »àdG º¡°SC’G OóY Y Oƒ«b Éæg g μ∏ ∏ ∏ ≈∏ ∑ π NO NO YESs NO NO Is the amount of shares national or foreign shareholders may own unrestricted ó©H øY âjƒ°üàdG ¿Éª°†d IƒYO Éæg g ∑ π YESs NO YESs YESs NO Is there a call for ensuring distant voting IójóL º¡°SCG QGó°UEG Y âjƒ°üà d ÚªgÉ°ùª d IƒYO Éæg g ≈∏ ∏ ∏ ∑ π YESs YESs YESs YESs YESs Is there a call for shareholders to vote the issuance of new shares Újò«ØæàdG ÚdƒÄ°ùŸG äÉ°†jƒ©J Executive compensation (IÒ¨àŸGh áàHÉãdG …CG) Újò«ØæàdG ÚdƒÄ°ùŸG äÉ°†jƒ©J äÉfƒμe ÚH õ««ªà∏d IƒYO ∑Éæg πg Is there a call to distinguish between components of executive compensation (i.e., NO NO YESs NO NO (fixed and variable Újò«ØæàdG ÚdƒÄ°ùŸG äÉ°†jƒ©J Ñe øY °û dÉH á«°UƒJ Éæg g ≠∏ ∞ μ ∑ π NO YESs YESr NO NO Is there a recommendation to disclose the amount of executive compensation ≈∏Y É¡«∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G ” »àdG º¡°SC’ÉH ®ÉØàM’G äGÎØH ¢UÉÿG ≈fOC’G ó◊ÉH á°UÉN á«°UƒJ ∑Éæg πg ¢†jƒ©àdG «Ñ°S π NO NO NO NO NO Is there a recommendation for minimum holding periods of equity received as com- pensation ácô°û∏d IOófi ±GógCG ≥«≤ëàH Újò«ØæàdG ÚdƒÄ°ùŸG äÉ°†jƒ©J §Hôd á«°UƒJ ∑Éæg πg Is there a recommendation to link executive compensation to specific objectives of NO NO NO NO NO the company Újò«ØæàdG ÚdƒÄ°ùŸG äÉ°†jƒ©J áeõM ≈∏Y âjƒ°üàdÉH º¡°SC’G á∏ª◊ ìɪ°ùdÉH ¢UÉN ¢üf ∑Éæg πg Is there a provision to allow shareholders to vote on compensation package for NO NO NO NO NO executives á°UÉÿG ¿Éé∏dG Special committees äÉ°†jƒ©J áæ÷ AÉ°ûfEÉH á«°UƒJ Éæg g ∑ π NO YESa NO NO NO Is there a recommendation to establish a compensation committee í«°TÎdG áæ÷ « °ûàd IƒYO Éæg g π μ ∑ π NO YESa NO NO NO Is there a call to establish a nomination committee » NGódG «bóà d á Kɇ áÄ«g hCG äÉHÉ°ù G á©LGôe áæ÷ AÉ°ûfE’ IƒYO Éæg g ∏ ≥ ∏ ∏ ◊ ∑ π NO YESs YESs YESa YESa Is there a call to establish an audit committee or a similar internal audit body ácô°ûdG á« e «g øY °û d IƒYO Éæg g μ∏ πμ ∞ μ∏ ∑ π NO YESs YESs NO YESa Is there a call to disclose the ownership structure of the company ácô°ûdG áªcƒM á°SÉ«°S øY ìÉ°üaEÓd •ô°T Éæg g ∑ π NO YESs YESs NO YESr Is there a requirement to disclose the governance policy of the company NO = ;܃∏£e ÒZ / ÖFÉZ YESs = ;‹ÉŸG ∫OÉÑàdG Ö°ùëH ܃∏£e hCG »eGõdEG YESr = ;í«°VƒJ Ëó≤J ácô°ûdG ≈∏Y Ú©àj ,ΩGõàd’G ΩóY ádÉM ‘ h ,¬H ≈°Uƒe YESv = ;áeõ∏e ÒZ ácô°ûdG øμd ¬H ≈°Uƒe ,…QÉ«àNG YESA = ,¬H í°üæj CGóÑŸG / ¿ƒfÉ≤∏d ∫Éãàe’ÉH ácô°ûdG í°üæJ. NO=Absent/not required; YESs = Statutory or required by financial exchange; YESr=Recommended and in case of deviation, company must explain; YESv=Voluntary, provision is recommended but company is not obliged; YESa=Advisory, the company is encouraged to comply with the code/principle (5πª©dG áYƒª›) É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdÉH ¢UÉÿG ᫪æàdGh …OÉ°üàb’G ¿hÉ©àdG áª¶æŸ …Qɪãà°S’G èeÉfÈdG :Qó°üŸG Source: MENA-OECD investment programme (Working Group 5) Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Table 5-6 : Select corporate governance äÉcô°ûdG áªcƒ◊ IQÉàfl äGô°TDƒe :6-5 ∫hóL indicators for banks in 2011 Ω2011 ‘ ∑ƒæÑ∏d »eÓ°SEG …QÉŒ Islamic Commercial Number of banks 46 ∑ƒæÑdG OóY Average total assets per bank in 2011 40.3 83.2 ΩÉY ‘ ∂æH πμd ∫ƒ°UC’G ‹ÉªLEG §°Sƒàe (QR billion) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e) 2011 Board characteristics IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› ¢üFÉ°üN Average number of members of board of directors 9 8.8 IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› AÉ°†YCG OóY §°Sƒàe Average number of executive members 3.8 2.7 Újò«ØæàdG AÉ°†YC’G OóY §°Sƒàe Average number of members with expertise in: :‘ IÈÿG …hP øe AÉ°†YC’G OóY §°Sƒàe Banking and insurance 5.3 4.8 ÚeCÉàdGh ∑ƒæÑdG Petroleum and natural gas 0.3 0.8 »©«Ñ£dG RɨdGh §ØædG Board meetings IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› äÉYɪàLG Average number of board meetings held 3.0 8.7 Égó≤Y ”q »àdG äÉYɪàL’G OóY §°Sƒàe

Liquidity infrastructure ádƒ«°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG Policies directed towards reinforcing liquidity øe ∑ƒæÑdG iód ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG õjõ©J ¤EG áaOÉ¡dG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG äóYÉ°S management of banks, by fostering financial stability, ÓN ádƒ«°ù d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG Ú°ù– Y ‹ÉŸG QGô à°S’G õjõ©J ÓN helped to improve the liquidity infrastructure during ∫ ∏ ≈∏ ≤ ∫ 2011. The first initiative was undertaken right at the ´É£≤dG øe Ö∏£dÉH ΩÉ©dG ájGóH ‘ ∫hq C’G AGôLE’G PÉîJG ”q óbh .2011 ΩÉY beginning of the year which signaled to the banking ójó– ”q ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .∫É©aq πμ°ûH ¬jód ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa IQGOEG ‘ô°üŸG sector the need for effective management of their k surplus liquidity. Accordingly, each bank’s total holding ∫OÉ©j ,´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T É¡«dEG ÉaÉ°†e …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOƒd ∞≤°S of Certificates of Deposit (CDs) plus QMR deposits was ôjÉæj 17 øe GQÉÑàYGk ,…õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG iód ∂æÑ∏d »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G capped to the bank’s reserve requirement maintained …ô£b ÉjQ QÉ« e 50 ᪫ H á«eƒ M äGóæ°S QGó°UEG ” ,É«fÉKk .2011 with the QCB, effective January 17, 2011. Secondly, ∫ ∏ ≤ μ government bonds worth QR 50 billion were issued Écƒk μ°U äGóæ°ùdG √òg øe ÒÑc AõL øª°†Jq óbh .ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa ¢UÉ°üàe’ to mop up the resultant increases in liquidity. A major á∏FÉ°ùdG ∫ƒ°UC’G á«Yƒf Ú°ùëàd á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d á∏«°Sh â∏μq °T á«eÓ°SEG portion of these bonds included Islamic Sukuks, which k provided an avenue to Islamic banks to improve the ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°S ¢†«ØîJ ” ,ÉãdÉK .á«eƒª©dG É¡JÉ«fGõ«e ‘ quantum of liquid assets in their balance sheet. Thirdly, ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG äGAGôLE’ ’ɪk μà°SG πMGôe IóY ≈∏Y …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG the QMR deposit rate was reduced in phases. This was , dP Y IhÓY .ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG ±ó¡H HÉ°S âbh ‘ ÉgPÉîJG ”q »àdG a continuation to the earlier policy measures aimed ∂ ≈∏ ≥ at managing the liquidity. In addition, it helped to IOƒLƒe âfÉc »àdG áHQÉ°†ŸG ∫GƒeC’G ᫪c øe ó◊G ≈∏Y ôeC’G Gòg óYÉ°S restrain the quantum of speculative funds that erstwhile Ú°ù– ¤EG ±ó¡J IOóq fi äGAGôLEG PÉîJG ”q ,É©HGQk .ΩɶædG ‘ Ék ≤HÉ°S was existing in the system. Fourth, specific measure targeted towards improving the liquidity infrastructure äÉfhPCG QGó°UEG ≥jôW øY ∂dPh 2011 ƒjÉe ‘ ádƒ«°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG was undertaken in May 2011 with the introduction of Gòg ±ó¡jh .áØ∏àfl ¥É≤ëà°SG äGÎa äGP (ájó«∏≤Jh á«eÓ°SEG) áfGõN Treasury Bills of varying maturities. This was aimed at ƒæÑ d áÑ°ùædÉH §°SƒàŸG ¤EG Ò°ü dG ióŸG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG ¤EG ôeC’G managing liquidity at the short- to medium-end, for ∑ ∏ ≤ Islamic and conventional banks. The other instruments πμ°ûJ »àdG iôNC’G á«dÉŸG äGhO’GC á°ûbÉæe ”q óbh .ájó«∏≤àdGh á«eÓ°SE’G which form part of the liquidity infrastructure have been .ôjô≤àdG Gòg øe ÊÉãdG π°üØdG ‘ ádƒ«°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG øe GAõLk discussed in Chapter 2.

The policy directives significantly altered the structure of πμ«g ‘ IÒÑc äGÒ«¨J ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG äÉ¡«LƒàdG âKóMCG banking sector liquidity during 2011. As at end-December ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f »Øa .2011 ÉY ÓN ‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ádƒ«°S 2011, primary liquidity64, the surplus fund parked with Ω ∫ ≤ ±ô°üŸG iód áXƒØëŸG ∫GƒeC’G ¢†FÉa …CG , 64á«dhq C’G ádƒ«°ùdG â°†ØîfG

64 64 QMR deposit stock plus balance in clearing account . á°UÉ≤ŸG ÜÉ°ùM ó«°UQ óFGR …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh ¿hõfl

163 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J the central bank declined considerably as compared to á°üM âdÉeh .(7-5 ∫hóL) áæ°ùdG ájGóH ™e áfQÉ≤ŸÉH ÒÑc óM ¤EG …õcôŸG that prevailing at the beginning of the year (Table 5-7). á«ÑæLC’G ƒæÑdG äÉYƒª› ƒëf á«dhC’G ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ á« æÑdG äÉYƒªéŸG The bank group-wise share of primary liquidity tilted ∑ q μ more towards foreign bank groups and Islamic banks ,á«dhC’G ádƒ«°ùdG ¢VÉØîfG iOCG óbh .(8-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdGh (Chart 5-8). The decline in the primary liquidity, in a way, /á«eƒμ◊G äGóæ°ùdG πãe iôNC’G á∏FÉ°ùdG äGhOC’G ºcGôJ ¤EG ,Ée πμ°ûH resulted in accumulation of other liquid instruments like Government Bonds/Treasury Bills. As at end-December áªFÉ≤dG áfGõÿG ¿hPCG â¨∏H ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘h .áfGõÿG ¿hPCG 2011, the outstanding treasury bills stood at QR 13.9 52^3 QGó≤à á«eƒq μ◊G äGóæ°ùdG äOGR ÚM ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 13^9 billion, whereas the governments bonds increased äóYÉ°Sh .(ÊÉãdG °üØdG ™LGQ , «°UÉØàdG øe ójõŸ) …ô£b ÉjQ QÉ« e by QR 52.3 billion (for details, refer Chapter 2). The π π ∫ ∏ increase in credit demand observed during the second ,ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ¿ÉªàF’G ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG ‘ áXƒë∏ŸG IOÉjõdG half of the year further helped the banks to deploy their .∫ƒ°UC’G ≈∏Y ∫ƒ°ü◊G ‘ É¡jód ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉa ΩGóîà°SG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑdG excess liquidity to earning assets.

á«dhC’G ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ á«μæÑdG äÉYƒªéŸG á°üM :8-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ á«dhC’G ádƒ«°ùdG äGQƒ£Jq :7-5 ∫hóL Chart 5-8: Bank group-wise share of Table 5-7: Developments in primary liquidity primary liquidity ƒæÑdG ájó« àdG ƒæÑdG ƒæÑdG ∑ƒæÑdG ∑ ∏≤ ∑ ∑ á«ÑæLC’G á«eÓ°SE’G á«∏ëŸG á«ÑæLC’G Islamic Local conven- Foreign All banks banks tional Banks banks 100 ô¡°ûdG ájÉ¡f 90 End- …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e QR billion month 80 Dec'10 69.2 1.7 49.0 18.5 70

2011 60 e Jan 42.9 9.2 21.2 12.4 50

Feb 25.8 5.2 13.7 6.8 shar 40 % March 19.8 2.8 10.9 6.2 30

April 26.6 3.3 14.7 8.5 20

May 27.3 3.2 18.6 5.5 10 0 June 22.4 4.6 13.8 4.0 J F S M N Jul'1 J O A De A Ma un an e e pr ug o ct'11 a b'1 July 21.9 2.2 15.0 4.7 p' c v r ' y' ' 1 ' 1 ' ' 1 ' ' 11 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 0

August 21.5 1.6 16.6 3.3 1 1 1

Sept 14.3 0.9 11.1 2.2

Oct 12.6 0.8 9.1 2.8

Nov 6.0 0.7 2.6 2.6 Islamic Commercial Foreign

Dec 5.6 1.8 1.3 2.5

An impact study was conducted as to how the banking ™FGOh ≈∏Y ∞≤°S ≥«Ñ£àd ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG áHÉéà°SG ∫ƒM á°SGQO AGôLEG ” sector responded to the introduction of the ceiling á∏μ«g IOÉYEÉH âeÉb ∑ƒæÑdG ¿q CG ¤EG π«∏ëàdG QÉ°TCGh .…ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG on QMR deposits. The analysis suggested that banks .(4-5 QÉWEG) ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG ‘ Ò«¨àdG Gòg ™e ΩAÓààd á«dÉŸG ÉgõcGôe restructured their balance sheet to accommodate the policy change (Box 5-4).

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 164 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Box 5-4: Response of the banking sector to the policy á≤∏©àŸG á°SÉ«°ùdG ‘ äGÒ¨à∏d ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG áHÉéà°SG :4-5 QÉWEG changes regarding QMR deposits

Qatar Central Bank (QCB) advised the banking sector that ™FGOh ó«°UQ ´ƒª› ¿CÉH ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤∏d äɪ«∏©J QGó°UÉH …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ΩÉb their total balance in QMR deposits and QCB CDs should ,∑ƒæÑ∏d »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G RhÉéàj ’CG Öéj ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°Th …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG not exceed the required reserve of the respective banks, k effective January 17, 2011. Simultaneously, to manage the ‘ á°†FÉØdG ádƒ«°ùdG äÉ≤aóJ IQGOE’h ,¬°ùØf âbƒdG ‘ .2011 ôjÉæj 17 øe GQÉÑàYG surplus liquidity inflows into the system, Government bonds á°SGQO â“ óbh .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 50 ᪫≤H á«eƒq μM äGóæ°S QGó°UEG ”q ,ΩɶædG worth QR 50 billion were issued. The response of the banking ,á«dÉŸG ÉgõcGôe πμ«g π«∏– ∫ÓN øe ¬«LƒàdG Gò¡d ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG áHÉéà°SG ióe sector to this directive is examined by analysing the balance ¥ƒ°Sh ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ äGQƒ£àdGh Ió« e Ò¨dG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G ‘ äGÒ¨àdGh sheet structure, changes in free reserves, developments in ∑ ≤ interbank market and foreign exchange market. .»ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdG

Balance Sheet Readjustment: Table 1 provides a snapshot ∫ÓN ‹ÉŸG õcôŸG πμ«g ‘ äGÒ«¨àdG øe IòÑf 1 ∫hó÷G Ωó≤j :‹ÉŸG õcôŸG πjó©J of the changes in the balance sheet structure during the one .äGôL’ÉH ¢UÉÿG ¬«LƒàdG ó©Hh πÑb óMGh ô¡°T IÎa month period before and after the policy directive.

…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏ŸÉH Ò¨àdG - 2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡æH áfQÉ≤e 2011 ôjGÈa ájÉ¡f : á«dÉŸG õcGôŸG πμ«g :1 ºbQ ∫hóL Table 1: Balance sheet structure : End-Feb 2011 vs. End-Dec 2010 - change in QR billion áaÉc Impact on assets á«eÓ°SE’G ájQÉéàdG á«ÑæLq C’G ∑ƒæÑdG Islamic Conventional Foreign ∫ƒ°UC’G ≈∏Y ÒKCÉàdG All banks

Net funds with QCB -42.7 3.2 -34.1 -11.8 …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe iód ∫GƒeC’G ‘É°U (except Req. Res.) .(»eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G AÉæãà°SÉH) Government securities 50.3 23.0 27.3 0.0 á«eƒμ◊G á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G QCB CDs -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ´GójEG äGOÉ¡°T Impact on liabilities Ωƒ°üÿG ≈∏Y ÒKCÉàdG Net domestic funds from FIs/banks 2.8 13.3 -7.9 -2.6 ∑ƒæÑdG / á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe á«∏ëŸG ∫GƒeC’G ‘É°U Net foreign funds from FIs/ banks -16.3 3.3 -18.3 -1.3 ∑ƒæÑdG / á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG øe á«ÑæLC’G ∫GƒeC’G ‘É°U Net funds from Head Office/ 5.1 0.0 13.0 -7.9 branches ´hôØdG / »°ù«FôdG ôq ≤ŸG øe ∫GƒeC’G ‘É°U

The table shows the following: :»∏j Ée ∫hó÷G ÚÑj • The issuance of Government Sukuk bonds provided ájQɪãà°SG á°Uôa á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«eƒq μ◊G ∑ƒμ°üdG QGó°UEG ôahq • Islamic banks an additional investment opportunity. To fund hóÑj ,(…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 23) Iójó÷G ájQɪãà°S’G ¢UôØdG √òg πjƒªàdh .á«aÉ°VEG this new investment opportunity (QR 23 billion), these banks appear to have resorted mainly to domestic inter-bank funds QÉ«∏e 13 ‹GƒM) ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH á«∏ëŸG ∫GƒeC’G ¤EG ∫hC’G ΩÉ≤ŸG ‘ äCÉ÷ ∑ƒæÑdG √òg ¿CG (around QR 13 billion). .(…ô£b ∫ÉjQ • Commercial banks depleted around QR 34 billion ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh øe …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 34 ‹GƒM ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑdG äóØæà°SG • from QMR deposits during the period, while around QR 27 ƒëf …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 27 ‹GƒM ¬«LƒJ ” ɪæ«H ,IÎØdG √òg ∫ÓN …ó≤ædG billion was channelled to the new issuance of Government bonds. .á«eƒq μ◊G äGóæ°ù∏d ójó÷G QGó°UE’G • Foreign banks withdrew around QR 12 billion, while ¢Uôa â«≤H ÚM ‘ ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 12 ƒëf á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG âÑë°S • the investment opportunities for the surplus liquidity so hóÑj ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah .Ohófi πμ°ûH ∂dP øY ¬ŒÉædG ádƒ«°ùdG ¢†FÉØH á°UÉÿG Qɪãà°S’G created were limited. Accordingly, it seems that they have un-winded their external liabilities implying an outflow of ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 11 ‹GƒM êhôN ¤EG iOCG ɇ ,á«LQÉÿG É¡JÉeGõàdG â¡fG ∑ƒæÑdG √òg ¿CG around QR 11 billion from the banking sector .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG øe …ô£b

Free Reserve: Commercial banks’ holding of free reserves ájQÉéàdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d Ió«≤e Ò¨dG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G â©ØJQG :Ió«≤e Ò¨dG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G (zero interest placements with QCB) increased initially owing OƒLh ΩóY ÖÑ°ùH ájGóH (ôØ°U IóFÉa ∫ó©Ã …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe iód áYOƒŸG) to lack of opportunities to place these funds. Subsequently, this floating liquidity found its way into available opportunities, ,áMÉàŸG ¢UôØdG ¢†©H áªFÉ©dG ádƒ«°ùdG √òg äóLh ºKq .∫GƒeC’G √òg Qɪãà°S’ ¢Uôa where it could fetch a positive return. However, foreign banks á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑ∏d Ió«≤e Ò¨dG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G ¿q CG ’EG .É«HÉéjk EG GóFÉYk Ö∏Œ ¿CG É¡æμÁ å«M holding of free reserve increased in the absence of potential .(2 ∫hóL) á∏ªàfi Qɪãà°SG ¢Uôa ÜÉ«Z πq X ‘ äOGR investment opportunities (Table 2).

165 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Iôq ◊G äÉ«WÉ«àM’Gh …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh ‘ äÉÑ∏≤àdG :2 ∫hóL Table 2: Fluctuations in QMR deposits and free reserve

ïjQÉàdG QMR-CB FR-CB QMR-FB FR-FB QMR-IB FR-IB Date (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏ŸÉH) ≠∏ÑŸG Amount in QR million

1/1/2011 46,825 2,263 17,221 1,341 0 1,650

1/17/2011 7,521 29,126 11,956 3,331 0 3,421

1/31/2011 9,283 11,963 5,322 7,086 2,020 7,209

2/9/2011 9,242 5,522 2,363 9,194 2,020 7,026

2/15/2011 10,231 5,549 239 9,812 620 5,947

2/28/2011 10,164 3,580 266 6,575 820 4,380

CB = conventional banks; FB= foreign banks; IB=Islamic Banks; FR= free reserve; Ió«≤e Ò¨dG äÉ«WÉ«àM’G = FR ,á«eÓ°SE’G ∑ƒæÑdG = IB ;á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG = FB ;ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG = CB QMR= QMR deposit …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh QMR =

Domestic interbank market: Interbank volumes were in 4^000 h 2^000 ÚH ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ΩÉéMC’G âMhGôJ :á«∏ëŸG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S the range of QR 2,000 – 4,000 million during Jan-Feb 2010. 500 øe πbCG ¤EG ºé◊G Gòg ¢†ØîfGh .2010 ôjGÈah ôjÉæj ∫ÓN …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e The volume reduced to below QR 500 million during Jan- k Feb 2011, along with a decline in the average number of OóY §°Sƒàe ¢VÉØîfG ™e ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæL ,2011 ôjGÈah ôjÉæj ∫ÓN ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e daily transactions, except for a few days immediately after Gòg Ò°ûjh .á°SÉ«°ùdG ‘ Ò«¨àdG â∏J »àdG ΩÉjCG á©°†H AÉæãà°SÉH ,á«eƒ«dG äÓeÉ©ŸG the policy change. The relatively high volume observed - ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ πjó©J ¤EG ΩÉjC’G √òg ∫ÓN ¬à¶MÓe â“ …òdG É«Ñ°ùfk ™ØJôŸG ºé◊G during these days indicates a readjustment of liquidity - ¢ü f ¤EG á« æÑdG äÉYƒªéŸG ‘ (ájó« àdGh á«ÑæLC’G ƒæÑdG) ádƒ«°ùdG ‘ ¢†FÉa øe from liquidity surplus (foreign and commercial) bank group ≤ μ ∏≤ ∑ to liquidity deficient (Islamic) ones. .(á«eÓ°Sq E’G ∑ƒæÑdG) ádƒ«°ùdG ‘

IóMGh á∏«∏d ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ IóFÉØdG ∫ó©ehq »eƒ«dG ºé◊G §°Sƒàe :3 ∫hóL Table 3: Daily average volume and rate of interest in overnight inter-bank market »eƒ«dG ºé G §°Sƒàe á«eƒ«dG äÓeÉ©ŸG §°Sƒàe ô¡°ûdG IóMGh á∏«∏d ∫ó©ŸG §°Sƒàe ◊ Month Average overnight rate (%) (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e) (Oó©dG) Average daily volume (QR mn.) Average daily transactions (number) Jan-10 1.76 2126.53 11

Feb-10 1.75 2873.19 13

Jun-10 1.85 1656.89 8

Sep-10 1.44 694.36 4

Dec-10 1.34 283.53 4

Jan-11 1.17 290.13 4

Feb-11 0.26 310.50 2

Foreign exchange market: Bank group-wise analysis of AGô°ûH ¢UÉÿGh á«μæÑdG äÉYƒªéŸG ≈∏Y õμJôŸG π«∏ëàdG ÚÑjq :»ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdG ¥ƒ°S the purchase of US Dollar from QCB reveals that during ,2011 ΩÉY øe ÚdhC’G øjô¡°ûdG ∫ÓN ¬fCG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe øe »μjôeC’G Q’hódG the first two months of 2011, foreign banks purchased US Dollar equivalent of QR 13 billion, whereas commercial ‘ ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 13 ∫OÉ©j Éà »μjôeC’G Q’hódG AGô°ûH á«ÑæLC’G ∑ƒæÑdG âeÉb banks purchased around QR 12 billion. It may be noted that, IQÉ°TE’G øμÁh .…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 12 ‹GƒM AGô°ûH ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG âeÉb ÚM during the year 2010, banks were net sellers of US Dollars .ô¡°TC’G º¶©e ∫ÓN »μjôeC’G Q’hódG ™«ÑH ∑ƒæÑdG âeÉb ,2010 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ,¬fCG ¤EG during most of the months. Thus, roughly 90% of the total QÉ« e 27) »LQÉÿG jƒªàdG á«Ø°üJ ´ƒª› øe %90 øe Üô j Ée ¿q CG hóÑj ,‹ÉàdÉHh unwinding of external finance (QR 27 billion) as observed in ∏ π ≤ the balance sheet analysis (Table 1) appears to be accounted ¢SCGQ äÉ≤aóJ ‘É°U ¤EG Oƒ©j (1 ∫hóL) á«fGõ«ŸG π«∏– øe ßMƒd ɪc (…ô£b ∫ÉjQ for by net capital outflows from the banking sector. .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG øe ∫ÉŸG

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 166 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Treasury bills (T-bills) and CDs ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°Th áfGõÿG ¿hPCG With the issuance of Treasury bills, CDs of maturity ójõJ »àdG ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T QGó°UEG ±É≤jEG ”q ,áfGõÿG äGóæ°S Qhó°U ™e above 91 days were discontinued by the second half k of the year. During the year, only 22 issuance were ,ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓNh .ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ Éeƒj 91 øY É¡bÉ≤ëà°SG IÎa made to the tune of QR 7.5 billion, out of which QR ,…ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 7^5 ¤EG ɡફb â∏°Uh §≤a GQGó°Uk EG 22 ∑Éæg ¿Éc 7.4 billion matured. Accordingly, the outstanding CDs ´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°T OóY H , dòd Ék ah .…ô£b ÉjQ QÉ« e 7^4 É¡æe ëà°SG stood as low as of 0.1 billion at end-December 2011 ≠∏ ∂ ≤ ∫ ∏ ≥ compared to QR 4 billion at end-December 2010. QÉ«∏e 4 `H áfQÉ≤e 2011 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ §≤a ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 0,1 áªFÉ≤dG QCB started auctioning the T-bills on behalf of the ≈∏Y OGõe AGôLEÉH ±ô°üŸG CGóHh .2010 Ȫ°ùjO ájÉ¡f ‘ …ô£b ∫ÉjQ Government from May 10, 2011. These instruments are mainly designed to manage short to medium √òg ±ó¡Jh .2011 ,ƒjÉe 10 øe AGóàHG áeƒμ◊G øY áHÉ«f áfGõÿG ¿hPCG term liquidity, and thereby support the liquidity ,πLC’G ᣰSƒàŸG ¤EG IÒ°ü≤dG ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG ¤EG ∫hC’G ΩÉ≤ŸG ‘ äGhOC’G infrastructure. During the year, T-bills worth QR 24 ¿hPCG QGó°UEG ” , É©dG ÓNh .ádƒ«°ù d á«°SÉ°Sq C’G á«æÑdG ºYO ºK øeh billion were issued across different maturities ranging Ω ∫ ∏ from 91 to 273 days. Within a span of 7 months after 91 ÚH ìhGÎJ áØ∏àfl ¥É≤ëà°SG ∫ÉLBÉH …ô£b ∫ÉjQ QÉ«∏e 24 ᪫≤H áfGõN its first issuance, the yield curve moved upward in óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ó¡°T ,∫hC’G QGó°UE’G øe ô¡°TCG 7 ¿ƒ°†Z ‘h .Éeƒjk 273h concurrence with the availability of liquidity in the k k market (Box- 5-5). .(5-5 QÉWEG) ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ôaGƒJ ™e øeGõàdÉH ÉjóYÉ°üJ ÉgÉŒG

Box 5-5: Yield curve - Based on T-bills yield áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG ¤EG kGOÉæà°SG – óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe :5-5 QÉWEG The yield curve reflects the monetary conditions of the QÉ°ùŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ¥ƒ°ùdG äÉ©bƒJh OÉ°üàbÓd ájó≤ædG ´É°VhC’G óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ¢ùμ©j economy and the expectation of the market on the future ,∂dP ÖfÉL ¤EG .É¡dÉM ≈∏Y iôNC’G äGÒ¨àŸGq AÉ≤H πX ‘ ,IóFÉØdG ô©°ùd »∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG path of interest rate, ceteris paribus. Besides, it also k k k facilitates the construction of a benchmark yield curve ¥ƒ°S ôjƒ£àd É«°SÉ°Sq CG ÉWô°T Èà©j …òdG »°SÉ«≤dG óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ™°Vh É°†jCG π¡°ùj ¬fEÉa which is a prerequisite for the development of a corporate äÉ©bƒJ π«∏– ¿CG øe ºZôdG ≈∏Yh .á∏°üdG äGP äGhOC’G øe ÉgÒZh äÉcô°ûdG äGóæ°S bond market and other related instruments. Even though it äɶMÓŸG øe Ohófi OóY ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SC’ »∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG QÉ°ùŸG ¿CÉ°ûH ¥ƒ°ùdG seems pre-mature to analyze the expectation of the market äÉeƒ ©ŸG ¢SÉ°SCG Y óFÉ©dG æëæe ™°Vƒd ádhÉfi Éæg ¿EÉa ,¬fGhC’ Ék HÉ°S hóÑj regarding the future path of interest rates based on a limited ∏ ≈∏ ≈ ∑ ≤ number of observations, an attempt is made to construct .Éeƒjk 273h 182 h 91 IÎØd áfGõÿG ¿hPCG QGó°UEG ójó÷G QÉWE’G øª°†àjhq .áMÉàŸG a yield curve based on the available information. The new πc ‘ Éeƒjk 91 É¡bÉ≤ëà°SG IÎa ≠∏ÑJ »àdG áfGõÿG ¿hPCG iƒ°S ájGóÑdG ‘ Qó°üj ⁄h framework includes issuance of T-bills with 91 days, 182 3 Éeƒjk 273 h 182 ≠∏ÑJ ¥É≤ëà°SG ∫ÉLBG äGP áfGõÿG ¿hPCG äQó°Uh .ô¡°TCG 3 IóŸ ô¡°T days, and 273 days. Initially, only 91 days maturity T-bills k were issued every month for a period of 3 months. T-bills .Éeƒj 91 ¬bÉ≤ëà°SG IÎa ≠∏ÑJ »àdG ∫hq C’G QGó°UE’G ó©H ô¡°TCG with maturities of 182 days and 273 days were issued 3 months after the first issuance of 91 days maturity.

With the introduction of T-bills, the term structure of interest ióŸG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG ¥É≤ëà°SG ∫ÉLBG πμ«g ó°UQ øμÁ ,áfGõÿG ¿hPCG ìôW ™e rate at the short- to medium-term (91 days to 273 days) is ºàj ¬fCG ÉÃh .¿hPC’G √òg ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG ∫ÓN øe (Éeƒjk 273 ¤EG 91) §°SƒàŸGh Ò°ü≤dG captured by the yields on the respective bills. Since these instruments are issued by an auction mechanism on price, it óFGƒ©dG ¢ùμ©J ¿CG ™bƒàŸG øªa ,ô©°ùdG ≈∏Y OGõŸG á«dBG ∫ÓN øe äGhOC’G √òg QGó°UEG is expected that, the derived yields on these instruments will QÉ©°SC’ »∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG QÉ°ùŸÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ÚcQÉ°ûŸG äÉ©bƒJ äGhOC’G √òg ≈∏Y reflect the expectation of the market participants on the future ¢ù£°ùZCG ‘ óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ô¡¶jh .ΩɶædG ‘ IôaƒàŸG ádƒ«°ùdG iƒà°ùeh IóFÉØdG path of interest rate as well as the level of liquidity available âfÉch .(1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG IhÓY – óYÉ°U »©«ÑW æëæe – 2011 in the system. The shape of the yield curve in August 2011 - a ≈ normal upward sloping curve appears to depict the liquidity .(2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ȪàÑ°S-¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T ∫ÓN ádóà©e á≤£æe ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG premium assumed by the market (Chart 1). Liquidity was in ɪé°ùæek »≤H ióŸG Ò°ü≤dG ¥É≤ëà°S’G πLCÉH ¢UÉÿG óFÉ©dG ¿q CG hóÑj ,∂dòd Ék ≤ah a moderate zone during August-September 2011(Chart 2). …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG á°SÉ«°ùH á°UÉÿG äGQÉ°TE’G øY Ó°†ak ,ádƒ«°ù d óà©ŸG iƒà°ùŸG ™e Accordingly the yield at the shorter term maturity appears ∏ ∫ have remained in consonance with the moderate level of ≈∏Y óFÉ©dG ™ØJQG 2011 ôHƒàcCG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¢VÉØîfG ™eh .IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ liquidity as well as the central bank policy signals on interest .óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ‘ óYÉ°U π' «e' ¤EG iOCG ɇ OÉM πμ°ûH Éeƒjk 182 IóŸ áfGõÿG ¿hPCG rate. With lowering of liquidity in October 2011, the yield á°UÉÿG Ωƒ°üÿGh ∫ƒ°UC’G πμ«g ‘ äGÒ¨àdG ¿ƒμJ ób ,ádƒ«°ùdG IhÓY ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉHh for 182 days T-bills increased sharply resulting in an upward k k ‘bent’ in the yield curve. In addition to the liquidity premium, .≈æëæŸG πμ°T ‘ É«°ù«FQ GQhO âÑ©d ób ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ πLC’G IÒ°ü≤dG ∫GƒeC’ÉH changes in the asset liability structure of short-term funds in ¤EG Ȫ°ùjO ô¡°T øe ∫hC’G ´ƒÑ°SC’G ‘ ÈcCG πμ°ûH ádƒ«°ùdG iƒà°ùe ¢VÉØîfG iOCG óbh the banking sector might also have played a major role in óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe πμ°T ¿CG hóÑj ,ΩÉY πμ°ûHh .2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘ óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe ´ÉØJQG driving the shape of the curve. Further low level of liquidity ƒ°UC’G «g ‘ äÉcôëàdG øY Ó°†ak ,‘ô°üŸG ´É£ dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ™°Vh ¢ù ©j towards the first week of December resulted in an elevated ∫ πμ ≤ μ flat yield curve in December 2011. Overall, it appears that, .IÒ°ü≤dG ¥É≤ëà°S’G ∫ÉLBG äGP Ωƒ°üÿGh the shape of the yield curve reflects the liquidity position of the banking sector as well as the movements in asset liability structure in the short-term time buckets.

167 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

óFÉ©dG ≈æëæe – áfGõÿG ¿hPCG :1 ÊÉ«H º°SQ 65 ΩɶædG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG :2 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Chart 1: Treasury bills – yield curve Chart 2: Liquidity in the system65

3   2.5  2  454   Q R

L  $XJ O

1.5 O L

E  1  45   6HS  45  0.5  45  2FW  0 45 'HF  91 182 273                      $ 0         - - 2 6 ' $ 1 0 S X X D H U X F H R \ O Q D S W F J Y \ 9-Aug-2011 6-Sep-2011 4-Oct-2011 6-Dec-2011

Interbank market ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S The activities in the interbank market increased during .ΩÉ©dG øe ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée ¥ƒ°S ‘ •É°ûædG OGORG the second half of the year. The volume and value of áfQÉ≤ŸÉH ÊÉãdG ∞°üædG ‘ ¬àª«bh ∫hGóàdG ºéM ÉÑjôk ≤J ∞YÉ°†J ó≤a transactions almost doubled in the second half as äÉ¡«LƒàdG ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH ᣰûfC’G ‘ IOÉjõdG ¢ùμ©Jh .∫hC’G ∞°üædG ™e compared to the first. The increase in interbank activities q reflects the policy directives taken during the first half øe ∫hC’G ∞°üædG ∫ÓN ÉgOɪàYG ” »àdGh ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdÉH á°UÉÿG which helped to improve the liquidity management by â∏μ°Th .‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG IQGOEG Ú°ù– ≈∏Y óYÉ°S ɇ ΩÉ©dG the banking sector. More than 50% of the interbank å«M øe ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH äÉ≤Ø°üdG øe %50 øe ÌcCG IóMGh á∏«∏d ¢Vhô≤dG deals were overnight borrowings, in both value and IóFÉØdG ô©°ùd íLôŸG §°SƒàŸG ô¡XCGh .(8-5 ∫hóL) ºé◊Gh ᪫≤dG volume terms (Table 5-8). The weighted average interest ôjGÈa ‘h .¥É≤ëà°S’G äGÎa ™e ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæLk ájóYÉ°üJ ácôM rate showed upward movement along with maturity. In ¢†Øîæe iƒà°ùe ¤EG ƒæÑdG ÚH IóMGh á « d IóFÉØdG ô©°S §Ñg ,2011 February 2011, overnight interbank rate fell to a low of ∑ ∏ ∏ 0.15% after the first policy directive. The average rate §°Sƒàe ≠∏Hh .á°SÉ«°ùdÉH ¢UÉÿG ∫hC’G ¬«LƒàdG ≥«Ñ£J ó©H %0^15 ≠∏H stood at 0.25% till July 2011 due to surplus liquidity AGóàHGh .á°†FÉØdG ádƒ«°ùdG ±hôX ÖÑ°ùH 2011 ƒ«dƒj ≈àM %0^25 ô©°ùdG conditions. From August onwards, the interest rate ÖæL ¤EG ÉÑæLk ájóYÉ°üJ ácôM IóFÉØdG QÉ©°SCG äó¡°T ,¢ù£°ùZCG ô¡°T øe showed an upward movement in tandem with lowering ,2011 Ȫ°ùjO ‘h .(9-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) ¥ƒ°ùdG ‘ ádƒ«°ùdG ¢VÉØîfG ™e market liquidity (Chart 5-9). In December 2011, the ™FGOh ≈∏Y IóFÉØdG ô©°ùH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ %0^75 øe πbCG ô©°ùdG §°Sƒàe πX average rate remained just below 0.75%, the QMR ÉY °ûH ƒæÑdG ÚH ᣰûfC’G â°ù Y óbh .…ô£ dG …ó ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG deposit rate. Overall, interbank activities reflected robust Ω πμ ∑ μ ≤ ≤ market conditions during the year. .ΩÉ©dG ∫ÓN ájƒ≤dG ¥ƒ°ùdG ´É°VhCG ¥ƒ°S ‘ íLôŸG §°SƒàŸG ó©eh ºéM :9-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ ¥É≤ëà°S’G äGÎa Ö°ùëH ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH äÓeÉ©ŸG ™jRƒJ :8-5 ∫hóL ∫ Table 5-8: Maturity distribution of (IóMGh á∏«∏d) ∑ƒæÑdG ÚH Ée Chart 5-9: Volume and weighted average rate in inter-bank transactions the Inter-bank market (overnight)

äÓeÉ©ŸG OóY §°SƒàŸG ∫ó©e 3,500 1.80 No. ᪫≤dG Value íLôŸG 1.60 Transaction WAR 3,000 1.40

´ƒªéŸG ¤EG ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG n 2,500 Percentage to Total 1.20 2,000 1.00 IóMGh á∏«d

58.1 50.9 0.49 ercent Overnight 1,500 0.80 P R millio

Q 1,000 0.60 ΩÉjCG 7-2 29.7 32.3 0.07 2-7 days 0.40 500 0.20 Ωƒj 30-8 5.6 8.2 0.66 8-30 days 0 0.00 29 2 3 31 3 2 1 28 2 1 2 1 28 2 29 2 2 30 3 ------Ma J Fe Ju A J Ma - - - - - ƒj 90-31 - a Ω u S J N De O 5.6 7.4 1.03 A p n l n ul

31-90 days b ep r o u ct r y c g v Ωƒj 90 øe ÌcCG 1.0 1.2 1.10 Above 90 days Volume WAR (Right scale)

65 65 Measured as free reserves ±ô°üàq ∏d á∏HÉb IôM äÉ«WÉ«àMG É¡fCG ≈∏Y É¡°SÉ«b ºàj

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 168 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Foreign exchange liquidity »ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdG ádƒ«°S The demand for foreign exchange liquidity surpassed ±ô°üdG ¥ƒ°S ‘ ¢Vô©dG »ÑæLC’G ó≤ædÉH ádƒ«°ùdG ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG RhÉŒ the supply in the foreign exchange market, resulting in ô£b ±ô°üe πÑb øe »μjôeC’G Q’hódÉH ±É°Um ™«H ¤EG iOCG ɇ ,»ÑæLC’G net sale of US Dollars by QCB in almost all the months .(10-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ) 2011 ÉY ÓN ÉÑjôk J ô¡°TC’G áaÉc ‘ …õcôŸG during 2011 (Chart 5-10). As discussed earlier, the Ω ∫ ≤ outflow of speculative capital from the system and an øe áHQÉ°†ŸG ∫GƒeC’G ¢ShDhQ ≥aóJ iOCG ÉÃQ ,≥HÉ°S âbh ‘ Éæ°ûbÉf ɪch increased demand for foreign currency credit, in addition ¤EG áaÉ°VE’ÉH ,á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG IOÉjRh ΩɶædG to other balance of payments transaction might have ≈∏Y Ö∏£dG IOÉjR ¤EG äÉYƒaóŸG ¿Gõ«Ã á°UÉÿG iôNC’G äÓeÉ©ŸG lead to increase in demand for US Dollars. .»μjôeC’G Q’hódG

Chart 5-10: Monthly net sale/purchase of US πÑb øe kÉjô¡°T »μjôeC’G Q’hódG AGô°T/™«H ‘É°U :10-5 ÊÉ«H º°SQ Dollars from QCB …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe

2 0 May Ap Aug'11 N Feb' Ju Se Dec'11D J Ma Jun Oc ul'11u a pr'11 ug'11 ec'11 o n p' t'11 t -2 v'11 ' r ' 11 11 ' 11 11 ' 11 11 1 -4 1 -6 -8 -10 -12 -14 -16 -18 -20

Regulatory infrastructure ᫪«¶æàdG á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG The three major regulators in Qatar are the Qatar …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ô£b ‘ á«°ù«FôdG áKÓãdG ᫪«¶æàdG äÉ£∏°ùdG º°†Jq Central Bank (QCB), the Qatar Financial Markets ô£b ±ô°üe ƒ jh .IQÉéàdGh ɪYC’G IQGRhh á«dÉŸG ¥Gƒ°SCÓd ô£b áÄ«gh Authority (QFMA) and the Ministry of Business and Ω ≤ ∫ Trade (MBT). QCB regulates and supervises the banks ,¬∏Ñb øe á°üNôŸG á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸGh ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y ±Gô°TE’ÉH …õcôŸG and financial entities licensed by it as also formulates ¥Gƒ°SCÓd ô£b áÄ«g Ωƒ≤Jh .É¡JQGOEGh ájó≤ædG á°SÉ«°ùdG áZÉ«°üH Ωƒ≤j ɪc and conducts monetary policy. The QFMA is the regulator of the securities market, while the insurance ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b º«¶æJ ºàj ɪæ«H á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G ¥ƒ°S ≈∏Y ±Gô°TE’ÉH á«dÉŸG business is regulated by the MBT. A new financial and ∫ɪYCÓd ójóL õcôe ¢ù«°SCÉJ ” óbh .IQÉéàdGh ∫ɪYC’G IQGRh πÑb øe business centre – the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) – ÉY ‘ ô£b ádhO áeƒ M Ñb øe , ɪ d ô£b õcôe ƒgh ,á«dÉŸGh ájQÉéàdG was established by the government of Qatar in 2005 to Ω μ π ∫ ∏ attract international financial services and multinational äÉ«°ùæ÷G IOó©àŸG äÉcô°ûdGh á«dhódG á«dÉŸG äÉeóÿG ÜÉ£≤à°S’ 2005 corporations to grow and develop the market for º«¶æJ áÄ«g ó©Jh .á≤£æŸG ‘ á«dÉŸG äÉeóÿG ¥ƒ°S ôjƒ£Jh ᫪æàd financial services in the region. The QFC Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) is the independent regulatory É¡°ù«°SCÉJ ”q óbh .õcôª∏d á∏≤à°ùŸG ᫪«¶æàdG áÄ«¡dG ∫ɪ∏d ô£b õcôe body of QFC. It has been established to regulate firms 66.¬dÓN øe hCG õcôŸG πNGO á«dÉe äÉeóN Ωóq ≤J »àdG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG º«¶æàd 66 that conduct financial services in or from the QFC . ô£b ‘ »ª«¶æàdG «¡dG ¿CG ßMÓj ,áMÉàŸG äÉeƒ ©ŸG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGhk Based on available information, It is observed that the πμ ∏ regulatory structure is Qatar is typically in line those å«M É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG ∫hO ‘ IóFÉ°ùdG πcÉ«¡dG ™e ΩAÓàj prevalent in MENA countries where the central bank is ,∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y á«HÉbôdGh ᫪«¶æàdG áÄ«¡dG IOÉY …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG Èà©j typically the regulator of banks; the other main sectors being regulated (and supervised) by separate agencies, πÑb øe É¡«∏Y ±Gô°TE’Gh iôNC’G á«°ù«FôdG äÉYÉ£≤dG º«¶æJ …ôéj ɪæ«H most often outside the central bank (Table 5-9). ºbQ ∫hóL) ¿É«MC’G º¶©e ‘ …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG êQÉN á∏°üØæe ä’Éch .(9-5

66 66 The central bank will regulate the insurance sector under a proposed new law which is 2012 ‘ IQGó°UG ™bƒàŸG ¿ƒfÉ≤dG Qhó°U ÚM ‘ ∂∏dPh ÚeCÉàdG ´É£b ≈∏Y áHÉbôdÉH Ωƒ≤«°S …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG expected to be issued in 2012.

169 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Table 5-9: Regulatory and supervisory structures §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG ∫hO ‘ á«aGô°TE’Gh ᫪«¶æàdG πcÉ«¡dG :9-5 ∫hóL in MENA countries67 67 É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG øª°V …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG êQÉN Country/ Within central bank Outside central bank Supervised ™°VÉÿG •É°ûædG/ó∏ÑdG activity ±Gô°TEÓd B BS BI SI BSI B S I SI BSI

Algeria ôFGõ÷G √√√

Bahrain øjôëÑdG √

Djibouti »JƒÑ«L √

Egypt ô°üe √√√

Iran ¿GôjEG √√√

Iraq ¥Gô©dG √√√

Jordan ¿OQC’G √√√

Kuwait âjƒμdG √√√

Lebanon ¿ÉæÑd √√

Libya É«Ñ«d √ á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G AÉæãà°SÉH) Oman ¿ÉªY √ (á«eƒq μ◊G √ √ (except gov. securities)

Mauritania É«fÉàjQƒe √√

Morocco Üô¨ŸG √√√

Qatar ô£b √ √

Saudi Arabia ájOƒ©°ùdG √√

Sudan ¿GOƒ°ùdG √√√

√ Syria √√ ÉjQƒ°S (shared)

Tunisia ¢ùfƒJ √√√

UAE IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G √

Yemen øª«dG √√√

Total ´ƒªéŸG 17 1 1 1 13 14 1

B=Banking; S=Securities; I=Insurance ÚeCÉà`dG =I ;á«dÉŸG ¥GQhC’G =S ;‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG =B

67 67 The list of MENA countries is as per IMF (Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East & ¥ô°ûdG ,»ª«∏bE’G OÉ°üàb’G ¥ÉaBG) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U ∞«æ°üJ Ö°ùëH É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG ∫hO áëF’ Central Asia) classification. .(≈£°SƒdG É«°SBGh §°ShC’G

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 170 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

As part of the move towards strengthening the •ƒëàdÉH á°UÉN IOó©àe äÉ°SÉ«°S »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO äóªàYG regulatory infrastructure, several macroprudential òg ±ó¡Jh .᫪«¶æàdG á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG õjõ©àd É¡«©°S QÉWEG ‘ » dG policies have been undertaken by GCC countries. In √ q ∏μ general, such policies seek to address two specific ôWÉîŸÉH ¿É≤∏©àj øjOóq fi øjó©H á÷É©e ¤EG ΩÉY πμ°ûH äÉ°SÉ«°ùdG dimensions of systemic risk – the time dimension and ∫hC’G ó©ÑdG ¢ùμ©jh .»©£≤ŸG ó©ÑdGh »æeõdG ó©ÑdG ɪgh ’CG – á«eɶædG the cross-sectional dimension. The former reflects the amplifying mechanism that operates within the financial OÉ°üàb’Gh ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG ÚHh ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG øª°V πª©J »àdG º«î°†àdG á«dBG system as also between the financial system and the real IOÉjR ¤EG ÚjOÉ°üàb’G AÓcƒdG π«e ≈∏Y á«dB’G √òg óæà°ùJh .»≤«≤◊G economy. This mechanism is based on the tendency ‘ ôWÉîŸG ÖæŒh á«dÉŸG IQhódG ‘ IôØ£dG IÎa ‘ ôWÉîª d ¢Vô©àdG of economic agents to increase their risk exposures ∏ in an upturn of a financial cycle and to become highly ≈∏Y ÊÉãdG ó©ÑdG óªà©j ,iôNCG á«MÉf øe .…OÉ°üàb’G ™LGÎdG äÉbhCG risk-averse in a downturn. The latter, on the other ≈æ©Ã (§HGÎdGh ,á°VÉ©à°S’Gh ,á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG ºéM) ôWÉîŸG õcôJ hand, depends on risk concentration (size of financial institutions, substitutability, interconnectedness) in the ΩɶædG QGô≤à°SG áYõYR ¤EG …ODƒj ¿CG øμÁ iÈc á«dÉe á°ù°SDƒe QÉ«¡fG ¿CG sense that the collapse of large financial institution ¢ù∏› ∫hO ÈY »∏μdG •ƒëàdG ÒHGóJ º¶©e ∞∏àîJ ,QÉWE’G Gòg ‘ .‹ÉŸG can destabilize the rest of the financial system. Viewed hóL) á«æeõdG äGÎØdG ±ÓàNG ™e hC’G É ŸG ‘ »é« ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG in this light, most macroprudential measures across ∫ ∫ Ω ≤ ∏ GCC countries are primarily time-varying in nature ób ¿Gó∏ÑdG øe ójó©dG ¿CG ¤EG IQÉ°TE’G øμÁ ,¥É«°ùdG Gòg ‘h .(10-5 (Table 5-10). Contextually, it might be mentioned ó©ÑdG øe ó◊G ¤EG ±ó¡J »∏μdG •ƒëàdÉH á°UÉN ÒHGóJ GôNDƒek â∏NOCG that several countries have recently introduced macroprudential measures aimed at limiting the á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒª∏d ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ ≈∏Y áaÉ°VEG) Gô°ùjƒ°S ‘ ɪ«°S’h ,»©£≤ŸG cross-section dimension, most notably in Switzerland ,∑ƒæÑ∏d ájƒfÉãdG Ωƒ°üÿG ≈∏Y áÑjô°V) ÉjQƒch (á«eɶædGq ᫪gC’Gq äGP (capital surcharge for systemically important financial .(¥É ëà°S’G äGÎa ¤EG áÑjô°†dG ó©e OÉæà°SG ™e institutions) and Korea (a levy on non-core liabilities of ≤ ∫ banks, with the levy rate depending on maturity).

The banking sector in Qatar is subject to supervisory á«ÑàμŸG áHÉbôdG øª°†àJq á«aGô°TEG áHÉbôd ô£b ‘ ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG ™°†îj oversight, comprising of on-sight inspection and off- .äɪ« ©àdG øe á eÉ°T áYƒªéà ƒæÑdG ójhõJ ”q óbh .á«fGó«ŸG áHÉbôdGh sight surveillance. Banks have been provided with a ∏ ∏ ∑ comprehensive set of instructions. Updations and ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y ∑ƒæÑ∏d äɪ«∏©àdG √òg ≈∏Y äÓjó©J hCG äÉaÉ°VEG ájCG π°SôJh modifications to these instructions are communicated .(6-5 QÉWEG) º¶àæe to banks on a regular basis (Box 5-6).

Box 5-6: Major regulatory developments during 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN á«°ù«FôdGq ᫪«¶æàdGq äGQƒ£àdGq :6-5 QÉWEG During 2011

Limits on placement of funds under required reserves :(ôjÉæj) »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G QÉWEG ‘ ∫GƒeC’ÉH ®ÉØàM’G ≈∏Y á°VhôØŸG Oƒ«≤dG (January): Banks were advised that under QMR deposits RhÉéàJ ’CG ,´GójE’G äGOÉ¡°Th …ô£≤dG …ó≤ædG ¥ƒ°ùdG ™FGOh QÉWEG ‘ ,∑ƒæÑdG øe Ö∏Wo and CDs, the total funds deployed should not exceed ô£b ±ô°üe iód ƒæÑdG ¬H ßØà– …òdG »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G áYOƒŸG GƒeC’G the required reserves maintained by banks with QCB and ∑ ∫ calculated on a monthly basis. .…ô¡°T ¢SÉ°SCG ≈∏Y Ö°ùàëŸGh …õcôŸG

Real estate finance (January): The total ceiling of real …GQÉ≤©dG πjƒªàdG ôWÉîà ¢UÉÿG ∞≤°ùdG ´ƒª› ™aQ ”q :(ôjÉæj) …QÉ≤©dG πjƒªàdG estate finance risk was raised to 150% of the bank’s tier-I ‘ á≤Ñ£e âfÉc »àdG %100 áÑ°ùf øe ’óHk ,∂æÑ∏d »°SÉ°SC’G ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ øe %150 ¤EG capital, instead of 100% earlier .≥HÉ°S âbh Islamic branches of conventional banks (February): ,ájÒ°†– äÉYɪàLG IóY ó≤Y ó©H :(ôjGÈa) ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑ∏d á«eÓ°SE’G ´hôØdG After holding several preparatory meetings, QCB advised ∞bƒàdG á«eÓ°SEG ´hôa É¡jód »àdG ájó«∏≤àdG ∑ƒæÑdG øe …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Ö∏W conventional banks that have Islamic branches to stop opening new Islamic branches, accepting Islamic deposits äÉ«∏ªY ÒaƒJ ΩóYh á«eÓ°SE’G ™FGOƒdG ∫ƒÑb ΩóYh IójóL á«eÓ°SEG ´hôa íàa øY and dispensing new Islamic finance operations. .Iójó÷G »eÓ°SE’G πjƒªàdG

Migrating to Basel III by banks (February): In line with its äGOGó©à°S’G ™e É«°TÉ“k :(ôjGÈa) ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe 3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe ≥«Ñ£J preparations for migrating to Basel III, QCB advised banks á°SGQO ∑ƒæÑdG øe …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Ö∏W ,3 ∫RÉH äÉÑ∏£àe ≥«Ñ£àH á°UÉÿG to study the principles and standards of Basel III and furnish IOóëŸG IóŸG ÓN …õcôŸG ±ô°üŸG ¤EG º¡JɶMÓe Ëó Jh 3 RÉH ÒjÉ©eh ÇOÉÑe their comments to the central bank within a stipulated time ∫ ≤ ∫ so as to enable QCB to coordinate with national banks in .¿CÉ°ûdG Gòg ‘ á«æWƒdG ∑ƒæÑdG ™e ≥«°ùæàdG øe ±ô°üŸG Úμªàd ∂dPh this respect.

Granting of foreign currency credit (March): As regards á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG íæà ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ :(¢SQÉe) á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH ¢Vhô≤dG íæe granting credit facilities in foreign currencies, banks were äÉLÉ«àMG ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk äÓ«¡°ùàdG √òg πãe íæe ∑ƒæÑdG øe Ö∏Wo ,á«ÑæLC’G äÓª©dÉH advised that such facilities should be based on the customer’s k actual needs according to purpose of granting the credit QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e ,á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG íæe øe ¢Vô¨∏d É≤ah á«∏©ØdG AÓª©dG facilities, and take into account several factors including the ÖfÉL øeh .OGó°ùdG QOÉ°üeh AÓª©∏d ájó≤ædG äÉ≤aóàdG ∂dP ‘ Éà IóY πeGƒY

171 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

customers’ cash flows, sources of repayment. On the ,¬H á°UÉÿG Ò©°ùàdGh ¿ÉªàF’G äÉ°SÉ«°S ™e É«°TÉ“k ôeC’G Gòg ¿ƒμj ¿CG »¨Ñæj ,∂æÑdG part of the bank, this should be in line with its credit and / IóFÉØdG ô©°S ‘ äGƒéØdG ôWÉfl IQGOEG ≈∏Y áÑJΟG ÖbGƒ©dG QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e pricing policies, taking into account the consequences on management of the interest/return rate gap risk, foreign .ìƒàØŸG õcôŸG ôWÉflh »ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdG QÉ©°SCG ôWÉflh óFÉ©dG exchange rate risk and open position risk.

Credit risk management by banks (March): QCB advised øe …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe Ö∏W :(¢SQÉe) ∑ƒæÑdG πÑb øe á«fɪàF’G ôWÉîŸG IQGOEG banks to improve their credit risk management by focusing :»∏j Ée ≈∏Y õ«cÎdG ∫ÓN øe ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl IQGOEG Ú°ù– ∑ƒæÑdG on the following: Responsibilities of Board of Directors: The Board of Directors ≈∏Y á≤aGƒŸG øY ’ƒÄ°ùek ¿ƒμj ¿CG IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› ≈∏Y »¨Ñæj :IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› äÉ«dhDƒ°ùe should be responsible for approving the credit risk strategy . æÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl äÉ°SÉ«°Sh á«é«JGΰSEG and policies of the bank ∂ Responsibilities of executive management: The executive á«é«JGΰSEG ò«ØæJ øY ádƒÄ°ùe ájò«ØæàdG IQGOE’G ¿ƒμJ :ájò«ØæàdG IQGOE’G äÉ«dhDƒ°ùe management is responsible for implementing the credit risk strategy and policies approved by the Board of Directors .IQGOE’G ¢ù∏› É¡«∏Y ≥aGh »àdG ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl äÉ°SÉ«°Sh Credit risk management: It includes measures towards IQGOEGh º««≤Jh ¢SÉ«bh ójó– ¤EG á«eGôdG ÒHGóàdG πª°ûJh :¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl IQGOEG identifying, measuring, assessing, managing and controlling .¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉîŸ æÑdG ¢Vô©J áÑbGôeh the bank’s credit risk exposures ∂ Besides, the guidelines also lay down systems and íæà á°UÉÿG äGAGôL’GhE ᪶fC’G É°†jk CG á«¡«LƒàdG ÇOÉÑŸG ™°†J ,∂dP ÖfÉL ¤EG procedures for credit granting and renewing .¿ÉªàF’G ójóŒh

Credit Reports of Qatar Credit Bureau (March): Prior /íæe πÑb :(¢SQÉe) á«fɪàF’Gq äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ô£b õcôà á°UÉÿG ¿ÉªàF’G ôjQÉ≤J to granting/renewing/scheduling or restructuring credit ∫ƒ°ü◊G ∑ƒæÑdG ≈∏Y Ú©àjq ,á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG ádhóL IOÉYEG hCG ádhóL/ójóŒ facilities, banks should obtain a credit report from Qatar Credit Bureau about any customer in Qatar so as to maintain ∂dPh ô£b ‘ π«ªY …CG ∫ƒM á«fɪàF’Gq äÉeƒ∏©ª∏d ô£b õcôe øe ÊɪàFG ôjô≤J ≈∏Y their credit risk at the lowest acceptable level. .∫ƒÑ≤e iƒà°ùe ≈fOCG óæY ¿ÉªàF’G ôWÉfl ≈∏Y ®ÉØë∏d Credit facilities against salary (April): QCB imposed limits ô£b ±ô°üe ¢Vôa :(πjôHCG) ÖJGôdG πHÉ≤e áMƒæªŸG á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG on both the amount and the price as regards credit facilities :ÖJGôdG πHÉ≤e áMƒæªŸG á«fɪàF’G äÓ«¡°ùàdG ô©°Sh ≠∏Ñe øe πc ≈∏Y GOƒ«bk …õcôŸG against salary. For Qatari citizens, the maximum limit was placed at QR 2 million (with a maximum period of 6 years); …ô£b ∫ÉjQ ¿ƒ«∏e 2 `ƒëæH ≈°übC’G ó◊G ójó– ” ,Újô£≤dG ÚæWGƒŸG ¤EG áÑ°ùædÉÑa for non-Qatari residents, the maximum limit was placed at QR ó◊G ójó– ”q ,Újô£≤dG ÒZ Úª«≤ª∏d áÑ°ùædÉHh ,(äGƒæ°S 6 ÉgÉ°übCG IÎa ™e) 400,000 (with a maximum period of 4 years). The maximum ójó– ”q óbh .(äGƒæ°S 4 ÉgÉ°übCG Ióe ™e) …ô£b ∫ÉjQ 400,000 ƒëæH ≈°übC’G rate of interest was fixed at QCB lending rate plus 1.5% .%1,5 óFGR ±ô°üŸÉH ¢UÉÿG ¢VGôbE’G ô©°ùH IóFÉØdG ∫ó©Ÿ ≈°übC’G ó◊G Provision against bad debts (September): QCB advised á«fÉμeEÉH ∑ƒæÑdG …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe ≠∏HCG :(ȪàÑ°S) áehó©ŸG ¿ƒjódG äÉ°ü°üfl banks that they may exclude bad debts, which the bank ≠∏ÑJ »àdGh É¡æe AõL hCG πμH ÖdÉ£j ∂æÑdG ∫Gõj ’ »àdG áehó©ŸG ¿ƒjódG OÉ©Ñà°SG continues to claim in whole or a portion of the bad debt and k for which a 100% provision is made, from the balance sheet. ¿ƒjódG √òg πé°ùJ ¿CG Öéj ,∂dòd É≤ah .á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG øe %100 É¡JÉ°ü°üfl Accordingly, these excluded bad debts should be recorded in øe ≥FÉKƒdGh ájóæà°ùŸG ¥GQhC’G ™«ªL ßØ– ¿CG »¨Ñæjh πé°S ‘ Ió©Ñà°ùŸGh áehó©ŸG a registry and all documentary papers and documentations ÚæeÉ°†dGh AÓª©dG øe ¿ƒjódG √òg π«°ü–h áÑdÉ£ŸG ‘ ∑ƒæÑdG ≥M ≈∏Y ®ÉØ◊G πLCG should be archived in order to keep the right of banks to claim OÉ©Ñà°SG ø Áh .áeRÓdG á«fƒfÉ dG äGAGôLE’G PÉîJG dP ‘ Éà ,áæ ªŸG FÉ°SƒdG H and collect these debts from the customers and guarantors μ ≤ ∂ μ π πμ by all possible means, including taking legal actions. The ¿ƒjO É¡fCG ≈∏Y É¡Ø«æ°üJ øe ÌcCG hCG áæ°S ó©H á«eƒª©dG á«fGõ«ŸG øe áehó©ŸG ¿ƒjódG bad debts may be excluded from the balance sheet only .óFGƒØdG hCG Oó°ùŸG ÒZ »°ù«FôdG ≠∏Ѫ∏d ájƒ°ùJ …CG ∑Éæg øμj ⁄h áehó©e after one or more years since they were classified as bad debts and there had been no settlement of the outstanding principal or interest.

Risk reserve (December): The risk reserve balance to be %2,0 ¤EG %1,5 øe ôWÉîŸG »WÉ«àMG ó«°UQ IOÉjR :(Ȫ°ùjO) ôWÉîŸG »WÉ«àMG increased from 1.5% to 2.0% effective from the financial year øe GQÉÑàYGk ,%2^5 ¤EG ∂dP ó©Hh ,2012 ΩÉY ‘ á«¡àæŸG á«dÉŸG áæ°ùdG øe GQÉÑàYGk ending 2012 and subsequently to 2.5%, effective from the financial year ending 2013. .2013 ΩÉY ‘ á«¡àæŸG á«dÉŸG áæ°ùdG

As part of a move towards better central bank CGóH ,á«aÉØ°ûdGh π°UGƒàdG Ú°ùëàd …õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe »©°S QÉWEG ‘ communication and transparency, Qatar Central Bank ÚH øeh .2010 ΩÉY øe AGóàHG ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ô°ûæH ±ô°üŸG has initiated the publication of a Financial Stability %40 Èà©J ,‹ÉŸG QGô à°S’G ƒM á à°ùe ôjQÉ J QGó°UEÉH ƒ j Gók H 86 Review, beginning 2010. Among the 86 countries with ≤ ∫ ∏≤ ≤ Ω ≤ ∏ independent financial stability reports, 40% are from the ≈∏Y …hÉ°ùàdÉH »bÉÑdG ´Rƒàjhq ,áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G øe ∫hódG √òg øe advanced economies; the remaining are more or less É«≤jôaEG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG á≤£æe ¿Gó∏H GóY Ée ,á«≤ÑàŸG ≥WÉæŸG equally distributed among remaining regions, except for ∫ƒM á∏≤à°ùe ôjQÉ≤J ô°ûæH ájõcôe ±QÉ°üe áKÓK iƒ°S Ωƒ≤j ’ å«M MENA countries, where only three central banks publish .(11-5 hóL) ‹ÉŸG QGô à°S’G independent financial stability reports (Table 5-11). ∫ ≤

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 172 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ¤EG á°UÉN IQÉ°TEG ™e »∏μdG •ƒëàdG á°SÉ«°S :10-5 ∫hóL Table 5-10: Macroprudential policy with special reference to GCC countries IGOC’G ∞jô©àdG ó∏ÑdG Tool Definition Country ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ±ƒ≤°ùdG .‹ÉŸG õcôŸG QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e ,¿ÉªàF’G ᫪c ≈∏Y Oƒ«b ¿ÉªàF’G ƒ‰ ≈∏Y á°VhôØŸGh Limits on quantity of credit, taking into account the bal- .πjRGÈdG ,âjƒμdG Kuwait, Brazil Bank-specific caps on ance sheet profile credit growth äGQÉeE’Gh ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG á ªŸGh ô£bh ¿ÉªY áæ£ °Sh âjƒ dGh øjôëÑdG .Iô≤à°ùe QOÉ°üe øe ¢Vhô≤dG πjƒ“ ¿Éª°V ¤EG ∂æÑdG πjƒ“ ±ó¡j μ∏ ∏ μ ™FGOƒdG ¤EG ¢Vhô≤dG óM Bank funding target to secure that loans are funded with .É«°ù«fhófGh IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG Loan-to-deposit limit stable sources Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar Saudi Arabia, UAE, Indo- nesia hCG) ìƒæªŸG ¢Vô≤dG ¤EG π°UCÓd IQó≤ŸG ᪫≤dG ‹ÉªLEG áÑ°ùf ≈∏Y Oƒ«b á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ,ô£b ,âjƒμdG ,(…QÉ≤©dG ¢VGôbE’G ≈∏Y ¢VhôØe ∞≤°S) øjôëÑdG ÓN É¡£Ñ°V ºàjh âbƒdG ±ÓàNÉH àîJ »àdG ᪫ dG ¤EG ¢Vô dG áÑ°ùf ᪫≤dG ¤EG ¢Vô≤dG áÑ°ùf ∫ ∞∏ ≤ ≤ .ÉjQƒch ,(…QÉéàdG / »æμ°ùdG AÉæÑ∏d ¢VGôbE’G ≈∏Y ∞≤°S) IóëàŸG Loan-to-value (LTV) .(IQhódG Bahrain (cap on real estate lending), Kuwait, Qatar, UAE ratio Limits on percentage of total appraised value of an (cap on lending for residential/commercial construction), asset to the loan provided (or, time-varying LTV that is Korea (adjusted over the cycle á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ,ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG á ªŸG ,ô£b ,âjƒ dG ,øjôëÑdG ¡à°ùŸG Nód ájƒÄŸG áÑ°ùædG ÓN øe ¢VGôbE’G Y á°VhôØe Oƒ«b μ∏ μ πNódG ¤EG ¿ƒjódG áÑ°ùf ∂∏ π ∫ ≈∏ ¿ƒ°VÉ≤àj øjòdG ¢UÉî°TCÓd á«°üî°ûdG ¢Vhô≤dG ≈∏Y ∞≤°S) IóëàŸG Debt-to-income (DTI) .‹ÉªLE’G …ô¡°ûdG .ÉjQƒch ,(ÖJGhôdG ratio Limits imposed on lending through the percentage of consumer’s monthly gross income Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE (cap on per- sonal loans to salaried individuals), Korea ¢UÉÿG ¢VGôbE’G OhóM QÉÑàY’G ‘ òNC’G ™e ,á«ÑæLC’G á∏ª©dÉH ¢VGôbE’G ≈∏Y á°VhôØŸG Oƒ«≤dG »ÑæLC’G ±ô°üdÉH .»ÑæLC’G ó≤ædÉH ¢UÉÿG ≥HÉ£àdG ΩóY .ÉjQɨægh ô£b Foreign exchange Limits on lending in foreign currency, taking into account Qatar, Hungary lending limits FX mismatches IQhódG/¿ÉªàF’G IQhO ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àe ‘ äGÒ«¨àdG ∫ÉŸG ¢SCGQ äÉÑ∏£àe .ájOÉ°üàb’G .πjRGÈdG ,ájOƒ©°ùdG Capital requirements Capital requirement changes depending on the credit/ Saudi Arabia, Brazil economic cycle /á«μ«eÉæjódG äÉ°ü°üîŸG ôFÉ°ùÿG ≈∏Y AÉæH ∑ƒæÑdÉH á°UÉÿG ¢Vhô≤dG ôFÉ°ùN äÉ°ü°üfl áeÉ©dG äÉ°ü°üîŸG .ájQÉ«©ŸG ¢Vhô≤dG äÉ°ü°üfl/á©bƒàŸG á«∏Ñ≤à°ùŸG .É«fÉÑ°SCG ,IóëàŸG á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ,ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ,ô£b ,¿ÉªY ,âjƒμdG Dynamic provisioning Bank loan-loss provisioning based on future expected Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Spain /General provisions losses/ Provisions on standard loans

ájOƒ©°ùdG á«Hô©dG áμ∏ªŸG ,(™FGOƒdG ‹ÉªLEG ¤EG GOÉæà°SG)k ô£bh ¿ÉªYh øjôëÑdG É¡H ®ÉØàM’G ∂æÑdG ≈∏Y Ú©àj »àdG äÉ«WÉ«àMÓd ≈fOC’G óë∏d ±Gô°T’G á«Hô©dG äGQÉeE’G ,(á∏LB’G ™FGOƒdGh Ö∏£dG â– ™FGOƒdÉH ≥∏©àj Ée ‘ ±ÓàNG) »eGõdE’G »WÉ«àM’G AÓª©dG äGóæ°Sh ™FGOh ¤EG .(á∏LB’G Ωƒ°üÿGh ‘É°üdG Ö∏£dG) óæ¡dG ,(Ö∏£dG â– ™FGOƒdG) IóëàŸG Reserve requirements Regulation that sets the minimum reserves the bank Bahrain, Oman and Qatar (based on total deposits), Saudi must hold to customer deposits and notes Arabia (different for demand and time deposits), UAE (demand deposits), India (net demand and time liabilities)

68 (Ü ,2011 ;2010) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°Uh 1(2011) Moessnerh Galati ,(2011) √ÒZh Lim ;(2010) »ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG áæ÷ ;(2010) Caruana ¤EG GOÉæà°SGk :Qó°üŸG 68 Source: Based on Caruana (2010); CGFS (2010); Lim et al.(2011), Galati and Moessner (2011) and IMF (2010; 2011, b)

68 .AGQB’G ‘ ójóL ≥aGƒJ ≥«≤– ≈∏Y πª©dG :»∏μdG •ƒëàdG á°SÉ«°S (2010) J.Caruana .∫RÉH :á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH .38 »ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG ΩɶædG áæ÷ ábQh .ÜQÉéàdGh πFÉ°ùŸG OôL :»∏μdG •ƒëàdG πªY QÉWEGh äGhOCG (2010) á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG ᪶fC’G áæ÷ .∫RÉH :á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH .337 á«dhódG äÉjƒ°ùàdG ∂æH πªY ábQh .äÉHÉàμdG ¢VGô©à°SG – »∏μdG •ƒëàdG á°SÉ«°S .(2011) R.Moessnerh G.Galati ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .238 ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U πªY ábQh .É¡eGóîà°SG á«Ø«ch äGhOC’G »g Ée :»∏μdG •ƒëàdG á°SÉ«°S .(2011) X.Wu h T.Wezelh M.Saiyidh A.Otanih P. Kongsamuth A.Costa h F.Columba hC.Lim .᪰UÉ©dG .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .Ú≤«dG ΩóYh ∂°ûdG ôYÉ°ûe ¬«∏Y ô£«°ùJ »ŸÉY OÉ°üàbG πX ‘ ájOÉ°üàb’G èFÉàædG Ú°ù– :»é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO .(2011) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .á∏Ñ≤ŸG äÉjóëàdGh »é«∏ÿG ¿hÉ©àdG ¢ù∏› ∫hO ≈∏Y á«ŸÉ©dG á«dÉŸG áeRC’G ÒKCÉJ .(2010) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .(»Hô¨dG IôμdG ∞°üf ‘) ᫪«∏bE’G ájOÉ°üàb’G äÉ©bƒàdG .(2010) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .(3 π°üØdG) »ŸÉ©dG ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J ?äGAGôLE’G òîàJ ≈àe :»∏μdG •ƒëàdG äÉ°SÉ«°S π«©ØJ ƒëf .(2011) ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U 68 J.Caruana (2010). Macroprudential policy: Working towards a new consensus. Committee on Global Financial Systems (2010). Macroprudential instruments and framework: A stock-taking of issues and experiences. CGFS Paper 38. BIS: Basel. G.Galati and R.Moessner (2011). Macroprudential policy – A literature review. BIS Working Paper 337. BIS: Basel. C.Lim, F.Columba, A.Costa, P. Kongsamut, A.Otani, M.Saiyid, T.Wezel and X.Wu (2011). Macroprudential policy: What instruments and how to use them. IMF Working Paper 238. IMF: Washington DC. International Monetary Fund (2011). GCC countries: Enhancing economic outcomes in an uncertain global economy. IMF: Washington DC. IMF (2010). Impact of the global financial crisis on the GCC countries and challenges ahead. IMF: Washington DC IMF (2010). Regional Economic Outlook (Western Hemisphere). IMF: Washington DC IMF (2011). Towards operationalizing macroprudential policies: When to act? Global Financial Stability Report (Chapter 3). IMF: Washington DC.

173 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

69 ájó≤ædG äÉ£∏°ùdG/ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG πÑb øe IQƒ°ûæŸG ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjQÉ≤J :11-5 ∫hóL Table 5-11: Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) published by central banks/ monetary authorities69 äGOÉ°üàb’G ‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjQÉ≤J QGó°UEÉH Ωƒ≤J »àdG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG OóY Economies No. of central banks publishing FSRs

áeó≤àŸG äGOÉ°üàb’G 34 Advanced Economies

á«bô°ûdGh ≈£°SƒdGÉHhQhCG 11 Central and Eastern Europe

á∏≤à°ùŸG ∫hódG á£HGQ 7 Commonwealth of Independent States

á«eÉædG É«°SBG 10 Developing Asia

»ÑjQÉμdGh á«æ«JÓdG ÉμjôeCG 11 Latin America and Caribbean

iÈμdG AGôë°üdG ܃æL ,É«≤jôaCG 10 Sub-Saharan Africa

É«≤jôaCG ∫ɪ°Th §°ShC’G ¥ô°ûdG 3 Middle East and North Africa ôjô≤àdG QGó°UE’G áæ°S ÒNC’G OóY (IÎØdG ,ôjô≤àdG º°SG) ó∏ÑdG q Country (Name of the Report; hC’G ôaƒàŸGq ôaƒàŸG ÒNC’G ôjô≤àdG πμ«g äÉëØ°üdG ∫ Structure of last available report (frequency Year Last Number of initiated available pages report ´É£≤dG - á«∏ëŸGh á«dhódG á«dÉŸG »∏μdG OÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£J – …ò«ØæàdG ¢üî∏ŸG ‹ÉŸG ™°VƒdG - (äGQÉ≤©dGh AÉæÑdGh äÉcô°ûdGh »∏FÉ©dG ´É£≤dG ) ‹ÉŸG ÒZ ¥Gƒ°SCG ™e áfQÉ≤eh) º¡°SC’G ¥Gƒ°SCG AGOCG - ÚeCÉàdG ´É£bh ‘ô°üŸG ´É£≤dG AGOCGh áeÓ°ùdG äGô°TDƒe) ≥ë∏ŸG - äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG º¶f – (᫪«∏bE’G º¡°SC’G ∞°üf ;‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J) øjôëÑdG .(á«aô°üŸG .(…ƒæ°S 2007 2010* Executive summary – International and domestic macro 46 Bahrain (Financial Stability Report; financial developments – Non-financial sector (households, Bi-annual) corporate, construction and real estate) – Financial condition and performance of the banking and insurance sectors – Per- formance of equity markets (and comparisons with regional equity markets) – Payment and settlement systems – Annex ((banking soundness indicators

á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG - (¿OQC’G ∫ÉM ƒg ɪc) á«dhódG á«dÉŸGh ájOÉ°üàb’G äGQƒ£àdG - ¢üî∏e ᪶fCÉH á°UÉÿG äGQƒ£àdG ∂dP ‘ Éà ,á«HÉbôdGh ᫪«¶æàdG äGQƒ£àdG) ‘ô°üŸG Ωɶæ∏d ‘ô°üŸG RÉ¡÷G øe ¢VGÎb’G) ¢VGÎb’G äÉYÉ£b - ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG - (äÉYƒaóŸG øe ÉgÒZh á°ü°üîàŸG ¢VGôbE’G äÉ°ù°SDƒe – ‘ô°üŸG ΩɶædG ôWÉfl - (´É£≤dG Ö°ùM .(…ƒæ°S ;‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J) ¿OQC’G .á«aô°üŸG ÒZ á«dÉŸG äÉ°ù°SDƒŸG Jordan (Financial Stability Report; 2010 2010 Summary – International economic and financial develop- 62 Annual) ments (as also Jordan) – Banking system infrastructure (regu- latory and supervisory developments, including those in payments systems) – Banking system – Borrowing sectors (borrowings from the banking system by sector) – Banking system risks – Specialized credit institutions and other non-banking financial institutions

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69 69 M.Cihak, S.Munoz, S.T.Sharifuddin and K.Tintchev (2012). Financial stability reports: »g ⁄ :‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjQÉ≤J .(2012) K.Tintchev h STSharifuddin h S.Munoz h M.Cihak What are they good for? IMF Working Paper 1. IMF: Washington DC, M.Cihak (2006). How Öà J «c .(2006) M.Cihak ,᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó ædG ¥hóæ°U .1 ‹hódG ó ædG ¥hóæ°U ªY ábQh ?ájQhô°V do central banks write on financial stability. IMF Working Paper 163. IMF: Washington DC, μ ∞ ≤ ≤ π and respective central bank websites. ,᪰UÉ©dG ø£æ°TGh :‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U .163 ‹hódG ó≤ædG ¥hóæ°U πªY ábQh .‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G øY ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üŸG .á«æ©ŸG ájõcôŸG ±QÉ°üª∏d á«fhÎμdE’G ™bGƒŸGh

Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J 174 Developments in Financial Infrastructure á«°SÉ°SC’G á«dÉŸG á«æÑdG äGQƒ£J

Concluding remarks á«eÉàÿG äɶMÓŸG As part of its move towards greater efficacy in P&S, øe ójõŸG ≥«≤– ¤EG ¬«©°S øe Aõéc ,…õcôŸG ô£b ±ô°üe òØfq QCB implemented several new initiatives in this area Gòg ‘ IójóL äGQOÉÑe Ió©H ,äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf ‘ á«dÉ©ØdG during 2011. The evidence appears to indicate that the systemic risks to the payments and settlement ôWÉîŸG ájOhófi ¤EG ∂dP »∏Y ádOC’G Ò°ûJh .2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ∫ÉéŸG systems are limited. Several of the policy initiatives øe ójó©dG ¿q CG hóÑjh .äÉjƒ°ùàdGh äÉYƒaóŸG Ωɶf Oó¡J »àdG á«eɶædG undertaken during 2011 appear to have had a salutary äOÉY ób 2011 ΩÉY ∫ÓN ÉgPÉîJG ”q »àdG äÉ°SÉ«°ùdÉH á≤∏©àŸG äGQOÉÑŸG effect on the liquidity infrastructure. The regulatory and á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG õjõ©J …ôéjh .ádƒ«°ù∏d á«°SÉ°SC’G á«æÑdG ≈∏Y IóFÉØdÉH governance infrastructures are being strengthened and modified, in line with the envisaged unification of ´É£≤∏d ¬«HÉbôdG äÉ¡÷G ó«MƒJ CGóÑe ≥ah É¡∏jó©Jh áªcƒ◊Gh ±Gô°TÓd the financial sector regulators in the country. .OÓÑdG ‘ ‹ÉŸG

175 Financial Stability Review 2011 2011‹ÉŸG QGô≤à°S’G ôjô≤J