Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security Author(S): W

Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security Author(s): W. Andy Knight and Randolph B. Persaud Source: Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 29-56 Published by: Distributed by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3177012 Accessed: 24-01-2019 15:39 UTC

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This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Subsidiarity, Regional Governance, and Caribbean Security

W Andy Knight Randolph B. Persaud

ABSTRACT

The reconfiguration of the global security order since the late 1980s has had a heavy impact on regional security in the Caribbean. Having lost strategic importance, the Caribbean states have been attempting to restructure their relationship with the United States. These small states are interested in building a regional security regime that is inclusive, transparent, and accountable. This analysis shows how the principle of subsidiarity may be employed to achieve that end.

For the past several years, the Commonwealth Caribbean states and the United States have been engaged in a sensitive diplomatic dis- pute over Caribbean security. At a December 16, 1996, meeting in Bridgetown, Barbados, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) leaders expressed grave concern over perceived U.S. threats to their sovereignty, and called on President Bill Clinton for an urgent meeting to develop a "consensual approach" to the region's security problems. During the same period, Caribbean leaders have been engaged in an ongoing process of regional integration that could eventually turn the Commonwealth Caribbean into the Caribbean commonwealth. The solution of an integrated Caribbean region is partly a response to security threats (real and perceived) that face the entire Caribbean Basin- threats both to the sovereignty of individual countries and to the security of individuals and groups in the region as a whole. The positive and ongoing involvement of CARICOM in Guyana's explosive racial conflict following the December 15, 1997, general elections in that country also attests to the potential for a regional security structure and, in certain cir- cumstances (such as in Guyana), for regional multilateral intervention under the broader principles and institutional authority of chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. The unfolding story of designing an appropriate security regime for the region illustrates both the changes and the continuities in regional security at this point in history. But this particular period also provides the occasion for a thorough reexamination of the region's governance structures and for the initiation of a serious discussion on the possibility

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 30 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 of developing a different form of regional governance arrangement-one that would allay some of the unease that Caribbean states and their civil societies currently face, while addressing some of the security concerns of the hemispheric power, the United States (Griffith 1991).

THE PROBLEM WI'H U.S. POLICY

U.S. security policy in the Caribbean region has traditionally focused on two strategic goals: to prevent extrahemispheric powers from gaining a strategic stronghold in the region and to maintain continual access to resources from the region (such as bauxite from Jamaica and Guyana, oil from Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela). In the Caribbean, that policy has had three main effects. First, military and police expenditures in most parts of the region grew dramatically after 1945. Second, these countries' economies were weak, and, because those economies were dependent and highly resource-based, they had to import or receive donations of all military equipment. Either way, this course of action did not help the domestic economies of these countries or enhance local security. Indeed, many of the weapons procured from outside the region were simply used against local populations, such as in the case of Haiti (Larmer and Brant 1998, 44). Third, most Caribbean countries, because of their dependence on the United States and other external actors, have been unable to develop anything more than very fragile sovereignty. The Cold War atmosphere further strengthened U.S. interest in the area, especially after the Cuban revolution. As an example, "by 1984 the Caribbean Basin had become home to 21 U.S. military installations, including 5 naval, 2 air force, and 7 army bases" (Griffith 1995, 5). U.S. counterin- surgency programs strengthened local security forces in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. Two of the more recent invasions were in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in late 1989. The former, following the overthrow of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, was the result of leftist fears; the latter was justified on the grounds of restoring democracy and bringing a corrupt leader, Manuel Antonio Noriega (suspected of being involved in a major drug-trafficking and money-laundering effort), to justice. A planned invasion of Haiti in 1994 was also justified on democratic and humanitarian grounds. This U.S. role in the Caribbean before the end of the Cold War, and particularly the record of the Reagan administration, shows clearly that the United States was prepared to violate the political and territorial sovereignty and integrity of any state in the Caribbean Basin as long as it was deemed politically expedient or militarily necessary to do so in the interest of U.S. "security" (Griffith 1995, 7). The United States has always feared that the countries might stray too far ideologically from

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms KNIGHT AND PERSAUD: CARIBBEAN SECURITY 31 basic U.S. national interests and has been prepared to do whatever was necessary to prevent this. The Carter administration did adopt a per- spective of "ideological pluralism" for the region, but that was swiftly abandoned with the entry of President Reagan (Persaud forthcoming). On the other hand, the Caribbean states have demonstrated their intention of vigorously protecting their national and regional sovereignty, drawing from time to time on extraregional economic and military support (principally from the United States) in order to manage internal national sovereignty. Although the end of the Cold War has not redefined the salient security issues for CARICOM states, notable shifts in U.S. security policy emphasis have reflected the trend toward the broadening and deepening of the security concept as it applies to the region. The main U.S. security issues for this region now pertain to pre- venting the flow of narcotics, illegal immigrants, and illegal money (via money laundering) from the Caribbean into the United States. These issues cannot be dealt with effectively using unilateral or bilateral mechanisms; they require a comprehensive multilateral framework.1 In its past attempts to deal with the huge transshipment of illegal drugs through the Caribbean, the United States has relied heavily on bilateral agreements. The U.S. bilateral strategy is underlined by the recent Shiprider Agreements, which provide U.S. agents with unre- stricted access to territorial waters and airspace of specific countries in pursuit of suspected drug traffickers. One analyst describes these agreements as going "to the heart of the continued sovereignty of the Caribbean states" (Howe 1997, 28). Furthermore, some parties to the Shiprider Agreements have had to succumb to veiled threats (such as foreign aid "decertification") as the basis for signing them. (Note that Jamaica did not automatically embrace this agreement; see Edwards 1997). Linked to this heavy-handedness is a U.S. law that requires a yearly review of Latin American countries and their status as allies in helping the United States combat the drug trade in the region. This review can often lead to unilateral "certification" or "decertification."2 CARICOM states would prefer a regional multilateral regime to be negotiated between the United States and the Caribbean Community, one that can be linked to the UN's global antinarcotics strategies. In June 1996, Guyana's foreign minister, Clement Rohee, made a plea through the Eco- nomic and Social Council for the United Nations to work with CARICOM to fight the drug trade. The strategic aim of involving the UN is clearly to counter U.S. pressure. Evidently, CARICOM wants to develop a regional security regime that would include the active participation of the United States, but which the United States would not dominate. What is interesting is that CARICOM wants the authority and legitimacy of the UN to be employed directly in the shaping of this proposed regional security regime, without necessarily taxing the scarce resources of the global organization.

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It would seem, therefore, that the Commonwealth Caribbean states might usefully employ the principle of subsidiarity, which involves, among other things, the devolution of UN authority in the formation of regional governance structures. The UN would thus perform a "subsidiary function" in regard to CARICOM. This principle is especially useful at a time when the Caribbean is working on developing a concept of comprehensive security, which entails broader questions of governance and social transformation while holding on to political sovereignty. This paper addresses several elements of the problem. First, in light of the changing security dynamics since the Cold War, the expansion of the security definition, and the changing nature of threats to the security of states and peoples of the region, it seems like a propitious time to develop a new regional security arrangement for the Caribbean Basin, one that is not dominated by, but still includes, the United States. Second, there is an expressed need for an authoritative regional security governance structure that would be legitimate in the eyes of Caribbean leaders and their populations. This simply means that, whatever regional security mechanism is devised, the process of doing so and of opera- tionalizing it must be open, democratic, and broadly inclusive in terms of allowing all voices in the region to be heard. Third, while there is no consensus on what a broadly constructed conception of security should look like, there is a clear indication that state leaders are slowly moving away from a narrow, state-centric conception of security as a wider range of potential threats to security (from economic and environmental threats to threats to the individual person) is conceivable. The conception of security is being both broadened and deepened (see Krause and Williams 1996; Dominguez 1998). Thus, how security is defined and conceived will shape the kinds of prescriptions being offered to address the Caribbean security problematic. Finally, discus- sions of developing a regional security mechanism for the Caribbean will have to be tied to developments in the evolution of the integration movement in that region and the implications that movement has for understanding the changed role of the state as security guarantor. Traditional international relations scholarship identifies the state as the primary guarantor of security. The security of the individual citizen within the state is supposed to be guaranteed in a contractual sense by the state. Each individual state, because of its supposedly unique interests, would act in a rational manner to protect itself from the encroach- ment of other states. According to this view, cooperation between states would generally not be preferred, because "a state cannot rationally assume that other states will act in a cooperative fashion" (Krause and Williams 1996, 232). A state is therefore expected to act in its own interest, as other states will do, particularly because there is no central authority in the current international anarchic environment to prevent

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms KNIGHT AND PERSAUD: CARIBBEAN SECURITY 33 states from utilizing violent means to destroy or invade others (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 9-13). The problem with this line of reasoning, in the Caribbean context, is that it does not accurately describe the security problematic of states. For one thing, the small, weak Caribbean states can hardly guarantee the security of their own citizens from the kinds of broadened security threats that currently exist. Even in the case of more traditional national security concerns, a small state, such as Guyana, which has ongoing border disputes with Venezuela and Suriname, could not defend itself without foreign assistance. Second, most of the regional security arrangements in the Caribbean Basin have had to be constructed and supported by the United States, for obvious reasons. Third, Caribbean states have a history of cooperation, in spite of the heterogeneity of the region and the tendency of individual state leaders to adhere to traditional international relations and state-centric approaches to governance (see de Alcantara 1998). The various integration movements highlight the potential that exists for the development of a regional security regime among Caribbean states. This article addresses three broad questions related to this thesis. First, in light of the movement toward integration in the Caribbean region, as well as the changing global security, political, and economic environment, what types of governance mechanisms would be most likely to assure Caribbean leaders and their civil societies of a sense of protection against the main (perceived or real) threats to the sovereignty and security of individual countries of the region? Second, in light of the perceived failure of the U.S.-led Organization of American States, the marginal success of the Caribbean's own Regional Security System (RSS), and the U.S. Atlantic Command in the region (LANTCOM, 1993-94), what political, economic, social, and other transformations will be needed if the Caribbean region were to implement a subsidiarity governance mechanism in the field of security? Finally, how will this affect U.S.-Caribbean relations? The basic framework of analysis follows roughly the following outline: a brief history of U.S. dominance and intervention in the Caribbean, Central American and Latin American region, the reasons for it and the effect such interference has had on Caribbean countries specifically; a succinct survey of the Caribbean integration movement and the current status of the regional governance arrangements; an overview of changes in the post-Cold War global security environment, their impact on Caribbean security, and recent shifts in U.S. security policy toward the region as a result; the construction of perceived and real threats to Caribbean states' sovereignty and security; a formulation of a subsidiarity governance model as it could be applied to the Caribbean region and a theoretical discussion of what is needed to

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 34 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 transform the current regional governance arrangements into such a model; and finally, a consideration of the potential implications of such an arrangement for future Caribbean-U.S. relations.

THE QUEST FOR INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

After World War II and the loss of much of its Asian and African empire, Britain modified its approach to the Caribbean islands it still controlled or formerly had controlled, and pushed them to formulate the first West Indian Federation in 1958. Ten nations were part of this arrangement, including the three most significant ones: Jamaica, Trinidad, and Barba- dos.3 It is important to reemphasize that at this stage, none of the insu- lar Caribbean countries except Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic was yet independent. Britain was essentially interested in more efficient political control of the region. The calculation was that it would be easier to govern through one federated unit than through ten separate colonies. The West Indian Federation lasted only four years, however. In September 1959, Trinidad proposed that all the economic resources and future economic goods of the islands be handed over to the Federation as a means of shoring up the federal center. The Jamaican leadership opposed this proposal, interpreting it as being in opposition to the Jamaican goal of national industrial development and therefore a limi- tation on Jamaica's capacity to realize its full economic potential. Seeking a solution to this dilemma, the leader of the People's National Party (PNP), Norman Manley, went to London to ask whether Jamaica would lose its right to independence if it opted out of the Fed- eration. Britain assured Manley that Jamaica had the potential to attain independence without the Federation's help. Returning home, Manley used the British assurance as the basis for his political platform to win majority support in the national election and thereby defeat the ruling government at the time, the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP). With the change of government, a referendum was held to determine whether Jamaica would remain a member of the Federation. The results of that referendum led to Jamaica's withdrawal in 1962, leaving Trinidad to bear the brunt of the Federation's economic and political burden. Decid- ing that this was not in its best interests, Trinidad also withdrew in 1962, and the Federation subsequently collapsed. The dissolution of the West Indian Federation, however, did not dampen the quest for Caribbean integration. Its demise became a cata- lyst for future movements that possessed the potential to reconcile diverse elements in the region. Added to this was a concerted effort to decolonize the Caribbean. In December 1960, the UN established the

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Committee of 24, under Resolution 1514(XV), which supported independence of colonized people as a preferred goal-recognizing that colonization was largely the reason for the persistence of underdevel- opment and fragmentation in what became known as the Third World. The committee's powers were enhanced by Article 73 of the UN Charter, under chapter 11, the "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Gov- erning Territories." This article stipulated that colonial powers should recognize that the interest of the inhabitants of the territories under their control ought to be paramount, and that they should accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of those inhabitants. This included ensuring respect for their culture; fostering their political, economic, social, and educational advancement; safe- guarding their just treatment, and protecting them against abuses. The article also called on colonial powers, inter alia, to aid in the development of self-government in the non-self-governing territories, to take into account the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions (Lei- bowitz 1976, 194). With pressure coming from the UN system for colonial powers to relinquish their colonies, the 1960s and 1970s saw many colonial territories moving toward independence. By early 1967, most of the territories in the Caribbean had become independent: Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 1962, Guyana and Barbados in 1966; and the rest of the British colonies in the region (excluding St. Vincent) attained associated statehood by mid-1967. After independence, efforts were once again made to integrate the region. An October 1967 conference of the Caribbean heads of governments in Barbados led to the establishment of a Regional Secretariat, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and, in 1968, a Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). CARIFTA was an attempt to integrate in a specific sector, the economic one. Its mandate was clearly to address the issue of how changing global demand was affecting Caribbean exports. CARIFTA proved to be a big success because, after its implementation, the value of intraregional exports increased from EC$86 million in 1967 to EC$451 million in 1974 (see Chernick 1978, especially 29). The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) was established in 1970, two years after CARIFTA, but with a similar underlying principle: to facilitate the economic integration of the region, to contribute to the har- monious economic growth and development of the member countries in the Caribbean, and to promote economic cooperation and integration among them, having special and urgent regard to the needs of the less- developed members. Eventually, CARIFTA was transformed into another integrative body, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established CARICOM, was signed on July 4, 1973,

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 36 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 between only four countries: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. It was designed to preserve the traditional areas of cooperation while opening up channels for regional development. CARICOM was unique in its approach because it called for the coordination of the foreign policies of all member states, the appointment of a free trade area, a common external tariff, and functional cooperation in noneco- nomic areas, such as education and health (Persaud 1995). CARICOM also encompasses a body known as the Caribbean Common Market, which was established at the same time. The aim of this organization was to promote and enhance regional trade and production. One of the factors that militated against more comprehensive integration arrangements was the issue of international representation. The leaders of some of the nations believed that they could increase their voting potential by maintaining individual seats in international organizations; the collective vote of the region was not as inviting as each individual vote. Therefore, the incentive to integrate into a single political and administrative Caribbean entity decreased as leaders realized the importance of maintaining separate representation. The problem with this position was that the concept of strength in numbers became nearly illusory. Demas (1987) argues that the West Indies would be more successful if they united and sent out their very best people to represent Caribbean interests internationally.4 Although political integration would decrease the region's number of votes in international organizations, the equality and the stature of its representation internationally would rise. Demas does admit that separate voting power would probably be an advantage; but only in some cases; such as when, for example, the OAS elects a secretary general. CARICOM's limited success led to the creation of the West Indian Commission (WIC), which made the case for political union of the Caribbean. A former prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, A. N. R. Robinson, pointed out to CARICOM that a restructuring of the international system was occurring. Evidence of this was the birth of a free trade area between Canada and the United States; the formation of a single European market by 1992; and the Soviet Union's spiral toward disintegration. The paper concludes,

[A]gainst the background of historic change and historic appraisal, the Caribbean could be in danger of becoming a backwater, sepa- rated from the main current of human advance into the twenty-first century. (Demas 1991, 2)

Established under the Grand Anse Declaration of 1989, the WIC was founded to examine how the Caribbean region could prepare for the 1990s and the twenty-first century while continuing to uphold the goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The membership, high-profile Caribbean representatives who reported to the CARICOM heads of gov-

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ernment, made immediate recommendations aimed at ensuring continued regional integration. These included

* Free movement of skills from one country to another. * Elimination of barriers to individual travel from one Caribbean ter- ritory to another. * Increased foreign and domestic investment. * Enhanced mobilization for international negotiations. * Plans for a common Caribbean currency.

One result of the WIC recommendations was the creation of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) on July 24, 1994. The ACS went beyond CARICOM to include the G3 states (Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia) and most of the other Caribbean countries and colonies. In all, 37 states and territories in the Caribbean Basin were included. The goals of the ACS are essentially twofold: to optimize the economic and political advantages to be gained from geographic proximity and to promote mechanisms for cooperation that would enable the region to offset or forestall marginalization in the world economy (Serbin 1994, 63). The desire of ACS members is to improve the position of the Caribbean in the international system of trading blocs. Ini- tiatives have focused on maximizing regional trade, strengthening regional alliances for bargaining power, and greater cooperation toward forming a regional identity, which, it is hoped, will overcome past divi- sions. It is further hoped that this will lay the foundation for future regional cooperation on economic, political, and cultural matters. Like all integration efforts, however, the ACS initiative has faced obstacles. One is the problem of the already-weak sovereignty of these states. Further integration is likely to "rouse the anxieties of governments of fragile, vulnerable societies" (Serbin 1994, 81). Second, cling- ing to its world power image, France has shown an interest in partici- pating in the ACS; three of its departments, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guyana, are members. Caribbean leaders have not looked on this favorably: "not only has this development produced a serious imbalance in the organization of smaller states, but it sets a dangerous precedent for incorporating other extraregional actors in an association that is supposedly by and for states of the Caribbean Basin alone" (Serbin 1994, 72-73). What's more, French participation would seriously infringe on the subsidiarity principle; the three departments are likely to seen as conduits of French influence rather than genuine participants in regional deliberations. The incremental integration efforts of the Caribbean region from the beginning of World War I to the creation of the WIC are an indication of how much this region has changed politically, economically, and socially. Regional integration through the "process of expansion or con-

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traction around an external aim" has been central to the idea of creating a region dedicated to the mutuality of interests (Caribbean Scholars' Conference 1966, 22). Successful regional integration and development could not have occurred, however, without the continued effort by the Caribbean islands to create a climate for individual national unity that assumes authority and legitimacy through the justification of political actions and national integration. One final important area is security cooperation. This does not play a central role in the ACS, and it is seen as a future goal for CARI- COM states. Two past efforts in this area should be mentioned. In 1982, five Caribbean countries (later seven) created the Regional Security System (RSS).5 Its mandate was to deal with smuggling, search and rescue, and local (internal) threats to security. The RSS, established with strong U.S. support, was primarily designed to deal with low-level threats. Its legitimacy was questioned by several leaders of Caribbean states that were not involved in its creation, primarily because the United States was seen as the sole decisionmaker in the arrangement. Despite some limited success and experiments with regional peacekeeping (for example, in Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Kitts and Nevis), the RSS has had an unstable existence. It was dissolved in mid-1994 but reconstituted under a new treaty in 1996. The other attempt of note was the U.S.-led LANTCOM initiative. A relic of the Cold War, LANTCOM was a U.S. military operation charged with coordinating all joint U.S. military actions from the North to the South Pole, including the Caribbean. Recently, LANTCOM has tried to get Caribbean states to become part of a regional response effort. However,

regional security, instead of emanating from an intraregional political initiative formulated by civilians, is being defined by the United States as one controlled by the military. This policy, which aims to set U.S. armed forces free to act in other regions of the world, has obvious implications for both regional self-determination and democracy. (Rodriguez Beruff and Garcia Muniz 1996, 25)

Establishment of bodies such as CARICOM, CARIFTA, the ACS, and the CDB may have created the illusion that the "integration" and "development" of the region were being redefined. It might be asked, however, whether this process of reconceptualization and policy activity has produced any real change in attitude. It would seem that the baggage of colonialism and imperialism is not so easily shed. It appears that the indoctrination of Caribbean people through three-century-old colonial institutions and continued under neocolonial governments has perme- ated the region. This is not a situation unique to the Caribbean. Several African postcolonial states found themselves in a similar situation. The end result of this indoctrination is the acceptance of a particular set of ide-

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms KNIGHT AND PERSAUD: CARIBBEAN SECURITY 39 ologies and principles by Caribbean leaders and peoples which have created what some have referred to as "a colonized mentality." The process of overt physical coercion by imperialism seems to have been replaced by mental colonization, so much so that although most Caribbean countries today may have "flag independence," their economies, politics, and even social policies are still dictated by dominant forces from outside the region. This state of illusory autonomy and external control has been labeled neocolonialism. Against the backdrop of centuries of exploitation, neocolonialism has been successful in limiting true Caribbean integration and indigenous socioeconomic development through the continued colonization of the Caribbean mentality. Attempts at "Caribbean integration" could never be easy in any case; the historical "domination" of colonialism has effectively limited the political imagination and options of Caribbean people. Tradi- tional concepts of Caribbean development, whether utilized by economists or politicians, generally elevate Western-defined economic progress above other significant human and social concerns. As such, they reflect all the arrogance of an ethnocentric (and particularly Western-influenced) reading of history, which assumes a unidirectional and progressive forward movement toward an ideal created in the minds of Western capitalists. Colonialism and neocolonialism have impeded the ability of the Caribbean peoples to unite completely on a common political, social, cultural, and economic front. Several Caribbean analysts now realize that true Caribbean integration and development efforts cannot, therefore, be successful until the people of this region embrace a philosophy that negates and destroys that long-perpetrated colonized mentality. In the meantime, the current changes in the global political, economic, and security environment may provide windows of opportunity through which the Caribbean can reformulate its approach to securing its future and its people.

POST-COLD WAR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE CARIBBEAN

The transformation of the world security order has sparked concern in the Caribbean that there could be a decline in the region's strategic relevance. Peter H. Smith is correct to argue that the countries of the hemisphere "confront perplexing questions" because of the end of the Cold War (Smith 2000, 1). Indeed, it has been suggested that one of the main reasons for holding the Summit of the Americas of April 1998 was to maintain and ensure U.S. interests in the area (Economist 1998a, 25). Many of the changes at the global level resulted in a geopolitical vacuum in the Caribbean region, which, in turn, forced Caribbean leaders to reconcep- tualize their security agendas. Other changes have posed a direct threat

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to the very survival of some of the most vulnerable states of the region, whose fragile economies make them highly susceptible to any alterations in the status quo. It can be added that Caribbean vulnerability and insecurity stem from the actions of U.S. foreign and defense policy in the region, as well as the actions of larger regional states, such as Venezuela, and domestic groups within each state (Griffith 1993, 28-33). As the end of the Cold War has lessened the threats to military security in the world, a wide range of new problems are being considered security issues. One of these is the drug threat. This involves various processes of production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and money laundering. The main areas of drug production in the Caribbean are Belize and Jamaica. With regard to the latter, marijuana has surpassed bauxite as the leading export, grossing between US$1 billion and $2 billion per annum (Griffith 1996, 182). The geography of the Caribbean also makes the area a haven for drug trafficking, especially as transshipment points for South American drug runners. Money laundering also poses a threat to the economic stability of the region. In Caribbean eyes, illegal drugs are a threat for a number of reasons beyond simple abuse. Production and trafficking have led to wide- spread corruption in politics and law enforcement. Greater political instability is hardly needed in the Caribbean. If by security we mean the guarantee of "safety and governability," then the drug problem in the Caribbean seriously undermines the ability of states in the region to provide security to their people. When it comes to law enforcement, lack of faith on behalf of the public "compromises the agents of national security, with the implication that their capacity for effective action is undermined, and individuals and groups become inclined to resort to vigilante tactics because of that diminished capacity or a perception of it" (Griffith 1996, 190). Political instability and crime, furthermore, have a major effect on tourism. A substantial loss in tourist traffic can have devastating effects on national economies that depend so heavily on this industry. Money laundering can further weaken already weak economies. In March 1991, for example, 311 banking licenses were revoked in Montserrat following investigations into money laundering there (Griffith 1995, 20). A loss of confidence in the banking sector undermines the potential progress that can be made in these economies. Migration is also a real security concern for the Caribbean states, although it is generally thought that this is a bigger problem for receiv- ing states. Migration out of the Caribbean, however, has been one factor responsible for the "brain drain." One-fourth of the population of the English-speaking Caribbean has already emigrated to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. There are more Haitian doctors in Montreal than in Haiti.

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The security of the Caribbean is also at risk from environmental threats. Some of these are natural, particularly the frequency of devastating hurricanes and the slowly rising sea level. Others are human- made, such as pollution, oil spills, and foreign overfishing. Most Caribbean countries also face overpopulation pressures, Guyana and Belize being notable exceptions. Although much less likely to lead to violence, these stresses constitute a threat to the future of the whole region. As the WIC has noted, there is an "absence of resilience in our economies" (quoted in Griffith 1995, 26). If environmental concerns are not addressed, they could devastate the tourist and agricultural indus- tries. These are all transnational problems that require regional or multilateral cooperation to solve.

UNDERLYING REASONS FOR INSECURITY

Lingering border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela and Guyana and Suriname notwithstanding, the current feeling of insecurity in the Caribbean region may best be understood as an economic problem. Most of the major internal security threats in the region stem from this cause. Migration, drug trafficking, arms dealing, and ethnic-racial con- flicts all have their roots in larger economic issues. This illustrates the importance of trying to understand the variations in the region's economies. With the exception of Puerto Rico, which developed a rel- atively strong industrial sector with the aid of the United States, and Bar- bados, which has a strong service sector, the economies of the region are still very much based on volatile, resource-based exports. While tourism has grown exponentially and has become a major revenue source for many Caribbean nations, it is a fickle industry, particularly because of its dependence on the whims of tourists. In some instances, indeed, attempts to embark on alternative paths of economic and social development have resulted in the politicization of the tourist trade, with severe consequences for Caribbean states. During the late 1970s, for example, a tourist incentive program in Jamaica called "Stay Over Three Nights" declined sharply because of Prime Minister Michael Manley's political agenda of Democratic Socialism (Persaud forthcoming). In a larger context, the tourist industry does not develop strong ties to the local economy and rarely uses local food and produce (Pastor and Fletcher 1991, 190). A newer post-Cold War concern for Caribbean leaders has been, ironically, a perceived loss of U.S. interest in the region. There are several examples of potential aid monies being transferred from the Caribbean to rebuilding efforts in Eastern Europe (Griffith 1995, 16). Another reason for insecurity and instability in the region is the continuing growth of large regional trading blocs. The Caribbean faces

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 42 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 the danger of being swallowed up. For example, the recent trade dis- pute over bananas does not bode well for the region. The European Community currently allows the Caribbean an 8 percent share of the European banana market. The World Trade Organization (WTO) recently struck down this preferential practice. That move, led by the United States, has been called "a diabolical campaign to abolish Euro- pean preferences that have kept the Caribbean banana trade-and the islands that depend on it-from going bust" (Larmer and Isikoff 1997). The United States may be creating more insecurity in the region by its actions. Beyond this, there is a fear that the growth of trading blocs could also lead to the reduction or loss of economic assistance, foreign investments, and preferential trading arrangements (Griffith 1995, 18). The Caribbean also suffers from a considerable debt burden. For instance, in 1992, the 5.5 million people in the English-speaking Caribbean carried a debt totaling US$9.5 billion. The austerity measures of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund, furthermore, have done more harm than good to people living in the region. "Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Panama, Barbados, Venezuela, and Jamaica all experienced strikes, riots, demonstrations, vandalism and arson when austerity measures were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (Griffith 1995, 24). Economic and security concerns cannot, therefore, be treated as independent variables. Any attempt to improve security would have to be accompanied by economic progress. These vulnera- bilities, coupled with obvious power deficiencies, have triggered a debate on the need for the Caribbean to unite as a region. The end of the Cold War has led to new questions about Caribbean security. Beyond the debate about the expansion of the definition of security, there are also questions as to how such a broadened conception of security can be obtained in the Caribbean. Under the current cir- cumstances, one of four things can happen. The states of the Caribbean can hope that the pressing need or threat makes its way onto the UN agenda. They can rely on the OAS to address such threats; or, as often in the past, the United States-the regional hegemonic state-will be left to address the problem. Finally, attempts to broaden the Regional Secu- rity System (RSS) may still be pursued (see Griffith 1993, chap. 6). In terms of governance, the Caribbean is at a disadvantage. Com- posed of a number of small, weak, and dependent states, the region does not possess a strong voice at the global level. This voice becomes even weaker when the Caribbean states do not pursue the same goals, or when they do not have a coordinated foreign policy. The solution may then lie in embracing the principle of subsidiarity in regional security governance. Failure to develop an indigenous governance framework could result in such a framework being imposed from outside.6

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APPLYING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE

Subsidiarity is a concept that first emerged from a Catholic Church encyclical, the Quadragesimo Anno, written in 1931 by Pope Pius XI (Knight 1996). Pius's letter describes a set of basic principles for the reconstruction of social order in the community, the most significant of which is the devolution of power and authority. Devolution here also means a sharing or, perhaps more accurately, a diffusion of power, as well as a distribution of the burdens of governance. With time, it became recognized that this principle could also be applied to regional and international politics; it helps establish a division of labor between institutions at the world level and those at the regional, state, and local levels. Today, the principle has been most often associated with the European Community. There are two distinct approaches to the practice of subsidiarity: top-down and bottom-up. In the latter, central authorities are subsidiary or auxiliary to the lower levels of power. Only when action or measures from the lowest possible level of government appear inadequate to attain a given goal would the higher level of authority intervene. Con- versely, in the top-down approach, the benefits of subsidiarity accrue to the central institutions. In any particular field, the powers enjoyed by central institutions are limited to those areas in which intervention or measures from the central body seem necessary to achieve a given objective. Defined in this way, subsidiarity favors noncentralization rather than decentralization. In a nutshell, subsidiarity can be defined as a system of decisionmaking in which lower levels of governance are not denied their competencies as long as they are capable of carrying out specific tasks assigned to them (Knight 1996). The Caribbean would see a number of benefits if the area were to develop a regional governance structure that could work with the United Nations through the subsidiarity framework. Those benefits would actually be embedded in and generated by a set of core elements of the regime. The most important of these elements are the following.

Inclusiveness. Subsidiarity as an organizing principle allows for the construction of a security regime or regional governance structure that is inclusive and democratically formed. Through equal participation in the formation of a Caribbean regional security framework, states in the region would be more likely to cooperate with the United States in defining and working toward regional objec- tives. Equal participation from the states in the region will certainly contribute to the cultural understanding of disputes. This will reduce uncertainty in decisionmaking and, in turn, shorten the long delays that usually attend emergency action. Subsidiarity thus allows for interaction and broad participation, not imposition.

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* Transparency. Because the local level is not excluded from the chain of devolved authority, more domestic support might come from each state for initiatives undertaken in the name of regional security. It must be stressed, though, that participation in the formation of the regime must be accompanied by ongoing transparent management. This is an absolutely critical point, because many initiatives of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping are ham- pered by domestic withdrawal, usually because of incomplete information. Transparency in situations of acute conflict is necessary to dispel any suspicion of partiality on the part of the "inter- vening" parties. Adequate disclosure of relevant information, moreover, is an important element of political accountability. * Burden sharing. With equal and democratic participation, states in the region would be more likely to make tangible contributions to any regional efforts undertaken. This is likely to have a number of positive effects. Such contributions are likely to ease the strain on the UN operational budget and thus lessen concerns about fund- ing at the Security Council. But burden sharing need not be con- fined to finances. A wider definition would involve restructuring the division of labor in the implementation of policy. The United States may very well restrict itself to providing logistical infrastruc- ture and support, technical advice, and information. The Caribbean countries might take up the "on the ground" command and control aspects of operations where an "interventionary force" is needed. * Recursivity. Democratic participation will make an enormous con- tribution to the further institutional development of Caribbean democratic culture and a stronger sense of regional identity. Sig- nificant spillover effects should accrue to other regional integration arrangements, fostered by confidence building through joint problem solving. A major spillover effect of a regional security regime, furthermore, is that the cost of domestic and border security for small states may be significantly reduced. This cost reduction has a major development component; scarce resources may be diverted to economic and social development. This will have a recursive effect on security, given that poverty itself is a major cause of domestic insecurity and instability in the Caribbean. Another major spillover effect pertains to the governance of domestic societies in the region. Participation in a regional security framework under the auspices of chapter 8 of the UN Charter may provide a strong incentive for states to uphold democratic participation in domestic politics. States that violate human rights or are confrontational may be excluded from the regime. This may exclude such states from

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the economic benefits associated with the regional institution, and also increase the cost of domestic insecurity. *Legitimacy. A major aspect of devolved authority pertains to the language of intervention. Anti-interventionism has always been one of the major Caribbean security concerns. This attitude, of course, is based on decades of extraregional intervention. Thus, U.S. intervention in the area has probably caused more suspicion of extraregional powers than any other factor.

Subsidiarity is one way to transform the stigma of interventionism and imperialism into a culture of multilateral governance for the region. It would enhance the region's ability to solve its problems without run- ning into the old quandary of unilateralism and illegitimate violations of legal and political sovereignty. Even if sovereignty had to be violated (say, for the purpose of human rights protection), if this were done by a regime made up of states of the region and, more important, if it were sanctioned by those states, it might be more justifiable and acceptable to the Caribbean people (Chopra 1998, Knight 1998). The cumulative effect of inclusiveness, transparency, burden sharing, and recursivity is that multilateral diplomacy would develop more legitimacy. This last benefit of subsidiarity needs further expansion.

SUBSIDIARITY AND LEGITIMACY

Adopting the subsidiarity principle would go a long way toward alleviating the legitimacy deficit that has traditionally plagued attempts to ensure Caribbean security. One important consideration relates to the expanding definition of security. If the United States should decide that migration is a security threat and should start to ship migrants back to their point of origin or elsewhere, it raises legitimacy questions. If the subsidiarity principle were adopted, it would help assure that the threats and problems being addressed are true threats, not constructed for political expediency. Indeed, a subsidarity-driven, multilateral immigration regime in the hemisphere would benefit not only the Caribbean (and Latin America) but also the United States. Such a regime would provide the United States with a direct forum to express its concerns, bring about consensus, and, in the end, dispense with charges of setting up unfair and, at times, racially inspired barriers to legitimate migration. The issue of migration is surpassed in political importance only by the use of force and, at times, direct military action by the United States in the region. The real problem is not the use of force per se but the use of force by whom, against whom, in what magnitude, by whose authority, and for what purpose. While the use of force in the abstract might be considered anathema, there are situations in which carefully

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 46 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 employed armed personnel might contain a conflict either from spread- ing or from becoming more violent.7 What becomes important is who should decide what the threats are and how and when they should be addressed. The construction of a regional security regime underpinned by the subsidiarity principle might enhance the legitimacy of security operations because local actors would participate more actively in the decision to employ force, as well as in the field operations, be it drug interdiction or various forms of armed multilateral intervention. Access to and participation in decisionmaking are critical elements of the democratic process. Indeed, Thomas Franck goes so far as to define legitimacy as

a property of a rule or a rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process. (1990, 42) If the states of the region are accommodated in shaping the regional agenda, and specifically are allowed to help frame the norms, rules, and decisionmaking process regarding external intervention, there is a much higher likelihood of both broader and deeper cooperation, in which the United States would not be seen as an unwanted outsider. The real issue is that power has to be shared; maybe not equally, but by no means exclusively imposed from without. Legitimacy and power are structurally related. M. J. Peterson sug- gests, "power is the generic concept, and authority is used to denote a special form of power relationship in which the addressees of power regard the power holders' influences as legitimate and worthy of acceptance" (1997, 1). Authority is then simply institutionalized power backed by legitimacy. This is what has been lacking in the past when it comes to Caribbean security. The United States has ample amounts of power and a wide range of policy instruments, though it usually lacks the needed legitimacy to install an effective security regime for the region. Thus the United States can never be looked on as being unilaterally capable of organizing security in the region. Again, this leads back to the usefulness of the subsidiarity principle. An organization that can definitively answer the questions "who are you to say?" and "why should I do that?" is one that will be successful in portraying itself as legitimate. Furthermore, the "standards of care, fairness, and evenhandedness expected in international politics create expectations that power holders will act intelligently and use their posi- tions to advance the common good, not only to increase their own advantages and those of a few allies, clients, or other close associates" (Peterson 1997, 4). Again the United States can make a positive contri-

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bution to regional governance by democratizing the institutional space in which such governance is channeled. Global democratization in a real sense means that "power holders are no longer in a position where others accept everything they say without question" (Peterson 1997, 5). The worldwide spread of democracy has led to the demand for "institutional mechanisms of accountability and replacement of top-down organizations with structures per- mitting bottom-up communication and critique" (Peterson 1997, 5). This has been traditionally lacking in efforts to build a Caribbean security regime. The broader problem, however, has been the absence of a workable framework of governance that is sufficiently responsive to interests of the region's strongest power, the United States, and simulta- neously to the long quest of smaller states and their peoples for sub- stantive political independence. A deepening of democratic participation, and ultimately of legitimacy, must take into account what James Rosenau has called the dis- aggregation of governance (1997, 151-52). According to Rosenau, the institutionalized authority of the state and formal international organizations has been effectively challenged by a host of nongovernmental organizations, and local social movements. The difference between state and nonstate actors is not merely a matter of kind but of form. They lead to different forms and locations of authority. In the first case, the "sphere of authority" is located at the state level, and governance is articulated through interactions in the hierarchically structured states' system. This "established" sphere of authority is top-down (Rosenau 1997, 155). It concentrates power in the hands of more powerful states, and, because it takes a narrow view of sovereignty, displaces nonstate actors from any meaningful role. Moreover, the institutional forms and practices of multilateralism that emerge from this framework tend to lack legitimacy, precisely because the central articulating principle of engagement is based on overt, material power. Institutional development based solely on the "established" "spheres of authority" model is likely to aggravate the problem of the democratic deficit. In contradistinction to the established model, in which authority is concentrated in the state, with corresponding institutional forms, in the "accommodative" model

the loci of authority have undergone transformation in ways that are accepted by both national governments and other actors to the extent that the transformed loci of authority are sufficiently clear-cut to enable all concerned to contain their differences and accommodate to each other. (Rosenau 1997, 155)

The crux of the accommodative model is that the "control and steering mechanisms" of governance emerge from both above and below. The institutional form of the regimes consistent with this broad-

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 48 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 ening of governance to include both state and nonstate actors will, by definition, be more participatory in character and more credible in political terms. This is precisely what the subsidiarity principle advances.

TOWARD A THEORY OF REGIONAL SUBSIDIARITY GOVERNANCE

Adopting the subsidiarity principle would not be a radical move for the Caribbean or the UN. The concept is implied in chapter 8 of the UN Charter. Article 52 states,

Nothing contained in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

As long as the Security Council is kept informed of developments, the existence of regional organizations (agencies) should serve as a supplement to the UN, not as a direct challenge to its authority. Fur- thermore, the UN already has formal arrangements with some bodies, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). An even better example in the security realm was the assignment of military operations in Bosnia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus it is not the international community that has set barriers to the achievement of a regional security structure in the Caribbean. Two main theories or schools of thought that have been presented to explain why states integrate into larger wholes. The first is labeled transaction- alism, and emerges from the work of Karl Deutsch (see Deutsch 1957). This school of thought posits that the phenomenon of political unification at the international level is comparable to what would be observed at the national level during the birth of nation-states. This can be seen in terms of a process having a number of steps. First, functional links develop between disparate communities. These may include, among others, trade, migration, mutual services, or military collaboration. These functional links then generate a series of transactions between those communities and result in the creation of transcommunity networks. The spillover effect gradually results in the assimilation of peoples and their integration into a larger whole. The last stage comes after these communities have been formed. It is then that the desires of members and the efforts of the elites may be directed toward institutionalizing, preserving, and protecting the communities' transactions through the establishment of institutions of government.

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The final step in this process is essentially political amalgamation. In terms of the Caribbean, one would probably place the region in the "community formation" phase. This stage, however, would appear to be laying the groundwork for further integration and ultimately a larger security or even political community. As Anthony Gonzales and Lloyd Searwar argue, CARICOM has reached a stage where it makes sense for the regional body to develop a collective approach to various problems that undermine the sovereignty of its individual member states.

[T]he shortcomings of national sovereignty, as a result of the limits of the nation-state in coping with the inequalities and imperfections of national and international existence, must be attacked by a sense of collective exercise of sovereignty in which the outdated distinc- tion between states are removed, and more emphasis placed on the common destiny of Caribbean peoples. (1995, 45)

Clearly, this will require individual Caribbean country leaders to com- promise their vision of state sovereignty to accommodate the development of common structures that can provide more security and collective well-being for the region as a whole in the future. The second dominant school of thought is often associated with Ernst Haas and has been labeled neofunctionalism (Haas 1958). The central tenet of this school is that institutional amalgamation precedes and leads to community, because effective institutionalization has the ability to refocus a people's political attention and to shift their loyalties. Haas argues that inherent in integration efforts is an expansive logic, which operates under appropriate conditions to extend continually the range of activities under international jurisdiction. With regard to the Caribbean, these conditions may include a fear of further U.S. dominance and hence a need to integrate as a form of buffer. The neofunctionalist school believes that each functional step toward greater international authority sets into motion political processes that generate demands for further steps. This is called the spillover effect. The costs of not proceeding with these steps become too large for states; and as a result, the integration process continues. The rewards of further integration are considerably greater than those from movement away from unification. This school therefore believes that states will have no real choice but to continue with the integration effort once the process has begun. Unlike the transactional process, integration here becomes an intensely political phenomenon. Again with regard to the Caribbean, this school would place the states of the region as moving in the direction of further integration. Currently, the greatest gains have been made in the area of economics. The Caribbean Community Mission to Guyana in the wake of the considerable racial and political tensions in late 1997 and

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 50 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 early 1998 does, however, suggest a more expansive political or conflict management role for regional institutions. It is interesting to note that since CARICOM's "intervention" in mid-January 1998, Guyana has made some progress in resolving the considerable feelings of racial insecurity among its citizens. A process of constitutional reform, led partly by CARI- COM officials, is well under way. Despite reversals on the "street level," where violence has erupted from time to time, the "Afro"-supported People's National Congress and the "Indo"-backed People's Progressive Party are, for the most part, honoring their commitment to reforms. Whichever school is used to analyze this phenomenon, in both cases, it would appear that the possibility for an indigenously fashioned regional security governance framework in the Caribbean is not far- fetched. This conclusion stems both from the history of the region and the impact of global forces that have been pushing states into regional trading blocs. It would appear that political and security cooperation is the next logical step. The Commonwealth Caribbean states might usefully employ the principle of subsidiarity, which, among other things, involves the devolution of UN authority in the formation of regional governance structures. The UN could thus perform a "subsidiary function" in relation to CARICOM and the ACS, for instance.

CONCLUSIONS

Security policy in the Caribbean Basin has been heavily influenced by the hemispheric hegemonic power, the United States, which has had a history of unilateral intervention in the affairs of states in Latin America and Central America as well. As a result, whatever security regime has been developed in the region has reflected U.S. national security interests over and above those of the Caribbean states themselves. The primary post-Cold War perceived threats to U.S. security are linked in some ways to the current move to broaden and deepen the security concept. The flow of narcotics into the United States from the Caribbean, illegal immigration of Caribbean individuals hoping for a better life in the United States, and the laundering of illegal money have all been constructed as security threats to the United States. These issues are also problems for Caribbean states. However, the perception of threat as constructed by Caribbean leaders and citizens differs from the U.S. perception. Caribbean states find themselves threatened by economic marginalization and insecurity as a result of globalization, a brain drain, environmental degradation, debt, ethnic conflict, and internal political and social instability. The history of U.S. interventionary policies in the Caribbean has left this area with marginally sovereign and highly dependent states that have never been in a position to address fully their own immediate

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security concerns. Attempts at economic and political integration of the region have met with varied success. As the West Indian Commission has pointed out, however, it is clear that, given the current changes in the global political, economic, and security environment, unless Caribbean states coordinate their political, economic, and security goals and policies, they will find themselves increasingly weakened as decisionmaking entities and marginalized in the global political economy. The vulnerability of these developing states is manifold. Whether it is as a result of earthquakes, hurricanes, economic downturns, cultural pen- etration, terrorism, drug trafficking, or mercenary or other criminal activity, individual Caribbean states cannot hope to provide security for their populations on their own. Thus it makes sense to think about constructing a security governance architecture for the region. This paper has advocated a different multilateral form of interstate security cooperation for the Caribbean region, one that reduces U.S. dominance while recognizing the need for the United States to continue helping to shape the mechanisms that will guarantee security for the region in the future. It is a form that will, of necessity, allow those states and groups in the Caribbean Basin that are normally marginalized in dis- cussions over the development of security cooperation to be able to voice their concerns and exercise their right to be part of such discus- sions. The basic assumption underlying the analysis was that, when it comes to the Caribbean region, the debate about who is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means should not occur only in the United States. Those questions ought to be addressed by Caribbean leaders, as well as their people. What is really threatened in the Caribbean is not only the abstract "state" but, more important, the material well-being of individuals and the cultural communities in the region. This statement has major implications for how issues of security are to be treated. The dominant discourse in international relations has centered on the belief that what is to be secured are states and, further, that states provide the same security. Assumptions such as the supremacy of the state, the self-interest of the state, and the existence of an anarchical state system have led to the conceptualization of what has become labeled as national or international security. According to this view, cooperation is unlikely, because states have an inherent distrust of each other. Unilateral actions and the abuse of citizens by their own governments have raised serious questions about this definition of security. People may need protection not just from other states but also from their own states and other domestic and external forces. Sovereignty, after all, refers to the rights of citizens within nation-states as much as to the defense of the core values of the latter from external attack. What is now needed is a framework to make the shift from national-international security to regional-global security. The latter would involve a

This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 15:39:43 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 52 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 43: 1 more cooperative, participatory, and inclusive approach to security. Regional and global security concepts do not have to be directly opposed to state-centric conceptions of international security, but the former certainly poses a direct challenge to the latter. It is not so much that consensus over a definition of security has been achieved, but rather that the traditional one bears inherent problems. Global security can be loosely defined as normative, having ethi- cal dimensions, existing as a potential, and acting as a sort of articulating principle for a transformed world order based on justice and global social change. Multilateralism may then be seen as the operational philosophy of global security, much the same way as national interest is the operational philosophy of international security. It provides a new framework for looking at world security, challenging the traditional par- adigm; and it goes beyond the current dominance of the rich and powerful in security affairs. Thus, adopting a global security view and, by logical extension, a regional security position might help resolve two problems in the Caribbean. It could avert U.S. dominance or perceptions of such dominance in the Caribbean Basin, and it may also help bring broader security issues, ones that require cooperation and coordination, onto the various national security agendas. If we construct security as global security, we can move easily to multilateral regional security arrangements, in both theory and practice. It must also be kept in mind that the very process of constructing a security regime, through inclusionary, participatory, accommodative, and democratic means, has the potential to generate the conditions necessary for long-term legitimacy.8 Finally, by addressing issues that go beyond military threats, and by doing so in a way sensitive to local traditions, the goals of long-term sustainable security might be reached. Thus, the importance of the principle of subsidiarity is obvious. In a subsidiarity governance arrangement, the lower levels of governance are not denied their competencies as long as they are capable of carrying out specific tasks assigned to them. This is a model that allows the more immediate levels (those most affected by decisions) to be responsible for carrying out governance tasks they can effectively and efficiently handle. This principle is especially useful at a time when the Caribbean is working on developing a concept of comprehensive security that deemphasizes the U.S. role in the construction of the security problematic in the region and entails the involvement of broader questions of governance and social transformation. The existing hierarchical structures must be transformed, not the least because, as Rosenau argues, "hierarchy is certainly not a necessary prerequisite to the framing of goals, the issuing of directives, and the pursuit of policies" (1997, 146). On the basis of current and recent events in the Caribbean and

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drawing from the integration theorists, it would appear that a regional security governance arrangement for the area is not a distant goal. It can and probably will be achieved in the near future. This, however, is only one step. The other is truly to adopt a subsidiarity principle at the international level; that is, under the umbrella of the UN Charter. This will go a long way toward alleviating the legitimacy problems that plagued the formation of a security regime for the Caribbean Basin in the past. It is the regional actors who suffer most from the immediate consequences of security problems. They are the ones who have a direct stake in the out- come; they are also the ones closest to the conflict and most sensitive to the local traditions and history. Finally, it is the regional actors who can give an urgent local issue their full and quickest attention. With the overload of items on the UN aid agenda, along with the attempts to expand the definition of security-which, in turn, exacer- bate the overload-it would appear that the UN has few choices but to let regional arrangements and agencies play a greater role in multilateral governance. This will also mean a greater involvement of local citizens, grassroots movements, NGOs, and other nonstate entities in the activities of such governance. True subsidiarity allows even those individuals at the lowest level of the international hierarchy to play a role in decisionmaking that affects them. The devolution of authority goes a long way toward alleviating the legitimacy deficit inherent in so many past attempts at constructing security arrangements in the Caribbean. It is also at the lowest levels of hierarchy that innovative solutions to the region's problems might be found.

NoTEs

Research for this paper was made possible through a research grant from the Quebec Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l'Aide a la Recherche (FCAR). The authors thank Duncan Rayner (Dalhousie University) for his valu- able research assistance and the Bishop's University Senate Research Committee for providing necessary research seed money. We also acknowledge useful critical comments and suggestions from Ivelaw Griffith, Edgar Dosman, Kim Nossal, and Larman Wilson. The comments and suggestions from three anonymous reviewers for this journal were especially insightful, and for that, we wish to express deep appreciation. 1. For an extended analysis of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism, see Persaud forthcoming. In general, stronger states, such as the United States, benefit more from bilateral negotiations, but multilateralism is the pref- erence of smaller states because it allows for a more level playing field. Smaller states also would have strength in numbers. The more powerful a state is, the more it can engage in unilateral action. Smaller states usually have little recourse in countering negative unilateral policies. 2. It is important to note, however, that some positive steps were taken

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in this area at the April 1998 Summit of the Americas, when the OAS was called on to establish an objective procedure for evaluating national efforts against drug trafficking. Such a measure, though, still requires U.S. congressional approval. See Economist 1998b. 3. Guyana and Belize dropped out of the negotiations before 1958. The Bahamas did not participate in the federation talks. 4. Demas's 1987 book is based on an address at the inauguration of the National Advisory Committee of St. Vincent and the Grenadines on Political Unity in the Eastern Caribbean, July 20, 1987. 5. The current RSS members are Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 6. For a critical examination of how imposed governance has been used in developing areas, see de Alcantara 1998; Smouts 1998. 7. We are not advocating foreign military intervention. The issue is that, in some situations, the refusal to employ legitimate force led to catastrophic violence. Rwanda is testimony to what happens when the threat of imminent violence is not responded to. The massacre in 1994 of more than eight hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda is a clear example of what can happen when the international community fails to intervene in an incipient conflict. 8. Marie-Claude Smouts argues that the appeal to the notion of subsidiarity governance stems from the prospect of being able to manage external- ities collectively in the face of weakened individual governments. Furthermore, "Governance, when all is said and done, involves participation, negotiation and coordination.... The rationale of procedure (to maintain the mechanism of dia- logue) is at least as important as the rationale of substance (to perform an activity of public interest), factors of which observers of international life are well aware" (Smouts 1998, 84-86).

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