NAVY NEWS WEEK 49-1

2 December 2018

New named HMS Edinburgh Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson has announced HMS Edinburgh as the name of a cutting-edge British warship on the eve of St Andrew’s Day. Published 29 November 2018 From: Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Gavin Williamson CBE MP Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson has announced HMS Edinburgh as the name of a cutting-edge British warship on the eve of St Andrew’s Day. The -hunting state-of-the-art frigate builds on the city’s proud naval history and is the seventh warship to carry the name. And as the eighth frigate to be named in the future Type 26 fleet, Edinburgh will be built on the Clyde as part of a £3.7bn programme that will sustain 4,000 jobs. HMS Edinburgh will be at the forefront of the nation’s world- leading navy, providing unrivalled capability at sea. The Defence Secretary marked the announcement with Councillor Jason Rust, Bailie for the Lord Provost of the City of Edinburgh at the Nelson Monument and museum on Edinburgh’s Calton Hill. Speaking during a visit to Edinburgh, Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said: The new HMS Edinburgh is a symbol of the ’s future global ambition, but also the important role plays in shipbuilding and the national security of our country. Her cutting-edge capabilities will ensure that the UK remains a world- leader at sea, protecting our national interests and promoting global peace. Built on more than 300 years of proud naval history, HMS Edinburgh will play a crucial role in defending our nation for decades to come. The Lord Provost of Edinburgh, Frank Ross, said: The last HMS Edinburgh famously retired from the ’s fleet in 2013. Five years later, we are thrilled a new ship will be named in the city’s honour. Built on centuries of history, she will be the seventh ship to carry the HMS Edinburgh title. It will be a truly Scottish ship – built on the Clyde – and I hope she will visit us in the Port of Leith on her maiden voyage when the time comes. We’ve always enjoyed strong ties with the Royal Navy and the many hundreds of personnel who have served aboard the HMS Edinburgh vessels over the years. I’m sure the new ship will reinforce this bond. The first ship to carry the name HMS Edinburgh was a fifth-rate ship, which was transferred into the Royal Navy in 1707. The last was a Type 42 , which was decommissioned in 2013 after deployments to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Royal Navy ships carrying the name Edinburgh have won nine battle honours between them, with five being awarded during the Second World War. Scotland is already crucial to the United Kingdom’s defence capabilities, being home to the RAF’s Quick Reaction Alert interceptors and submarine-hunting Maritime Patrol Aircraft flying from Lossiemouth, and soon to the be home to the entire Royal Navy Submarine Service from 2020. More than 10,000 sailors, soldiers and air personnel are also living permanently in Scotland, supported by 8,000 reservists and civilians. Meanwhile, the Scottish industry benefits from £1.59bn of defence spending every year - supporting 10,500 private sector jobs - and just last year the Defence Board confirmed £1.7 billion would be invested to upgrade Scottish military bases over the next decade. All the Type 26 will be built on the Clyde, supported by suppliers across the country and securing decades of work for more than 4,000 people. The first three ships, HMS Glasgow, HMS Cardiff and HMS Belfast, have already been ordered for £3.7bn. HMS Edinburgh will join HMS Birmingham, HMS Sheffield, HMS Newcastle and HMS London as part of the second batch of Type 26 warships. The first Type 26 warship, HMS Glasgow, will enter service in the mid-2020s. Source: https://www.gov.uk

Kim Jong Un orders mass production of high-speed boats By Mun Dong Hui 2018.11.29 1:29pm North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the mass production of “high-speed boats” equipped with torpedos during a visit to Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province in July this year, report sources in the country. “As Kim was conducting an on-the- spot visit to Chongjin, he told a group of 2nd Economic Committee [North Korea’s military-related sector] officials that they need to produce a lot of high-speed boats,” said a source in North Hamgyong Province on November 22. “He said the country’s Soviet-made torpedo boats are so worn out that only a few actually operate, so they need to build a lot of new ones.” Kim appears to be referring to the Very Slender Vessel (VSV) equipped with torpedoes that North Korean announced it had developed in 2015. North Korean high-speed boats are generally equipped with 12.7mm or 14.5mm guns, but according to the regime, the VSV has a 30mm gun together with room for torpedos. The VSV has a pointed front and pierces through waves. “High-speed boats are being made in the Chongjin Shipyard in Sunam District,” said the source. “Boat engines are being made in the No. 129 Factory in Songpyong District.” Both the Chongjin Shipyard and No. 129 Factory are affiliated with the 2nd Economic Committee. The shipyard builds patrol boats and six-seater half-submarine attack vessels, while the No. 129 Factory produces sheets of aluminum and steel and parts for torpedoes. “Kim Jong Un has ordered the engines for high-speed boats be produced at the No. 129 Factory. He has handed down an order for the factory to produce 10 of these engines per month,” said a separate source in North Hamgyong Province. “The No. 129 Factory produced supplemental engines for Russian-made torpedo vessels in the past. Now it makes parts for the VSV.” Kim’s order for VSV production suggests he is trying to produce military-related parts domestically, a theme he has emphasized on a regular basis. Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on November 7 that Kim Jong Un visited the [Chongjin] shipyard to understand the structure, tactical and technical data and weapons installed in the combat vessels made there, stating that the “shipyard has created combat vessels that have outstanding maneuverability and firing capabilities, and that they will make the country’s naval forces even stronger.” Source: https://www.dailynk.com

The destroyer Zumwalt's big guns don't have any ammo, and the Navy may ditch them entirely because they don't even work right Ryan Pickrell Nov. 30, 2018, 11:08 AM

The guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), the Navy's most technologically advanced surface ship. Us Navy

 The US Navy's most expensive destroyer, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, could be losing its revolutionary 155mm deck guns, as the Navy has yet to find suitable ammunition.  The new ship class has also faced engineering, engine, and electrical problems, and recent photos suggest it may be losing some of its stealth.  The Navy plans to incorporate the Zumwalt into the fleet in 2021 as a platform that can strike land targets and other ships.  With a high-voltage electrical system, the ship is a top candidate for futuristic weapons systems like railguns and lasers. The Zumwalt-class destroyer, the largest and most advanced surface combatant in the world, was built to be a silent killer, but the revolutionary warship has faced a string of setbacks during development — including the embarrassing problem that its supergun still does not work right. The two 155mm guns of the Advanced Gun System on the Zumwalt, intended to strike targets farther than 80 miles away, are ridiculously expensive to fire, as a single Long Range Land Attack Projectile costs almost $1 million. Procurement was shut down two years ago, leaving the Zumwalt without any ammunition to fire. That's not the only problem — the gun also lacks the desired range, Breaking Defense reported Wednesday. "We just cannot get the thing to fly as far as we want," Vice Adm. William Merz, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems, told the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee Tuesday, explaining that the Navy may do away with the guns entirely if it can't develop effective and cost-efficient ammunition, according to Breaking Defense. The Navy "will be developing either the round that goes with that gun or what we are going to do with that space if we decide to remove that gun in the future," he continued. "The ship is doing fine, on track to be operational in 2021 in the fleet," he said, adding that the Zumwalt-class destroyer remains a "very capable platform with or without that gun." The Zumwalt-class were expected to serve as multi-mission ships, focusing primarily on land-attack and naval gunfire support missions with secondary anti-ship and anti-aircraft mission capabilities. The Navy saw the ship operating in coastal areas and supporting ground troops, but that mission was changed late last year, according to The Diplomat. The destroyer will now serve as a surface strike combatant, relying on a diverse arsenal of anti-ship and anti-air missiles capable of being launched from 80 Mk 54 Vertical Launch System cells, which Merz said were larger than those of other surface ships, creating more options for armaments. The Zumwalt, however, has fewer missile cells than the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, which have 96 and 122 missile launch cells that can carry interceptors, cruise missiles, and rocket-launched torpedoes. It appears that the Navy intends to force the Zumwalt through the development process and then sort the rest out later. "We determined that the best future for that ship is to get it out there with the capability that it has and separate out the Advanced Gun System, leaving everything else in place," Merz said, according to Breaking News. But the gun is apparently not the only problem when it comes to the Zumwalt. The ship has been steadily becoming less and less stealthy as the Navy settles for bolt-on components — including satellite communication antenna systems mounted on the sides and the high-frequency vertical antenna bolted on the top — amid efforts to cut costs. The Drive spotted these problems on one of three Zumwalt-class destroyers in the works. (There were initially supposed to be more than 30.) The publication speculated that these non-low-observable features would negatively affect the stealth capabilities of the ship, which was initially built to be as stealthy as a fishing boat. These potential detriments were not visible on earlier versions of the Zumwalt-class destroyers. The Zumwalt-class destroyers have also experienced serious engine and electrical problems during development. Nonetheless, the ship's twin Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines and advanced technological systems make it a candidate for future railgun and directed-energy weapons. "She is going to be a candidate for any advanced weapon system that we develop," Merz said Tuesday, according to Breaking Defense. The Zumwalt's primary competitor is China's Type 055 Renhai destroyer.

A Type 055 Renhai-class cruiser.REUTERS/China Stringer

Though the Chinese warship is not as technologically advanced as the Zumwalt, which remains unmatched, the Renhai destroyers are equipped with 112 VLS cells able to fire HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, CJ-10 land-attack cruise missiles, and missile-launched anti-submarine torpedoes, according to the South China Morning Post. The missions vary a bit, as the Type 055 is expected to serve as an air- defense and anti-submarine warship, one that could escort Chinese aircraft carriers. Source: https://www.businessinsider.com Maybe the US Navy should ask Turkey how they are doing it.

Here's how the world's 2 most powerful stealth destroyers stack up Daniel Brown Oct. 16, 2018, 1:10 PM China launched its first domestically-built Type 055 guided-missile stealth destroyer in July 2017, and since then, has added three more Type 055s to its fleet, with the last two launched in July 2018. It's no secret that China has grand ambitions for a world-class navy. In addition to its Type 055 destroyers, Beijing is also growing its fleet. But the US already has a world-class navy, and has even launched and commissioned its own new powerful Zumwalt-class of stealthy destroyers. While the Type 055's full specifications are still not completely known, it appears to be the one of the world's most powerful destroyers alongside the Zumwalt. Here's how the Type 055 and Zumwalt-class destroyers match up. First, let's compare the sizes. Type 055 is about 590 feet long and 65 feet wide with a maximum displacement of about 13,000—14,000 tons. The Zumwalt, on the other hand, is a much larger ship at 610 feet long and 81 feet wide with a maximum displacement of about 15,656 tons. In regards to propulsion, Type 055s have four QC-280 gas turbines, each providing about 23-28 megawatts of energy. This large amount of energy may one day power railguns or other future weapons systems. The Zumwalt, on the flip side, has two Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines, providing the ship with 78 megawatts of energy, including 58 megawatts in reserve. This reserve power may also power railguns or high-energy lasers in the future. In terms of stealth, Type 055 has an enclosed forward deck, main mast and bow, with the latter hiding the anchor and other equipment. But its hull and superstructure are fairly conventional. The Zumwalt, however, is stealthy from the bottom up, including enclosed gun turrets and sensors. The Zumwalt's "Tumblehome" hull and superstructure "significantly reduces cross section and acoustic output making the ship harder to detect by enemies at sea," according to the US Navy. As for radars, Type 055 uses X and S-band radars, with the former being used to track smaller and stealthier targets, and the latter being used to track targets at greater ranges. But the Zumwalt only has an X-band Spy-3 radar. It was supposed to have a similar dual-band radar as Type 055, but the S-band radar was cut to save costs. And for armament, Type 055 has 112 Vertical Launch System cells, each cell having a diameter of about 2.8 feet. The VLS tubes fire HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, CJ-10 land-attack cruise missiles and missile-launched anti-submarine torpedoes. Type 055 is also equipped with an H/PJ-38 130 mm main gun on the bow, and H/PJ-11 and HHQ-10 close-in weapons systems for last minute defense. But the Zumwalt only has 80 VLS cells, each of which have a diameter of about 2.3 feet. The Zumwalt VLS cells can fire Tomahawk, Evolved Sea Sparrow, and other guided missiles. It's also equipped with two 155 mm Advanced Gun Systems on the bow, and two Mark 46 close-in guns which fire 30 mm rounds. Rounds for the AGS are so expensive, about $1 million apiece, that the Navy doesn't have any and has no plans to buy them, rendering the deck guns effectively out of service. Ultimately though, the two destroyers will have different mission sets. Type 055 destroyers will focus more on air defense, anti-submarine missions and protecting carriers, which is why they have more VLS cells and a longer range than the Zumwalt. These mission sets, along with its large size, are why the US has even classified the Type 055 as a cruiser. Although analysts say the Zumwalt is ultimately more powerful than Type 055, the US destroyer is more of a land attack ship, designed to deploy close to enemy shores and fire its large 155 mm guns like old — if they ever get ammunition. This also explains why the US only has plans to build three Zumwalt-class destroyers, and China plans to build about 12-24 Type 055 destroyers. Source: https://www.businessinsider.com

India-UK joint naval exercise 'Konkan-2018' begins at Goa Devdiscourse News Desk panaji Last Updated at 29-11-2018 21:07:02 IST

(Image Credit: Flickr)

India-UK joint naval exercise "Konkan- 2018" has started at Goa and would go on till December 6, the Indian Navy (IN) said on Thursday. The Royal Navy of UK will be represented by HMS Dragon, a Type 45 Class Destroyer equipped with an integral Wildcat helicopter. The Indian Navy will field INS Kolkata, the first ship of latest Kolkata class destroyers, equipped with integral Speaking and an IN submarine during the sea phase between December 2 to 6. In addition, the Indian Navy's maritime patrol aircraft Dornier will also participate in the exercise. The harbour phase is already underway from November 28 to 30. The thrust of the exercise this year would be on anti-submarine warfare, visit board search and seizure (VBSS), anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare and seamanship evolutions. The Konkan series of exercises commenced in 2004, and since then has grown in scale. Both navies have, over the years, undertaken bilateral activities such as training exchanges and technical cooperation. "The bilateral Konkan exercise provides a platform for the two navies to periodically exercise at sea and in the harbour, so as to build interoperability and share best practices," a Navy release said. Source: https://www.devdiscourse.com

World War 3: China WARNS Japan over plan to convert aircraft carriers for FIGHTER JETS BEIJING has issued a stark warning to Tokyo to not go ahead with plans to put F-35 Stealth jets aboard aircraft carriers, claiming the move would “drive the country to repeat its militaristic history”. By Joe Gamp PUBLISHED: 08:43, Fri, Nov 30, 2018 | UPDATED: 09:08, Fri, Nov 30, 2018 Since the end of World War II, Japan’s military has functioned as a self defence unit, with the US keeping eye on the once militarised nation following its surrender at the end of conflict on September 2, 1945. But now a Chinese news agency has reportedly responded to Tokyo’s decision to modify an aircraft carrier – the JS Izumo helicopter carrier – to carry F-35B fighter jets. The fighter planes are said to cost a total of $8.8billion (£6.8billion), with the value of each jet said to be $88million (£68million). Sources familiar with the process claim the addition of the fighter jets – which can take off and land vertically – would upend the balance of power in Asia. Asia Times reported the modification of the ship to carry the Stealth fighter jets would change the boats from self-defence tools to full-fledged assets for military expansion. On Thursday, according to Japanese news agency Asahi Shimbun, the plan to buy 100 of the stealth fighter jets was “aspirational” and said that in reality Tokyo was planning to buy “around 40” of the US produced jets. But a source confirmed to CNN that the expansion will include 100 F-35s - 40 of which are F-35B variants. The source said the move will mark the first time JApan has harnessed this type of military capability since the end of World War II. They told CNN: "With short take-off vertical landing capability you are now able to operate at sea. You are able to penetrate areas and reach ranges in a shorter distance which is an important capability." They told CNN: "With short take-off vertical landing capability you are now able to operate at sea. You are able to penetrate areas and reach ranges in a shorter distance which is an important capability." On Wednesday, Japanese Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya told a briefing that Japan wished to acquire a "highly competent fighter jet" and confirmed the defence ministry was working towards modifying 27,000-ton Izumo-class destroyers to carry fighter jets.

The potential modification of the ships could turn them from Self defence to military-ready weapons (Image: GETTY)

Mr Takeshi told reporters: “Since this is valuable equipment that we already own, I think it would be desirable to use it for as many purposes as possible." Chinese military analyst Song Zhongping told Asia Times: "By having the F-35B on its carriers, Japan will be asked to play a bigger role in the US' global military strategy to the extent that Japan might be able to deploy its troops around the world.” Asia Times also reported that an unnamed military expert claimed: "Japan must not forget its infamous history of invading countries and regions in the Asia-Pacific region during the WWII." Japan's mid-term defence maintenance plan comes up for approval by the cabinet, lead by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in December. Source: https://www.express.co.uk

We Have The First Official Report On 's Sunken Frigate And It Isn't Pretty The investigation into the accident is still ongoing, but it has already uncovered confusion on the bridge and design flaws in the ship. By Joseph Trevithick November 29, 2018 Norwegian authorities have released a preliminary report regarding the collision of Royal Norwegian Navy frigate Helge Ingstad and the -flagged oil tanker Sola on Nov. 8, 2019. The initial findings detail a series of confused missteps on the part of warship’s crew leading up to the accident, but also describe potentially serious defects in the ship’s basic design, which could have far-reaching ramifications. The Accident Investigation Board of Norway (AIBN), together with the Defense Accident Investigation Board Norway (DAIBN), publicly posted the first major review of the mishap online on Nov. 29, 2018. Helge Ingstad has been slowly sinking in the water outside of the Sture Oil and Gas Terminal outside of the city of Bergen since the accident occured, but the Norwegian Armed Forces, or Forsvaret, are continuing their efforts to salvage the vessel. The Sola only suffered minor damage.  Stricken Norwegian Frigate Has Almost Completely Sunk After Its Anchor Wires SnappedBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone  Norwegian Frigate To Oil Tanker Before Collision: 'We Have Everything Under Control'By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone  We Have Located The Precise Spot Where Norway's Half Sunken Frigate Lies (Updated)By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone  One Of These Five Ships Will Become The U.S. Navy's Next Frigate By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone  Badly Damaged Norwegian Frigate Intentionally Ran Aground After Tanker Collision (Updated)By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone “This report is a preliminary presentation of the AIBN's investigations relating to the accident and does not provide a full picture,” the report warns up front. “The report may contain errors and inaccuracies.” Based on what the investigators have determined so far, Helge Ingstad entered the fjord heading south and checked in with the Fedje Maritime Traffic Center, or Fedje VTS, at around 2:40 AM local time. Any ship over 80 feet long has to alert this control center before entering due to the narrow nature of the waterway. The ship was traveling at approximately 20 miles per hour and had its navigation lights on. The ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder was set to “receive only” mode, meaning that it was not transmitting its own position and other information to ships in the area. At 3:40 AM, personnel on Helge Ingstad’s bridge began to turn control of the ship over the next watch. At that time, the ship’s crew was aware of three northbound ships on its radar screen and had also visually observed “an object with many lights was observed lying still just outside the Sture terminal,” according to the report.

Helge Ingstad sails in front of the Canadian Halifax-class frigate Ville de Québec off the coast of Norway during NATO's Exercise Trident Juncture in October 2018.

Sola did not leave the terminal until 3:45 AM. Less than 15 minutes later, the tanker’s crew radioed the Fedje VTS to inquire about a contract on their radar that was sailing with its AIS transponder apparently off. At 4:00 AM, Fedje VTS identified the ship in question as probably Helge Ingstad and the tanker and the frigate began communicating directly. Approximately one minute later, the two ships collided. At present, investigators say the most likely cause of the accident was the frigate’s crew mistaking the lights they saw in the distance for a static object rather than a moving ship. The watchstanders on Helge Ingstad also appeared to believe, at least at the beginning, that they were communicating with one of the three other vessels they had previously identified on their radar.

A gash in the side of Helge Ingstad after the collision. Forsvaret

This determination is based in no small part on the response from Helge Ingstad to Sola’s demand at that the warship immediately turn hard to starboard to avoid a collision. The frigate’s crew indicated that they couldn’t turn in that direction because they would hit the “lighted object” along the shore, which turned out to be the tanker in motion well away from the actual shoreline. The warship’s crew had told their counterparts onboard Sola that they planned to pass this object before turning, which could explain why they made no attempt to maneuver until right before the collision. This doesn’t explain why Helge Ingstad was unaware that there was a fourth ship heading north in the fjord, since Sola’s AIS transponder was on and transmitting. Publicly available radar tracks show the tanker, as well, meaning it should also have been visible to the frigate’s own radars, too. There also appears to have been a lapse in good judgment in crew's decision to change the watch on the bridge while they were in the middle of a congested shipping lane. The preliminary report also raises questions regarding training and procedures for positively identifying ships and other potential hazards, especially in the dark. A final report on the incident should contain more thorough explanations of exactly how the final moments of the collision played out and recommendations for the Norwegian Navy to try and prevent these sorts of accidents in the future. “So far, the AIBN has not seen any indication of technical systems not working as intended up until the time of the collision,” the report notes. Separate from its findings regarding the events leading to the collision, the AIBN has also uncovered a serious technical issue that could have impacts well beyond this particular accident. Norwegian officials have alerted both the country’s navy and Spanish shipbuilder Navantia, which built the Helge Ingstad and Norway’s four other Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates, with concerns they have about the basic “watertight integrity” of the ships. “The AIBN has found safety critical issues relating to the vessel's watertight compartments,” an annex to the main report explains. “This must be assumed to also apply to the other four Nansen-class frigates. It cannot be excluded that the same applies to vessels of a similar design delivered by Navantia, or that the design concept continues to be used for similar vessel models.” After the collision, the frigate’s crew identified flooding in three compartments, the aft generator room, a crew quarters, and the stores room. Damage parties were uncertain about whether or not the steering engine room, the ship’s aftmost compartment, was also filling with water. All of these compartments are all supposed to be watertight, specifically to help contain damage from spreading. Unfortunately, the frigate’s crew found that water was rushing from the generator room into the gear room, which was not otherwise breached, through the hollow propeller shaft tubes. Stuffing boxes in bulkheads in the gear room also failed, leading to flooding in the adjacent aft and fore engine rooms. “This meant that the flooding became substantially more extensive than indicated by the original damage,” the report explains. “Based on the flooding of the gear room, it was decided to prepare for evacuation.” Needless to say, this is a major problem. It calls into question the ability of the ships to withstand any serious damage to their aft compartments, something that is pretty important for a surface combatant. The five Fridtjof Nansen-class ships form the very core of Norway’s naval surface warfare capabilities, too. The loss of Helge Ingstad by itself has forced the Royal Norwegian Navy to reassess its deployment schedule and has prevented it from fulfilling the full scheduled extent of its obligations to Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1). The Forsvaret continues to hope the frigate will only be temporarily out of commission, though this seems increasingly unlikely given the news about the extent of the damage and flooding. Even more worryingly, the frigates are derived from Navantia’s F100 design, of which Spain has five in service, known as the Álvaro de Bazán-class. Navantia is also building a class of enlarged F100-derived destroyers, known as the Hobart-class, for Australia. Beyond that, the Spanish firm had unsuccessfully pitched a derivative of the design to Canada. It is still proposing one, through a partnership with U.S. contractor General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, to the U.S. Navy for that service’s FFG(X) program. If the watertight integrity issues are present in any of these other ships, it could have serious immediate impacts on the ability of the Norwegian and Spanish navies abilities to conduct operations. If the issues are widespread, and depending on how difficult and labor intensive they might be to fix, it could also delay work on Australia’s future Hobart-class ships. Even if Navantia worked out a relatively easy solution, that this problem escaped notice for so long – the first Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate entered service in 2006 – could make potential customers reticent to consider F100-derived ships or other designs from the company in the future. All told, the issue potentially opens up the shipbuilder, which is a Spanish-government owned enterprise, to lawsuits and financial losses. "Navantia has offered, since the very beginning, its collaboration with the [Royal Norwegian Navy] in order to clarify the accident," Esther Benito Lope, a Navantia spokesperson, told Defense News. "Navantia will analyze all the possibilities, considering that some of the mentioned possibilities … are concluded from a very preliminary investigation." The full extent of the damage and the exact nature of any design flaws won’t be known until Norway raises Helge Ingstad from the seabed and gets her back into port. This salvage process is still underway, but has been significantly delayed since the frigate almost completely sank on the night of Nov. 12-13, 2018. Bad weather has further hampered the recovery effort. On Nov. 29, 2018, the Forsvaret said that contractors had attached additional chains to help keep the ship in place and prevent it from completely sinking beneath the waves. Ships and other equipment from private maritime company BOA, which is leading the salvage operation, including the floating crane barge Rambiz and diver support ship Risøy, are in the area and waiting for the weather to clear to resume work. With all the factors at play, there is no firm timeline for when the Norwegian Navy might get Helge Ingstad into a dry dock so inspectors can get a full look at the ship, inside and out. If nothing else, Norway is down at least one frigate and it's already looking to reassess whether the four it has left are truly combat ready. Source: http://www.thedrive.com

Marines Riding On Cargo Ship To Pacific Exercises A Sign Of A More Flexible Deployment Strategy Using the cargo ship helps reduce demand on warships and puts more Marines in more places at any given time. By Joseph Trevithick November 15, 2018 Members of the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy are conducting the latest iteration of a set of regional exercises throughout the South Pacific while embarked on a container and roll-on-roll-off cargo ship, the USNS Gunnery Sergeant Fred W. Stockham. This isn’t the first time the Marines and sailors have used this mode of transportation for these drills, but it reflects an increasingly important option for deploying Marines and other American forces during various types of combat and non-combat that also helps ease the strain on traditional amphibious vessels and surface combatants. The embarked elements of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and U.S. Pacific Fleet, kicked off the first of their exercises, known collectively as Koa Moana, or “ocean warrior” in Hawaiian, in French Polynesia in September 2018. They subsequently traveled to Vanuatu nearly 3,000 miles further west. The drills will run through December 2018, with additional stops in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, the last location being a U.S. commonwealth. “The task force's continued multilateral engagements are designed to strengthen and enhance relationships among the United States and partner nations in the Indo-Pacific and South Pacific regions,” a statement from the I Marine Expeditionary Force, which contributed personnel to the deployment, explained. “Koa Moana promotes regional security and stability, and improves interoperability between security establishments by preparing to respond effectively to crises, and maintain a flexible and effective maritime force in readiness.” These exercises cover a range of military, law enforcement, and disaster response skill sets and are valuable for forming relationships with security forces in these small island nations and territories that would be useful in the event of any future crisis. They also include civil-military engagements, typically pop-up medical and dental clinics and community construction projects, which provide an immense, if often intangible benefit in promoting American interests abroad. Exercises such as Koa Moana are cost-effective tools to counter the influence of potential opponents, such as China, which is seeking to expand its influence and ability to project military power in the region. Though Chinese and Ni- Vanuatu authorities subsequently denied it, there were reports earlier in 2018 that the People’s Liberation Army Navy had sought to establish a base in the country, underscoring the outsized geopolitical significance of that island nation. Vanuatu's government later asked for a more permanent U.S. military presence. But Koa Moana, which has occurred regularly since at least 2015, and the use of the Stockham in particular, also highlight important developments in the U.S. military’s own ability to conduct expeditionary and distributed operations in the region. Around the same time that the drills first began, the Marines and Navy were exploring increasing the use of non-combatant cargo ships and their civilian merchant marine crews from Military Sealift Command (MSC) to help support various operational demands. “We will evaluate and experiment with Marine detachments on ships other than amphibious vessels such as afloat forward staging bases, destroyers, littoral combat ships, mobile landing platforms, and joint high-speed vessels,” Former Marine Commandant General James Amos and then-current Chief of Naval Operations U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Greenert had argued in a 2013 article in Proceedings magazine. “[The Marine Corps needs to] modify traditional employment methods and augment amphibious warships by adapting other vessels for sea-based littoral operations.” Shipbuilder National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), now part of General Dynamics, originally delivered Stockham, which displaces more than 54,000 tons with a full load, to the Maersk Line shipping company as the M/V Lica Maersk in 1980. The Navy picked her up in 1997, originally naming her the USNS Soderman. The Navy withdrew her from service in 2000 to convert her into an “enhanced prepositioning ship,” which involved modifications to improve her ability to load and unload cargo simultaneously, either using her roll-on-roll-off features or rear helipad, and do so both while in established ports or sitting offshore. In the latter case, the ship can employ temporary floating docks to transfer cargo to smaller ships and landing craft who would then ferry it ashore. The ship returned to service in 2001, at which time the Navy rechristened her the Stockham. This makes the Stockham, one of three Shughart-class ships, a cost-effective option for shuttling the Marines and sailors around to their various ports of call in the South Pacific during Koa Moana. It can easily unload their vehicles and other equipment thanks to its roll-on-roll-off configuration. These same capabilities, plus its “enhanced” features, would make it a valuable tool in responding to any humanitarian disaster, as well.

USNS Stockham, at rear, performs a "skin-to-skin" operation with the expeditionary transfer dock USNS Montford Point. A ramp connects the cargo ship to the other vessel, allowing vehicles to drive straight out onto the deck and then onto waiting landing craft. USN

But leveraging MSC's cargo fleets also gives Marines, as well as other American forces, added flexibility to respond to a wider variety of crises abroad where a maritime deployment may be the most effective option, but when no surface combatants are in the immediate vicinity or available on short notice. A roll-on roll-off ship such as the Stockham would be a good tool for delivering Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Companies into a hotspot where the nearest military airfield or civilian airport may be off limits. These units are on call at various locations around the world to reinforce American embassies and rapidly respond to other overseas contingencies, such as a major terrorist attack or violent political upheaval. Special operations forces also benefit from the additional deployment capacity cargo ships offer. Special operators already have at least one dedicated converted roll-on roll-off ship themselves, the M/V Ocean Trader, that acts as a mothership and sea base for covert operations. Ships such as Stockham might not have all the features of purpose converted vessel, but could still provide a useful capability for less intensive, lower-priority operations. Having more Marines afloat at any one time, regardless of what units they come from, only increases the service's ability to respond quickly to global crises in general. In the Pacific, in particular, distributed and expeditionary operations could easily see U.S. personnel spread across a broad area full of high- and low-risk environments, and everything in between, increasing the need to be able to rapidly and flexibility respond to new developments. Using MSC ships means the service can provide this enhanced presence that without the Navy having to buy additional ships. In using MSC's ships, the Marines and sailors also don’t have to rely entirely on larger, traditional amphibious ships, or other surface combatants, especially for those low- or no-risk missions. This eases the operational demands on those vessels, which are limited in number, always in high demand, are more expensive to operate, and are suffering from Navy-wide maintenance backlogs that are limiting the availability of all surface warships and . The latter issue is “a sucking chest wound,” U.S. Marine Corps Major General David Coffman, in charge of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation's Expeditionary Warfare Division said during a talk at the Hudson Institute think tank on Nov. 9, 2018. As such, the flexibility offered by MSC’s fleets is only of increasing importance, especially in the Pacific, where tensions with the Chinese have been ratcheting up all throughout 2018 as relations have cooled due to a number of different factors. Using cost-effective bolt-on launchers for over-the-horizon anti-ship and land attack missiles, such as the Navy's newly acquired Naval Strike Missiles, MSC's ships, including the Shughart-class roll-on- roll-off ships, can be more active players in future combat operations. The Navy has already been exploring simply embarking Marine Corps truck-mounted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) or other ground-based, mobile missile launchers on various ships to give them an immediate boost in stand-off strike capability. Either option would give forces ashore extra firepower without the Navy necessarily needing to employ more expensive surface combatants or submarines. Previous deployments have shown that embarking Marines and other uniformed military personnel on the cargo ships is something of a morale boost, as well. Merchant mariners usually “get pretty fancy meals and places to eat and meals and lounges that are pretty unheard of in the Navy,” as well as more luxurious crew quarters and recreational facilities, retired Navy Captain Bob Sweeney, formerly commander of MSC’s Far East division, told Marine Corps Times in 2015. Of course, using MSC’s ships for more varied roles isn’t an all-purpose solution. In their present state, the bulk of the command’s ships have, at best, very limited defenses and would be extremely vulnerable even in medium-threat environments, an issue that came to the forefront just recently when the Navy admitted it did not have the necessary ships to adequately protect maritime logistics operations during a high-end conflict. Increasing the offensive and defensive capabilities of MSC’s cargo fleets may be more complicated. The ships' non-combatant status and civilian crews present doctrinal and legal obstacles to using them in more serious conflicts, to begin with. There’s also the matter of age and the total number of cargo vessels, which may be under increasing strain themselves in the near future. Still, the added capabilities and capacity that ships such as Stockham offer Marines and other uniformed personnel when it comes to various mission sets is definitely another argument for expanding and improving MSC’s inventory, though. All told, the Stockham transporting a relatively small number of Marines and sailors around to exercises in the South Pacific is a pretty mundane task for the ship. But it’s also an important demonstration of the less visible options available to the U.S. military to move personnel around the region, which may be vital for responding to future regional crises. Source: http://www.thedrive.com

A Question of Time: Improving Taiwan’s Maritime Deterrence Posture November 15, 2018 Joe Petrucelli The following essay is adapted from a report published by George Mason University’s Center for Security Policy Studies: A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture By Joe Petrucelli

Tuo Jiang-class missile boat in service with the Taiwanese Navy. (Defense Ministry of Taiwan)

Just last month two U.S. Navy warships conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait, reminding the world that the status of Taiwan remains contested and unresolved. Although China prefers to use peaceful means to achieve unification, it has not taken the possibility of force off the table. Accordingly, Taiwan remains one of the few states to endure the plausible risk of military invasion. After visiting Taiwan to study this problem, a team of researchers, including the author, recently released a report advocating for a dramatic shift in Taiwan’s conventional deterrence posture. Among our recommendations, we call for Taiwan’s navy to change its current acquisition priorities and embrace an unconventional-asymmetric doctrine of sea denial. We suggest this shift in maritime strategy because of what we termed Taiwan’s deterrence trilemma. At a strategic level, Taiwan must simultaneously accomplish three goals that exist in tension with each other:  It must counter China’s grey zone challenges, which means Taiwan must project symbolic strength across its airspace and territorial waters;  It must raise the costs of invasion, which means it needs forces that can prolong any conflict and inflict unacceptable losses on the invaders; and  It must do both of these things in a resource-constrained environment defined by a general unwillingness to significantly increase defense spending At least in the near term, a military invasion remains unlikely since the PLA faces a number of obstacles that complicate its ability to mount a successful invasion. Nonetheless, time is on China’s side and Taiwan’s naval doctrine and force posture remain misaligned. Although Taiwan has revised its strategy to emphasize multi-domain, asymmetric deterrence, it remains focused on purchasing high-end, high-capability systems such as the F-35B fighter, Aegis-like destroyers and diesel submarines, the “darlings of their service chiefs.” We argue that Taiwan should enhance its deterrence posture by adopting a more coherent and holistic approach. Specifically, we recommend that it adopt an elastic denial-in-defense strategy, which will consist of three core elements:  Accept risk in the grey zone. Grey zone aggression does not constitute an existential threat allowing Taiwan to rebalance its force to maintain “just enough” capability to push back against grey zone challenges, such sufficient naval strength to prevent and intercept unwanted excursions into Taiwanese waters;  Prioritize denial operations. Specifically, divest as many costly, high-tech platforms as possible so as to invest in large numbers of relatively low-cost, counter-invasion capabilities. This would raise the cost associated with bringing a hostile force close to Taiwan’s shores; and  Invest in popular resistance. The prospect of waging a prolonged insurgency will likely deter China’s leadership far more than the threat of fighting a relatively small, conventional force. We are not the first to propose shifting to an asymmetric maritime force to deny China use of the seas as an invasion corridor. Numerous reports and analyses have suggested specific maritime platforms Taiwan should acquire to execute a sea denial strategy, such as fast missile boats, semi-submersibles, mini-submarines, mines, and coastal defense cruise missiles. We entirely agree with these recommendations and note that to date, despite talk of an asymmetric strategy, Taiwan has made only marginal changes. For example, while it has modestly increased its inventory of missile boats and anti-ship cruise missiles, Taiwan’s navy remains anchored around a relatively small and therefore vulnerable inventory of high-end platforms. The political reality is that Taiwan’s navy faces major resource constraints and so must make difficult choices. Accordingly, Taiwan should defer its high-profile procurement priorities, especially the Aegis-like destroyer and the Indigenous Diesel Submarine (IDS). These are technically challenging programs, especially given Taiwan’s lack of experience building similar platforms. Additionally, they are expensive enough that Taiwan will not be able to field them in large numbers and ultimately remain vulnerable to Chinese long-range strike and anti-access weapons systems. Taiwan’s current naval fleet, although aged, is sufficient to “show the flag” and resist grey-zone aggression for the near future. Instead of these planned procurements, Taiwan should significantly increase the numbers of low-cost, lethal platforms, even at the expense of other planned procurements. These lower cost platforms, by the larger numbers procured, complicate adversary targeting and improve their force-level survivability against PLA strike capabilities. Taiwan should start by fielding a larger fleet than currently envisioned of its stealthy Tuo Jiang missile and build on the lessons learned from these small to field a future small frigate. Both can fulfill peacetime missions but be built in large enough numbers to possibly survive in a wartime environment. By delaying the more ambitious destroyer and IDS programs and starting with smaller, less expensive projects, Taiwan can best prioritize limited resources. This incremental approach also helps develop relevant technical capability, so that potential future submarine and large surface combatant programs are less technically risky when it becomes fiscally and strategically appropriate to build them. The immediate savings from delaying the destroyer and IDS programs can be diverted into the sea denial platforms that Taiwan needs now, ranging from the small frigate discussed above to even smaller missile boats, mini-subs and mobile anti-ship cruise missiles. Moreover, Taiwan should eliminate its entire amphibious force. Bluntly speaking, Taiwan’s amphibious assault ships are strategically unnecessary as they are not immediately useful for confronting limited challenges to Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty or other “grey zone” aggression. They also have no ability to counter a cross-strait invasion. Rather than procure expensive amphibious assault ships and maintain aging landing craft, which generate sizable sustainment costs, Taiwan should retire this entire force. It can then shift these savings into further investments in counter-invasion capabilities. Because Taiwan’s Marine Corps would be losing its sealift, it should be rebranded as Taiwan’s premier counter-amphibious force so as to fill a gap between the navy’s sea denial role and the army’s ground denial mission. Specifically, it would specialize in defending possible landing zones with mines and spread out hard points in addition to engaging landing craft with dispersed, near- shore weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles. These proposals to transform Taiwan’s naval strategy and procurement plans would produce a force capable of waging a sea denial campaign against a conventionally superior opponent, tailored to the specific threat of a cross-Strait invasion. The changes in naval force structure would be mirrored throughout Taiwan’s armed forces, to include a reduction in army ground strength, the termination of plans to procure F-35B fighters, and accelerated procurement of similar asymmetric capabilities. To invest in popular resistance, we recommend transforming Taiwan’s two-million-man Reserve Force into a Territorial Defense Force prepared to conduct a lengthy insurgency campaign. By abandoning plans for a decisive battle and shifting to a posture that increases invasion costs and prevents a quick victory, Taiwan can better deter China. Read about these recommendations and more in the full report: A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture. Joe Petrucelli is a Ph.D. student at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government and a currently mobilized U.S. Navy reserve officer. The analysis and opinions expressed here are his alone and they do not represent those of the Department of Defense. Source: http://cimsec.org