Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue MARCH 2012 Table of Contents

About the Report...... 4 Introductory Note...... 4 What It Is About: A Human Dimension...... 4 Part I: Religious Dimensions of FGC: Perceptions and Practice...... 5 I.1. Introducing FGC as a Development Issue...... 5 I.1.a. Background: Definitions and Context...... 6 I.1.b. Culture or Religion?...... 6 I.1.c. Origins and Prevalence...... 7 I.2. Awareness and Opposition...... 12 I.2.a. FGC as a Human Rights Issue...... 12 I.2.b. The Limits of Cultural Pluralism...... 12 I.2.c. Local Activists and Global Civil Society...... 13 I.2.d. International Law and National Sovereignty...... 14 I.2.e. Policies of U.S. and European Governments...... 14 I.3. Religious Actors and FGC: Support and Opposition...... 15 I.3.a. Mechanisms: Religion As It Influences FGC Practices...... 15 I.3.b. Religion and Support for FGC...... 16 I.3.c. Religion and Opposition to FGC...... 17 Part II: FGC in Egypt...... 18 II.1. General Background: Egypt...... 18 II.1.a. Demographics and Gender in Egypt...... 18 II.1.b. Government...... 19 II.1.c. Religion in Egypt...... 20 II.2. FGC in Egypt...... 21 II.2.a. History and Prevalence...... 21 II.2.b. International Law and National Sovereignty: The Legal Situation in Egypt...... 22 II.2.c. Local Activists and Global Civil Society in Egypt...... 22 II.2.d. The Limits of Cultural Pluralism...... 23 II.2.e. Policies of U.S. and European Governments...... 23 Appendix...... 24 References...... 25 Further Reading...... 29 Footnotes...... 30 Boxes and Figures Figure 1: FGM/C Prevalence at National Level...... 6 Figure 2: Prevalence of FGC by Country...... 7 Box 1: Terminology and Practices...... 8 Box 2: Religious Sources and FGC...... 8 Box 3: Gender and FGC...... 15 Box 4: The January 25 Revolution, Public Spaces, and Gender...... 19 Figure 3: Distribution of FGC in Egypt...... 21

The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University, created within the Office of the President in 2006, is dedicated to the interdisciplinary study of religion, ethics, and public life. Through research, teaching, and service, the Center explores global challenges of democracy and human rights; economic and social development; international diplomacy; and interreligious understanding. Two premises guide the Center’s work: that a deep examination of faith and values is critical to address these challenges, and that the open engagement of religious and cultural traditions with one another can promote peace.

About this Publication

This is the pilot in a series of case studies intended to highlight the complex dimensions of specific global development issues. It is designed as a teaching tool for use in the classroom as a four-hour workshop. The goals are twofold: (a) to explore in-depth a topic that is important for both human rights (gender equality, rights of children) and public health, and that is rooted in both culture and religious practice; and (b) to learn about opportunities and pitfalls of international approaches to addressing the issues raised in such cases. It is meant to provoke discussion and critical analysis by offering a range of perspectives and approaches to an issue, with the intent that readers will draw their own conclusions.

About the Author

Anny Gaul is a Georgetown student working towards an M.A. in Arab Studies at the School of Foreign Service and a Ph.D in Arabic Language & Literature at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. After graduating from Yale with honors, she spent two years in the Peace Corps in southern Morocco, working on projects ranging from small business development to gender issues to HIV/AIDS awareness & prevention. Her research at the Berkley Center focuses on religion, gender, and global development. Other academic interests include food studies, literacy & language policy, and politics of culture & representation in the Arab world.

Introductory Note This case study is designed for use in the classroom as a focused, four-hour workshop. The goals are twofold: (a) to explore in- depth a topic that is important for both human rights (gender equality, rights of children) and public health, and that is rooted in both culture and religious practice; and (b) to learn about opportunities and pitfalls of international approaches to addressing the issues raised in such cases. The text was prepared by Anny Gaul, Berkley Center graduate fellow, under the supervision of Thomas Banchoff and Katherine Marshall.

What It Is About: A Human Dimension Fauziya Kasindja was 17 years old when she fled Togo in 1994 and sought asylum in the United States. She was imprisoned for two years as an illegal entrant. Women’s organizations supported her defense. In May 1996, she was declared a political refugee and granted asylum. The grounds were important: that she was fleeing genital surgery and forced marriage at home. She has since written a book and received awards for her courage. Her case has helped to change attitudes in the United States and illustrates several dimensions of the issue, among them the rights of the child, gender attitudes in her country and internationally, and local circumstances that color understandings of the practice of female genital cutting.

Kasindja’s parents had supported their five daughters’ freedom of choice, sending them to school and refraining from the local tradition of female genital cutting. However, after her father died, her mother was forced to leave their home, and Kasindja came under the tutelage of her father’s brother and his wife (her sisters were already married). Kasindja’s uncle and aunt took a more “traditional” view of culture. Kasindja had to leave school: “we don’t think girls should be too civilized,” said the aunt. Arrange- ments were made for surgery and her marriage to a man of forty-five who already had three wives. Although genital surgery was against Togolese law, the law was not enforced. Kasindja fled, with help from a sister. Her rights were affirmed, not without considerable difficulty, in the United States.

However, the challenge remains for her community – a reality clearly illustrated by the way that Kasindja’s fight affected her mother’s position. A September 11, 1996 New York Times article focused on what happened to the mother in the wake of Kasindja’s departure. A widow without brothers or a living father in a society with few opportunities for women without male protection, she had no choice but to return to the village where her brother-in-law was headman. The mother was accepted back after she presented herself before her brother-in-law and other male elders, apologized for her rebellion in allowing her daughter to escape, and performed other acts of contrition and obeisance. Even through this process, the mother was not allowed to speak for herself, but had to have a male cousin as spokesperson.

The article highlights the cultural, economic, and power dynamics at work. Among other dimensions, it observed that the uncle was more willing than the sister-in-law to discuss ending genital surgery. Many women in Togo and elsewhere, including the midwives whose sources of livelihood depend on the practice, support genital surgeries, often as a source or representation of women’s solidarity. Not to have the operation, or to allow your daughters to escape it, can imply moral turpitude, making it difficult or impossible to obtain a spouse, a disastrous fate in a place with few roles for single women.1

Questions to consider:

• Religious messages about this topic vary and often conflict. How does this complicate understandings of how religion functions within a society, a social change movement, or a transnational process such as development? What are some possible strategies for navigating contradictory religious messages?

• How might generational differences influence attitudes towards FGC in a given community? (Consider, for example, how religious attitudes might change with age and how the impacts of cultural trends or religious social movements might vary among different generations of a given society)

• To what degree is the continuation of FGC a result of women’s subordinated roles in patriarchal societies? How far is the continuation of the practice linked to religious norms that affect relationships between men and women? How can the planned groups address the “patriarchy” dimensions of the issue?

• How do preconceptions about Islam in particular color the debates around FGC? What are appropriate responses?

I.1. Introducing FGC Is FGC primarily a culturally or a religiously linked practice? The topic is complicated by its complex association with religious teachings and A common practice in many African and Middle Eastern communi- a common understanding (however little bolstered by religious teach- ties, female genital cutting (FGC), also commonly referred to as female ing) that FGC is prescribed by Islam. It is largely but not exclusively genital mutilation or female circumcision, outrages many outside ob- found in Muslim communities, mostly but not always in Africa. Vari- servers. It is a prominent and polarizing flashpoint in debates that occur ous Christian and African traditional religious communities also prac- at the intersection of culture, religion, gender, development, and human tice it; indeed, it was practiced as recently as the early twentieth century rights. in Europe and North America. Though no global religious leader today supports FGC, local faith leaders often support or at least condone the Well-meaning efforts to end the practice, led by a variety of institutions practice. Many individuals justify the practice in religious terms. Thus and individuals, governments and private entities over many decades, religion is at issue in complex ways. have yielded disappointing results. The practice is deeply embedded in cultural traditions and reflects, at various levels, a community’s approach The practice is widely seen as violating international human rights stan- to gender relations and specifically to women’s traditional, often subser- dards. From a modern medical perspective, FGC has damaging health vient roles. effects and no health benefits. But efforts to change the practice meet both support and opposition, indicating that there is far more at stake 5

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 here than health and human rights. Opposition is often accentuated by Western Europe and North America, largely among immigrant com- resentment of outside interference in sensitive local matters and thus munities. Box 1 describes and defines different practices that fall under exemplifies the challenges of effecting social change, working across cul- the category of FGC. tures to achieve development objectives, and advocating on behalf of others. International debates about FGC date back to the colonial era. Since the 1970s the topic has generated wider scrutiny and discussion in the The FGC challenge pits international (and often national) human rights arenas of international public health, development, human rights law, standards against rights to cultural identity, centralized and intellectual and among religious scholars and practitioners. A range of efforts over versus local and practical religious teachings and practice, and changing many years seeking to outlaw the practice or to encourage practicing expectations about gender roles against realities of gender relationships communities to abandon FGC have yielded mixed results. Despite a as they are experienced at the family and community level. handful of successfully implemented change models, overall prevalence of FGC remains culturally entrenched in most places. The trend is of I.1.a. Background: Definitions and Context a slow decline in most practicing cultures, but many millions of girls and women are still affected – not only on the African continent, but Female Genital Cutting is a broad term applied to practices that involve increasingly immigrant communities throughout the world as well. 2 the cutting or alteration of female genitals. These practices take many forms and occur primarily on the African continent; they also occur in As an international issue, FGC is controversial and complicated in part because it represents deeply ingrained and fundamental elements of cul- Figure 1 tural and personal identity, including marriageability, religious values, and gender identity. A complexity is that its particular meanings vary among cultures and communities. At the same time, from the perspec- FGM/C Prevalence at National Level tive of international human rights law, FGC represents an indisputable violation of several distinct universal rights of women and girls, including the right to freedom from discrimination and violence, the right to health and bodily integrity, the rights of the child, and at times (when the procedure results in death, as it sometimes does) the right to life. 3

FGC refers to a range of practices that vary in their medical and social significance and consequences. These vary from a ceremonial prick or small excision of only a part of the clitoris to removal of the majority of 0.9% - 10% genital tissue followed by infibulation, or the surgical closure of the vaginal opening. Even in a single geographical location, FGC practices and the rationales for them may vary widely. This variation matters because 10.1% - 45% assumptions about the ubiquity, consistency, or motivations behind the practice in a local community can seriously affect any efforts to engage 45.1% - 90% and end the practice.

I.1.b. Culture or Religion? 90.1% - 98.1%

Religion is commonly perceived as a major motivation for FGC. An Survey data not available but evidence of high prevalence rates important question is how far the religious link is exaggerated or constructed. Incorrect assumptions about religion and FGC can result in Missing data or FGM not widely practiced. underestimating the important roles played by ancient cultural traditions, ethnic expectations, economic factors, and gender relationships within communities, all of which contribute to the perpetuation of the Source: United Nations Population Fund practice. Efforts to address FGC on exclusively religious grounds – or 6

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 from any perspective that does not consider FGC’s role in a broader custom began in ancient Egypt and that it originally signified the for- framework of influences – have often been ineffective or even coun- malization or physical manifestation of gender differences. Removing terproductive. Box 2 summarizes some religious perspectives on the part of the female sexual organs was seen not only as distinguishing a practice. girl as definitively female, but also marking her as ready for adulthood, marriage, and sexual relations. 7 It has been practiced for many centuries Although focus on the issue tends to center on African communities, in some (never all) Muslim and Christian communities as well as com- various forms of altering, cutting, and/or mutilating female genitals have munities adhering to traditional religions. occurred and continue to occur in other contexts. In Victorian England and in the United States in the mid-twentieth century, clitoridectomies World Health Organization estimates place the number of women (the medical term referring to the surgical removal of the clitoris) en- and girls who have undergone FGC at between 100 and 140 million joyed widespread popularity as a means to “cure” conditions and behav- worldwide. The vast majority of cases occur in continental Africa8 (see iors ranging from lesbianism to excessive masturbation. 4 This practice Figure 1). The practice is concentrated in 28 countries in sub-Saharan represented not only medical but also the social norms of the era, which and northeast Africa (Figure 1). The rate of occurrence varies widely by sought to shape the women of the emerging middle class (and their country and region. While reliable data are not available for every coun- sexualities) into a specific mold of femininity. Victorian clitoridectomies try, at least four countries, Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, and Sudan, are reported eventually fell out of favor, but other forms of genital surgery and cutting to have prevalence rates of 90 percent or higher. 9 FGC appears to be in- are common today in Western societies. Each year, approximately 2000 creasing among immigrant communities in Western Europe and North North American infants whose genitals are considered “cosmetically America. 10 unacceptable” or “ambiguous” undergo some form of genital surgery – even though these surgeries can result in scarring, pain, and loss of Figure 2 sexual sensation, and no medical evidence exists supporting their long- Prevalence by Age (%) term benefits.5 And since 1985, various forms of elective plastic surgery

have been increasingly performed on women – sometimes to address Data Source 15-49 15-19 35-39 issues such as urinary incontinence, but more often for aesthetic rea- Benin DHS 2006 12.9 7.9 16.3 Burkina Faso DHS 2003 76.6 65.0 81.6 sons or in order to reconstruct the hymen to simulate a “virginal” state. Cameroon DHS 2004 1.4 0.4 1.2 6 While these forms of FGC differ from those practiced in African and Central African Rep. MICS 2000 35.9 27.2 43.3 other non-Western contexts in significant ways (and are not the focus of Chad DHS 2004 44.9 43.4 46.2 this case study), they highlight that most (if not all) cultures imbue its Côte d'Ivoire MICS 2006 36.4 28.0 43.8 members’ bodies with distinctive significance in terms of how gender Djibouti MICS 2006 93.1 — — Egypt DHS 2005 95.8 96.4 95.9 is conceptualized, and consequently have various cultural practices that Eritrea DHS 2002 88.7 78.3 92.6 shape and (literally) construct the body in order to realize this meaning. Ethiopea DHS 2005 74.3 62.1 81.2 Gambia MICS 2005/06 78.3 79.9 79.5 Debates about FGC have often made a link with male circumcision, Ghana MICS 2006 3.8 1.4 5.7 another practice that is both religious and cultural in origin and justifica- Guinea DHS 2005 95.6 89.3 98.6 Guinea-Bissau MICS 2006 44.5 43.5 48.6 tion. There are significant similarities, in terms of defining gender and Kenya DHS 2003 32.2 20.3 39.7 links to rites of passage for young members of a community. For many Mali DHS 2006 85.2 84.7 84.9 years, benefits of male circumcision have been questioned, like FGC Mauritania DHS 2000/01 71.3 65.9 71.7 (sometimes called female circumcision), through the framework of chil- Niger DHS 2006 2.2 1.9 2.9 dren’s rights. With the recent emergence of evidence of the benefits of Nigeria DHS 2003 19.0 12.9 22.2 Senegal DHS 2005 28.2 24.8 30.5 male circumcision as a deterrent to HIV/AIDS infection, these parallels Sierra Leone MICS 2006 94.0 81.1 97.5 have received less emphasis. Somalia MICS 2006 97.9 96.7 98.9 Sudan (North) MICS 2000 90.0 85.5 91.5 I.1.c. Origins and Prevalence Tanzania DHS 2004/05 14.6 9.1 16.0 Togo MICS 2006 5.8 1.3 9.4 Uganda DHS 2006 0.6 0.5 0.8 The origins of FGC practices are not well known, but FGC predates Yemen PAPFAM 2003 38.2 — — both Islam and Christianity. Scanty available evidence suggests that the © 2004 Population Reference Bureau 7

One of the many controversies surrounding FGC is what to call the practice in the first place. “Female circumcision,” a term once widely used, eventually gave way to “female genital mutilation,” which many NGOs and activists felt more accurately reflected the nature of the procedure and downplayed the comparisons to male circumcision (which con- tinues to be widely regarded as a separate issue, particularly in the medical community). “Female genital mutilation” is still in use by many groups today, including the World Health Organization. However, many organizations found that the term “mutilation” was offensive and perceived as biased and inaccurate by practicing communities. “Female genital cutting” has been adopted more recently by many advocacy groups as a less judgmental or offensive option. Other terms used variously include excision, female genital surgery, and ritual genital surgery. 14

Generally, practicing communities use words from a local dialect, including tahara or khittan in Egypt, tahur in Sudan, tizian and gaaad in Mauritania15, and bolokoli in Mali. 16 Many local terms for the practice connote “purity” or “cleanliness,” while others have meanings closer to “cutting,” “circumcision,” or even “to make more beautiful.” “Female Genital Cutting” or “FGC” is used in this case study, as it is currently accepted by a number of government, multi-lateral, and non-governmental agencies worldwide.

Four commonly understood categories or classes of FGC are described by the World Health Organization as follows: I. Clitoridectomy: partial or total removal of the clitoris (a small, sensitive and erectile part of the female genitals) and, in very rare cases, only the prepuce (the fold of skin surrounding the clitoris). II. Excision: partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (the labia are “the lips” that surround the vagina). III. Infibulation: narrowing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a covering seal. The seal is formed by cutting and repositioning the inner, or outer, labia, with or without removal of the clitoris. IV. Other: all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incis- ing, scraping and cauterizing the genital area. 17

Box 2: Religious Sources and FGC

Islam Major sources of authority in Islam include the Qur’an, the hadith and sunna, and shari’a. The Qur’an is believed to be the literal word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. It is a source of divine authority and considered untranslatable from its original Arabic (translated versions are often termed “interpretations”). The hadith and sunna refer to the actions and sayings of the Prophet, which were collected into standard collections in the centuries after his death. Different Muslim sects and communities rely upon different sets of hadith. The level of authenticity of a particular hadith is determined by the reliability of the chain of sources that links it back to one of the Com- panions of the Prophet and eventually Muhammad himself. Each hadith is classified along a spectrum of reliability based upon the authority and trustworthiness of its transmitters. There are canonical collections of hadith in both the Sunni and Shi’i traditions.

Finally, shari’a, which loosely translates to “the way,” is a general term used to refer to laws and legal interpretations that are derived from interpretations of the Qur’an and the hadith. This is often expressed through fatwas, which are religious opinions issued by a particular Islamic scholar or group of scholars. There is no one accepted authority for the interpretation of these sources, and no one agreed-upon set of what shari’a comprises. 8

Examples from all these sources of authority have been used to argue both for and against FGC. The bottom line is that although it is not mentioned anywhere in the Qur’an, there are reports in the hadith in which Muhammed refers to female circumcision or FGC without explicitly condemning or condoning it, meaning that many religious leaders feel uncomfortable condemning what the Prophet himself did not take occasion to condemn (according to the classical sources).

Qur’an “…follow the religion of Abraham inclining towards truth…” (4:125) This verse refers to the obligation of Muslims to follow the Abrahamic tradition of circumcision. Some cite it as evidence that women should be “circumcised,” or cut, but others argue that the specific example refers to male circumcision, and that in many communities (though not all), different words are used to refer to male and female circumcision, rendering the analogy invalid.

Abraham’s circumcision does figure prominently in other classical Islamic sources – both hadith and written historical traditions. Some scholars, including the authoritative 14th century historian Ibn Kathir, claim that female circumcision began with Abraham’s second wife, Hagar (who according to some traditions was herself Egyptian), whose son, Ismail, is said to be the patriarch of the Arabs. 18 Although this is a historical tradition and not explicitly supported by scripture, it does hold some authority.

“…enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong…” (3:110) This verse has been cited by those who oppose FGC as an argument that because the practice can be shown to have harmful effects, it is a religious obligation to discourage it actively.

“For anything you do not know, ask the expert.” (16:43) Groups have cited this verse as a reason to defer to medical experts’ opinions about harmful practices such as FGC.

Other general principles outlined in Qur’an and used in arguments against FGC often include the principle that women and men should both benefit from sexual pleasure (2:187; 30:21) and the principle of individual account- ability for one’s deeds and actions (17:15).

Hadith 19 There are at least four instances of hadith that are commonly cited in defense of FGC. Two of them refer only to “circumcision” in general, and critics point out that this is a major weakness of their use as an argument in favor of FGC: frequently female “circumcision” is referred to by a different name than male circumcision in Arabic us- age, limiting the applicability of the male circumcision requirement to the female case, and in any case, only male circumcision is explicitly required by the Prophet.

A third hadith states that circumcision is “sunna” for men and “makruma” for women, a distinction that implies that it will bring women honor but is not an obligation. Critics of this hadith question its validity and authenticity.

The final hadith, often referred to as the hadith of “Umm Attiyyah,” is the only one that discusses female circumcision or FGC explicitly:

“A woman used to perform circumcision in Medina. The Prophet said to her: Do not cut severely as that is bet- ter for a woman and more desirable for a husband.” (Sunan Abu Dawud, Book 41, Number 5251).

The authenticity of this particular hadith is widely disputed; it only appears in one of the six accepted collections of Sunni hadith, and it is designated as of weak authority by Abu Dawud, who included it in his collection. This clas- sification is key: as Muhammad Sidiqi, a leading contemporary expert on hadith, points out, Abu Dawud “draws attention to the defects of certain traditions he cites…In the case of traditions which he believed to be genuine, however, he makes no comments whatsoever.” 20

Some have pointed out that the intention of the Prophet’s statement was to minimize the potential harm of the practice and prioritize the well-being of both a woman and her husband, and that therefore the underlying principle was not to promote the practice (which had long been an existing tradition) but rather to minimize its potentially harmful effects as far as was practical.

Islamic scholars generally agree that hadith that tacitly condone or mention female circumcision are weak and therefore cannot be justifiably cited as evidence for arguments in support of FGC.21

Shari’a Fatwas abound both in support of FGC and against it, including those from highly esteemed authorities. For example, the 14th-century scholar Ibn Taymiyya wrote a fatwa in support of FGC, arguing that “its purpose is to reduce the woman’s desire; if she is uncircumcised, she becomes lustful and tends to long more for men.” 22 On the other hand, one of the most unequivocal religious opinions against FGC was issued by the grand Mufti of Egypt in 2007; this fatwa went beyond stating that the practice had no basis in Islam and explicitly forbade it, labeling it as haram, or forbidden. This statement was supported by opinions issued by scholars at Al-Azhar in Egypt, considered to be the highest seat of Sunni Islamic authority. 23 One such opinion is as follows:

“After the [statement by the Mufti] there is nothing left for me to say. This is what I have been demanding from the Mufti and the religious scholars – a categorical ruling on such issues. But when some of them say that this is permit- ted ‘when necessary,’ and if a doctor performs it ... It was a doctor who did this, and look at the result ... Society as a whole is responsible for the death of this girl. This is tantamount to the custom of burying girls alive, before the advent of Islam. It is like the burying the girl in the physical and psychological sense.” 24

Other contemporary scholars, such as the popular television preacher Amr Khaled, have also condemned the practice through speeches and sermons, characterizing it as oppressive to women. 25

Similar rulings exist in the contemporary Shi’i literature. Sayyed Muhammad Husayn Fadlullah, a prominent Leba- nese cleric, published a fatwa declaring that anything causing harm to “the soul, body, and the sexual abilities” of men or women were prohibited acts. 26 He goes on to explain that this includes FGC, which he classifies as neither required by Shari’a nor part of the sunna and pointing out that in general, Islam seeks to foster respect for women and has historically addressed traditional practices such as FGC “not…in a head-on way, but in a gradual way that leads to the termination of [such customs] in the long run”. 27

Contemporary supporters of FGC are not difficult to find, either, however (although even the most outspoken tend to stress that it is beneficial but not required). A prominent example is Wagdi Ghoneim, an Islamist and member 10

of the Muslim Brotherhood who has compared FGC to “cosmetic surgery” with a moral bent – that is, a cosmetic operation that adds to a woman’s honor. 28 Recently, Ghoneim spoke on the subject in Tunisia, where FGC has been virtually nonexistent, prompting a reaction from the Tunisian Ministry for Women’s Affairs. 29 The growing phenomenon of Islamic leaders spreading their ideas through social media, including facebook and YouTube, suggests emerging models and concerns for the way that FGC (and attitudes towards it) might shift, travel, and evolve through religious networks.

Christianity

FGC is not addressed explicitly in Christian scripture, but several Christian religious authorities have made statements condemning it:

Coptic Church (Egypt) Bishop Moussa, Bishop Youth of the Coptic Orthodox Church and Representative of Pope Shenouda III, stated:

“…from the Christian perspective – this practice has no religious grounds whatsoever. Further, it is medically, morally and practically groundless. […] When God created the human being, he made everything in him/her good: each organ has its function and role. So, why do we allow the disfiguring of God’s good creation? There is not a single verse in the Bible or the Old or New Testaments, nor is there anything in Judaism or Christian- ity – not one single verse speaks of female circumcision.” 30

Church of England In March 2004, the British Parliament passed the Female Genital Mutilation Act. Shortly afterward, the Church of England, which is the official state church of the UK as well as the “mother church” of the 80 million-member worldwide Anglican Communion (which has branches in many places colonized by the British at some point in their histories), issued the following statement:

“In November 2002 the General Synod of the Church of England passed a motion which condemned all forms of FGM but also recognised the urgent need for continuing action to eradicate the practice world wide. We support the new Act which seeks to strengthen the law and will seek to play our part in challenging the ritual practices and customs which serve to legitimise FGM.” 31

Roman Catholic Church The Vatican has not taken a definitive stance on FGC, but local African Catholic leaders, including bishops, have started to do so. One bishop in Tanzania stated:

“Women are born with certain body parts for good reason, just as men are. If God wanted those parts missing, why did he create them?” 32

This mirrors other issues wherein local religious leaders and those higher up in a hierarchy take different stances on an issue (and not only in the Roman Catholic church): local priests have differed from the Vatican on issues such as condom use, for example, and in 2010, Roman Catholic bishops and a group of nuns took opposite positions on a healthcare law in the U.S.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 Health risks and complications associated with FGC procedures vary dynamics) based on her own in-depth ethnographic research. 35 And widely according to the type of procedure and the conditions under in 1979, two major international developments took place: the World which it takes place. In general, the international medical community Health Organization sponsored the first Seminar on Harmful Tradi- agrees that whatever the reasons behind the practice, it constitutes the tional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children in Khar- removal and damaging of normal, healthy body tissue for entirely non- toum, Sudan, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of medical purposes. Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly. 36 These marked a new level of awareness and discus- The WHO lists potential immediate complications of FGC procedures sion of FGC in the international community, and also reflect the major as including severe pain, shock, hemorrhage, urine retention, tetanus, frameworks through which efforts to address FGC have been mounted and sepsis. 11 Psychological trauma is often associated with a painful – namely, public health and human rights. Another significant land- procedure performed at a young age, commonly without anesthetic mark in the international arena was the International Conference on or warning. Long-term consequences can include recurring bladder Population and Development, held in Cairo in 1994, which resulted in or urinary tract infections, cysts, infertility, and increased risks during a Programme of Action advocating for women’s access to reproductive childbirth. 12 In the most severe cases of Type III, infibulation requires rights – and which explicitly included discouragement of FGC. 37 This additional surgery or cutting (and ensuing complications, including a Programme of Action marks an important shift towards situating FGC high risk of infection) each time a woman gives birth or resumes sexual within the context of human rights. intercourse after childbirth. Although risks are typically higher for Types II and III, any form, performed under extreme circumstances, can and The shift from a medical or health-based framework to a broader, rights- has accidentally resulted in death. 13 oriented one (exemplified by the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action) has been a general trend in the past several decades. Earlier approaches I.2. Awareness and Opposition to FGC had focused primarily on the health risks and medical consequences of the practice, and aside from the occasional incorporation of I.2.a. FGC as a Human Rights Issue a religious perspective, did not address the underlying cultural values and societal structures that reinforce the practice. This approach encour- Early criticism of FGC dates to various colonial administrations, which aged some to “medicalize” FGC practices – a shift that encouraged the banned the practice in colonies such as Egypt, Sudan, and Kenya. These performance of FGC procedures by medical professionals. This shift bans were often enacted at the urging of local Western missionaries, who often resulted in more hygienic procedures, but had little impact on the put pressure on their governments to outlaw FGC. This often created frequency of their occurrence. strong dissent and opposition among local practicing groups, who de- fended the practice on cultural grounds.33 In Kenya, for example, de- Advocates argue that medicalization is not an adequate solution, say- fense of FGC actually became a central component of nationalist resis- ing that while health risks vary depending on the circumstances of the tance against colonial rule. 34 To this day, discussions and debates about procedure, FGC is a violation of human rights no matter what the cir- FGC elicit vehement and often defensive reactions from members of cumstances and no matter how severe the consequences.38 Campaigns practicing cultures, in part because of this colonial legacy. Some Afri- that focus on FGC as a human rights issue tend to frame the question can women reject what they perceive as Western feminist demands to in human rights terms such as bodily integrity, consent, and freedom eradicate a practice they consider an important part of their culture and from violence or gender discrimination, rather than highlighting health identity. Others argue that is not the place of outsiders to dictate “what is dimensions. A recent UNICEF report succinctly summarizes the prob- best” for Africans, contending that FGC is an indigenous problem that lematic nature of medicalization as a solution to FGC, noting that it will require locally-implemented, culturally-specific solutions. Indeed, a does not “provide individuals with the opportunity to revise self-enforc- number of African advocates today work to end FGC, at the commu- ing beliefs, did not change the expectation of rewards and sanctions as- nity and country level as well as across the region. sociated with conforming or not conforming to the socially accepted norm, and tended to legitimize the practice while obscuring the fact that In the post-colonial era, the issue rose to new international prominence it is a violation of the rights of women and girls.” 39 in the 1970s. In 1975, the anthropologist Rose Oldfield Hayes helped focus international attention on FGC with the publication of an article I.2.b. The Limits of Cultural Pluralism contextualizing it within social structures (such as patriarchy and gender 12

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 Two books published in the late 1970s highlight the emergence of dif- ment that focuses not only on human rights, but also decolonization ferent approaches to FGC, notably separating women, development and traditional African values. 44 It specifically commits to promoting practitioners, and Western scholars from people from the places and the preservation of what it terms “positive African cultural values” – spaces where FGC is traditionally practiced. These different approaches implying that while cultural sensitivity is important, cultural practices have colored debates about FGC and how to address it in various con- should not go unquestioned. 45 texts. In 1979, feminist activist Fran Hosken wrote a highly publicized report describing FGC practices in a number of African countries and I.2.c. Local Activists and Global Civil Society calling for international aid organizations and faith-based groups to put an immediate end to it. Some anthropologists and scholars criticized Today there are many diverse actors working to end FGC, from inter- the report as an ethnocentric and culturally insensitive treatment of the national agencies such as UNICEF and the World Bank to regional issue. 40 Her arguments have been echoed by many subsequent activists and national NGOs to local, grassroots groups. Organized indigenous and aid workers. 41 action against FGC began at least as early as the 1960s and has grown along with international efforts on the issue. 46 An example of a suc- The publication in 1980 by Nawal El Sadaawi, an Egyptian doctor cessful indigenous actor is the NGO Tostan, which works throughout and activist, of The Hidden Face of Eve marked another important West Africa and addresses FGC by engaging communities holistically, milestone. It is an account of women in the Muslim world and the consulting local religious and traditional leaders but involving all seg- various forms of oppression they face. Excerpts from her work, which ments of a community to effect change.47 Tostan draws upon prin- highlighted FGC and included a description of her own childhood ciples outlined in international human rights law, calling its approach experience undergoing the procedure, were published in Ms. Maga- a “human rights-based community empowerment program,” but zine, bringing the issue to the attention of a more mainstream audi- works on the local level, addressing the issue in its specific cultural con- ence in America – and presenting a perspective from within an FGC- text (specifically, its importance to girls’ marriageability) and eliciting practicing culture to such an audience for the first time. Saadawi, collective commitments to change from the community as a whole. though outspoken against FGC, was also highly critical of Western 48 Organizations like Tostan often rely on international organizations, attitudes (such as Hosken’s) towards the practice, which she consid- foreign governments, and UN agencies for funding, but their project ered condescending and patronizing. “That kind of help,” she wrote, design and implementation arose from grassroots, community-based “which they think of as solidarity, is another type of colonialism in efforts. Senegal, where Tostan does much of its work, is often cited as disguise. So we must deal with female circumcision ourselves. It is our one of the success stories in the movement to end FGC. As of 2010, culture, we understand it, when to fight against it and how, because reportedly 4500 of Senegal’s 5000 rural communities had pledged to this is the process of liberation.” 42 abandon the practice. 49

Initial approaches that highlighted health aspects aimed to some extent Other indigenous actors working on FGC issues are regional in scope. to ensure that international approaches were more culturally neutral and In 1984, the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affect- sensitive in addressing the issue. By focusing on the scientific facts of the ing the Health of Women and Children (IAC) was founded by a group health risks, advocates sought to avoid being perceived as passing judg- of representatives from 20 African countries. 50 Since then, it has worked ment on its practitioners and supporters. However, as this approach was to educate not only African governments, but also general populations seen as failing to decrease the prevalence of FGC, advocates turned to about the importance of eliminating FGC.51 While its stated goal is the a human rights framework as an alternative way to encourage its aban- elimination of harmful practices, its focus is on local efforts. The IAC donment. is illustrative of a growing movement towards advocating an approach to FGC that is participatory, locally-driven, and grassroots-oriented. Al- An important point is that the human rights framework is designed though the IAC maintains official ties with UN organizations, includ- to take cultural sensitivity into account; the major treaty addressing ing the WHO, its board members are drawn from African nations and women’s rights, for example, includes the right of women (and men) to its projects are largely community-oriented and focused on a range of participate in “the process of social and cultural change.” 43 The Banjul traditional practices without focusing exclusively on FGC. 52 Charter, also known as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, addresses the issue of African cultural values directly. The Char- FGC remains quite controversial. Even within the international aid ter, which came into effect in 1986, is a regional human rights instru- community fierce debates continue. Some see active advocacy on the 13

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 issue as counterproductive, and a form of cultural imperialism. They can Charter on Human and People’s Rights) requires member states “to argue that advocacy reinforces negative stereotypes and draws atten- abolish customs and practices harmful to the welfare, dignity, normal tion away from what some term more urgent and important issues, like growth and development of the child and in particular: (a) those cus- health, education, and the general status of women in society – that is, toms and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child; and (b) the greater social, economic, and political milieu into which FGC is those customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the grounds embedded. Advocates who work to end the practice (for example, the of sex or other status.” 58 IAC) take the approach of integrating the issue of FGC within a larger societal framework and web of issues to address it in a more holistic way. Given the nature of social and cultural rights, governments are gener- Yet the outrage and frustration at slow progress drive a continued call for ally expected to comply with international law in an incremental way focus and action by a significant group of individuals and groups, both – for example, by taking steps to modify cultural and social patterns and from the affected communities and beyond. encourage behavior change. The process of changing a custom such as FGC is rather difficult for governments to implement. Indeed, success- I.2.d. International Law and National Sovereignty ful efforts to eliminate FGC have always involved non-governmental community groups in addition to governmental actions. However, gov- Various instruments of international law apply to FGC, including sever- ernments can take concrete steps to fulfill their duties according to legal al human rights conventions in addition to nonbinding resolutions and human rights frameworks, including legal measures (e.g., constitutional declarations. While these measures (and the national legislation they oc- protections, legal reform, and criminalization), regulatory measures casion or inspire) are far from universally enforced, they are a significant (e.g., establishing policies for health professionals or creating measures means for influencing national legislation and raising awareness around encouraging civil society organizations to conduct their activities), and human rights violations in order to hold governments accountable. 53 broad policy initiatives (e.g., promoting girls’ education, media campaigns, etc.). Finally and significantly, many countries specify reserva- International law applies to FGC in both implicit and explicit ways. tions when ratifying human rights treaties, denoting the limits of inter- Generally speaking, FGC is considered to be both a form of violence national law with regard to national sovereignty and indigenous cultural against women as well as a form of gender discrimination according to norms. In the case of CEDAW, many Islamic signatory states (including international law. It is explicitly mentioned in documents like the Afri- Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia) stated explicit can Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Beijing Declara- reservations in cases wherein provisions of the treaty conflicted with Is- tion, both of which identify it specifically as a harmful cultural practice. lamic or shari’a law, asserting the primacy of the latter over international 54 But more broadly, it is seen as a violation of many provisions of both law. 59 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the In many cases debates around FGC are enmeshed in broader strate- Child, including the right to life, the right to physical integrity, the right gies towards women and gender equality. Box 3 highlights some gender to freedom from violence, the right to health, and the right to freedom dimensions. from discrimination on the basis of gender. 55 The international human rights framework balances these claims with rights linked to culture: I.2.e. Policies of U.S. and European Governments CEDAW, for example, mandates states to work to change discriminatory social and cultural patterns, implying the right of women (and men) USAID and the U.S. Department of State take the position that FGC to participate in a “process of social and cultural change.” 56 is a violation of health and human rights and a practice that “hinders development.” It “opposes any practice of or support for Female Genital Certain provisions of international human rights law, such as the right Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) and works toward the goal of total elimi- to culture, the rights of minorities, and the right to religious freedom, are nation of FGM/C. Under no circumstances does USAID support the sometimes invoked in support of allowing FGC to continue. Advocates practice of FGM/C by medical personnel.” 61 In some instances – for for ending the practice would argue, however, that the accepted frame- example, in a Somali community in Kenya – USAID has supported work of economic, social, and cultural rights specifies that no cultural campaigns to stop FGC that specifically target religious leaders and rights should infringe upon, negate, or destroy any other right, and that scholars and evoke religious principles to advocate for abandonment, 62 legal measures taken against harmful cultural practices constitute “justi- while in other contexts, USAID has funded a number of NGOs that fiable limits” on such freedoms. 57 Moreover, the Banjul Charter (Afri- address reproductive health and family planning comprehensively, with 14

The gender dimensions of FGC are many. Some frameworks for thinking about the issue with a gender lens include:

• Gender and human rights law: the advent of CEDAW and gender mainstreaming introduced the notion that the rights of individuals extended beyond the “public sphere” into the “private” realm of the home and family, giving rise to human rights-based arguments against not only practices like FGC but domestic violence and other issues.

• Gender-related taboos: because FGC is performed by women on other women, often men actually do not realize the severity of the operation or even the difference between before and after genital operations are performed.60 Because of taboos surrounding sexuality and women’s bodies, it can be difficult even to discuss the issue within communities. • • Gender and the woman’s body: in general women’s bodies tend to be the sites of so-called “culture wars,” not just in debates around FGC but also in relation to the wearing of hijab, the beauty industry, abortion, plastic surgery, and other issues. This phenomenon can lead to reactionary responses to FGC advocacy that may not be rooted in religious or cultural authority so much as in defense or protection of the sanctity of women’s bodies (and the meanings that current gender and power dynamics place upon those bodies). • • Gender roles in communities and the economy: often those performing FGC procedures also work as midwives. They tend to be trusted female members of the community whose income depends on fees from these genital surgeries as well as delivering children; in many societies, income sources for women are limited and so the role of the women who actually enact FGC may persist in part out of economic need.

FGC as an integrated component within this larger framework. The prison offense in France. 66 Seemingly exempt from these laws, however, UK Department for International Development similarly states that are forms of FGC that are medically justified or contextualized in some FGC is a priority in its “population assistance program.” 63 way, such as surgeries on intersex infants or elective cosmetic genital surgeries, as described above. On February 16, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke at the first State Department event in recognition of the UN’s Interna- I.3. Religious Actors and FGC: Support and Opposition tional Day of Zero Tolerance to Female Genital Mutilation, marking a newly public and overt stance against the practice (the UN had com- I.3.a. Mechanisms: Religion As It Influences FGC Practices memorated the Day for nearly a decade prior to Clinton’s speech). 64 She noted the importance of religious leaders in shaping communi- Religion is a complicating factor in continuation of and opposition to ties’ opinions on the issue, and announced that the U.S. government FGC. Religious identity is an unreliable indicator of FGC prevalence: will partner with the University of Nairobi to establish a “Pan-African for example, in Senegal, Ethiopia, and Ghana, prevalence rates are high- Center of Excellence” to address FGC – which will develop strategies er among Muslims than Christians; in Niger, Nigeria, and the Tanza- to end the practice as well as to support those who have experienced nia, prevalence rates are higher among Christians than Muslims; and FGC procedures. 65 in Mali, Eritrea, and Burkina Faso, rates are more or less equal among religious groups. 67 Many, including those involved at family and com- The “no tolerance” rhetoric reflects Western regulatory practices when munity levels, tie the practice to their religious beliefs and teachings. it comes to FGC: within the borders of Western European and North American states, FGC is generally addressed through criminal legisla- Religion influences FGC practices in particular situations and commu- tion. Canada, for example, not only criminalizes the practice within its nities through different mechanisms. Such mechanisms include: borders but also has made it illegal to send Canadian girls abroad to have the procedure done elsewhere; and performing genital cutting is a 1. Motivation based on religious values or obligations: A 1998 report 15

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 released by the International Conference on Population and Re- cording to the intermarrying communities that practice it; while productive Health in the Muslim World, held at Al-Azhar Uni- these communities are not always directly or exclusively defined versity in Egypt (one of the world’s preeminent centers of Sunni Is- by religion, often intermarrying communities can be identified lamic scholarship) commented that the existence and persistence of through association with a particular religious sect or leader. 73 Re- FGC “were the result of misunderstandings of Islamic provisions.” ligion informs the contexts and norms that define how marriage is 68 FGC is perceived as helping girls and their families fulfill religious practiced (in the case of polygyny, for example); and so in societies obligations, such as abstinence from sexual activity outside of mar- wherein a woman’s primary (if not sole) means to financial security riage, and embody religious values, such as cleanliness and purity. is marriage, FGC becomes inextricable from a woman’s security 69 In Sudan, for example, one type of circumcision is referred to as and material interests (and by extension, those of her family). sunna, a word connoting religious tradition or habit – reflecting the popular sense that FGC is encouraged, if not required, by Islam. 70 The role of religion is often overemphasized in discussions of FGC, but While there is confusion surrounding the legitimacy or origins of religion can and does influence its practice – and campaigns waged to FGC regarding Islam (and there often is), religion can be a mo- end it – in subtle, diverse, and sometimes contradictory ways. Although tivating factor in its perpetuation. Even without explicit religious religion is not the sole cause of FGC in any context, it is nevertheless textual evidence mandating the practice, the complex relationship an important arena in which the practice is contested. Religious factors between religion and culture can lead to the use of religious expla- can create barriers to addressing or ending FGC, but can also provide a nations for cultural practices, particularly (though not exclusively) framework of values and moral authority that can be useful in efforts to among populations with high illiteracy rates. 71 In other words, encourage abandonment. simply because religion is not the root cause of a cultural practice does not mean that it is not evoked as a source of moral authority I.3.b. Religion and Support for FGC to argue for its continuation. Religion works to provide motivation for the practice of FGC through 2. Identity formation along the lines of religion: FGC can function as specific religious values such as virginity, fidelity, and purity. Islam and a physical manifestation of a religiously prescribed or constructed Christianity, for example, prohibit sexual activity outside of marriage, identity. In communities or countries with multiple ethnic groups placing a high value associated a woman’s virginity upon marriage and or religious sects, FGC can be perceived as a distinguishing factor her fidelity afterwards. While this is not an uncommon cultural or social differentiating one ethnic group or sect from another; ethnic and norm, it can become codified through religious rules and consequently religious identity can also determine which type of FGC is prac- carry added significance. 74 FGC is perceived as a way of preserving a ticed in a particular community. woman’s chastity and encouraging fidelity (the practice is believed by many to “contain” a woman’s sexual desire), and therefore becomes a 3. Moral authority expressed through religious leaders and institu- key means for families, individuals, and communities to uphold a re- tions: Although religious authorities generally agree that there is no ligious obligation. Islam emphasizes purity through various rituals and basis in Islamic or Christian doctrine for FGC, local religious lead- obligations, and some practicing communities link these principles to ers sometimes encourage or support FGC, or promote one form FGC, which is considered an active and important means to preserving over another. Moreover, statements from religious leaders merely a woman’s “purity.” This is reflected in terminology, as FGC procedures declaring that FGC is not specifically required by religion do not are literally synonymous with purity in the dialects of many groups that carry the same force as declaring that it is discouraged or forbidden practice it (e.g., tahara in Egypt, tahur in Sudan, and bolokoli in Mali). on the basis of religion; some religious opinions issued by Muslim 75 This association creates an implicit link between the practice and other leaders, for example, have decreed that although FGC is not an obligations that are explicit religious obligations. obligation for Muslims, it is religiously permissable. 72 Identity formation along religious lines also works to reinforce FGC. 4. Material interests and social structures created by religion: Mar- In some communities in the Sudan, for example, differences in FGC riageability is a key aspect of FGC in nearly every practicing com- practice are distinguishing factors among ethnic groups that practice munity, meaning that social pressure to conform to the practice different forms of Islam. Undergoing a particular type of FGC is what for the sake of one’s family and daughter is a significant underly- marks a woman as a specific kind of Muslim woman; the practice ing cause. Trends and occurrences of FGC can be categorized ac- functions as a physical manifestation of a religiously inscribed identity. 16

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 76 In a broader sense, within many interpretations of Islam there is a who has undergone a form of FGC and subsequently requests or re- sense that moral behavior is the responsibility not only of the individ- quires his first wife to undergo the procedure.78 Often rates of polygyny ual, but of society as a whole. FGC, although not an originally Islamic rise with increasing economic development (as more men are financially practice, therefore potentially has particular traction in certain Islamic able to support larger households), increasing competition among mar- contexts, as it is perceived as a cultural and social action sanctioned riageable women; in such situations, a family will do everything pos- (and often celebrated) by the community that assists individuals fulfill sible to increase their daughter’s potential for marriage, including, of religious obligations – thereby strengthening the Muslim character of course, FGC. Although social and economic factors lead to increased the community. competition, the added, religiously prescribed element of polygyny acts as a magnifying factor that creates higher incentives for continuing the Another key mechanism is that of religious leaders who provide moral practice of FGC. authority to support the legitimation of FGC, whether implicitly or explicitly. In some Muslim communities, religious laws (often interpreted I.3.c. Religion and Opposition to FGC by local religious leaders) are viewed as superceding national or local laws – meaning that if a local religious leader promotes, condones, or merely Similar mechanisms can lead or encourage religious actors to oppose refrains from condemning FGC, national legislation against the prac- FGC. Campaigns to encourage abandonment of the practice often use tice will have little significance among the local population. In many or integrate a perspective that highlights religious values, highlighting instances, moral authority on the issue is located in local religious ac- the sexual rights of men and women in marriage and the sanctity of the tors rather than centralized religious authorities; for example, the Coptic human body (for which there are scriptural bases in Islam) to “de-link” pope in Egypt condemned FGC as having no religious, medical, moral, Islam from FGC. Essentially, these approaches use religious arguments or practical grounds, but a high prevalence rate of FGC among Coptic to demonstrate that FGC is not only not required by Islam, but that a Christians in Egypt persists. 77 In some places – for example, in certain “correct” interpretation of the religion leads to the inevitable conclusion communities in Kenya – while FGC procedures themselves are not ex- that it is actually un-Islamic. 79 plicitly religious, girls are recognized and praised by priests in church im- mediately after their circumcision, conferring a general sense of religious The notion of communal identity formation within Muslim commu- approval on the tradition, regardless of official doctrine. nities, discussed above, can also be used to argue against FGC. 80 Some religious scholars have made the argument that FGC locates the bur- The function of moral authority is especially meaningful in an Islamic den of correct behavior, and of a family’s morality, within an individual context because the few (often disputed) references to FGC practices in woman – and that according to Islamic principles, this responsibility Islamic holy texts are in the hadith, a set of religious writings less authori- should rest with the behavior of the individual and her community – tative than the Qur’an and far more open to interpretation and debate. not a physical alteration of her body. This argument has particular force This also speaks to a system of religious authority centered on individual in Islam, because there is a strong Qur’anic injunction that no person scholars and their interpretations more than on a central or orthodox can be made to bear the sins of another (Qur’an 53:38). religious authority, so local religious leaders’ opinions can have particular import in Muslim communities. Successful community-based approaches to ending FGC engage local religious authorities as key actors in supporting the legitimation of end- Finally, material interests and social structures related to religion can ing the practice. These authorities’ support, respect, and cooperation can function to perpetuate the practice of FGC. In the vast majority of cases, be key to gaining trust and legitimacy within the community as well as FGC is inextricable from, and essential to, marriageability – making this supporting the values invoked to encourage FGC abandonment. Fi- factor one of the most significant obstacles to its abandonment, particu- nally, just as intermarrying communities that share common material larly in societies in which a woman’s socioeconomic status (as well as that interests and marriage patterns can create social pressures for continu- of her children) is almost wholly dependent upon her marriageability. ing FGC, they must be engaged as a whole community, not merely Intermarrying communities are often organized along religious lines or through targeting certain individuals, in order to change attitudes and identify with a central religious leader. Moreover, marriage customs are behaviors in a way that will lead to large-scale abandonment. 81 Just as often governed by religious laws. Polygyny, for example, sanctioned and religiously governed marriage patterns can magnify the effects of pres- regulated within Islam, has been shown to be a causative factor in certain sures to practice FGC, they can magnify successful efforts to eliminate situations – instances, for example, wherein a man takes a second wife it as well. 17

Questions to consider:

• In an Egyptian context, what are the implications of pursuing advocacy strategies based on women’s rights and/or children’s rights? Who speaks for “women” and “children”? Are there other development frameworks (rights-based or not) that might be invoked? What are the implications of Egypt’s reservations regarding CEDAW (see Appendix)?

• How are patriarchy and religion involved at theoretical and practical levels in Egypt?

• How might future U.S. government support be reviewed specifically in relation to gender and FGC issues? What do recent events in Egypt bring to bear upon this issue?

• What are the implications of “medicalizing” FGC? If medicalization does nothing to decrease prevalence, but results in fewer medical complications resulting from the procedure, is that progress? Can a medicalization approach be integrated into larger, more structural ways of addressing the issue? Should it? How does this fit into ideas of how social change can or should occur, and how quickly?

• Should government enforce an unpopular or undemocratically supported ban on a traditional practice that might be harmful to its citizens? What are the ethical implications of both criminalization approach as well as approaches that focus on education and/or advocacy?

• In 1994 and 2008, media stories were instigating factors in changes to government policy. How might the changing nature of mass media affect the way FGC is practiced and perceived? How can media be used to move from awareness-raising to advocacy and political action or change? How might this change in the wake of of the January 25 Revolution?

II.1. General Background: Egypt ratio of urban to rural residents has remained nearly constant, with approximately 43 percent of the population in rural areas and 57 percent II.1.a. Demographics and Gender in Egypt in urban areas. 84

With over 78 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous Arab The World Economic Forum’s 2009 Global Gender Gap Index country and among the world’s 20 most populous countries. The me- ranked Egypt 126th out of 134 countries in terms of the gap in gen- dian age in Egypt is 24 years, and a third of its population is under der equality, based on a range of indicators comprising health, educa- the age of 15. 82 Fertility rates have been declining since the 1980s, tion, political participation, and economic opportunity. 85 For most though the rate of decline has leveled off in recent years.83 Between Egyptian women, regardless of education level, marriage is the key 1990 and 2007, despite population growth by over 40 percent, the means to achieving “inclusion and social status.” 86 Although the fe- 18

One commentator described the events of the revolution in terms of a “re-appropriation of public space, indicative of the public’s refusal to concede the streets and squares to the dictates of the security apparatus.”96 This description makes reference to the emergency laws that have been in place since Mubarak took power (and renewed most recently by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces currently ruling the country), which stipulate that gatherings of more than just a few people can be categorized as criminal activity. Under this sort of legal order, “public space does not belong to the public at all,” which helps explain the power of the revolution’s pivotal focus on Tahrir Square in Cairo (as well as other major squares in cities like Alexandria). Aside from the point that “women’s unpaid labor in the home was central to the reproduction of bodies protesting on the street” – an observation extending from feminist theory that considers the ways that gender cuts across notions of public and private spaces – women’s bodies were particularly politicized during the January 25 Revolution and its aftermath.97

It was widely observed that women and men participated equally and peacefully in the protests in Tahrir Square – in marked contrast to the increased levels of sexual harassment experienced by women in recent years. According to a recent report by the National Council for Human Rights in Egypt, 83 percent of employed Egyptian women had experienced sexual harassment in the workplace at some point, and reports of increasing physical and verbal harassment towards women (both those wearing hijab and those without) had attracted much attention in recent years.98 High- profile incidents, however, including assaults carried out by military officers and justified as “virginity tests” and the assault of CBS correspondent Lara Logan, have cast a pall on the status of women in public spaces post-revolution.99 These assaults have largely been attributed to state security personnel or regime-affiliated “thugs,” which were present throughout the protests in Tahrir, and who have a history of using sexual assault as a way of targeting women journalists, lawyers, and activists (perhaps most notoriously in May 2005, in connection with protests over an amendment to the Egyptian constitution).100 While these incidents show that women’s bodies are still sites of fierce and sometimes violent contestations in Egypt, the refusal of the SCAF to investigate military involvement in sexual abuses has become a major criticism of the council’s power.

male illiteracy rate has been dropping (from 57.4 percent in 1992 to of women’s political representation are less than promising. Only eight 51 percent in 1996, for example 87), Egyptian girls are less likely to women won seats in the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections, enroll in school than their male counterparts, and Egyptian women meaning that they constitute a mere 1.5 percent of the new parlia- tend to have lower levels of political participation than men. 88 How- ment. 89 ever, maternal health indicators are improving; in 2008, health professionals attended nearly 80 percent of births (as opposed to 46 percent II.1.b. Government in 1995), and nearly three-quarters of women received pre-natal care in 2008, up from 39 percent in 1995. In short, although Egyptian Egypt (officially the Arab Republic of Egypt) has been a presidential women and girls have made inroads in recent decades, particularly in republic since 1953 – but one characterized more by authoritarian- the areas of health and education, cultural and structural barriers to ism than by democratic rule. In February 2011, then-president Hosni gender equality persist. Mubarak became the second Arab leader (after Ben Ali of Tunisia) to leave power due to the revolutionary protest movements of the “Arab Egypt claims a significant role in the development of Islamic feminist Spring.” The current political situation remains fluid; a military coun- thought, and has a rich tradition of activists (such as Nawal el Saadawi cil, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), is running the and many others) who have advocated for gender equality and wom- government, reflecting decades of a regime strengthened by a strong en’s rights in Egypt. Yet significant gender inequalities remain. Despite (and often brutal) security apparatus. Islamist parties (including but a long history of active women’s participation in Egyptian revolutions, not limited to the political party affiliated with the Muslim Brother- including the January 25 Revolution of 2011, post-revolution levels hood) made the strongest showing in the first post-Mubarak parlia- 19

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 mentary elections, although numerous reformist and other political under the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser and intensified under actors have emerged in the post-January 25 political arena. his successor, Anwar Sadat). 101 It is likely that post-revolution, the politics, structure, and curricula of Al-Azhar will be subject to new The Mubarak era was characterized by a strong bureaucracy and secu- contestations as the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist politi- rity apparatus with power consolidated in the ruling National Demo- cal parties assume new roles in Egyptian parliament; already Azhari cratic Party. Hence, despite a multiparty system and a bicameral legis- leadership has initiated meetings with the Muslim Brotherhood and lative body, free and fair elections were not held and Egypt had many Salafi leaders; in the past, the relationship between Al-Azhar and features of an authoritarian political system. 90 The legislature was these groups has been a strained one. 102 characterized as having little decision-making power and functioned more as an “indicator of public opinion” than a governing body. 91 The non-Muslim population of Egypt is almost entirely Christian. Hosni Mubarak was President for 30 years, from the assassination Most Egyptian Christians belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church of president Anwar Sadat in 1981; that year, emergency law was de- (some estimates place the percentage of Copts at closer to 15 per- clared, consolidating executive power in the office of the president. cent of the population – higher than the level officially given by the Egyptian government). 103 Copts are considered the cultural, if Parallel to a trend throughout the Arab world, the number of Egyp- not literal, inheritors of Egypt’s pre-Islamic and Pharaonic heritage. tian civil society organizations grew rapidly in the 1990s, but the re- As secular and nationalist-based ideologies have given way to those gime maintained tight control over the funding and agendas of such rooted in Islam, there has also been a shift in Copts’ roles within organizations. Egypt has one of the highest numbers of civil society Egyptian society. Copts and Egyptian Muslims share common cul- organizations in the Arab world, in both relative and absolute terms. 92 tural characteristics nonetheless. FGC is widely practiced in both The growth in civil society coincided with a number of other liberal- religious communities. izing reforms, including economic restructuring. These reforms were often requirements tied to significant levels of American economic Conflicts between Muslims and Copts have been increasing in num- and military aid; Egypt has long been considered a major U.S. ally in ber and intensity in the past several decades. 104 This trend has de- the Middle East, and only Israel received more U.S. foreign aid dollars veloped alongside a general Islamicization of Egyptian society, which than Egypt during the Mubarak era. increased in particular in the wake of Egypt’s disastrous military defeat in the 1967 war against Israel. This defeat marked a loss in confidence The Mubarak regime was a notorious perpetrator of major human in the secular pan-Arab ideology promoted by Egyptian president Ga- rights abuses, including torture and abuse of prisoners (many of them mal Abdel Nasser and a consequent rise in the significance of Islam political), as well as limits on freedoms of the press, assembly, and reli- as a feature of Egyptian society, particularly in the context of political gion. 93 The high levels of American aid to the former regime despite opposition. State crackdowns on Islamist activities, including the de- these well-documented human rights abuses is likely to affect Egyp- tention, torture, and even execution of Islamists, began under the re- tian attitudes towards future U.S. aid and policies concerning Egypt. gime of Anwar Sadat and continued through the Mubarak era. Many In a 2011 Gallup poll, the majority (75 percent) of the general Egyp- contend that instances of interreligious violence were often provoked tian public opposed U.S. aid to Egyptian political groups. 94 Nonethe- or supported, tacitly or overtly, by the former regime as a distraction less, the pattern of significant loans from the U.S. to Egypt appears to and to exaggerate the threat of Islamic extremism; given the much- be continuing post-Revolution. 95 celebrated cooperation between Muslims and Copts throughout the 2011 uprisings, this point of tension remains relevant. II.1.c. Religion in Egypt Despite the weight of Al-Azhar as a religious institution, Egyp- The majority (between 85 and 90 percent) of Egyptians practice tian society includes many other types of religious organizations, Sunni Islam. Egypt is home to Al-Azhar University, which was from grassroots-style movements like the Muslim Brotherhood to founded in the tenth century and remains one of the most influ- “televangelist”-style preachers like Amr Khaled. Generally speaking, ential centers of Sunni Islamic scholarship in the world. Alongside political Islam traces its roots to Egypt, where the first Islamic politi- this legacy is the history of the Egyptian state’s use of Al-Azhar’s re- cal group, the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in the 1920’s. One ligious authority to support and bolster its legitimacy, particularly of the group’s founding goals was to restore the Islamic community in the face of rising Islamist political opposition (this trend began (or umma), formulated partially in response to the Egyptian govern- 20

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 ment at the time, which was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire women 15-19 (in Egypt, nearly all women undergo FGC before the and promoting secular reforms. 105 The tension between secular-ori- age of 15). 111 ented Egyptian governments and the Muslim Brotherhood persisted through the end of Mubarak’s regime, under which it was officially A 2001 report observed that the majority of FGC cases in Egypt were banned as an organization but made substantial electoral gains via Type I or Type II (measured at 19 percent and 64 percent of total members running as independents in 2005 – only to be suppressed cases, respectively), with a minority of Type III procedures, most con- again largely through the regime’s manipulation of the 2010 elec- centrated in the southern regions of the country. 112 In general, preva- tions.106 Its history of organizational development despite its illegal lence tends to be slightly lower among younger, urban, wealthy, and status afforded the Brotherhood a significant advantange in the first educated women than among older, rural, poorer, and less educated round of post-Mubarak elections. women. 113 Geography, however, also plays a key role; in the Frontier Provinces of the country (which include the Sinai peninsula and many The Islamic concept of a society’s collective responsibility for the mo- desert areas) prevalence is significantly less than in other regions, at rality of its members (mentioned in section I.3.b.), is manifested in around 66 percent among women 15-49. 114 Egypt in particular through the notion of da’wa, a historical Islamic concept defined as “a duty, incumbent on some or all members of A significant trend in the practice of FGC in recent years has been the Islamic community, to actively encourage fellow Muslims in the the medicalization of the practice. Traditionally, FGC procedures in pursuit of greater piety in all aspects of their lives.” 107 The Mus- Egypt were performed by traditional birthing attendants, or dayas, lim Brotherhood revived this concept and put it into practice in the and without anesthetic, but recent surveys indicate significant increas- modern era, and da’wa itself has taken on a life of its own, becoming es in the number of procedures carried out by medical professionals “a space for the articulation of a contestatory Islamic discourse on (whether doctors or government-trained midwives) to nearly three- state and society,” now aided by various contemporary media for- quarters of cases in 2008. 115 Some reports have indicated that this mats. 108 In addition to the Muslim Brotherhood, the da’wa concept increased medicalization has resulted in Egyptian girls undergoing the has been propounded by a group of “televangelists” called al-duah procedure at older ages than previously was the case, due to pressure al-gudud (“the new preachers”) who focus not only on religious, but from medical professionals who argue that fewer complications result also civic ethics and duties. 109 when the operation is performed on older girls. 116

Hence, Islam as manifested in modern Egyptian society has broad Figure 2 shows the distribution of the practice in Egypt. implications for social change. It should be noted that often the English term “advocacy” is translated into Arabic as “da’wa,” which Figure 3 can be confusing for some activists who consider “da’wa” to be a strictly religious term and not necessarily appropriate in advocacy 110 contexts. FGM/C Prevalence in Egypt*

II.2. FGC in Egypt

II.2.a. History and Prevalence Less than 90% 90% - 97.5% More than 97.5% Egypt has one of the world’s highest prevalence rates of FGC, despite numerous campaigns to end it and significant governmental and religious condemnation of the practice (by both Muslim and Coptic leaders). It has persisted despite rising female literacy (education has long been expected to temper FGC and other “traditional practices”). As of 2008, over 90 percent of Egyptian women (aged 15-49) had * Prevalence among women aged 15-49. Data for the Frontier Governorates are from 2000. undergone some form of FGC. FGC practice appears to be declin- Note: This map does not reflect a position by UNICEF on the legal status of any ing gradually within Egypt, however. Some 96 percent of women country or territory or the delimitation of any frontiers. Source: DHS, 2003 aged 45-49 had undergone FGC, compared to only 80.7 percent of 21

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 II.2.b. International Law and National Sovereignty: The Legal Situation measures mentioned above, including a media campaign, originally in Egypt launched in 2003, focusing on awareness and advocacy. 125 In 2008, Egypt hosted a regional meeting focused on FGC, which resulted in From a legal standpoint, a certain level of ambiguity has always sur- the Cairo Declaration for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutila- rounded FGC in post-independence Egypt. For years, although many tion, aimed at raising awareness and motivating action against FGC educated Egyptian citizens and medical professionals agreed that the worldwide. 126 In general, although the Egyptian government took practice was illegal, no record of such a law could be located – only a an increasingly strong role in enacting legal measures to end FGC in series of decrees issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Health that did the latter years of the Mubarak regime, much of the concrete action not carry the force of law and pertained largely to health professionals’ taken to change the practice has come through local and international participation in performing the practice. 117 Doctors were forbidden NGOs. 127 to perform FGC procedures in government medical facilities, and traditional practitioners were forbidden to perform the procedure any- II.2.c. Local Activists and Global Civil Society in Egypt where. 118 The history of local- and community-based programs in Egypt In 1994, following a highly publicized CNN report about FGC in that aim to end FGC dates back to the 1920s, but since the 1990s Egypt, and in the wake of the United Nations International Confer- they have become far more integrated into broader development ence on Population and Development (ICPD) – held in Cairo that frameworks. 128 After the 1984 Cairo Conference on Population same year – the Egyptian Minister of Health decreed that the proce- and Development, a national taskforce was created, focused on dure should be conducted in government health facilities one day a drawing attention to FGC. The taskforce brought together a vari- week by professional health workers (and after attempting to persuade ety of grassroots organizations and actors from throughout Egypt, the parents against it). What followed was a backlash (both domestic and worked to raise the issue’s profile, particularly within the Egyp- and international) against this endorsement of the “medicalization” of tian government – which started tracking FGC-related statistics in FGC, and consequently, the decision was reversed a year later. 119 In 1995. 129 Gradually, efforts to encourage the abandonment of FGC response, supporters of FGC challenged the ban in court, which sub- in Egypt have evolved into coalitions among international organiza- sequently declared the decree unconstitutional (citing, among other tions (such as USAID and various UN agencies), Egyptian govern- reasons, that it interfered with physicians’ autonomy in the practice of ment agencies (for example, the National Council for Childhood medicine). 120 In 1997, Egypt’s highest court of appeals overturned the and Motherhood, which is a part of the recently created Ministry of lower court’s decision, making FGC procedures a punishable offense Family and Population 130), and local actors. 131 Although supported for anyone, whether a traditional birth attendant or a health profes- by international and national organizations, many current efforts sional. 121 According to press reports, 13 individuals had been pros- tend to highlight local, community-centered approaches and actors, ecuted under these provisions as of 2001. 122 It was not until June of in part to combat the notion that FGC abandonment is an imposi- 2008 that the Egyptian legislature formally criminalized FGC in the tion of outside or Western values. national penal code, following months of public outcry over a young girl who died from the procedure. 123 One example of such a project is the “FGM-Free Village” model, carried out with the help of UN Volunteers in 120 Egyptian villages, In addition to its domestic laws, Egypt is party to a number of inter- which aims to target not just women or the midwives that conduct national treaties that carry implications for FGC, including CEDAW, FGC, but also community leaders, teachers, mothers, midwives, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the African youth, and men, and encourage entire communities to give up FGC Charter on Human and People’s Rights. However, when signing and as a collective action. 132 The holistic approach required to sustain ratifying CEDAW, the Egyptian government specified reservations long-term behavior change also has the advantage of situating the indicating that in the case of any conflict between CEDAW provi- issue of FGC within a broader right-based program, lessening the sions and Islamic shari’a law, shari’a would take precedence. 124 chance that the campaign is perceived as one being waged by those with an outside agenda. 133 By 2009, 50 Egyptian villages had pledged In accordance with principles of international law regarding social and to end FGC as a community. cultural rights, the Egyptian government has undertaken a number of measures to discourage FGC in addition to the legal and regulatory Religious legitimacy also plays into many of these programs. Of the 22

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 various Egyptian NGOs that started working on FGC issues in the and does not interfere with her sexual satisfaction (which is generally 1990s, many were Islamic or Coptic organizations, while others tar- considered to be the responsibility of the man). 143 One focus group geted religious leaders as agents of change; groups also used religious observed that FGC is a less clear-cut issue than other measures of gen- festivals as a way to reach large audiences to raise awareness about der discrimination and equality, such as girls’ education. 144 the issue. 135 Recent data indicate that these approaches are making headway in reducing the rates of FGC, while medicalization con- The medicalization policy of the Egyptian government described above, tinues to increase. 136 Along with medical professionals and youth, which briefly legalized FGC if conducted by medical professionals, was religious organizations have been cited as one of the primary sources a way of addressing the question of cultural pluralism: it required physi- of legitimacy and credibility for the promotion of FGC abandon- cians to attempt to dissuade parents from subjecting their daughters to ment in Egypt. 137 the procedure, but essentially endorsed it by allowing it to take place in government facilities. The backlash against this accommodation was Efforts to end FGC in Egypt have faced numerous difficulties since both international and domestic, indicating the pressure the interna- the revolution. In the first place, instability has lead to decreases in UN tional community is capable of exerting in this case. According to one funding designated for discouraging FGC. 138 Regime change resulted series of focus groups in Egypt, however, many Egyptians expressed the in the dissolution of the National Council for Childhood and Moth- opinion that the issue of FGC was a personal and family matter, and erhood, and in any case former first lady Suzanne Mubarak’s activism resented governmental regulations or interference. 145 No doubt this on FGC (not to mention a host of other issues aimed at women’s em- sentiment is due in part to the agendas of Western donor agencies that powerment) has tainted it by association to some degree. 139 Moreover, funnel aid money to the Egyptian government – agendas that promote as more Islamist politicians and policymakers assume power, the state’s specific modernizing discourses, often couched in the language of hu- condemnation of FGC on religious grounds – once definitive and man rights, related to women and the family. Consequently, more re- streamlined as the official position of Al-Azhar – is now up for con- cent steps taken by the Mubarak government had begun to focus on testation. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood (whose Freedom and supporting local efforts to empower women and their communities to Justice Party is one of the more moderate of the Islamist parties now advocate for abandonment.146 represented in parliament) have pointed out that according to classical Islamic sources, FGC is neither explicitly forbidden nor required. 140 II.2.e. Policies of U.S. and European Governments While this has not translated into promotion of the practice, it does not lend itself to speaking out against it either. Despite the unequivocal policies of American and European governments, which take firm stances against FGC, a recent UNICEF report II.2.d. The Limits of Cultural Pluralism notes that international agencies and governments have kept a generally low profile in abandonment efforts in Egypt due to the sensitivity FGC in Egypt can be understood as a largely cultural phenomenon, of the issue. But with the fall of the Mubarak regime, the implications practiced equally by both Muslims and Copts. However, religion’s in- of U.S. and European policies in Egypt will almost certainly change. fluence cannot be ignored: a representative 2008 survey found that approximately half of all Egyptians (men and women) believed FGC One scholar notes that although “For decades, Cairo has been the was required by religious precepts. The ambiguity surrounding FGC default location for anthropologists as well as journalists and develop- and religion in Egypt is captured in a recent New York Times Maga- ment workers,” being “unquestionably stable” and “open to Americans zine interview with Wael Ghonim, the Google executive who played and Europeans…Egypt is no longer open access.” 147 After decades of a highly visible role in the Egyptian uprisings. When asked about the U.S. support of the oppressive Mubarak regime, American initiatives high prevalence of FGC in Egypt, he replied: “I question the num- in Egypt are likely to be regarded with suspicion in Egypt. At least ber…I think there is a religious debate around it, but I haven’t really one female member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has stated that read enough to make a judgment call.” 141 Western-funded anti-FGC campaigns represent the promotion of a hidden Western agenda promoted by NGOs. 148 It remains to be seen Despite condemnations by national religious and political leaders, how the outcomes of the January 25 Revolution will impact the rela- these top-down messages often conflict with those of local religious tionship between American and Western actors and governments and leaders. 142 Egyptians who support the continuance of FGC believe Egypt, particularly with regard to issues (like FGC) that are tied to that it ensures a woman’s virtue, improves her chances for marriage, gender, religion, and culture. 23

Egypt and in view of the fact that one of the most important bases Reservations made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification: of these relations is an equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure complementary which guarantees true equality between In respect of article 9 the spouses. The provisions of the Sharia lay down that the hus- Reservation to the text of article 9, paragraph 2, concerning the band shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully granting to women of equal rights with men with respect to the and shall also make a payment to her upon divorce, whereas the nationality of their children, without prejudice to the acquisition wife retains full rights over her property and is not obliged to by a child born of a marriage of the nationality of his father. This spend anything on her keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the is in order to prevent a child’s acquisition of two nationalities wife’s rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge’s rul- where his parents are of different nationalities, since this may ing, whereas no such restriction is laid down in the case of the be prejudicial to his future. It is clear that the child’s acquisition husband. of his father’s nationality is the procedure most suitable for the child and that this does not infringe upon the principle of equal- In respect of article 29: ity between men and women, since it is customary for a woman The Egyptian delegation also maintains the reservation con- to agree, upon marrying an alien, that her children shall be of the tained in article 29, paragraph 2, concerning the right of a State father’s nationality. signatory to the Convention to declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of that article concerning the sub- N.B.: This reservation was withdrawn on 4 January 2008 mission to an arbitral body of any dispute which may arise between States concerning the interpretation or application of the In respect of article 16 Convention. This is in order to avoid being bound by the system Reservation to the text of article 16 concerning the equality of of arbitration in this field. men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during the marriage and upon its dissolution, without Reservation made upon ratification: prejudice to the Islamic Sharia’s provisions whereby women are accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so as to en- General reservation on article 2 sure a just balance between them. This is out of respect for the The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the con- sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which govern mari- tent of this article, provided that such compliance does not run tal relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question counter to the Islamic Sharia. 24

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UN International Conference on Population and Develop- ment, official website: http://www.iisd.ca/cairo.html

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “2008 Human Rights Report: Egypt.” http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119114.htm

United States Department of State, Egypt: Report on Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female Genital Cutting (FGC), 1 June 2001, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/46d57876c.html Accessed 29 October 2010.

“Wajdi Ghanim Et L Excision Des Femmes” (sic). Online video. http://www.viduba.com/video:QZlVZdVVKNnYHpUN TVlVVRmM0VVV31TP

“Wajdi Ghaneim talks about the subject of women’s circumcision.” Online video. http://www.viduba.com/video:QVlV1Zl RWd0UHpEVhVkWWdVRwhEVn1TP

World Health Organization. “Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An interagency statement UNAIDS, UNDP, UN- ECA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF,

Gruenbaum, Ellen. The Female Circumcision Controversy: thropology.” Medical Anthropology. 5(1), 1991. An Anthropological Perspective. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Assaad, Marie Bassili. “Female Circumcision in Egypt: Social Implications, Current Research, and Prospects for Change.” UNICEF. “The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Studies in Family Planning. Population Council. 11(1), 1980. Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries.” 2010. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publi- Boddy, Janice. Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Co- cations/pdf/fgm_insight_eng.pdf lonial Sudan. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). Rahman, Anika, and Nahid Toubia. Female Genital Mutila- tion: A Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide. New York: Zed, 2000.

Abusharaf, Rogaia Mustafa. “Revisiting Feminist Discourses on Infibulation: Responses from Sudanese Feminists.” Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy, and Change. Shell-Duncan, Bettina, and Ylva Hernlund, Eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

Abdel-Tawab, Nahla, and Sahar Hegazi. “Critical Analysis of Interventions Against FGC in Egypt.” Frontiers Project, Egypt. 2000.

UNFPA Egypt: National Project on FGM/C The FGM- free Village Model. http://egypt.unfpa.org/english/ fgmStaticpages/21b26036-082c-475d-b6ec-41cc0945bb27/ The_National_project.aspx

Gordon, Daniel. “Female Circumcision and Genital Opera- tions in Egypt and the Sudan: A Dilemma for Medical An-

1 Draws on Carole Nagengast, “Women, Minorities, and Indig- 8 World Health Organization Fact Sheet: Female Genital Mutila- enous Peoples: Universalism and Cultural Relativity”, Journal tion. of Anthropological Research, Vol. 53, No. 3, Universal Human Rights versus Cultural Relativity (Autumn, 1997), pp. 349-369, 9 Rahman, Anika, and Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutila- Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3630958 tion: A Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide (New York: Zed, 2000), p.7 2 World Health Organization. “Eliminating Female Genital Mu- tilation: An interagency statement UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECA, 10 Rahman and Toubia, FGM UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNI- FEM, WHO.” Geneva: WHO, 2008. tilation.

3 World Health Organization Fact Sheet: Female Genital Mutila- 12 World Health Organization Fact Sheet: Female Genital Mu- tion. Fact Sheet No. 241. February 2010. , and Rahman, Anika, and Nahid Toubia. Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide to Laws and 13 In recent years, FGM/C operations resulting in girls’ deaths Policies Worldwide (New York: Zed, 2000). have garnered more and more media attention, both within practicing countries and in the international community. See 4 Green, Fiona J. “From clitoridectomies to ‘designer vaginas’: http://www.fgmnetwork.org/gonews.php?subaction=showfu The medical construction of heteronormative female bodies and ll&id=1240246169&archive=&start_from=&ucat=1&, and sexuality through female genital cutting.” Sexualities, Evolution http://bikyamasr.com/wordpress/?p=15987 and Gender. August 2005; 7(2): 153-187 14 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 4 5 Green, Fiona, “Medical construction,”164-70. 15 Cooke, Miriam, and Margot Badran. Opening the Gates: A 6 Green, Fiona, “Medical construction.” Century of Arab Feminist Writing. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1990. 7 Asaad, Marie Bassili. “Female Circumcision in Egypt: Social Implications, Current Research, and Prospects for Change.” 16 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 3, and Cooke, Miriam, and Studies in Family Planning. Population Council. 11(1), 1980. Margot Badran. Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Femi- nist Writing. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1990.

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 17 World Health Organization Fact Sheet: Female Genital Mu- 27 Ibid. tilation. 28 “Wajdi Ghanim Et L Excision Des Femmes” (sic). Online vid- 18 As discussed in Women in the Qur’an, Traditions, and Inter- eo. http://www.viduba.com/video:QZlVZdVVKNnYHpUNT pretation, Barbara Freyer Stowasser, Oxford: Oxford University VlVVRmM0VVV31TP and “Wajdi Ghaneim talks about the Press, 2004, p.147. subject of women’s circumcision.” Online video. http://www. viduba.com/video:QVlV1ZlRWd0UHpEVhVkWWdVRwhE 19 For sources on Hadith, including those discussing FGM/C, Vn1TP see Abdi, Maryam Sheikh, “A Religious Oriented Approach to Addressing FGM/C among the Somali Community of Wajir, 29 Melki, Wiem. “Ministry of Women Affairs Warns of Dangers Kenya.” Frontiers Program, Population Council. 2007; http:// Associated with Genital Mutilation.” Tunisialive. 17 February www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/ 2012. http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/02/17/ministry-of- texts/muslim/search.html; and http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/ women-affairs-warns-of-dangers-associated-with-genital-muti- violence&harrassment/fgm.html lation/

20 Siddiqi, Muhammad Zubayr. Hadith Literature: Its Origin, 30 Innocenti Digest. “Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Development and Special Features. Ed. Abdal Hakim Murad. Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting.” UNICEF. Sesto Fioren- Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993: 62. tino, Italy: 2005.

21 Islamopedia Online. “The Cooperative Office of Dawah in 31 http://www.cofe.anglican.org/info/socialpublic/marriagefam- Saudi Arabia answers the question: What does Islam have to say ily/children/fgm/ about female circumcision? 22 April 2010. http://www.islamopediaonline.org/fatwa/what-does-islam-have-say-about-female- 32 http://www.desertflowerfoundation.org/en/catholic-church- circumcision opposes-fgm/

22 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/speaking- 33 Frederiksen, Bodil Folke. “Jomo Kenyatta, Marie Bonaparte of-fatwas-what-about-female-circumcision/article1540876/ and Bronislaw Malinowski on Clitoridectomy and Female Sexu- ality.” History Workshop Journal (2008) 65 (1): 23-48. 23 Population Council. “FGM Abandonment Program: Evalua- tion Summary Report.” 2008. http://www.unicef.org/evaldata- 34 Frederiksen, Bodil Folke. “Jomo Kenyatta, Marie Bonaparte base/files/EGY_FGM_AP_report.pdf and Bronislaw Malinowski on Clitoridectomy and Female Sexu- ality.” History Workshop Journal (2008) 65 (1): 23-48. 24 As reported by UNICEF, quoted here: http://my.telegraph. co.uk/brereribbit/brereribbit/38/fgm-is-not-islamic/#disqus_ 35 Hayes, Rose Oldfield. “Female Genital Mutilation, Fertility thread Control, Women’s Roles, and the Patrilineage in Modern Sudan: A Functional Analysis.” American Ethnologist 2(4), 1975. 25 “Amr Khaled attacks female circumcision.” YouTube video. Uploaded 12 March, 2009. http://www.youtube.com/ 36 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 10 watch?v=9e9oVtghmnE 37 Website of the UN International Conference on Population 26 Islamopedia Online. “Fadlullah of Lebanon rules: Female and Development, http://www.iisd.ca/cairo.html Genital Mutilation is prohibited if it negatively affects the soul, body and the sexual abilities.” 22 April 2010. http://www.is- 38 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 1 lamopediaonline.org/fatwa/fadlullah-lebanon-rules-female-genital-mutilation-prohibited-if-it-negatively-affects-soul-bod 39 UNICEF. “The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five Af- 31

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 rican Countries.” 2010. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/ 53 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 17 pdf/fgm_insight_eng.pdf 54 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 19 40 See, for example, Abusharaf, Rogaia Mustafa. “Revisiting Feminist Discourses on Infibulation: Responses from Sudanese 55 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 30 Feminists.” Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Contro- versy, and Change. Shell-Duncan, Bettina, and Ylva Hernlund, 56 qtd. in Rahman and Toubia, FGM, 47; see Convention on the Eds. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm 41 Gruenbaum, Ellen, The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological Perspective (Philadelphia: University of 57 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 32-8 Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 58 Banjul Charter 42 Qtd in Gruenbaum, Controversy 59 Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW. 43 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina- http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations- tion Against Women. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ country.htm cedaw/cedaw.htm 60 e.g., Abdi, Maryam Sheikh. “A Religious Oriented Approach 44 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. to Addressing FGM/C among the Somali Community of Wajir, http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html Kenya.” Frontiers Program, Population Council. 2007, p.19

45 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 61 United States Agency for International Development. “Fam- http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html ily Planning: USAID Policy on Female Genital Mutilation/Cut- ting (FGM/C).” 1 September 2000.

47 Marshall, Katherine, and Marisa Bronwyn Van Saanen. “Shift- 62 Abdi, Maryam Sheikh. “A Religious Oriented Approach to ing Community Attitudes: The Tostan Story in West Africa.” Addressing FGM/C among the Somali Community of Wajir, Development and Faith: Where Mind, Heart, and Soul Work Kenya.” Frontiers, Population Council. 2007. Together. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007. 63 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 234 48 Ibid. 64 Stearns, Scott. “Clinton: ‘Cultural Tradition’ is No Excuse for 49 “700 Senegalese villages abandon female circumcision.” Africa Female Genital Mutilation.” Voice of America. February 16, Daily News, AFP. Monday, November 29, 2010. 2012. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Clinton- Cultural-Tradition-is-No-Excuse-for-Female-Genital-Mutila- 50 Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices (IAC) web- tion--139478343.html site. http://www.iac-ciaf.net/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=25&Itemid=28. 65 Ibid.

51 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 10 66 Green, Fiona, “Medical Construction.”

52 IAC website. http://www.iac-ciaf.net/index.php?option=com_ 67 UNICEF. “Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=28. Exploration, 2005.”

69 World Health Organization. “Men’s and women’s percep- 85 Hausmann, Ricardo, et al. “The Global Gender Gap Report: tions of the relationship between female genital mutilation and 2009.” World Economic Forum. 2009. women’s sexuality in three communities in Egypt.” WHO Social Science Policy Brief. 2010. 86 Handoussa, Heba, et al. “Egypt Human Development Report 2010.” United Nations Development Programme and Institute 70 Gordon, Daniel. “Female Circumcision and Genital Opera- of National Planning, Egypt. 2010. tions in Egypt and the Sudan: A Dilemma for Medical Anthro- pology.” Medical Anthropology. 5(1), 1991. 87 “Combined fourth and fifth periodic reports of States parties: Egypt.” Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 71 Gordon, “Dilemma.” Against Women (CEDAW). March 2000. < http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/382/60/PDF/N0038260. 72 Asaad, “Female Circumcision,” p. 5 pdf?OpenElement>

73 Tostan: Community-Led Development website. . 89 Barakat, Ibtisam, “Welcome to the New Egyptian Parliea- 74 Gruenbaum, Controversy, p. 77 MENt,” Jadaliyya, Jan 25, 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/ pages/index/4160/welcome-to-the-new-egyptian-parliament 75 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 3 90 See Freedom House Country Report: Egypt, 2010, http:// 76 Gruenbaum, Controversy www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&c ountry=7816, as well as Brownlee, Jason. “The Decline of Plu- 77 Innocenti Digest. “Changing a Harmful Social Convention: ralism in Mubarak’s Egypt. Journal of Democracy 13(4), 2002, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting.” UNICEF. Sesto Fioren- and Perry, Glenn E. “The Arab Democracy Deficit: The Case of tino, Italy: 2005. Egypt.” Arab Studies Quarterly. 26(2), 2004.

78 Gruenbaum, Controversy 91 Albrecht, Holger, and Oliver Schlumberger. “Waiting for Go- dot: Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle 79 Abdi, Maryam Sheikh. “A Religious Oriented Approach to East.” International Political Science Review 25(4), 2004. Addressing FGM/C among the Somali Community of Wajir, Kenya.” Frontiers, Population Council. 2007. 92 Yom, Sean L. “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World.” MERIA. 9(4) 2005 80 Ibid. 93 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human 81 Examples of successful campaigns targeting intermarrying Rights, and Labor. “2008 Human Rights Report: Egypt.” http:// communities include the FGM Free Village model, in Egypt www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119114.htm (http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=25204) and the Tostan approach, applied in various African countries (http:// 94 Moghaded, Dalia, and Mohamed Younis. “Egyptians Oppose www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/magazine/24FOB-Footbind- U.S. Aid to Political Groups in Their Country.” AbuDhabi Gal- ing-t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine&pagewanted=all) lup Center. June 8, 2011. http://www.gallup.com/poll/147953/ Egyptians-Oppose-Aid-Political-Groups-Country.aspx 82 CIA World Factbook 95 Jadaliyya Reports. “Interim Government Obtains Four Times 83 Demographic and Health Survey, Egypt, 2008 the Loans Obtained during Mubarak’s Time.” Jadaliyya. 20 33

BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY Female Genital Cutting: Cultural, Religious, and Human Rights Dimensions of a Complex Development Issue • MARCH 2012 January, 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4092/ Islamic Counterpublic.” Cultural Antrhopology. 16(1), 2001. interim-government-obtains-four-times-the-loans-ob 106 Shehata, Samer, and Joshua Stacher. “The Brotherhood Goes 96 Ahram Online. “The Battle for Public Space: Squares and to Parliament.” Middle East Report. 240, 2006. http://www. Streets of the Egyptian Revolution.” January 25, 2012. http:// merip.org/mer/mer240/shehata_stacher.html www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4149/the-battle-for-public- space_squares-and-streets-of 107 Hirschkind, Charles. “Civic Virtue and Religious Reason: An Islamic Counterpublic.” Cultural Anthropology. 16(1), 2001. 97 Elyachar, Julia. “Writing the Revolution: Dilemmas of Eth- nographic Writing after the January 25th Revolution in Egypt.” 108 Hirschkind, Charles. “Civic Virtue and Religious Reason: An Jadaliyya. February 10, 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/ Islamic Counterpublic.” Cultural Anthropology. 16(1), 2001. index/4277/writing-the-revolution_dilemmas-of-ethnographic- wr 109 Moll, Yasmine. “Building the New Egypt: Islamic Televange- lists, Revolutionary Ethics, and ‘Productive’ Citizenship.” Jadali- 98 Radwan, Noha. “How Egyptian Women Took Back the Street yya. 14 February 2012. Between Two Black Wednesdays: A First Person Account.” Jadaliyya, February 20, 2011. http://www.jadaliyya.com/ 110 Abdel-Tawab, Nahla, and Sahar Hegazi. “Critical Analysis of pages/index/694/how-egyptian-women-took-back-the-street- Interventions Against FGC in Egypt.” Frontiers Project, Egypt. between-tw. See also http://harassmap.org, a website created by 2000. Egyptian women to report and track instances of harassment in public places. 111 El-Zanaty, Fatma and Ann Way. 2009. Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 2008. Cairo, Egypt: Ministry of Health, El- 99 Radwan 2011; Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Military “Vir- Zanaty and Associates, and Macro International. ginity Test” Investigation a Sham: Impunity Highlights Lack of Independence of Justice System.” November 9, 2011. http:// 112 United States Department of State, Egypt: Report on Female www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/09/egypt-military-virginity-test- Genital Mutilation (FGM) or Female Genital Cutting (FGC), investigation-sham 1 June 2001, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/46d57876c.html [accessed 29 October 2010] 100 Radwan 2011. 113 Demographic and Health Survey, Egypt, 2008 101 Barraclough, Stephen. “Al-Azhar: Between the Government and the Islamists.” Middle East Journal, 52(2), 1998. http:// 114 Demographic and Health Survey, Egypt, 2008 www.jstor.org/stable/4329188 115 Feldman-Jacobs, Charlotte, and Donna Clifton. “Female 102 For an overview of political parties and actors in post-rev- Genital Mutilation/Cutting: Data and Trends.” Population Ref- olution Egypt, see http://egypt.jadaliyya.com/ and http://www. erence Bureau, 2008. islamopediaonline.org/country-profile/egypt/al-azhar-and-dar- al-ifta 116 World Health Organization. “Men’s and women’s perceptions of the relationship between female genital mutilation and 103 CIA World Factbook women’s sexuality in three communities in Egypt.” WHO Social Science Policy Brief. 2010. 104 Diab, Khaled. “Can Egypt protect its Copts?” The Guardian. 17 October 2009. 118 United States Department of State, Egypt: Report on FGM/C 105 Hirschkind, Charles. “Civic Virtue and Religious Reason: An 34

120 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 142 134 UNICEF. “The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five Af- 121 Rahman and Toubia, FGM, p. 142 rican Countries.” 2010. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/ pdf/fgm_insight_eng.pdf 122 United States Department of State, Egypt: Report on FGM/C 135 Abdel-Tawab and Hegazi, “Critical Analysis” 123 UNFPA Egypt: National Legislations, Decrees and State- ments banning FGM/C: http://egypt.unfpa.org/english/ 136 “Results Framework: Joint Programme, Abandonment of fgmStaticpages/3f54a0c6-f088-4bec-8671-5e9421d2adee/Na- FGM/C and Empowerment of Families.” UNDG. 24 April tional_Legislations_Decrees_and_Statements_banning_fgm. 2008. aspx 137 UNICEF. “The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the 124 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations- Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five Af- country.htm rican Countries.” 2010. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/ pdf/fgm_insight_eng.pdf 125 UNICEF. “The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five Af- 138 http://ht.ly/965CD rican Countries.” 2010. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/ pdf/fgm_insight_eng.pdf 139 http://ht.ly/965CD

126 Ibid. 140 The Orchid Project. “Female genital cutting in Egypt.” 15 February 2012. http://ht.ly/965CD 127 Abdel-Tawab and Hegazi, “Critical Analysis” 141 Goldman, Andrew. “Wael Ghonim Has No Regrets.” The 128 Abdel-Tawab and Hegazi, “Critical Analysis” New York Times. 13 January 2012. http://www.nytimes. com/2012/01/15/magazine/wael-ghonim-has-no-regrets.html 129 UNICEF. “The Dynamics of Social Change: Towards the Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five Af- 142 Demographic and Health Survey, Egypt, 2008 rican Countries.” 2010. http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/ pdf/fgm_insight_eng.pdf 143 WHO policy brief

130 “Results Framework: Joint Programme, Abandonment of 144 Ibid. FGM/C and Empowerment of Families.” UNDG. 24 April 2008. 145 Ibid.

131 UNFPA Egypt: Political Environment and Legislations 146 UNICEF Dynamics of Social Change nographic Writing after the January 25th Revolution in Egypt.” Jadaliyya. 10 February 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/in- 132 UNFPA Egypt: National Project on FGM/C The dex/4277/writing-the-revolution_dilemmas-of-ethnographic-wr FGM-free Village Model. February 2012. http://ht.ly/965CD 35

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