Intercultural Struggle and the Targeting of Noncombatants: the Case of the Islamic State

religions

Article Intercultural Struggle and the Targeting of Noncombatants: The Case of the Islamic State

Ross Moret 1,* and Simone Burgin 2 1 Florida State University, Honors Program, 127 Honors Way, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA 2 Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]

Received: 28 June 2018; Accepted: 23 July 2018; Published: 27 July 2018

Abstract: The prohibition against targeting noncombatants is a long-held commitment in both Muslim and Western military ethics. Nevertheless, some militant Muslim groups, and particularly the Islamic State, have created ever-widening space for attacking those traditionally considered immune from targeting in military operations. Our essay uses two theoretical apparatuses developed in social psychology—cultural cognition and moral foundations theory—to explain how certain aspects of post-9/11 tactics on the part of the United States and its allies have contributed to this phenomenon. We also use these same tools to show that similar dynamics work to contribute to the rightwing backlash against Muslims in the United States.

Keywords: military ethics; Muslim ethics; just war theory; noncombatant immunity; discrimination; cultural cognition; moral foundation theory

1. Background If the Islamic State (ISIS) group is known for one thing among the general public in the West, it is its brutality. It is not difficult to recall—indeed, it is difficult to forget—the images of Islamic State fighters killing prisoners, Western journalists, and even aid workers in gruesome fashion on international television. These images were most prevalent between 2014 and 2016 when, in addition to committing large numbers of executions, ISIS was taking control of significant chunks of land in Syria and Iraq and inspiring numerous terror attacks in the West. The level of coverage has shrunk with the size of its geographical holdings, but ISIS continues to inspire and encourage attacks against civilian populations and they continue to justify these attacks by appealing to traditional Islamic sources. While Islamic tradition has a long history of prohibiting the targeting of noncombatants, various militant groups have found ways of getting around the prohibition while still holding to the prima facie distinction between combatants and noncombatants, usually by appealing to certain exceptional circumstances that temporarily require such targeting. That is to say, the prohibition is overridden, but only in particular, drastic situations. ISIS, however, is different. Not only do they target noncombatants, they do so with a sense of great enthusiasm and as part of what they see as a state of affairs that will endure until theReligions black 2018 flag, 9 governs, x FOR PEER the REVIEW entire world. And they use this brutality 2 of 10 as a tool for their propaganda. In their eyes, their legitimacy is not threatened, but is strengthened, by the level of brutality they are ablesuch to inflict that onsome noncombatants. without formal How, legal then, training despite have the begun prohibition to issue legal rulings, and some have found against targeting noncombatants in Muslimsubstantial tradition, followings did ISIS in doing come toso. the One place helpful of not way only of ordering,approaching these tensions while accounting but sensationalizing the brutal, targetedfor both killing continuity of civilians? and change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim There is longstanding tension inethical Islamic discourse jurisprudence tends betweento functiontaqlid according, following to thethe judgmentsmore or less formal procedures and norms of of an established scholar, and ijtihad,what arriving he calls at a Shari Shari ʿ aa rulingreasoning. on one’s This own.framework Traditionally, includesijtihad methods of interpreting and applying the was only performed by scholars whoQur had ʾ an gone and through sunna (precedent-setting a long, formal process traditions of study about at the the life feet and sayings of Muhammad) as well as of recognized authorities. In recent decades,specific judgments however, a reached certain democratizationby scholars of previous has occurred, times. Shari suchʿa reasoning also involves achieving a balance between respect for the past and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus Religions 2018, 9, 230; doi:10.3390/rel9080230 suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamicwww.mdpi.com/journal/religions tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; but practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, their application includes a good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa reasoning to understand how the Islamic State group has approached the issue of targeting noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on the ways that ethical reasoning functions in light of precedents in Islamic tradition, we emphasize the ways that a sense of fit guides the use of precedents. More specifically, we argue that the Islamic State’s arguments justifying the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the norms of Islamic tradition, such that to understand ISIS on this point one must understand the factors that contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a comprehensive case would require much more than one essay, we suggest that two psychological paradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural cognition, can help to shed light on the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In emphasizing the importance of cultural conflict in the formation of ethical norms, both of these paradigms also point to the significance of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the part of important officials in the United States in fueling anti-Western extremism in general and the targeting of noncombatants in particular among militant Muslims. At the same time, we suggest, similar cultural dynamics in the West have fueled a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the part of the United States.

2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State Much of the classical Muslim tradition concerning noncombatant immunity can be summarized in a tradition of Muhammad, in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “Do not cheat or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” a prohibition that in other traditions also includes protections for women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, 92). These prohibitions, when combined with other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the basis of a longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the targeting of slaves and the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. 76) as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. However, as in Western traditions, it has been generally recognized among Muslims that some noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the process of a legitimate attack. In recent decades, Muslims have nearly always accepted a prima facie commitment to noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, however, most notably concerning which persons count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war in Islam should only be defensive in nature and that the command protecting noncombatants from targeted attacks is inviolable. For example, in their “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of leading Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibition against targeting noncombatants, such that “only combatants may be killed; their families and noncombatants may not be killed intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary suspension of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emergency passed, Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 2 of 10 Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 10 suchthat somethat some without without formal formal legal legal training training have have begun begun to to issue issue legal legal rulings, rulings, andand somesome have found found substantialsubstantial followings followings in in doing doing so. so. One One helpful helpful way way of of approaching approaching these these tensions tensions while while accounting accounting forfor both both continuity continuity and and change change in in the the tradition tradition is is provided provided by by John John Kelsay, Kelsay, who who argues argues that that Muslim Muslim ethicalethical discourse discourse tends tends to to function function according according to to th thee more more or or less less formal formal procedures procedures and and norms norms of of whatwhat he he calls calls Shari Shari ʿ aa reasoning.reasoning. ThisThis framework includes me methodsthods of interpreting and and applying applying the the QurQur ʾ anan andand sunnasunna (precedent-setting(precedent-setting traditionstraditions aboutabout the life and sayings of Muhammad) Muhammad) as as well well as as specificspecific judgments judgments reached by scholarsscholars ofof previousprevious times.times. ShariShariʿaa reasoningreasoning also also involves involves achieving achieving a abalance balance between between respect respect for for the the pastpast andand creativitycreativity regardingregarding applicationapplication in the present. Kelsay Kelsay thus thus suggestssuggests that that Muslims Muslims tend tend to to treat treat Islamic Islamic tradition tradition as as a a body body of of precedents precedents that that must must be be respected; respected; butbut practitioners practitioners must must also also seek seek to to find find the the right right fit fit between between the the precedent precedent and and a a particular particular situation. situation. ItIt is is not not surprising, surprising, therefore, therefore, that that while while the the broad broad norms norms of of Shari Shariʿaa reasoning reasoning are are relatively relatively stable, stable, theirtheir application application includes includes a a good good deal deal of of diversity diversity and and disagreement disagreement (Kelsay (Kelsay 2007,2007, p. 73). 73). ThisThis essay essay uses uses the the framework framework of of Shari Shariʿaa reasoning reasoning to to understand understand how how the the Islamic Islamic State State group group hashas approached approached the the issue issue of of targ targetingeting noncombatants. noncombatants. However, However, whereas whereas Kelsay Kelsay tends tends to to focus focus on on thethe ways ways that that ethical ethical reasoning reasoning functions functions in in light light of of precedents precedents in in Islamic tradition, tradition, we we emphasize emphasize thethe ways ways that that a a sense sense of of fit fit guides guides the the use use of of precedents. precedents. More More specifically, specifically, we we argue argue that that the the Islamic Islamic State’sState’s arguments arguments justifying justifying the the ta targetingrgeting of of noncombatants noncombatants stretch stretch the the use use of of precedents precedents beyond beyond the the normsnorms of of Islamic Islamic tradition, tradition, such such that that to to understand understand ISIS ISIS on on this this point point one one mu mustst understand understand the the factors factors thatthat contribute contribute to theirtheir sensesense ofof “fit”. “fit”. While While a a comprehensive comprehensive case case would would require require much much more more than than one oneessay, essay, we suggest we suggest that two that psychological two psychological paradigms, paradigms, moral foundations moral foundations theory and theory cultural and cognition, cultural cognition,can help to can shed help light to onshed the light deepening on the extremismdeepening ofextremism ISIS beyond of ISIS their beyond predecessors. their predecessors. In emphasizing In emphasizingthe importance the of importance cultural conflict of cult inural the conflict formation in the of ethical formation norms, of bothethical of norms, these paradigms both of these also paradigmspoint to the also significance point to the of anti-Muslimsignificance of rhetoric anti-Mus andlim actions rhetoric on and the partactions of importanton the part officials of important in the officialsUnited Statesin the inUnited fueling States anti-Western in fueling extremism anti-Western in general extremism and the in targetinggeneral and of noncombatants the targeting of in noncombatantsparticular among in particular militant Muslims. among militant At the sameMuslims. time, At we the suggest, same time, similar we culturalsuggest, dynamicssimilar cultural in the dynamicsWest have in fueled the West a political have fueled climate a inpolitical which climat continuede in which forms ofcontinued Islamophobia forms have of Islamophobia contributed tohave the contributedrelaxation of to the the prohibition relaxation againstof the prohibition targeting noncombatants against targeting on thenoncombatants part of the United on the States. part of the United States. 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State 2. CaseMuch Study: of the Targeting classical Noncombatants Muslim tradition in concerning Muslim Tradition noncombatant and the immunity Islamic State can be summarized in aMuch tradition of the of classical Muhammad, Muslim in tradition which he concer chargesning his noncombatant army when immu they gonity out can to be fight, summarized “Do not incheat a tradition or commit of Muhammad, treachery, nor in which should he you charges mutilate his army anyone when or kill they children,” go out to afight, prohibition “Do not that cheat in orother commit traditions treachery, also includesnor should protections you mutilate for women anyone andor kill aged children,” men (al-Shaybani a prohibition 1966 that, pp. in 76, other 92). traditionsThese prohibitions, also includes when protections combined for with women other and practices aged men in Muhammad’s (al-Shaybani 1966, life, form pp. 76, the 92). basis These of a prohibitions,longstanding Muslimwhen combined tradition thatwith has other sometimes practices been in expanded Muhammad’s to include life, prohibiting form the thebasis targeting of a longstandingof slaves and theMuslim elderly tradition [see (al-Shaybani that has 1966sometimes, p. 76) as been well asexpanded (Kelsay 2007to include, p. 114)]. prohibiting However, asthe in targetingWestern traditions, of slaves itand has the been elderly generally [see recognized(al-Shaybani among 1966, Muslims p. 76) as that well some as (Kelsay noncombatants 2007, p. may 114)]. be However,killed unintentionally as in Western in thetraditions, process ofit ahas legitimate been generally attack. recognized among Muslims that some noncombatantsIn recent may decades, be killed Muslims unintentionally have nearly in the always process accepted of a legitimate a prima attack. facie commitment to noncombatantIn recent immunity.decades, Muslims Disagreements have continue,nearly always however, accepted most notably a prima concerning facie commitment which persons to noncombatantcount as noncombatants. immunity. Di Somesagreements have argued continue, that however, war in Islam most should notably only concerning be defensive which in persons nature countand that as noncombatants. the command protecting Some have noncombatants argued that war from in Islam targeted should attacks only isbe inviolable.defensive in For nature example, and thatin their the command “Open Letter protecting to Baghdadi noncombatants(2014)”, a rebukefrom targ ofeted the Islamicattacks is State, inviolable. a large For international example, in group their “Openof leading Letter Muslim to Baghdadi scholars (2014)”, and juristsa rebuke argue of the in Is favorlamic of State, a very a large firm international prohibition againstgroup of targeting leading Muslimnoncombatants, scholars suchand jurists that “only argue combatants in favor of maya very be firm killed; prohibition their families against and targeting noncombatants noncombatants, may not suchbe killed that intentionally”“only combatants (sec. 8.d).may Others,be killed; such th aseir Yusuf families al-Qaradawi, and noncombatants have argued may for thenot temporarybe killed intentionally”suspension of (sec. the 8.d). prohibition Others, such in order as Yusuf to address al-Qaradawi, a kind have of emergency argued for the situation. temporary But suspension when that ofemergency the prohibition passed, in Qaradawiorder to address reversed a kind his opinionof emergency (Lieber situation. 2017). But when that emergency passed, QaradawiSo significant reversed is his the opinion prohibition (Lieber against 2017). targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such as OsamaSo significant bin Laden tendis the to prohibition observe its against prima facietargetin status.g noncombatants He overcomes that the even prohibition jihadi militants by expanding such as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 3 of 10 greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued in 2002, are responsible for their leaders because they live in a democracy. That is to say, the United States cannot claim to have any true noncombatants: all are responsible for the crimes of the national government (bin Laden 2005, p. 164). As important for bin Laden, however, is a kind of principle of reciprocity, which he suggests overrides the command to distinguish between soldiers and civilians. In a famous interview with Taysir Aluni in October of 2001, bin Laden made the following argument about the permissibility of targeting noncombatants: Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 10 The Prophet forbade the killing of children and women, and that is true. It is valid and has been laid down by the Prophet in an authentic Tradition .... but this forbiddingsuch that some of killing without formal legal training have begun to issue legal rulings, and some have found children and innocents is not set in stone, and there are other writings thatsubstantial uphold followings it. God’s in doing so. One helpful way of approaching these tensions while accounting saying: “and if you punish (your enemy, O you believers in the Onenessfor both of continuity God), then and change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim punish them with the like of that which you were afflicted ... ” The scholarsethical anddiscourse people tends of to function according to the more or less formal procedures and norms of the knowledge, amongst them Sahib al-Ikhtiyarat [ibn Taymiyya] andwhat ibn al-Qayyim,he calls Shari and ʿ a reasoning. This framework includes methods of interpreting and applying the Shawaani, and many others, and Qurtubi—may God bless him—in hisQur Qur ʾ anan commentary,and sunna (precedent-setting traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as say that if the disbelievers were to kill our children and women, thenspecific we should judgments not feel reached by scholars of previous times. Shariʿa reasoning also involves achieving ashamed to do the same to them, mainly to deter them from trying toa kill balance our children between and respect for the past and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus women again. (2005, pp. 118–19) suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; but practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. Bin Laden, then, although his arguments show signs of internal inconsistency, takes pains to It is not surprising, therefore, that while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, justify targeting those usually considered noncombatants. Notice, as well, that the reciprocity that their application includes a good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). bin Laden cites includes a particular intention—preventing one’s enemies from continuing to kill This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa reasoning to understand how the Islamic State group noncombatants on one’s side. has approached the issue of targeting noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on The Islamic State group is considerably less invested in any form of prima facie noncombatant the ways that ethical reasoning functions in light of precedents in Islamic tradition, we emphasize immunity than is bin Laden. We might say that while bin Laden sees the targeting of noncombatants the ways that a sense of fit guides the use of precedents. More specifically, we argue that the Islamic as an unfortunate but just temporary necessity given the wicked deeds of his enemies, the Islamic State’s arguments justifying the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the State eagerly encourages the targeting of those uninvolved in any war effort, and not so much because norms of Islamic tradition, such that to understand ISIS on this point one must understand the factors of their deeds as because of their status as unbelievers. This is perhaps most clearly stated in an article that contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a comprehensive case would require much more than in the first issue of their magazine Rumiyah, “The Kafir’s Blood is Halal for You, So Shed It”. The style one essay, we suggest that two psychological paradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural of argumentation is common to many of their official publications, offering vivid imagery, vicious cognition, can help to shed light on the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In rhetoric, and the sternest interpretations buttressed by citations to the Qur an, hadith, and many emphasizing the importance of cultural conflict in the formation of ethical norms, both of these classical sources—although invariably without context. The first part of the argument is somewhat paradigms also point to the significance of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the part of important familiar among Islamic militants, with references to the sword verse1 and an interpretation suggesting officials in the United States in fueling anti-Western extremism in general and the targeting of that Muslims are duty-bound to fight non-Muslims who are not granted dhimmi status. The Islamic noncombatants in particular among militant Muslims. At the same time, we suggest, similar cultural State takes things considerably further, however, in both its tone and argument. The tone can be dynamics in the West have fueled a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have summarized in the brutal declaration that “the blood of a kafir is cheap, filthy, and permissible to shed” contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the part of the (35). The argument involves erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants while United States. declaring it a religious duty to extend the battle lines to any place where disbelievers may be found. Instead of a prima facie prohibition against killing noncombatants, the Islamic2. Case State Study: declares Targeting a prima Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State facie order to kill disbelievers unless they fall under the terms of a specific covenant of protection. Much of the classical Muslim tradition concerning noncombatant immunity can be summarized Muslims currently living in Dar al-Kufr [the territory of unbelief] mustin a be tradition reminded of Muhammad, that in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “Do not cheat the blood of the disbelievers is halal [permissible], and killing them isor a formcommit of worship treachery, to nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” a prohibition that in other Allah, the Lord, King, and God of mankind. This includes the businessmantraditions riding also to includes work protections for women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, 92). These in a taxicab, the young adults (post-pubescent “children”) engaged inprohibitions, sports activities when in combined with other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the basis of a the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy a sandwich. Indeed, evenlongstanding the blood Muslim of the tradition that has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the kafir street vendor selling flowers to those passing by is halal to shed—andtargeting striking of slaves terror and the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. 76) as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. into the hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim’s duty. There is no shar’i requirementHowever, as to in target Western traditions, it has been generally recognized among Muslims that some noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the process of a legitimate attack. In recent decades, Muslims have nearly always accepted a prima facie commitment to 1 Qur an 9:5. noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, however, most notably concerning which persons count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war in Islam should only be defensive in nature and that the command protecting noncombatants from targeted attacks is inviolable. For example, in their “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of leading Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibition against targeting noncombatants, such that “only combatants may be killed; their families and noncombatants may not be killed intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary suspension of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emergency passed, Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 4 of 10

soldiers and policemen nor judges and politicians, but all kuffar [unbelievers] who are not under the covenant of dhimmah are fair game. How can the disbelievers ever dream of safety and security while Muslims suffer anywhere in the world and while the rule of Allah is mockingly replaced by manmade monstrosities of democracy? (36) Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 10 For the Islamic State, then, the distinction between combatants and noncombatant is largely insignificant. The only category that matters is one’s status assuch a Muslim. that some The without rhetorical formal strategy legal oftraining have begun to issue legal rulings, and some have found the Rumiyah piece seeks to incite violence by Muslims againstsubstantial those in thefollowings West, so in no doing distinctions so. One helpful way of approaching these tensions while accounting between Muslims are mentioned. It is clear elsewhere, however,forthat both a continuity person’s status and change as a Muslim in the is tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim determined by her loyalty to the Islamic State, such that the overwhelmingethical discourse majority tends to of function the world’s according to the more or less formal procedures and norms of population are considered disbelievers (and legitimate targets),what including he calls the Shari Shi ʿ aa andreasoning. most Sunnis This framework includes methods of interpreting and applying the (al-Ibrahim 2015). Qur ʾ an and sunna (precedent-setting traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as specific judgments reached by scholars of previous times. Shariʿa reasoning also involves achieving 3. Analysis: Identity, Cultural Conflict, and Justification for Targetinga balance between Noncombatants respect for the past and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus Why is ISIS pushing beyond the boundaries of the precedentssuggests of traditional that Muslims Shari tenda reasoning to treat Islamic to tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; blur, even erase, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants?but practitioners One answermust also might seek involve to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. investigating the group’s selective and sometimes faulty interpretationsIt is not surprising, of classical sources.therefore, Such that work while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, is important and can be very helpful in illustrating the ways intheir which application ISIS departs includes from a mainstream, good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). and even other forms of militant, Islam. The multidimensionalThis and multidisciplinaryessay uses the framework fields that of Shariʿa reasoning to understand how the Islamic State group comprise cognitive science, however, suggest that judgments,has including approached ethical the judgments, issue of targ areeting not noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on generally the result of a simple process of self-aware, rationalthe deliberation. ways that Instead,ethical reasoning even considered functions in light of precedents in Islamic tradition, we emphasize judgments are the outcome of a mixture of intuitions, emotions,the ways and that deliberations, a sense of fit all guides of which the use of precedents. More specifically, we argue that the Islamic are experienced and worked out through a messy process involvingState’s arguments culturally justifying constructed the normstargeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the and, often, interpersonal communication.2 To understand whynorms ISIS of takes Islamic this tradition, position such concerning that to understand ISIS on this point one must understand the factors noncombatants, then, one must offer an explanation that goesthat beyond contribute their to interpretation their sense of of “fit”. texts. While a comprehensive case would require much more than One must explain how they derive their sense of “fit”. one essay, we suggest that two psychological paradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural A helpful tool for beginning to explain why ISIS’s approachcognition, differs from can that help of al-Qaedato shed light and on other the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In militant groups is moral foundations theory (MFT), a conceptualemphasizing scheme developed the importance by Jonathan of Haidtcultural conflict in the formation of ethical norms, both of these and others to explain the aspects of both continuity and uniquenessparadigms between also point human to moralthe significance systems. of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the part of important One aspect of continuity that Haidt identifies is the process of moralofficials decision in the making United and States deliberation, in fueling anti-Western extremism in general and the targeting of a process he describes as “social intuitionist” in nature. The processnoncombatants is “intuitionist” in particular insofar among as moral militant Muslims. At the same time, we suggest, similar cultural intuitions come first, both temporally and in terms of priority,dynamics with rational in the West deliberation have fueled coming a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have second. It is “social” because morality is viewed as a strategycontributed for influencing to the otherrelaxation people of ratherthe prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the part of the than an aspect of an individual’s search for personal meaning.United Continuity States. in human morality is also found in its substance and is derived, according to Haidt, by five or six foundations that are rooted in human evolutionary biology: liberty vs. oppression; care vs.2. Case harm; Study: fairness Targeting vs. cheating; Noncombatants ingroup in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State loyalty vs. betrayal; authority vs. subversion; and sanctity vs. degradation.Much of Thethe classical theory leaves Muslim a good tradition concerning noncombatant immunity can be summarized deal of fluidity in how these foundations are actualized in historicalin a tradition communities of Muhammad, and individuals, in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “Do not cheat however, since each foundation is emphasized and interpretedor differently commit treachery, according tonor a wideshould variety you mutilate anyone or kill children,” a prohibition that in other of historical settings and cultural norms by people with their owntraditions idiosyncrasies. also includes protections for women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, 92). These If moral intuitions come first and deliberation second, asprohibitions, moral foundations when combined theory indicates, with other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the basis of a then we can begin to see how a sense of fit influences the choicelongstanding and interpretation Muslim tradition of precedents. that has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the But MFT is helpful in another sense, too, in that Haidt draws atargeting distinction of betweenslaves and “individualizing” the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. 76) as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. foundations (liberty vs. oppression, care vs. harm, and fairnessHowever, vs. cheating)as in Western that highlighttraditions, the it has been generally recognized among Muslims that some importance of individual human beings and “binding” foundationsnoncombatants (ingroup may loyalty be killed vs. betrayal,unintentionally in the process of a legitimate attack. authority vs. subversion, and sanctity vs. degradation) that emphasizeIn therecent values decades, that undergird Muslims group have nearly always accepted a prima facie commitment to solidarity. In the American context, Haidt suggests, liberals tendnoncombatant to focus only immunity. on the individualizing Disagreements continue, however, most notably concerning which persons foundations, and particularly on liberty and care, whereas conservativescount as noncombatants. are traditionally Some more have prone argued that war in Islam should only be defensive in nature and that the command protecting noncombatants from targeted attacks is inviolable. For example, in their “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of leading 2 See, for example, (Kahneman 2011; Haidt 2012; Greene 2013; Sapolsky 2017Muslim). scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibition against targeting noncombatants, such that “only combatants may be killed; their families and noncombatants may not be killed intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary suspension of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emergency passed, Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 5 of 10 to put all of the foundations on roughly equal footing.3 When we move to think about groups that embody rightwing authoritarianism, such as al-Qaeda and especially ISIS, we find that the binding foundations take on a remarkable emphasis to the point that commitments to care and liberty (individualizing foundations) become relativized under the aegis of loyalty, authority, and sanctity (the binding foundations). More specifically, al-Qaeda and ISIS both weld authority and loyalty together to form a lens through which the other foundations are interpreted. These central foundations are not understood in precisely the same fashion, however. Bin Laden’s instinct was to work to unite ordinaryReligions Sunnis 2018, 9, x by FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 10 emphasizing the oppression of the West. In conjunction with that instinct, while bin Laden did not hesitate to declare certain regimes apostate, he was much slower to make such declarationssuch that againstsome without formal legal training have begun to issue legal rulings, and some have found common Muslims, especiallyReligions Sunnis. 2018, 9, x ForFOR ISIS,PEER however,REVIEW the circle of loyalty is drawnsubstantial much tighter followings in doing so.2 One of 10 helpful way of approaching these tensions while accounting and is explicitly linked to one’s loyalty to the Islamic State. The authority foundationfor both is conceived continuity and change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim in a tighter fashion as well.such Althoughthat some binwithout Laden formal was legal often training strident have in his begun religious to issueethical interpretations legal discourse rulings, tends and some to function have found according to the more or less formal procedures and norms of and dismissive of others,substantial there was followings generally ain sense doing that so. heOne understood helpful way something of approachingwhat of a distinction,he thesecalls Sharitensions ʿ a reasoning.while accounting This framework includes methods of interpreting and applying the at least in principal, betweenfor both his continuity interpretations and change and thein the sources tradition of authority, is provided the byQur Qur John ʾ anan Kelsay, andand sunna the who (precedent-setting argues that Muslim traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as hadith. This distinctionethical is blurred discourse with the tends Islamic to function State. On according one hand, to they the acknowledgemore orspecific less formal that judgments their procedures reached and by normsscholars of of previous times. Shariʿa reasoning also involves achieving legitimacy depends uponwhat fulfilling he calls the Shari Shari ʿ aa requirementsreasoning. This for framework leadership. includes On the other mea balancethods hand, of because between interpreting respect and for applying the past the and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus those requirements haveQur been ʾ an met and (according sunna (precedent-setting to them), their traditions interpretations about are the seen lifesuggests and as binding sayings that Muslims onof Muhammad) tend to astreat well Islamic as tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; all Muslims. In this way,specific authority judgments is tied to reached a concrete by scholars political of entity, previous binding times. authority Sharibut ʿpractitionersa and reasoning loyalty also must involves also seek achieving to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. together in a way that wasa balance not possible between for respect bin Laden. for the Those past loyal and tocreativity the authority regarding ofIt the applicationis Islamicnot surprising, State in the present.therefore, Kelsay that while thus the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, receive considerations ofsuggests care, liberty, that Muslims and fairness tend as to deemed treat Islamic appropriate tradition by theas a State. bodytheir Othersof applicationprecedents receive thatincludes must a be good respected; deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). no such consideration atbut all. practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedentThis essay and uses a particularthe framework situation. of Shari ʿa reasoning to understand how the Islamic State group While MFT works toIt explainis not surprising, how intuitions therefore, might that work while to shape the abroad person’s norms basic ofhas moralShari approachedʿ approach,a reasoning the are issue relatively of targ etingstable, noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on it doesn’t tell us much specificallytheir application about how includes a sense a good of fit relatesdeal of to diversity the interpretation and disagreement andthe ways adjudication (Kelsay that ethical 2007, reasoning p. 73). functions in light of precedents in Islamic tradition, we emphasize of precedents. It is essential toThis note, essay therefore, uses the that framework an important of aspectShariʿa of reasoning group belonging to understandthe ways is developed that how a sense the Islamic of fit guides State groupthe use of precedents. More specifically, we argue that the Islamic through narrative, in whichhas approached an individual the takes issue up of a positiontargeting within noncombatants. a story told However, by theState’s group. whereas arguments Group Kelsay justifying tends theto focus targeting on of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the identification can becomethe veryways intense that ethical when reasoning a process dubbedfunctions by in social light psychologistsof precedentsnorms asin of “identityIslamic Islamic tradition, tradition, we such emphasize that to understand ISIS on this point one must understand the factors fusion” occurs. Essentially,the theways individual’s that a sense identity of fit guides becomes the oneuse withof precedents. the group More in athat robust, specifically, contribute visceral we to arguetheir sense that the of “fit”.Islamic While a comprehensive case would require much more than sense, such that the individualState’s arguments reacts—cognitively justifying andthe ta emotionally—torgeting of noncombatants the experiences stretchone essay, of the others usewe inofsuggest precedents that twobeyond psychological the paradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural the group as though theynorms were of one’s Islamic own, tradition, as evinced such by that bin Laden’sto understand application ISIS on of reciprocitythiscognition, point one and can mu the helpst understand to shed light the factorson the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In Islamic State’s to the worldwidethat contribute suffering to their of Muslims. sense of “fit”. While a comprehensiveemphasizing case would the require importance much moreof cult thanural conflict in the formation of ethical norms, both of these In this regard, anotherone essay, theoretical we suggest apparatus that calledtwo psychological cultural cognition paradigms, becomes paradigmsmoral very foundations helpful. also point theory to the andsignificance cultural of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the part of important Cultural cognition, a termcognition, developed can by help a multidisciplinary to shed light on researchthe deepenin teamg housed extremism at Yaleofficials of LawISIS in School,beyond the United their predecessors.States in fueling In anti-Western extremism in general and the targeting of refers to the way that individualsemphasizing tend the to adoptimportance views thatof cult fit withural theirconflict cultural in the identities formationnoncombatants when of facingethical in particularnorms, both among of these militant Muslims. At the same time, we suggest, similar cultural disputed matters. Whenparadigms deciding whether also point they to believe the significance that human of beingsanti-Mus arelim causing rhetoricdynamics global and warming actions in the onWest the have part offueled important a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have or whether gun control preventsofficials gunin the violence—or, United States we argue, in fueling whether anti-Western noncombatants extremismcontributed can be justifiablyin general to the andrelaxation the targeting of the prohibition of against targeting noncombatants on the part of the targeted in military operations—peoplenoncombatants in don’t particular characteristically among militant base theirMuslims. views At on the theUnited same best time, availableStates. we suggest, similar cultural evidence (whatever theydynamics tell themselves), in the West but uponhave fueled a sense a ofpolitical how they climat oughte in towhich respond continued as part forms of a of Islamophobia have cultural group. contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting2. Case noncombatants Study: Targeting on theNoncombatants part of the in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State There are three mainUnited processes States. that comprise cultural cognition: motivated reasoning,Much identity of the classical Muslim tradition concerning noncombatant immunity can be summarized protective cognition, and naïve realism. Motivated reasoning “refers to the unconsciousin a tradition tendency of of Muhammad, in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “Do not cheat 2. Case Study: Targeting Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsicor to thecommit formation treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” a prohibition that in other of accurate beliefs” (Kahan Much2011). of The the idea,classical supported Muslim bytradition scores concer of experimentsning noncombatanttraditions as well as immualso other includesnity can protectionsbe summarized for women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, 92). These data (cognitive science,in polls, a tradition ethnographic of Muhammad, accounts, in political which he analyses, charges and his soarmy forth), whenprohibitions, isthat they people go outwhen to fight,combined “Do not with cheat other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the basis of a characteristically, but unwittingly,or commit treachery, manipulate nor data should in service you mutilate to a particular anyone goal or kill otherlongstanding children,” than that a ofMuslimprohibition tradition that in that other has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the arriving at a valid or truetraditions conclusion. also Evidenceincludes isprotections weighted for in a women certain fashion,and aged sensory mentargeting (al-Shaybani perceptions of slaves 1966, and pp. the 76, elderly 92). These [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. 76) as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. prohibitions, when combined with other practices in Muhammad’sHowever, as life,in Western form the traditions, basis of it a has been generally recognized among Muslims that some longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes been noncombatantsexpanded to includemay be killedprohibiting unintentionally the in the process of a legitimate attack. 3 We say “traditionally” becausetargeting Haidt’s of major slaves work and on the the subject elderly was published[see (al-Shaybani in 2011, before 1966, the risep. of76) DonaldIn as recent well Trump. asdecades, (Kelsay Muslims2007, p. 114)].have nearly always accepted a prima facie commitment to For brief comments by Haidt on Trump, see (Edsall 2016). However, as in Western traditions, it has been generally noncombatantrecognized among immunity. Muslims Disagreements that some continue, however, most notably concerning which persons noncombatants may be killed unintentionally in the process countof a legitimate as noncombatants. attack. Some have argued that war in Islam should only be defensive in nature and In recent decades, Muslims have nearly always acceptedthat the commanda prima facie protecting commitment noncombatants to from targeted attacks is inviolable. For example, in their noncombatant immunity. Disagreements continue, however,“Open most notably Letter toconcerning Baghdadi which (2014)”, persons a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of leading count as noncombatants. Some have argued that war in IslamMuslim should scholars only be defensiveand jurists in argue nature in andfavor of a very firm prohibition against targeting noncombatants, that the command protecting noncombatants from targeted attackssuch that is inviolable. “only combatants For example, may in betheir killed; their families and noncombatants may not be killed “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State,intentionally” a large international (sec. 8.d). groupOthers, of such leading as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary suspension Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibitionof the prohibition against targeting in order noncombatants, to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emergency passed, such that “only combatants may be killed; their families Qaradawiand noncombatants reversed his may opinion not be (Lieber killed 2017). intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have arguedSo significant for the temporary is the prohibition suspension against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation.as Osama But whenbin Laden that emergency tend to observe passed, its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such

as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 6 of 10

Religions 2018, 9, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 10 are interpreted in such a way, and/or reasoning processes are manipulated in order to legitimize a particular conclusion or pointsuch of that view, some often without in an unconsciousformal legal training effort to have regulate begun one’s to issue emotions legal rulings, and some have found (Westen et al. 2006). However,substantial throughout followings all of this, thein doing one doing so. One the reasoninghelpful way honestly of approaching believes she these tensions while accounting is expending mental energy onlyfor inboth service continuity of the and truth. change in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim In the case of the Islamic State,ethical motivated discourse reasoning tends to is function perhaps mostaccording apparent to th ine themore ways or thatless theyformal procedures and norms of selectively interpret the tradition,what and he theircalls selectivityShari ʿ a reasoning. is perhaps This most framework apparentin includes their interpretation methods of interpreting and applying the of the so-called “sword verse”,Qur Qur ʾ anan 9:5,and which sunnais (precedent-setting rendered in the “Kafir’s traditions Blood” about article the life as “So and when sayings of Muhammad) as well as the sacred months have passed,specific then judgments kill the mushrikin reached by wherever scholars youof previous find them times. and Shari takeʿa them, reasoning also involves achieving surround them, and wait for thema balance at every between outpost.” respect As notedfor the above, past and the creativity Islamic State regarding takes this application verse in the present. Kelsay thus to mean that Muslims are alwayssuggests and everywherethat Muslims to tend target to treat disbelieving Islamic tradition noncombatants as a body for of killing. precedents that must be respected; This interpretation is selectivebut in atpractitioners least two senses. must First,also seek it ignores to find the the textual right fit context between of thethe verse’sprecedent and a particular situation. revelation, disregarding the surroundingIt is not surprising, verses. therefore, More than that that, while it cuts the out broad the norms second of half Shari ofʿ thea reasoning are relatively stable, verse, which reads: “But if theytheir should application repent, establishincludes prayer,a good anddeal giveof diversity zakah, let and them disagreement [go] on their (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving andThis Merciful”. essay uses4 Second, the framework historically of Shari speaking,ʿa reasoning the verse to referredunderstand to how the Islamic State group polytheists of the Arabian Peninsula,has approached not to Jews the andissue Christians of targeting or other noncombatants. “People of theHowever, Book”. 5whereasWe Kelsay tends to focus on are suggesting, therefore, thatthe these ways kinds that of ethical interpretive reasoning shortcuts functions are one in piecelight of evidenceprecedents that in theIslamic tradition, we emphasize reasoning of Islamic State ideologuesthe ways is that motivated a sense notof fit by guides a desire the to use understand of precedents. the text More in allspecifically, of its we argue that the Islamic complexity, but to justify the establishedState’s arguments practices justifying of the group. the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the The goals to which motivatednorms reasoningof Islamic tradition, applies are such legion, that to but, understand as with ISIS, ISIS byon farthis the point most one must understand the factors researched aims are political andthat moral contribute in nature. to their Some sense such of goals “fit”. are While related a tocomprehensive the interests or case values would require much more than of the individual, such as rationalizingone essay, or we forgetting suggest one’sthat two dishonesty. psychological Those pa thatradigms, are most moral relevant foundations theory and cultural to the current discussion, however,cognition, have can to dohelp with to shed the way light that on motivatedthe deepenin reasoningg extremism functions of ISIS in beyond their predecessors. In relation to one’s group identity.emphasizing The classic the study importance of this kind, of cult “Theyural Saw conflict a Game”, in the was formation published of ethical norms, both of these by Albert H. Hastorf and Hadleyparadigms Cantril also in 1954 point (Hastorf to the significance and Cantril of 1954 anti-Mus) andlim was rhetoric based upon and actions a on the part of important particularly rough football gameofficials between in Princetonthe United and States Dartmouth. in fueling Students anti-Western who attended extremism the game in general and the targeting of were asked to give their generalnoncombatants impressions in of particular the conduct among of each militant team. Muslims. Other students, At the same who didtime, we suggest, similar cultural not attend, were shown film ofdynamics the game in and,the West in addition have fueled to giving a political their climat generale in impressions which continued after forms of Islamophobia have watching the film, were askedcontributed to imagine themselves to the relaxation as referees of the of theprohibition game, citing against infractions targeting as theynoncombatants on the part of the watched. In a process that is intimatelyUnited States. familiar around the world, students from both universities consistently biased their reports in favor of their team. Princeton students overwhelmingly thought the Dartmouth team was playing2. Case dirty Study: by purposely Targeting injuring Noncombatants their star player,in Muslim whereas Tradition Dartmouth and the Islamic State students held that the player was injuredMuch accidentallyof the classical and Muslim that the tradition Princeton concer teamning was bentnoncombatant on revenge immunity can be summarized for the rest of the game. The majorin a tradition finding ofof theMuhammad, experiment, in andwhich that he which charges most his interestsarmy when cultural they go out to fight, “Do not cheat cognition researchers, is that studentsor commit from treachery, Princeton sawnor should a qualitatively you mutilate different anyone game fromor kill that children,” of the a prohibition that in other Dartmouth students, yet studentstraditions from bothalso schoolsincludes assumed protections (and for believed) women that and their aged interpretation men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, 92). These of the game was objectively accurate.prohibitions, These phenomenawhen combined are referred with toother as identity-protective practices in Muhammad’s cognition life, form the basis of a and naïve realism. longstanding Muslim tradition that has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the Identity-protective cognitiontargeting involves of aslaves number and of the processes elderly that [see are (al-Shaybani implicitly mobilized 1966, p. in76) order as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. to protect one’s identity withinHowever, a particular as in group, Western often traditions, blurring theit has line been between generally the self recognized and the among Muslims that some group such that the individualnoncombatants is personally threatened may be killed by opposition unintentionally to the group’s in the process values or of interests. a legitimate attack. In essence, one takes up the group’sIn valuesrecent anddecades, identity Muslims as one’s have own nearly via identity always fusion, accepted and this a prima facie commitment to motivates the individual’s reasoning.noncombatant Identity-protective immunity. Di cognitionsagreements tends continue, to make however, relations most between notably concerning which persons groups difficult because each sidecount characteristically as noncombatants. interprets Some have contested argued matters that war in ain self-serving Islam should way. only be defensive in nature and In the case of ISIS, identity-protectivethat the cognition command plays protecting a particularly noncombatants important from role targ insofareted as attacks loyalty is toinviolable. For example, in their the group and its authority form“Open the coreLetter of to their Baghdadi ethical (2014)”, position. a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of leading Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibition against targeting noncombatants, such that “only combatants may be killed; their families and noncombatants may not be killed 4 Sahih International version. intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary suspension 5 For more examples of how ISIS selectively interprets scripture, see (Siddiqui 2015). For more discussion on the contest of of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emergency passed, Qur an 9:5, see (Esposito 2015). Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 7 of 10

Just as important is the phenomenon of naïve realism, an “asymmetry in the ability of individuals to perceive the impact of identity-protective cognition” (Kahan 2011, p. 22). Essentially, members of a group tend to be quite adept at noticing the biases of other groups (realism), but much less skilled in acknowledging their own (naivety). This asymmetry introduces a situation in which the questioning of one’s (or one’s group’s) position or interests is often seen as a biased or even bad-faith attack, ushering in resentments that, in some cases, shift the argument away from the issues at hand in favor of attacks on the integrity of one’s opponents. If matters take this kind of turn, a vicious circle is often started in which each group continually, but unknowingly, reenacts the naïve realism at the heart of the original conflict. ISIS, again, exhibits these patterns in a number of ways. Like many critics of the West, Islamic State ideologues are skilled at pointing out real ethical failures on the part of the West, particularly concerning policies that are harmful to Muslims or Muslim-majority countries. A strong degree of naivety is evident, however, insofar as the group is unable or unwilling to offer any measure of self-criticism, or even self-awareness. So too, they routinely attack the integrity of their opponents. One common strategy is to offer summary judgments that strain credulity, such as when in the “Kafir’s Blood” article they suggest that “any Muslim who has studied his religion” will understand that scholars have reached a consensus that noncombatant disbelievers should be targeted (36). At other times, they argue that their opponents have lost the ability to recognize even the most self-evidentiary truths because they have given in to corruption to the point of losing their God-given human nature, or fitra.6 What we see with ISIS and in other situations rife with group conflict, moreover, is that cultural cognition is at the center of a larger set of processes that harden the boundaries between “Us” and “Them”. In certain extreme instances, these boundaries can become so rigid that those considered other, “Them”, are dehumanized to the point that they no longer deserve the kind of treatment normally accorded to fellow human beings. When cultural cognition is rooted in an intense privileging of the binding foundations (loyalty, authority,Religions and sanctity), 2018, 9, x FOR one PEER can REVIEW see how easily the jump to 2 of 10 dehumanization can be made (Waller 2002, pp. 236–57). More broadly, moral foundations theory andsuch cultural that some cognition without both formal suggest legal that training ethical reasoning have begun to issue legal rulings, and some have found is in large measure an explicit working out of one’ssubstantial moral intuitions followings which, in doing in many so. One cases, helpful is rooted way in of approaching these tensions while accounting one’s sense of group belonging. Intuitions andfor deeply both feltcontinuity convictions and change tend to in come the first:tradition reasoning, is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim which is influenced by a broad number of socialethical dynamics discourse and cognitive tends to biases, function comes according second. Insofarto the more or less formal procedures and norms of as the Islamic State is concerned, therefore, wewhat suggest he calls that Shari Shari ʿ aa reasoningreasoning. is This not framework employed asincludes a methods of interpreting and applying the means of reaching the conclusion that noncombatantsQur ʾ an should and sunna be targeted. (precedent-setting Rather, Shari traditionsa reasoning about is the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as selectively employed as a means of justifying thespecific deeply judgments held conviction reached that by scholars there is noof previous distinction times. Shariʿa reasoning also involves achieving between enemies of the Islamic State: all are undera balance God’s between judgment respect and worthy for the past of execution. and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus suggests that Muslims tend to treat Islamic tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; 4. Conclusions: Cultural Conflict in Circular Perspectivebut practitioners must also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. Of course, none of these processes functionIt is not in surprising, a vacuum: therefore, they are that employed, while the howeverbroad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, unconsciously, in the light of real-world conflictstheir as defense application against includes real-world a good opponents, deal of diversity or enemies. and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). And they are not the sole provenance of Muslim militantsThis essay but are uses employed the framework by most of Shari us inʿ onea reasoning form to understand how the Islamic State group or another, depending both on the particularshas of the approached cultural conflict the issue in questionof targeting and noncombatants. the structures However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on of our moral intuitions. In the rest of this essay,the we ways point that briefly ethical to somereasoning of the functions concrete in ways light that of precedents in Islamic tradition, we emphasize historical events and interpretations might engagethe ways the process that a ofsense cultural of fit cognitionguides the and use push of precedents. people More specifically, we argue that the Islamic toward adopting the various aspects of rightwingState’s authoritarianism. arguments justifying the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the It is not difficult to see, for example, hownorms these of patterns Islamic andtradition, mechanisms such that might to understand lead certain ISIS on this point one must understand the factors people to adopt a general attitude of oppositionthat tothe contribute West. As to a their general sense typology, of “fit”. the While thinking a comprehensive may case would require much more than function roughly as follows. Many Muslims areone acutely essay, aware we suggest of the sufferingthat two experiencedpsychological by pa theirradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural cognition, can help to shed light on the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In emphasizing the importance of cultural conflict in the formation of ethical norms, both of these

6 See especially “The Fitrah of Mankind and the Near Extinctionparadigms of the also Western point Woman” to the in significanceDabiq, issue 15 (20–25).of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the part of important officials in the United States in fueling anti-Western extremism in general and the targeting of noncombatants in particular among militant Muslims. At the same time, we suggest, similar cultural dynamics in the West have fueled a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have contributed to the relaxation of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the part of the United States.

Religions 2018, 9, 230 8 of 10 fellow Muslims throughout much of the globe, a suffering that is experienced on some level as one’s own, in large measure because of a shared religious identity. The consciousness of this suffering is paired with a broadly, although not universally, accepted narrative that juxtaposes the greatness of premodern Islamic civilization with the poverty, tyranny, and indignities that Muslims have endured under colonialism and the continued meddling of the West in Palestine, Iran, Iraq, India, Egypt, and elsewhere. Sometimes this narrative is framed in grand language ofReligions civilizational 2018, 9, x struggle FOR PEER in REVIEW which 2 of 10 Israel, Europe, and the United States are depicted as extensions of the crusades or the state of willful ignorance exemplified by pre-Islamic Arabia. Other times the languagesuch is more that localized,some without emphasizing formal legal training have begun to issue legal rulings, and some have found the specific blame due to a particular group of people. But whatever thesubstantial case, this followings suffering andin doing these so. One helpful way of approaching these tensions while accounting narratives work to activate the processes of cultural cognition, suchfor that, both for continuity some, reasoning and change about in the tradition is provided by John Kelsay, who argues that Muslim these matters becomes more an exercise in justifying one’s beliefs by marshallingethical discourse evidence tends against to function the according to the more or less formal procedures and norms of West than an attempt to come to an accurate assessment of the situationwhat by means he calls of Shari Shari ʿ aa reasoning.reasoning. This framework includes methods of interpreting and applying the Moreover, recent events and policies on the part of the West, andQur particularly ʾ an and sunna the United (precedent-setting States, traditions about the life and sayings of Muhammad) as well as might exasperate matters and push certain Muslims to subsume the individualizingspecific judgments foundations reached within by scholars of previous times. Shariʿa reasoning also involves achieving the binding foundations. Implicit and explicit Islamophobia, for example,a balance frames between public respect discourse for the in past and creativity regarding application in the present. Kelsay thus such a way that Muslim identity is emphasized at the expense of othersuggests possible that identifications Muslims tend (racial, to treat Islamic tradition as a body of precedents that must be respected; ethnic, class, and so on). Those who suffer the pain of discrimination underbut practitioners the rubric of must Islamophobia also seek to find the right fit between the precedent and a particular situation. do so as Muslims, such that their moral reactions are very likely to stemIt fromis not the surprising, binding foundations,therefore, that while the broad norms of Shariʿa reasoning are relatively stable, particularly as violations against the loyalty they feel toward their grouptheir and application the sanctity includes of the group’s a good deal of diversity and disagreement (Kelsay 2007, p. 73). most deeply held beliefs. This essay uses the framework of Shariʿa reasoning to understand how the Islamic State group Or consider the war on terror. While explicitly waged against anhas abstraction, approached “terror”, the issue targets of targ of eting noncombatants. However, whereas Kelsay tends to focus on the war on terror are almost exclusively Muslims. Morally questionablethe ways tactics that that ethical target reasoning Muslims functions in light of precedents in Islamic tradition, we emphasize such as torture, rendition, certain forms of drone strikes, the treatmentthe ways of prisoners that a sense at Abu of Ghraib,fit guides the use of precedents. More specifically, we argue that the Islamic and many other instances are very likely to trigger strong reactions rootedState’s in arguments the loyalty justifying and sanctity the targeting of noncombatants stretch the use of precedents beyond the foundations. And inhumane actions on the part of one’s enemies, howevernorms real of orIslamic perceived, tradition, make such the that to understand ISIS on this point one must understand the factors path toward dehumanizing those enemies all the easier. that contribute to their sense of “fit”. While a comprehensive case would require much more than It would be wrong to think, however, that these kinds of dynamicsone essay, are limited we suggest to Muslims, that two or psychological paradigms, moral foundations theory and cultural to Muslim militants. They are, rather, very widespread, and particularlycognition, so in the can context help to of shed cultural light on the deepening extremism of ISIS beyond their predecessors. In conflict. Let us return to the example of targeting noncombatants inemphasizing the West. Asthe inimportance the Muslim of cultural conflict in the formation of ethical norms, both of these tradition, the just war tradition and international law both prohibit theparadigms targeting also of noncombatants.point to the significance of anti-Muslim rhetoric and actions on the part of important Commitment to these norms has been tested in recent years, however,officials in the in context the United of the States war on in fueling anti-Western extremism in general and the targeting of terror, where both George W. Bush and Barack Obama authorized thenoncombatants use of “signature” in particular drone strikes, among militant Muslims. At the same time, we suggest, similar cultural a practice that allows American drones to strike vehicle convoys withoutdynamics verifying in the West the have identities fueled a political climate in which continued forms of Islamophobia have of potential targets so long as they possess certain, rather slippery, signaturecontributed attributes to the relaxation such as age, of the prohibition against targeting noncombatants on the part of the actions, and location (Himes 2016). Yet, Bush and Obama were bothUnited careful States. to maintain the prima facie prohibition against targeting noncombatants, each arguing in their own ways that signature strikes satisfied the prohibition. Donald Trump’s approach is another matter.2. Case HeStudy: has largelyTargeting delegated Noncombatants in Muslim Tradition and the Islamic State drone policies to his military commanders. His rhetoric, however, suggestsMuch a remarkablyof the classical cavalier Muslim tradition concerning noncombatant immunity can be summarized attitude toward concerns related to the principle of discrimination. Forinexample, a tradition on of 2 DecemberMuhammad, 2015, in which he charges his army when they go out to fight, “Do not cheat then-candidate Trump said on Fox News: or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate anyone or kill children,” a prohibition that in other We’re fighting a very politically correct war. And the other thingtraditions is with the also terrorists, includes you protections for women and aged men (al-Shaybani 1966, pp. 76, 92). These have to take out their families. When you get these terrorists,prohibitions, you have to takewhen out combined their with other practices in Muhammad’s life, form the basis of a families. They, they care about their lives, don’t kid yourselves. Butlongstanding they say they Muslim don’t caretradition that has sometimes been expanded to include prohibiting the about their lives. You have to take out their families. (Fox and Friendstargeting 2015) of slaves and the elderly [see (al-Shaybani 1966, p. 76) as well as (Kelsay 2007, p. 114)]. However, as in Western traditions, it has been generally recognized among Muslims that some Although he later publicly reversed position on targeting the familiesnoncombatants of terrorists, thesemay sentimentsbe killed unintentionally in the process of a legitimate attack. were reportedly repeated on his first day in office during a visit to CIA headquartersIn recent decades, (Jaffe 2018 Muslims). have nearly always accepted a prima facie commitment to More than that, Trump’s attitude toward targeting noncombatantsnoncombatant is part of immunity. a broader, Di fiery,sagreements continue, however, most notably concerning which persons rhetorical disposition through which Trump appeals to his base by drawingcount as hard noncombatants. boundaries between Some have argued that war in Islam should only be defensive in nature and “Us” and “Them”, with Muslims often cast in the role of “Them”. For example,that the command shortly after protecting the Islamic noncombatants from targeted attacks is inviolable. For example, in their “Open Letter to Baghdadi (2014)”, a rebuke of the Islamic State, a large international group of leading Muslim scholars and jurists argue in favor of a very firm prohibition against targeting noncombatants, such that “only combatants may be killed; their families and noncombatants may not be killed intentionally” (sec. 8.d). Others, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, have argued for the temporary suspension of the prohibition in order to address a kind of emergency situation. But when that emergency passed, Qaradawi reversed his opinion (Lieber 2017). So significant is the prohibition against targeting noncombatants that even jihadi militants such as Osama bin Laden tend to observe its prima facie status. He overcomes the prohibition by expanding greatly those who count as combatants. Citizens of the United States, bin Laden argued

Religions 2018, 9, 230 9 of 10

State-inspired Barcelona terror attack in August of 2017, then-candidate Trump addressed the question of how best to deal with terrorism by referencing a spurious story about American General John J. Pershing’s tactics for snufﬁng out insurgency in the Philippines in the early 20th century. As Trump explained it:

General Pershing was a rough guy. And he sits on his horse, very astute like a ramdrod. Right? And, the year was early nineteen hundreds. And this was a terrible problem. They were having terrorism problems just like we do. And he caught 50 terrorists who did tremendous damage and killed many people. And he took the 50 terrorists, and he took fifty men, and he dipped 50 bullets in pigs’ blood. You heard that, right? He fit, he took 50 bullets, and he dipped them in pigs’ blood. And he had his men load his rifles. And he lined up the 50 people. And they shot 49 of those people. And the 50th person, he said “you go back to your people and you tell them what happened”. And for 25 years there wasn’t a problem. (Reilly 2017)

The reader will notice the similarities between Trump’s approach and that of the Islamic State: appeals to brutality against the Other, appeals which include a strong element of dehumanization, work to trigger the values associated with the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and sanctity. Moreover, commitment to the individualizing foundations is subsumed under the binding foundations, such that the normal treatment generally according to other human beings—such as prohibitions against execution of prisoners or targeting noncombatants—can be suspended in light of the priority given to protecting the group. Perhaps most troubling, Trump’s statements have gained some traction among the public. As with ISIS, this support seems to be grounded, at least to some degree, in a kind of reaction to the brutality of one’s opponents. Just as the Islamic State’s appeal is specific to a historical context that includes signature drone strikes, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and other questionable tactics in the war on terror, so Trump’s appeal is contextualized by the brutality of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, and especially by the 9/11 attacks. That is to say, the disconcerting prioritization of the binding foundations and their justification through cultural cognition by those inclined toward rightwing authoritarianism may not be empirically or ethically justifiable, but they are not conjured from nothing. They are, in large measure, reactions against unjust behavior. If this analysis is correct, it suggests that regaining a strong commitment to the prohibition against targeting noncombatants will be a difficult task. Yes, ISIS may be defeated on the battlefield and Trump and his ilk may be removed from office. Both of these developments may lead to policies more in keeping with the traditional commitment to the principle of discrimination. By our way of thinking, however, such policy changes would alleviate a symptom of an underlying problem. The heart of the matter, we are suggesting, has to do with the perception among some that there is a cultural struggle between the West and Islam. If this problematic perception is to be undone, it will take a sea change in political rhetoric, domestic and foreign policy, military tactics, and education by a number of governments and other institutions over an extended period of time. Only time will tell whether we have the resolve to make these changes.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, R.M. and S.B.; Methodology, R.M.; Writing-Original Draft Preparation, R.M. and S.B.; Writing-Review & Editing, R.M. and S.B. Funding: This research received no external funding. Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Sohail Hashmi for editing this special issue and for inviting us to contribute. Conﬂicts of Interest: The authors declare no conﬂict of interest. Religions 2018, 9, 230 10 of 10

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