WIT.3003.002.0001
2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION Letters Patent issued 16 February 2009
WITNESS STATEMENT OF PENNY ARMYTAGE
Date of Document: 28 April 2010 Filed on behalf of: The State of Victoria Solicitor’s Code: 7977 Prepared by: Telephone: +61 3 8884 0444 Victorian Government Solicitor's Office Facsimile: +61 3 8684 0449 Level 25 DX 3000077 Melbourne 121 Exhibition Street Ref: PAC 944884 Melbourne VIC 3000 Attention: John Cain
PART 1 – INTRODUCTION - 3 Current role, qualifications and experience - 3 Administrative arrangements - 3 Request from Commission - 5 PART 2 – CONTEXT - 6 Environment and Climate Change - 6 Geography - 7 Demography - 7 Socio-political and economic factors - 8 Dependence on volunteers - 9 Risk environment - 10 All hazards framework - 11 PART 3 – CURRENT SYSTEM - 12 Historical development - 12 Current organisational structure - 14 Emergency services organisations - 14 Overview - 14 MFB - 14 CFA - 15 DSE - 17 NEO arrangements - 18 Emergency management arrangements - 18 Victoria Emergency Management Council - 19 VEMC Co-ordination Group - 19 State Fire Management Planning Committee - 20 OESC - 20 PART 4 – POLICY DRIVERS AND POLICY FOCUS - 21 Significance of Black Saturday - 21 Objective of bushfire management policy - 21 Nature of bushfire management - 21 Guiding principles - 23 Areas for improvement - 24 Planning and prevention - 24 Preparation and response - 25 PART 5 – AMALGAMATION AND ITS RISKS - 25 Previous consideration of amalgamation and its alternatives - 25 Risks - 27
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PART 6 – THE STATE’S ALTERNATIVE: STRENGTHENING THE EXISTING SYSTEM- 29 Strengths of the current system - 30 Investment in continuous improvement - 30 Expertise - 31 Inter-agency co-operation - 32 Surge capacity - 33 Links with community - 34 Less tangible strengths - 34 Key developments since 7 February 2009 - 35 Options to be explored - 36 Strategic Leadership and Governance - 36 Operational leadership, integration and resourcing - 38 Integrated Planning - 41 Performance Standards and Monitoring - 42 CONCLUSION - 44 SCHEDULE – EXPANDING THE METROPOLITAN FIRE DISTRICT - 45
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I, PENNY ARMYTAGE, Secretary of the Department of Justice, 121 Exhibition Street, Melbourne, can say as follows:
PART 1 – INTRODUCTION
Current role, qualifications and experience
1. I am the Secretary of the Department of Justice (Department). I was appointed to the role in March 2003.
2. I have held senior executive roles in the Victorian Public Service for the past 16 years, including the roles of:
2.1 Executive Director, Operations Division, Department of Human Services, from January 2002 to March 2003;
2.2 Commissioner for Correctional Services, Department of Justice, from February 1999 to January 2002; and
2.3 Assistant Director, Protection and Care, Department of Human Services, from April 1995 to November 1998.
3. I hold a Bachelor of Social Work from the Preston Institute of Technology. I am a National Fellow of the Institute of Public Administration Australia and a member of the Australian Institute of Company Directors. A copy of my current curriculum vitae is Attachment 1 to this statement.
4. I have a diverse range of practice and management experience and have been a front-line worker, a supervisor and an executive in both the government and non government sector.
5. My experience in executive roles has provided me with the opportunity to gain insight into institutional arrangements in the State’s emergency management sector. I have also gained experience in organisational change through my roles at the Department, where I carried out a major restructure, and the Department of Human Services.
6. Since February 2009, I have taken a leadership role in the whole-of-government response to the Black Saturday bushfires and this Royal Commission, chairing weekly meetings of the State Co-ordination and Management Council Bushfires Sub-Committee.
Administrative arrangements
7. The Minister for Police and Emergency Services (the Hon Bob Cameron MP) is principally responsible for the administration of (relevantly) the following legislation:
• Police Regulation Act 1958;
• Country Fire Authority Act 1958;
• Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958;
• Emergency Management Act 1986;
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• Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority Act 2004; and
• Victoria State Emergency Services Act 2005.
8. As will be apparent from the discussion below, this suite of legislation establishes the majority of Victoria’s key emergency services sector organisations, namely, Victoria Police, the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB), the Country Fire Authority (CFA), the Victoria State Emergency Service (VICSES), the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority (ESTA), and the office of the Emergency Services Commissioner.
9. However, not all emergency services organisations in Victoria fall within the Justice portfolio. The most relevant example in terms of the Commission’s inquiry is the fire management function performed by the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) under the Forests Act 1958 (Forests Act). The Minister for Environment and Climate Change (the Hon Gavin Jennings MLC) is principally responsible for the administration of the Forests Act. Other emergency service organisations or agencies with important emergency management functions outside the Justice portfolio are listed in Part 7 of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria.1
10. I am responsible to the relevant responsible Minister for the general conduct and effective, efficient and economical management of the functions and activities of my Department and must advise the Ministers in all matters relating to the Department.2
11. Through its responsibility to the Minister for Police and Emergency Services (Minister), the Department is responsible for policy and planning in the emergency services sector, a role it performs in close collaboration with the emergency services agencies.
12. Specifically, with the assistance of key staff, I am responsible for:
12.1 Developing, and advising the government on, emergency management policy and legislation;
12.2 Monitoring and reporting to government on the budget, governance and strategy of the emergency services agencies and, through the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner, on the performance of those agencies;
12.3 Supporting the emergency services agencies to develop business cases for the budget development process; and
12.4 Assisting the Minister with board appointments to the emergency services agencies.
13. My principal advisers in relation to emergency management are the Executive Director, Police, Emergency Services, and Corrections, Tony Leech, and the Emergency Services Commissioner, Bruce Esplin. Mr Leech’s Division includes the OESC and Emergency Services Policy and Support business units, along with numerous other business units in the Police and Corrections portfolios. Mr Leech
1 These include the Department of Primary Industries, Marine Safety Victoria, the Department of Transport, VicRoads, the Department of Human Services, Department of Defence, Airservices Australia, and Ambulance Victoria (the administration of the Ambulance Act falls within the portfolio of the Minister for Health). 2 Public Administration Act 2004, s 13.
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represents the State in national emergency management discussions and keeps the Minister and me appraised of key issues in the portfolio.
14. I also receive key advice from the Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Bruce Esplin, whose statutory obligations under the Emergency Management Act 1986 (Vic) (EM Act) include providing expert advice to government on the performance of the State’s emergency management arrangements and prescribed emergency services agencies. Mr Esplin conducts reviews and makes recommendations in relation to major incidents. In this regard, I note that, with the appointment of this Royal Commission, the Victorian Government decided that Mr Esplin should not conduct a review of the bushfires of 7 February 2009.
15. The OESC plays a sector leadership role and is responsible for ensuring the delivery of efficient, equitable and integrated fire and emergency services, and for the administration of the EM Act. It also provides advice and support to the Emergency Services Commissioner, Bruce Esplin. The OESC performs its functions through its Planning and Policy, Performance and Review, Communities and Media Relations, and Research and Strategic Projects teams.
16. The Emergency Services Policy and Support business unit complements the OESC’s role. It manages the Department’s responsibilities in relation to emergency services legislation, policy, budgetary matters, (tele)communications, corporate governance and some funding programs.
17. In addition, the Department’s Strategic Communications group plays an important role in the Government’s fire communication campaigns.
Request from Commission
18. The Solicitors Instructing Counsel Assisting the Royal Commission asked for witness statements from the heads of the State’s three fire agencies concerning their views about an amalgamation of their agencies, including detailed structural and budgetary proposals.
19. After discussions between the solicitors and the Victorian Government Solicitor, it was agreed that I will provide a statement dealing with the organisational structure of the State’s emergency management system generally. I am authorised to provide this statement on behalf of the State.
20. In the course of preparing this statement, I have consulted extensively with relevant Victorian Government departments and emergency services agencies and organisations, including the three fire agencies. I have met with fire agencies in New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland. I have also undertaken a study tour of the United States and Canada where I met with fire agencies. It is worth noting that the United States and Canada, like Victoria, have a multi-agency model rather than a single fire service.
21. In any discussion of possible structural change, strategy must precede structure. That is, it is necessary to consider the strategic objective sought to be achieved before looking at how best to configure the resources available in order to achieve it. Structure is simply a means to an end; it is not the end in itself. I note that Professor Paul ‘t Hart and Major General Molan both make similar observations in their submissions to the Commission.3 Given this, while this statement first identifies the
3 Professor Paul ‘t Hart, Organizing for effective emergency management EXP.3031.001.0001at 0003, [2.1C]. Major General A J Molan, Thoughts on Organisational Structures Appropriate to Emergency like Situations, EXP.030.001.0001 at 0008.
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key structural elements of the emergency management system as it relates to bushfires, it goes on to:
21.1 Identify the relevant policy settings, objectives and outcomes of an effective bushfire management system;
21.2 Note that amalgamation will not of itself achieve these ends, and may be counterproductive; and
21.3 Address how the current system can further evolve to better protect the community and visitors to the State.
PART 2 – CONTEXT
22. The State’s emergency management system operates within a complex landscape of environmental, demographic, socio-political and economic factors, and a fluid risk environment. Further, some policy settings, such as the State’s dependence on volunteers and the “all hazards” approach must be taken as a given. The significance of this context is dealt with briefly below.
Environment and Climate Change
23. Victoria is one of the most bushfire prone areas in the world. Fires, including large and severe ones, have occurred in Victoria for at least several hundred thousand years. The occurrence of, and losses caused by, recent and future bushfires are, in part, a consequence of the intrinsic nature of fire in our environment. This comprises:
23.1 A climate prone to occasional drought and fire weather that is amongst the most severe in the world;
23.2 Native vegetation that is not only adapted to (and benefits from) fire, but is among the most flammable in the world; and
23.3 Abundant lightning which is a natural source of ignition and more likely to start fires when drought and fire danger are at their worst.
24. Climate projections prepared by the CSIRO on behalf of the Victorian Government in 2008 indicate that climate change is likely to exacerbate the State’s susceptibility to bushfire. A copy of Climate Change in Victoria: 2008 Summary (2008), published by DSE, which provides a general overview of the projections prepared by the CSIRO, is Attachment 2 to this statement. Evidence received by the Commission from Kevin Hennessy of CSIRO, Marine and Atmospheric Research indicates that this work is still regarded as the best information available on Victorian climate projections.4
25. Those projections indicate that Victoria will experience higher average temperatures, an increase in the number of hot days (both in terms of frequency and intensity5), lower average rainfall and increased evaporation.6 These projected changes in our climate are likely to increase the risk of drought and the frequency and intensity of bushfire.7 One measure of this increase is the projected increase in the number of ‘extreme’ fire days per year. Relative to the climate of 1974 to 2003,
4 K Hennessy, Climate Change and the 2009 Bushfires - Prepared for the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, EXP.006.001.0001 at 0022. 5 See Attachment 2, at 9. 6 See Attachment 2, at 11. 7 See Attachment 2, at 11 and 14.
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by 2020 it is expected that the number of ‘extreme’ fire danger days will generally increase by between five and 40 per cent; by 2050, even under a lower emissions growth scenario, the number of ‘extreme’ fire danger days is projected to grow by around 15 to 25 per cent.8
Geography
26. The total area of Victoria is 22.7 million hectares, comprising about 7.7 million hectares of public land, with the balance being privately owned.
27. The State manages the public land estate to provide a diversity of goods and services within sustainable levels, including the protection of natural assets and environmental values from the adverse effects of fire. Wherever possible, bushfire management aims to achieve multiple land management objectives.
28. There are also more than 70,000 kilometres of public/private land interface. This creates a complex environment within which the State must work with the community, local government and industry to manage existing and potential issues at this extensive interface.
Demography
29. While Victoria might be densely populated relative to the other States and Territories, the population has historically been, and still is, widely dispersed, especially in rural and forested areas. This limits the human resources available for the delivery of emergency services in many high bushfire risk areas.
30. Population projections recently compiled by the Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD), based on Australian Bureau of Statistics figures, indicate that population density will increase in many bushfire prone areas of Victoria. A copy of Victoria in Future 2008: Victorian State Government Population and Household Projections 2006-2036 (September 2009), which sets out the conclusions of those projections, is Attachment 3 to this statement.
31. Those projections suggest, for example, that the population of regional Victoria is growing and is projected to continue to grow by about 477,000 people in the next 30 years, especially in regional centres, such as Greater Geelong, Greater Bendigo and Ballarat, coastal areas, and ‘tree-change’ locations such as rural areas around Melbourne, Alpine areas and the Murray River.9 The population of Melbourne is also growing and the fastest growth is, and likely to continue to be, in the six ‘growth area’ municipalities of Wyndham, Melton, Hume, Whittlesea, Cardinia and Casey City. All of these municipalities are on the outer fringes of Melbourne, that is, the rural interface.
32. Yet, while population density is likely to increase in many bushfire prone areas, the capacity of these communities, collectively speaking, to cope with bushfire might not necessarily increase in proportion to this increase in population density. Broadly speaking, this might occur for two reasons:
32.1 First, based on current trends, it is projected that population growth will continue to be greatest on a proportionate basis among older Victorians. In 2006, people aged 60 and over comprised 18 per cent of the population,
8 See Attachment 2, at 14. The evidence before the Commission indicates that these figures are similar to those projected for south-eastern Australia more generally, see: EXP.006.001.0001, 0034 and TEN.056.001.0001 at 0006. 9 See Attachment 3 at 3.
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whereas they are projected to comprise 27 per cent of the population by 2036.10 Further, the ageing of the population is projected to be more pronounced in rural and regional areas.11 This will clearly affect the capacity of communities in bushfire prone areas to cope with bushfire, both in terms of levels of direct participation by individual community members in volunteer fire brigades, and in terms of the personal resources available to individuals and households to prepare for and protect themselves against bushfire.
32.2 Second, trends in internal migration indicate that most of the population growth in regional Victoria is projected to come from net migration from Melbourne.12 Whether city people are moving to rural and regional areas for employment, cost of living reasons, or as part of the ‘tree-change’ and ‘sea-change’ movements, they will typically have little experience living with bushfire.
Socio-political and economic factors
33. The State’s emergency management system depends on people, be they statutory office-holders, salaried employees, employees undertaking additional duties or volunteers. All of these people have rights and interests, connections with communities, and associations that are relevant to their participation in the system. The way in which the emergency management system is designed and operates must, therefore, be sensitive to the needs of the people who comprise it and take account of the obligations owed to them by the State.
34. Particularly relevant, in this context, is the industrial relations environment. Industrial representation of career firefighters and officers employed by MFB and CFA, and public sector forest firefighters and support personnel, is split between the United Firefighters Union (UFU), the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU), and the Australian Workers’ Union (AWU). The history, cultures and interests of these unions are very different. In particular, the UFU’s relationship with management of both MFB and CFA could be characterised at times as being quite hostile and acrimonious.
35. Volunteer emergency services personnel are also represented within this environment. For example, CFA volunteer firefighters are represented by Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria (VFBV). The Victoria Emergency Service Association represents volunteer VICSES personnel.
36. Also relevant is that fact that the State’s financial and human resources and its policy-making capacity are not unlimited; yet the demands on them are immense. The Government is ultimately accountable to the electorate for the manner in which the State’s resources and capacity are applied.
37. In this respect, I note that the Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services 2010 reports that Victorian fire service organisations’ expenditure per person in Victoria in 2008-2009 was $221.66 – above the national average of $137.60 and above every other State and Territory.13 This result was partly due to Black Saturday. However, even in 2007-2008 expenditure per person in Victoria was $163.39, above the national average of $122.97 and above every other State
10 See Attachment 3 at 6. 11 See Attachment 3 at 5. 12 See Attachment 3 at 3. 13 Australian Government, Report on Government Services 2010 (2010) Productivity Commission at Chapter 9, Table 9A.17
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and Territory. Between 2004-2005 and 2008-09, Victorian fire service organisations’ expenditure per person has risen by $114.36, or 106 per cent (the rise between 2004-2005 and 2007-2008 still represented a rise of 52 per cent, even without the effect of the additional funding allocated for Black Saturday).
Dependence on volunteers
38. Related to these matters of socio-political and economic context is that fact that the emergency management system depends on the dedicated participation of volunteers. The extent of this dependence cannot be overstated. Volunteers provide the system with both the workforce capacity and the geographical reach it needs to be able to deliver fire and other emergency services to communities across the State where and when they are needed, in response to incidents of all kinds.
39. CFA is a volunteer-based organisation. While it is supported in important ways by around 1,400 paid staff (including more than 500 career firefighters), it is only through its more than 59,000 registered volunteers (including 37,039 trained firefighters) that CFA is able to provide fire and emergency response and community safety programs to communities throughout Victoria.14
40. The VICSES is also a volunteer-based emergency services organisation, and depends on more than 5,500 volunteers to perform its emergency response and rescue functions in relation to floods, severe storms, road accidents and other emergency incidents. Similarly, the Australian Volunteer Coast Guard Association and Life Saving Victoria rely on the commitment of volunteers to perform their important water safety and emergency rescue roles.
41. The workforce capacity and geographical reach made possible by emergency services volunteers could not be matched by a paid workforce. This is the case for two reasons:
41.1 It simply would not be economically feasible for the work done by volunteer emergency services personnel to be done by salaried employees;15 and
41.2 Perhaps more importantly, it would not be desirable as a matter of policy for the work done by volunteer emergency services personnel to be done by salaried employees. As discussed in greater detail below, the participation of volunteers in the emergency management system confers considerable strengths on the system, most notably, an important link with communities and critical surge capacity. The Commission has received evidence that “[t]he role of CFA career staff is to support volunteers and the community”.16 That evidence also notes that: 17
the purpose of integrated brigades, with both career and volunteer firefighters, is so that career staff support volunteers in the provision of services to the community, to ensure that any potential service gaps are met.
14 In 2009, CFA brigades responded to 30,876 urban incidents and 8,664 rural incidents, with incidents including bushfires, grass and structural fires, car accidents, rescues, oil spills and flood assistance. 15 As the evidence of Alexander de Man indicates, the value to the Victorian community of CFA volunteers per year has been estimated to be as high as $840 million: De Man, WIT.3004.046.0240 at [34]. 16 De Man, WIT.3004.046.0240 at [25]. 17 De Man, WIT.3004.046.0240 at [164].
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42. In this context, I note that CFA volunteer numbers have remained relatively steady over the past 10 years. Evidence received by the Commission indicates that there were 36,379 operational volunteers in 2000, compared with 36,808 operational volunteers in 2009. It also shows that volunteer numbers have grown since 7 February 2009. This is consistent with the increase in interest in volunteering that CFA typically experiences after major emergency incidents. Furthermore, while volunteer numbers are highest in rural areas, they remain high in metropolitan and peri-urban areas. The Commission has also received evidence concerning the number of volunteers registered with CFA and distribution of those volunteers by Region.18
Risk environment
43. Bushfire has been, and continues to be, a dominant feature of Victoria’s risk environment. However, bushfire is just one of the types of incident to which the State’s emergency management system needs to be able to respond.
44. In recent decades alone, Victoria has faced numerous other complex emergency situations that have posed a significant threat to life, property and order and required a response co-ordinated at the State level. These have included:
44.1 Complex emergencies that threaten essential services, such as the Longford gas plant accident on 25 September 1998 and subsequent gas crisis.
44.2 Chemical incidents, such as the Coode Island explosion and chemical fire on 21 August 1991; the Portland oil spill; the Westpoint chemical fire on 22 December 2007; the discovery of the presence of methane gas in Cranbourne in September 2008; and the incident at Melbourne Airport on 21 February 2005 that resulted in the closure of a terminal and 47 people being taken to hospital (cause undetermined).
44.3 Public health and bio-security threats, like the H1N1 human swine flu where the first two cases were reported in North America in March/April 2009 and first reported in Victoria on 9 May 2009, the 2007/08 Equine influenza (EI) outbreak, and food poisoning outbreaks in Melbourne between 8 and 19 January 2005.
44.4 Severe storms, such as the Labour Day Weekend Storms (5 to 7 March) of this year (the largest hailstorm event in Melbourne’s recorded history), and the tornado in Bendigo on 18 May 2003.
44.5 Widespread floods, like the October 1993 spring flood in North Eastern Victoria, the Geelong and Southern Victoria floods of November 1995, the Melbourne and Central Victoria Floods of December 1999, and the Gippsland floods of June/July and November 2007.
44.6 Transport disasters, for example, the Kerang rail disaster on 5 June 2007, the Ballan train derailment on 15 November 2003, and the Essendon aircraft crash on 3 December 1993.
44.7 Complex structural and infrastructure fires such as those in the Burnley Tunnel on 23 March 2007 and at the Yallourn power station on 9 October 2002.
18 See generally for this paragraph, De Man, WIT.3004.046.0240 at 0252 to 0254, 0258, [47], [48.4- 48.7], [60].
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44.8 Other environmental emergencies like the heat wave in late January 2009.
44.9 Significant criminal acts, like the Hoddle Street massacre on 9 August 1987, Russell Street bombing on 27 March 1986, and triple-shooting in central Melbourne on 18 June 2007.
45. The system also needs to be able to cater for political or public events (or disturbances) requiring a large-scale, co-ordinated security response. The Waterfront Dispute in 1998, the World Economic Forum held in Melbourne in 2000, and the 2006 Commonwealth Games are examples of such events.19
46. In recent years, the State has also contributed emergency services personnel and resources in response to serious incidents occurring outside the State, such as the Port Arthur massacre, the Bali bombing, the Boxing Day Tsunami, the NSW hail storm event, the tsunami in Samoa on 29 September 2009 and routine mutual aid for other states in relation to bushfire. In addition, the State has provided several specialist firefighter deployments to the United States and Canada to provide mutual support during major bushfires.
47. The State has also learnt from emergency events overseas and interstate. For example, the OESC sent a team to the United States after the September 2001 terrorism attacks, and to London after the Underground bombings in July 2005 to obtain a first-hand view on ‘lessons learnt’ and how these could be applied in Victoria.
All hazards framework
48. The State’s emergency management system is premised on an ‘all hazards/all agencies’ principle. This principle is also reflected in the emergency management arrangements in all other States and Territories and at Commonwealth level.20
49. The State’s emergency management system must be capable of dealing with both small, everyday emergencies and large, infrequent and complex emergencies. It must allow emergency service organisations to focus on and optimise their capacity to perform their core functions by responding to small, frequent events in the most effective and efficient way. Yet it must also facilitate the co-operation and integration of all the emergency services organisations – both the core emergency services agencies and other organisations with emergency management and support functions – to respond effectively and efficiently to large, infrequent events, often in dynamic and chaotic conditions.
50. The State’s emergency management system, therefore, needs to be flexible enough and possess the requisite specialised emergency service capabilities to be able to manage emergency incidents of all types, but also standardised enough to allow all emergency service organisations to integrate quickly and effectively at the point of need in response to a large or complex emergency.
19 I chaired the Commonwealth Games Security Taskforce in the lead-up to the Games, membership of which included the Chief Commissioner of Police, Emergency Services Commissioner, Department of Premier and Cabinet, Department of Treasury and Finance, and Department of Planning and Community Development. 20 See Australian Government, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements (2009) Attorney- General’s Department
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PART 3 – CURRENT SYSTEM
Historical development
51. The emergency management system as it relates to bushfires has evolved through the State’s history, in response to specific events and to changes in the needs of the community and the risk environment. A more detailed paper on the historical development of the State’s bushfire management arrangements, prepared by the OESC is Attachment 4.
52. In particular, many steps in the evolution of that system have been the consequence of reviews following events that challenged the existing arrangements. For example:
52.1 While fire brigades have been registered since the Fire Brigades Act 1890, the serious bushfires in country Victoria in the summer of 1926 led to the formation of volunteer Bush Fire Brigades to fight fire on private land outside both the official Country Fire Districts, for which the then Country Fire Brigades Board and the Bushfires Brigades Board (now amalgamated in CFA) then had responsibility, and the Metropolitan Fire District (MFD), for which the then Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board (now MFB) was responsible.
52.2 The devastating ‘Black Friday’ bushfires of 13 January 1939 and recommendations of the ‘Stretton’ Royal Commission of that year and the later report of 1944 led to a number of important reforms, including:
(a) the enactment of the Forests Act, authorising the then Forests Commission of Victoria (now DSE) to take control of the suppression and prevention of fire on public land in Victoria outside the MFD, that is, State forests, national parks and other protected public land;
(b) the adoption of planned burning as an official fire management practice in Victoria; and
(c) the formation of CFA, from existing Country Fire Brigades Board brigades and volunteer Bush Fire Brigades, to manage fire on all private land outside the MFD.
52.3 The Western District fires of 1977 resulted in a Board of Inquiry and the subsequent strengthening of municipal fire prevention arrangements.
52.4 The ‘Ash Wednesday’ bushfires of 16 February 1983, and the findings subsequently made by the Public Service Board of Victoria review into emergency services arrangements and the ‘Miller’ Bushfire Review Committee, led to the enactment of the EM Act in 1986 and implementation of the State’s current emergency management arrangements. Specifically, the new Act:
(a) formally adopted the ‘all hazards/all agencies’ approach as the organising principle for the State’s emergency management system;
(b) established the three major functional areas of emergency management – prevention, response (including immediate relief) and recovery – as the conceptual framework for the development of operational arrangements;
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(c) identified planning, preparedness and co-ordination as the key areas of responsibility within each of these three areas of emergency management;
(d) provided that the Minister for Police and Emergency Services would be the Co-ordinator in Chief, with primary responsibility for emergency management, and would be supported by a Victorian Emergency Management Council and the Chief Commissioner of Police as Deputy Co-ordinator in Chief;
(e) in relation to the response function -
(i) provided that the Chief Commissioner of Police would be the State Co-ordinator of emergency response;
(ii) put the State Emergency Response Plan, or DISPLAN, on a legislative footing;
(iii) established a mechanism for determining which fire agency would have the control function for a particular bushfire; and
(iv) provided a mechanism for the declaration of a ‘state of disaster’ and exercise of coercive powers; and
(f) formalised the emergency management role of local councils, requiring them to prepare municipal emergency management plans.
Legislative recognition of recovery management, and the formalisation of the State Emergency Recovery Plan, was given effect in 1994.21
52.5 The Longford gas plant accident and gas supply crisis in 1998 led to the amendment of the EM Act to include infrastructure failure in the definition of ‘emergency’. Longford also led to the establishment of the Central Government Response Committee as a standing departmental committee reporting to the Security and Emergencies Committee of Cabinet.
52.6 The deaths of five CFA firefighters in the Linton bushfire in December 1998 prompted CFA and DSE to implement minimum standards for firefighter accreditation and a number of other measures to enhance firefighter safety.
52.7 The recommendations of the inquiry into the widespread fires of the summer of 2002-03 led to, amongst other things, the development, and later implementation, of the Integrated Fire Management Planning framework to ensure a consistent approach to fire prevention planning across the State.
52.8 Following the Interim Report of this Royal Commission, amongst other things, the State introduced revised command, control and co-ordination arrangements. The arrangements were supported by amendments to the EM Act and were explicitly based on the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (which had been utilised by the fire agencies in Victoria since 199022).23
21 Emergency Management (Amendment Act) 1994. Rees Ex 3, WIT.004.001.0001 at [67]. See, generally, Overland Ex 443, WIT.3010.003.0229 and attachments.
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Current organisational structure
53. The organisational structure of the State’s emergency management system as it relates to bushfires comprises both:
53.1 The system of discrete, specialist emergency services agencies (ESOs), and other organisations with emergency management functions, including government and non-government organisations; and
53.2 The set of emergency management arrangements – inter-agency bodies, processes, principles, rules and guidelines – that support the operation and integration of the ESOs in the performance of their various functions within the ‘all hazards/all agencies’ framework.
Attachment 5 is a diagram illustrating these arrangements.
Emergency services organisations
Overview
54. The key emergency services organisations for bushfire management in Victoria are the State’s three fire agencies: MFB, CFA, and DSE along with its Networked Emergency Organisations (NEO) partners.24
55. These comprise part of the broader system of emergency service organisations, which consists of:
55.1 The core emergency services delivery agencies: Victoria Police, MFB, CFA, VICSES, Ambulance Victoria and Life Saving Victoria. Each of these agencies has a clear mission statement, a well-designed and highly specialised focus and is staffed by professionals, whether paid or volunteer.
55.2 ESTA, which provides call and dispatch services to support the emergency services delivery agencies. It receives event notifications and mobilises the appropriate emergency service agency(ies) to respond to an incident.
55.3 Key emergency relief and recovery agencies, including the Department of Human Services (DHS), municipal councils, the Salvation Army, and Australian Red Cross; and
55.4 Other government agencies and departments, and non-government entities that have emergency management functions, whether in the areas of prevention, response and/or recovery. In the context of bushfire management, local councils are of particular relevance in this regard.
56. While many of these emergency services organisations will play a role in bushfire management through the cycle of prevention, response and recovery, the fire agencies are the institutions at the core of the State’s capacity to manage bushfire. Attachment 6 is a schematic diagram setting out the unique and common functions of the fire agencies.
MFB
57. MFB is a capital city, high-density urban fire and emergency service, which has expertise in managing complex incidents, including industrial and infrastructure
See paragraphs 82 to 85 for further explanation of the NEO arrangements.
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emergencies, to protect lives, large assets and essential services. It also provides general fire and rescue services, and, along with Ambulance Victoria, it has been a first responder for medical emergencies since 2001.
58. MFB is established as a body corporate under the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958 (MFB Act). Its functions include to provide fire suppression and fire prevention services, and emergency prevention and response services, in the Metropolitan Fire District (MFD).25 A breakdown of its activities is contained in Attachment 7.
59. MFB is governed by a five member Board, which is subject to the general direction and control of the Minister for Police and Emergency Services.26 The CEO of MFB, Graham Fountain, is responsible to the Board for the carrying out of MFB’s functions.27 The CEO is also the Chief Officer.28
60. The Chief Officer of MFB is responsible under the MFB Act for the control and direction of all members of units in the metropolitan fire district in the event of any fire, accident, explosion or any other emergency.29 This responsibility has been delegated to the Chief Fire Officer, Tony Murphy.
61. MFB operates through six divisions and delivers its fire and other emergency response services through 52 fire stations located in four zones in the metropolitan fire district. A conceptual diagram of the organisational structure of MFB is Attachment 8. The Chief Fire Officer is the head of the Operations Division. An Assistant Chief Fire Officer is in charge of each of the four zones.
62. The total amount allocated to MFB from both the State, local government and insurance statutory contributions in 2009-2010 was $274.85 million.
63. MFB has a relatively small workforce of career firefighters, supported by paid staff. It employs 1,734 operational members (of whom 58 are female), 293 corporate employees, and 72 trainee and temporary staff.
64. The firefighters and officers employed by MFB are represented by the United Firefighters Union of Australia (UFU).
CFA
65. CFA is both a bushfire (rural) and urban fire and emergency service. It has expertise in managing bush and grass fires to protect lives and private property, including agricultural assets and local infrastructure. CFA also has experience in managing complex incidents, including industrial and infrastructure emergencies, to protect lives, large assets and essential services. In addition, it provides general fire and rescue services to rural, regional and outer-urban communities, partners with DSE to manage campaign forest fires and has a lead role in major fires on private land in country Victoria. It is trialling first responder services through some of its volunteer brigades.
25 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958, s 7. The MFD covers an area of 1,096 square kilometres, that is, about half of metropolitan Melbourne. It includes the CBD, the Port of Melbourne (and, therefore, part of Port Phillip Bay), and Essendon and Moorabbin airports. The permanent population of the MFD is around 2 million, which increases to more than 3 million during business hours. 26 The Board may consist of up to seven members: Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958, s 9. 27 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958, ss 7, 28. 28 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958, s 31(2). 29 Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958, s 32B.
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66. CFA is established as a body corporate under the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 (CFA Act). It is vested with control of the prevention and suppression of fires in the “country area of Victoria”, which includes around half of metropolitan Melbourne, and key regional centres.30 It is responsible for:31
taking superintending and enforcing all necessary steps for the prevention and suppression of fires and for the protection of life and property in case of fire and the general control of all stations and of all brigades and of all groups of brigades … , subject to the provisions of this Act, so far as relates to the country area of Victoria … .
67. A breakdown of CFA’s activities is contained in Attachment 9.
68. CFA is governed by a Board (referred to in the Act as ‘the Authority’), consisting of 12 members, which is subject to the general direction and control of the Minister for Police and Emergency Services.32 The CEO, Mick Bourke, is responsible to the Board for the carrying out of CFA’s functions.33 Subject to the general powers and direction of CFA, the Chief Officer of CFA, Russell Rees, has control of brigades and their officers and members.34
69. The activities of CFA are administered through eight divisions. CFA delivers its fire and other emergency response services through nine Area headquarters across Victoria, which provide direct operational support through 20 regions and 1,223 fire brigades comprising 140 brigade groups. A diagram depicting the organisational structure of CFA is Attachment 10. The Chief Officer heads the operational division and is part of the Executive Management Team.
70. The total amount allocated to CFA from both the State and insurance contributions in 2009-2010 was $391.2 million. Funding figures for previous years are included in Attachment 11.
71. CFA is a volunteer-based organisation, but has both volunteer and career members. Its workforce consists of more than 59,000 volunteer personnel, supported by 495 career firefighters and 986 support and administrative staff.
72. As at 31 March 2010, there were 59,672 volunteers registered with CFA, 37,039 of whom are ‘operational’ volunteers, meaning they are trained and qualified to respond to fire. CFA’s important non-operational functions, such as community education and development, community safety and protection, community communications, recruitment, training, peer support, and brigade administration and finance, are performed by both operational and ‘non-operational’ volunteers. Of CFA volunteers, 47,836 are male and 11,836 are female.
73. Some career firefighters and officers of CFA are represented by the UFU, membership of which is open to professionally employed firefighters and officers across Victoria. CFA volunteer firefighters are represented by VFBV.
30 Country Fire Authority Act 1958, s 14. The “country area of Victoria” is the part of the State that lies outside the MFD, but does not include any forest, national park or protected land (s 3). It covers more than 150,182 square kilometres and includes Geelong, Bendigo and Ballarat and the Ports of Geelong, Westernport and Portland. The area takes in about 2.6 million people and more than 1 million homes. 31 Country Fire Authority Act 1958, s 20. 32 Country Fire Authority Act 1958, ss 6A, 7. 33 Country Fire Authority Act 1958, s 16A. 34 Country Fire Authority Act 1958, s 27.
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DSE
74. DSE was created under the Public Administration Act 2004. The Secretary to DSE, Greg Wilson, is responsible to the Department’s Ministers for the general conduct and effective, efficient and economical management of the functions and activities of the Department, and must advise the Ministers in all matters relating to it.35 The Secretary is also a body corporate, and is subject to the direction and control of the Minister for Environment and Climate Change.36
75. The functions, powers and duties of DSE are conferred or imposed on it or on the Secretary directly, as the Department head, by legislation. Relevantly, the Secretary is responsible for the control and management of State forests and plantations, and certain other protected public land.37 The Secretary also has a statutory obligation to:38
… carry out proper and sufficient work for the prevention and suppression of fire in every State forest and national park and on all protected public land….
As such, the Secretary is responsible for the prevention and suppression of fire on Victoria’s 7.7 million hectares of public land, amounting to about one third of the State.
76. While the Secretary is authorised to use fire for land management purposes, he must have regard to the Code of Practice for Fire Management on Public Land.39 The Code states that:
A level of preparedness for wildfire suppression will be provided which is appropriate to the existing and forecast fire danger, recognises the possibility of extreme fire conditions and aims to minimise wildfire losses of human life and damage to public land assets and values.
77. DSE was allocated $198.1 million in the 2009-10 Budget for its land and fire management activities. In addition, it received supplementary funding of $354.2 million for additional costs it and CFA incurred in responding to the January and February 2009 bushfires. These figures and those for previous years are set out in Attachment 11.
78. Within DSE, the Office of Land and Fire Management is responsible for managing the activities involved in performing the Secretary’s land and fire management functions, including planned burning and fire suppression. DSE uses planned burning for ecological and bushfire risk management purposes, and aims to prepare Victoria for bushfire and reduce the frequency and impact of large, landscape-scale fires. The scale of the planned burning program means that strategic and operational planning for, and implementation of, planned burns constitutes a large part of DSE’s work.
79. The Office of Land and Fire Management is administered by a General Manager, who reports to the Secretary. The Executive Director, Land and Fire Management, is responsible for the administration of the activities involved in performing those functions, including planned burning and fire suppression. While there is no formal delegation of the Secretary’s responsibilities to the Chief Fire Officer, the Chief Fire
35 Public Administration Act 2004, s13. 36 Conservation, Forests and Lands Act 1987, ss 6, 7. 37 Forests Act 1958 (Vic), s 18, Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978, s 18A. 38 Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978, s 62(2). 39 Forests Act 1958, s 62A.
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Officer’s role, in relation to the control of, and response to, fire, is recognised in the EM Act.40 A diagram depicting the organisational structure of the DSE is Attachment 12.
80. DSE has a permanent workforce of fully-paid employees with bioscience and forestry industry experience and expertise. About 1,000 staff in DSE focus on land, forest and fire activities across the full year with an emphasis on firefighting in summer.
81. Government forest firefighters and support personnel, whether they are employed by DSE or its Networked Emergency Organisation (NEO) partners (discussed below), are represented by either the CPSU or the AWU.
NEO arrangements
82. DSE delivers its fire suppression and prevention activities in partnership with Parks Victoria, VicForests, Melbourne Water, the Department of Primary Industries (DPI), and DPCD. In the bushfire context, these agencies are known as the NEO.
83. The NEO arrangement gives DSE access to fire trained personnel in the public sector beyond its own organisation. It provides workforce surge capacity when needed by providing DSE with a total capacity of more than 3000 staff (including Project Fire Fighters41) for major emergency/campaign suppression efforts that can be sustained over a number of weeks. There is a logistical capacity to feed and sleep 1,800 NEO staff in remote areas. This surge capacity provides for both on- ground firefighters together with key Incident Management Team positions.
84. NEO partners, particularly Parks Victoria, also contribute to fire policy and planning, and the implementation of fire management strategy on public land.
85. Critically, DSE/NEO firefighters are public servants, already trained, and there is a relatively small marginal cost to their deployment. The NEO arrangements are cost- effective for government, because it is able to easily marshal skilled firefighting personnel without paying the overhead costs of retaining them as firefighters year round. In this regard, I note that the average annual cost of an operational staff member (salary and on-costs) at CFA is $97,200 and the average annual cost of an operational staff member at MFB is $99,000.
Emergency management arrangements
86. The State’s emergency management arrangements have been described in detail by Mr Esplin42 and their historical evolution is described both above and in Attachment 4. As a result of this evolution, the State has an EM Act which formalises the ‘all hazards/all agencies’ approach as the key organising principle of the emergency management system. It does this by:
86.1 Adopting a very broad definition of ‘emergency’, which includes, in addition to fire, such incidents as epidemics, riots and disruptions to an essential service.
86.2 Establishing a framework within which an undefined number of agencies – both government and non-government – might have one or more roles
40 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 16. 41 Project Fire Fighters are people employed by DSE on a full-time basis for several months each fire season to help suppress bushfires, as well as assist in prevention works, including planned burning: Waller Ex 6, WIT.002.002.0001 at [238]. 42 Esplin Ex 11, WIT.005.001.0001.
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and/or responsibilities in preventing, responding to or recovering from an emergency.
Further, the State’s emergency management system operates in an environment where key policy and planning documents are contained in the Emergency Management Manual, a publication maintained by the OESC in collaboration with emergency service organisations. This promotes a common understanding of what the emergency management arrangements are, the role of various organisations within them, and the planning and management arrangements that bring all the different elements together. In the response environment, the framework is underpinned by the use by all agencies undertaking management responsibilities of the Australasian Inter-Service Incident Management System (with a related system being used by Victoria Police).
87. A number of inter-agency bodies and processes have also been established to facilitate the operation of the emergency management system, and many of them have been canvassed in evidence before the Royal Commission. For present purposes, therefore, I intend to focus only on a few of the bodies that are most relevant to the current discussion.
Victoria Emergency Management Council
88. The EM Act established the Victoria Emergency Management Council (VEMC) to “advise the Co-ordinator in Chief on all matters, including the co-ordination of activities of government and non-government agencies, relating to the prevention of, response to and recovery from emergencies.”43
89. The VEMC is comprised of the Co-ordinator in Chief and representatives of relevant government and non-government agencies, nominated by the responsible Minister or the agency.44 The Emergency Services Commissioner acts as the Executive officer of the VEMC.45 The EM Act does not specify which agencies should be represented, but rather leaves it to the Co-ordinator in Chief to determine which agencies should be represented and to invite those agencies. Meetings are typically attended by representatives of Victoria Police, the prescribed emergency services agencies46, and those Departments and other agencies closely involved with emergency prevention, response and recovery. I understand that meetings are often attended by up to 60 representatives.
VEMC Co-ordination Group
90. Under the EM Act, the Co-ordinator in Chief is authorised to establish such committees “as are necessary to ensure comprehensive and integrated emergency management”.47 The Co-ordinator in Chief has established a number of committees pursuant to his power.
91. One of these is the VEMC Co-ordination Group, which was established to provide assistance and advice to the Co-ordinator in Chief in relation to the co-ordination of response and recovery activities during significant emergencies.48 The Co-
43 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 8(1). 44 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 8(2). 45 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 8(3). 46 MFB, CFA, Vic SES and ESTA: Emergency Management Act 1986, s 4 defines “emergency service agency” to include CFA, MFB, VICSES and “any other prescribed agency”; the only agency currently prescribed is ESTA, see: Emergency Management Regulations 2003, r 3 and Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority Act 2004, s 43(f). 47 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 9. 48 Esplin Ex 11, WIT.005.001.0001 at 0005.
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ordination Group is chaired by the Co-ordinator in Chief, and comprises the State Response Co-ordinator and Deputy Co-ordinator in Chief (that is, the Chief Commissioner of Police), the State Recovery Co-ordinator, the Emergency Services Commissioner (again as Executive Officer), and either the CEO or the chief operations officer of the prescribed emergency services agencies, and a representative of key Departments, including DSE, DPI and DHS.
State Fire Management Planning Committee
92. The State Fire Management Planning Committee was also established by the Co ordinator in Chief under the EM Act and reports to VEMC.49 Mr Brian Parry has been appointed as Chair of the Committee, which comprises senior representatives of CFA, MFB, DSE, DHS, Victoria Police, VICSES, Parks Victoria, Energy Safe Victoria, Department of Transport, DPCD, OESC, Municipal Association of Victoria, VicRoads, DPI, Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development and Tourism Victoria. It is supported by the State Fire Management Planning Support Team, which is hosted by CFA.
93. The Committee is responsible for implementing the Integrated Fire Management Planning (IFMP) Framework (discussed further below) in accordance with endorsed plans and strategies. The role of the Committee is to ensure a consistent, sustainable and integrated approach to fire management planning across Victoria, by providing leadership and strategic guidance to regional and local planning committees, and developing the key tools and processes necessary to enable and support integrated fire management planning.
94. I note that eight Regional Strategic Fire Management Planning Committees were established along the standardised regional boundaries adopted by the Victorian Government as part of the A Fairer Victoria strategy.50 These Regional Committees are intended to provide an important link between State and municipal fire management planning and support the State Fire Management Committee.51
OESC
95. Under the EM Act, the Emergency Services Commissioner is required “to establish and monitor standards for the prevention and management of emergencies to be adopted by all emergency services agencies”. 52 The emergency services agencies are required “to adopt and to use their best endeavours to comply with” the standards prepared by the Commissioner.53 Further, compliance with standards must be reported on.54 However, this standard-setting and monitoring regime applies only to those emergency services organisations that are listed in, or prescribed under, the EM Act as an “emergency services agency”. Currently, this group comprises only CFA, MFB, VICSES and ESTA. Relevantly, it does not include DSE (in respect of its fire management function), Victoria Police (in respect of its emergency management functions) or Ambulance Victoria.
49 Free Ex 92, WIT.049.001.0001 at 0020 to 0021. 50 See State Government of Victoria, A Fairer Victoria: Creating opportunity and addressing disadvantage (2005), Department of Planning and Community Development
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96. As noted above, one of the roles of the OESC is to provide advice and support to the Emergency Services Commissioner. In relation to the performance management regime established under the Act, this involves developing emergency management standards that set best practice within Victoria, and monitoring and evaluating performance against those standards by the emergency services agencies. In addition, the OESC is responsible for maintaining the Emergency Management Manual Victoria, which describes and directs the emergency management arrangements.
PART 4 – POLICY DRIVERS AND POLICY FOCUS
Significance of Black Saturday
97. The tragic events of Black Saturday compel the State, both through the Royal Commission and its own reflections, to determine how to better prepare for, and respond to, future bushfires. Nevertheless, it is the State’s view that many of the strengths of the current emergency management system, especially as they relate to bushfire management, were displayed in the preparation for and response to the fires on 7 February 2009. As the State has consistently emphasised, many things were done very well on Black Saturday.
98. The State acknowledges, however, that there were shortcomings in the performance of the system on Black Saturday, and that these demonstrate that there are areas for improvement in our ability to manage bushfire. But the fires of 7 February 2009 were not like the majority of bushfires – even those large and complex ones – that had been seen in Victoria up to that date. As the Commission has itself recognised, they were unprecedented in their scale and behaviour. They would have tested the very best emergency services system, as it did ours. It is important that we approach the lessons of Black Saturday in this light. It is also important that any re- evaluation hold clearly in mind the strategic objectives sought to be achieved by bushfire management and the principles that should guide any future development.
Objective of bushfire management policy
99. The objective of the State’s bushfire management policy is to manage bushfires efficiently and effectively so as to minimise their occurrence and impact and to protect human life, as well as property and essential services, while managing Victoria’s natural assets in an ecologically sustainable manner and not compromising the State’s capacity to respond to other emergencies.
100. This objective is premised on the principle of the primacy of life, and reflects community expectations as to the other important interests that should also be served by bushfire management policy.
Nature of bushfire management
101. While the same principles apply to the management of bushfires as apply to the management of emergency incidents of other kinds, bushfire management has a number of features that set it apart.
102. First, the official bushfire season, as reflected in declared fire danger periods for districts, is only a few months long; however, the management of bushfire and bushfire risk is a year-round 365 day endeavour.
102.1 For example, most planned burning is conducted outside the bushfire season, when weather and conditions on the ground are most conducive to controlled and effective preventative burns. It is important to note that
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climate change appears to be extending the duration of the bushfire season and the most intensive period of planned burning in Autumn now overlaps with the end of the season.
102.2 Similarly, fire prevention and emergency management planning processes also occur outside the bushfire season, as does the majority of firefighter and incident management training and practice. Community engagement and education programs are run outside the bushfire season, as well as during the high risk months. All of these activities need to be conducted before the bushfire season so that the bushfire risk can be mitigated, and the community is prepared to deal with the residual risk, once the season commences. Operational commitments during the bushfire season also mean that there is less time for planning and prevention activities during that period.
103. Second, the complex nature of bushfire and the scale of the bushfire risk in Victoria mean that bushfire management is extremely resource-intensive. It requires:
103.1 A highly trained workforce with a diverse range of skills and considerable surge capacity;
103.2 A large inventory and wide range of (often purpose-designed) appliances and equipment for controlled burning, fire suppression and firefighter safety;
103.3 Readily available and accessible stores of water and supplies of chemical retardants; and
103.4 Extensive communications networks and advanced IT capability.
104. Third, the management of bushfire is technically and logistically complex. This complexity is present at all stages of the management process. For example, risk identification and risk mitigation planning is heavily reliant on assessments and projections based on detailed and current data concerning local ecosystems, topography, climate and weather, land use and demographics. Planned burning and bushfire suppression depends on detailed forest and fire science, and accurate weather forecasting. Both bushfire suppression and recovery require the co ordinated deployment of large numbers of personnel and resources, and the management of complicated information-sharing and communications. Building community resilience is important through ensuring communities are well-informed, including during emergencies, and considerable progress has been made in enhancing warning capability and capacity. This need is particularly acute in the case of large, complex fires.
105. It is important to note that different types of bushfire call for a different style of response. With the exception of the fires on and around 7 February 2009, the large bushfires that Victoria has experienced in the last decade have predominantly been remote forest fires. This type of bushfire, examples of which include the 2002-2003 fires in the Victorian Alps and the Wilsons Promontory fires, calls for a campaign- style response. The Black Saturday fires, on the other hand, were much more similar to those of Black Friday in 1939 and Ash Wednesday in 1983. They moved quickly and burned intensely through areas of high population, calling for quite a different style of response.
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Guiding principles
106. In light of the objective of bushfire management policy and the nature of bushfire management in Victoria, the State has done a considerable amount of work, internally, to identify and articulate the key criteria for an effective bushfire management system for Victoria, within the all hazards framework. In the State’s view, there are five such criteria or basic principles, and these should guide our assessment, and future development, of the bushfire management system:
106.1 ‘All hazards/all agencies’ State-wide risk management – localised risk identification and planning integrated into a single, State-wide planning and risk management framework for all incidents;
106.2 Scalable emergency management arrangements – emergency services organisations come together and scale up quickly and in a co-ordinated way in response to extreme incidents;
106.3 Consequence-focussed response – decision-making by response agencies based on awareness of possible consequences and supported by seamless co-ordination of resources;
106.4 Community centred – community involvement at all stages of the bushfire management ‘life cycle’ leading to resilient communities; and
106.5 Public value outcomes – strategic capability development leading to reduced duplication and more resources for service delivery.
107. Consistent with these principles, the State’s view is that the attributes of an effective bushfire management system for Victoria are:
107.1 Well informed, resilient communities that are responsible, risk aware and ready to respond;
107.2 Emergency service organisations that can combine and scale efficiently in relation to emergency events;
107.3 Emergency management arrangements that are capable of drawing on a range of different agencies to manage all risks across the State in a proactive and planned manner;
107.4 A workforce that is flexible, scalable and agile and can respond effectively to future demand requirements;
107.5 Tools, technologies and systems that meet the current and future needs of the emergency service organisations;
107.6 Clear roles and associated training standards for all participants in emergency management, including government, private sector and community sector organisations;
107.7 Transparency in relation to, and accountability for, performance;
107.8 Relevant legislation, operational policy, regulation and governance arrangements that support the future arrangements; and
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107.9 An emergency services sector that continues to be responsive to change, as a result of both internal and external review, and strongly embraces continuous improvement.
Areas for improvement
108. Against the objectives and principles outlined above, the events of Black Saturday, and the evidence before the Commission, have highlighted shortcomings in two areas:
108.1 The planning and work done to mitigate the risk of bushfire and to prepare communities for that risk; and
108.2 The way the agencies prepared themselves for the risk of bushfire and the way the fires were managed on the day.
109. It is the State’s contention that the focus must be directed at improving these areas so the State’s objectives are better met.
Planning and prevention
110. With respect to planning and prevention, shortcomings highlighted include:
110.1 The need for continued risk reduction to be undertaken through planned burning, especially for the protection of towns near forested areas;
110.2 A lack of bushfire risk identification and mitigation at regional and local levels; and
110.3 The inadequacy of municipal emergency management planning in some areas.
111. These shortcomings point to four key areas for improvement:
111.1 Integration of bushfire management planning processes, including:
(a) State-wide bushfire management planning;
(b) district planned-burning planning processes and regional and local fire- prevention planning processes; and
(c) the various municipal planning processes.
111.2 Strengthening responsibility and accountability for bushfire risk identification and mitigation at the regional and local levels, for example, in relation to participation in the IFMP process.
111.3 Resourcing of local government to fulfil its bushfire management responsibilities in the areas of emergency management planning, fire prevention planning, as well as land use planning and vegetation management.
111.4 Standards in relation to bushfire mitigation activities and discharge of bushfire management responsibilities, for example, planned burning by DSE, and emergency management and fire prevention planning by local government.
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Preparation and response
112. With respect to preparation and response, shortcomings highlighted include:
112.1 Some Incident Management Teams were not adequately staffed and/or pre-positioned in Incident Control Centres as required;
112.2 As the Interim Report has noted, within the iECC there was an absence of oversight of Incident Control Centres in some cases (such as Kilmore East);55
112.3 The capacity of senior emergency managers to assess the information coming in, analyse its significance and make decisions about appropriate actions was sorely tested by the scale of events witnessed on Black Saturday; and
112.4 The operations of CFA and DSE within the iECC illustrate that they must be better integrated at that level.
113. These shortcomings point to four further areas for improvement:
113.1 Responsibility and accountability for operational control, especially at State and Area/Regional levels;
113.2 Integration between the fire services and other response organisations at all levels;
113.3 Training and experience of operational leaders, particularly through joint exercises to build the relationship, trust and networks, which are critical to effective emergency management; and
113.4 Standards in relation to operational performance, for example, preparedness levels, competency levels, and systems interoperability.
PART 5 – AMALGAMATION AND ITS RISKS
114. The State does not consider that the amalgamation of the fire agencies will in itself achieve the kind of improvement needed to enhance our capacity to mitigate the impact of, and respond to, large complex bushfires of the kind that occurred on Black Saturday. Nor does the State consider that other proposals for structural change, such as an expansion of the Melbourne Fire District, necessarily deliver the needed improvement. Such proposals carry considerable risks that may not realise the improvements sought and indeed could jeopardise the existing level of service. In the State’s view, decisions made in the past to retain a multi-agency approach to bushfire management have been sound.
Previous consideration of amalgamation and its alternatives
115. While there has not been a formally developed proposal for full amalgamation of Victoria’s three fire agencies, in October 1982 the Public Service Board of Victoria (PSBV) produced an options paper after it was commissioned to examine the linking of MFB and CFA.56 The paper canvassed four options: integration of fire services under a single board; integration of fire services under a single board with separate
55 Interim Report of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission at [9.159]. 56 See Ministry for Police and Emergency Services, A Study of AlternativeAlternative Organisation and Funding Arrangements for an Integrated Fire Service in Victoria (October 1982), UFU.002.001.0027.
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service structures; integration of fire services under a single board with retention of MFB/CFA structures; and interlinking membership of existing MFB/CFA boards.
116. There was a very strong public response advocating a ‘no change’ or ‘minimal change’ position and, in its final report, the PSBV recommended the establishment of a Victorian Fire and Emergency Services Board with separate country and metropolitan operational fire services and the incorporation of the activities of VICSES, covering counter-disaster planning (with operations being devolved to councils).57 The proposed Board would also have overseen the fire prevention activities of the (then) Forests Commission of Victoria.
117. The PSBV noted that the benefits of this model were likely to be its capacity to:
117.1 Facilitate effective integration of organisational and operational arrangements for the State’s fire and emergency services;
117.2 Provide government with the capacity to coordinate fire and counter- disaster planning at both a State and regional level; and
117.3 Provide a central focus for accountability of fire and emergency functions not achievable by maintaining separate organisational structures with separate reporting arrangements.
118. The PSBV’s final report was again met with strong public opposition, with some seeing the recommendation as representing the destruction of volunteer culture. The Government never acted on the recommendations with the relevant Minister telling Parliament that he thought the existing arrangements had achieved cost containment and co-operation between agencies.
119. In 1994 the Public Bodies Review Committee examined MFB, and made a number of recommendations concerned with improving the delivery of fire services that also affected CFA, including common standards of fire cover and a joint call taking and dispatch system.58 The Committee stated that:
[t]he Committee does not recommend an amalgamation of the [MFB] and CFA or any change to Ministry reporting structures. Such an amalgamation would not of itself bring significant advantages, but could be expected to produce major disadvantages given the different basis of day-to-day operations between the two organisations.
120. Inquests into the Dandenong Ranges Fires (1997)59 and Linton (1998)60 both mention the need for improved standardisation of operating practices between CFA and DNRE/DSE, but do not mention organisational integration.
121. Similarly, the report of the Victorian Bushfires Inquiry (Esplin Report) promotes closer working relationships between the three fire agencies – especially through
57 See Public Service Board of Victoria, Study of Alternative Organisation and Funding Arrangements for an Integrated Fire Service in Victoria (November 1983), UFU.002.001.0136. 58 Parliament of Victoria, 33rd Report to the Parliament, Report of the Public Bodies Review Committee into the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board (1994), UFU.002.001.0268. 59 Coronial Services Centre, 1997 Dandenong Ranges Fires - Inquests into the Deaths of Jennifer Louise Lindroth, Graham Kingsley Lindroth and Genevieve Erin during a Fire at Ferny Creek and Four Other Fires in the Dandenong Ranges on 21st January 1997, UFU.002.001.0416. 60 State Coroner’s Office Victoria, Report of the Investigation and Inquests into a Wildfire and the Deaths of Five Firefighters at Linton on 2 December 1998, Ex 546, TEN.132.001.0001.
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integrated fire management planning – but does not canvass any changes to organisational arrangements.61
Risks
122. There are risks associated with amalgamation that the State considers outweigh its perceived benefits and in all likelihood will jeopardise such outcomes being realised at all.
123. As a general observation, beneficial and enduring changes in large organisational systems generally tend to be the product of incremental, rather than radical change. I have had the benefit of reading Professor Paul 't Hart's thoughtful and thought- provoking submission to the Commission on Organising for effective emergency management. Professor 't Hart makes a number of salient observations on this issue. In the context of amalgamations generally, he notes:62
The evidence from the research into the effects of corporate mergers and takeovers is [...] clear: more than half of them fail in terms of value creation, and many end up exacerbating rather than erasing the tribal identities and 'silo mentalities' of the constituent parts they sought to remedy.
124. More specifically, the history, cultures, composition and size of Victoria’s fire agencies suggest that amalgamation might produce an entity that, while nominally unified, actually consists of separate silos along existing organisational lines, with an additional administrative layer at the top and interpolated through it. It is likely that such an outcome would carry over elements of the existing organisational structure that currently inhibit further integration. On this basis, it is far from certain that an amalgamation of the fire agencies would be successful. Again I consider Professor 't Hart's observations to be apposite in this context:63
Clearly one of the big questions on the public mind following the Black Saturday bushfires is whether Victoria has one (or even two) fire brigades too many. In this submission, I have not studied this question specifically. Still, the general lesson that emerges from international emergency management research is pretty clear: it is not formal structures but the quality of communication, coordination and collaboration within, across and beyond fire services that matter most in shaping the quality of emergency responses. […] it is wrong to conclude these go away when organisations are chopped and changed, for instance by forcibly merging them into ‘superagencies’.
125. Even if the process of amalgamation could be managed so as to produce genuine operational integration and cultural cohesion in the long term, the implementation of structural change on such a scale is likely to lead to a reduction in operational effectiveness and disruption to critical planning processes during what could be a protracted transition period. This could be expected to result from:
125.1 Shocks to the system, such as loss of confidence, confusion as to roles, cynicism, despondency, loss of loyalty and possible attrition;
61 State Government of Victoria, Report of the Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires, Ex 374, INF.018.002.0001. 62 Professor Paul ‘t Hart, Organising for effective emergency management, EXP.3031.001.0001 at 0014 [5.4]. 63 Professor Paul ‘t Hart, Organising for effective emergency management, EXP.3031.001.0001 at Professo 0014 [5.4].
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125.2 Loss of experience, as many senior personnel cannot be accommodated in the new entity;
125.3 Loss of tacit knowledge, and destruction of, or damage to, relationships that aid organisational effectiveness;
125.4 Conflict/competition over position and values; and
125.5 A potentially lengthy period of introversion where the primary focus of the new entity is “inward looking” rather than service focused for the community’s benefit.
126. Operational effectiveness would also be affected by the industrial fallout that would probably accompany any move to amalgamate the fire services. As noted above, industrial coverage of paid firefighters is split between the UFU, the AWU and CPSU. In addition, the voices of volunteer firefighters are represented separately by VFBV. The history and cultures of, and interests advocated by, these unions and VFBV are very different. The quite distinct positions taken by these organisations in relation to any proposal to amalgamate the fire agencies and on the rights of their members in any merged entity are illustrated by their submissions on this topic.64 This is perhaps best exemplified in the opposing views of the VFBV and UFU in their submissions to the Commission. The VFBV expresses the concern that:65
… amalgamation will exacerbate rather than resolve [the current industrial issues it outlines as adversely affecting its members’ welfare and efficiency]. Further, amalgamation of the agencies will undermine the [CFA’s] integrated workforce model comprising paid staff and volunteers and will seriously impact on Victoria’s fire fighting capacity.
The UFU’s dismissal of these concerns as “unsustainable”66 underscores the polarised position of the two parties.
127. Furthermore, it is likely that the implementation of structural change on such a scale would take a number of years, and it might be years, perhaps decades, before genuine operational integration and cultural cohesion could be achieved.
128. In the present context, and given the projected impact of climate change, the State simply cannot afford to ‘break in’ a new system, that is, suffer a loss – even temporarily – of operational effectiveness and continuity in planning and preparation for bushfire. This is particularly so given that the largely seasonal nature of bushfire (although it requires a year round focus when mitigation and preparation is taken into account) would leave only a very narrow window of opportunity open for making significant structural changes, before operational arrangements would need to be bedded down again for the bushfire season. In an environment where the fire agencies are tested every bushfire season, such a risk is unacceptable.
129. Experiences interstate indicate that attempts at amalgamation of existing fire services, or even more limited structural integration, have produced mixed results. Even where that process is regarded as having been a success, it appears that it has taken significant effort over a number of years to establish the restructured entity and achieve genuine cultural cohesion. Indeed, the slow pace of substantive integration, and cultural and industrial issues appear to be prominent features of
64 AWU Submission, SUBM.002.057.0384; UFU Submission, UFU.002.001.0001; and VFBV Submission, VFBF.002.001.0001. 65 VFBV Submission, VFBF.002.001.0001 at 0009. 66 UFU Submission, UFU.002.001.0001 at [56].
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experiences of significant structural change within emergency management systems elsewhere in Australia.
130. For example, in his evidence to the Commission, the Chief Officer of the Tasmania Fire Service, Wayne Brown, spoke about the unique position of the Service as a fully integrated fire service and referred to the amalgamation of the former rural and urban fire services, which took place in 1979, as having been a success. He also indicated, however, that it had taken between 10 and 20 years for the merging of the cultures of the former fire services to occur.67 This is particularly notable given that the Tasmanian Fire Service only has approximately 230 volunteer brigades, with a total of around 5,000 members.68
131. Indeed, the significant differences between the Victorian context and the situation in the other States and Territories – especially as regards the prominence and scale of the bushfire risk, and the demand for and amount of investment in bushfire management services – mean that we should not rush to find a solution to the problems faced in Victoria in the approaches taken in other jurisdictions.
132. As an alternative to amalgamating the fire agencies, it has been suggested that the MFD be expanded to encompass all high-density (>1000 persons per km sq) areas of Melbourne. This would result in MFB becoming responsible for fire and other emergency response in most parts of metropolitan Melbourne that are currently served by CFA. While this proposal would not involve amalgamation, it would result in a fundamental change to the current organisational structure of the emergency management system.
133. For the reasons set out in the Schedule, the State’s view is that existing arrangements for the provision of fire and emergency services in metropolitan areas outside the MFD work well and must be maintained. One of the reasons discussed in the Schedule is the detrimental impact that expanding the MFD is likely to have on CFA’s critical surge capacity and, therefore, on the State’s ability to manage bushfire. CFA relies heavily for its surge capacity on volunteer firefighters who live in the outer suburban areas of Melbourne. Expanding the MFD would remove CFA stations and brigades from those areas and, in doing so, is likely to affect the number of people who are able or willing to continue volunteering with CFA, and its capacity to recruit new volunteers, from the growth areas of Melbourne.
PART 6 – THE STATE’S ALTERNATIVE: STRENGTHENING THE EXISTING SYSTEM
134. In the State’s view, substantive and lasting improvement in its ability to manage bushfire can be achieved more effectively, and without the risks and costs associated with amalgamation, by working within, and pushing the further evolution of, the current emergency management system. The current system has many strengths that facilitate effective bushfire management, and these have been – and must be further – developed in light of the experience of Black Saturday. Professor ‘t Hart’s cautionary note resonates in this context:69
The oft-observed focus on ‘hardware’ (formal structures; technical equipment; legal frameworks) focused disaster-induced reforms is overrated. It distracts attention from the often more salient and cost effective, yet symbolically less powerful ‘software’ factors (leadership, training, network building, organisational culture). At worst, structural
67 Brown T10362:18-T10362:21. 68 Brown Ex 476, WIT.7521.001.0001 at [30]. 69 Professor Paul ‘t Hart, Organising for effective emergency management, EXP.3031.001.0001 at 0014 [5.3].
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reform exercises result in one set of institutional weaknesses being replaced by another, at great cost to the taxpayer.
135. The essential architecture for realising such improvements is in place already, and the State has considered a number of options for driving the performance of the system in this direction. These options are outlined further below.
Strengths of the current system
Investment in continuous improvement
136. The State has invested significantly to ensure that the emergency service organisations can respond in the most effective and efficient way to emergency incidents of all types and sizes. In this regard, I refer to the expenditure figures noted above at paragraph 37.
137. The State has also actively managed a balance between supporting and fostering the growth of the distinct specialisations of the emergency services organisations, and ensuring that those organisations are sufficiently aligned and integrated in their operations through appropriate emergency management arrangements.
138. As a result of this investment and attention to the important balance between the maintenance of specialised emergency service capabilities and the effective integration of those capabilities, the State’s ability to manage bushfire has improved over time.
139. This improvement is evident from the fact that, in most circumstances, the current emergency management system manages bushfire very well. The system successfully deals with hundreds of bushfires every year. For example:
139.1 CFA and DSE attended or patrolled 316 grass/scrub/forest fires on 7 February 2009. The vast majority were successfully either extinguished or contained with no loss of life and minimal property loss, with 12 fires identified by the Commission as ultimately proving difficult to contain.
139.2 CFA reported 2711 grass fires and 3411 non-structural fires for the most recent bushfire season, that is, between 1 November 2009 and 15 March 2010.
139.3 DSE attends 621 fires per annum on average, with busy years exceeding 800 fires.
140. Indeed, prior to 7 February 2009, the State’s emergency management system performed very well against national and international standards and was regarded as reflecting ‘best practice’. For example, in his 2003 report into Fire Prevention and Preparedness, the Victorian Auditor-General stated:70
The DSE and the CFA are regarded by other Australian fire agencies and internationally as industry leaders in a number of areas. Interstate agencies visit or attend training in Victoria to gain a more detailed knowledge of our local programs, practices and procedures for use in their own agencies. Both agencies regularly deploy expert staff internationally and interstate.
70 Auditor-General Victoria, Fire Prevention and Preparedness, Ex 720, TEN.216.001.0001 at 0034.
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141. The report goes on to say that “[i]nter-agency coordination has improved significantly since the Linton tragedy of 1998, especially in the areas of incident control and strengthened cooperative arrangements”.71
Expertise
142. Perhaps the most tangible of the current system’s strengths is the expertise and specialist skills that each fire agency has developed. Each agency specialises in different areas of emergency management, and in managing different risks.
143. For example, CFA has expertise in fighting bushfire in rural areas and on the urban- rural interface, which involves using local knowledge together with modern bushfire suppression techniques to protect communities, local infrastructure, homes and farm assets.
144. This specialist capability depends, in large part, on the existence of deep linkages with local communities, and intimate knowledge of the local landscape and available resources. CFA has developed these linkages and knowledge by virtue of both its long history of serving and educating Victorian communities, and the fact that its brigades are drawn from and are a constant presence within those communities, providing emergency response and community safety programs year round. Yet CFA’s specialist capacity also depends on an expert understanding of the behaviour of and methods of suppressing bushfire, which CFA has developed through experience and a commitment to building a highly-trained, professional firefighting force.
145. In a complementary manner, DSE specialises in campaign-style forest firefighting, which involves using the landscape – both by utilising existing features of the landscape and by manipulating the landscape – to contain fire to unpopulated areas and limit its impact on communities, critical infrastructure and natural assets until it can be controlled and eventually suppressed.
146. This specialist capability relies on an expert understanding of the behaviour and impact of fire in different types of forest and terrain, and on firefighting expertise and incident management skills that are adapted to the management of fire on public land, including the use of controlled burning, dry firefighting, and firefighting in remote, rugged and forested terrain. That capability also depends on a range of specialist policy, planning, technical and delivery skills, and the development and ability to use specialist tools to predict the behaviour of fire, such as mapping and modelling programs.
147. DSE has gained this specialist capability through years of research and work in the field managing Victoria’s forests, parks and other protected public land, and through the bioscience and forestry industry experience and expertise brought to the agency by its employees, NEO partners and project workers. DSE personnel also have local knowledge and strong partnerships with the community, developed as a result of their presence across regional Victoria.
148. The particular expertise and specialist capability of DSE and CFA was displayed on 7 February 2009. This was the case, for example, in the management of the Bunyip fire.72 On the one hand, the planning and approach to suppression undertaken by
71 Ibid at 0041. 72 See the convenient summary of the evidence concerning the management of the fire in Bunyip Fire Submissions: Submissions of Counsel Assisting, SUBM.202.002.0001, especially at 0004, [1.7]-[1.8], and 0006-0012 (in relation to the suppression efforts of DSE), and at 0016, 0018-0020, [4.9], [4.20]- [4.27], and 0023-0028 (in relation to the operational planning and response by the CFA).
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DSE while the fire was in the State Park illustrate the expertise and specialist capability of DSE and its NEO partner, Parks Victoria, in campaign-style firefighting in rugged and forested terrain. On the other hand, the preparation and operational planning being conducted simultaneously by CFA, in anticipation of the fire escaping the Park, demonstrates the expertise and specialist capability of CFA in responding to bushfire in rural areas so as to protect local communities and assets.
Inter-agency co-operation
149. A willingness and commitment to inter-agency co-operation is another critical strength of the current system, which has increased over time and continues to develop today. This developing culture of co-operation is evident in the working relationships between the three fire agencies at both the strategic and operational levels, such as through the Inter-Agency agreements and the development of joint standard operating procedures.
150. There is a significant degree of co-operation between the DSE and CFA in relation to public/private land interfaces; through the preparation and use of local mutual aid plans; through the fielding of joint incident management teams; and through shared facilities such as the State Aircraft Unit. There were a number of examples of this co-operation on Black Saturday. For example, the response to the Western District fires shows the effectiveness of co-operation between CFA and DSE at the incident level – both within IMTs and on the fireground, and with respect to the sharing of resources – in facilitating operational planning and response to bushfires that occur on the interface of public and private land, irrespective of whether they start on public or privately held land, and the particular importance of that partnership in sparsely populated areas.73
151. MFB and CFA also work together very effectively in the mutual aid zones, and co operation between the two agencies frequently extends beyond those zones to the outer urban areas of Melbourne more generally. This was illustrated, for example, by the effectiveness of the assistance rendered by MFB to CFA in the south eastern suburbs of Melbourne on 7 February 2009 and in response to the Bunyip fire at Drouin.74
152. CFA, MFB, DSE and other agencies have formal and informal arrangements for the provision of interagency support in the following areas:
152.1 Joint community safety initiatives, such as publications for industry and the community, for example, caravan park fire safety guidelines;
152.2 Community engagement and education campaigns;
152.3 Joint fire prevention programs, for example, Juvenile Fire Awareness Intervention programs;
152.4 Equipment design and procurement, for example, personal protective equipment;
73 See the summaries of the evidence in relation to the management of Horsham, Pomborneit and Coleraine fires in the Submissions of Counsel Assisting: SUBM.202.005.0001 especially at 0004, [1.12], and at 0013-0019, [5.1]-[5.35]; SUBM.202.007.0001 at 0007-0008, [5.1]-[5.11]; and SUBM.202.006.0001 at 0016-0019, [5.1]-[5.21], and at 0020-0023, [6.1]-[6.25]. 74 See the summary of the evidence in this regard in the Narre Warren, Cranbourne and Upper Ferntree Gully Fires: Submissions of Counsel Assisting, SUBM.202.003.0002 at 0012-0013, 0015 and 0018, [4.8]-[4.9], [5.5], [5.7] and [8.8]; and in the Bunyip Fire Submissions: Submissions of Counsel Assisting, SUBM.202.002.0001 at 0027, [4.59]-[4.60].
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152.5 Training programs, for example, joint drills and exercises;
152.6 MFB strike team deployment during bushfires and MFB appliances and crews ‘stepping up’ into CFA areas to provide fire cover when CFA has deployed its crews to rural and regional areas;
152.7 MFB and CFA deployment of a wide range of specialist resources such as scientific officers, high angle rescue teams and aerial ladder platforms;
152.8 MFB and CFA also assist during large scale events such as wind storms, including the deployment of Rapid Impact Assessment Teams and incident management expertise; and
152.9 Victoria’s urban search and rescue capacity comprises staff and resources from CFA, MFB, SES and Ambulance Victoria.
153. In addition, there is a significant degree of coordination between emergency services organisations and other Government departments and agencies. As is illustrated by the evidence before the Commission on the response to the Code Red days on 11 and 12 January 2010, Government departments and agencies have developed protocols and policies to allow for them to prepare for and respond to bushfires (and bushfire warnings). This allows all relevant agencies – whether or not they have emergency management functions – to take appropriate steps after receiving notification from a common source.75
Surge capacity
154. Considerable surge capacity is another key strength of the current system. This surge capacity derives primarily from the volunteer base of the CFA workforce. As discussed above, the CFA’s volunteer workforce of around 59,000 includes more than 35,000 trained firefighters. As the Commission has heard in evidence from Alexander de Man, a fully career-comprised service would be limited by rostering and other arrangements. The participation of volunteers, however, makes it possible for CFA to deploy a large response force, yet retain significant capacity to deploy elsewhere if new fires occur or other emergency incidents occur, or to increase or relieve existing deployments as a fire develops or continues to burn for a number of days. That surge capacity is also critically important for fighting campaign fires, and for providing surge capacity for other organisations.76
155. Additional surge capacity is also brought to the system by the NEO arrangements, which are particularly important in the context of campaign-style forest firefighting. As a result of those arrangements, DSE can send up to 1,800 personnel anywhere in the State to fight bushfire on public land, and feed and house those personnel (in tented camps) for extended periods of time.
156. The Commission has heard evidence in relation to the importance of the system's surge capacity on 7 February 2009 in facilitating, for example, the successful containment of the Harkaway, Ferntree Gully and Lynbrook fires in a region of the State in which resources were already heavily committed in response to the Kilmore East, Murrindindi and Bunyip fires.77
75 Haynes Ex 847, Wit 3004.035.0200 at 0203, [14] and 0223-0267, Schedules A to N. 76 For example, CFA volunteers provided extra support to the VICSES in its response to the hail storms and flash floods of 6 March 2010. 77 Rees Ex 3, WIT.004.001.0001 at [372]-[373].
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Links with community
157. The participation of volunteers in the emergency management system also confers strength on that system by providing an important link between the emergency services agencies and the communities that they serve. These links are integral to the capacity of the agencies to perform their functions effectively and efficiently, especially their community safety functions, as they assist to build respect, trust, goodwill and relationships with community leaders. The credibility of CFA volunteers in local communities assists them to carry out important work in areas such as community awareness, education and safety programs, assistance at community events, and fundraising for not-for-profit organisations. These links also benefit communities themselves, by helping them to become more resilient and better able to cope in difficult circumstances. CFA brigades are important community institutions, particularly in rural areas, and various reports have highlighted the community connectedness of the organisation. For example, a 2007 report found that over half of surveyed CFA members were involved in volunteering for an organisation other than CFA.78
Less tangible strengths
158. The current system also has strengths that are less tangible, but still critical. Foremost among these is the commitment and loyalty shown by emergency services personnel. This commitment and loyalty derives, in part, from the sense of affinity that they feel with the particular mission and work of their agency and the clear sense of identity and shared values associated with it. For example, MFB firefighters are highly organised and identify as dedicated city firefighters, whereas CFA firefighters are largely drawn from and engaged with the communities that they serve, and are motivated by the opportunity to participate in their protection. DSE personnel identify through their knowledge and understanding of Victoria’s forest and park ecosystems and their work in the environment.
159. The system also gains strength from the wealth of tacit knowledge, well-developed internal relationships, and established relationships with partner organisations and stakeholder groups, including the community. These resources, which can only develop over time, assist the agencies to fulfil their emergency management functions, both individually and collectively.
160. Further, the system benefits from considerable agility.79 The individual emergency services organisations in Victoria demonstrate these qualities of agility regularly, for example, through responding quickly to unexpected and unprecedented incidents using skills or plans for other events:
160.1 CFA was able to respond quickly to the Cranbourne landfill incident using its community engagement expertise; and
78 De Man, WIT.3004.046.0420 at 0246-0247, [33]. 79 In a 2007 ‘provocation paper’, the Victorian State Services Authority and United Kingdom think-tank Demos describe agile organisations as possessing qualities such as fast decision-making, flexible resource allocation, accessing and analysing data, appropriate risk taking, flexible policy making, balancing short-term responsiveness with long-term management of uncertainty, actively shaping the operating environment and a shared values base: Demos and State Services Authority, Agile Government: A Provocation Paper, State Services Authority
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160.2 the planning for mass fatalities that occurred before the Commonwealth Games was sadly able to be quickly put into place after the Black Saturday tragedy.
Key developments since 7 February 2009
161. Many important developments to the State’s emergency management system have been made since 7 February 2009 to improve and strengthen our preparedness for, and capacity to respond to, bushfire.
162. A number of programs and processes initiated prior to 7 February 2009, which integrate the approaches of ESOs and other government agencies, have been further developed since the bushfires. For example:
162.1 Very recently the Government endorsed a 10-year Emergency Services Communications Strategy Framework which builds upon the work of the State-wide Integrated Public Safety Communications Strategy (SIPSaCS) introduced in 2001. SIPSaCS represented over $660 million investment over 10 years to improve emergency services communications with an emphasis on utilising communications technologies that are integrated on a multi-agency basis. SIPSaCS changed the organisation and culture of ESOs in relation to emergency service funding by aligning and prioritising the needs of all agencies.80
The Emergency Services Communications Strategy Framework is being driven by a (new) Emergency Services Heads of Agency Committee (ESHoAC) and renews the Government’s commitment to continuous improvement to the emergency services communications systems in place in Victoria. By comparison, other States and Territories are only in the early stages of developing and implementing cohesive policies in the area of emergency services communication81.
162.2 Mr Esplin gave evidence about the genesis and development of the whole of government approach to community education and communication,82 culminating in the development in 2008 in the Living with Fire, A Community Engagement Framework 2008-2012, involving each of MFB, CFA, DSE and DHS.83 The capacity developed through that process, including the use of research to determine its effectiveness and shape the next steps, was utilised in the 2009/10 Summer Fire Campaign, where a whole of Victorian government approach was taken to ensure consistent messaging across all agencies.84
162.3 Arrangements for public, community or commercial broadcasters to participate in the dissemination of warnings to the community have evolved through the development and expansion of protocols regarding ‘emergency broadcasters’. In addition to the ABC, Sky TV News and all commercial radio broadcasters have entered into Memoranda of Understanding and are therefore recognised as emergency broadcasters. Further, a process has been developed for community radio broadcasters with appropriate
80 Lloyd Ex 868, WIT.3028.001.0001 at [14]. 81 Lloyd Ex 868, WIT.3028.001.0001 at [23]. 82 Esplin Ex 11, WIT.005.001.0001 at [108]-[114]. 83 Esplin (Attachment 28) Ex 11, WIT.005.001.1952. 84 Implementation Monitor Delivery Report, Comrie (Annexure MNC-1) Ex 840, WIT.3031.001.0004, at 0064-0067; Robertson Ex 843, WIT.3003.001.0001 at 0005-0010, [12]-[22].
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capabilities to become an emergency broadcaster,85 and a MOU has just been signed with the first community radio broadcaster, UGFM, under this process.
163. Further, as the Commission is aware, the State has implemented a range of improvements to its preparation for, and capacity to respond to, bushfires since 7 February 2009. These are summarised in both Mr Comrie's Delivery Report86 and the witness statement of Neil Robertson.87 I do not wish to repeat all these measures here other than to highlight the development of the One Source-One Message tool. This tool enables Incident Controllers, regardless of which agency they are drawn from, to send bushfire warnings simultaneously to a range of outlets including the CFA and DSE web sites, Victorian Bushfires Information Line operators and media broadcasters.
164. Finally, following the 7 February 2009 bushfires, a number of issues relating to the delivery of emergency relief were also identified. As a result:
164.1 DHS, in conjunction with VICSES, has developed a State Coordination Agreement to better deliver services in relief centres;
164.2 From April 2010, the state and regional responsibility for emergency relief will reside with DHS; and
164.3 The future direction of emergency relief will be progressed by DHS throughout 2010 and 2011, including consolidation; modification and improvement; and, if required, the development of a ‘new generation’ model.
Options to be explored
Strategic Leadership and Governance
165. The Government formed the State Coordination and Management Council Bushfires Sub-Committee (SC & MC Bushfires Sub-Committee) to:
165.1 Manage the policy development program to improve the State’s preparations for, and capacity to respond to, future bushfires;
165.2 Advise Ministers on such policy initiatives and manage the State’s appearance before this Commission; and
165.3 Drive the implementation of these measures.
I note that the Mr Comrie commented favourably in his Delivery Report on these and other governance arrangements assessing them as “appropriate and effective” and concluding that “(t)here is ample evidence on which to conclude there is a strong commitment at all levels of the Victorian Government to implement the Commission’s interim recommendations”.88
85 Esplin Ex 11, WIT.005.001.0001 at 0017, [91]-[96]; Robertson Ex 843, WIT.3003.001.0001 at 0024, [56]; Implementation Monitor Delivery Report, Comrie (Annexure MNC-1) Ex 840, WIT.3031.001.0004 at 0028-0029. 86 Implementation Monitor Delivery Report, Comrie (Annexure MNC-1) Ex 840, WIT.3031.001.0004. 87 Robertson Ex 843, WIT.3003.001.0001. 88 Implementation Monitor Delivery Report, Comrie (Annexure MNC-1) Ex 840, WIT.3031.001.0004 at 0017.
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166. The State wants to capitalise on the momentum generated by the SC & MC Bushfires Sub-Committee arrangements. Measures to improve strategic leadership and inter-agency governance could be achieved by:
166.1 Revitalising the Victorian Emergency Management Council (VEMC) (or its successor) 89 so that it becomes:
(a) a more effective advisory body to the Minister focused across the entire emergency management ‘cycle’ including prevention and mitigation;
(b) responsible for the implementation of sector-wide strategy and planning; and
(c) accountable collectively for the delivery of strategy and planning, including through holding its member agencies to account for delivering constituent elements of strategies or plans.
Measures to effect this transformation could include:
(a) re-configuring the VEMC’s membership. The current membership has become too large and unwieldy for it to perform its role effectively. The ‘leaner’ VEMC would include the Chief Commissioner of Police, the CEOs of MFB, CFA, VICSES, ESTA and Ambulance Victoria, the Emergency Services Commissioner and the Secretaries of the Departments of Sustainability and Environment, Health and Human Services [or their nominee(s)]. The inclusion of senior representation from Health and DHS would ensure that emergency relief and recovery receives appropriate attention.90 As I have indicated, the SC & MC Bushfires Sub Committee provides a good example of an effective collaborative body able to drive whole of Government reform;
(b) appointing the Secretary, Department of Justice as chair of the VEMC (or its successor body) on the nomination of the Co ordinator in Chief.91 This appointment has the advantage of:
(i) the Secretary already having a direct support and advice relationship with the Minister for Police and Emergency Services;
(ii) providing stronger linkages with the Federal Government through the Executive Director’s role in representing Victoria on the National Emergency Management Committee;
89 One of the strategic priorities set out in the interim Integrated Emergency Services Framework was “a revitalised VEMC to spearhead new governance arrangements”: Department of Justice, Integrated Emergency Services Framework (October 2009), DOJ.001.003.0291 at 0321. 90 Section 8(2)(b) of the Emergency Management Act 1986 already enables the Co-ordinator in Chief to determine which government and non-government agencies (whose activities include the “prevention of, response to and recovery from emergencies”) should be represented on the Council. 91 Section 8(2)(a) of the Emergency Management Act 1986 already permits the Minister to nominate the Chair.
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(iii) clarifying the separation of the political and administrative responsibilities for emergency management in Victoria; and
(iv) providing continuity with the State Coordination and Management Council’s Bushfire Sub-Committee’s work as the focus shifts to implementation of the Government’s response to the Royal Commission’s final report.
(c) rationalising the Committees established to support the VEMC’s functions, with a cohesive work program to be put in place to guide the committees and ensure their work is aligned with the overarching strategy; and
(d) establishing a dedicated secretariat function in the Department of Justice to support the VEMC in its policy advice and strategy implementation roles. Staffing of the Secretariat could include secondees from the VEMC members’ Departments and agencies, including Victoria Police.
166.2 Requiring the Council (possibly through a special-purpose Committee) to examine and advise the Minister and Government on the potential efficiencies or economies of scale that could be delivered through ‘shared services’ or common procurement arrangements and co-ordinate the implementation of such arrangements. This approach is not new to emergency management. Considerable progress has already been made in emergency services communications and co-locating emergency management facilities. However, there remains considerable scope to expand this approach. Areas for consideration would include communications, facilities, vehicles, equipment, uniforms, training and research. With its current mega-department structure, the State has developed considerable experience in developing and managing such models;
166.3 Clarifying the role of the Chief Commissioner of Police as the State Co ordinator of DISPLAN (the state emergency response plan).92 A number of steps have already been taken in this regard, most notably the creation of new command, control and co-ordination arrangements for emergency management in Victoria. The next step will involve extending that approach to the planning and preparation phases of the emergency management ‘cycle’; and
166.4 Convening an annual Strategic Planning Conference comprised of the VEMC members and emergency management representatives from across Government and the not for profit and private sectors. This forum would assist to bring a broader perspective to the VEMC’s work and advice to Government (and ‘compensate’ to a large degree for removing a number of agencies from the VEMC to enable it to function more effectively).
Operational leadership, integration and resourcing
167. The Commission has already received evidence from the Chief Commissioner of Police, Simon Overland, on the new command, control and co-ordination model
Emergency Management Act 1986, ss. 5(2) and 11.
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which has been embedded in the State Emergency Response Plan,93 and from the Deputy Chief Fire Officer, CFA, John Haynes,94 on how that model has been translated into Victoria’s bushfire management arrangements. It is probably not necessary to repeat that explanation other than to emphasise two key changes:
167.1 Clarifying unity of control for the response to large bushfire events. As the Commission has heard, the Chief Officer of CFA is now the default State Controller for such events, and the Chief Fire Officers of DSE and MFB become deputies to the State Controller; and
167.2 Establishing and strengthening the mid-tier operational level through Areas of Operation. Again, as the Commission has heard, the default Areas of Operation on extreme risk fire days over the last summer were aligned with the Government’s Fairer Victoria Regional boundaries. An Area of Operations Controller from either CFA or DSE was appointed to lead and be accountable for each Area of Operation on such days.
I note that, in his evidence before the Commission, Mr Comrie said that he saw the new arrangements in action on 11 and 12 January 2010 in the State Control Centre and the observation that he made then confirmed “that the new arrangements appeared to be working and working well”.95
168. Allied to the new command, control and co-ordination arrangements, the fire agencies have developed a new model for pre-positioning Incident Management teams dependent on the forecast fire danger.96 As advised in the State’s submissions on Incident Management, the fire agencies are currently reviewing those arrangements in light of the experiences of the 2009-10 fire season with a view to further refining them.97
169. As indicated in the State’s Delivery Report, Victoria Police and CFA have also implemented two important initiatives to provide important feedback on the performance of incident management teams:98
169.1 First, the Chief Commissioner of Police as part of his role as the State Emergency Response Co-ordinator has established State Emergency Management Assurance Teams (SEMAT). SEMATs are designed to be rapidly deployed to Area of Operations or Incident Control Centres on dangerous fire risk days to review and report on emergency preparedness and response arrangements, both in terms of potential immediate improvements and longer term opportunities for improvement; and
169.2 Second, for the 2009-10 fire season, the Chief Officer of CFA (as State Controller for bushfire response) engaged a retired senior officer to provide a real time monitoring and reporting role on bushfire response performance at all three tiers of operation, namely, Incidents, Areas of Operation and State.
93 Overland T10017:20-T10017:24, Emergency Management Manual Victoria, Part 3: State Emergency Response Plan Ex 831, RESP.3001.013.0031 at 0067. 94 Haynes Ex 847, Wit 3004.035.0200 at 0213, [38]; Haynes T11965:25-T11966:1. 95 Comrie T17504:31 to T17505:24. See also Implementation Monitor Delivery Report, Comrie (Annexure MNC-1) Ex 840, WIT.3031.001.0004 at 0106-0110. 96 CFA.001.032.0300. 97 Submissions of the State of Victoria on Systemic Issues – Training of Incident Controllers, Resourcing of IMTs and ICCs, and Preparedness, RESP.3000.005.0360. 98 See Implementation Monitor Delivery Report, Comrie (Annexure MNC-1) Ex 840, WIT.3031.001.0004.
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170. Further improvements in operational leadership, integration and resourcing could be achieved through:
170.1 Clarifying the roles of the Chief Fire Officers in each of the three agencies and their relationships with their CEO and Board or Secretary. In the main, this would involve elevating their status so they are unambiguously the Commander in Chief in the lead-up to, and during, major fires and the CEOs/Secretaries ensuring that the resources are readily available to the CFOs to undertake their role and holding them to account for their performance;
170.2 Rationalising organisational boundaries to improve both planning, preparation and response. It will assist to build relationships between staff from different agencies (including through practising and training together), which experience has demonstrated are critical to high performance when tested by a genuine emergency. Over the 2009-2010 fire season, the default Areas of Operation on dangerous fire risk days were aligned with the Fairer Victoria boundaries. Victoria Police and CFA are already moving to align their boundaries with the Fairer Victoria regions. DSE will now also commit to fire and emergency management planning, exercising and coordination along these boundaries. One of the primary benefits of such alignment is to assist in forging stronger inter-agency relationships through joint planning, preparedness, training and response activities. As is noted above, relationships lie at the core of the most effective emergency management arrangements;
170.3 Inter-agency secondments to again strengthen relationships and provide better insights into the specialist capabilities and cultures of other agencies; and
170.4 In November 2009, the State Coordination and Management Council requested the State Services Authority (SSA) to provide advice on practical options to strengthen the capacity of the Victorian public service workforce to respond to significant and complex emergencies. This includes the identification of workforce capabilities required in emergencies, business continuity management, deployment and mobility arrangements and the systems required to support those processes. The SSA report is expected to be completed by mid-2010. This work holds the promise of further bolstering the public service's surge capacity to respond to major emergencies.
171. In addition, the Government has sought advice on:
171.1 The possible creation of an ‘Emergency Victoria’ concept under which agencies would retain their separate identities, but come together under this branding in response to large scale multi-agency events. This branding would be in part symbolic, but also designed to bring a unifying momentum to an increase in joint exercising, increased interoperability of systems and shared services discussed above; and
171.2 Establishing a university-based Centre of Excellence as both:
(a) a training institution for leaders in emergency services agencies (from the supervisory level up). This would build on existing training and leadership development work and programs. Importantly, a key aim would be to create an environment where joint training and exercises are undertaken to assist to build the
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relationships, trust and networks between agency leaders, which are critical to effective emergency management; and
(b) a research body (with a multi-disciplinary approach with access to all faculties along the lines of the successful Monash University Accident Research Centre model for road safety) to inform policy and strategy development. I understand that the Commission has recently heard evidence from a number of academic researchers on this important topic, including proposals to establish endow one or more chairs for bushfire research in a Victorian university or establish a national bushfire research centre. The advice Government has sought will also explore these proposals.
Integrated Planning
172. One of the key improvements possible in bushfire management is to take a more systemic approach to, and increase the effort in, risk mitigation. This is one of the principal aims of IFMP.
173. The Commission has heard evidence from a number of witnesses concerning the origins, objectives and implementation to date of IFMP, which has received about $14.5 million in funding since 2004-05. As that evidence explains, the IFMP Framework is intended to address a number of issues identified in recent years relating to fire management planning at municipal, regional and state levels, by establishing a consistent and more strategic and integrated approach to bushfire management planning across the State.
174. The IFMP Framework, which sets out a series of strategies for implementing IFMP, was developed by a multi-agency Integrated Municipal Fire Management Planning team, after an extensive research and consultation process conducted between 2004 and 2006. The Framework was submitted to the Victorian Government in September of that year and approved by the Premier in February 2007.99 Some progress has been made in implementing the IFMP Framework strategies since that time, especially through the establishment and early work of the State and Regional Committees. Significant funding has also been made available, since the multi- agency team was established, to facilitate the development and implementation of IFMP.100 However, the State acknowledges that, as Mr Esplin indicated to the Commission,101 implementation of IFMP has been slow to start.
175. Yet evidence before the Commission also suggests that IFMP has gathered momentum more recently.102 This is evident, for example, in the establishment of Municipal Fire Management Planning Committees in eight municipalities, one in each region, as part of a program to pilot IFMP at the local level.103 I understand that the State Committee also endorsed the State Fire Management Strategy in July 2009.104
176. The Commission has also heard evidence from municipal planning officers that indicates that IFMP is genuinely starting to take root at the local level.105 For
99 Free Ex 92, WIT.049.001.0001 at 0017. 100 IFMP has received approximately $14.5 million in funding from 2004-2005 to date. 101 Esplin T319:18. 102 See the evidence of the Manager of the State Fire Management Planning Support Team, Norman Free: Free Ex 92, WIT.049.001.0001 at 0022-0025. 103 Free Ex 92, WIT.049.001.0001 at 0024. 104 See State Fire Management Strategy 2009, Ex 832, CFA.001.034.0001. 105 See the evidence of the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer for Corangamite Shire Council, Kevin Kittel: Kittel Ex 834, WIT.4026.001.0001.
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example, the evidence from Corangamite Shire indicates that the transition of responsibility for fire management planning from the Municipal Fire Prevention Committee to the new Municipal Fire Management Planning Committee has gone smoothly while accommodating local needs, and that Committee members are supportive of and engaged with IFMP.
177. Parks Victoria’s $21 million Melbourne Bushfire Protection Program is being planned and delivered in accordance with IFMP guiding principles and will include a focus on the development of plans to feed into the IFMP framework. The program’s objective is to reduce the risk of bushfire to communities and assets in Melbourne’s interface areas through reducing fuel loads, planned burning, fuel breaks, bushfire response, and community education and engagement. It is anticipated the program will result in an additional 50ha of planned burns and an additional 100kms of fuel break across the Melbourne area each year. The project brief for this program is Attachment 13.
178. Possible measures to accelerate implementation of IFMP include:
178.1 Legislating to support the regime (and potentially using that opportunity to rationalise the current planning requirements to ease the current planning burden on Local Governments and enable Councils to better deploy their resources);
178.2 Relocating its central project management from CFA to the proposed Secretariat to support VEMC; and
178.3 Examining what further support may be required at the local government level to facilitate its effective implementation including a clearer planning policy framework for bushfires, bushfire planning capacity building and integrated responses to planning, building and biodiversity conservation.
179. The appropriate arrangements for centralising responsibility for hazard mapping and risk identification proposed by Counsel Assisting in their submissions on Planning will be resolved as part of this exercise.106 Access to centralised and sophisticated hazard mapping is a good example of the reduction in duplication across agencies.
Performance Standards and Monitoring
180. Since its inception in 2000, the performance management regime provided for in the Emergency Management Act 1986 has been implemented on a co-operative, good will basis through development of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria, inquiries (as a driver of continuous improvement), budget performance measures, and Productivity Commission bench-marking.
181. The focus has been on what can be learnt from large scale incidents to improve their management (including the prevention and planning dimensions) in the future. While such examinations are important and will continue to be undertaken, there is scope within the existing regime to develop a more rigorous framework based on agency and system output measures to drive performance improvement on a more ‘routine’ basis.
182. First, the scope of the performance management regime could be extended. As noted above, it currently only includes CFA, MFB, VICSES and ESTA. To take a more holistic view of the sector, it should also include agencies. Importantly, in the bushfire context, DSE (in respect of its fire mitigation and suppression function) and
106 State's Submissions on Planning, RESP.3000.006.0001 at [34] and [89].
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Victoria Police (in respect of its emergency management functions) would be encompassed by this broader performance management regime. 107 To reflect that broader focus, the State will consider changing the Emergency Services Commissioner’s title to the Emergency Management Commissioner.
183. Second, the focus would be on output, rather than input measures, at both an agency and systems level. The OESC would perform this role in:
183.1 Developing standards in consultation with agencies and the VEMC;108 and
183.2 Actively monitoring performance against those standards.109
184. Third, a greater “spur” to performance would be added through:
184.1 Public reporting on performance;110 and
184.2 Requiring “cure plans” to be developed and reported against where shortcomings in performance are detected. By convention, the OESC publishes reports into any review of emergencies it conducts, other than those involving the State’s security arrangements. One possibility is for the State to formalise this convention and require reporting against it. Section 72 of the Coroners Act 2008 provides a potential model. It:
(a) enables a coroner to make recommendations to any Minister, public statutory authority or entity (including on public health and safety);
(b) requires such authorities or entities to provide a written response within 3 months; and
(c) requires the coroner to publish the response on the Internet.
One exception in possibly adapting such a regime for emergency management is where the recommendations and response to them relate to security issues.
185. Fourth, and linked to the improved integration and rationalisation of fire and emergency management planning, the State will examine moving the responsibility for auditing municipal, regional and State plans111 to the OESC, and requiring more of a quality assurance, rather than a compliance based approach to be taken to this audit function.
107 This could be achieved through prescribing each of these agencies (to the extent that their functions are relevant) as an “emergency services agency” for the purpose of s 4 of the Emergency Management Act 1986. 108 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 21D(2). 109 Emergency Management Act 1986, s 21E. 110 The Commissioner is required to report annually through the Department of Justice’s Annual Report: Emergency Management Act 1986, s 21I. 111 Currently, CFA is responsible for auditing Municipal Fire Prevention Plans (Country Fire Authority Act 1958, s 55B), and VICSES is responsible for auditing Municipal Emergency Management Plans (Emergency Management Act 1986, s 21A).
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CONCLUSION
186. As I have suggested, the current system has many strengths that facilitate effective bushfire management. However, the tragic experience of Black Saturday exposed a number of shortcomings in the current arrangements and compel the State and its agencies to improve the performance of the system by driving its further evolution. The final recommendations of the Royal Commission will be important in informing the State’s ongoing efforts in this regard.
187. The State’s aim is both to:
187.1 Build on the strengths of the individual fire agencies; and
187.2 Improve their ability to join together in a co-ordinated manner to mitigate the risk and impact of, prepare and plan for, and respond to large scale bushfires.
188. This approach will deliver the benefits sought by the proponents of amalgamation while avoiding the considerable risks inherent in trying to create a high performance single fire agency.
189. The key measures to deliver this improvement, and their link to the guiding principle(s) I outlined earlier, are:
189.1 Strengthening the existing system governance arrangements, with a particular focus on interoperability and potential efficiency gains in shared service arrangements to deliver greater public value;
189.2 Clarifying operational roles and boundaries to improve the ‘scalability’ of the emergency management arrangements;
189.3 Developing leadership capacity again to enhance ‘scalability’ and to improve the consequence focus of the response;
189.4 Enhancing and extending the performance management framework to ensure a consequence-focused response; and
189.5 Rationalising and strengthening the integrated fire management planning regime. This enhanced framework will deliver on the ‘all hazards/all agencies’ State-wide risk management approach, placing the community at the centre of the emergency management arrangements and delivering greater public value.
Dated:
PENNY ARMYTAGE
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SCHEDULE – EXPANDING THE METROPOLITAN FIRE DISTRICT
1. As discussed above, CFA is both a highly skilled bushfire (rural) fire fighting and emergency response force and an advanced urban firefighting and emergency response force. Since its inception, CFA has provided urban fire services to all regional cities and towns in Victoria, including the regional centres of Geelong, Bendigo and Ballarat. As Melbourne has continued to grow beyond the MFD, CFA has increasingly served the metropolitan area as well.
2. As existing communities grow and new communities are established in outer suburban areas and the urban growth corridors of Melbourne, CFA has expanded and established new highly trained and well equipped community-based volunteer brigades. Where the demands on a brigade require it, CFA will place some career firefighters in the brigade, which then becomes an ‘integrated brigade’. There are, however, no sole career firefighter-staffed CFA brigades. Of the 1,223 CFA brigades in Victoria, 31 are integrated brigades.
3. By agreement, MFB and CFA have established a mutual response zone around the edges of the MFD. There are 24 CFA stations that abut the MFD. Nine of these are staffed by integrated brigades, including Boronia, Eltham and Dandenong. The remaining 15 stations are staffed by volunteer brigades.
4. However, to expand the MFD as proposed would involve considerable cost. We can get a sense of the indicative cost of such a change by comparing the average operating costs of the nine CFA stations mentioned above with the average operating costs of an MFB station. CFA estimates that the average annual operating costs of the nine stations at approximately $1.5 million per station. By contrast, the average annual operating costs of an MFB station is around $5.9 million per station. While more rigorous analysis is required, these figures provide some indication of the cost differential were the MFD to be expanded as proposed.
5. The Commission has heard evidence in relation to the current funding model for fire and emergency services. In short, CFA receives 77.5 per cent of its funding from insurance companies and 22.5 per cent from the State. MFB receives 75 per cent of its funding from insurance companies, 12.5 per cent from local government and 12.5 per cent from the State.112 Based on the current funding model, expanding the MFD as proposed would alter significantly the distribution of the burden of funding for the provision of services in affected metropolitan areas. Broadly speaking, this would result in a greater share of that burden being borne by local governments and, therefore, rate payers in these areas. I note, however, that the State has reserved its position on this issue pending completion of Green and White Paper process being conducted by the Department of Treasury and Finance.
6. Expanding the MFD as proposed is likely to reduce CFA’s critical surge capacity (through which volunteers in urban brigades are deployed to fight bushfires in regional and rural Victoria) and, therefore, significantly affect the State’s ability to manage bushfire. Under mutual aid arrangements, MFB also deploys its members and appliances to these urban CFA stations to cover the loss of CFA volunteers to these bushfire fighting activities.
7. CFA uses its surge capacity relatively frequently and did so on 7 February 2009. For example, 986 firefighters from CFA’s Region 8 (Dandenong Westernport Area) responded to 172 events within the Region. In addition, 492 firefighters from the Region responded to five major fires outside the Region. The vast majority of the
Country Fire Authority Act 1958, s 76; Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act 1958, s 37.
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Region 8 firefighters who performed an operational role on that day were volunteers (1356 of 1468 in total).113
8. As this example also shows, CFA relies heavily for its surge capacity on volunteer firefighters who live in the outer suburban areas of Melbourne. There are up to 7,000 such firefighters currently available to CFA. This large pool of personnel is a critical resource for CFA and, therefore, for the State’s ability to manage bushfire. Surge capacity is also critical for incidents other than bushfires, such as Longford, and the support provided to the SES in major floods in Gippsland and Benalla and the recent storm events in Melbourne and metropolitan areas.
9. Expanding the MFD would remove CFA stations and brigades from the outer suburban areas of Melbourne. This is likely to affect the number of people from those areas who are able or willing to volunteer with CFA in two key ways. First, for practical reasons, many people from those areas might not be able to commit to a CFA brigade that is further from where they live or work. Second, it is likely to become more difficult to maintain the same level of interest in volunteering in urban fringe areas. This is because volunteers from those areas would no longer be serving their own communities and would have fewer opportunities to engage in structural firefighting and other emergency response activities, which are key sources of engagement for volunteers, especially outside the bushfire season.
10. The loss of urban CFA brigades through expansion of the MFD may also result in a diminution of social capital in these outer metropolitan areas.
113 Rees Ex 3, WIT.004.001.0001 at [44]-[45].
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