JOURNAL of HISTORY and MILITARY STUDIES [JHMS] Copyright © the Author(S), 2019 Volume 5(1): ISSN (Print): 2536-6726 ISSN (Online): 2734-388X Page: 42-63

Foreign Interest in Post-Colonial Nigeria and Its Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970

Williams Ehizuwa Orukpe

Abstract This paper examines the international politics of interventionism and neutrality in the Nige- rian Civil War 1967-1970. It interrogates the nature of foreign interest in the civil war and its impact on the scope, dimension and outcome of the war. Thus, in post-colonial Nigeria, foreign interventionism and interest in the country centered on oil exploration and the preservation of Western neo-imperialistic dominance in West Africa and Africa at large. But Nigeria based on her large population size and economic potentials emerged as a bottleneck in the smooth realisation of foreign neo-imperialist interest in Africa. Hence, when the Nigerian Civil War broke out in 1967, the foreign powers saw the war not only as a means to gain access to cheap oil, but as an opportunity to eventually eradicate the Nigerian threat by ensuring her disintegration. Consequently, the foreign powers gave material and military support to the Biafran republic to fast track the realisation of their interest. However, this scheme was tact- fully concealed under their foreign policy of neutrality and humanitarianism. Conversely, they gave support to the Nigerian government during the war to safeguard their interest in the event of Nigerian victory. The paper then argues that interventionism in international relations is not a charitable or humanitarian exercise in the international society, but an instrument of foreign policy and a critical means to an end. Using secondary sources of data, the paper reveals that political and economic survival, not a shallow sense of brotherhood and solidarity among states, informed interventionism and neutrality in the Nigerian Civil War.

Keywords: Foreign Interest, Nigerian Civil War, Interventionism, Neutrality, Disintegration

Introduction Warfare, as a means to an end in modern international relations since 1648, is dynamic and complex. Hence, John G. Stoessinger opined that, most explanations of war are somehow defective. In that, wars are usually attributed to nationalism, militarism, alliance systems, ______Corresponding Author: Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe economic factors, or some other fundamental causes that cannot be directly connected to the actual outbreak of warfare.1 He maintained that military historians, “…Somehow always missed the human essence of the problem. Forces over which people apparently had no control were frequently enthroned as fundamental causes. Yet, it was people who actually precipitated wars”.2

Hence, in the international state system, while sovereign states remain the primary actors in international relations; it follows that it is the people at the helm of affairs of a state that actually interact with the peoples of other states in order to achieve the national interest of the state.

Thus, over time and in a bid to secure the political and economic survival of states, the leadership and policy makers of states have increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of other countries; or on the other hand isolate themselves, that is, remain neutral in the internal affairs of other states especially when interventionism would not directly serve their interests. It is in this circumstance that, interventionism and isolationism (neutrality) have emerged as major foreign policy thrusts of European and American states; and a critical instrument of achieving the foreign interests of these states beyond their territorial boundaries. In the history of international relations, interventionism and neutrality have been used as a double-edged sword. Deploying these weapons into use, strong states ex- plore and exploit the dynamic imperative and complexity of warfare as a means to an end in the international system by either intervening or remaining neutral.

Several incidences abound in world history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that clearly demonstrate this reality. During the American War of Independence (1775– 1783) between Britain and her American colonies, Louis XVI of France made an alliance with the colonist, and French forces under General Lafayette intervened in the American War.3 France’s support of the insurgent British American colonies was apparently a way to redeem her image4 and avenge the loss she suffered in the hands of Britain and Prussia during the Seven Years War (1754–1763) that involved every European great power at the time, and spanned across five continents: affecting Europe, the Americas, West Africa, In- dia, and the Philippines. It ended in the eclipse of the power of France, and subsequent rise of Britain as the world’s predominant power.5

In a related development, when the French Revolution, (which was partly facilitated by French participation in the American War of Independence through which democratic and liberal ideologies were imported into France by French troops; and reproduced in the French revolutionary doctrine of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity), broke out in 1789, it made France the centre stage for the politics of interventionism and neutrality to play out.

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

It happened that the cruel execution of the French monarch, King Louis XVI and his wife Marie Antoinette by guillotine in 1793 propelled the other European powers (Britain, Spain, Holland, German and Italian states) to intervene in the internal affairs of France not out of sympathy or brotherly love for the French monarchy; but squarely out of concern for their own national security. Hence, they acted to protect their political interest at home by concerting to pre-empt the spread of revolution and nationalism across Europe.6 Ac- cording to Edmund Burke in his Letters on a Regicide Peace:

The threat to Britain comes not from France but from Jaco- binism, the egalitarian, antimonarchical ideology of the French revolution. If the revolutionaries in France are permit- ted to get away with overturning property rights and the rights of monarchs, England too will succumb to revolution. Britain must defeat the French to teach its own citizens that revolution does not pay.7

Consequently, the French revolution was internationalised as a result of foreign interest in the country. Thus, the European powers formed the Quadruple Alliance consisting Brit- ain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia to contain the spread of revolutionary ideology across Eu- rope through interventionism.

During the European War of Interventionism in France in 1793, France anticipated Amer- ica’s reciprocity of the French support during her war of independence. However, rather than intervene in support of France, the United States of America (USA), out of consider- ation of her national interest, adopted the foreign policy of neutrality. However, although American public opinion favoured France, based on sympathy for their shared republican ideals, as well as on residual hostility towards Britain; the American policy makers realised that the USA was a new and relatively weak state. Hence, they feared that Britain would try to regain her possession over America, should the USA provide assistance to revolutionary France, when she engaged in anti-interventionist war with Britain and other Euro- pean powers in February 1793. As a result, in April 1793, USA President, George Washing- ton declared that the country would be neutral in the war between Britain and France.8 Thus, Alexander Hamilton in his Letter of Pacificus argued that:

There was no way the USA can assist France… France has no navy capable of protecting its (USA’s) oversea trade. Were the USA to side with France, Britain would simply destroy the American trade as well. Siding with France would therefore cost the United States a great deal while doing little for France. Worse, the country would expose itself to invasion by Britain and her ally Spain, another formidable power.9

44 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe

It is against this backdrop that, this paper argues that the foreign policy principles of interventionism and neutrality constitute a double-edged sword used for one and the same purpose- to protect the foreign interests of states. Overtime, this fact has become evident in the various international and intra-national wars that characterised contemporary international system. Wars and civil unrests have paved the way for interventionism and neutrality to progressively evolve as means and tools for pursuing the foreign interests of states, that is, the internationalised core national interests of states; and this is the continued political and economic survival of states in the international society. In post-colonial Nigeria, this stark reality of the international political system played out fully during the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970.

In the course of the Nigerian Civil War, Britain, USA, Russia, France, Israel, and Portugal, among others, pursued their divergent foreign interests in Nigeria and Africa at large using the war as a spring board. Hence, the international politics of interventionism and neutrality as means to an end in international relations found full expression in the Nigerian Civil War. Therefore, it is in this context that this paper interrogates the foreign interests in the Nigerian Civil War and their impact on the war. It highlights the impact of foreign interest on the nature, duration and casualty level of the Nigerian Civil War; and demonstrates its impact on Nigeria’s foreign policy and international relations after the war. The paper maintains that, in the modern international society, because of the dynamic nature of state relations and the complex nexus between interventionism and neutrality, there con- tinues to be no permanent friends or foes, but permanent interests. And for the sake of these interests, states are willing to adopt any means necessary to achieve them, be it interventionism, neutrality or total warfare.

Historical Background of the Nigerian Civil War According to S. E. Orobator, the origin of the Nigerian Civil War, one of the most devastat- ing conflicts in contemporary Africa, can be traced to the amalgamation of 1914.10 Hence, it could be safely said that the integration of the diverse peoples of Nigeria without their consent by Frederick Lugard for the colonial administrative convenience of Britain sowed the seed of discord that led to the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. More so, the subsequent antecedent of colonial distortion of Nigeria’s fragile unity achieved in 1914 further paved the way for the war.

Nigeria’s division into three unequal regions opened the way for the unhealthy rivalry between the North, East and West for political and economic dominance; and this snow- balled into mutual distrust and perhaps hate. Hence, since 1946, the Hausa, Igbo and Yo- ruba ethnic groups had been locked in a fierce struggle for control and dominance of the political economy of the country. It was in this circumstance that the Nigerian political

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 landscape became highly polarised by ethnicity and regionalism. These contradictions in the Nigerian political system heated up the polity and the displaced and marginalised minority groups in the country out of resentment and frustration began agitating for state creation. The consequent ethnic-nationalism that emerged in Nigeria created social dis- harmony in the nation, political tension, and put asunder the unity of the people welded together in 1914. So destabilizing was the minority agitation in colonial Nigeria that the Willinck Commission of 1957 was set up to look into the issue. Therefore, Kalu Ezera observed that:

Just as the minority problem overshadowed the independence of India and Pakistan, so too did it plague the constitutional conference of 1957 which sat to discuss the question of Nigeria’s independence…, indeed, the greatest problem that faces Nigeria as a country is that of unity… The nature of this problem has been how to organize together within the framework of a single state, the various peoples making up Nigeria without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each.11

On November 23, 1957, the four-man Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willinck arrived in Nigeria to probe into the position and fears of the minorities.12 The Commission held public sittings and private meetings with various groups all over Ni- geria and received detailed memoranda from minority groups, state movements and several individuals having their own schemes for reorganizing the federal structure of the country.13 After three months, the Commission of Inquiry released its report thus:

The commission did not recommend the creation of a single new state. It did not think the creation of new states in each of the regions would provide a remedy for the fears of minority. It feared that such recourse would only create fresh problems as each of the existing regions is so heterogeneous that there would be no end to agitation for further fragmentation. It therefore recommended that constitutional safeguards for the minorities be written into the constitution. It also recommended the strengthening of the Federal police as a means not only of securing the unity of Nigeria, but also of acting as checks against any possible abuse of power by the majori- ties.14

However, in post-colonial Nigeria, the unresolved minority agitation for state creation once again reared its head. In time, it culminated in the creation of the fourth Region, Mid- west in 1963. But the nature of politicking that ensued in the country following this development ushered in the military into Nigerian politics, and progressively led to the outbreak

46 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe of the Nigerian Civil War. During the period, Nigerian political elites demonstrated a high level of corruption and converted politics basically into a means of economic exploitation. Consequently, politics was commercialised and used to service the selfish interest of politicians, party members, and sponsors of political officeholders. Thus, the centrality of political power in acquiring wealth and fame during the period triggered a do-or-die ap- proach in the contestation for power in Nigeria. This situation invariably gave rise to several political crises in the country that pushed the nation to the brink of collapse before the military intervened on January 15, 1966. Thus, A. Ademoyega observed that:

The ostensible reasons usually given for staging military coups d’état, especially in Third World countries, are to eradicate bribery and corruption, put an end to tribalism regionalism or sectionalism; free the masses from misery, poverty and squalor; end drift in the country and provide purposeful leadership; enhance the image of the country in the eyes of the international community.15

Therefore, it is apt to contend here that, it was the greed of Nigerian politicians and the negation of political ethos in the country that laid the background for the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War, in the sense that, immediately after independence, the NCNC–NPC coalition government sought to isolate the AG and the Western region from access to the wealth of the nation; and privatize the economic resources of the nation for themselves and their party loyalists. Hence, in response to this development, Samuel Akintola advised the AG to corporate with the NCNC–NPC coalition government in order to gain access to the national wealth. But this position was rejected by Obafemi Awolowo, who wanted the AG to remain in opposition. Consequently, the ideological dichotomy between Akintola and Awolowo led to the AG crisis of 1962; and set the ball rolling for the series of crises that later rocked Nigeria. These crises include the Census Crisis of 1963, Federal Election Crisis of 1964, the Western Region Election Crisis of 1965 and the Tiv Riots: which were all not unconnected with the struggle for political power for the economic exploitation in Nigeria.

Therefore, it was against the backdrop of the maddening violence that characterized the country that the military struck on January 15, 1966, to sanitise the polity. But, the unification decree of the new Aguyi Ironsi’s military administration that supplanted Nigeria’s Fed- eralism, coupled with the leadership style of Ironsi, who surrounded himself with Igbo ad- visers created fear of Igbo hegemony in the North. Consequently, there were protests against the Igbos in the North and a counter coup in July 29, 1966. Ola Balogun captured these developments thus:

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

Ironsi’s inept handling of political issues and open chauvinism on the part of his adviser lent credence to the impression that Nigeria is been dominated by an Igbo clique stationed in La- gos. This feeling was further reinforced by the pattern of kill- ings in the January coup. Consequently, the unification decree triggered off chain reactions in the North, as there were large scale demonstrations against unitary government in the Northern cities of Kano, Kaduna, Jos and Zaria. In Kano, 50,000 demonstrators bearing placard saying ‘No unitary government without referendum’ and ‘Let there be secession’ delivered protest notes to the Emir of Kano and to the provincial secretary: the protest notes alleged that the unification decree opened the way for Igbo imperialism. These protests led to the death of many Igbos and large-scale exo- dus of non-Northerners resident in the Northern region.16

It is in the context of the foregoing that, Williams Orukpe opined that, “It is the politicians, political parties and party politics in post-colonial Nigeria that are critically responsible for the political instabilities and civil war that rocked and shook the foundation of Nigeria and pushed the nation to a state of near total collapse.”17

The Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 The Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970 brought to the front burner of Nigeria’s domestic politics, the pivotal importance of warfare as a means to an end. The Biafran War, as it is often called, for the Igbo majority of the Eastern region was a means to achieve secession and statehood. While on the part of the Nigerian Federal government under Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian Civil War was an indispensable means of protecting the unity and sovereignty of Nigeria. Therefore, it is in this regard that the Nigerian Civil War can be rightly described as an instrument of nation building in post-colonial Nigeria.

The Nigerian Civil War is a tragic episode in Nigerian history that lasted for almost three years. During this period, the peoples of Nigeria who had been bound together by their colonial experience since 1914 violently turned against one another to precipitate one of the deadliest conflicts in African history. This flash point of conflict opened up on May 30, 1967, following the collapse of diplomacy- the Aburi Accord. This prompted Odumegwu Ojukwu to declare the independence of the Eastern region from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra: with a new flag depicting an image of a rising sun, and a national anthem. Ac- cording to Bola Ige, it was at this point that warfare became the only means to an end. He captured it this way:

48 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe

It was now clear that only armed conflict could resolve the impasse, unless of course Ojukwu renounced secession or the Federal Government allowed the secession to succeed. Both sides prepared for war. In the East, all able-bodied per- sons were pressed into service for the protection of their be- loved homeland. The Federal Government began to recruit troops, mainly from the North at first, and later from the West, where the leaders encouraged the young men to join so that there would be more Yorubas in the Nigerian army.18

More so, as part of efforts geared towards winning the war, Gowon expanded his Execu- tive Council that arguably served as his war cabinet. He instructed the Military Governors to appoint Commissioners, who should be former but acceptable politicians, into executive councils.19 Ige revealed that Gowon himself personally selected Obafemi Awolowo, Yaya Gusau, Anthony Enahoro, Joseph Sarwuan, J.S. Tarka, Aminu Kano, Wenike Briggs, Joseph Eyitayo Adetoro, Femi Okunnu, Okoi Arikpo, and Alhaji Shehu Shagari from across the federation into his Executive Council to advise him.20 This move was necessary as Ojukwu had confidently boasted of Biafra’s military power, and that no power in Black Africa can subdue the Biafra Republic.21 Further, through the use of propaganda, Ojukwu had rallied international support for Biafra, and sent prominent Biafrans like Sir Francis Ibiam, Professor Kenneth Dike and Chinua Achebe as special envoys to various parts of the world to lobby for support for Biafra, particularly from the United States, Britain and West- ern Europe.22 These developments fostered increased foreign interventionism in the Nige- rian Civil War.

However, on July 6, 1967, the Nigerian Federal government launched “Operation UNICORD” (a police action) against Ojukwu, who had been accused of treason. This Fed- eral war strategy involved the blockade of Biafran seaports and airports in order to prevent Biafran troops from receiving arms and food supply from outside. But on August 8, the Biafran army completely turned on the heat on the Federal government, when it in- vaded the Midwest and easily conquered Benin City without a fight. Subsequently, the Midwest was declared the independent Republic of Benin, with Albert Okonkwo as the administrator.23 The Biafran war strategy was to take the war to Lagos, and the conquest of the Midwest was a stepping stone. Arising from this development, the Federal government that had hitherto concentrated its fighting forces on the northern border of Biafra saw the need to abandon its concept of limited police action and re-strategized as a result of the threat the Biafran occupation of the Midwest posed to the Nigerian state. Balogun observed that:

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

Rather than split the Federal ranks, the invasion of the Mid- west drew the Federation closer together by driving home to all the mortal danger that Ojukwu represented, and by creat- ing a sense of personal involvement that had hitherto been lacking in the South… The Federal Government incensed by the treachery that had enabled Ojukwu to occupy the Mid- west abandoned its ‘Police action’ strategy for a new policy of ‘Total War’ against secession.24

Consequently, Biafran effort to capture Ore and Ibadan from the Midwest was met with stiff Federal counter offensive. The Biafran troops were dislodged from one position after the other in a series of outflanking movements, as they retreated east ward.25 Thus, by September 20, Benin City was liberated from Biafran hegemony, and the Federal troops advanced into Enugu, which fell in October 4, 1967. This was followed by the conquest of Calabar, an important seaport of the Biafran eastern flank, by a Marine Commando team led by Col. Benjamin Adekunle. From Calabar, the Federal troops linked up with the troops of the First Division in Ogoja, and cut off the last road link between the now land-locked Biafra and the neighbouring Cameroun Republic; and sealed off Biafra’s eastern borders.26 This development gave rise to food scarcity and starvation in Biafra Republic. But still, the war raged on as a result of foreign interventionism in the Nigerian Civil War. Western powers airlifted food and arms into Biafra, which sustained the Biafran war effort, before the war finally ended on January 12, 1970, following the unconditional surrender of Lt. Col. Philip Effiong, the Acting Head of State of Biafra Republic to Yakubu Gowon after Ojukwu fled Biafra into exile.

Foreign Interests in the Nigerian Civil War At this juncture, it is pertinent for us to ask: What constitutes the foreign interests of Eu- rope and America in the Nigerian Civil War? This question brings to the fore the centrality of national interest as a major determinant of international relations, which dates back to the formation of states in any form.27 In this regard, J.C. Johari maintains that: “The term national interest is the most widely used and generally intelligible short-hand description of all the purpose elements in foreign policy.28 In other words, it is the key to unlocking the causations and motivations behind states’ actions in the international system. Further, Johari notes that: “Since the modern State is known as the Nation-State the interest of the state is known as national interest despite the fact that, it is defined, protected and promoted by the government and as such it may be termed government interest.”29 Hence, it is safe to assert here that the foreign interest of a state is the core national interest of the state, which its government is pursuing or seeks to achieve beyond the territorial boundary of the state. Therefore, it is the internationalisation of the national or domestic interests of states in the international community.

50 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe

However, it must be emphasised that, it was the discovery of oil in Nigeria in 1956, and the emergence of Nigeria in 1960, as the most populous African nation with vast economic potentials that informed foreign interests in post-colonial Nigeria, and precisely in the Ni- gerian Civil War, 1967–1970. With reference to this, Soala Ariweriokuma rightly observed:

The Niger Delta region (a part of Biafra Republic then) has been associated with oil production activities for over eight decades, but the presence of oil was first registered only in 1956 with the discovery at Oloibiri. Since then, the region has increasingly grown to be the hub of Nigerian oil exploration and production activities.30

Consequently, the prospect of oil exploration in the Niger Delta is the magnet that attracted European and American interests in the Nigerian Civil War. To this end, Balogun averred that, “The fact that Nigeria had vast petroleum resources and was on the way to becoming one of the world’s major oil producers was by no means irrelevant to the course of events during the Nigerian Civil War.”31

Further, at independence in 1960, according to Olajide Aluko, Nigeria like other African States, lacking the military and financial capability of the Great Powers had no global or continental ambition. It pursued an Afrocentric foreign policy that was primarily con- cerned with the unity, stability, independence and economic development of African States.32 However, this foreign policy thrust threatened European economic and neo-imperialist interests in West Africa and Africa at large. Balogun puts it thus: “the size and the political and economic potentiality of… Nigeria necessarily appeared an obstacle to the neocolonialist manoeuvres of imperialist countries seeking to recolonize Africa.”33

Therefore, it is against this backdrop that the foreign powers intervened in the Nigerian Civil War not out of humanitarianism or charity, but to remove all obstacles in the way of the foreign powers in Africa. Hence, to facilitate their unhindered access to the resources of Nigeria, they either remained neutral or gave support to the Federal government: to protect their investment and oil exploration in the country; or to Biafra Republic to fast track the breakup of Nigeria and annihilation of the threat the country posed to foreign interest in Africa. Hence, Balogun concludes that:

Imperialism in our age has been forced to abandon direct colonial domination for a more flexible policy of indirect control through puppets and henchmen… Ojukwu… appeared an entirely amenable instrument for the furtherance of their interests in view of his rabid anti-communist views and ready willingness to ally with even the most reactionary Western

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

power, Portugal… A strong and united Nigeria posed a highly dangerous threat to continued Western neo-colonialist domination of Africa, whereas the multitude of independent and mutually hostile states that might result from the disintegration of Nigeria could be easily manipulated and exploited. Western interest thus lay in encouraging the disintegration of Nigeria, not in ensuring the preservation of Nigeria’s unity.34

British and American Interests in the Nigerian Civil War Nigeria’s colonial linkage with Britain to a sufficient degree informed her pro-West foreign policy at independence. In fact, to consolidate the nascent international cooperation between Britain and Nigeria, the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact was signed in 1962. But even after the abrogation of the Nigeria-British military agreement, their relationship continued on the basis of colonial affinity. Hence, when the Nigerian Civil War broke out, Nigeria naturally relied on Britain for support. However, it was at this point that the dynamics of international politics played out on the Nigerian centre stage. In that, British interest in the war differed remarkably from that of the Nigerian state. Britain down played her colonial linkage with the nation she had created. Hence, during the war, British interest was principally how to maintain and expand her supply of cheap high quality oil from Nigeria. Thus, it was the case that Britain maintained a strategic and splendid isolationism in the Nigerian Civil War, as she did during the Bismarckian alliance era in Europe before it collapsed in 1890, as a means of achieving her national interest in the region. Implicit in this reality is the fact that, while British interventionism was officially on the part of Nigeria, she had keen interest in the affairs of Biafra. Hence:

Britain placed a high priority on the maintenance of her oil extraction and refining operations. Consequently, when the war broke out they (Britain) cautioned them (Nigeria) not to damage British oil installations in the East (Biafra Republic) … Shell and British Petroleum controlled 84% of Nigeria’s 580,000 barrels per day; and two-third (2/3) of this oil came from the Eastern region… Two-fifth (2/5) of all Nigerian oil ended up in Britain.35

Consequently, demonstrating Britain’s splendid isolationism and fluid allegiance in the Ni- gerian Civil War, Shell-BP (against the request of the Nigerian government that they refrain from the paying royalties demanded by Biafra) went ahead to pay the royalty in order to protect their oil extraction interest in Biafran territory. This defiance consequently led to a blockade on oil by the Federal government.36

British shifting allegiance in the Nigerian Civil War could also be seen in Britain’s humanitarian campaign for Biafra. The humanitarian campaign began on June 12, 1968, with media

52 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe coverage on ITV and in the British newspaper- The Sun; and through charity organisations such as Oxfam and Save the Children Fund that were deployed and equipped with large sums of money at their disposal.37 However, Britain soon returned to giving full support to Nigeria through arms supply and military intelligence, when it became clear that Nigeria had an upper hand in the war and would emerge the victor. More so, Soviet Union’s full military support of Nigeria panicked Britain, who feared the threat Soviet penetration into the country posed to British interest in Nigeria, West Africa and Africa at large.

As for the USA, the country outrightly adopted a foreign policy of neutrality in the Nigerian Civil War in order to protect her economic interest in the theatre of conflict. The US Sec- retary of State, Dean Rusk observed that: “America is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an area under British influence.”38 But in reality, the American foreign policy thrust was based on the fact that, “Gulf Oil Nigeria, the third major player in Nigerian oil exploration, producing 9% of the oil coming out of Nigeria before the war began was lo- cated and operating offshore of the federally controlled Midwestern territory…”39

Hence, since the USA oil interest lies in the Nigerian controlled territory therefore to protect her economic interest and private investments, the USA adopted a neutral foreign policy position in the war. Thus, she continued to pay royalties to the Federal government and her operations were mostly undisrupted.40

Irrespective of this fact, individual Americans were upset over the alleged genocidal war, the Igbos painted the war to be. And they resented image of starving and dying Baifrans making the rounds; and were convinced that it was conceived as a national preoccupation of the USA to promote human freedom everywhere. Consequently, Senator Ted Kennedy led a national relief campaign for Biafra. In this circumstance, USA presidential candidate, Richard Nixon observed thus:

Until now efforts to relieve the Biafra people had been thwarted by the desire of the Federal government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory, and by the fear of the Igbo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide. But genocide is what is taking place right now, and starvation is the grim reaper.41

It could therefore be safely contended that, in view of the spirit of the Atlantic Charter signed between USA and Britain in 1941 which recognised the right of oppressed people to self-determination, Britain and USA in the Nigerian Civil War were in essence, truly in favour of the disintegration of Nigeria. Hence, they were completely supportive of the Bi- afran secessionist cause psychologically, ideologically and theoretically. But because of

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 their expedient national economic interest in Nigeria and Africa, they camouflaged their true intent under the foreign policy thrust of neutrality and splendid interventionism in the Nigerian Civil War.

French Interest in the Nigerian Civil War France is another Western power that intervened in the Nigerian Civil War. However, French interest in the war and means of achieving it was intricately dynamic. In addition to protecting her investments in Nigeria, France was cautious of her interest in West Af- rica, which the Nigerian foreign policy threatened. According to Daniel C. Bach:

In 1966, the value of French asset had been estimated at £35million representing 10% of total foreign investment in Ni- geria… Nigeria’s foreign policy towards West African neighbours helped maintain the unity and stability of Francophone states. Until 1966, Nigeria’s policy actively contributed to the preservation of Francophone influence in West Africa. The first change in Nigeria’s relationship with its neighbours was prompted by its disagreements with Ivory Coast during the Nigerian Civil War.42

More so, an economically stable French West Africa, which Nigeria pushed for would dwin- dle their reliance on France and French influence in the region may be eclipsed by that of Nigeria.

Consequently, France’s involvement in the Nigerian Civil War was a geographical strategy to compete with, and perhaps curb, British influence in West Africa. In that, Nigeria was a central and strategic base from which British influence was expanded into predominantly French-aligned areas.43 Thus, to balance the power of Britain in West Africa, France gave military assistance to Biafra Republic in anticipation of the eventual disintegration of Ni- geria. France provided weapons, mercenaries and promoted the Biafran cause interna- tionally, describing the situation as genocide. Thus, Charles de Gaulle referred to the Bia- fran cause as a just and noble cause.44 Consequently, through Pierre Laureys, France provided two B-26 Alouette helicopters and pilots. France supplied Biafra with captured Ger- man and Italian weapons from World War II, and cooperated with South African Secret Service to import weapons into Biafra.45

However, France was also cautious not to jeopardize her interest in Nigeria, as she had substantial investments in the country. Thus, France withheld from recognising Biafra dip- lomatically; and she also supplied Nigeria Panhard armoured vehicles46 during the course of the war in order to be on a safe side in the eventuality of Nigerian victory. Hence, Chris- topher Griffin concluded that:

54 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe

France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra’s greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigeria government, which is what ultimately occurred. 47

Russian Interest in the Nigerian Civil War Nigeria attained sovereign status during the Cold War era: a period of ideological contestation between the USA and the Soviet Union to spread capitalism and communism re- spectively to other parts of the globe for their national and economic survival. In this circumstance, at her independence in 1960, and because of her newness and relative weak- ness in the comity of nations, Nigeria adopted a Non-alignment foreign policy posture towards the Cold War, in order to protect her national interest, which is survival. Although Nigeria deliberately and meticulously steered away from the Cold War politics, when the Nigerian Civil War broke out in 1967, it soon made the country a theatre of the Cold War politics.

During the war, Soviet Union saw her opportunity to gain a foothold in Nigeria, from where she could spread her influence in Africa. Hence, Soviet Union strongly backed the Nigerian government. She gave Nigeria military, financial and diplomatic support. This is captured thus: “Russia consistently supplied Nigeria with weapons, with the diplomatic disclaimer that these were strictly for cash on a commercial basis. In 1968, Russia agreed to finance the Kanji Dam on the Niger.”48

It followed therefore the foregoing that Soviet Union camouflaged her interest in the Ni- gerian Civil War under the pretense that her support for the Nigerian government was simply based on trade and commerce; and her shared opposition to internal secessionist movement.49 However, the true reality behind Soviet interventionism in the Nigerian Civil War that is worthy of emphasis was that, the Soviet Union wanted to use the war as a platform to increase Soviet influence in Africa through the most populous Black African nation. This realization created panic in Britain and forced her to adjust her foreign policy towards the war. Ola Balogun captured this development this way:

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

The British government was forced into selling arms to Nige- ria mainly out of fear of gains by the Russian rival and appre- hension that British interests in the secessionist area might be ceded to France in the case of Biafran success, not for love of Nigeria nor out of sympathy for Nigeria’s interests. Russian aid was mostly motivated by the opportunity of increasing Soviet sphere of influence in Africa…50

Israeli Interest in the Nigerian Civil War Israel and Nigeria maintained close diplomatic, cultural and economic relations upon the emergence of Nigeria as a sovereign state in 1960. This bilateral relation was based on Israel’s perception of Nigeria as an important player in West African politics. Hence, before her independence, Israel and Nigeria had already established a diplomatic linkage in 1957.51 Thus: “In 1960, Britain allowed the creation of an Israeli diplomatic mission in Lagos, and Israel gave $10 million loan to the Nigerian government. Israel developed cultural relations with the Igbo based on possible shared traditions…”52

Consequently, Israel played a significant role in the development of Nigeria. In this regard, hundreds of Israeli experts and volunteers were sent to help in the development and mod- ernisation of Nigeria’s agriculture, education, health and technology53 before both countries broke diplomatic relations in 1973, as a result of Israel’s invasion and occupation of the Sinai region belonging to Egypt,54 during the Yom-Kippur War.

However, during the Nigerian Civil War, the triumph of Biafran propaganda attracted Is- rael’s support for the Biafran cause. The Igbo alert of genocide taking place in Biafra re- minded many Israelis of the Holocaust that is, their ordeal and Jewish massacre under Nazi Germany. Hence, “the Israeli public, press and Parliament called for assistance to Biafra, evoking Israel’s deep moral obligation to help people in distress.”55 Consequently, Israel gave clandestine support to Biafra by supplying her weapons and humanitarian assistance. This is captured thus:

In August 1968, the Israeli air force covertly sent twelve tons of food aid to a nearby site outside of Nigerian airspace. Cov- ertly, Mossad provided Biafra with $100,000 through Zurich and attempted an arms shipment. Soon after Israel arranged to make clandestine weapons shipments to Biafra using Cote d’ Ivoire transport planes.56

However, conscious of the overall foreign interest of Israel which is to increase her influence and in economic relations with West African and African States at large, which could be best served by Nigeria; Israel also sold arms to Nigeria seeking to prevent a diplomatic

56 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe rapture with the Nigerian government, which would affect Israel’s position in all Black Af- rica.57

The Impact of Foreign Interests on the Nigerian Civil War Walter Rodney had argued that, Europe by way of its interventionism in pre-colonial and colonial Africa for the economic benefit of Europe underdeveloped Africa, and created many problems for the continent.58 However, in post-colonial Africa, foreign powers have still continued to meddle in the internal affairs of African States because of their selfish national interests. This interventionism or neo-imperialism of foreign powers in Africa has directly or indirectly continued to be largely responsible for the socio-political destabiliza- tion, crises, economic misfortune, and policy disorganisation and restructuring of African states; but for the utmost benefit of the West and consolidation of Western hegemony in Africa.

In post-colonial Nigeria, this reality is clearly evident and demonstrable in the nature of foreign interest in the Nigerian Civil War and its impact on the war. Foreign interest in the Nigerian Civil War encouraged the prolongation of the war. In other words, the war could have come to a swift end, or could have been completely avoided were it not for foreign supply of arms and ammunition to both the Nigerian government and Biafra Republic. Ac- cording to Ola Balogun:

There is no doubt that the war would have come to a negoti- ated end long before the Federal forces finally achieved victory, if the Biafran regime had not been able to procure arms supplies. But this was precluded by the intervention of foreign powers operating both directly and through the international charity organisations to provide rebels with arms and funds.59

This development dovetailed into or is closely connected with the next impact of foreign interventionism in the Nigerian Civil War. Foreign interest in the war impacted significantly on the nature and dimension of the Nigerian Civil War. The active support and participation of foreign mercenaries elevated the war to the status of an international war and increased its destructiveness in the period. Consequently, the war involved the use of foreign war technology and witnessed the introduction of a new method of warfare in Nige- rian military history, aerial warfare. Aerial battles during the Nigerian Civil War were facilitated by the fact that Russia supplied Nigeria with Jetfighters, while Egypt provided Nige- ria with the pilots to fly them. But however, aerial warfare was poorly utilized during the war. Hence, Balogun noted that, “aerial warfare was virtually non-existent, apart from a

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 few B.26 bombing raids by rebel planes at the beginning of the war, followed later by Fed- eral deployment of Soviet-built Ilyushin bombers ineptly piloted by Egyptian pilots, there was not much action in this field.”60

Paradoxically, foreign interventionism in the Nigerian Civil War worsened the food scarcity and starvation in Biafra during the blockade, and ironically was responsible for the high rate of casualties in Biafra Republic. In that, as Balogun puts it:

Humanitarianism by itself could not have provided for the settlement of the conflict, nor even for a solution of the relief problem. Shortage of protein foods in the secessionist en- clave was principally caused by the original act of secession itself, which cut the East off from traditional sources of supply of meat and other protein foods from other parts of the Federation. An airlift of relief materials from Western Europe and America were at best a temporary solution to the problem, the ultimate solution lay in the re-establishment of traditional economic links between the former Eastern region and the rest of the Federation.61

In the final analysis, it is noteworthy that another significant impact of foreign interventionism in the Nigerian Civil War was the expansion and reorganisation of the Nigerian army during the period. Balogun observed that, “the Federal army had been thrown into a serious state of disorganisation by the sudden withdrawal of nearly all Igbos, and a very high percentage of other officers of Eastern origin, following the events of July.”62

Hence, the dire need to fill this vacuum and respond to the imminent threat of secession led to the expansion and reorganisation of the Nigerian army. Thus, according to Balogun, “from an initial force of thirteen to fifteen thousand men, the Federal forces swelled to an estimated two hundred thousand by the time the war ended two and a half years later.”63

More so, foreign interventionism during the war, which was responsible for the arming of Biafra and her successful invasion and occupation of the Midwest in 1967, prompted the shift of Nigeria’s military strategic thinking during the war from limited police action to total warfare. Foreign interests in the Nigerian Civil War also fostered Nigeria’s rethinking of her concept of national security. In that aspect, Nigeria realized that threat to her national security comes mainly from her West African neighbours than within; as it was through her neighbours that the foreign powers almost sabotaged her war effort. Based on this understanding, Nigeria adopted the foreign policy thrust of good neighbourliness towards her West African neighobours and championed regional economic cooperation

58 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe and integration in West Africa at the end of the civil war. This was in a bid to contain unbridled foreign influence and interests in the region, which has been understood to be detrimental to Nigeria’s unity and security.64

Conclusion The Nigerian Civil War was an epochal event in the political and military history of the nation. From 1967–1970, it emerged as a multidimensional struggle between the Nigerian state, the Igbo dominated Biafra Republic, and the foreign powers. On the part of Biafra, it was a secessionist agenda that is, a means of asserting the right to self-determination of the Igbo. For the Nigerian government, the war was a means of protecting the unity and sovereignty of Nigeria. However, for the foreign powers, the Nigerian Civil War was a means of pursuing their foreign economic interest in Nigeria, West Africa, and Africa at large.

In this circumstance, the Nigerian Civil War transformed post-colonial Nigeria into a center stage for the dynamics of the international politics of interventionism and neutrality to be played. In the pursuit of their foreign interests in the country, old friendship was sus- pended in the balance, then, support and interventionism in the war calculatedly made it possible to enhance the achievement of the foreign policy objectives of foreign powers in the country, and Africa at large. Thus, this paper maintains that, the critical foreign interest of Europe and America in the Nigerian Civil War, in reality, lied in their desire to get access to the abundant rich oil reserves of the country; and to consolidate their neo-imperialist design in Africa through the disintegration of Nigeria. In this regard, Nigeria’s dominant position in Africa was a threat to Western hegemonic agenda in the continent; hence, during the Nigerian Civil War, the foreign powers systematically sought the disintegration of the nation by directly or indirectly supporting Biafra.

Consequently, this paper submits that foreign interventionism led to the prolongation and sophistication of the Nigerian Civil War, accentuation of the Biafran economic dilemma, and triggered the expansion and reorganisation of the Nigerian military. More so, it facilitated the growth of Nigerian military’s strategic thinking; and the rethinking of the concept of Nigeria’s national security. Therefore, foreign interest in the Nigerian Civil War fast- tracked the emergence of the Nigerian Army as the strongest, most equipped and experi- enced in West Africa after the war. Thus, based on this vantage military position which Nigeria attained during the civil war, in the post-civil war years, the nation quickly emerged as the pivot around which regional cooperation, integration and collective security in West Africa revolved. Hence, post-colonial Nigeria is not only fundamental to the success of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); but also a strong barrier holding back unbridled neo-imperialism in West Africa, and by extension the African continent.

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

Endnotes

1 John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War? (8th ed.). Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2001, p. xv. 2 Ibid. 3 Herbert L. Peacock, A History of Modern Europe 1789–1981 (7th ed.). London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982, p. 10. 4 A.J. Grant and Harold Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 1789-1950 (6th ed.). Lon- don: Longman Group Ltd, 1952, p. 3. 5 James C. Riley, The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 78. 6 Herbert L. Peacock, A History of Modern Europe, pp. 43–44. 7 Chris Brown, et al (ed.), International Relations in Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 253. 8 Ibid., p. 352. 9 Ibid., p. 353. 10 S.E. Orobator, Political Conflicts and Crisis in Africa: Origin Development and Management (1960-1995). Benin– City: Ethiope, Publishing Corporation, 1996, p. 17. 11 Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria (2nd ed.). London: Cambridge University Press, 1964, p. 244. 12 Ibid., p. 252. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 A.M. Mainasara, The Five Majors: Why They Struck. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1982, p. 7. 16 Ola Balogun, The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis 1966-1970. Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1973, pp. 25–28. 17 Williams Ehizuwa Orukpe, Political Parties, Party Politics and the Rise of Political Instabilities in Post-Colonial Nigeria (1960-1966.). M.A. Thesis, Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, 2014, p. 1. 18 Bola Ige, People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria (1940-1979). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Plc, 1995, p. 336. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., pp. 336–337. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 338. 23 Ibid. 24 Ola Balogun, The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis, 1966 – 1970, p. 85. 25 Ibid., p. 86. 26 Ibid. 27 J.C. Johari, International Relations and Politics: Theoretical Perspectives in the Post-Cold War Era. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 1985, pp. 442–451. 28Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Soala Ariweriokuma, The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: The case of Nigeria. London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 245. 31 Ola Balogun, p. 75.

60 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe

32 Olajide Aluko, “The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of African States” in Olajide Aluko (ed.) The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, pp. 1–2. 33 Ola Balogun, p. 75. 34 Ibid., p. 95. 35 Stremlau, J. J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 65. 36 Chibuike Uche, Oil British Interest and the Nigerian Civil War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 120-124. 37 Kevin O’Sullivan, “Humanitarian Encounters: Biafra, NGOs and Imaginings of the Third World in Britain and Ireland, 1967-1970”, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 16, Issue 2-3, 2014, p. 302. 38 Damola Awoyokun, Biafra: The Untold Story of Nigeria’s Civil War, P.M. News, February 19, 2013. 39 Chibuike Uche, Oil British Interest and the Nigerian Civil War, pp. 120-124. 40 Ibid., pp. 125-127. 41 James Alabi Olawoyin, Historical Analysis of Nigeria-Biafra Conflict, Master Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1971, pp. 137-139. 42 Daniel Bach, Relations Between Nigeria, France and selected Francophone States in West Africa 1960 – 1975. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1978, pp. 6–253. 43 James Alabi Olawoyin, Historical Analysis of Nigeria-Biafra Conflict, pp. 137-139. 44 Ibid. 45 Christopher Griffin, “French Military Policy in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970”, Journal of Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 26, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 114-135. 46 Z. Levey, Israel, “Nigeria and Biafra Civil War, 1967-1970”, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 16, Issue 2- 3, 2014, p. 179. 47 Christopher Griffin, “French Military Policy in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970”. 48 Angela Stent, “The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of Realism”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 3(2), 1973. 49 Z. Levey, “Israel, Nigeria and Biafra Civil War, 1967-1970”, Journal of Genocide Research, p. 273. 50 Ola Balogun, The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis 1966 – 1970, 101. 51 Z. Levey, “Israel, Nigeria and Biafra Civil War, 1967-1970”, Journal of Genocide Research, p. 265. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Kenneth B. Noble, “Nigeria and Israel May Restore Ties” in the New York Times.http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/10/world/Nigeria-and-Israel-may-restore-ties.html accessed June 25, 2017. 55 Z. Levey, “Israel, Nigeria and Biafra Civil War, 1967-1970”, Journal of Genocide Research, pp. 270-271. 56 Ibid., pp. 271-272. 57 Ibid., p. 266. 58 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-L’ Ouverture, 1972, pp. 103–122. 59 Ola Balogun, The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis, 1966 – 1970, p. 104. 60 Ibid., p. 87. 61 Ibid., p. 106. 62 Ibid., p. 79. 63 Ibid., p. 80. 64 Chukka Enuka and Ikenna Odife, The Nigerian Civil War as a Domestic Determinant of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 1967–1975. Accessed June 25, 2017.

Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019

Bibliography

Ariweriokuma, S., The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Africa: The case of Nigeria. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

Awoyokun, D., Biafra: The Untold Story of Nigeria’s Civil War, P.M. News, February 19, 2013.

Bach, D., Relations Between Nigeria, France and selected Francophone States in West Africa. 1960 – 1975. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1978.

Balogun, O., The Tragic Years: Nigeria in Crisis 1966 – 1970. Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1973.

Brown, C., et al (eds.), International Relations in Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Enuka, C. and Odife, I., The Nigerian Civil War as a Domestic Determinant of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy1967–1975. https://googleweblight.com/i?u=https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ujah/article/view/67018&gri- qid=TOY2ipTw&hl-en-NG&geid=1015>.

Ezera, K., Constitutional Development in Nigeria (2nd ed.). London: Cambridge University Press, 1964.

Grant, A.J. and Temperley, H., Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 1789 – 1950 (6th ed.). London: Longman Group Ltd, 1952.

Ige, B., People, Politics and Politicians of Nigeria (1940 – 1979). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational books Plc, 1995.

Issue: A Journal of Opinion, Vol. 3(2), 1973.

Johari, J.C., International Relations and Politics: Theoretical Perspectives in the Post-Cold War Era. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 1985.

Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 16, Issue 2-3, 2014.

Journal of Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 26, Issue 1, 2015.

Mainasara, A.M., The Five Majors: Why They Struck? Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company, 1982.

New York Times.http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/10/world/Nigeria-and-Israel-may-restore-ties.html Accessed June 25, 2017.

Olajide Aluko (ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.

Olawoyin, J.A., Historical Analysis of Nigeria-Biafra Conflict. Master Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1971.

62 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Foreign Interest… and Impact on the Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970 W. E. Orukpe

Orobator, S.E., Political Conflicts and Crisis in Africa: Origin Development and Management (1960 – 1995). Benin– City: Ethiope, Publishing Corporation, 1996.

Orukpe, W.E., Political Parties, Party Politics and the Rise of Political Instabilities in Post-Colonial Nigeria (1960 – 1966.). M.A. Thesis Submitted in the Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, 2014.

Peacock, H.L., A History of Modern Europe 1789–1981 (7th ed.). London: Heinemann Educational Boooks, 1982.

Riley, J.C., The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Rodney, W., How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: Bogle-L’ Ouverture, 1972.

Stoessinger, J.G., Why Nations Go to War? (8th ed.). Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2001.

Stremlau, J. J., The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Uche, C., Oil British Interest and the Nigerian Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.