WORKING PAPER Number 4, March 2010
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World
Khalil al-Anani
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 01 WORKING PAPER Number 4, March 2010
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World
Khalil al-Anani Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...... iii
The Author ...... v
Acknowledgements ...... vi
Introduction: The New Map of Islamists ...... 1
Exclusionary Policies: Who Stopped the “Tsunami”? ...... 4
Myths Used to Justify Excluding Moderate Islamists ...... 10
The Role of the United States ...... 14
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution ii Executive Summary
he United States has long shown confusion in its accept peaceful political participation, do not rely Tpolicies toward Islamist political movements in on militias, and accept the values of democracy . the Middle East . By conflating moderates and hard- Many groups fulfill these requirements, including liners, and believing that moderate Islamists pose the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, a threat to u S. . strategic interests in the region, the and Yemen, as well as the Moroccan Justice and De- United States has opted to support regimes that limit velopment Party (PJD) . democratic participation . American administrations have backed, with limited exceptions during the presi- The United States has long resisted engaging with dency of George W . Bush, authoritarian regimes that moderate Islamists because of several unfounded not only impose restrictions on, and enact regulations beliefs . Key among these is that allowing moderate against, political participation, but use intimidation Islamists to enter the political arena would under- and violence against Islamist groups and parties . mine stability in the region . But a principal reason for unrest and instability in the Middle East is the In reviewing this current state of affairs, and exam- failed economic and social policies of the autocratic ining the effects of excluding Islamists from the po- governments in power . In a number of countries, litical arena, it becomes clear that the policies have such as Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, and Al- numerous negative repercussions, particularly relat- geria, collective anger and discontent is the result ing to u .S . national security interests . The historical of poor economic and social conditions produced experience in the Arab world indicates that despo- by “stable” regimes . Many in the United States tism produces extremism . Ultimately, political re- also believe in the fallacy that moderate Islamists pression increases citizens’ feelings of exclusion and will use democratic participation as an entryway to diminishes preferences for moderation and peaceful take over the state . History has shown otherwise . political participation . Today, from Saudi Arabia Indeed, many shakeups in the region, particularly to Morocco, there is a clear rise in extremist Salafi in Iran in 1979, Sudan in 1989, and Afghanistan in movements of various types, some of which are the the 1990s, were not the result of Islamists gaining result of regimes’ exclusionary policies . power through the ballot box . In addition, numer- ous cases have shown—particularly in Morocco, The United States should therefore consider poli- Algeria, Yemen, and Jordan—that when moder- cies that promote engagement with moderate Is- ate Islamist parties do participate in the political lamist groups in the Middle East . This paper defines system, they tend to become more pragmatic and moderation as the extent to which Islamist groups moderate in their political discourse and policies .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution iii There are benefits for the United States in engag- • Do Not Treat Democracy Promotion Sole- ing with moderate Islamists . Islamists have a wider ly as a Response to Terrorism. The United appeal across the Arab and Islamic world than radi- States should not link the spread of democ- cals, and are well positioned to challenge Islamic ex- racy in the Arab world with the war on ter- tremism . In addition, dialogue with Islamists would rorism . Any American policy that views de- bolster public opinion of the United States within mocracy primarily as an instrument of u .S . several countries where religion is part of the fabric national security is destined to fail since it will of the political arena . TheU nited States should aim only reinforce Arab perceptions of American for face-to-face dialogue with moderate Islamist hypocrisy; Arabs have the right to political parties by promoting the following policies: freedom and democracy like the rest of the free world, regardless of any single nation’s se- • Rethink the Basic Understanding of Mod- curity concerns . erate Islamists. The first step for the United States is to reassess past approaches and begin • Capitalize on the New Generation of Mod- to see moderate Islamists not as threats but erate Islamists. The United States should as possible partners . In order to do this, the invest in building strong relationships with United States must understand how moderate younger Islamists who will become future Islamists think, and what their expectations leaders of their movements . This generation’s are of the United States . activists differ from their predecessors in their more pragmatic orientation; their ideological • Understand the Internal Dynamics of Is- openness to liberal democratic values, such as lamist Movements. TheU nited States should freedom, pluralism, equality, accountability, understand the nature of the internal conflicts and transparency; and their willingness to en- and divisions within moderate Islamist orga- gage with the West . nizations, particularly ongoing disputes be- tween conservatives and reformers, as well as the relative influence of each wing .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution iv The Author
halil al-Anani is a Senior Fellow at the Al Ah- Insight journal . He authors a weekly column in Kram Foundation, based in Cairo . He is the Egypt Daily News, and is a frequent writer for many Deputy Editor of the journal Al Siyassa Al Dawliya, leading Arabic newspapers, including Al Hayat, published by the Al Ahram Center for Political and Al Ahram Weekly, Al Ghad (Jordan), and Al Watan Strategic Studies . Al-Anani is a noted political ana- (Oman) . lyst specializing in Middle East politics with a focus on Islamist politics, democratization, security and In 2008, al-Anani served as Todd g . Patkin Visit- conflict resolution, Egypt, and Arab politics . ing Fellow in Arab Democracy and Development at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Al–Anani has authored several books covering Is- Brookings Institution . Before his current position lam and Islamist dynamics, Arab politics, Hamas at the Al Ahram Center, al-Anani worked as a head and Hizballah, Egypt, and Turkey . His most recent of the opinion section at Al Masry Al Youm news- books are The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Search- paper and was a political analyst at the Egyptian ing for the Truth (2008) and Dismantling the Great Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade . Al-Anani Walls: Tribalism, Authoritarianism, and Islamism in received a Master’s Degree in Political Science from the Arab World (forthcoming) . Al-Anani contributes Cairo University and is pursuing a Ph .d . at the to a variety of publications, including Arab Affairs School of Government and International Affairs at journal, Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi journal, and Arab Durham University, UK .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution v Acknowledgements
spent four months at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the IBrookings Institution, and am grateful to the many people without whose support and help, this paper would not have come out . I would like to thank Martin Indyk, Kenneth Pollack, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Andrew Masloski, Yinnie Tse, and Ariel Kastner . I am also deeply thankful to Todd g . Patkin for his generosity .
This paper was made possible in part by a grant from the Tom Lantos Foun- dation for Human Rights and Justice .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution vi Introduction: The New Map of Islamists
he map of Islamist movements in the Arab world exclude moderate Islamists from the political scene? Thas changed over the course of the past three de- What are the risks of doing so? What are the ef- cades . There are wide gaps between those movements fects of exclusion on the interests and image of the that use violence, look to change political regimes by United States in the region? Given these questions, force, and seek confrontation with the West, such as how then should the United States deal with moder- al-Qa’ida, and those movements that seek to practice ate Islamists? This paper analyzes the dangers posed politics peacefully, have respect for the sovereignty of by excluding all moderate Islamists from the politi- the state, and are willing to work with the reigning cal arena, and recommends measures by which the political regimes . These latter, moderate groups share United States can engage moderate Islamist parties a belief in coexistence with the West . in order to advance both its democratic principles and national security interests . Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, American confusion over moderate Islamist groups has caused The Meaning of Moderation u .S . policymakers to accuse them of bearing at least some responsibility for the existence of extremist As “moderation” is a relative term, one should exer- movements in the Middle East . Moreover, because cise caution when using it . Those beliefs and actions officialA merican discourse conflates moderates and that the United States perceives as moderate may radicals, and sees even moderates as serious threats seem extreme to others, whereas those that Islamist to u .S . strategic interests in the region, the United movements see as moderate may seem extreme to States has accepted or ignored Arab regimes’ repres- Washington and Arab regimes . Thus, to avoid a sion of Islamist movements . The danger is that the semantic debate, this paper defines moderation in exclusion of moderate groups from the political the framework of the social and political context in arena may cause them, and their constituents, to which it is used . Specifically, it considers the con- radicalize . As Francois Burgat has written, “State cept of Islamist moderation as being the extent to violence creates the violence of the Islamists ”. 1 which movements accept peaceful political partici- pation, do not rely on militias, and accept the values The current situation in the Arab world presents of democracy and its various components, such as the following dilemmas: Can Arab regimes, with freedom, tolerance, and equality, irrespective of reli- the backing of the United States, successfully gion, ethnicity, or gender .
1 Francois Burgat, Face to Face With Political Islam, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 77.
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 1 With this framework in mind, one can classify pluralism and democracy—which is trying to dom- many Islamist groups as moderate . The Muslim inate Arab societies . From Saudi Arabia in the east Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen to Morocco in the west there has been a clear rise believe in the validity of political participation as a in support for Salafi movements of various types, path toward peaceful integration . They respect the including traditional, jihadist, and political . rules of the political game and have decided to act within the constitutional framework of their states . The traditional Salafi movement believes in a strict, The Moroccan Justice and Development Party conservative reading of religious texts and does (PJD) goes further by having a somewhat progres- not tolerate any process of religious renewal . Salafi sive religious and political agenda . All these Islamist religious rhetoric has become more widespread movements believe in pluralism, civic engagement, in recent years, as it is increasingly disseminated and the rule of law . However, it should be noted throughout society, particularly through the Arab that they differ amongst themselves in the degree media . Similarly, social and educational activi- to which they accept democratic values, depending ties take place within associations that are tied to on the degree of political contestation permitted in groups, specifically charity organizations, affiliated their countries . For example, Egypt’s legal ban on with the Salafi movement . As such, Salafi discourse the Muslim Brotherhood, in effect since 1954, has currently dominates much of the social and public hampered the group’s ability to develop a progres- spheres in the Arab world . sive platform that accepts robust democratic values, such as full freedom and equality, as the political Major differences in rhetoric and strategy have platform of the PJD in Morocco does . emerged between Salafi movements and moderate Islamists . While the latter believe in democracy, The level of moderation of Islamist groups is strong- the Salafists consider it a human invention (bida’a) ly associated with the political, cultural, and reli- which contradicts Islamic law (Shari’a) . Therefore, gious climates in which they exist . The more open they do not believe that women have the same rights the climate, the more flexible the Islamists become, as men or that religious minorities have the same and the more willing they are to accept democratic rights as Muslims in Muslim-majority communi- values . Thus, while groups like the Muslim Broth- ties . Also, Salafi discourse offers a culturally narrow erhood in Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait, participate message, viewing the world through dichotomies of peacefully in politics, other movements in relatively “the faithful and the infidel” and “good and evil,” more open political climates also hold a more pro- thereby building barriers between Salafists and the gressive and democratic political platform, as is the rest of society . case in Morocco, Turkey, and Indonesia . These ex- amples indicate that the extent to which Islamist While many see the Salafi framework as having groups moderate is tied to the degree to which the negative implications for non-Muslims, the frame- regimes respect democratic values and allow politi- work also has a strong, and often negative, impact cal groups and parties, including liberals, leftists, on the Salafists themselves . It encourages political and Islamists, to participate in politics . apathy and provides a metaphysical interpretation of the economic and social hardships under which The Salafi Catalyst a majority of Arabs suffer . Salafi rhetoric is devoted to engaging people in meeting the needs of the af- However imperfect moderate Islamist groups may terlife, instead of being invested in daily issues and seem to the West, they are preferable to a new player problems . Thus, believers develop a mentality in on the scene—with decidedly hard-line views toward which they consider their problems as something
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 2 to tolerate until they pass away, rather than some- Unlike moderate Islamism, political Salafism is be- thing to solve . reft of any flexibility or desire to change the content of its political and religious message, and instead Jihadist Salafism, as a movement, has two important focuses on the application of Islamic law . Moreover, elements: a belief in the immutable, uncompromis- like other Salafists, political Salafists view the West, ing nature of Islam and a mobile organization that and particularly the United States, as a dangerous seeks to use violence to advance its agenda . Because enemy, rather than potential partner . Because they Arab regimes have suppressed moderate Islamist believe that the United States is a threat to Muslim groups, many young people have channeled their identity, they feel they must confront it . interests into joining Salafi alternatives . Jihadist Salafi groups, such as al-Qa’ida, maintain an ide- Since Salafists compete with moderate Islamists for ology of “believer versus infidel” and use violence public support, they have been developing strate- against local and international actors . While u .S . gies for attracting new audiences in order to exercise military campaigns against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan hegemony over the Arab street . Instead of using tra- and Iraq, as well as domestic security campaigns ditional means of gaining support, such as prosely- across the Arab world, may reduce the number of tizing at mosques or homes, they take advantage of these groups, the circumstances that produce these the tools of modern technology, which allow them, groups remain . Therefore, the difficult social and especially younger members, to connect with po- economic conditions in Arab countries constitute tential recruits electronically through chat rooms, incubators for reviving Jihadist Salafi trends . blogs, and Facebook . However, perhaps ironically, despite the innovative approach to spreading their The last—and most insidious—of the Salafi message, they refuse to innovate when it comes to groups are the political Salafists, who constitute a the content of their ideas . They believe the time for new movement growing in strength in the Arab the “Salafi era” has come, and that they must use world . Political Salafism is a combination of two all the tools available to them to influence Arab so- components: an ultra-conservative understanding cieties . Given the frustration dominating the Arab of Islamic texts and a rigid political ideology that street, Salafi groups have grown increasingly confi- followers believe should be imposed on society . dent of their impending success .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 3 Exclusionary Policies: Who Stopped the “Tsunami”?
etween 2004 and 2005, many Arab countries taking a different course . We are supporting the Bexperienced what Mona Yacoubian refers to democratic aspirations of all people ”. 3 She called as an “Islamist Tsunami”—a rise of moderate Is- for free and fair elections in Egypt, and the Mus- lamists in the civil and political arenas .2 While lim Brotherhood benefited from the pressure, par- initially heartened by the “Arab spring,” u .S . poli- ticipating (as independents) in the parliamentary cymakers soon soured and began reconsidering the elections held at the end of 2005, and winning an Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda ”. At the unprecedented twenty percent of seats . Less than same time, the “Tsunami” ended, and in a num- two months later, Hamas emerged victorious in the ber of countries, particularly Jordan, Egypt, Ye- January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, much men, Kuwait, Algeria, and Morocco, the influence to Washington’s surprise and disappointment . This of moderate Islamists began to recede . Three main was a turning point in the American effort to spread factors lay behind the decline of moderate Islamists: democracy in the region . Because the Bush admin- the United States’ backtracking on its support of istration did not appear to respect the outcome of Arab democracy; the harsh suppression that Arab the Palestinian elections, moderate Islamists began regimes employed against the Islamist opposition; to question the level of tangible American support and the growing influence of Salafists . for political reform in their countries .
The Bush administration’s policies during 2004 and The second factor in the decline of moderate Is- 2005, which pushed for political change in Arab lamists has been the harsh techniques Arab regimes societies, increased moderate Islamists’ optimism in have used to suppress them . The regimes have ben- the possibility of becoming full participants in the efited from both the United States’ silence in the political process after being excluded for decades . face of the regimes’ efforts to restrict and repress In June 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the opposition, and its overall reluctance to change made the administration’s commitment to democ- the authoritarian landscape of the region . The Mus- racy promotion clear when she said, “For sixty years, lim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, has faced a my country, the United States, pursued stability at difficult environment after its sudden ascent in the the expense of democracy in this region here in the 2005 elections . The regime feared that the Broth- Middle East, and we achieved neither . Now we are erhood would become the inevitable alternative to
2 Mona Yacoubian, “Democracy and Islamist Parties: The Arab Experience,” Aspen Institute, June 2006 . 3 Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, June 20, 2005 .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 4 the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) . As a regime prevent opposition candidates, mainly from result, it has made full use of legal and illegal means the Brotherhood, from running . to pressure the group . The regime’s reaction to the Brotherhood was part of a plan to stifle all forms While the suppression of the Egyptian Brother- of political opposition that emerged in 2004 and hood was justified because it is considered an illegal 2005, and correct the state of imbalance exposed group, the Brotherhood in Jordan has faced obsta- by its weak electoral performance . The Egyptian cles despite the fact that it enjoys state legitimacy authorities applied a comprehensive strategy of and has a legal political party, the Islamic Action punishing the Muslim Brotherhood, through eco- Front (IAF) . The Jordanian regime has retained the nomic, political, and even constitutional means . “one-person, one-vote” law, enacted in 1993, that Specifically, the regime attempted to stop the so- many consider unfair because it weakens large po- cial and religious activities of the Brotherhood by litical parties through a single non-transferable vote arresting dozens of Brotherhood leaders in various system (SNTV) 6. The law also enabled widespread Egyptian governorates . The authoritarian pressure gerrymandering, which the government used to its hit its peak in February 2007, when forty Brother- advantage against the Iaf . As a result, the party suf- hood leaders were sent to military court . In April fered a loss of six seats in the 1993 elections and, 2008, twenty five were sentenced to prison, with coupled with unprecedented government interfer- terms ranging from three to ten years 4. More re- ence, won only six seats, the IAF’s lowest total ever, cently, the regime has moved against the senior in the November 2007 elections, down from sev- leadership of the Brotherhood, targeting moderates enteen held since 2003 7. The Brotherhood has also and reformists, most notably two members of the faced challenges outside the political arena . The Guidance Bureau, Abdel Monem Abu el-Futouh regime has targeted the social and philanthropic and Osama Nasr 5. The government charged and activities of the group by dissolving the board of di- imprisoned them after they attempted to collect rectors of the Islamic Center Society (ICS), a Broth- money for Palestinians without legal permission . erhood affiliate that runs hospitals, clinics, schools, and a wide array of other social institutions . All this The regime has hampered the Brotherhood’s po- has reduced the influence of the Muslim Brother- litical future by amending thirty-four clauses of hood within Jordanian society . the Egyptian Constitution . The most important of these is Article 5, which prohibits any political In Morocco, both security and political restrictions activity on religious grounds or with a religious ref- have hampered Islamists . The Justice and Devel- erence (marji’iyya) . This is ironic given that Article opment Party failed to increase substantially its 2 of the Constitution states that the principles of share of seats in the September 2007 parliamentary Islamic law are the primary source of legislation . elections, contrary to the expectations of surveys Similarly, the modification of Article 88 under- conducted by the International Republican Insti- mines the ability of the judiciary to monitor par- tute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute liamentary elections, and will therefore help the (NDI) . The PJD won just forty-six seats out of a
4 Among those arrested were Khairat el-Shatir, the Brotherhood’s deputy, and Hassan Malik, a businessman in the Brotherhood, who both received a sentence of seven years, and Mohammed Ali Bishr, a Guidance Bureau member, who received a sentence of three years . 5 The Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood is the highest executive office in the movement . It consists of sixteen members who are elected through the Shura Council of the movement . 6 Previously, voters could cast a number of votes corresponding with the number of seats in their district . 7 Several months before the 2007 parliamentary elections, the IAF withdrew from municipal elections, claiming the government was allowing military personnel to vote repeatedly in the elections .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 5 total of 325, adding only four seats to what it had Islamic Constitution Movement (Hadas), winning garnered five years earlier in the 2002 elections . seventeen out of fifty seats and becoming the larg- est bloc in the Kuwaiti National Assembly . Hadas, The PJD suffered heavily from a security campaign whose roots lie in the Kuwaiti branch of the Mus- waged against Islamists of all stripes after the ter- lim Brotherhood, had entered the election with six rorist attacks that shook Casablanca in May 2003 .8 seats, then the largest parliamentary bloc, but saw its Moreover, the PJD, as well other large parties, was numbers cut in half after the balloting . The Salafists hampered by the kingdom’s complex electoral sys- benefited from new electoral legislation—which, tem that effectively prevents any single party from ironically, Hadas had helped design—that divided securing an absolute majority . As Michael McFaul the country into five electoral districts (down from and Tamara Cofman Wittes explain, “The seat al- twenty five) . In addition, the Salafists capitalized on locations are made through a complicated ‘remain- an ineffectiveH adas political machine, tribal allianc- der system’ run by local magistrates who determine es in several districts, and allegations of corruption the ‘threshold number’ needed to win a seat in a against incumbent Hadas members 10. Following the particular district . After the top vote-getting par- election, the first demand the Salafi representatives ties have been allocated one seat each, the threshold made was to apply Shari’a through a committee to number is subtracted from their vote totals, and the monitor “unethical” behaviors, and they insisted on rest of the seats are allocated to parties according to creating a moral police similar to the one in Saudi their remaining vote totals, in descending order ”. 9 Arabia 11. Under this system, there is little chance for a party to win more than one seat in a given district, even In Yemen, political Salafists have sought to create under the best scenario . (This, in addition to the a political party to compete with the main oppo- practice of vote-buying and the inability of the Is- sition movement, the moderate Islamist Yemeni lamist and secular opposition to form an electoral Congregation for Reform (Islah) party, for the coalition, explains the low voter turnout of under parliamentary elections scheduled to take place in thirty-seven percent .) 2011 . Two of the largest Salafi associations—the Virtue and the Wisdom—have joined forces as one The third and final factor in the decline of moder- political movement and are working to establish a ate Islamists is the growing challenge of Salafism, political party to be headed by Shaykh Abdul Majid which threatens to siphon supporters from the al-Zindani, President of Al Iman University, whom Brotherhood and other mainstream groups . The Washington has placed on its Specially Designated most prominent example of this took place in Ku- Global Terrorist list .12 In addition, Yemeni conser- wait’s 2008 parliamentary elections, where Salafi vative leaders created the so-called Vice and Virtue candidates achieved an unexpected victory over the Committee in order to impose religious supervision
8 On May 16, 2003, five coordinated explosions, detonated by a group of suicide bombers, went off within thirty minutes of each other in Casablanca, killing over forty people . See Keith B . Richburg, “Moroccans Lose Sense of Security; Death Toll Rises to 41 in Five Suicide Blasts,” Washington Post, May 18, 2003 . 9 Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “The Limits of Limited Reforms,” Journal of Democracy 19, no . 1 (2008), pp . 19-33 . 10 For a detailed analysis of Kuwait’s 2008 parliamentary elections, see Nathan J . Brown, “A Setback for Democratic Islamism?” Kuwait Times, May 30, 2008 . 11 Jassim al-Qams, Bashar al-Sayegh, Eid al-Rmizan, and Fayez al-Twalah, Aljarida (Kuwait; in Arabic), June 5, 2008, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 6 on society .13 TheY emeni regime is looking to attract Mahmoud Ezzat, deputy general guide of the Broth- Salafis to counter-balance the moderate Islamist op- erhood, Mohamed Morsi, the head of the Political position movement . Bureau, and Mahmoud Hussein, secretary-general of the Brotherhood—all conservatives—grew at the The Industry of Extremism expense of reformists, such as Abu el-Futouh, Esam al Erian, a member of the political committee, and The exclusion of moderate Islamists from the po- Gamal Heshmat, Ibrahim al-Zafarani, and Khaled litical process is the goal of the Arab authoritar- Hamza . In 2007-8, the regime arrested and then ian regimes . The relevant question for u .S . poli- tried in military court a number of the Brother- cymakers is: What is the result of this exclusion? hood’s first-line leaders . Adding insult to injury, the Of greatest significance to theU nited States is that court handed down harsh sentences against a num- the rank-and-file of moderate Islamist groups may ber of Brotherhood pragmatists, such as Khairat el- grow increasingly frustrated over their exclusion Shater, the group’s third-in-command, and Ayman from the political process and radicalize as a re- Abdul Ghani, the manager of student activities . In sult . The historical experience in the Arab world addition to further alienating Muslim Brotherhood has shown that despotism produces extremism, members, these measures removed the most mod- and exclusion pushes some down the path of ex- ernizing and progressive voices within the group’s tremism . Ultimately, political repression convinces organizational structure . Not surprisingly, when moderate Islamists that political participation is the Brotherhood held internal elections recently, it useless . In addition, because the price of participa- chose conservatives, who lacked any reformist cre- tion is high—intimidation, arrests, and prosecu- dentials or broad progressive agendas, to fill all six- tions— some conclude it is simply not worth the teen seats of the Guidance Bureau . risk . The impact of the regime’s actions can be seen in the In Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, the regime January 2010 internal Muslim Brotherhood elec- of President Gamal Abdel Nasser imprisoned, tor- tions . The Brotherhood elected a newG eneral Guide, tured, and executed Muslim Brotherhood leaders, Mohammed Badie, who hails from the conservative putting into motion a process of radicalization faction of the organization . To many observers, the which led young Islamists to leave the Brotherhood election capped the long struggle between conser- to look for violent alternatives . In the past few years, vatives and reformists within the Brotherhood, and the Mubarak regime has continued the policies of Badie’s victory signified that conservatives had suc- Nasser, launching a sustained crackdown against ceeded in taking control of the group (not surpris- Islamists . Hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood mem- ingly, many reformers questioned the fairness and bers have been arrested without clear charges . The transparency of the vote) . With the conservative regime has shut down Muslim Brotherhood-affiliat- faction victorious, observers believe the movement ed businesses in an attempt to cripple the organiza- will no longer devote energy to participating in tion financially . politics but will rather focus on religious and edu- cational activities . It is likely that political activity The regime’s strategy of repressing the Brotherhood will be devoted to defining the group’s position on undermined the influence of reformists and tilted social issues in a regressive manner; specifically, the the scale in favor of conservatives . The influence of group is unlikely to adopt a position that calls for
13 Jalal Sharabi, “Yemen establishes the Virtue Committee,” Al Arabiya (in Arabic), July 15, 2008, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 7 equality among Egyptian regardless of religion or Morocco also witnessed frustration on the part of gender . Ultimately, the exclusion of reformists with- moderates . After the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary in the Brotherhood will disappoint and frustrate elections, Abdelilah Benkirane, secretary general of younger members of the group, and may ultimately the Justice and Development Party, said in an inter- lead to their defection 14. view with the IslamOnline website that he saw no advantage in political participation and that it was Similarly, in Jordan, hardliners in the Islamic Ac- necessary to withdraw party members from parlia- tion Front effectively staged a coup within the par- ment to protest the state’s lack of respect for democ- ty, grabbing the reins of leadership from moderates racy 15. after suffering historic losses in the 2007 parliamen- tary elections, for which the party’s reformist wing In Algeria, the results of excluding moderate Is- was held responsible . The conservatives, led by Zaki lamists were more deadly . The Islamic Salvation Bani Irsheid, the Secretary General of the IAF and Front (FIS), a legal, nonviolent party, made signifi- close associate of Hamas, seized the opportunity cant gains in the municipal and legislative elections to control the party by insisting that pragmatists of 1990 and 1991, but was forcefully repressed by like Ruheil Gharaibeh, Abdul Latif Arabiyat, and the leadership of the National Liberation Front Jamil Abu Bakr bore responsibility for the electoral (FLN), which led to the beginning of a bloody civil loss . They disbanded the group’s Shura Council and war . As a result, the FIS disintegrated and some asked the council members to tender their resigna- young members took arms against the regime under tions . New elections took place wherein the con- the name of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which servatives won a majority of the fifty seats in the transformed into the Salafist Group for Preaching council . and Combat (GSPC) that joined al-Qa’ida, calling themselves “al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb ”. 16 In 2008, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also The exclusion of the FIS from the political scene in elected a new chairman, Hammam Saeed, a hard- the early 1990s started an escalating cycle of vio- liner with staunch conservative views, compared to lence that continues to this day . his predecessor, Salem Falahat, who lost by one vote in the group’s internal elections . Thus the impor- Depoliticizing Arab Societies tant question is why the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were split between the conservative What the above cases have in common is that the Hammam Saeed and the reformist Salem Falahat, ultimate victims of the regime’s harsh measures are and ultimately elected the former? One answer is the moderates . Arab regimes have made political that many Brotherhood members felt an acute sense participation very costly, and Islamists are paying a of injustice on account of intensifying state repres- high price for taking part in the political process . By sion against the group . Their choice should be un- placing restrictions on entry into the political arena derstood as a turn toward the “hawkish” strategy of and by suppressing moderates, the government may confronting the regime, and away from the “dov- cause many Arab youth to think seriously about join- ish” strategy of political participation . ing Salafi movements instead . It is well known that
14 AbdelRahman AyYash, “National and State Inceptions of the Islamic Movement,” Al-Ghareeb (in Arabic), posted January 31, 2010, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 8 the traditional Salafists ban political participation, and Jordan have sought to use the Salafi movement and yet agitate for change in public matters . This to attack those Islamists who participate in politics . more dogmatic approach may suit well the younger Currently, the Mubarak regime is giving space to generation that is politically disaffected, but still has Salafists to exert control over the religious and so- strong feelings about the issues affecting their com- cial scene; however, this tactic of strengthening Sal- munities . fists to weaken the Muslim Brotherhood is clearly fraught with risk over the long term . In some ways, this entire process is a vicious cycle in which the people of the Arab world (and Ameri- Ultimately, the democratization process itself is an- can interests) suffer, while the authoritarian regimes other victim of the exclusionary practices of Arab and the Salafists benefit . Since most Salafi move- regimes, which prevent any opportunity for alter- ments do not participate in the electoral process, native political voices to mature . Moreover, the they do not pose a threat to the regimes—at least insistence on exclusion may lead to a reduction in in the short term—as moderate Islamists would . tolerance within society and an increase in social, Therefore, authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Yemen, sectarian, and religious tensions .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 9 Myths Used to Justify Excluding Moderate Islamists
s the American expression goes, “Don’t judge Islamists . A large sector of politicians and academics Aa book by its cover ”. However, there are some also share a set of prejudices that must be shed in American politicians and observers who judge move- order to develop a more accurate view of the Islamist ments of moderate Islamists by the cover of their more spectrum . The following are the major myths preva- hard-line counterparts . In reality, there remains no lent in Western discourse . convincing or adequate reason for American policy to support the removal of moderate Islamists from the The Myth of “One-Man, One-Vote, political arena . While some American officials argue One-Time” that there are risks in the inclusion of moderate Is- lamists, the results of excluding them, in fact, are more Many Western observers fear that once Islamists gain costly for the United States . Unfortunately, Washing- power they will never relinquish it . They believe that ton has turned away from democracy promotion in the victorious Islamists will change the rules of the the Middle East since 2006, and is playing a part in game to remain in power and will impose Shari’a excluding moderate Islamists from the political scene . law, thereby putting an end to democracy . This argu- ment is largely based on three historical cases: Iran Historically, the incorporation of moderate Is- in 1979, Sudan in 1989, and Afghanistan under lamists in the political arena has typically led to the rule of the Taliban during the second half of the their further moderation . For example, the cases of 1990s . The fact that shatters the argument is that in Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, and Kuwait, discussed all of the above cases, Islamists did not gain power below, all demonstrate this . But the flip side is also through democratic means . In Iran, the mullahs relevant—excluding moderate Islamists comes at gained power through the Iranian Revolution . In Su- a cost . In the clearest example of this, the blood- dan, military generals under the leadership of Omar shed that took place in Algeria during the 1990s, as al-Bashir, the current president, in cooperation with mentioned earlier, was in reaction to the suppres- Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic sion and exclusion of moderate Islamists from the Front, staged a military coup to form an Islamist political arena . Therefore the question is not only government . In Afghanistan, the Taliban gained whether inclusion leads to moderation, but also control through a civil war and announced the cre- what exclusion ultimately leads to . ation of an Islamic emirate in 1996 . The resulting extremism in each country is not surprising . Accord- There are many American misconceptions regard- ing to Graham Fuller, “Accession to power through ing the differences between moderate and hard-line force, by any group or party, invariably creates an
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 10 authoritarian structure and legacy of violence that appeared to contribute to the moderation of the impedes evolution toward moderation and rule of Justice and Development Party in its rhetoric and law ”. 17 policies . The party has remained committed to re- specting and adhering to the democratic rules of Similarly, the secular regimes in the Arab world the system, and undertaking democratic governance that gained power over the last half century, either within the organization itself . through military coup or fraudulent elections, have changed the rules of the game to remain in power In Algeria, the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Move- until death or inheritance, as in the cases of Egypt, ment of Society for Peace (MSP) has gone so far as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, and Syria . Thus, the to participate in governing coalitions . The party “one-man, one-vote, one-time” hypothesis has not gained close to fifteen percent of the vote in the been tested in any democratic setting, but rather 1997 parliamentary elections—becoming the sec- under despotic or revolutionary conditions . It ond largest party in parliament—and joined the should therefore not be generalized when engaging governing coalition . In the 2002 and 2007 parlia- with the issue of Islamists . On the flip side, there mentary elections, it received seven percent and are cases of moderate Islamists ceding power, such nine percent of the vote, respectively, but remained as in Jordan when the Muslim Brotherhood dis- committed to being a coalition partner and support- solved its executive office in reaction to the move- er of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (rather than ment’s poor performance in the November 2007 looking to advance its own presidential candidate) . parliamentary elections . This reflects the party’s ability to mold its ideology and accept governing partnerships with an ostensi- The Myth of Inclusion and Exclusion bly secular regime .
Some Western analysts believe that integrating Is- In Yemen, moderate Islamists shared power and lamists into the political arena will not cause them led parliament in 1993 under Shaykh Abdullah al- to become more moderate or to accept more vig- Ahmar, the head of the Islah Party and Speaker of orously the rules and values of democracy . Steven parliament . The party played an important role in Cook, for example, has claimed that it is dangerous preserving Yemeni unity in 1994 after some move- to assume Islamist moderates would become more ments threatened to rebel and secede . Thus, the moderate if they came to power .18 However, in ex- Islamist party not only proved its compliance with amining various Arab experiences, the error of this political norms but played an important role in fur- concern is evident . Historical examples have dem- thering the stability of the country . In Jordan, the onstrated that moderate Islamists who are integrat- Islamic Action Front has been the largest parliamen- ed in the political system deepen their moderation tary bloc for several sessions, in addition to holding and develop a pragmatic political vision . five ministerial portfolios in the Jordanian cabinet in 1991 . Moreover, in 1994 the Brotherhood did In Morocco, after King Mohammed VI came to not reject the peace agreement between Jordan and power in 1999, the government implemented Israel because there was a positive relationship be- a gradual process of political liberalization that tween the Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime,
17 Graham e . Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p . 97 . 18 Steven a . Cook, “The Myth of Moderate Islam,” Foreign Policy Web Exclusive, June 2008, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 11 proving that moderate Islamists can employ prag- This argument, however, is not supported by the matism and political realism 19. available evidence . During the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt and Algeria, respectively, experienced tre- In each of these cases the Islamists did not seek pow- mendous internal turmoil—outright civil war in er through coups or conflict . Rather, they showed Algeria’s case—because they were determined to considerable responsibility toward their constituen- exclude moderate Islamists . In addition, the attacks cies and respected the rules of the game . Problems of 9/11 demonstrated that American support for only began to emerge when authoritarian regimes Arab authoritarian regimes had fueled widespread sought to exclude them from the political arena . anti-Americanism and pushed many Muslim youth to side with Osama bin Laden . For instance, Mo- The most important benefit of incorporating mod- hamed Atta, the ringleader of the attackers, was erate Islamists into the political process is that it born and raised in Egypt, but was not the product spurs internal discourse within the movements, of any Islamist political party, or even a mainstream which in turn serves to strengthen reformists and movement like the Muslim Brotherhood . Instead, weaken conservative and hard-line elements . For Atta joined al-Qa’ida . example, in August 2007, the reformists in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were given impor- Therefore, Islamist participation in politics does not tant powers to design a political party platform seem to cause instability in the Arab world . Rather, for the first time in the group’s eighty-year history . a key reason for unrest in the Middle East is failed Although the platform advances some regressive economic policies . In a number of countries, such as ideas, particularly toward women and Christians Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, poor (like rejecting their right to run for the presidency), social and economic conditions—including high the movement had the courage to formally declare rates of corruption and rising unemployment— its political vision in public . However, after the re- have provoked collective grumbling and discontent, gime used security fears to exert more pressure on and in some cases, riots, as was the case in Egypt in the group, the power of reformists diminished and 2007 and 2008 . The demographic factor—a surge conservatives regained the upper hand . in the percentage of young people in countries like Egypt—has exacerbated the economic situation . The The Myth of Stability Instead of instability and radicalism that emerges as a result, Democracy therefore, is not the product of Islamist groups, but rather the failed policies of the regime . Some u .S . policymakers and scholars have argued that stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved In addition, political violence and instability exist without supporting authoritarian regimes . This because of separatist and rebel movements in some framework dictates that political alternatives to nations, such as Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Alge- the existing regimes should be restricted as they ria . Such movements survive and thrive mainly as a may cause instability . Accordingly, even moderate result of internal discord, including economic, so- Islamists, who vie for political representation, are cial, and demographic problems, as well as religious considered a threat to stability and American inter- and ethnic tensions . This, and the economic situa- ests in the region . tion described above in countries like Egypt, suggests
19 The Brotherhood did oppose the peace treaty with Israel, but did so within political parameters . See Mohammad Suliman Abu Rumman, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing “Political Setback” or Diminished Popularity? (Amman: Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung, 2007), p . 24, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 12 that if stability exists at present, it is deceptive and Instead, the party took second place after the Inde- fragile and may explode at any moment . pendence Party, a secular, leftist party .
The Myth of Promoting Democracy In Egypt, the parliamentary elections of 2005 saw versus Empowering Islamists voters cast ballots in favor of independent candi- dates not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Many American observers and officials believe that rather than for liberals or Islamists . Neither the supporting democracy in the Middle East will di- ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) nor the rectly empower Islamists . This may appear true, Muslim Brotherhood won the majority of seats in but only by default . Authoritarianism in the Arab parliament as independents won approximately world has squelched any opportunity for the cre- forty percent of seats (many of them later joined ation of liberal or secular parties or movements to the NDP) .20 Similarly, in Jordan, the November compete with Islamists . The Islamists are attractive 2007 elections saw only six of the Islamic Action for many because they are the only option, apart Front’s twenty-two candidates win seats . In Kuwait’s from corrupt and despotic ruling parties . 2008 and 2009 elections for the National Assem- bly, Hadas gained only three seats and one seat, re- Accordingly, some might argue that moderate Is- spectively . Even though the Islamists’ had improved lamists would take power in any free and fair elec- their organizational abilities and voter mobilization tion . However, it is likely that a gradual and contin- techniques, they failed to garner a majority . In short, ued liberalization of the political sphere would not while state restrictions, especially those instituted in play in favor of Islamist parties, as several examples Morocco and Jordan described earlier, affected the illustrate . The Justice and Development Party in ability of Islamist groups to compete fairly in elec- Morocco did not win a majority of seats in the tions and were a major reason for the groups’ poor September 2007 parliamentary elections, despite showing at the ballot box, shifting voter preferences the expectations of American organizations, which also played a role . conducted surveys of the Moroccan electorate .
20 The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), “Evaluation of the Electoral System in Egypt,” May 14, 2007, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 13 The Role of the United States
he American retreat since 2006 from the Bush support workers who were protesting in the in- Tadministration’s “Freedom Agenda” has signi- dustrial city of El-Mahalla El-Kubra . This move- fied thatA merican foreign policy toward the Middle ment would not have started, or succeeded, had East has shifted, and democracy is no longer consid- Egyptians not courageously challenged the regime . ered integral to American strategic interests, as op- Their courage was born, in part, of u .S . policies . posed to other traditional interests such as the war on terrorism, maintaining regional stability, guaran- The ultimate problem withu .S . policy towards the teeing Israel’s security, and securing sources of oil . Middle East is the confusion between short- and This has tarnished the image of the United States long-term interests . Because of this, policymakers and damaged its credibility in the Arab world . question whether or not u .S . policy should un- equivocally support democracy, when they should TheO bama administration has repeatedly indicated instead be concentrating on how such support it will not deal with democracy in the Middle East could be implemented . The major shortfall of the in the same manner as its predecessor . It does not Bush administration in its efforts to promote de- view democracy promotion as part of its broader mocracy was not the goal, but the path it followed strategy toward the region, evidenced by the fact to achieve it . Many activists in the Arab world that President Obama, in his June 4, 2009 speech hoped the Obama administration would revise the in Cairo, showed only limited interest in democracy Bush strategy for spreading democracy by defining promotion . TheO bama administration has failed to the policy as a long-term strategic goal, but this has acknowledge the fact that the Arab people are inter- not happened . ested in changing their political situation and fight- ing for their freedom . While the Bush agenda for One specific aspect ofA merican democracy promo- democracy promotion had its flaws, it gave many tion in the Arab world that Washington should re- young Arabs cover to take a stand in confronting consider is its unwillingness to engage with Islamist corrupt and failed dictators . For example, Egypt groups . The important question here is: Does the witnessed widespread social and economic unrest United States need to make contact with moderate during 2007 and 2008, and young people played Islamists in order to support democracy in the Arab a vital role in mobilizing the populace against world? The answer is a resounding “yes ”. the government . The April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt took hold as young people used new tech- Religion is not merely an ideology for Arabs and nology (Facebook, blogs, instant messaging) to Muslims; instead it is a genuine identity . In an
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 14 opinion poll conducted by Gallup, ninety-six to How Should the United States Deal ninety-seven percent of those surveyed in Egypt with Moderate Islamists? responded that they associate Shari’a with protect- ing human rights, promoting a fair judicial system, The irony in President Obama’s preference for dia- and providing justice for women . In addition, logue is that amidst talk of engaging former foes, ninety-four percent associated it with the promo- one group seems to have been left out— moderate tion of economic justice .21 Indeed, a significant Islamists . President Obama thus far seems uninter- percentage of Arab societies look to religion as the ested in opening channels of dialogue with Islamist basis for reforming economic and social condi- moderates, be they legally organized as in the case of tions . Arguably, this strong association with reli- the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the Justice and gion in the Arab world is a reason secular parties Development Party in Morocco, and the Movement have had difficulty garnering supporters over the for the Society of Peace in Algeria, or banned, as past half century . The strong association with Is- with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, lam also means that the religious and social capital and the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia . Irony aside, Islamists hold can be easily converted into political there are fundamental problems with this policy . capital . Accordingly, the issue is not whether reli- Moderate Islamists have a wider appeal across the gion should have a place in the political arena, but Arab and Islamic world than extremists, and are well how interested parties can best assist Arab societies positioned to challenge Islamic radicalism . Yet, they in understanding how religion can, in fact, facili- are being left out of the equation . The following are tate a progressive and democratic society . The best strategies for the United States to deal with moder- way to do this is to actively promote political and ate Islamists: cultural openness, which can help curb the creep- ing growth of Salafism . • Rethink the Basic Understanding of Moder- ate Islamists. A great deal of misunderstand- Indeed, engagement with moderate Islamists holds ing and mistrust persists between moderate benefits for the United States, especially regard- Islamists and u S. . policymakers . Both parties ing its interest in preventing the spread of Salaf- bear some responsibility stemming from ideo- ism . With political Salafism on the rise in the Arab logical and political blind spots . Some Islamists world, the United States can counter this trend see the United States as an imperialist power through engagement with moderate Islamists . Pro- because of its war in Iraq and unlimited sup- moting political openness and engaging Islamism port for Israel . At the same time, others seri- would be critical elements in facilitating alternatives ously doubt whether the United States will ever to Salafism that are more palatable to Washington . put pressure on Arab regimes to permit their Other benefits exist in reaching out to moderate integration into the political process . Thus, Islamists . Because moderate Islamists are a signifi- moderate Islamists themselves have a role to cant portion of Arab societies, the United States play in remedying the mistrust and misunder- can restore its image and regain credibility in the standing . It is up to them to rid themselves of region by opening channels of communication and their rigid dislike of the United States and deal dialogue with them (in addition to correcting mis- with it cognizant of its status as a world power takes in Iraq and having a balanced relationship which pursues its own interests . Moreover, they with Israel) . must make serious revisions to their political
21 Magali Rheault and Dalia Mogahed, “Many Turks, Iranians, Egyptians Link Sharia and Justice,” Gallup, July 25, 2008, available at
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 15 and religious discourse to become more demo- national security is destined to fail since it will cratic and supportive of tolerance, pluralism, only reinforce Arab perceptions of American and equality for all citizens . hypocrisy; Arabs have the right to political freedom and democracy like the rest of the free For its part, the United States has doubts world, regardless of any single nation’s security about the behavior of some of the Islamist concerns . In addition, this perspective con- groups in question due to their vague posi- strains efforts to spread democracy, subsuming tions on democratic values, as well as their it under a set of overriding interests, and, ac- positions on Israel and their support for resis- cordingly, reduces the chances for rapproche- tance movements such as Hamas and Hizbal- ment between the moderate Islamists and the lah . Despite this, the first step for the United United States . States is to reassess past approaches and be- gin to see moderate Islamists not as a threat Even while acknowledging links between de- but as a possible partner . In order to do this, mocracy and national security, it is in the inter- the United States needs to develop an under- est of the United States to encourage the inte- standing of how moderate Islamists think, gration of moderate Islamists into the political and what their expectations are of the United arena because it reflectsu .S . ideals . The added States . Four important points merit attention benefit is that Islamists play an important role here . First, Washington must understand the in curbing extremism and terrorism within the differences between the various types ofIs- Arab world as well as beyond it . Moderate Is- lamist groups, distinguishing between radicals lamists are the preferred option in light of the and hardliners on one side, and moderates on rise of a new political Salafism that supports the other . Second, the United States should political activity from a narrow-minded reli- recognize that many moderate Islamists want gious and political perspective . to engage in peaceful political participation— a process that would be helped along if the • Understand the Internal Dynamics of the United States was willing to assist their inte- Moderate Islamist Movements. It is up to the gration into secular politics . Third, theU nited United States to understand better the nature States must realize that Islamist groups are not of the internal conflicts and divisions within just religious movements, but social move- Islamist organizations, particularly ongoing ments covering a broad sector of Arab society . disputes between conservatives and reformers, Fourth, the United States must realize that the as well as the relative influence of each wing . political and religious discourse of Islamists is Arab regimes’ efforts to limit political freedoms a result of their political environment, and in their countries has produced debate as well that in order for them to become more pro- as division within the various mainstream Is- gressive, the authoritarian climate in which lamist movements . The current internal debate they operate must also change . reflects the desire of many Islamists, particularly those of a younger generation, to influence and • Do Not Treat Democracy Promotion Solely change the political and religious discourse of as a Response to Terrorism. Unfortunately, their leaders and movements . In Jordan, there the United States links the spread of democ- are divisions between the conservative and re- racy in the Arab world with the war on terror- formist wings of the Muslim Brotherhood . ism . Any American policy that communicates In Egypt, there is a significant gap within the democracy primarily as an instrument of u .S . Brotherhood pitting conservatives against
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 16 younger members who complain about and political and religious rhetoric of the conserva- challenge the leadership’s grip over the orga- tive leadership . And perhaps most important, nization . In Algeria, there is serious conflict most of them have no objection to join with within the Movement of Society for Peace other groups, such as the liberals, leftists, and between Bouguerra Soltani on the one hand nationalists, in order to work towards democ- and his deputy Abdel- Mujeed Munasara on ratization and the entrenchment of political the other . In the Moroccan Justice and De- freedoms . velopment Party there is strong disagreement between the party’s former general secretary, The United States could invest in the coming Saad al-Din Al-Othmani, and Abdelilah Ben- generation of Islamists by building trust with kirane, who replaced him, over how best to their leaders and dealing with them respectful- deal with the Moroccan government . ly . This could happen through educational ex- change programs and strengthening people-to- • Capitalize on the New Generation of Mod- people communications . Second, the United erate Islamists. The new generation of mod- States should support their right to integrate erate Islamists represents a promising future . into secular politics . When Obama took of- The United States should invest in building fice in January 2009, many young moderates strong relationships with this younger genera- hoped that he would open a new chapter with tion who will become the future leadership of their movements and support their right to be- their movements . This generation’s activists dif- come full political participants in public life . fer from their predecessors in their more prag- Not surprisingly, then, some expressed a desire matic orientation; their ideological openness to to engage with the United States and interact liberal democratic values, such as freedom, plu- with it as a friend, not as a foe 22. ralism, equality, accountability, and transpar- ency; and willingness to engage with the West . In addition, the United States should organize This is, in part, due to their ability to access and intellectual and cultural forums, encouraging interact with modern forms of media and their young Islamists to participate in them along- willingness to consider the examples of mod- side their liberal and leftist counterparts . The erate Islamist groups in Turkey and Morocco . United States should also seek the participa- They continuously direct criticism at their tion of Islamists in student exchange programs leadership for its lack of faith in democratic val- in order to increase mutual understanding ues, as is the case with young members of the between them and young Americans, thereby Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt . Young activists helping them to more closely identify with the in the Brotherhood have put pressure on the Western democratic experience . leadership and succeeded in shaping some of its decisions, including its participation in the • Open Channels for Direct Dialogue with May 4, 2008 strike to protest rising food prices Moderate Islamists. It is impossible for the and sinking wages (the Muslim Brotherhood United States to change its position toward had declined to participate in the strikes held moderate Islamists without adopting an ag- a month earlier) . These activists often deliver gressive strategy of face-to-face engagement sharp criticism of the clogged administrative with them . While the historical mistrust system within the group and the reactionary between both parties might complicate this
22 Interviews with young Muslim Brotherhood bloggers, Egypt, January-February 2009 .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 17 kind of dialogue, there are strong reasons to with the United States, such as the Turkish move forward . If Islamist groups see that the Justice and Development Party . Obama administration is serious and wants to engage with them, they will think hard about Conclusion building a good relationship with United States . TheO bama administration should not The 9/11 attacks demonstrated how religion and miss the opportunity it has to use its credibil- politics are intertwined in the Middle East . Howev- ity and positive image to engage with moder- er, the United States has not exerted much effort to ate Islamists . Because engagement is fraught understand the real changes in the Islamist spectrum with challenges, the dialogue, at the outset, that have taken place over the past decade . It is now could take place through a third party, and time for u .S . policymakers to revisit their strategies then proceed to direct dialogue . The first track toward Islamist groups and realize that democracy of engagement could entail increasing areas promotion in the Arab world means engaging with of cooperation between American non-gov- moderate Islamists . The United States should ques- ernmental organizations and research centers tion and rethink any number of myths surrounding and reformist leaders from moderate Islamist the exclusion of moderate Islamists and then begin movements . Then, the possibility of using an to engage with them in a strategic dialogue . The intermediary to reach Islamists in the Arab Obama administration should deal with them as world could be tested by establishing contact partners rather than threats, not only to restore u .S . with Islamist leaders or some of the moder- credibility in the Arab world, but also to preserve ate Islamist parties which have good relations American strategic interests in the region .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 18 Project on Middle East Democracy and Development
his paper was produced as part of the Sa- Saban Center publications addressing Middle East Tban Center for Middle East Policy’s Project democracy and development include: on Middle East Democracy and Development Tamara Cofman Wittes and Andrew Masloski, De- (MEDD) . The project aims to forge a new consen- mocracy Promotion Under Obama: Lessons from the sus on behalf of constructive u .S . engagement for Middle East Partnership Initiative, Saban Center change in the Middle East . Middle East Memo #13, May 2009;
MEDD hosts the Patkin Visiting Fellows, experts Tamara Cofman Wittes and Richard Youngs, Eu- from the Middle East with direct experience in po- rope, the United States, and Middle Eastern Democ- litical and economic reform . racy: Repairing the Breach, Saban Center Analysis Paper, Number 18, January 2009; MEDD is built on the premise that economic, so- Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom’s Unsteady March: cial, and political reform must be discussed and ad- America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy (Wash- vanced together . By pairing political and economic ington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); analysis and bringing together u .S ., European and regional activists and analysts, MEDD helps build Steven Heydemann, Upgrading Authoritarianism in an informed understanding on workable strategies the Arab World, Saban Center Analysis Paper, Num- to support political and economic development in ber 13, October 2007; the Middle East . These insights strengthen the ef- Tamara Cofman Wittes & Andrew Masloski, Elec- forts of regional reformers as they seek to define a tions in the Arab World: Progress or Peril?, Saban Cen- more effective course for change . Donor govern- ter Middle East Memo #11, February 12, 2007; ments and others supporting reform also benefit from a better understanding of how to target their Tamara Cofman Wittes & Sarah e . Yerkes, What resources and manage complex transitions in the Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration’s Middle East . The result is more effective develop- Freedom Agenda, Saban Center Analysis Paper, ment strategies and the creation of greater space Number 10, September 2006; for moderate political voices to counter Islamist Abdel Monem Said Aly, An Ambivalent Alliance: extremism . The Future of U.S.-Egyptian Relations, Saban Cen- ter Analysis, Number 6, January 2006 .
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 19 The Saban Center for Middle East Policy
he Saban Center for Middle East Policy was to promote a better understanding of the policy Testablished on May 13, 2002 with an inaugu- choices facing American decision makers . They in- ral address by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jor- clude Bruce Riedel, a specialist on counterterrorism, dan . The creation of the Saban Center reflects the who served as a senior advisor to four presidents on Brookings Institution’s commitment to expand dra- the Middle East and South Asia at the National Se- matically its research and analysis of Middle East curity Council and during a twenty-nine year career policy issues at a time when the region has come to in the CIA; Suzanne Maloney, a former senior State Department official who focuses on Iran and eco- dominate the u .S . foreign policy agenda . nomic development; Stephen r . Grand, Fellow and Director of the Project on u .S . Relations with the The Saban Center provides Washington policymak- Islamic World; Hady Amr, Fellow and Director of ers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely the Brookings Doha Center; Shibley Telhami, who research and policy analysis from experienced and holds the Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland; knowledgeable scholars who can bring fresh per- and Daniel Byman, a Middle East terrorism expert spectives to bear on the critical problems of the from Georgetown University . The center is located Middle East . The center upholds the Brookings in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings . tradition of being open to a broad range of views . The Saban Center’s central objective is to advance The Saban Center is undertaking path breaking understanding of developments in the Middle East research in five areas: the implications of regime through policy-relevant scholarship and debate . change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building and Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domes- The center’s foundation was made possible by a gen- tic politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; erous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of Los An- mechanisms and requirements for a two-state so- geles . Ambassador Martin S . Indyk, Vice President lution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for of Foreign Policy at Brookings was the founding the war against terrorism, including the continuing Director of the Saban Center . Kenneth M . Pollack challenge of state sponsorship of terrorism; and po- is the center’s Director . Within the Saban Center is litical and economic change in the Arab world, and a core group of Middle East experts who conduct the methods required to promote democratization . original research and develop innovative programs
The Myth of Excluding Moderate Islamists in the Arab World The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution 20 BROOKINGS 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 www.brookings.edu