World Bank Document

Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 5158

Public Disclosure Authorized PROJECT PEEFCRMANCEAUDIT REPORT

INDONESIA - AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND ECTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

AND

NATIONALFOOD CROPS EKTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND) Public Disclosure Authorized

June 25, 1984 Public Disclosure Authorized

Cperations Evaluation Departnent

Thi's document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipints only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS

AAETE - Agency for Agricultural Education, Training and Extension AARD - Agency for Agricultural Research and Development AIC - Agricultural Information Center AITC - Agricultural In-Service Training Center BAPPENAS - Badan Perancana Pembangunan National (National Planning Agency) BIMAS - Bimingan Massal (Mass Guidance Program for Self-sufficiency in Rice and Palawija Crops) BRI - Bank Rakyat Indonesia (People's Bank of Indonesia) BWUD - Badan Usaha Unit Desa (UninicorporatedVillage Unit Cooperative) CRIA - Central Research Institute for Agriculture DGFCA - Directorate-General of Food Crops Agriculture DGWRD - Directorate-General of Water Resources Development GOI - The Government of Indonesia INMAS - Intensifikasi Massal (Mass Intensification - a farm input program) IRRI - International Rice Research Institute KUD - Koperasi Unit Desa (Village Unit Cooperative) MOA - Ministry of Agriculture NAIC - National Agricultural Information Center, Ciawi PIU - Project Implementation Unit PNP - Perusahan Negara Perkebunan (State-owned Estate Enterprise) PPS - Penyuluh Pertanian Specialis (Extension Subject Matter Specialist) PPM - Penyuluh Pertanian Madia (Field Extension Supervisor) PPL - Penyuluh Pertanian Lapangan (Field Extension Worker) REC - Rural Extension Center USAID - United States Agency for International Development FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY

PROJECT PERFORMANCEAUDIT REPORT

INDONESIA - AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND) AND NATIONALFOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No.

Preface ...... i Basic Data Sheets ...... iii Highlights ...... v

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I. PROJECT SUMMARY ...... 1

A. Agricultural Research and Extension Project ...... 1 B. National Food Crops Extension Project ...... 3

II. AUDIT FINDINGS ...... 5

A. Agricultural Research ...... 5 General ...... 5 Problems and Constraints ...... 7 Main Issue ...... 9 B. Agricultural Extension ...... 12 General ...... 12 Problems and Constraints ...... 12 Yin Issue ...... 15 C. Civil Works Construction as a Common Problem ...... 16 D. Recurrent Cost Implications as a Common Issue .16 E. Research/ExteasionLinkages ...... 18 F. Sustainability of Project Benefits ...... 19

Annex I - List of Existing AARD Research Institutes and Centers .... 20

Annex II - Comments received from the Borrower ...... 21

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

A. Agricultural Research and Extension Project ...... 25 B. National Food Crops Extension Project ...... 61

Map IBRD 11429R (PPA) Map IBRD lOS11R (PPA)

Index of Map IBRD 1081IR (PPA)

[This documenthas a resticteddistribution and may beused by recipientsonly in the performance of their offWcialduties. Its contentsmay not otherwisebe disclosedwithout World Bank authorization. PROJECT PERFORNANCEAUDIT REPORT

INDONESIA - AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND) AND NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PREFACE

This is a performance audit of two projects in Indonesia. They are the first phases of larger on-going investment programs in agricultural research and extension. Loan 1179-IND, supporting the expansion and improvement of the country's agricultural research capacity and the establishment of agricultural information centers in the amount of US$21.5 million, was approved in May 1975; the Loan was closed in December 1982, and final disbursement was made in April 1983. Loan 1267-IND, supporting the improvement of agricultural extension services for food crops in the amount of US$22.0 million, was approved in May 1976; the Loan was also closed in December 1982 and fully disbursed by April 1983.

The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and Project Completion Reports (PCRs) for the Agricultural Research and Extension Project and the National Food Crops Extension Project, both dated November 15, 1983. The PCRs were prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, based on draft PCRs submitted by the Agency for Agricultural Education, Training and Extension (MAETE), the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development (AARD) and the Project Directorate in the Directorate-General of Food Crops Agriculture (DGFCA).

An OED mission visited Indonesia in November 1983. The mission held discussions with government officials, project staff and farmers. The information obtained during the mission was used to test the validity of the analyses and conclusions of the PCRs.

The audit memorandum is based on these discussions, on interviews with Bank staff associated with the projects, and on a review of the PCRs, the Appraisal Report (646a-IND) dated April 8, 1975, the President's Report (P-1620-IND) dated April 23, 1975, and the Loan Agreement of December 19, 1975 for the Agricultural Research and Extension Project; and the Appraisal Report (1105a-IND) dated May 7, 1976, the President's Report (P-1804a-IND) dated May 7, 1976, and the Loan Agreement of June 4, 1976 for the National Food Crops Extension Project. Correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files have also been consulted. - ii -

A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on February 23, 1984. Comments received from the Director of the Project Implementation Unit (Research) are in Annex II and have been taken into account in preparing the final report.

The audit finds the PCRs comprehensive and accurate with respect to the projects' principal achievements and shortcomings and has no reason to question their conclusions. The memorandum highlights implementation problems and constraints for the two projects and focusses on the issues of research performance, extension organization, and the financing of recurrent costs.

The valuable assistance provided by the Government of Indonesia is gratefully acknowledged. Special mention is to be made of the Minister of Agriculture who was the Director-General of DGFCA, the Heads of AARD and AAETE, and the Project Directors and their staff. PROJECTwuIRORNAIu Amzr w=4

IOUSZU - AQKIULTUCIL UE33IQ AID £IT0t PaJECr (LOW 1179-M)

ZASIC DAXA5S1r

r PROJCr DA

Apraial < Actua or Actual an Z of lt_m Estiate EstImntod Actual AgraiSl Eatimsat

Total Project COats (USS m1llion) 4.6 46.0 9 Loan Amut (US$ il11On) 21.5 21.5 100 Date Doard ApprovWl 05175 05/13/75 Date Iffectivenaes 06175 02/23176 300 Is Date Pbyasial Components Completed 06/81 04)83 130 7; Closagi Date 12/31/81 12/31182 115 7; Performan c - Civ l Worka (m2) /b 4B.175 48.214 100 - Agricultural Infomation Cantors (no.) 10 12 120 -Fellowbips (No.) K. Sc. 85 146 172 Ph.D. 34 28 82 Short-term 54 8S 157

C V)LAX11EDISBU UNS FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 rSO FY81 M2 1I83

AppraiSal estimte (0S8 million) 1.1 6.8 13.7 18.0 20.5 21.5 - - ActaL (USS million) - 0.1 1.0 3.9 8.5 14.7 18.0 21.5 Actua as Z of etimate 0 0.9 7 21 Al 66 84 100 Date of final disbursement April 5. 1983

USSION DATA

Date No. of 1 -days Specializations Performance Types of -ision (2lC) Peruom ln Field Repre-ented /c latfDX /d Wrnd /a Problem If

Identification 11/72 2 A Preparation 07n3 6 (IRI) A*Ex. Appraisal 03/74 4 AMEn Poatsppralsal 09/74 2 A,ZD

Supervialon I 01/76 1 9 A 2 2 *.F Supervislon 2 07/76 3 18 A,En 2 2 n Supervision 3 01/77 3 20 A ZD 2 1 K Supervislon 4 06/77 3 12 A,En 2 1 M.V Supervision 5 06/78 1 10 ED 2 1 0 Supervision 6 11/78 3 26 A,! 2 1 K Supervision 7 10/79 3 15 A,zY,F 2 1 F1N,T Supervi0io 8 04/80 2 7 A.EZ 2 1 F,II Supervision 9 02/81 2 8 A.En 2 1 F.* Supervison 10 11/82 3 15 A,f 2 1 F.M

Total 140

OTHER PROJECT DATA

2orroer Republic of indoneela Ezecetrig Agencies AAD and AAZE Fiscal Year April 1 - March 31

Nes: of Currency (abbreviation) Rupiah (R4-) Currency Exchae Rate: Appraisal Year Average U051.00 - Up. 415 Intervenin Years Average US$1.00 - 4p. 520 Completion Year Average USS1OO - Rp. 625

Follow-on Project: Mure llatioa Agricultural Research Project Lan/Credit lhber Loan 1840-DD/Credit 1014-lID Loan/Credtt AJmot US065.0 milllon Dots Board Approval 05)06/80

/a Calculated in term of moutha from the date of Board approval. 7 Inudes costructlon at Sukemndi. Sumai Ptib. Sembaa and Xembndg. 7; A - Agriculturist; Z - Econmist; F - Fnacal Analyst; Zs - Ingiar; Ixz Ixtealon Specialist. /d 1 - Problem-fre or minor problem; 2 - Mbderate problems; 3 - Major problems. 7; 1 - Impovlng: 2 -Statonary; and 3 - Deteriorating. 7i F - inancal; - Managerial; T - Tecbnical; 0 - Other. - iv -

mUUT PmPOm axrr mnWR

zn8T1A - NATIOSL MM SF8 W"IG JUCT (1AU 1267-Im) DAZIC DATABURS

Appraisal Actal or Actual - X of : t_ Eatlata ratiated Actual Appraisal Estimate

Total Project Cost. (Us$ millnt) 44.2 U1.1 201 /a loan Annt (W4 alionM) 22.0 22.0 100 Data Bard Aproerl 05/25/76 05/25/76 - Data Effectiveoes 06/14/76 06/14/76 100 Date Ebyslcal Coinposents Cn.pleted 06/61 12/82 130 /b Coming Date 06/30/12 12/31/82 100 7ii Performanc - aw or Renovated RZCD (Mo.) 645 705 109 - Staffing (No.) 11.940 12,943 108 - Felloahip and Training (lb.) Post Grad_te Abroad 6 19 - 317 In-Serwice Traaini (P11. P1, PM5) 5.230 12,831 245 Short-tea Abroad 50 89 178

CUMLATIVE DISDSEITS FT77 r78 M79 mo M3 112 FY13

Appradal estimate (US$ millLon) 1.4 6.3 12.1 17.6 21.2 22.0 - Actual (MS1 millio) 0.1 4.6 8.2 12.6 16.4 19.6 22.0 Actual as Z of atimta 7 73 66 71 77 89 100 Date of final diaburaamat AprlI 26, 19B3

SlSSION DATA

Date No. of Naoiaya Specialination Performance Typaa of Hlmion (mo/) PFrmos In Field ILepreaeted Ic Ratlng /d Trend / Probl_ /f

Identification 0/75 2 Preparatio 07/75 Appraisal 08/75 5 Poatappra-sl 02/76 3

Supervielon 1 06/76 2 12 A 1 2 Supervision 2 12/76 1 15 A I Supervislon 3 07/77 1 a A 1 Supervision 4 02/78 2 12 A,Ex 1 2 Supervislon 5 06/78 3 43 A 1 2 Supervision 6 11/78 2 10 A.E 1 1 SupervisLon 7 03/79 2 10 A,t 2 1 K,? Supervision 6 12/79 3 15 A 2 1 1 SupervLsion 9 06/80 1 6 A 2 1 K Supervimli 10 05/51 3 9 A*ZO,r 2 1 1 SuperwliIon 11 02/62 2 4 A 2 1 K Superwimmon 12 06/62 5 10 A,N 2 1 K SupervisLon 13 12/82 2 10 A 2 1 K

Total 164

02311 PlOJECT DATA

Borror Republic of Ildonesla Executlig Agency Directorate- eral of Food Crope Agriculture Fiscal Year April 1 - March 30

ame of Currency (abbrevwltion) upisah (Np.) Currency Exchage Rate: Apprisal Tear Average 0S11.00 - Rp. 415 Interveing Tears Average USSI100 - lp. 535 Completion Year Average 1551.00 - Rp. 650

Follow-on Project: Nm National Agricultural ZEtension 1I Project Credit Number Credit 996-END Credit Acoit USS42.0 million Date Board Approval 03/18/80 la Durlg isplip entatiSe the acop of the project wee expanded to cover 13 province instea of 9 am appradid . Jb Clculated in tr of mtb frow be date of Board approval. 7; A - Agrlculturist- ;! Econiat;- s 7 - Financial Alyst; En - Enginer; Hz - ztenalon Specialist; K - Kanageont Specialst. /d 1 - Problw-fres or minor problems: 2 - Moderate problsms; 3 - Major probles. 7; 1 - Improvina; 2 - Statioear. sod 3 - Deterloratin. 71 F - Financia; K - manqeria. PROJECT PERFORMANCEAUDIT REPORT

INDONESIA - AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

HIGHLIGHTS

The project was designed to strengthen national productionr-oriented agricultural research programs in rice, secondary crops, highland vegetables and rubber by providing four new national research centers with equipment and improving transfer and uptake of research information through the establishment of ten equipped agricultural information centers. The project also aimed at strengthening the newly created Agency for Agricultural Research and Development (AARD) and the Agency for Agricultural Education, Training and Extension (AAETE) through increased staffing, overseas and local fellowships, and technical assistance. Generally this objective was achieved and in some cases appraisal targets were exceeded.

Implementation by the two Project Implementation Units (PIUs) was generally satisfactory, though PIU (Research), which was newly formed under the project, had start-up problems, causing delays in implementation. The completion period had to be extended by one and a half years and the closing date by one year. There was no cost overrun. Manpower development has been shown to require careful attention at the planning stage; exceeding appraisal targets, it has been the most significant contribution of this project (PCR, para. 5.14). All four planned research centers have been established and all but one well equipped. Against the target of ten, twelve fully equipped agricultural information centers have been established. Technical assistance was most useful, though underutilized because of delays in civil works construction and a large number of staff being away on training (PCR, para. 5.13). The project has assisted in raising the credibility of AARD, both nationally and internationally (PCR, paras. 6.01-6.02; PPAM, para. 17). The Bank was supportive and helpful.

No economic rates of return have been calculated for the project. The ongoing AARD research programs developed for rice, secondary crops, highland vegetables and rubber are well conceived. With the progress in infrastructure development, the return of local and overseas students, and increased staffing, the research activities will be further intensified. The rice varietal improvement program has made a significant contribution in releasing disease and insect resistant varieties. A number of improved varieties of maize, cassava, sweet potato, groundnut, mungbean, tomato and potato have already emerged. The agricultural information centers have produced useful extension materials (PCR, paras. 8.01-8.02).

Other points of special interest and lessons learnt are:

- project implementation units proved appropriate for implementing this project (PCR, paras. 3.03 and 6.03; PPAM, paras. 19-26); - vi - several projectdesign featureswere inadequateand requiredmodi- fication during implementation(PCR, para. 3.06; PPAM, paras. 21-24); specialdifficulties encountered in adequatelyspecifying lists for laboratory equipment point to a need for improved procedures at appraisal (PPAM, para. 25); construction problems occurring due to the involvement of inexperienced and underfinanced small-scale local contractors could have been mitigated through improved contractors' support and more effectivesupervision (PCR, para. 3.11; PPAM, paras. 48-49); with physicalinfrastructure being graduallyimproved, planning and managementare becomingmore importantconstraints in agricultural researchand, therefore,ought to becomea major focus of attention (PPAM,paras. 29-32); and recurrent cost implicationspose a major uncertaintyfor future agriculturalresearch (PPAM, paras. 50-54). - vii -

PROJECT PERFORMANCEAUDIT REPORT

INDONESIA - NATIONALFOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

HIGHLIGHTS

The project was originally approved for nine provinces, but in 1978 it was expanded to embrace four additional provinces. It was designed to strengthen existing extension services for all food crops by expanding trained extension personnel, introducing extension based on regular visits to farmer groups by continuously trained extension officers, providing vehicles and equipment, constructing or renovating Rural Extension Centers, and granting fellowships and overseas study tours. Generally the objective was achieved.

Implementation by the Project Directorate was generally satisfactory, though the Directorate had some start-up problems which caused initial delays in the implementation of the civil works and ir-service training components. Most of the targets of physical achievements were eventually exceeded, however, and the closing date had to be extended by only six months. The project cost was US$89.09 million, representing a 101% cost overrun, which was mainly due to expansion of the scope of the project. The Bank was supportive and helpful.

The project has been successful in organizing field extension work for food crops in the thirteen provinces (PCR, paras. 5.03-5.04). The expanded extension force recruited and reorganized under the project has formed farmer groups in each village area, encouraged the farmers and village leaders to select leading farmers to be the main points of contact between extension workers and the mass of farmers, and arranged and implemented a permanent schedule of meetings with the farmer groups. The project has thus far extended mainly information on rice, with limited attention paid to fruits, vegetables and important secondary crops. A significant specific impact of the project has been its remarkable success in combatting the unprecedented severe attack of brown planthoppers in the nation's main rice areas in 1976-77. In the years following the outbreak, a shift by hundreds of thousands of small farmers to recently released resistant rice varieties and increased usage of insecticides and fertilizers have been achieved (PCR, para. 8.01).

Because of the nature of the project it was not possible to quanr tify the benefits. A hypothetical rate of return calculation indicated that an annual increase in paddy output of 8 kg/ha over without project conditions, assuming that all benefits were to be derived from paddy growing alone, would yield a 20% economic rate of return. In contrast, the average yield of paddy in Indonesia has gone up from 2.78 tons/ha in 1976 to 3.78 tons/ha in 1982, or by 1,000 kg/ha, and the total production of paddy has increased from 23.3 million tons to 34.1 million tons in the same period. - viii -

While this increasehas been due to a varietyof factors,the improvedexten- sion system can be surmisedto have playedan importantpart.

Other points of specialinterest and lessonslearnt are:

- several design changes, most notably in project scope, were required during implementation(PCR, paras. 2.01-2.05 and 5.07; PPAM, paras. 35-37);

- the training-and-visitsystem of extension,though well established under the project, is bound to undergo considerablemodification and require adaptation as coverage is extended to include more crops and farmers (PCR, paras. 5.03-5.04 and 8.02; PPAM, paras. 40-43);

- constructionproblems occurreddue to the Involvementof inexperienced and underfinancedsmall-scale local contractors(PCR, paras. 3.03-3.04and 3.07; PPAM, paras.48-49);

- despite Bank support for this and a follow-onproject, organizational aspects of agriculturalextension remain in disarray In Indonesia. These aspects should be resolved prior to future lendingor be made an explicitobjective of any new project (PCR, paras.2.01-2.05; PPAH, paras. 45-47);

- there were major cost overrunsin the operationalcomponents of the project, pointing to a need for a more realistic assessment at appraisal and for more effective operationalcost controls (PCR, para. 4.02; PPAM, para. 39); and recurrentcost implicationspose a major future uncertaintyfor agriculturalextension (PPAM, paras. 50-54);and

- research/extensionlinkages have remained inadequate despite efforts in Indonesia and in the Bank to extend and improve such linkages(PPAM, paras. 55-56). PROJECT PERFORMANCEAUDIT MEMORANDUM

INDONESIA - ARICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND) AND NATIONALFOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

I. PROJECT SUMMARY1/

1. Indonesia's flrst five-year plan (1969-74) focussed heavily on increasing agricultural production for both domestic consumption and export. Although the agriculture sector's contribution to gross domestic product and to export, representing 40% and 45Z, respectively, in 1968, has declined considerably, it still provided employment to about two-thirds of the population in the early 1980s. Agricultural production, and rice production in particular, were to be stimulated through a variety of programs and approaches. Agricultural research and extenblon were among these, and systematic reviews of the country's requirements were undertaken in the late 19609. The preparation of plans for the improvement of research and extension took several years and was assisted by several external agencies. The Bank, attaching great importance to these vital functions, got involved early with the intention of supporting a gradual but sustained improvement process. The first effort to finance agricultural extension activitieswas part of an education project (Credit 288-IND) approved in 1972. This was followed in 1975 by the Agricultural Research and Extension Project (Loan 1179-IND) and in 1976 by the National Food Crops Extension Project (Loan 1267-IND). Follow-on projects, both approved in 1980 and currently under implementation, are the National Agricultural Research Project (Credit 1014-IND/Loan 1840-IND) and the National Agricultural Extension II Project (Credit 996-IND). The respective project agencies are already preparing proposals for continuation projects, most likely to be submitted to the Bank with a request for financing, indicating both a measure of success of past efforts as well as a continued need for support. Bank involvement in Indonesia's agricultural research and extension efforts has already been reviewed in general terms as part of a larger, comparative study, and the findins of this audit are broadly consistent with the conclusions of that study. 1 J

A. The Agricultural Research and Extension Project (Loan 1179-IND)

2. This project was appraised in 1974; the Loan was signed in December 1975 and became effective in February 1976. Project activities continued

1/ Adapted from the PCRs.

2/ The World Bank, Strengthening Agricultural Research and Extension - The World Bank Experience, OED Report No. 4684, September 1, 1983. - 2 - into 1983, considerably past the original target date of mid-1981, and the Loan was closed one year behind schedule on December 31, 1982. Final disbursement took place in April 1983.

3. The project's objectives were to strengthen production-oriented research programs for rice, secondary crops, highland vegetables and rubber, and to provide support for the agricultural extension service. Financing was provided for the establishment of three national research centers and one regional research station, upgrading of about 12 regional research stations, and the establishment of ten agricultural information centers. Other key project components were technical assistance to the implementing agencies and a fellowship training program for the agencies' staff.

4. The project was implemented largely as planned. A project implementation unit (PIU) was established within the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development (AARD) to implement the project's research component, and an existing PIU within the Agency for Agricultural Education, Training and Extension (AAETE) was responsible for the extension component. After some delays with establishing and staffing the PIU for research, the recruitment of consultants, design work and procurement for that component got underway. Civil works construction progressed more slowly than expected, primarily because preparation of project features was not very advanced at appraisal and the time estimate for completing detailed designs was overGpti- mistic. But eventually, the total constructed floor space slightly exceeded the appraisal estimate. Problems with the recruitment of consultants were encountered, and consultants' performance was mixed. The PIU for extension suffered fewer start-up delays, but had difficulties in finalizing construction contracts with the result that the information centers were completed about two years behind schedule, although 12 were established instead of the ten anticipated. Contractors' performance for both components was not entirely satisfactory as construction generally was not comp'eted on time and the quality of civil works in some cases was substandard.

5. Project costs were US$(5.0 million, or almost identlcal to appraisal estimates. However, there was considerable underspending for civil works and technical services (76% of appraisal estimate) which compensated for overruns for materials and equipment and establishment cost (140%). Under- spending occurred mainly as a result of overestimation of physical contingencies, devaluation of the local currency coupled with an increase in the loan disbursement percentage for civil works, lesser utilization of consultants' services, and deferral of part of the fellowship program to the follow-on project and consequent savings in staff emoluments. The higher cost for materials and equipment was due to the acquisition of more laboratory equipment than foreseen at appraisal, and price escalation in the wake of delayed procurement. The recurrent cost for the extension component was greatly underestimated at appraisal. Disbursement was extremely slow during the first three years of the project, consistent with the delays in physical implementation.

6. Institutional development, an implied objective of the project, registered measurable progress. AARD consolidated its position and continued to evolve, through the strengthening of staff, organizational changes and systems development, into a reasonably dynamic core organization of the country's agricultural research establishment. Its PIU gained experience in dealing with outside agencies such as the Bank, and in the preparation and execution of investment proposals. The structure of the research establishment has been improving with the designation of lead institutes for specific crops, the clarification of the mandate of several other institutes, and the improvement of some substations. AAETE, though firmly established with a well-functioning PIU, did not evolve as expected at the project design stage into a more central and encompassing organization with broader responsibilities for the varied extension functions in the agricultural sector. The project did, however, enhance the agency's capacity for performing the relatively limited functions that have been assigned to it.

7. The project's immediate impact is basically the improved capacity of research institutes and information centers benefitting from its support. The Sukamandi Research Institute for Food Crops has been assigned primary responsibility for rice research, and also for research on water management and agricultural machinery. Responsibility for research on secondary crops, originally also foreseen for Sukamandi, has been transferred to another institute for reasons of locational superiority. The Lembang Horticultural Research Institute's responsibility has been broadened to cover more crops than originally planned, and the Sungei Putih Research Institute for Estate Crops has primary responsibility for research on estate rubber. The Sembawa Research Institute has become the national research center for smallholder rubber-based farming systems. At the time of project completion, the project's main impact on these institutes was the upgrading of facilities and equipment, while the operational impact was minor as there were delays in the staff training program and the return of participants in the fellowship program had barely begun. But the project set the stage for a rapid intensification of research activities, partially with support from funds from the follow-on project. The agricultural information centers were all functioning, with some handicap derived from inadequate staffing and a more serious and growing constraint being felt from restricted budgetary allocations.

8. The project's ultimate impact on agricultural production and the economy as a whole, while expected to be positive in the long run, has not been estimated, and rates of return have not been calculated.

B. The National Food Crops Extension Project (Loan 1267-IND)

9. The appraisal of this project was completed in 1976; loan signing took place in June 1976 and the Loan became effective in September 1976. Project activities were completed in December 1982, about 18 months behind schedule. The actual closing date of December 31, 1982 was six months late. By April 1983 the Loan was fully disburs;ed.

10. The objective of the project was to strengthen agricultural extension services for food crops in nine of the country's 26 provinces through an increase in the number of extension staff, training of extension - 4 - workers, the introduction of a sound extension methodology, the construction or renovation of about 530 Rural Extension Centers (RECs), and the provision of vehicles and equipment and of consultancy services. A small amount of funding was also provided to complete some on-going research work not related to extension.

11. The implementation of the project encountered considerable difficulties, but at the time of completion most physical targets were reached or exceeded. Initial project staffing problems and office space limitations led to operational difficulties with contractors, delays in organizing in-service training, and inadequate production of extension materials. Local financing problems related to the Borrower's budgetary procedures seriously hindered implementation until these procedures were streamlined in 1978. Civil works construction, mainly related to RECs, suffered from the involvement of inexperienced contractors which resulted from a government policy to support the local (i.e. province and district level) construction industry, from delays in payments caused by the inadequate budget procedures, and from the poor performance of a supervising civil works consultant. Instead of accelerating the completion of the civil works component, as implied in revised implementation targets, it took one year longer than originally appraised. The initial delay of about two years in in-service training of extension staff was more than offset by a massive training effort launched in subsequent years.

12. Total project cost of US$89.1 million was more than double the appraisal estimate. The overriding causes of this sharp increase were the expansion of the project's scope in 1978 to encompass 13 provinces instead of the nine included at appraisal, and underestimation of incremental operating cost. Expenditures for staff salaries and travel far exceeded anticipated levels. The overall cost overrun was mitigated by cost savings in the civil works category arising from an initial overestimation of unit cost.

13. Institutionally, the project contributed to the strengthening of the extension capabilities of DGFCA, but did not, as it was not specifically intended to, resolve any of the institutional shortcomings inherent in the country's fragmented approach to agricultural extension. There were organizational improvements within DGFCA, however. The establishment of a Project Directorate served to focus the extension effort within DGFCA, regularize the relationship in extension matters between DGFCA and the Provincial Inspectors of Agriculture, and enable the formation of a fully dedicated field extension service for food crops. Remaining weaknesses are of a structural nature with extension staff still being accountable to various agencies such as DGFC, AAETE, BIMAS or Provincial authorities, financed from the respective agency budgets; some staff are structurally related to one agency and functionally to another. A major advantage for project implementation was the fact that only one agency - DGFCA - had executing authority.

14. Operationally, the project aimed at introducing the training-and- visit system of extension. This system is effectively operating in all project REC areas. Farmer coverage is, however, still modest on average and only - 5- about 40X, or even lower, in some provinces. Where the system is in operation, its basic principles are generally accepted and applied. Field level workers and supervisors are well managed and are performing their functions as intended. Subject matter specialists, however, tend to devote more time than expected on administrative and other activities, and less than desirable on training field level workers. Overall, the system clearly is still evolving in a local context, and adjustments to the varied growing conditions and cropping systems will have to be made as coverage is intensified and farmers' exposure lengthens over time. The need to facilitate this process, through careful monitoring and appropriate responses, is becoming more acute, as the system spreads geographically and to additional agricultural subsectors in the future.

15. The impact of extension activities on agricultural production is difficult to measure. No quantitative indicators are available for this project, although it can be reasonably argued that the increased extension activities have been a contributing factor to the rapidly increasing production of rice, primarily in Java, since the mid-1970s. There are also indications that extension staff have been effective in applying on a large scale specific actions, such as the introduction of a new crop variety or the promotion of preventive measures against a calamity caused by insects. However, an objective evaluation of the effectiveness of the new extension system will have to await the accumulation of statistical evidence along with the growing capacity of and increased cooperation with the country's agricultural research system. No rates of return have been calculated for the project.

II. AUDIT FINDINGS

A. Agricultural Research

General

16. The Agricultural Research and Extension.Project (Loan 1179-IND) has to be viewed in perspective in order to be able to correctly gauge its rela- tive importance with respect to scope and impact. In its ten-year history AARD has developed into a large organization which, until recently, comprised 30 research institutes with about 100 substations located throughout the country, and seven centers in Bogor and Jakarta (Annex I). The project supported merely four of the institutes, although the training component benefited AARD more broadly. While physical investments completed in the four institutes represented important phases in their respective development, other developmental aspects are of a long-run nature, and in this respect, and in relation to the large, overall development task facing AARD, project intervention was relatively short and limited. This project thus was more of a building block and catalyst than an all-encompassing and final intervention. Therefore, the problems of attribution of benefits and measurement of ultimate impact are particularly pronounced. 17. In some respects, the project's importance was disproportionately larger than its share in AARD's operations would indicate. It provided the much-needed support for AARD after it was established in 1974. At that time, AARD had yet to overcome internal political opposition and to cope with the growing pains that any new organization formed through consolidation of existing entities is likely to face. The project, therefore, together with support provided from other sources, deserves a significant measure of credit for the survival and continued, dynamic evolution of AARD.

18. Recognizing the importance of continuity of support, the Bank Group approved a follow-on project, the National Agricultural Research Project (Credit 1014-IND/Loan 1840-IND) in May 1980, at a time when less than one- half of the funds from Loan 1179-IND had been disbursed. This was a very timely move because funds in some disbursement categories, i.e. for laboratory equipment and for fellowships, came close to being exhausted, and also because the implied endorsement of AARD's goals and strategy enhanced its ability to obtain vital political and financial support. Without the follow-on project, the physical investments in the target institutes would have remained much below desirable levels, and the prospects for significantly improving research activities would have remained very uncertain.

19. A successful feature of the project was the establishment of the PIU (Research), despite the initial problems associated with it (para. 26). It provided an effective organizational framework for acquiring and applying the necessary expertise for implementing the project and, subsequently, per- mitted the smooth inr-phasing of the follow-on project. Limiting PIU's mandate to the physical implementation of the assigned project components, and keeping it free of responsibilities for managing any established facilities and for operational aspects related to research work turned out to be practical and cost effective.3/

20. The project also benefitted from an appropriate degree of flexibility applied by the project authorities and the Bank. This flexibility was called for In view of the persisting changes that AARD and its con- stituent institutions have been undergoing, some shortcomings in project design (para. 21), and external developments unforeseen at appraisal. It was partly manifested in changes in disbursement percentages, changes in the manpower development program, inclusion of long-term fellowships at local universities, reallocation of loan funds, deferral of some activities to the follow-on project, changes in physical design features for civil works, adjustments in procurement schedules to account for delays in civil works construction, and accommodation of the change in research mandate for the institutes at Sukamandi and Sembawa. Flexibility was also exercised in the provision of technical assistance, and some additional expertise not foreseen

31 The current Director, PIU Research, concurs with this observation (Annex II, para. 3). at appraisal was recruited at the same time as underutilization of technical assistance to be provided by program and research specialists occurred.4 /

Problems and Constraints

21. Project Design. The PCR indicates that civil works implementation was slow because of lack of adequate preparation of the project, and overoptimistic expectations with regard to completion of detailed designs (PCR Loan 1179-IND, para. 3.06). There is no doubt that these were factors adversely affecting the project schedule. However, it is unlikely that a further delay in the approval of the project in 1975 for the purpose of ad- vancing civil works designs or improving training proposals would have improved the final outcome. Some of the project aspc-:tsnot fully prepared required flexibility in any case and were adequately dealt with in the course of implementation. However, had the time requirements for these preliminary project activities been more accurately assessed at appraisal, implementation would have proceeded more smoothly. One aspect not foreseen at appraisal was the obstacle in the overseas fellowship program caused by the candidates' lack of proficiency in foreign languages. Project authorities took the necessary measures to overcome this, but not without incurring further delays in the program.

22. There were some shortcomings in the architectural and systems designs which were not discovered before civil works were completed. At Sembawa, the work flow is somewhat impaired by the narrow design of passage ways and by the shortage of non-lab work space. At Sukamandi, glass houses have not been equipped with adequate ventilation, and are therefore unuse- able. Moreover, it is questionable whether such a large area under glass is actually needed there. Another systems weakness became apparent in conjunction with the preparation of laboratory equipment lists (para. 25). It was not resolved at appraisal - and still was not resolved at the time of the audit mission - to what extent laboratory functions within a large research organization such as AARD could and should be centralized. The project brought to light that fully equipping all institutes with a wide range of instruments is very costly, and most likely suboptimal from the point of view of operating these facilities with qualified specialist personnel.

23. In retrospect, the composition of investments may appear unbalanced in some respects. Overall, the provision of physical facilities has outpaced manpower development, leaving some of the investments temporarily underutilized. This aspect was aggravated by the appraisal not having given enough emphasis to manpower development and by the implementation delays experienced with the training component. In the audit's view, this is not a problem provided the on-going fellowship program under the follow-on project is successfully completed and future research programs are adequately managed

4/ Project staff emphasized that specifications reflected in the Staff Appraisal Report often times become outdated and should not be implemented too rigidly. This view is reaffirmed in the comments in Annex II (para. 4). - 8 -

(para. 29) and financed (para. 50). A completely harmonious development of physical and manpower resources would be desirable, but is hardly realistic on such a large scale. Under the circulmstances,the available facilities are likely to be a drawing factor in the recruitment of new staff and a political asset in the struggle for budgetary support for research.

24. Another aspect pertaining to the composition of investments is related to the change in mandate of project-supported institutes. As there have been such changes and investment requirements have changed along with them, the current requirements do not precisely match appraisal expectations and, hence, established project facilities. The Sembava institute was proposed to be elevated from the status of a rubber research facility subordi- nate to the Sungei Putih institute to that of a national lead institute for research on rubber-based smallholder farming systems. Consequently, available activities related to outreach activities consistent with the new status, e.g. auditorium, communications, guest accommodations, are now inadequate. At Sukamandi, whose mandate was originally expected to include a major role in research on palawija crops, newly established facilities are now too large since palawija research will be centered in Malang instead. The assignment of new functions, such as work related to agricultural machinery and water management, will take up some of the slack there. Facilities at Lembang may become constrained with the expansion of the institute's mandate to include major research on additional crops and the possible operation of additional substations. These developments reflect shortcomings in national research planning on the one hand, but also the presence of a dynamic, evolving system on the other. In the audit's opinion, while forward planning should be emphasized to minimize frequent organizational changes, already established facilities should not stand in the way of periodic organizational adjustments in the interest of long-run efficiency. The above adjustments were on the whole improvements and are, as such, supportable.

25. Laboratory Equipment Specifications. In addition to the unresolved organizational aspect of AARD's laboratory system, problems also arose with respect to the specification of laboratory equipment to be provided to individual institutes.5 / The provisions at appraisal were subsequently found inadequate by research staff, and equipment needs had to be reviewed by a consultant. But some of the equipment lists had already been previously expanded and approved for procurement, with a resulting substantial cost overrun for this category, and the strong possibility that the set of equipment installed at the institutes is not fully satisfactory in terms of composition as well as the choice of specific instruments. Since the Bank had approved all the purchases and the applicable procedures were followed by the Borrower as well as the Bank, this experience points toward a shortfall in technical capability within the Bank's appraisal framework to cope with matters in a highly specialized field. Since similar problems exist under

5/ The Borrower, acknowledging persisting problems, is attempting to improve the situation with the help of carefully selected consultants (Annex II, para. 6). - 9 -

the follow-on project, the conclusion is warranted that more attention needs to be paid to the issue of adequately specifying laboratory equipment needs either at appraisal or under a phased procedure, deferring certain decisions to a suitable mechanism while implementation is in progress.

26. The Establishment of PIU (Research). While project implementation eventually benefitted from a well-functioning PIU, serious initial delays were caused by staffing problems of the PIU (Research). It took from April 1975 until June 1978 (PCR Loan 1179-IND, para. 3.03) to appoint a capable, full-time director of PIU (Research). Furthermore, the appointment of technical assistance consultants for the PIU was delayed until 1977. It is not surprising in light of those difficulties that the whole implementation schedule slipped by nearly two years. This experience shows that special care must be taken to expedite the appointment of key personnel for a newly created PIU. Among the main prerequisites are adequate physical working conditions and promotional incentives, and active Borrower support. To a large extent, these prerequisites can be assessed and provided for at the appraisal stage.

27. Time Delays and Cost Implications. It was the combination of gaps in project preparation, overoptimistic appraisal, PIU (Research) start-up difficulties, and involvement of an inexperienced construction industry that caused slippages in implementation. Some of these factors could have been mitigated at the project design stage, as indeed they were under the follow-on project. The fact that cost increases in some components were compensated by savings in other components is largely coincidental. Effects on dollar costs of local currency devaluations, which were especially pronounced because of the low foreign exchange content of civil works expenditures, could not have been anticipated at appraisal. However, the sharp overspending on laboratory equipment and extension should not be overlooked as a result of underspending in some categories and the consequent favorable overall outcome.

Main Issue

28. The main issue arising in conjunction with this project is less related to past experience than to its future operation. As the completed project was a phase in an on-going program, the generation of benefits depends on further development and efficient operation of that program. In this context, optimal use of facilities and competent planning and management of research activities, together with adequate funding of recurrent expenditures (para. 50), are the prerequisites for maximizing returns on investments.

29. Research Performance. Although various methods have been devised in other countries, research performance is extremely difficult to evaluate objectively. At present, no comprehensive evaluation results for AARD generally, or the project institutes in particular, are readily available. However, there are indications of serious deficiencies. The most obvious and - 10 - widely acknowledged stems from a shortage of staff. The institutes' recruitment levels have reached 40-60% of their revised staff targets,6/ and up to one-third of the staff are away on training. The effective staff strength thus ranges from about 25% to 40%. The efficient conduct of research, given current manpower resources, is hindered by the fact that recent recruits lack experience, and trainees are sent away for extensive periods after some time on the job, interrupting longer-term research work they had been involved with. The filling of these gaps and injection of practical research expertise through employment - short-term or otherwise - of expatriate specialists is not much in evidence. Technical assistance for agricultural research, both to mobilize foreign resources for this purpose and to upgrade the local establishment, has been underutilized.

30. In the future, as an increasing number of trainees return, thought will have to be given to providing adequate incentives to researchers in order to retain their services and boost performance in the long run. Addi- tional incentives will be required for postings in outlying stations. That staff are extremely sensitive to the conditions surrounding their place of work became clear to the audit mission from the critical remarks of staff at the relatively central and well-endowed institute at Sukamandi. Living conditions and social amenities primarily determine recruitment and retention of staff, however, and only to a lesser degree, performance. To maximize the latter, financial and promotional incentives will have to be provided together with a variety of non-financial incentive devices. The present situation, aggravated by the existence of different pay levels for some categories of research workers, is inadequate.7/

31. At a higher level, research programming and management have already been receiving increasing attention, but that much further improvement is necessary is widely acknowledged within AARD. Research programming, at the institute level and especially within AARD, will be gaining added signifi- cance with the rapid expansion of research capacity over the next few years. In this respect it is difficult to assess the implications of the recent transfer of the functions of AARD's Center for Agricultural Research Programming (CARP) to AARD's Secretariat. In the past some advocates had pleaded for a strengthening of CARP. Effective management to execute approved programs is the keystone of a research system. Much management support will have to be provided to individual institutes and their constitutent stations, and a cadre of research program leaders will have to be established. Stronger administrative support to free managerst time for overseeing progress on onr-going research would likely be highly beneficial.

6/ The total number of professional staff appointed exceeded appraisal estimates (PCR, Loan 1179-IND, Annex 11). AARD, however, raised the target for staff recruitment during implementation.

7/ Borrower comments show that steps are being taken to overcome the incentives hurdle (Annex II, para. 7). The audit feels that follow-up by the Bank regarding the nature and effectiveness of these steps should be accorded highest priority. - 11 -

Employment of business management expertise would relieve overburdened technical managers. A concerted effort must be made to achieve a more effective use of facilities and staff. If successful, a gradually growing portion of available land area can be expected to be devoted to genuine research uses and a declining portion to the production of planting materials, and the practical recommendations issued by researchers will have a firmer footing than has been the case in the past.

32. A key requirement to bring about improvements in research performance is an effective review of on-going activities in light of established objectives and underlying requirements. Supervision activities for this project did not cover this aspect because the project did not include any provision for reviews; the main focus was strictly on implementation matters.8/ The situation has improved under the follow-on project, which explicitly requires the Borrower to conduct periodic reviews, and for which some supervision communications with the Borrower have reflected concern for research performance.9 / A 1981 study by the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR)1l/ reviewed AARD and produced recommendations concerning institutional improvement and the role of future external assistance for AARD. However, implementation of these recommendations has been minimal, and the need for improvement in the critical areas (i.e. programming and allocation of resources, manpower resources, structure and organization, and research-production linkages) is more pressing than ever. Only very recently has AARD embarked on the design of a comprehensive system of research program reviews in which they are again being helped by ISNAR. A series of reviews will start in 1984 and work through all the major research programs. It is extremely important to monitor the outcome and impact of these reviews in order to enable the Government, and within its own sphere of influence the Bank, to take the necessarv action. The predominant emphasis clearly has to shift from the development of the country's agricultural research capacity to its effective and efficient use as investments under the follow-on project are nearing completion.

8/ Although several supervision missions and the pre-appraisal mission for the follow-on project reviewed research programs for crops covered by this project, no interaction in this regard with the Borrower is docu- mented. If any specific recommendations were ever made, there was no follow-up.

9/ However, project staff expressed a preference for restricting Bank supervision activities to implementationmatters and leaving operational concerns, including programming, to be dealt with in the now scheduled periodic in-depth research reviews (Annex II, para. 9).

10/ ISNAR, The Agency for Agricultural Research and Development of Indo- nesia, The Hague, 1981. - 12 -

B. Agricultural Extension

General

33. The development of agricultural extension was supported by both projects included in this audit, though in very different ways which are related to the organizational set-up in Indonesia (para. 45). Loan 1179-IND provided funds for infrastructural investments for the Agency for Agricul- tural Education, Training and Extension (AAETE), while Loan 1267-IND exclusively supported extension activities of the Directorate General of Food Crops Agriculture (DGFCA). The former built on experience gained under a Bank-supported education project and continued the desirable linkage between agricultural education and extension. The latter was an entirely new beginning. The appraisal target for the establishment of agricultural information centers under Loan 1179-IND was exceeded, although there were considerable construction problems similar to those encountered in other civil works components (para. 48). A follou-on education (agricultural training) project is proposed to provide similar centers to those provinces not already included under Loan 1179-IND.

34. Although the National Food Crops Extension Project (Loan 1267-IND) was expanded in scope during implementation and completed behind schedule, the revised physical targets were virtually all met or exceeded. The project made a major contribution towards demonstrating a working model for agricultural extension despite the fact that organizational issues remain far from being resolved satisfactorily. It was a crucial link in an evolutionary chain, with the follow-on project (Credit 966-IND) playing an even more important role because it fortifies achievements under this project and ex- pands extension coverage to more crops and more farmers. Valuable experience has been gained, which, to a large extent, has already been incorporated in follow-on operations.

Problems and Constraints

35. Project Design. Because of the uncertainties surrounding the project, especially during preparation (PCR Loan 1267-IND, paras. 2.01-2.05), the project's scope was changed several times. The initial concept proposed in 1975 comprised five proc:inces,and in the course of appraisal this number was expanded to nine. In 1978 four additional provinces were added in response to foreseeable cost savings on civil works and the keen interest displayed by nonr-participatingprovinces. While these changes reflect flexibility on the part of the project authorities and the Bank, they also rendered cost estimates and financing arrangement obsolete, and put an additional strain on project management. But other than acting as an additional delaying factor, expanding the scope of the project had no major adverse effect on the physical accomplishments of the project.

36. Another design aspect that proved inadequate concerned the size of Rural Extension Centers ,RECs). The originally proposed 40 m2 were found during the construction phase to be too small, but no design changes were made under this project. However, RECs to be built under the follow-on - 13 - project have been enlarged to 130 m2 , and it has been decided to also enlarge the centers established under this project according to the new specifications. The original underestimation of space requirementL.can be ascribed to the inexperience with the central role of RECs under the newly introduced extension system.

37. It was also felt necessary to modify the project's training component during implementation, both with respect to the mix of target degree levels and the number of trainees involved (PCR Loan 1267-IND, para. 5.07). Experience so far has shown that highest priority needs to be given to the formulation and execution of a training program in support of extension, but also that there is a strong tendency for the associated costs to escalate. Effective cost control mechanirns are thus essential in the conduct of training programs extending over a number of years.

38. Time Delays and Cost Implications. Implementation of this project had a poor start because of staffing and financing problems (PCR Loan 1267- IND, paras. 3.02-3.03), and the involvement of inexperienced contractors (PCR Loan 1267-IND, para. 3.04). However, as these problems were gradually dealt with the pace of implementationand disbursement accelerated, and the project was completed about 18 months, and the Loan closed six months, behind the original schedule; but that schedule did not include the four expansion provinces. The timely approval of the follow-on project made it possible to capitalize on the momentum gained in the latter years of this project.

39. Delayed implementation explains only a part of the cost overrun of 482 over the revised 1978 estimate. This cost overrun must be considered high in view of the favorable circumstances that led to cost savings in land acquisition and civil works construction. Excluding capital costs, the cost overrun was 108%. This figure is cause for concern as the effects relate to operating costs and are thus long lasting. Indications are that this overrun is about equally attributable to an unrealistically low cost estimate prepared in 1978 on the one hand, and to sharp increases in selected expenditure categories on the other. These latter include staff salaries and extension operations. While staff recruitment exceeded expectations by only 8%, staff emoluments were over 100% higher. Non-salary expenditures for extension operations even exceeded estimates by more than four-fold. The recurrent expenditure component thus accounted for 73% of total project costs, compared with 48% estimated in 1978 for 13 provinces and 43% in the original proposal covering nine provinces. These results demonstrate the importance of paying careful attention to a project's recurrent cost implications, both during project implementation and after completion (para. 50).

40. The Training and Visit (T&V) System. The introduction of this system on a wide scale was one of the primary objectives of the project. Al- though a full assessment of the organization and operation of the system requires more effort than could be spent as part of the audit, available information points to a promising beginning in Indonesia. The framework for the organization has been established in all project provinces, and the basic features are understood and put into practice at all levels. There has been - 14 -

some on-goingmonitoring and evaluationll/,though by far not enough. Firm quantitativeevidence on the impact on yields and production is not yet available.12/

41. Among the shortcomingsto date are supervisionand training. While field level workers (PPL) are generallywell supervisedby their immediate supervisors,there frequentlyhave been problems above that level, notably with the subject matter specialists(PPS). PPSs have been preoccupiedwith numeroustasks not within their terms of reference,leaving them insufficient time for the trainingof and interactionwith field extensionstaff as well as for contactswith the researchcommunity. In an effort to alleviatethis problem the follow-on project provides for the tighteningof control and programmingof PPS work. This aspect, togetherwith additionalmeasures, is hoped also to improve the content and effectivenessof trainingactivities, which are so essentialif this systemis to functioneffectively.

42. The performanceof farmer groups has also not been without problems. Leadershipaspects, participationof farmersin such groups, interaction within the group, interactionwith extension staff and other agencies such as cooperatives,and the nature and organizationof group action have varied greatly among different locations. Flexible approaches are thus requiredto successfullyharmonize the groups'goals and aspirationswith the extension objective. This is a major area where further adaptationof the system to local conditionsis required.

43. Flexibilityand adaptationare also crucial as extension becomes more comprehensive, and the focus is shifting from a single crop (rice)/ annual pattern to a multi-crop/perennialhorizon. There is qualitative evidence that the system has been relativelyeffective in promotingimprove- ments in irrigated rice production in Java under the unique set of circumstancesprevailing there, i.e., extensiveprior farmer experiencewith the crop, favorablegrowing conditions,the existenceof a viable research- based and tested technical package, and adequately functioning support services. One importantquestion confrontingextension is how to adapt its activitiesin the future in rice growing areas where yields are approaching economicallyoptimal levels. Another, more difficult,question is to find effectiveways to cope with the vastly increased flow of specializedtech- nical informationin a multicropenvironment. Becauseof the highly limited contacts between farmers and subject matter specialists, complicated

11/ One study,Evaluation on the Performanceof the NationalFood Crops Ex- tensionProject, was undertakenby DGFCA in cooperationwith Padjadjaran Universityin 1981.

12/ OPS comments that there is a major M&E effort on the T&V projects in India but this has not been able to come up with methods of measuring impactin the form of yield and productivityincreases. The best it has been able to do is to measure the number of farmers being contactedby T&V and the numbers using recommendedpackages, and it is doubtful whether impactscan be measuredin the statisticalsense. - 15 - technical and agro-economicinformation will have to filter through the lowest, i.e. PPL, layer of the extensionsystem, while the system'scapacity for this task is as yet largelyunproven. One seriouscomplicating factor Is the virtual absence of low-risk,superior technicalpackages for individual non-rice, especially dryland, crops, and for multi-crop farming systems. Another adverse factor is the inadequateinput supply and marketingsystems for those crops in most dryland farming areas. To effectivelyutilize the vast staff resourcesin the face of the laggingresearch results and general infrastructuredevelopment, and at the same time build and maintainfarmers' interest,will be the acid test of the T&V systemin Indonesia.

44. Continuousmodification and adaptatlonof the T & V system are no doubt required. But to the extent that this process requires additional resources,it forces a trade-offwith the overall expansion of extension. Presently, from 30% to 60% of all farmers are covered by the extension service in the respective project provinces. The allocation of limited incrementalresources between an upgradingof the service to farmersalready receiving advice, an intensificationto reach nonr-participatingfarmers in existingextension areas, and an expansionto improvefarmer coveragein new areas will have to be carefullyweighed.

Main Issue

45. Extension Organization. The creation of a unified agricultural extensionsystem has been seen as a desirablegoal by some, includingthe Bank, since the early 1970s. Bank financingfor improvingfood crops exter- sion in a limited area representeda compromisebetween meeting the urgency of strengtheningsupport for food productionin the least disruptiveway, and providingmore time for sortingout the underlyinginstitutional malaise (PCR Loan 1267-IND, paras. 2.01-2.05). While institutionalreform, with the exceptionof the preparationof a proposalfor coordination(Section 3.04 of the Loan Agreement),was not part of the project,it was hoped that progress would be made during the time the projectwas being implemented. Howevei, virtuallyno progresshas been made. Even the follow-onproject continues to operatein an institutionalenvironment where AAETE, the DirectoratesGeneral of the Ministry of Agriculture,and provincialauthorities have to struggle in executing their separate mandates towards a common goal, i.e. to effectivelytransmit superior technologyto farmers. The only encouraging features in the follow-on project are the strengtheningof the Advisory Working Group on extension coordinationset up under this project, and provision for a study to develop recommendationsfor strengtheningand improving the organizationand management of the country's agricultural extension services; the latter, to date, has not progressed beyond the draftingof consultants'terms of reference,however.

46. There is no question that the existing structuraland functional divisions in the organizationare causing operationalinefficiencies and budgetaryanomalies. At the field level it is difficult to integrate the extension function for all crops in a system dominated by food crops extensioninfrastructure. There has been a mismatchbetween the demand for trainingof extensionstaff, and AAETE's capabilityfor meeting that demand. - 16 -

The effectiveness of Agricultural Information Centers, under AAETE, has been impaired by the structural separation of producers/disseminators and uRers of information. The linkage between research and extension is also weakened by the splintered extension apparatus. The support of extension activities by different line agency budgets causcs local bottlenecks in the availability of funds and conflicts for individua±s in positions with different structural and functional line responsibilities.

47. The adverse implications of the institutional deficiencies inherent in Indonesia's extension system will be amplified and aggravated with the system's expansion into new locations and its increasing emphasis on dryland farming and on multi-crop coverage. It is imperative, therefore, that the institutional issue be satisfactorily resolved before the Bank agrees to finance further projects in support of agricultural extension in Indonesia.

C. Civil Works Construction as a Common Problem

48. As referred to in the PCRs (Loan 1179-IND, para. 3.11; Loan L267- IND, paras. 3.03, 3.04 and 3.07), there were contractual, financial, procedural and quality problems with civil works construction. The two major underlying reasons were the participation in the projects of inexperienced, underfinanced local contractors, and poor construction supervision. It is remarkable that under the circumstances there were no cost overruns for the civil works components, even though rupiah devaluation acted as a dampener on the dollar cost of clvil works.

49. The choice of contractor, for contracts under Rp. 200 million, is limited as national policy requires such contracts to oa awarded to contractors resident in the area of the project site. While a project must conform to Borrower policies, it is essential to ensure that the consequences of such policies are not detrimental to the project. Appropriate measures would have to include (i) efforts to provide all necessary assistance, in this case outside the project by the Borrower, to the local construction industry which is to benefit from this policy, and (ii) adequate supervision of contractors by project authorities. The audit did not attempt to assess the developmental impact of this project on the local construction industry, but such an assessment should be undertaken if the Bank continues to be involved in financing civil works which are subject to implementation under preferential bidding policies. But aside from the possibly adverse policy aspects, the audit is especially concerned that the supervision of contractors through consultants under the control of project authorities has been so broadly deficient. To improve the quality of contractor work, the Bank should be satisfied that adequate provision under the project has been made for the supervision and control of contractors.

D. Recurrent Cost Implications as a Common Issue

50. As agricultural research and extension are nonrrevenue-earning public undertakings, they require continued budgetary support; only a fraction of the cost of research is covered through levies on estate crops. Over the past decade the Government has been successful in financing - 17 - ambitious investment programs for facilities, equipment and, more recently, manpower development. These investments require a rapidly growing commitment of financial resources to meet recurrent expenditures. The audit is concerned about the budgetary implications of the situation and, concommitantly, about the adverse effect on research and extension performance should a significant gap develop.

51. The concern about adequate continued funding, shared by research officials encountered in the course of the audit, is based on various obser- vations. First, there reportedly exists a funding shortage for AARD in the current fiscal year. This shortage has manifested itself in inadequate budgetary allocations for implementing the follow-on research project, and in insufficient allocations to meet research institutes' operational needs. Second, mission discussions with research officials, both at institute as well as central levels, frequently turned to a proposed additional follow-on research project, to be implemented in parallel with the fellowship component of the on-going follow-on project (expected to be completed in 1989). These discussions indicated a perceived need for substantial further physical expansion of the research system, both in terms of expanding existing facilities and of creating new ones, which would imply further acceleration in the growth of recurrent expenditures. Third, the audit mission was unable to locate any projections of global recurrent budgetary requirements for research in Indonesia up to, say, 1995 when facilities currently existing or under active planning and construction will be in full operation. Without such projections it is impossible to evaluate future research spending in relation to overall budgetary growth or in relation to the growth in agricultural GDP.

52. The audit mission also encountered frequent references to shortages of extension funds by staff at all levels. To what extent operational deficiencies in extension are due to weak management or a shortage of funds is difficult to determine. There was, however, no doubt in the minds of the staff interviewed that their activities had suffered because of lack of funds. The appraisal mission for the follow-on extension project estimated that recurrent expenditures pertaining to that project, which represents only a partial but substantial accounting of the country's total agricultural extension expenditures, amounted to about US$17.0 million in 1980, expanding to US$25.0 million (1980 dollars) by 1985. These are modest orders of magnitude in relation to the country's GDP and Government budget. It is thus likely to be predominantly political will rather than scarcity of resources what will determine the level of future funding for agricultural extension.

53. In the audit's opinion, the next order of priority is to improve the performance of research and extension, but a prerequisite for such improvement is adequate budgetary support. Without improvement in performance, returns on existing investments would be low, and justification for more investment doubtful. The resulting implications for the Bank are two- fold, relating to its policy dialogue with Government and to the formulation of future projects in support of agricultural research and extension. The urgency of providing adequate support for these activities on a sustained basis must be impressed upon Government continuously and effectively, and the - 18 - composition of future projects should reflect the country's capacity for meeting recurrent financing requirements.

54. In order to contain unsupportable increases in recurrent costs related to the existing research and extension establishments, measures must be devised and implemented to improve the cost effectiveness of operations. Furthermore, extreme caution needs to be exercised with regard to che rate of further expansion in physical facilities, and such caution must be paired with a hightened concern for performance and careful projection of budgetary effects. There is no question that the size of the country and the magnitude of the task at hand warrant further capital spending on agricultural research and extension. But in the extreme case that a protracted funding constraint develops, efficiency considerations would favor smaller - and slower growing - but adequately funded over larger and faster expanding research and extension programs. The design of future projects should thus be guided by a realistic assessment of government's long-term commitment of budgetary resources. The performance in this respect was on the whole impressive under the present projects, but experience to date under the follow-on projects is pointing towards a marked deterioration.

E. Research/Extension Linkages

55. There is general awareness of the need for such linkages in the research community and also within the extension services. Interaction is taking place, but it is difficult to determine actual practices on a systemr- wide basis and to assess the effectiveness of this interaction. Extension service subject matter specialists are supposed to be the prime channel of communication between research and extension. But, as noted earlier (para. 41), that function has been hampered by the diversion of subject matter specialists' attention to other matters. AAETE (RAIC) staff also have contact with research staff in connection with the preparation of extension materials, but such contacts are infrequent, nonr-systematicand often super- ficial.

56. Heavy reliance on informal contacts in the past has led to an uneven exchange of information depending on individual initiatives and the physical proximity of extension staff to research facilities. More recently, there have been some arrangements for joint activities such as formal monthly meetings at research institutes, joint field programs and farm level research trials and experiments. Heavier involvement of research staff in extension training is also contemplated. But shortages of staff, residential facilities in some locations, means of transport, and travel funds are posing serious constraints. Extensior-oriented dissemination of research results directly by the research institutes is also expected to increase. Thus, while the linkages have been inadequate, there are indications that they are strengthening. These improvements notwithstanding, much additional effort will be needed to create an institutional framework and operational procedures conducive to an effective two-way transmission of information between research and extension in Indonesia. - 19 -

F. Sustainabilityof Project Benefits

57. A major prerequisite for maximizing project benefits is a continuityof effort, and the on-going follow-on projects largely fulfill this basic conditionfor the near future. Beyond that, measuresto improve researchperformance (paras. 29-32), to further strengthenand appropriately adapt the T&V extension system (paras. 41-44) and to rationalize the extension organization (paras. 45-47) are required for deriving sustained, longer-term benefits. Under these conditions, and provided Government accords the necessary priority backed by adequate recurrent cost financing to agriculturalresearch and extension (paras. 50-54), the present projects have the potential of generating good returns in a generally favorable economic and policy environment. - 20 -

Annex I

PROJECT PERFORMANCEAUDIT REPORT

INDONESIA - AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

List of Existing AARDResearch Institutes and Centers (December 31, 1982)

Institutes /a Location

1. Central Research Institute for Food Crops Bogor 2. Food Crops Research Institute Bogor 3. Food Crops Research Institute Banjarmasin 4. Food Crops Research Institute Maros 5. Food Crops Research Institute Sukamandi 6. Food Crops Research Institute Sukarami 7. Food Crops Research Institute Malang 8. Horticultural Crops Research Institute Lembang 9. Central Research Institute for Industrial Crops Bogor 10. Industrial Crops Research Institute Bogor 11. Industrial Crops Research Institute Malang 12. Industrial Crops Research Institute Manado 13. Industrial Crops Research Institute Tanjung Karang 14. Central Research Institute for Fisheries Jakarta 15. Inland Fisheries Research Institute Bogor 16. Marine Fisheries Research Institute Jakarta 17. Fish Technology Research Institute Jakarta 18. Central Research Institute for Animal Science Bogor 19. Animal Husbandry Research Institute Bogor 20. Animal Health Research Institute Bogor 21. Central Research Institute for Forestry Bogor 22. Forest Research Institute Bogor 23. Forest Products Research Institute Bogor 24. Estate Crops Research Institute Bogor 25. Estate Crops Research Institute Jember 26. Estate Crops Research Institute Medan 27. Rubber Research Institute Sungei Putih 28. Rubber Research Institute Sembawa 29. Tea and Chinchona Research Institute Gambung 30. Sugar Research Institute Pasuruan

Centers 1. Secretariat Jakarta 2. Soil Research Center Bogor 3. Statistics and Agro-data Processing Center Jakarta 4. Plant Quarantine Center Jakarta 5. Agro-economic Research Center Bogor 6. Central Library for Agricultural Sciences Bogor 7. Center for Agricultural Research Programming Bogor

/a Those underlined received support under Loan 1179-IND. -21 _ Conments Received from the Borrower Page 1 [MEPATEEME PEMUORF BADAN PENELITIAN DAN PENGEMBANGANPERTANIAN PROYEK PEMBINAAN PENELITIAN DAN PENGEMBANGAN PERTANIAN BANTUAN WORLD BANK .3,,. Rapxnm 29 - P. MinWu Jokan Sdatn Sik.Smiak 18. Satw T.hopa 7U2RI Tepon: 262584-24541 T 4424. 44332 P.Q Box: 187 Ka : LITTANI JAKARTA

No: kL.-,o.f 04* l. -f /ft-. 4 April2q1, 1984

Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank 1818 H. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 U . S . A.

Re: Project Performance Audit Report: Indonesia Agricultural Research and Extension Project (Loan 1179-IND and National Food Crops Extension Project (Loan 1267-IND)

Dear Mr. a5pur;

Thank you for your letter of February 23, 1984 enclosing the first draft of the Project Performance Audit Report on the above project. I do wish to coEment on a number of points made in the Report with reference to the Research Project, but first, may I compliment Mr. Ablasser on the well balanced, objective and concise report that he has prepared. We are finding the views and suggestions that Mr. Ablasser has expressed most helpful in the implementation of the National Agricultural Research Project II.

Regarding the Report in general, I find the summary and evaluation of the Agricultural Research Project's experience, accomplishments and implementation problems to be realistic, objective and well balanced.

I would, however, like to comment of the following points mentioned in the Agricultural Research section of the Report in the order that they appear. 1. In paragraph 16,mention is made to the AARD organizational structure and the point is made that the project supported merely four of the agency's institutes as indicated in Annex 1. While major support for physical facilities and equipment procurement was concentrated at four institutes, the training component of the Project did provide support more broadly throughout the AARD. As a point of accuracy, in listing the AARD Research Institutes and Centers as of December 31, 1982, there are a number of ommisions in Annex I. I therefore enclose a revised version of Annex I, that is in agreement with the AARD structure shown in Annex 4 of the PCR, should you wish to substitute it for Annex I in the final version of the Audit Report.

2/.. -22- Annex 3s Page 2 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Page 2 April , 1984

2. In paragraph 17, the last sentence indicating that, "the survival and continued, dynamic evaluation of AARD can in large measure be credited to this project", may be a bit strong. While the project undoubtedly was a major catalytic factor in the evolution of AARDthere were a considerable number of other inputs, both from the GOI and external agencies that have contributed substantially to AARD's continued growth and development.

3. The point is well made in paragraph 19 that limiting the PIU's mandate to physical implementation of assigned project components was both practical and cost effective. I fully agree that the tendency to involve the PIU in operationalaspects related to researchwork must be avoided for the PIU to operate efficiently.

4. The benefits to the Project from flexibilityapplied by both the Bank and project authoritiesduring implementation,paragraph 20, were indeed considerable. There are always certain shortcomingsin project design and unforeseen external developmentsthat take place between appraisal and implementation. It is fortunatethat the Bank generallyconsiders the Project Appraisal Documant as a guideline,and allows for flexibility to make changes when needed during implementation to help to ensure project success.

S. Regarding short comings in architectural and systems designs the example mentioned in paragraph 22 of the Sukamandiglass houses might mention lack of adequate ventilation,rather than a lack temperature control equipment.

6. The points regardingthe feasibilityof centralizinglaboratory facilities and functionsin the AARD, paragraph22, and the difficultiesassociated with efficientlypreparing laboratoryequipment lists and specifications for procurementof large quantitiesof such equipment,paragraph 25, continue to be pressing problems for the AARD. Mr. Ablasser rightly calls attentionto the fact that both the Bank as well as the borrower experience shortfallsin technical capabilityin this regard. The suggestion for a phased procedure during implementationis valid. In Research Project II an attempt is being made to overcome this short fall with technical advice of carefullyselected consultants.

7. The difficultyof providingadequate incentivesto researchers,paragraph 30, is a point well taken. Indonesiais taking steps to overcome this limitation,but the problem will continue for some time.

8. The AARD continuesto evalue its operationalprocedure for research programming and management,paragraph 31. Mr. Ablasser has rightly called attentionto the increasingneed to increaseeffectiveness in this process in line with the rapid expansion of research staff and capability during the next few years. His suggestions for more management support to the individualinstitutes, the developmentof a cadre of research program leaders, and stronger adminstrativesupport to free manager'stime for overseeing progress on ongoing research are valid and helpfull.

3/.. -23- Annex II Page 3 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Page 3 April , 1984

9. Since the Audit Report emphasizes the benefits to the Project of limiting the PIU's mandateto physicalimplementation of assignedproject components, no.3 above and paragraph 19 of the Audit Report, it seems the case made for more effective review of research activities during Bank Supervisions is somewhatof a contradiction. It would seem more efficientto generally restrictregular Bank SupervisionMission activities, with the PIU, to implementation matters, and to use the periodic in depth research reviews, required by the Bank in Agricultural Research Project II, as the major vehicle for review of researchactivity.

10. The Audit Report rightly calls attention to the increasingrequirement for adequate budget support for increased recurrent cosits of the constantly expanding research program in the future,paragraph 50, and to meet present needs paragraph 51.

In closing, I thank you for the opportunity to review the draft project Performance Audit Report, and for the continuing interest and supportof the World Bank.

(1~~7~%s~Yyours,

Budhoyo Soekotjo Director, PIU Research

Enc.

cc. The World Bank, RSI Jakarta Secretary , AARD

Ss -- 2? -

",,; / , /44vK K - 25 -

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

Project Completion Report

November 15, 1983

Projects Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (II I >1 - 27 -

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

1.01 The major emphasis of the first five year plan (1969-74) of Indonesia was on rehabilitation of neglected infrastructure, especially in irrigation and transport, and on expansion of agricultural production. The most important single objective was for rice production: an increase of 47% was to be achieved in five years, largely through a major expansion of the existing schemes for the supply of the inputs and credits to farmers (BIMAS/INMAS).

1.02 Agriculture accounted for about 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), nearly two thirds of employment and close to 80% of non-oil exports. Except for oil palm and tea, agriculture is dominated by smallholder production; there are some 15.6 million smallholders producing subsistence and cash crops in about 15.8 million ha. There are also 1,800 estates occupying 2.2 million ha producing mainly rubber, sugar, tea, palm oil and tobacco.

1.03 The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) was originally organized into five Directorates General - Food Crops, Estate Crops, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries and Forestry. Barring for a brief period from 1961 to 1965 when all research institutes were first brought under the Agricultural Research Service and later under the Agricultural Research Coordinating Bureau by -IinisterialDecree, each director general operated its own separate agricultural research and extension services. Duplication of work was commonplace and coordination was weak, leading to waste of manpower, overlap in objective and low levels of efficiency. Training standards were poor and quality of staff was variable.

1.04 In an attempt to rectify this unsatisfactory state of affairs, GOI with assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) commissioned a study by a Joint Agricultural Research Survey Team, which published its recommendation on "Organization, System and Requirements for Research in Agriculture and Related Industries in Indonesia" in July 1969. These recommendations were endorsed by the Bank's Agricultural Sector Survey Mission which visited Indonesia in February/March 1972 and which led to GOI requesting IDA's assistance in preparing a project for improving the effectiveness of agricultural research and extension. - 28 -

II. PROJECTIDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

2.01 In responseto GOI's request,a reconnaissanceand identification mission visitedIndonesia in November/December1972. Their report recommendedthe establishmentof a semiautonomousagricultural research and developmentagency formed by integrationof all research instituteswithin the Ministry. Within such an organizationa projectsuitable for IDA financingwas proposedinvolving not more than five institutes,and focussingon crops which had receivedlittle supportfrom GOI or bilateral aid sourcesbut were likely to respondquickly to researchimprovements.

2.02 It was proposedthat linkagewith the extensionservice would be effectedby the provisionof about 10 agriculturalinformation dissemination centers servinga new extensionagency to be formed by consolidationof all extensionactivities in a manner similar to that proposedfor research.

2.03 GOI having indicatedthat it would implementessential changes implicitin the above proposal,a preparationmission includingconsultants specializedin rubber, oil palm, horticultureand field crop research,and in extensionvisited Indonesia in August 1973. The preparationreport was submittedby this mission ir.December 1973.

2.04 Almost concurrentlyGOI, concernedabout improvingtheir national capabilityin science and technologyappointed a committeeto develop guidelinesfor research. This committeerecommended establishment of 14 agencies for researchand developmentin differentministries including an agency for agriculturalresearch and development(AARD) in the Ministryof Agriculture.

2.05 An appraisalmission visitedIndonesia in March 1974. The appraisalmission proposedestablishment of four nationalresearch centers for (i) rubberat Sugei Putih in North Sumatraprovince; (ii) oil palm at Marikat also in North Sumatraprovince; (iii) highlandfruits and vegetable at Lembang in West Java province;and (iv) palawijacrops at Bedali near Malang in East Java provinceand regionalsubcenters within a new agency for AgriculturalResearch and Development,which was to be setup followingthe signing of a PresidentialDecree dealingwith a major reorganizationof Ministry of Agriculture.

2.06 PresidentialDecree No. 44 and 45 of 1974 established14 agencies for Researchand Developmentin variousministries including the AARD as the agency to providescience and technologysupport to the agriculturalsector and the AAETE as the agency for agriculturaleducation, training and extensionwithin the Ministry of Agriculture. The remainderof the GOI - 29 -

fiscal 1974/75was a period of transitionduring which the agency heads, each with a nucleus of senior staff,were appointed,and made preparation for transferof budget supported18 researchinstitutes and agricultural education,training and extensionresponsibilities from the five directoratesgeneral to the two new agenciesby April 1, 1975. No time limit for the transferof the cess-fundedresearch institutes (rubber and tea) was specifiedin the decree but was plannedto take place as a second stage transition. It was decidedthat PNP financedresearch institutes (oil palm, sugar and tobacco)would not be transferredto AARD.

2.07 A postappraisalmission which visitedIndonesia in September/ October 1974 made the followingchanges: (i) The oil palm research componentwas dropped in view of GOI insistencethat PNP/PTP supported researchinstitutes, including the Marihat Oil Palm ResearchStation, would not be incorporatedinto the AARD. (ii) The highlandfruits and vegetables componentwas reducedto cover highlandvegetables only, in view of the inabilityof the GOI to identifya suitable50 ha extensionto the 56 ha Margahayuhorticultural branch station. (iii) PalawijaResearch Center at Bedali was droppedbecause of the difficultiesin land acquisition. GOI proposeddeveloping a 150 ha block of governmentland at Sukamandi,in West Java provinceas the center for palawijacrops nationalresearch program. The site on the basis of a brief field examinationby the Bank mission appearedto be technicallysuitable, although not as ideal as the Bedali site, for palawijacrops researchpurposes. (iv) In place of oil palm, rice was includedin the project,because of its importanceand an adjacent 250 ha in Sukamandiwas proposedto be developedas the nationalrice researchcenter. The palawijaand rice researchprograms were to share certain facilitiesand servicesin a central laboratoryand office complex, and a joint housingcomplex was to be developed.

2.08 In examiningthe possibilitiesfor orderlydevelopment of the integratedrice and palawijacrops site, the missionen-1ired into progress being made on the nationalrice researchprogram for which a projectassi- stance was being soughtfrom USAID. After considerablediscussion between GOI, USAID and IRRI representativein Jakarta and Bank ResidentStaff, the mission proposedto assist in furtheringthe developmentof the national rice researchprogram and the possibilityof joint,para..lel or coordinated financingfor this componentbetween USAID and Bank was left open. Further justificationfor includingrice researchcomponent at S:.amandi was the Bank's involvementin the developmentof Sukamandiunder the Seeds Project (Credit246-IND).

2.09 At negotiationGOI informedthat governmentdid not intendto request foreignassistance for substantialcivil works and equipmentat Sukamandiin additionto that financedunder the Bank loan and that no foreign-assistedprojects were plannedwhich would be inconsistantwith the - 30 -

development of Sukamandi as the headquarters for the national rice and palawija crop programs and the primary center for research on these crops_ GOI further assured to provide social amenities at outlying research centers.

2_10 The Bank considered it important to make this loan as soon as possible (i) because of the need to assist in the formative stages of developing a substantive and organizational framework for greatly improved future research programs; and (ii) because the benefits derived from becoming involved with the project at an early stage outweighed the possible negative consequences of not having final cost estimates based on detailed design. The cost estimates particularly for the civil works component of the research centers and information centers were approximate and price contingency correspondingly large. Should there be a substantial cost overrun, it was proposed to be met either from a second agricultural research and extension loan or from the government's own resources. The first year of the project was proposed to developing, with the help of internationally recruited advisors, the details of future research programs and to preparing detailed designs of project facilities. The Bank also required that the GOI furnish evidence of final Ministerial Decree providing the necessary organizational cbanges, creation of a PIU (Research) under AARD, appointment of the Director of Pfl (Research) and directsrs of the four national research programs and AARD control over Sungei Putih rubber center before Board presentation and made appointment of a research advisor to the Head of AARD and an architect, management and cost control consultant by a specific date, covenants of the loan agreement.

2.11 The project was designed to strengthen production-oriented research programs of rice, secondary food crops, high land vegetables and rubber and improving agricultural extension service by

Ca) the establishment of a national rice and palawija crop research center at Sukamandi, a national vegetable research center at Lembang, a national rubber research center at Sungei Putih and a regional rubber research station at Sembawa in South Sumatra including the construction of office buildings, laboratory facilities, staff housing and dormitories and health, education and recreational facilities and the purchase of vehicles, furniture, field and laboratory equipment and related materials;

(b) upgrading of about six regional stations for rice research, about four regional stations for palawija crops research and two regional stations for highland vegetable research at sites agreed between GOI and the Bank including the purchase of vehicles, furniture, field and laboratory equipment and related materials; - 31 -

(c) the establishment of a national agricultural information center at Ciawi in West Java and nine regional agricultural information centers at Wonocolo in East Java, Ungaran in Central Java, Kayu Ambon in West Java, Bukittinggi in West Sumatra, Tanjung Morawa in North Sumatra, Tanjung Karang in Lampung, Maros in South Sulawesi, Banjar Baru in South Kalimantan and Lingsar in West Nusa Tenggara including the construction of office and related buildings and staff housing, and the purchase of vehicles, furniture and equipment;

(d) 76.5 man years of technical assistance to assist AARD and AAETE;

(e) 119 long-term and 54 short-term fellowship to train staff of AARD and AAETE; and

(f) recruitment of about 179 professionals (M.Sc, PhD or equivalent) for the research centers and information centers.

2.12 The total project cost estimated at appraisal was US$46.6 millicn of which US$21.6 million was foreign exchange. The Bank loan provided US$21.5 million of which US$16.7 million was for AARD and US$4.8 million for AAETE. It was approved by the Board on May 13, 1975 and signed on Decem- ber 19, 1975. The closing date was extevded from December 31, 1981 to December 31, 1982. The loan was disbursed in full on April 5, 1983. - 32 -

III. IMPLEMENTATION

3.01 There was an approximately nine months delay in the s_gning of the loan agreement following Board presentation arising from a difference of opinion regarding the exact interpretation of the Indonesian word implying ' t control" in a Ministerial Decree dealing with the use of cess funds for rubber research. The project became effective from February 23, 1976.

3.02 From the beginning AARD and AAETE moved with different pace. Both AARD and AAETE were created at the same time and both had to spend considerable time to consolidate but AAETE inherited a PIU with experience in handling Bank projects while AARD had to establish a new PIU. Moreover, AAETE had a smaller and more straight forward component to implement.

AARD

3.03 Project Implementation Unit. A PIU was established in April 1975. The first Director resigned after a few months. For a short period this key post was vacant. The next Director was also a part-time lecturer in Gaja Mada University. He failed to devote adequate time and attention to the project which is one of the reasons for initial delay in the implementation of the project. He was replaced in June 1978 when the project picked up momentum. The current Director who joined in 1982 kept up the momentum.

3.04 Architect and Engineering Consultant. During the initial site plan and working drawing phase the Bank provided architect and engineering assistance as part of project supervision. The draft master plan prepared by the first consultant engaged in November 1975 was found to be inadequate by the supervision mission and his contract was terminated. AARD appointed another consultant on June 6, 1977 for design, supervision and cost control of all civil works. The supervision mission examined in great detail the draft schematic drawings prepared by the second consultant and prepared agreed modification in September 1977. This consultant with the advice and assistance of the IADS consultant engaged at the end of 1977 completed the basic design, detailed drawings, cost estimates and prequalification of bidders for civil works which were reviewed and accepted by the Bank in May 1978.

3.05 Technical Assistance. A total of 62.5 man years of technical assistance fcr specialists to be assigned for the period varying from a few weeks up to four years was included in the project. AARD's initial attempt to appoint a research advisor to the Head of AARD and his headquarters staff, due to have been effected by December 31, 1975 under the loan - 33 -

agreement, and to contract a consulting organization or organizations to provide technical assistance and to manage the fellowship program were -unsuccessful. The first supervision mission discussed with the Head of the AARD the prospect of cons-dering the International Agricultural Development Service (IADS), as principal consultant. The contract with IADS was signed on February 11, 1977 more than a year behind schedule to provide both the technical assistance and the management services for the fellowship program. The Project specialist and leader of the team joined in March 1977 but the procurement/civil works consultant joined in July 1977. The civil works design and cost estimates were finalized after the procurement/civilworks consultant joined. Similarly the fellowship program and procurement started after these consultants were on board.

3.06 Civil Works. The appraisal had assumed that FY76 would be the first year of the project and that the consultants to assist the AARD with implementation planning and civil works design would be completed in year 1. Civil works at the National Highland Vegetable Research Center, National Rubber Research Center and National Rice and Palawija Crops Research Center were scheduled to be completed by October 1977, July 1978 and February 1979, respectively. But actually the civil works at the National Highland Vegetable Research Center were completed in March 1981 and at all other sites by mid 1982. The main reason for the slow implementation of the project was the lack of adequate preparation for the project at appraisal. It was also too optimistic to assume that preparation of detailed design and cost estimate would be completed in year 1 given the fact that both AARD and PIU (Research) were new organizations having no previous experience with Bank projects.

3.07 Procurement. Despite the fact that civil works were let on the basis of ICB no foreign firm competed. Vehicles were procured through ICB. Equipment was procured through ICB or-LCB according to the conditions laid down in the Loan Agreement.

AAETE

3.08 Civil Works. The existing PIU of the Second Education Project (Cr. 288-IND) was assigned to implement the project. PIU appointed PRW Architects as consultant for implementing site surveys, designs, preparing bid documents and supervising construction work in ten sites. Site selection, acquisition and survey of all the ten sites were completed by April 1977. But due to delay in appointing cost control consultant, preparation of architectural and construction documents, bidding, contract award and signing the contracts were accomplished one year behind schedule. All the ten AICs were completed between January and May 1979 about two years behind schedule. - 34 -

3-09 Procurement. Civil works were let on the basis of local competitive bidding. All equipment and vehicles were procured through international competitive bidding, while furniture were procured locally. Total time lapse between preparation of the master list for equipment and actual delivery to site has varied between 766-940 days. However, PIU anticipated the delay and placed orders for equipment well in time so that most of it arrived within 2-3 months of completion of civil works.

3.10 Technical Assistance. Loan Agreement required AAETE to employ an agricultural extension advisor/specialist for NAIC by March 31, 1976. A Fund-in-Trust agreement with FAO for provision of four information specialists was signed in November 1977, about a year and a half later. The leader of the team and the agricultural extension advisor for NAIC joined in July 1978.

Performance of Contractors and Suppliers

3.11 None of the contractors could complete the civil works in time according to contract, in Sukamandi, Sungei Putih and Sembawa. The duration had to be extended by 180 days, 210 days and 290 days, respectively. In Margahayu/Lembang no time extension was necessary while in Pangragajian/ Lembang and Baru Ajak/Lembang duration of contract was extended by only 45 days. Although there was provision of penalty in the contract agreement for delay, it was not enforced. Due to reasons stated earlier the construction of civil works started late and further delay by the contractors in execution compounded the problem. The quality of civil works was also not uniform. It is particularly poor in Sembawa.

3.12 The construction period of the AICs varied between six months and ten months. The qua'lty of work in some AICs left much to be desired. However, the AAETE took action to rectify most defects. - 35 -

IV. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

4.01 Total project cost was US$46.03 million, surprisingly close to the appraisal estimate of US$46.6 million. This agreement is purely fortuitous since overruns and underruns in different items have cancelled each other. Annexes 1 and 2 show the actual expenditure as percentage of appraisal estimate. For the project as a whole actual expenditure for civil works (77%) and Technical Services (75%) were less than appraisal estimates while those for materials and equipment (163%) and establishment cost (132%) were higher than appraisal estimates.

4.02 Annex 2 shows the agency-wise performance. Under research the actual expenditure for civil works (70%), technical services (75%) and establishment costs are less than appraisal estimates and that for materials and equipment (225%) are considerably higher. The physical contingencies for civil works were overestimated. Moreover due to devaluation in November 1978 and incresing the disbursement percentage of civil works from 40 to 50% the rupiah expenditure was reduced. Savings under technical services is due to (i) lesser utilization of consultants services; and (ii) a portion of the training cost for those who commenced their training under the project but have to continue beyond the closing date being met from National Agricultural Research Project (Cr 1014/Ln 1840-IND). Lower establishment cost under research is due to (i) establishment cost at appraisal being calculated using a ratio of US$30,000 per professional - while the actual cost was much lower; and (ii) delay in posting staff at the research centers due to late completion of civil works and training. Higher cost for materials and equipment is due to (i) inadequate provision for laboratory equipment at appraisal; and (ii) escalation of price due to delay in procurement of laboratory equipment consequent on delay in completion of civil works.

4.03 The significantly higher operating cost of the extension component (US$8.61 million) which does not include salaries of staff of AICs is due to the fact that the appraisal underestimated additional operating cost of US$9,000 per AIC per year.

4.04 Disbursement was extremely slow (Annex 3). By the end of the fourth year (FY78/79) total disbursement was only 18Z of the loan compared to the appraisal estimate of 84%. Disbursement picked up during the last four years and by April 5, 1983 the loan was disbursed in full. Several reallocations were made between categories of expenditure.

4.05 Project accounts were generally well kept. - 36 -

V. OPERATINGPERFORMANCE

Research

5.01 The four national programleaders for rice, secondarycrops, highland vegetablesand rubber were appointedbefore the effectivenessof the project. Initiallythe nationalprogram leader for rice and secondarycrops operated from Bogor, for rubber from Medan and for highlandvegetables from Lembang. Becausethe control span of the AARD Head was becomingrather extensive,GOI, by PresidentialDecree No. 47 of September29, 1979 established five centralResearch Institutes(Food Crops,Fisheries, Animal Husbandry,Forestry and IndustrialCrops) and one new researchcenter for (programmingand monitoring)(Annex 4). Because of the unique historical developmentof the research institutesfor estate crops, they are under a Board of Management,chaired by the Head of the AARD (Chart,Annex 4).

5.02 Sukamand'Research Institutefor Food Crops. The AppraisalReport placed major emphasison the developentof Sukamandias the National Center for Rice Researchand Palawija Crop Research. This situationchanged significantly,however, between appraisaland completionof the project. There was no questionabout the suitabilityof the Sukamandilocation for research on irrigatedrice. But there was always a questionabout the appropriatenessof Sukamandilocation for palawijacrop research. A series of administrativeactions and decisionshas sharpenedthe focus and broadenedthe responsibilityfor rice researchwhile, at the same time, diffusingand dispersingthe responsibilityfor researchon palawijacrops.

5.03 As a result of the recent emphasison program developmentin the AARD, the CentralResearch Institutefor Food Crops (Bogor)has assigned primary, secondaryor supportingresponsibility to each of its seven research institutesfor the commodityand functionalresearch under its mandate (Annex 4). In that assignment,Sukamandi has primaryresponsibility for research on irrigatedrice. AARD is consideringmaking it also the main center for researchon water managementand agriculturalmachinery. For secondarycrops Sukamandihas no primaryresponsibilities. Temporarily it is the nationalheadquarters for wheat research. But this is not a suitable location for wheat researchand when a suitablelocation is found, the headquartersof wheat researchwill be relocated. Sukamandihas a secondary role for researchon corn, sorghumand grain legumeson a commoditybasis and for croppingsystem and postharvesttechnology on a functionalbasis. 60X of the 250 ha east farm has been developedout of GOI funds but the entire west farm of 150 ha still remains to be developed.

5.04 A staff of 180 implementsthe researchprogram at Sukamandi. This includes 8 PhDs, 13 MSs, 35 lrs and 17 BSs. The remainingsupport staff have high school educations. More staff members are continuingtheir - 37 -

studiesfor higher degrees. The social amenitiesare in place and a telephonehas recentlybeen installed.

5.05 The appraisalmission originallyselected Bedali near Malang as the site for NationalResearch Center for palawijacrops but for reasonsstated earlierreluctantly agreed to shift it to Sukamandi. After the joint facilitiesfor rice and palawijacrop researchhave been createdat Sukamandi GOI has shifted primaryresponsibility of the bulk of palawijacrop research to Malang. The appraisalmission's stand has been vindicatedin a costly manner. However,GOI proposeto make full use of the facilitiescreated at Sukamandi.

5.06 LembangHorticultural Research Institute. During the project implementationthere were severaladministrative changes. The responsibility of the Lembang Institutehas been broadenedto cover researchand development of higlandand lowlandvegetables and other food crops with Segenungresearch stationand Cipanasexperimental farm as its substations. The physical developmentof the LembangInstitute proceeded very smoothlyand the supportingequipment was essentiallyin place at projecttermination. There are 2 PhDs and 8 MSs providingleadership to 100 supportstaff. 50% of the land has been providedwith irrigationout of funds from the National AgriculturalResearch Project (Cr. 1014/Ln.1940-IND).

5.07 SungeiPutih ResearchInstitute for EstateCrops. Civil works have been completed,equipment has been receivedand is being installed. 103 ha of land has been cleared and experimental plantings have been made and an earlier international clone nursery is on the estate which offers some producing trees for research. At presentthere are 3 PhDs, 2 MSs and 23 IRs and othersare on trainingabroad. A nationalresearch program document describes the lead role that SungeiPutih will play in the nationalprogram. The major responsibility for researchin the estatesector for this commoditywill rest with this Institute. Other operatinglocations which will have the same statusas Sungei Putih but will be followingthe leadershipof SungeiPutih in rubber researchare, the researchinstitutes at Sembawa,Bogor, Jembar, Tanjung Morawa and Getes. A number of promisingclones have yieldedover 3 tons of dry rubber per ha per year. Social amenitiesare still lackingalthough the project providedfunds. The deep well already installeddoes not provide adequatewater supplyand a second deep well is proposedto be installedwith GOI funds.

5.08 SembawaResearch Institute for Estate Crops. Sembawais to become a nationalresearch center for smanllholderrubber based farming systems. Sembawa is locatedin the largestsmallholder rubber producing area in Sumatra,and has excellentexperimental plantings (938 hectares)some of which are alreadyproducing, with additionalplantings scheduled to utilize the 3,350 ha of land area available. The existingplantings include 33 - 38 -

experiments on breeding, soil and fertility, agronomy and tapping. Research workers have decided to conduct rubber and other perennial crop-based farming system research at Sembawa by the end of 1982.

5.09 The change of Sembawa from a branch station to a national research and development center has created some difficulties. The physical facilities are inadequate for the staff already in position and need to be expanded. The water supply is still a problem. The pipe carrying water from Musi river leaks at some places at times, the underground storage and filtration system are not adequate and one of the generators is out of order. The social amenities are reasonably satisfactory with suitable hospital services and a high school located in Palembang. Telephone is still lacking.

Extension

5.10 Agricultural Information Centers and Production of Extension Material. The staffing pattern of the AIC and their educational qualifica- tion are shown in Annex 5. Extension material produced is shown in Annex 6. AICs send the extension material to the various agricultural services at the provincial, regency and district level, the various research institutions, agricultural high schools and agricultural training centers mostly by post. There is some complaint in some prcvinces about the quality of printing and the inadequacy of the material particularly for distribution to farmers. Although the DIP for production of extension materials is many times more than what was estimated at appraisal, it is still insufficient. These problems may be partly overcome by a better coordination between NAIC and RAICs. An evaluation was conducted in 1980 to find out how some of the information materials are being utilized by the target audiences. Such evaluation should be repeated.

5.11 Civil Works - Research and Extension. Actual building area constructed in the four research centers with rehabilitated structure is 48,214m2 compared to the appraisal estimate of 48,175 sq m (Annexes 7 and 8). Two additional agricultural information centers have been established over and above ten AICs established as per appraisal estimate out of savings. Location of five AICs was changed in the same province due to nonavailability of land in the original location as follows: (a) North Sumatra: from Tanjung Morawa to Gedang Johor; (b) Lampung: from Tanjung Karang to Tegineneng; (c) West Sumatra: from Bukittinggi to Padang; (d) South Sulawesi from Maros to Ujung Pandang; and (e) West Nusa Tenggara: from Lingsar to Perinjauan.

5.12 Procurement of Equipment. The appraisal report did not spell out the details of procurement. Provision was made for Rp 4,500,000 per laboratory staff for equipment and Rp 41,500 per staff for office furniture - 3q -

which was found inadequate and the Loan Agreement was amended to augment the allocation. Specifications, tender documents and bills of quantities were prepared in 1977/78 for four locations. These documents were revised in 1979 with the decision to fully equip laboratories of Margahayu, Sungei Putih and Sembawa with funds from the Project and Sukamandi with funds from the National Agricultural Research Project (Cr. 1014/Ln. 1840-IND). All laboratory equipment has been physically delivered to the three locations mentioned above. However due to lack of floor space in the existing laboratory building in Sembawa plus the absence of an air conditioned room to house some specific scientific equipment, installation of the equipment has been delayed. The other two laboratories have been equipped. Some equipment has not been used as the staff have not been trained as-yet. Contracts for supply of field and workshop equipment for all the four centers were awarded in March/April 1980. Excepting 4 Nos discplough 12 trailers and 1 tractor all the rest have been delivered. These are expected to be delivered by June 30, 1983. A contract was awarded for the supply of 351 titles of journals at a cost of US$103,300. The journals are being supplied. GOI waived restriction for import of vehicles by ICB. Nine LWB and 35 SWB four wheel drive vehicles have been supplied.

5.13 Technical Assistance. The increased use of technical assistance by the PIU at AARD HQ over the proposed was due to retention of consultants in the financial administration and procurement position for much longer periods than projected at appraisal, and the addition of a consultant to assist the Director of the PIU in the review of the design and the supervision of civil works (Annex 9). A number of factors were involved in the under utilization of the technical assistance projected for program and research specialists. Only a program specialist was appointed for 4 years for rubber because the selected candidates were not available. No technical assistance was furnished for the rice and pLlawija program because of the continuing presence of IRRI scientists during the implementation period through USAID program. The short-term consultants were nearly all utilized, since these specialists could be better matched with the tasks assigned, and the local support could be more easily arranged. AAETE signed a contract with FAO Fund-in-Trust for four consultants and made almost full use as per the appraisal estimate.

5.14 Fellowship. Between the time the appraisal report was prepared in 1975 and contracts signed with IADS in 1977 to manage the fellowship program, there was marked improvement in the MSc program of several Indonesia institutions. This provided the incentive for increasing local fellowship for M.Sc, reducing the number abroad and increasing the number of PhDs abroad. This would make the MSc training more cost-effective and serv2d as a screening device for PhD training abroad. Against the target of 89 long-term fellowships 142 persons have completed MSc or PhD degrees and 211 commenced MSc or PhD studies during the tenure of the project but will - 40 -

completeunder the NationalAgricultural Research Project. Under extension against appraisalestimate of 9 PhD and 12 MS abroad and 9 MS in-countrythe actual achievement was 9 PhD abroad and 1 in-country and 25 MS abroad. Details are given in Annex 10. 5.15 It became evidentthat studies abroadwere being constrainedby lack of ability in the English language. In responseto this need, an Englishfor AgriculturalTraining Program was initiatedwithin the PIU. The first session was started in April 1978 and a total of 12 sessionswere held throughfirst half of 1982. A total of 190 AARD staff participatedin these sessions. Under researchagainst a target of 44 short-termfellowships 73 fellowships abroad were administeredunder the project. - 41 -

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCEAND DEVELOPMENT

AARD

6-01 AARD was establishedpractically at the same time as the project was being appraised. It lacked previousexperience in implementingBank projects. There was thereforeinitial delay in appointingthe engineering and technicalconsultants. It must be said, however,to the credit of AARD that once it consolidatedits positionand got acquaintedwith Bank procedures,the speed of the project implementationaccelerated. Project componentsfor a second Bank projectwere identifiedjointly by AARD and a Bank missionin 1977. A preparationreport was completedby AARD in February 1978 which was appraisedin June-July1979. The projectwas approvedby the Board in May 1980 (NationalAgricultural Research Project Cr. 1014/Ln. 1840-IND - $65.0 million).

6.02 AARD has existedfor a short time, especiallywhen measuredin the context of time in the continuing,accumulative process of generationof knowledgethrough research. SeveralAARD scientistshave receivednational awards. The AARD has maintainedall of the formerties of its individual institutions,with internationalresearch centers and agenciesand expanded its contactwith others. 6.03 PIU Research. In 1975 the PIU was formedwithin AARD to administerthe constructionprogram and equipmentprocurement and to coordinatethe training,fellowship and technicalassistance program under the project. The PIU had no experiencein implementingBank projects. It is only after the appointmentof a dynamicdirector and consultantson finance,training and procurementthat the PIU becamevery effective. At the time of appraisalof the secondresearch project schematicdesigns for about half of civil works were ready. The PIU was also entrustedthe implementationof the secondBank project from 1980. On the whole the PIU has performedcreditably and despite intialdelay, implementedthe project satisfactorily.Its record keepingand accountingwere satisfactoryand it regularlysubmitted the semiannualreports.

AAETE

6.04 AAETE was createdat the same time as AARD. Contraryto the case of AARD, however,AAETE did not get the policy supportfor it to assume the responsibilitiesallocated to it by the presidentialdecree. Since AAETE had a more straightforwardcomponent of the projectto implementand it already had an adequate'ystaffed PIU it proceededat a fasterpace than AARD from the beginningand completedthe extensioncomponent earlier than the researchcomponent under AARD. AAETE also establishedtwo additional - 42 -

AICs out of savings. AAETE lost no time in utilizingthe facilitiesof the newly establishedAICs and made funds, several times higher than the appraisalestimate, available for productionof extensionmaterials. AAETE also spent more than their share of civil works. Under the Third AgriculturalTraining Project 15 more AICs would be establishedby AAETE in the remainingprovinces.

6.05 PIU (Extension). The PIU establishedfor the SecondEducation Project which became part of the AAETE was responsiblefor implementationof extensioncomponent. The PIU was adequatelystaffed to start with. In view of the experiencewith IDA procedures,it proceededin a businesslike manner from the start. Despiteinitial delays the PIU performedcreditably and implementedthe project satisfactorily.Its record keeping and accounting were satisfactory. It submittedsemi-annual reports regularly.

6.06 InternationalAgricultural Development Service. IADS rendered very useful service. The ProjectSpecialist and leader of the teamaprovided valuableassistance to the Read of AARD. He organizedthe overseasfellow- ship program and the trainingprogram well. Both the civil works/procurement specialistswere helpful in the implementationof the civil works and procurementprogram. The first financialspecialist was ot little use but the performanceof the second financialspecialist was satisfactory. The rubber program specialisthelped in the developmentof the rubber research program for the NationalRubber ResearchCenter, Sungei Putih. He joined the Bank at the end of his four year contract. The technicalassistance provided to the vegetableresearch program made littlecontribution. The use of technicalassistance through cooperation between international researchcenters and nationalresearch programs would be more beneficial than direct use of consultantsfrom consultingfirms who do not have a base in any active researchorganization. On the whole performanceof IADS has been satisfactoryand AARD renewed the contractwith IADS for providing technicalassistance to the NationalAgricultural Research Project.

6.07 FAO Fund-in-TrustConsultants. Except two consultantswho were engaged for short period, the other three consultantshave rendereduseful services. These consultantsvisited the AICs regularlyand conductedon the job trainingcentered on designinga specificinformation program, encouragingpretesting of materialsproduced, commenting on prototypesof some of the materials,assisting the staff in gainingmore skills in the use and maintenanceof various equipment. They also assistedin the planningof training curriculafor the trainingon operationand maintenanceof printing equipment;graphic arts; photographyand film processing;operation and maintenanceof mobile units and agriculturaljournalism and rural broad- casting. On the whole their performancewas satisfactory. - 43 -

VII. BANK PERFORMANCE

7.01 The Bank played an importantrole during the process of establishment of AARD and AAETE and went out of its way to help the new organizations. The Bank made the first loan availablevery early in the formativestage of developingthe substantiveand organizationalframework for greatlyimproved future researchprograms without adequatepreparation of the projectand made optimisticassumptions about implementation.The Bank recognizedthat benefits from full scale project would take long time to materialize. For this reason the first researchproject was designedas one phase in the long-termprocess of buildingnational research capacity. As soon as AARD consolidatedits positionthe Bank approveda second bigger project. The main contributionof the Bank projectshas been the developmentof manpower because it is individualswho build or change institutions. The Bank has also approvedseveral projects under AAETE to strengthenagricultural educationand in-servicetraining. The Bank agreed to raise the disbursement percentagefor civil works, to financelong term fellowshipsin loca' universities,to reallocateadditional funds for equipmentand to the establisbmentof two additionalagricultural information centers out of savings under the project. During the life of the project,there were ten supervisionmissions. Early supervisionmissions provided engineering and architecturalassistance. From July 1978 supervisionresponsibility passed on to RSI in Jakartawhich facilitatedcloser contact,frequent consultation, faster approval,regular supervisionresulting in accelerateddisbursement. The Bank agreed to extend the closingdate by one year to allow full disbursement.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

8.01 Overall the project is a success. The projectwas intendedto support the new institutionalsystem for researchand extension. The full strengtheningof these systemswill take many years and results,measured in terms of economicbenefits, would be difficultto quantify. A number of intangibleand tangiblebenefits flowed from the project such as: (i) improvedcapability and increasedcoverage of researchand extensionstaff through trainingwhich has laid the foundationof professionallycompetent staff for the continuationof researchand extension:(ii) productionof new improvedvarieties of crops;and (iii) developmentand widespreadpropagation of new techniquesand packagesof practicescapable of realizingthe full potentialof new improvedve-ieties.

8.02 AARD has alreadyreleased a number of improvedvarieties (Annex 12) and AAETE has producedextension materials for disseminationof new - 44 -

knowledge. The result has been gratifying. The production of rice at least partly due to research and extension contributions has far exceeded the forecast made by the appraisal mission (Annex 13).

8.03 The four commodity groups supported by this project are significant sources of income for small farmers. Rice cultivation, in particular, provides most of the resources of many small farmers as well as the staple diet of the population. By helping to increase the productivity of these four commodity groups, the project has made a direct impact on the well being of the small farmers in particular and the population in general. - 45 -

ANNEX 1

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

Total Project Cost (US$ million)

Actual as Z of appraisal Appraisal estimate Actual estimate GOI Bank Total GOI Bank Total GOl Bank Total

Civil works 10.57 7.04 17.61 7.71 5.83 13.54 73 83 77

Materials and equip- ient 1.07 3.27 4.34 0.22 6.15 7.07 86 188 163

Vehicles 0.08 0.69 0.77 0.03 0.69 0.72 38 100 94

Technical services 1.45 10.50 11.95 0.17 8.83 9.00 12 84 75

Land acquisition and establishment cost 11.93 - 11.93 15.70 - 15.70 132 - 132

Total 25.10 21.50 46.60 24.53 21.50 46.03 98 100 99 - 46 -

ANNEX 2

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

Total Project Cost of Research and Extension Components (US$ million)

Actual as X of appraisal Appraisal estimate Actual estimate GOI Bank Total GOI Bank Total GOI Bank Total

Research Civil works 8.98 5.98 14.96 5.66 4.88 10.54 63 81 70 Materials & equipment 0.51 2.10 2.61 0.89 4.97 5.86 174 237 225 Vehicles 0.07 0.31 0.38 - 0.38 0.38 - - 100 Technical services 1.14 8.31 9.45 0.02 7.12 7.14 1.8 85 75 Land acquisition & establishment cost 11.00 - 11.00 7.09 - 7.09 64 - 64

Subtotal 21.70 16.70 38.40 13.66 17.35 31.01 62 103 80

Extension Civil works 1.59 1.06 2.65 2.05 0.95 3.00 129 90 113 Materials & equipment 0.57 1.16 1.73 0.03 1.18 1.21 5 102 70 Vehicles 0.01 0.38 0.39 0.02 0.31 0.33 - - - Technical services 0.30 2.20 2.55 0.16 1.71 1.87 53 78 75 Land acquisition & establishment cost 0.93 - 0.93 8.61 - 8.61 926 - 926

Subtotal 3.40 4.80 8.20 10.87 4.15 15.02 320 86 187

Total 25.10 21.50 46.60 24.53 21.50 46.03 98 100 99 - 47- ANNEX3

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCL AND EXTENSIONPROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

A. Schedule of Disbursement (US$ million)

Fiscal Appraisal estimate Ac-tual Actual cumulative year Total Cumulative Total Cumulative as Z of total loan

1975/76 1.1 1.1 - - 1976/77 5.7 6.8 0.06 0.06 0.3 1977/78 6.9 13.7 0.89 0.95 4 1978/79 4.3 18.0 2.91 3.86 18 1979180 2.5 20.5 4.64 8.50 40 1980/81 1.0 21.5 6.20 14.70 68 1981/82 - - 3.34 18.04 84 1982/83 - - 3.46 21.50. 100

B. Disbursement by CateRories

Original /a Actual disburse- Actual as x Category allocation ment at 04/05/83 of original

Research Civil works 3.90 4.88 125 Equipment, materials and furniture 1.35 4.97 368 Vehicles, excluding sedans 0.35 0.38 105 Fellowship and consultant services 5.60 7.12 127 Unallocated 5.50

Subtotal 16.70 17.35

Extension Civil works 1.00 0.95 95 Equipment, materials and furniture 0.65 1.18 181 Vehicles, excluding sedans 0.15 0.31 207 Fellowship and consultant services 1.50 1.71 114 Unallocated 1.50

Subtotal 4.80 4.15

Total 21.50 21.50

/a Several reallocations were made during implementation. INDONUSIA..

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND) PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

Orgaza:ttovAl Structure of the Agency for Agricultural Research and DavelosI at (R )

AAMRDJI

CrNr n eNTlR mO H^10" RsiFOrRn StCotlAR1AT AGRICUIL.TURAL AGICIiI.TUIAl 1.1RARY FOR M:RIr.UI.I *AI h:srAp 11 DATA ARCIUITURAW. qIlARANa11 I

CLIflR:A CFTRAI. Al1II cFIT .I For tlTrR rnx I *FSFARcI R.FARCI RFSrANCII I FSEARCIU RL5FAKCI I SIUPr), Salt AILCRO-.CIC NSTITUT9FOR INSTITUTEFOR I STITUiF roR INSTITUTEFOR liISTiTUTF Fr I I tsTAr Crnr i arSs>^All _ PSVARCII ronu CROIIS IHOIISTRIAI.CROPS FS.Sl'lY _ ANIHAI.SCI..NCZ , Fl R11F.lS I1

-RF.SI:ARI X RK CII rFrr AARCII...... x ' . | ...... iiAHCII elr.sI[-- RKS l' INSTI UTFS I I STIi111.S IIISTIlIJTES INSTltUTbSZI IIISTIl UTCS Il IIIIIs

FIW11 rSUA-- MWOR _]IUUAHL1 IPO.RFS- OREST ANINAI.W AIIIHA LAW) FiIZIiiFl [i"ul'; ,Jl^r L J Ur L tl rn . S_lroguc-Tihu, U~~j M I--lJ l --_-

@,~~~~~~A A,C ,ui , ,-'1- - ~~~~~~fl * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1~~~~IIAR

iiAi eC42 | ~ts§@I -_ l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-|l4'le -- 49 - ANNEX 5

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Agricultural Information Centers

Others/ agric. Institutions Agronomy Ani. Fishery Forestry Agric. Agric. ext./ Total hus. econ. engin. educ.

Number of Subject Matter Specialist by Specialization

NAIC Ciavi 2 2 1 - 1 - 1 7 RAIC Gedong Johor 1 2 - - 1 1 1 6 RAIC Padang 1 3 - - 1 - 4 9 RAIC Tegineneng 2 2 - - 1 1 2 8 RAIDC Kayuambon 2 1 2 - 1 - 2 R RAIC Ungaran 2 2 1 - 1 - 3 7 RAIC Wonocolo 4 2 1 1 4 - 3 15 RAIC Banjarbaru 1 2 - 1 2 - 3 9 RAIC Ujung Pandang 1 2 - 2 2 - 1 8 RAIC Peninjauan 2 2 1 1 - - 2 R RAIC Aceh 1 1 - - - 1 3 6 RAIC Ambon 1 - - - - - 1 2

Total 20 21 6 5 14 3 26 95

Sarjana Senior Junior Elemen- Institutions Ph.D Master Sarjana Muda high high tary Total /a /b school school school

Number of Personnel by Level of Education 34 NAIC Ciawi - 4 3 1 12 3 11 45 RAIC Gedong Johor - 1 5 5 21 5 8 36 RAIC Padang - 2 7 3 22 1 1 48 RAIC Tegineneng - 2 6 2 24 6 R 46 RAIDC Kayuambon - 3 5 3 26 2 7 30 RAIC Ungaran - 1 8 8 10 - 3 34 RAIC Wonocolo 1 1 13 2 12 2 3 39 RAIC Banjarbaru - - 3 6 - 21 2 7 35 RAIC Ujung Pandang - 1 7 5 15 2 5 41 RAIC Penrijauan - 1 7 7 20 2 4 15 RAIC Aceh - - 6 1 7 - 1 8 RAIC Ambon 1 - 1 - 5 - 1

Total 2 19 74 37 195 25 59 411

/a Universlty Graduate (in-country). 7b Academy Graduate (Bachelor, In-country). -50- AVI= 6 IUDONSA

AcRICULTUTALRESEA8L AND ZXTIISION PmJKCT (LOAN1 174-rIM)

Production of Extension NMatrialn during 1978/79 - 1982/83

NaIC RAIC RAIC RAtC RAIC RAIC RAIC RA1C RAlC RAIC RATC RA1C Type of extension material Gedong Padang Teginensng Kayo Ambo. Ungaran Wanocolo Hataran njiung l anjr hubon Banda Jobor Pandang Dart Ae11

Prining Medi-:L. Information (copies) 14n.00on 94,000 "4,n0 n4.OO A7,0O0 142,000 117.000 4A.n0n 42.000 ;6.000 4n,0nn 3f.nAnn

bro-eure (copies) Forestry 19,00n 12.000 1.000 1O.000 17.000 .0onn 11,nnn R,O0 1F.,00n 17.1nn - 4^,01 Industrial plantations 11.000 26.0no 27,000 53,5no0 10.nw 27,00n 20.nno 12.nn0 11.nnn 21.0nn 4,000 4.n0n Animsl humbandry 48.500 26.000 27,000 27.500 53,non 14.5nn 12.nO0 24.nOO 46.nnn e.nnn - - Fisbery 29.000 10.000 22.n0o IR8500 10o0nO 12.500 31.000 3,nnn 2s.n0n 21.nnn 9,nn0 Sn,n Food crops 43.5nn 17.00n 23.00 25.75n 41,0o IS.-0n0 30.nno 27,000 1,0nn0 2%000 %nnnn Harticulture 21.500 15on0 15,noo 8.750 70,no0 77,000 12.0nn - 90non 9,0no - - Extension 35.000 36.000 24o000 24.750 26.n00 51,5no 23,000 20,nnn 2s,0no 11.non Q,nno %.non

Posters (copies) Forestry 10,000 12o000 5.000 18.750 ,0noo 145son - 15.00 10mnnn 5.0sn - - Industrial plantatlon. 28.500 17.000 12.0Zo 17.500 22,00n 14s500 23,000 250noM 25,nn0 15,0nn 5,000 5,000 Animol husbandry 19.500 19.500 27.000 33.750 2z,0nn 25.000 43,000 25,00n 25,nnn 2,0n00 5s.nn - Fishery 22.000 37,000 62.00o 13.750 12.non 49.nOO 56,0noo ,non 15.o0 20.oon s.no0 %.ooo Food crops 17,500 43.000 28,000 30.000 27,0nO 27.50n 57,n00 15,000 25.0nn 30.nnn ,0ono 5.000 Harticulture 15.000 16.000 20,000 - 33.000 20,noo 0.00 10000 1000nl 100.nno - - Extenaloc 28.500 26,000 41,000 31,250 55,000 34,900 40,n0O 2n,00n 25,000 15.000 - -

Leaflets/Folder (copies) Forestry 33,000 8,000 - 38.000 24,000 - 25,000 10.000 24.00n 35,n0o s,0no In,OO Industrial plantations 19.000 65.000 53.000 65.000 41.006 4s,000 81.000 45.,O0 45,000 65,000 2n0.no 1O.nnO Animal husbandry 46,000 69,0no n0,000 84.0no 68,000 84,0no 80,000 66,00n 65.0nn 45,n00 s,non I.000o Fishery 22,non 65.00n 83,000 55.000 17.00n 75,000 60.000 25.s0 85,000 75.00n 20.000 10.000 Food crops 36.000W 9,000 90.000 49.00 61,000 0,oon000 82,0 7R,00n 79,00n 8s,00o 100.00 15,n00 Narticulture 22.0nO 20,000 10,000 20,0n0 115,000 40.000 350O00 3n,nnn 2n0,nn 1o.nn0 - 5.0o0 Extension 70.nn0 53.nno 43,000 53,0n0 61.000 17,000 76.n00 7n,nnn 6f,000nn 32,O I.5n00 15.n0n

Slide Program (sets) 28 4S 15 34 36 43 16 27 32 23 A s

Photo Progra (sets) 36 42 43 46 4s .50 1R 41 4n 4 14 10

Copy Fil (copies) 0 8 5 1 3 23 1 1 1 1 - -

RecordingfR dio Program (aets) 65 177 138 130 126 As 132 124 128 124 36 36

DisplayJ (ets) 27 2Q 20 17 31 56 9n 12 23 14 3 -

Magazine, Agriculture (copies) 20 ------

Instructional media (sets) 8 15 IR 16 12 21 20 14 18 17 3 5

TV Program (timex) 22 24 - - 4 - 24 - 12 - - -

Exhibition (tiues) 2 4 5 11 5 5 4 4 5 7 I 4 -51- ANNME7

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECr COMPLETIONREPORT

Key Indicators - Civil Works (Research)

Total area ({g u) Space Appraisal Z increases estimate Actual (decrease)

Sukamandi (Rice & PalawiJa) New Structures Central facilities 4,208 3,569 (15) Field services center 4,500 760 (83) Screen houses, etc. 1,600 1,747 9 Drying floors 1,500 - (100) Housing & messes 14,798 15,316 3.5

26,606 21,392 (19.6)

Rehabilitated Structure Central facilities - 1,566 Field services center 982

- 2,548

Subtotal 26.606 23,940 (10)

Lembang (Vegetables) New Structures Central facilities 1,175 1,400 19 Field services center 100 72 (28) Screen houses, etc. 200 216 8 Housing & messes 3,550 3,555 -

5,025 5,243 4.3

Rehabilitated Structure Central facilities - 1,010 Field services center 227

- 1,237

Subtotal 5,025 6,480 29

Sungei Putih (Rubber) Central facilities 3,869 4,110 6 Field services center 1,600 1,236 22.8 Screen houses, etc. 1,200 667 (44.4) Housing & messes 5,657 6,742 19

Subtotal 12,326.5 12,755 3.5

Sembawa (Rubber) Central facilities 949.5 1,577 66 Field services center 700 421 (40) Screen houses, etc. 200 317 58.5 Housing & messes 2,369 2,724 15

Subtotal 4,218.5 5,039 19.45

GRAND TOTAL 48,175.5 48,214 -52 -

INOCESIA

AUCULUIAL USEAU *JW ENSIOU ROWEC?(LON 1179-DmD)

IUOIJCT CWHzTION REORT

ClvS Vbwks - Research

SukmeadI Sukalamdil Hargaayn angragajia Baru Aick Sunogi Smbm XI Lanbang LA=baug Lanbaut Putlh

Contract zount CRP bil) 1.78 1.03 0.32 0.13 0.19 1.23 0.75

Duratlon of ConstrUCtlon Ieluding extenioan and coinislonig (days) 900 630 570 37S 345 1,110 920

New Structures (sq a) I.boratoryroffice buildlng. 3.569 - 1.400 4,110 1,575 Of fI ce - t1011 Vehicle shed 616 72 648 346 Fertilizer/cebical *eore 144. 450 Screen/green house 1.747 216 667 317 Power houme - - - - - 75 Housing Type 36 a 144 792 432 144 Type 70 70 560 840 280 Type 120 840 3,600 1,920 600 Type 150 1,500 2,850 1,650 750 600 Type 150 (variant) 750 750 750 600 450 Type 250 250 - 240 250 280 Jr. mesa - 1.400 840 Sr. e 1,440 360 385 265 265 1,110 370

Rehabilitated Structure (sq a) hdfIDIStrative office (library) 1,566 1,237 Field servlce center 300 workshop 192 Field office 490

Total Civil Works 13,618 10,322 3,310 1,255 1,91S 12,755 5.039

Utilitles Pover source 300 KYA PLU PLK 800 XVA 375 WVA generator generator generator

Water Source Deepmll PAR PAN Deepimll Msa rlver

Telephone PARX PABX of 5/50/6 1 trunk PABX 1 trunk 1 crunk L additlonal llne 1/15/2 11D line 5/5016 & PAU PAIBX Sf50/6 3/2 5/3 INDONESIA

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH MID !XTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Key Indicators - Technical Assistance (Han-month.)

Secondary Highland Nature of technical AARD HQ Rice crops vegetables Rubber Other NAIC RAIC Grand total assistance Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. AtU -pr.ActualAppr. Actual Appr. Actual Appr. Actual

Reaearch advisor to head of AARD 36 63 ------

Financial administra- tor 36 55 ------

Equipment procurement apacialiat 12 67 ------

Training course instructor 30 ------

Program advisor - - 48 - 48 - 48 37 48 48 - 11 - - - -

Other specialista - - - - 168 - 168 68 108 - - - -

Agricultural extenslon advisor ------60 36 - -

Agricultural informa- tionspecialist ------108 108

Total 114 185 I8. - 216 - 216 105 156 48 _ 11 60 36 108 108 918 493 AalCULTUIAL 3ZSAUCN ANDEXTElSION PR3W?CT (LOAN 1179-11>)

PROJECT COIPLETIONWRO?T

Key Indleutors - Long-TerM*nd Short-Term Fellowbipa

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.1

Xlee * lav erePer _ij PatiedI Hiahland wgat b asu Continuing Fa11ed/ ContinuIng P tledI Coutiuwleg Appraisal Complated withdrew under Appraisal NXX 11 Completed vithdrew under 'AR It Appraisal CempleAd withdraw mder UA It

ReSearch Tor u Fellewha proara Loral proram In IndooeeleI ISe - _ _ . 2 . 3 . . . !Se 4 29 24 47 4 6 3 3 I 1 6 tt phIl - - - IS - - - I - - - - - Subtotal 4 29 24 62 4 ! 6 7 3 1I 1i Overses program Diplema - - - - ...... YSe 9 5 1 - * 3 - I 7 2 2 1 PhD 5 3 - 4 S 2 - 3 4 t I 3 Subtotal 14 a I A 14 _ 4 11 3 3 Total Lona-Tero is 37 25 66 Is 13 6 It 14 4 4 Shnrt-Tern Fe)1o2!hI Pro ran Abroad------Local (English tralnig)- -- !ucensl ,n Lf-PTgermFaellovehl Pro tam

Phr Overwe progra

Short-Tri, fellovwhip Praogra AbrNzd - _ _ a' Rubber OtherMARn pror7ao Failed/ Continuing Total Appraisal Falled/ Continu[n- Completed vithdrev underNAR Failed/ Continuinx It AppraisalClo-pleted vithdrev underMAR MT Appraisal CObpleted vtthdrev underWAI Tt Research Long-ternTellov hip Progran Local program in Indonesia 65c- --- NSc I 1 1 6 I 5 - 3 PhD 4 4 56 28 1 6 - - - 7n 71 9 h4 5 - 4 - 147 11 - 4 - 12 Subtotal 6 7 S 14 4 61 24 84 22 106 Overseas program 65 IRS Diploma - HSc I - - - 13 - - - h - - - I - PhD 7 5 6 - 5 3 - 6 4 43 22 1 7 - 14 2S 14 1 Subtotal 20 In 9 1 6 4 11 - 14 hp 6 Totat LonnrTerm 17 26 16 6 2n 13 72 24 1n3 _q 142 7n 722 Short-Tern Fellowship Program Abroad - - - - Loeal - - - (English training) - - 44 73------4 Ixtension - - Long-Ter. FallovwhipProgren LoCal programin Indonesia HSc - - - - - PhD - - -4--- overseasprogram - "Sc - - - - - PhD - - - - 12 - - - 25 ------4 Short-Ter.Fellovwhip Program - - Abroad ------1t 12 - -

______.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. - 56 - ANNEX II

INDONESIA

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT CO1PLETION REPORT

Professional Staff (Number)

Appraisal estimate PhD MSc Ir/a Total

1. National Rice and Palawija Crops Research Center (Sukamandi) 57 8 13 35 56

2. National Vegetable Research Center (Margahaya) 24 2 8 40 50

3. National Rubber Research Center CSungei Putih and Sembawa) /a 48 4 5 35 44

4. Agricultural Information Center 50 2 19 74 95

/a University graduate (in-country). AMU 12 . - ~57-

AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSIONPROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NEWRELEASED VARIETIES

Year . Rice Palawija Horticulture

1976 1. Adil 2. Nakmur 3. Gemar 4. PB 34 5. Gata 6. Gati

1977 1. PB 32

1978 1. Brantas 1. Hhrapan Baru (maize) 2. Serayu 2. Adira 1 (cassava) 3. Asahan 3. Adira 2 (cassava) 4. Cltarum 4. Daya (sweet potato) 5. PB 36 5. Nomor 129 (mungbean) 4. PB 38 .1979

1980 1. Semaru 1. Bromo (maize) 1. Intan (tomato) 2. Cisedane 2. Arjuno (maize) 2. Ratna (tomato) 3. Cimandirl 3. Cipanas (potato) 4. Ayung 4. Cosiwa (potato) 5. PB 42

1981 1. PB 50 1. Parikesit (maize) 2. PB 52 2. Prambanan (sweet potato) 3. PB 54 3. Borobudur (sweet potato) 4. Herak (mungbean) 5. Galunggung (soya- bean)

1982 _

1983 1. Sadang 1. Nuri (mungbean) 2. Sentani 2. Manyar (mungbean) 3. Rusa (peanuts) 4. Anca (peanuts) -INDONESIA AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND) PROJECTCOMIPLETION REPORT Rubber, Rice and PalawijaCrops: Comparisonof AreasPlanted, Production and Yields

AppraisalEstimate Actual 1971 1980 1980 Area Production Yield Area Production Yield Area Production Yield ('000 ha) ('000 ton) (ton/ha) ('000 ha) ('000ton) (ton/ha) ('000 ha) ('000 ton) (ton/ha) Rubber 1,972 810 - 2,200 1,000 - 2,3231' 905 V Rice 8,500 12,700 1.5 9,300 16,600 1.78 9,005 20,164 2.24 Maize Sorghum2,687 & 2,138 .79 4,000 5,000 1.25 2,7353 3,9911/ 1.46 UA Soybeans 630 422 .67 1,000 1,000 1.0 732 652 .89 Groundnuts 413 299 .72 500 500 1.0 506 470 .93 SweetPotatoes 367 2,579 7.0 380 3,500 9.1 276 2,079 7.5

For 1977 2/ For 1979

V Maize only I0 ~ 59 ~ ANNME 14

INDONESIA

ACGICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1179-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Status of Covenants

Lo;m agreement covenant Subject Action taken

3.01 (b) Establish & staff PM1 (Research Completed Maintain & staff PIU (Extensson) Completed

3_01 (c) Funding of budgeted expenditures Provided

3.04 (a) Appointment of architects, and cost control consultants Completed

3.02 (b) Appointment of research Completed more than a advisor year behind schedule.

3.02 (c) Engagement of research Completed more than a service organization year behind schedule.

3.02 (d) Engagement of advisors ii) research Completed more than a year behind schedule. (ii) extension Completed about a year and a half behind schedule.

3.02 (e) Engagement of specialists (i) research (i) Completed for rubber and highland vegetables behind schedule. (ii) extension (ii) Completed about a year and a half behind schedule.

3.04 (a) Submission of documents as- necessary Compiled with.

3.05 Acquisition of land & rights completed for research AARD has obtained right of use of land in Sungei Putih

3.06 (b) - Appointment of national program directors and directors of P.I.U. (Research) and P.I.U. (Extension) Completed C. o -

Hrs~~,;,o>6z e//,5;c A/-' - 61 -

INDONESIA

NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

November 15, 1983

Projects Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office cl•

~~~~l~~~I - 63 -

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

NATIONALFOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT

(Loan 1267-IND)

I. Introduction

1.01 Agriculture plays an important role in the economy of Indonesia. Although its contribution to gross domestic product has declined from 40% to 30X and to export from 45% to 33% since 1968, it still offers employment to 66% of the population. Except for oilpalm and tea, agriculture is dominated by smallholder production; there are some 15.6 million smallholders growing subsistence and cash cops on 15.8 million hectares. There are also 1800 estates occupying 2.2 million ha producing mainly rubber, sugar, tea, paln oil and tobacco.

1.02 The Ministry of Agriculture (HOA) was originally organized into five Directorates General - Food Crops, Estate Crops, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries and Forestry. Each director general operated its own separate extension services.

1.03 The major emphasis of the first five year plan (1969-74) was on rehabilitation of neglected infrastructure, especially in irrigation and transport, and on expansion of production in agriculture for both the domestic and foreign market.

1.04 The most important single objective was to increase production of rice, the staple food of the country. The mass guidance (BIMAS) program was introduced in 1965-66 with this objective in view. A BIMAS secretariat within the Ministry of Agriculture was created to administer the program. Although there was provision for a BIMAS Secretary as executive head, the Director General of the Directorate of Food Crops Agriculture (DGFCA) held the post. The BIMAS program was implemented via Village Units (VU) which comprised 600- 1000 ha of rice land in two to three villages and up to abcut 1500 farm fnmilies. A fully established VU had a BRI credit office, a farmers cooperative (BUUD/KUD) for input supply and purchase of paddy or village Kiosk to supply inputs and at least one field extension worker (PPL). The main responsibility of the PPL was to provide technical advice to the farmers, maintain a check on planted area, yields and production, assist with planning VU crop production programs and assessment of input requirements. In 1967/68 the mass intensification (INMAS) program was initiated in the belief that after a few years under BIMAS the farmers- requirements for credit would be less. Under this program, all farmers who are not eligible for BIMAS due to credit default or who do not wish to take credit or accept full packages, could obtain subsidized inputs for cash. - 64 -

1.05 GOI bad been actively participating with the PAO/IBRD Cooperative Program since 1970 in the development of a long-term plan for strengthening the agricultural education system of the country, including agricultural extension. The plan essentially embraced agricultural education in its entirety, and GOI with CP guidance and under the aegis of the Education Division of the Bank prepared for Bank financing an agricultural education project that had incorporated agricultural extension within its overall scope (Education II Cr. 288-IND - US$6.3m approved in 1972). Finance had been made available accordingly to strengthen 13 middle-level national agricultural schools; to establish provincial in-service extension training centers; and to strengthen and integrate the extension services of the five Directorates- General of the MOA by creating a national coordinating agency for agricultural education, training and extension within the Ministry.

1.06 As a continuation of this plan a World Bank sector survey with CP participation in November 1973 and a World Bank/CP reconnaissance mission in September 1974 identified the further need to establish 150 rural extension centers (RECs) together with the strengthening of 10 regional training facilities for agriculture (outside Java) that would provide higher level technicians.

1.07 In 1974, the Government reorganized the MOA (Presidential Decrees No. 44 and 45), by removing the research functions and responsibility for extension methodology from the Directorates-General and placing tbem into two new agencies, the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development (AARD) and the Agency for Agricultural Education, Training and Extension (AAETE) respectively. AAETE assumed responsibility for agricultural education and training and extension methodology. The responsibility of implementation of Education II (Cr. 288-IND) and extension component of Agricultural Research and Extension Project (Ln. 1179-IND) devolved on AAETE. The reorganization did not provide for AAETE-s responsibility for extension through the provinces to the districts and sub-districts. The five Direcrtorates-General remained responsible for the administration of extension services in the provinces - an arrangement which needs to be examined and streamlined to ensure maximum impact of extension services.

1.08 The DG of DGFCAwho continued to hold the post of BIMAS Secretary, had the largest number of extension workers and provided the bulk of the extension service in the provinces. Extension staff of the different Directorates-General at the provincial, district and sub-district levels were administratively part of the local government structure, but received supervision and technical back up from their respective Directorates-General.

1.09 The GO! sought the Bank-s assistance in preparing a project to establish an integrated National Agricultural Extension service covering food crops, estate crops, animal husbandry, fishery and forestry under AAETE. - 65 -

II. Project Identification,Preparation and Appraisal

2.01 In response to GOI-s request a CP mission visited Indonesia in January/February 1975 to initiate preparation of a National Extension Service Project. Subsequently, in pursuance to an internal decision by the Bank to prepare for possible Bank financing a National Agricultural Extension Service Project for Indonesia under the aegis of the Agricultural Projects Division, rather than under its Education Division, a Bank mission visited Indonesia in April 1975. The mission discussed the approach of the proposed National Extension Service with AAETE, representatives of all the DGs, BAPPENAS, BIMAS and Department of Home Affairs. It was decided that a special project preparation team within the AAETE would prepare a National Agricultural Extension Project covering all sub-sectors, with the assistance of CP.

2.02 The special team completed the project preparation in July 1975 and an appraisal mission visited Indonesia in August 1975. The mission proposed establishment of a national agricultural extension service for all farm enter- prises in Indonesia, separated from regulatory, administrative and research functions, under AAETE. Furthermore, AAETE would be responsible for all in- service training in regional inr-service training centers and in RECs and the DGs for the services and regulatory work. The project was proposed to cover five provinces of West Java, East Java, South Sulawesi, North Sumatra and West Sumatra.

2.03 An important issue arising out of the proposed National Agricultural Extension project was issuance of the 'Ministerial Decision' establishing the separate lines of commAnd for (i) extension under AAETE; (ii) regulatory work and services under DGs within MOA without which, it was thought, it would not be possible to implement the project. A letter was addressed by the Bank on October 15, 1975 to the Head of the AAETE requesting, inter alia, issuance of a ministerial decree transferring the responsibility for all extension activities and extension staff from the five DGs to AAETE, which would operate through the Provinicial Government extension services at the field level. The Head of the AAETE in his reply of November 30, 1975 asserted that a ministerial decree authorizing basic organizational restructuring of the MA was not needed, this having been accomplished by Presidential Decrees Nos. 44 and 45 of 1974.

2.04 There was no agreement between DGFCA and AAETE about the transfer of extension staff and extension activities from DGFCA to AAETE since the proposed transfer was considered to disrupt severely the efforts to increase food production which was accorded the highest priority. In the face of this opposition, the Minister of Agriculture subsequently decided not to attempt a unification, but to strengthen the extension capabilities of the different DGs.

2.05 A post appraisal mission visited Indonesia in February 1976. Because of budgetary and personnel constraints, GOI decided to limit immediate large scale strengthening of extension services to DGFCA and requested the Bank to - 66 -

reorient the National Agricultural Extension Project to assist DGFCA to strengthen and expand its agricultural extension capabilities. To support activities of the BIMAS program, the coverage of the project was increased from five to nine provinces. The project was accordingly renamed National Food Crops Extension Project.

2.06 Negotiations for the project took place from April 13 to April 16, 1976 and the Bank and the Indonesian delegation agreed to (i) the loan beiPg effective with the appointment of the Project Director and a firm of architects; (ii) import restrictions for vehicles being waived before Board presentation; (iii) the State Auditor being considered as an independent auditor.

2.07 GOI having fulfilled the conditions of Board presentation, t,-e project was approved by the Board on May 25, 1976 and the Loan Agreement was signed on June 4, 1976.

2.08 The appointment of the Project Director directly under DG OF DGFCA in accordance with the provision of Section 3.02 and a firm of architects in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.03(1) of the Loan Agreement were conditions of effectiveness. According to covenant 3.03(ii) the Borrower was required to appoint an extension specialist by December 4, 1976 and according to Section 3.04 the Borrower was required to submit a proposal outlining arrangements for coordinating agricultural extension activities under the Project with those of the other Directorates-General of MDA by June 1977.

2.09 The project was designed to strengthen agricultural extension services for food crops in nine provinces of West Java, Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan by providing for:

(a) an increase in the number of extension staff from about 4140 to about 9240;

(b) an extensive training program for extension workers and farmers in the nine provinces inlcuding (i) in-service training for incremental project staff and (ii) a program of overseas fellowship;

(d) construction of 349 Rural Extension Centers (REC) and renovation of about 180 existing RECs and the construction of a project headquarters;

(e) employment of a local firm of architects, an extension specialist and about 50 man-months of short term specialists;

(f) procurement of vehicles and equipment; and - 67 -

(g) completion of a rice research contract with IRRI initiated under Credit 246-IND.

2.10 The total project cost estimated at post appraisal was US$44.2 million of which US$15.8 million was foreign exchange. The Bank loan approved by the Board was US$22.0 million. The closing date was extended from June 30, 1982 to December 31, 1982.

iII. IMPLEMENTATION

3.01 The legal opinion having been signed on August 7, 1976, a Project Director appointed on September 1 and the contract for architect having been signed on September 7, 1976, the Loan Agreement became effective from September 21, 1976.

3.02 Although a Project Director was appointed on September 1, 1976 it took a long time to fill the other key posts on a full-time basis. FollowinR repeated recommendations by Bank supervision missions four Assistant Directors were appointed by end of 1978. The central project office was composed of 15 professional staff of whom about 6 holding important administrative positions, devoted half or less of their time to the project. The problem was compounded by the fact that the project headquarter building was so small that many officers and support staff worked in other agencies scattered throughout Jakarta. Insufficient manpower led to implementation problems such as (a) delay in payment to contractors for completed RECs; (b) delay in organizing in-service training; and (c) inadequate production of extension materials.

3.03 The poor administrative performance of the project in the first two years was principally due to the lack of full-time headquarters staff in several key positions. The major administrativeproblem facing the project in the first two years was the prefinancing problem. Project staff used to submit budget allocation requests for Bank reimbursable expenditure (DIP Supplement) to BAPPENASfor approval several months later than locally financed budget (DIP) requests, as BAPPENASconsidered prefinancing requests after it had reviewed DIP requests for all projects in different sectors. Thus DIPs were approved by BAPPENASaround January (for the budget year beginning April 1) while DIP supplements were considered much later. Even after DIP Supplement was approved by BAPPENAS, Bank Indonesia took several months to prefinance which caused further delay. Thus DIP supplement for 1977-78 was approved by BAPPENAS in April 1978, one year after commencement of the fiscal year and Bank Indonesia commenced prefinancing from October 1978, 18 months behind schedule. The Bank staff discussed the matter with GOI and the entire prefinancing procedure was streamlined by a Finance Ministry Decree (387/KMK,012/1978of October 20, 1978). According to the new procedure both DIP and DIP-supplement should be sent together by January to BAPPENAS so that approval of both could be obtained in time for the fiscal year. The central Project Office was substantially strengthened by increasing the professional - 68 -

staff from 15 to about 50 after the NationalAgricultural Extension II Project was approvedin February1980.

3.04 Civil Works. Althoughaccording to the implementationschedule in the AppraisalReport constructionand renovationof RECs were spreadover five years, GOI decided to complete the same in three years. The Bank agreed providedGOI could make adequate funds available in the DIP and DIP supplement. The architectprepared standard designs for new RECs and the existing RECs to be renovatedbefore end of 1976. Contractorswere also prequalified by that time. By end of 1977, constructionof 167 RECs were almostcom- plete. But due to the delay in prefinancing,payment to contractors could not be made and many contractorsstopped working. DGFCA'sattempts to keep con- tractorson the job by requestingdirect paymentby the Bank to contractors were approvedon three occasions. Many completedRECs were not handed over due to non-receiptof paymentand could not be furnishedor used for several months. Althoughthe problemof prefinancingwas solvedby the Finance Ministrydecree in October 1978 devaluationof rupiahin November1978 created a sense of uncertaintyand many contractorsslowed down work. It took BAPPENASseveral months to approve a new yardstickand the permissible increasedue to inflationfollowing devaluation. The provincialauthorities of East Java decidednot to constructRECs of 40 sq m approved under the project and waited until the NationalAgricultural Extension II projectwas approved under which the size of the RECs was increased to 130 sq m. The new Presidential Decree to encourageindigenous contractors at districtand province level furtherdelayed the constructionsince the RECs were tendered on district(Kabupaten) basis. Constructionof the last few RECs was completedtowards the end of 1982. Thus insteadof three years as plannedby GOI it took six years to completethe constructionand renovationof RECs. Seen against appraisalestimates the delay was only one year.

3.05 In-serviceTraining. No in-servicetraining program could be organizedin 1976-77and 1977-78 due to the failureof obtainingprefinancing in a timelymanner. The first in-servicetraining, a three week orientation course for 40 PPs was held in Jakarta in September1978. However,later emphasismade up for the initial short fall in the trainingprogram.

3.06 Procurement. Procurement of vehicles and equipment was done following ICB. Furniture were procured by following LCB. Civil works being scatteredwere let on the basis of LCB.

3.07 Performanceof Contractorsand Suppliers. The performanceof the consultantin supervisingcivil works for qualitywas not satisfactory. Adequatesupervision of constructionparticularly outside Java was not enforcedby the Consultant resultingin poor qualityof civil works. There , was no unusualdelay in the supply of vehicles,equipment and furniture.

3.08 IRRI Contract. In December 1972, the GOI entered into a five-year contractwith the InternationalRice ResearchInstitute for provisionof specialiststo strengthenrice, maize and soybeanreserch at the Central ResearchInstitute for Agriculture-sresearch station adjacent to the National - 69 -

Seeds Corporationsseed productionfarm at Sukamandiin West Java. Funds to the amountof US$1.0 millionin support of this contract were provided under credit246-IND. In March 1975 the contractwas renegotiatedat a revisedcost of US$1.7 million. Since it was consideredinappropriate to extend the closing date of credit246-IND to continuepayments on accountof the IRRI contractalone, $0.7 millionwas includedunder the NationalFood Crops Exten- sion Project to cover the cost of the contractfrom the closingdate of credit 246-INDto the terminationof the contract.

3.09 The IRRI contractwas not dirctly concernedwith the extension programunder the project. At the end of the contractUS$0.67 millionwas spent.

3.10 Status of Covenants. All the loan conditionswere generallycomplied with. The ProjectDirector was appointedand the contractfor architect signedwithout delay to make the project effectivewithin four months of the Board presentation. Adequatefunds were made availableto cover incremental operatingcosts of DGFCA, Bimas and each of the ProjectProvinces. Extension Specialistwas appointedsix months behind the date stipulatedin section 3.03(ii)of the Loan Agreement. A MinisterialDecree outliningarrangements for coordinatingextension activities of all the Directorates-Generalwas issued,about two years behind the date stipulatedin section3.04 of the Loan Agreement. Despitedifficulties in recruitingsuitably qualified staff for provincesin the other Islands,total number of extensionstaff recruited exceededthe appraisalestimates. The contractdocuments for civil works and procurementwere submittedin time. The accountswere audited for all the fiscal years but always behindschedule. All lands for constructionwere acquired in time. Annual programfor trainingand fellowshipwere submitted to the Bank and the agreed program was implemented.

IV. FINANCIALPERFORMANCE 4.01 Total projectcost (Annex1) was US$89.09million an lOlZ cost overrun over the appraisalestimate of US$44.2 million. This was mainly due to underestimationof a numberof essentiallocal cost items and additionof four provincesin 1978 over nine provincesoriginally included in the project. The Supervisionmission of June 1978 updated the projectcost estimatefor nine provinceswhich stood at US$50.3million. The cost increasesoccurred largely in categoriesthat were not reimbursedunder the Bank loan. While there had been cost increases in nonreimbursable categories, there were savings in civil works and procurement due to overestimationof unit cost at appraisal. The June 1978 supervision mission worked out the revised requirement for loan funds to be US$18.0million for nine provinces. To use the expectedsurplus of US$4.0million of loan fund, DGFCA proposedin May 1978 and the Bank agreed to includeanother four provincesunder the project. The cost for the enlargedproject (13 provinces)estimated by the June 1978 supervisionmission was US$60.3 millionwhile that preparedby GOI was US$77.4 million. Estimates of physicalachievement for the four additional provinces were prepared on the basis of same yardsticksas those used for the originalnine provinces. In this report the term -appraisal estimate' has been used to cover estimates for thirteenprovinces. - 70 -

4.02 The actual project cost (US$89.09 million) is higher than either supervision mission estimate of $60.3 million or GOI estimate of US$77.4 million. This is due to further increases in salary, travel cost and daily allowance of supervisory staff during the period 1978-1982.

4.03 Disbursement (Annex 2) lagged behind appraisal estimated but only slightly. The project closed only six months behind schedule and by April 26, 1983 disbursement was full. Actual disbursement for civil works and vehicles, equipment and furniture was less than the appraisal estimates while for training and consultant services it was much higher. The disbursement under training and consultant services exceeded the allocation substantially because of the larger number of extension staff trained due to the great importance laid by GOI to manpower development (Annex 5).

4.04 Project accounts were generally well kept but audits were not done in a timely manner. After repeated requests by supervision missions, audits for the first three years were done one at a time by an outside firm which was not quite satisfactory. and at the close of the project firm arrangements had been made for auditing accounts. However, the audit reports are still being awaited. - 71 -

V. OPERATINGPERFORMANCE

5.01 OrganizationalDevelopments. The major organizationalinnovations of the projecthave been the establishmentof a ProjectDirectorate betweenthe Director General of Food Crops Agriculture (DGFCA)and the Provincial Inspector of Agriculture and the organization of most of the existing crops of field level DGFCAstaff in the project provinces,plus an additionalbody of newly recruited field level staff, into a true extension service. In effect, a field extensionservice, totally devoted to supplyingfarmers with technical informationon a regularbasis, directedand supervisedby a unit in Jakarta totallydevoted to extension,has been createdand insertedin an organizational structuretraditionally preoccupied with regulatingthe transferof suallholderpaddy land to the plantingof sugar and tobaccoand with the managementof BIMAS program.

5.02 This changein emphasis has occurred de facto, not de jure. The management of food crops extension is merely the project management, with salaries paid under the projectslocal budget;the managementpositions (Project Director,Assistant Directors, etc.) are functional,not structural. The field extensionstaff are paid under a varietyof budgets,chiefly from that of BIMAS and the projectitself. Many of the extensionactivities are financedby Provincialbudgets, while some trainingactivities are financedby AETE. Nevertheless,despite the organizationalmorass, an extensionservice has been firmlyestablished. To ensurecontinuity, impact and successof this servicethere is urgent need to streamlineits structure,strengthen its staff in numbersand qualityand improveits logistics. The reasons for this successappear to be the following:

(a) Quality of projectmanagement. All the ProjectDirectors and AssistantDirectors have directedoperations both at headquarters and throughfield supervisionmissions energetically, forcefully,and purposefully,concentrating on achievingthe aims of the Trainingand Visit extensionsystem throughoutthe project provincesto the maximum extentpossible with their limitedfinancial, personnel, and organizationalresources.

(b) Single-AgencyImplementation. The projectwas implementedby officersof a single agency,the DGFCA. Thus, even thoughthe ProjectDirectorate has no directstructural jurisdiction over the ProvincialInspector and their staffs,all provincialstaff realizethat projectstaff are in close contactwith the DirectorGeneral and representhim, and that they themselves may be promotedor transferredto centralproject office.

(c) Receptivityof Provincialand Field Staff. The Trainingand Visit System is a logical approach to implementing agricultural extension and is generallyrecognized as a great improvement over the old haphazard, sporadic, undermanned, enforcement- orientedby most ProvincialInspectors and their staffs and it is no wonder that they have cooperatedwith representativesof - 72 -

the project from Jakarta in establishing the new approach to extension.

5.03 Extension Program The project, despite several deficiencies in administrative functions at the central level has been successful in orgar- izing field extension work in provinces. The expanded force of PPLs recruited and reorganized under the project formed farmers groups in each village area, encouraged the farmers and village leaders to select leading farmers to be the main points of contact between the extension worker and the mass of farmers, and arranged and implemented a permanent schedule of meetings (normally on a 14 day basis) with the farmer groups. The PPLs have been well managed by the PPM and PPS of the project, and by structural extension officers in the district, residency, and provincial extension bureaus.

5.04 While PPLs and PPMs have generally been well managed and supervised, and have devoted themselves almost entirely to extension work, the PPSs frequently have not,especially in the initial years of the project. PPS have often been drafted to perform a multitude of administrative jobs to the detriment of their extension responsibilities. As a result, training of PPLs bad to be left to the PPMs, who are often no more qualified than the majority of PPLs and who have no link with research stations and universities. However, after the National Agricultural Extension II project became effective, involvement of the PPSs in the training and visit system has improved due to tightening the control and programing of PPS work by the Assistant Directors. But improved training is an area where further focus is obviously justified.

5.05 Civil Wores. Total number of RECs constructed or renovated under the project is 705 against appraisal estimate of 645 for 13 provinces. (Annex 3, Table 3) Most RECs have 1-2 ha of land provided by provincial governments without any cost to the project.

5.06 Procurement of Vehicles, Equipment and Furniture. Procurement has been completed more or less according to appraisal estimate and distribution in provinces is shown in Annexes 4, Table 12.

5.07 Training. 13,619 extension staff were trained compared to appraisal estimate of 5,436 (Annex 5) but the quality was lower than foreseen at appraisal. Although the in-service training program started two years after loan effectiveness, the total number of extension staff trained exceeded appraisal estimates. Three PPS have been sent for PhD program and 16 for MS program abroad. In order to overcome the difficulty of attracting PPs to the Other Islands,/l 80 PPLs having requisite educational background have been sent to local universities for Ir /2 degree. On successful completion they will be posted as PPS in other Islands. These postgraduates programs were taken up in the last year of the project and has to be funded from National Agricultural Extension II Program for one year. Since proficiency in English was a major constraint for the etudies abroad, GOI arranged English courses in

/1 AU Islands in Indonesia other than Java are grouped together and referred to as Other Islands.

/2 In-country graduate degree in Agriculture. - 73 -

Jakarta for three months in cooperation with the British Council and Lembaga Indonesia Amerika. 43 extension staff participated in this course.

5.08 Consulting Services. Against the provision of 50 man-months of Extension Specialist and 50 man-months of short term Subject Matter Specialists, in the Appraisal Report, the project employed the following consultants:

Man-months

1. - Extension Specialist. 6 2. - Horticulturist. 6 3. - Financial Accountant 48 4. - System Analyst 24 5. - Agroeconomist 12 6. - Agronomist 12 7. - Training Advisor 24

Total 132

The extension specialist appointed on part time basis had to leave within a few months due to personality conflict. The horticulturist continued for about six months. The financial accountant and the system analyst worked in the project for the longest period helping in maintenance of accounts. The agroeconomist and agronomist stayed only for a year and were assigned various duties. The training advisor continued for two years helping in organizing and supervising in-service training program and fellowships. Supervision missions pointed out the inadequacy of extension packages for secondary crops. They recommended that commodity specialists and extension specialists on secondary crops might be invited from CINMYT, ICRISAT, AVRDC, IITA for short periods for reviewing the research results, helping in preparing suitable packages of practices and training for PPS and provincial and Kabupaten staff. No action was taken by Project Directorate, but the validity of this recommendation remains.

VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

6.01 DGFCA. After the issue of the Presidential Decree Nos. 44 and 45 in August 1974 the Directorate General of Food Crops Agriculture had four directorates for planning, economics, production and agricultural technique. The Director General as the Secretary of BIMAS had extension staff under BIMAS program but there was no directorate for extension. The Project Directorate, therefore, had to be established to implement the project and to serve as link between the Director General and the extension staff in provinces and districts. The Project Directorate not being a structural set up, the Director General had difficulties to fill the positions on a full time basis. Initially most of the senior positions were on a part-time basis. But gradually all the professionals in the Project Directorate were appointed on a full time basis. Initially when the Project Directorate was not adequately - 74 -

staffed procurement of vehicles, equipment and furniture was handled by the office of the Secretary to the DG. One of the staff of this office participated in a course on procurement in Washington. It must be said that procurement of vehicles, equipment and furniture was handled very efficiently. For the first two years, therefore, the bulk of the disbursements were for procurement.

6.02 Other than procurement, D&FCA did not directly deal with the implementation of the project. But the Director General and the Secretary to the DG closely monitored the progress of the project implementation and provided the needed guidance.

6.03 Project Directorate. The Project Director was responsible for the implementation of the project. Because of the difficulties in filling the posts of professional staff on a full-time basis and lack of experience with Bank projects, there was some initial delay in the implementation of the project. But despite the initial setback the Project Director has performed creditably and implemented the project satisfactorily. The dedication of a handful of project staff has transformed the traditional multi-purpose extension organization into a motivated cohesive force. Its record keeping and accounting were satisfactory and it regularly submitted the monthly and annual reports. The same Project Directorate is also responsible for implementation of the National Agricultural Extension II Project.

6.04 Consultants. The extension specialist made valuable contribution during his short tenure. He gathered reliable and reasonably comprehensive management information. The financial-management consultants provided excellent assistance in preparing a new budgeting, accounting and management information system. The horticulturist during his brief stay made a survey of horticultural production and marketing in Indonesia. It is not known, however, to what use this information was put. The agroeconomist and the agronomist unfortunately did not make any worthwhile contribution because their terms of reference were revised by Project Staff in the process of recruitment. The training advisor made useful contributions in the follow up and impact evaluation of different in-service training programs.

VII. BANKPERFORMANCE

7.01 The Bank's involvement in assisting the improvement of field extenr- sion services for food crops began with the extension component in the irrigation project (Ln. 1100-IND). It intri-duced a version of the training and visit system of extension in irrigation command areas by provincial food crops agricultural staff. The Bank also helped in the strengthening of in- service training of extension in education projects (Cr. 288-IND) as well as creating facilities for production of extension materials in the Agricultural Research and Extension Project (Ln. 1179-IND). Based on successful organization of these efforts, the Bank attempted to formulate a project which would create a unified extension service, also based on the training and visit system, serving all smallholder agricultural activities. However, due to the - 75 -

development outlined above, it was eventually decided to proceed with a food crops extension project to be implemented by the DGFCA. Once the decision was made the Bank went out of its way to help. The scope of the project was increased from 9 to 13 provinces. During the life of the project, there were 13 supervision missions. From July 1978 supervision responsibility passed on to RSI in Jakarta which facilitated closer contact, frequent consultation, faster approval and regular supervision. The Bank agreed to finance long-term fellowships for PPL in local universities, increase the number of long-term fellowships abroad and to the construction of additional RECs out of savings. The Bank agreed to extend the closing date by six months to allow fuli disbursement. Mutual understanding and respect between the Bank and DGFCA and Project Directorate were excellent throughout. The most creditable feature is the creation of a climate in which issues relating to deficiencies of extension can be frankly discussed between the Bank and GOI staff and hopefully resolved.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

8.01 Overall the project achieved success in its main objectives. The project thus far has extended mainly information on rice, with limited attention paid to fruit, vegetables and secondary crops. The major specific agricultural impact of the project has been its remarkable success in combatting the unprecedented severe attacks of brown plant hoppers in the nation's main rice areas in 1976-77. In the years following the outbreak, the expanded corps of field workers has promoted a shift by hundreds of thousands of small farmers to recently released resistant rice varieties and increased usage of fertilizers and effective insecticides. The rapid alleviation of losses to this pest alone has probably fully recouped the costs of the project from an economic point of view, and underscores the value of a well-organized corps of field extension workers in constant contact with farmer groups in every locality, capable of reacting quickly to unanticipated change in agricultural conditions by disseminating needed information to the mass of farmers. The total paddy production in Indonesia has increased from 23.3 million tons in 1976 to 34.5 million tons in 1982.

8.02 Although the project has been followed by the National Agricultural Extension II Project covering all the sub-sectors in 26 out of 27 provinces of Indonesia, further Bank support would be necessary to sustain and improve the extension service already introduced. Even the success in increasing the rice production is not uniform. Other Islands have lower productivity. A question is being raised whether the disparities between Java and the Other Islands, where extension services are much weaker, are increasing. Secondary crops have hardly received any attention so far. A unified extension program covering all subsectors is still not a fact but a goal. The transmigration program has received insufficient extension support. Further assistance is therefore necessary for upgrading the skill of extension staff, increasing number of RECs in Other Islands and in transmigration areas, and providing houses, offices and vehicles for extension staff in Other Islands for all round improvement in agricultural productivity in Indonesia and above all to place the extension service in a structural framework of the Indonesian civil service. -76- ANNEXI

INDONESIA

NATIONALFOOD CROPSEXTENSION PROJECT (LOhN 1267-IND) PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

Total Project Cost (US$ million)

Revised cost Revised cost Appraisal estimateJune estimate June estimate 1978 for 1978 for for 9 'a 9 provinces 13 provinces Actual provinces Total FEC Total FEC GOI Bank Total

CapitalCosts Land acquisition 2.92 3.04 - 4.86/b - 0.70 - 0.70 Construction 4.94 6.73/c 1.82 7.977E 2.26 0.48 3.08 3.56 Vehicles, equipment, furniture 13.44 10.89 9.47 13.31 11.31 1.58 12.27 13.85

Subtotal 21.30 20.66 11.29 26.14 13.57 2.76 15.35 18.11

Trainingof Consultants Consultants 0.72 0.83 0.64 0.83 0.69 - 0.97 0.97 Overseas training 0.72 0.64 0.58 0.87 0.72 - 2.35 2.35 In-servicetraining 2.15 2.60 - 3.22 - 0.02 2.66 2.68

Subtotal 3.59 4.07 1.22 4.92 1.41 0.02 5.98 f6.00 IncrementalOperating Costs O&M buildings,vehicles and equipment 2.32 6.02 0.78 7.20 0.94 7.15 - 7.15 Extensionactivities 5.76 4.86/e - 5.50 - 26.29 - 26.29 Overhead,administration 1.51 3.94/f - 4.20 - 46.21 - 6.21 Salaries 9.03/d 10.08 - 11.60 - 21:.66 - 24.66

Subtotal 18.61 24.90 0.78 28.50 0.94 64.31 - 64.31

IRRI contract (Cr. 246-IND) 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 - 0.67 0.67

Total 44.20 50.33 13.99 60.26 16.62 67.09 22.00 89.09

/a Physical and price contingenciesdistributed. 7-b Using 1 ha sites for RECs in additionalfour provinces. /c Includessite development,fencing and roads (totalUS$3,569,000) for which no Bank finance is required. /d Only two years' incrementalsalaries. /e Includes costs for workshops,meetings and field days (U.S$2,454,000). If Includeslocal handling costs for vehicles,equipment and furniture(US$1,320,000) and extension supervision (travel and daily allowance). -77 - ANNEX 2

INDONESIA

NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECT CONPLETIONREPORT

A. Schedule of Disbursements (US$ million)

Fiscal Appraisal estimate Actual Actual cumulative year Total Cumulative Total Cumulative as Z of total loan

1976177 1.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 1977/78 4.9 6.3 4.5 4.6 21 1978179 5.8 12.1 3.6 8.2 37 1979/80 5.7 17.8 4.4 12.6 57 1980/81 3.4 21.2 3.8 16.4 75 1981/82 0.8 22.0 3.2 19.6 89 1982/83 - - 2.4 22.0 100

B. Disbursement by Categories (US$ million)

Actual Original disbursement Actual as % Category allocation at 04/26/83 of original

Civil works 3.70 3.07 83 Equipment, furniture, vehicles and other material 12.90 12.27 95 Training and consultants' services 3.60 5.98 166 IRRI contract 0.70 0.67 96 Unallocated 1.10 - -

Total 22.00 22.00 100 78- TableANN 13

INDONESIA

NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECT COMPIETION REPORT

Physical Achievements and Key Indicators (13 provinces)

Appraisal Activities estimate Actual

Recruitment PPL (no.) 10,000 10,905 PPM (no.) 1,620 1,648 PPs (no.) 320 390

Civil Works New REC construction (no.) 490 519 Rehabilitation of RECS (no.) 155 186 Headquarters building (no.) 1 1 Houses for experts (no.) 2 2

Procurement of Mobile Units Passenger car (no.) 3 4 Mobile audiovisual unit (no.) 16 16 Four-wheel drive vehicle (no.) 576 436 Motorcycle (no.) 3,625 2,975 Speed boat (no.j 60 60 Trailer (no.) 169 174 Bicycle (no.) 7,082 7,311

Procurement of Furniture and Equipment Central office (unit) 1 1 Provincial office (unit) 13 13 Kabupaten office (unit) 174 174 REC (unit) 705 705

Training In-service (no.) 5,230 13,256 Overseas (ro.) 206 363

Consultant Services (man-months) 100 13Z

Extension Materials Extension news (copies) - 66,000 Slides (titles) - 7 Film (no.) - 4 Diaries (PPS-PPM-PPL) (no.) - 37,000 - 79 ANNEX 3 Table 2

INDONESIA

NTATIONALFOJD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PPOJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

Key Indicators - Appointment of Extension Personnel (Numbers)

Appraisal estimate Actual Provinces PPS PPM PPL PPS PPM PPL

West Java 49 336 1,641 50 338 2,362 Central Java 57 262 1,432 74 264 1,110 DI Yogyakarta 10 32 206 12 32 262 East Java 62 282 1,846 68 284 1,908 South Sumatera 15 54 345 23 62 634 West Sumatera 20 76 450 27 76 500 North Sumatera 22 96 687 28 96 928 South Kalimantan 14 64 375 10 64 457 South Sulawesi 50 138 618 38 138 861 West Kalimantanu 12 74 203 DI Aceh 1 21 280 2,400 19 76 263 Bali } 17 68 311 West Nusa Tenggara } 12 76 306

Total 320 1,620 10,noO 390 1,648 10,905 ANNEX 3 - 80 - Table 3

INDONESIA

NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

Key Indicators - Construction and Renovation of RECs (13 provinces)

Appraisal estimate Actual Province C R T C R T P

West Java 137 12 149 137 25 162 20 Central Java 55 47 102 60 44 104 30 East Java 57 54 111 67 68 135 23 DI Yogyakarta 6 6 12 6 6 12 12 North Sumatera 31 6 37 34 6 40 37 West Sumatera 21 7 28 21 10 31 28 South Sumatera 18 3 21 21 3 24 21 South Sulawesi 37 9 46 41 9 50 46 South Kalimantan 18 5 23 20 5 25 23

Subtotal 380 149 529 407 176 583 2240

DI Aceh 26 2 28 26 2 28 - Bali 24 2 26 26 2 28 - West Nusa Tenggara 32 - 32 32 - 32 - West Kalimantan 28 2 30 28 6 34 -

Subtotal 110 6 116 112 10 122 -

Total 490 155 645 519 186 705 2 240

C - Construction R - Renovation T - Total P - Fencing, site development financed by GOI outside the project. IN)ONE SIA

NATIONALFOOD CROPS EXgtISI0!N PROJECT (LOA!11267-I'D)

PR)JeCT COMPLC.TI10'RT!PO)RT

Doployment of Vehicles

Motorcycle Boat Mobile Toyota jee,n 'licro Uonda Speed Province S-,fan .unit L.C. S.C. Total bus Trailer traLl I cc 8 cc Total Bicycle boat .1totok Total

lest Java - 2 - 44 44 - '0 414 2 25 441 1,474 - - - lentral Java - 2 1 30 91 - 30 405 79 3' *14 1,1031 - - DI Yogvakarta - 1 1 16 17 - 4 53 ? 7 67 143 - - Gast Java - 2 1 81 92 - 30 517 41 37 595 1,496 - - - louth qutmitera - 1 1 21 22 - 6 89 2 5 96 3?.2 4 16 20 'lest Sum,ntera - 1 1 30 31 - 10 136 8 1" 160 320 - - - 'ortl .,tiatera - 1 1 33 34 - 11 190 30 10 230 542 - - - South nlimantan - 1 1 27 28 - 9 141 - 5 146 340 4 16 20 South Sulawesi - 1 1 1f1 62 - 23 182 56 15 253 599 - - - 'Test Rlinant%n - 1 1 20 .1 - 7 7 7R - 85 177 4 16 20 .)I Aceh - 1 1 22 23 - 10 7 95 - 102 221 - - - .ti - 1 1 22 23 - 8 7 101 - 1 8 277 - - - West :lusa Tan.'gnra - I 1 16 17 - 6 7 100 - 107 216 - Project headquarters 4 - 10 19 49 1 - 30 41 - 71 21 - - - Subtotal 4 16 22 512 534 1 174 2,190 635 150 2,975 7,266 12 48 60

Other provinces - - 9/a 3/b 12 - - - - - 45/c - - - Total 4 16 31 515 546 1 174 2,10 635 150 2,975 7,311 12 48 60

Target 1x 16 - - 567 - 169 - - - 3,625 7,082 - - 60

/a Nortih 'lulawesi - 1, Central Sul.awesi - 1, Southeast Sulawesi - 1, Jnmbi - 1, Riau - 1, Sengkulu - 1, East Kalimantan- 1, 'talukui - 1, 'ast 'lusa Tengcarn - I a.l; 1):'1 Jakarta - lb North Sulawesi - 1, Ceitral Sulawesi - I and Southenst Sulawesi - 1. 7c Centra! S"ilwest - 45.

'Iote: Motorboats for: Souith Kalimantan - 1 (13 SHIP), South Sualavast (2 (24 SIIP), Bali - 2 (24 SHP) and Maluku (13 SHP). I * INDONESIA

NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECTCO?MPL9TION REPORT

Distribution of EauLpment and Furniture in Provinces

Over- Slide head Radio Mea- Cene- Type- Press Calcu- Dupli- projec- projec- Mega- tran- Scale suring Mist Hand Light Hand Scale Hand Provinces rator writer lamp lator cator tor tor phone sistor (25 kg) tapes blower sprayer trap duster (2,000 8r) counter

West Java 149 149 447 149 16 149 20 447 149 1,490 447 298 1,490 149 1,490 149 1,490 Central Java 102 102 306 102 30 102 30 306 102 1,020 306 204 1,020 102 1,020 102 1,020 DI Yogyakarta 12 12 36 12 4 12 4 36 12 120 36 24 120 12 120 12 120 N East Java IlI IlI 333 IlI 30 111 30 333 111 1,110 333 222 1,110 ill 1,110 lit 1,110 South Sumatera 21 21 63 21 6 21 6 63 21 210 63 42 210 21 210 21 210 West Sumatera 28 28 84 28 10 28 10 84 28 280 84 56 280 28 280 28 280 North Sumatera 37 37 111 37 11 37 11 111 37 370 LL1 74 370 37 370 37 370 South Kalimantan 23 23 69 23 9 23 9 69 23 230 69 46 230 23 230 23 230 South Sulawesi 46 46 138 46 23 46 23 138 46 460 138 92 460 46 460 46 460 West Kalimantan 30 30 90 30 7 30 8 90 30 300 90 60 300 30 300 30 300 DI Aceh 28 28 84 28 10 28 11 84 28 280 84 56 280 28 280 28 280 Bali 26 26 78 26 8 26 8 78 26 260 78 52 260 26 260 26 West Nusa 260 Tenggara 32 32 96 32 6 32 7 96 32 320 96 64 320 32 320 32 Project head- 320 quarters - - - - 4 1 1 ------_ Total 645 645 1,935 645 174 646 178 1,935 645 6,450 1,935 1,290 _.450 645 6,450 645 6,450

I1'0 IIovia Craln Soil HeB- pro- Magnt- mois- test- nirLng Deik Heat- nil lec- fying Photo- ture Ing Soil E:reen ram- cvlin- with Cup- Piling Insect Rain 3ook Scale Ing 0 rovincea neter tor glass copier tester kit auger board era 4rr chair Chair board cabinet net qauae rack (50 kg) table tleat Java 17 20 1,490 1 17 16 298 149 17 149 298 2,98A 149 298 1,490 149 149 149 1,192 Central Java 31 30 1,n20 1 it 11 204 102 31 102 204 2,040 102 204 1,0?0 102 102 102 316 71 Yogyakarte % 4 120 1 3 4 24 12 5 1t 24 2410 1i 24 120 !2 12 12 06 East Java 31 3n 1,110 1 31 31 222 111 31 III 222 1,110 111 222 1,110 111 Ill Ill 555 South Sumatera 7 6 210 1 7 7 42 21 7 21 42 420 21 42 210 21 21 21 168 'eat Sunatera 11 10 280 1 11 10 56 28 11 28 56 560 28 56 '80 iS 28 28 224 , North Sumatera 12 il 370 1 12 12 74 37 12 37 74 740 37 74 170 37 37 37 296 South Kalimantan 10 9 230 1 10 9 46 23 10 23 46 460 23 46 '30 23 23 23 184 South Sulaweasi 24 23 460 1 24 23 92 46 24 46 q2 920 46 92 460 h6 46 45 368 'JestKalimantan 8 7 300 1 8 7 60 30 8 30 60 600 30 30 300 30 30 30 240 Dl Acah 11 10 280 1 11 10 56 28 11 28 56 280 28 56 280 2. 25 28 140 Balt 9 3 260 1 9 8 52 26 9 26 52 520 26 52 260 26 26 26 208 Weat HIusa Tenggara 7 6 320 1 7 6 64 32 7 32 64 640 32 64 320 32 32 32 256 Pro ject headquarters 4 1 - - 4 4 - - 4 ------

Total 187 175 .6,40 13 187 179 I,2qO 645 187 645 1.2'f0 11,510 645 1,260 6,450 645 645 645 4,743

IIJIX -84- ANNEX 5

INDONESIA

NATIONAL FOOD CROPS EXTENSION PRIOJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

In-Service, Local and Overseas Training (13 Provinces)

Appraisal estimate Actual

In-Service and Local Training PPL orientation } 3,640 7,044 PPL basic extension } 2,670 PPM orientation 1,340 2,356 PPS orientation } 285 PPS basic extension } 255 PPS agroeconomic } 38 PPS soil and irrigation } 250 32 ?PS agronomy 34 PPS plant protection } 41 PPS extension specialist 1 26 Instructors } 9 Extension staff (province ani kabupaten 416 Masters degree program 80/a English courses - 437b

Overseas Training Long-term felloriship:MSc } 6 16/a PhD } 37 Short-term fellowship 50 89 Study tour for: Staff 100 175 Farmers 50 65 Conference and seminars - 15

/a The first year-s cost was financed by Loan 1267-IND and subsequent years by Credit 996-IND.

/b Financed by GOI. - 85 - ANNEX 6

INDONESIA

NATIONALFOOD CROPS EXTENSION PROJECT (LOAN 1267-IND)

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

Productionof ExtensionMaterials

Title of books Total copies

CroppingSystem 1,000

AgriculturalInformation and Letters of Decree 3,000

PostharvestManual 1,000

Manual on Evaluationof five steps to increasingrice production 2,000

Soil, Fertilizerand Fertilizing 2,000

The Terms and Understandingin AgriculturalExtension 1,000

Maize Cultivation 5,000

SecondaryCrops Manual 3,000

Diagnosticof Rice and SecondaryCrops Diseases 4,000

Rice Field Cultivation 14,000

Horticulture I 3,000

Efficiency of Fertilizing on Secondary Crops 3,000

HorticultureII 3,000

Guidance on Rural BroadcastingManual 3,000

Farm MachineriesApplication 3,000

Cassava Cultivation 3,000

Farmers'Experiences on SpecialIntensification Schemes, Cropping Season 1980 3,000

Green Plant Hopper and Rice Diseases in TropicalRegion 6,000

Mushroom-FishParasites and How to Control;Burns of Peppers; Cattle Tick Diseases 3,000 4,\.... THAILAND t ii? 11 _W -_ I

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PamekasanIP; Aceh Utara (Lhoksumawe) 4. Belitung (Tanjung Pandang) 1. Baniarnegara(Banjarnegaral 27 Sumenep (Sur ?idi ISigi) 5. Lahat (Lahat) 12. Kebumen (Kaburene 28. Nganjuk (Ngar KOTAMADYA 6. Muara Enim IMuara Enim) 13. WoKosobo(Wonosobol 29. Magetan (Maga Banda Aceh 7. Ogan Komering Ulu (Baturaia) 14. TemanggungITemanggungl KOTAMADYA a Ogan Komering llir (Kavuagung) 15. Magelang(Magelang) 30 Kediri PROVINCE OF NORTH SUMATRA 9. Bangka (Pangkalpinang) 16. Purworejo (Purworejo) 31. Bleiar (Bli KABUPATEN KOTAMADYA 17. Satatiga(Salatiga) 32. Malang Asahan (Tanjungbalai) 10. Pangkalpinang 18. Demak (Demak) 33. Probolnggo Dairi (Sidikalang) 11. Palembang 19. Jepara (Jepara) 34. Pasuruan Karo (Kabanjahe) 20. Kudus (Kudusl 35. Mookeruo Langkat RaPnjai) VII PROVINCE OF BENGKL;L;J 21. Pat; (Pati) 36. Surabaya Labuhan Batu(Rantau Prapat) KABUPATEN 22. Rembang (Rembang) 37 Madiun STaelungun (PematangSiantar) 1. Bengkulu Utara 23. Grobogan (Grobogan) Tapanuli Selatan (PadangSidempuan) 2. Bengkulu Selatan 24. Blora (Bloral XifI PROVINCE O0- Tapanuli Tengah (Sibdga) 3. Reiang Lebong 25. Sragen (Sragenli KABUPATEN Deli Serdang [Medan) KOTAMADYA 26. Bovolali (Boyolali) 1. Buleleng (Sing Nias (Gunung Sitoli) 4. Bengkulu 27. Klaten (Klaten) 2. Jembrana (NeL_ KOTAMADYA 28. Sukohario (Sukoharlo) 3. Tabanan (Tab, ICOTAMA A VIII PROVINCE Of LAMPUNG 29. Karanganyar (Karanganyarl 4. Badung (Denp Medan KABUPATEN KOTAMADYA 5. Bangli (Bangli) PematangSiantar 1. Lampung Utara (Kota Bumi) T1. 6. Gianyar (GianIarKI Taniung Balai 2. Lampung Tengah (Metro) 32. Pekalongan a. KaraunasemKr Binjaw 3. Lampung Selatan (Teluk Betng) 33. Tegal Tebing Tinggi KOTAMADYA 34. Magelang 4. Tanjung Karang 35. Salatiga XIV PROVINCE 0O PROVINCE OF WEST SUMATRA 36. Surakarsa NUSA-TENG- 9 --ABUPATEN IX PROVINCE OF WEST JAVA 1. Lombok 3arat. PasamanILubuksikaping) KABUPATEN Xi SPECIAL REGION OF JOGJAKARTA 2. Lombok Teng Lima Puluh Kota (Pavakumbuh) 1. Serang (Serang) KA8UPATEN 3. Lornbok Timu. Agam (Bukittinggi) 2 Tanggerang(Tanggerang) 1. Sleman (SIeman) 4. Sumabo TSuri- Tanah Datar (Batusangar) 3. Bekasi (Bekasi) 2. Kulon Progo (Wates) S. Dornpu (Dompu) Sawah LuntoP Siauniung) 4. Ciamis (Ciamis) 3. Bantul (Bantull 6. Bima (Raba) PadangPariaman Pariaman) 5. Karawang (Karawang) 4 Gunung Kidul (Wonosari) Pasisir SelatanIPainan) 6. Purwakarta (Purwakartal KOTAMADYA SolokO Solok) 7 Indramayu . 5 Yogakarta XV PROVINCE O- KOTAMADYA 8. Cirebon (Cirebon) NUSA-TENGCE: Padang 9. Kuningan (Kuningan) PadangPaniang 10. Majalengka XMajalengka)XII PROVINCE OF EAST JAVA 1. Sumba Barat = Bukittinggi 11. Sumedang(Sumedang) KABUPATEN 2 SurnbaTimur Pavakurnbuh 12. Subang 1. Surabava (Surabaya) a Manggarai(Ri Sawah Lunto 13. Bogor (Bogor) 2. Gresik (Gresik) 4. Ngada(Baiawal PROVINCE OF R!AU 14. Lebak ILebak) 3. Lamongan (Lamongan) 5. Endeh (Endeh) KAPUPATEN 15. PandaigelangIPandaigelang) 4. Tuban (Tuban) 6. Sika tMemumnr-- enKAlisATBengkalis) 16. Sukabumi ISukabumi) 5. Mojokerto (Mojokerto) 7. Flores Timur Bengis englat 17. Cianjur (Cianjur) 6. Jombang (Jombangi 8 Alor (Kalabahi) Kampar (Bangkinangl 18. Bandung (Bandung) 7. Bojonegoro (Bojonegoro) 9. Belu (Atambua) Kepulauan Riau (Tanjung Pinang) 19. Garut (Garut) 8. Ngawi INgawi) 10. Timor Tengat 20. Tasikmalava (Tasikmalayal 9. Madiun (Madiunl 11. Timor Tengat _ KOTAMADYA KOTAMADYA 10. Kediri (Kediarm 12. Kupang Pakanbaru 21. Bandung 1 7. Ponorogo (ponorogo) PROVINCE OF JAMBI 22. Bogor 12. Pacitan (Pacitan) XVI PROVINCE C- KABUPATEN 23. Cirebon 13. Trenggalck ITrenggalek) KABUPATEN Batang Harm(Batang Hari) 14. Tulungagung ITulungagungl 1 Pontianak (M Bungo Tebo (Muara Bungo) X PROVINCE OF CENTRAL JAVA 15. Blitar (Blitar) 2 Sanggau(San_ Kerinci (SungaiPenuh) KABUPATEN 16. Malang (Malang) -g (Lumajang) 3. Sambas Singkawang) 15. Majene (Majenel (Pasuruan) 4. Ketapan. IKetapang) 16. Polewali Mamasa(Pofewali) ggo (Probotinggol 5. Sintang sSingtang) 17. Tana Thraja (Makale) -in (Panarukan) 6. Kapuas Hulu (Putusibau) 18. Luwu IPalopo) xo (Bondowoso) KOTAMAr i A 19. Mamuju tMamuju) Jember 7. Pontianak 20. Enrekang(Enrekang) ingi (Banyuwangi) KOTAMADYA n IBangkalan) 21. Pare-Pare * (SamPang) XVII PROVINCE OF CENTRAL KALIMANTAN 22 Ujung Pandang an(Pamenepa) KABUPATEN jN(nu nk 1. Barito Utara (Muara Teweh) IMganiua) 2. Kapuas(Kuala Kapuasl XXII PROVINCEOF SOUTH-EASf (Magetan) 3. KotawaringingTimur (Sampit) SULAWESI KABUPATEN AOYA 4. Kotawaringin Barat IPangkalanbun) 1. Kendari (Kendari) 5. Barito Selatan (Buntok) 2. Kodaka(Kolakal :l,tar) KOTAMADYA 3. Buton (Bau-BauI -. 0 6. Palangkaraya 4. Muna (Rahal :g_

.° XVIII PROVINCE OF SOUTH KALIMANTAN XXIII PROVINCEOF NORTH SULAWESI * KABUPATEN - KABUPATEN 1. Barito Kuala lMartabahan) 1. Gorontalo (issmu) 2. Banjar (Martapura) 2. BalaangMangandow IKotamobagul CE NOF ALl 3. Hlulu SungaiSelatan (Kandangan) 3. Minahasa(Tondano) sTEN 4. Kotabaru (Kotabarul KOTAMADYA (Singaraja) 5. Hulu SungaiTengah (Barabail 4. Menado i (Negara) 6. Hulu SungaiUtara (Amuntai) 5. Gornt o (Tabananl KOTAMAOYA _Denpassar) 7. Banjarmasin XXIV PROVINCEOF MALUKU * .anglil KABUPATEN (Gianyar)N 1. Maluku Tengah(Masohi) (Klungkung) XIX PROVINCE OF EAST KALIMANTAN 2. Maluku Tenggara(Tual) em (Karangasem) KABUPATEN 3 Maluku Utara (Ternate)

1. Bulongan(Tanjung Selor) KOTAMADYA

- CE OF WEST 2. Bereau(Tanjung Redep) 4. Ambon _NGGARA KABUPATFN 3. Kutai (Tenggarong) * Barat (Mataram) 4. Pasir (Tanahgrogot) XXV PROVINCEOF WEST IRIAN k Tengah (Praya) KOTAMADYA KABUPATEN * Timur (Selong) 5. Balikpapan 1. Teluk Cenderawasih(Beak) D(Sumabwa Besar2 . Jayapura(Jayapural Dompul XX PROVINCE OF CENTRAL SULAWESI 3. JayawijayaTimur (Wamena) * tba) KABUPATEN 4. JayawijayaBarat (Enaretafi) 1. Buol Toli-Tdii (Toli-Toli) 5. Fakfak (Fakfak) -E OF EAST 2. Donggala(Palul 6. Manokwari(Manokwari) --NGGARA KABUPATFN 3. Poso (Posoi 7. Merauke(Merauke) 4. Banggai(Luwuk 8. Yapen Waropen(Seruil larat (Waikabubak) 9. Sorong (Sorong) Timur (Waingapu) XXI PROVINCE OF SOUTH SULAWESI _ai(Ruteng) KABUPATEN XXVI SPECIAL REGIONOF JAKARTA 23agawa 1. Pangkajenedan Kepulauan(Pangkajene) WILAYAH 'Endeh) 2. Maros (Maros) 1. Jakarta Barat '-~mumere) 3. Goa (Sungguminasa) Z Jakarta Pusat -imur (Larantuka) 4. Takalar (Takatar) 3. Jakarta Selatan "alabahil 5. Jeneponto (Jeneponto) 4. Jakarta Timur -ambua1 6. Bantaeng(Bantaeng) 5. Jakarta Utara ~engahUtara (Kefamenc'ul 7 Bulukumba (Bulukumbal KOTAMADYA 'engahSelatan (So} 8. Sinlai (Sinjai) 6. Jakarta Barat 9. Bone (Watampone) 7. Jakarta Pusat 10. Barru (Barrul 8. Jakarta Selatan -ICE OF WEST KALIMPNTAN 11. Soppeng(Watamsoppeng) 9. Jakarta Timur XTEN 12. Wajo ISingkang) 10. Jakarta Utara -- ik (Menpawah) 13. Sidenreng-Rappang(PangKajene-Sidenreng) ISanggau) 14. Pinrang(Pinrang)