International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 5, (2020), pp. 1417-1424

THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Rahbar Khаlikova State Technical University named after I.Karimov,

Abstract The article is devoted to the relations of the Bukhara emir with Russia, which refers to the peace treaty of September 12, 1866, which states that the treaty was divided into 10 sections and sent by the Russian authorities to the Bukhara emirate for investigation and approval. The treaty of June 23, 1868, and not a peace treaty, was an ultimatum rather than a peace treaty, The agreement signed by the emir of Bukhara is inevitably different from that which was not signed by the emir two years ago.Its conditions were aimed at restricting the rights of the emir of Bukhara, which was an agreement to completely subordinate Bukhara. Referring to the history of the July 1873 treaty, this treaty was discussed at a special meeting in St. Petersburg on November 4, 1872. The sections of the agreement clearly show that no attempt is made to destroy the sovereignty of the emir. On the contrary, we see that both parties assume equal obligations on the basis of an analysis of these provisions. The article analyzes how this agreement differs from the peace agreement of 1868. Keywords---Jobtitle,militare,emirate,Bukhara,Russian,,,emir,territory,Governor- General,Muzaffar, Kaufman,ultimatum, Muslims,Zirabulak.

1. INTRODUCTION. The terms of the first peace treaty were suggested to the Emir of Bukhara on September 12, 1866, by the Governor-General of Orenburg Krijanovsky. [1]. This contract shows, Amir should not involve Kokand Khanate affairs, peace is ensured by the following terms and conditions or to prove commitment,itshould include: a) in order to meet demands of Russian citizens in the territory of Bukhara and decide all the time, maintaining the position of the Russian head of caravan; b) permission to build caravanserai in Bukhara for storage of Russian goods; c) the Russian traders were supposed to pay the same taxes as the citizens of Bukhara. This peace treaty consists of 10 chapters which had been sent to Russian embassies by the Russian authorities to the treaty and sent to the Emir of Bukhara for examination and approval. However, at the appointed time, there was no response from the Emir of Bukhara to a peace treaty. The Russians knew that the Emir of Bukhara did not openly and willingly agree with these conditions. In response to this contract, on September 23, 1867, Russian troops invaded the cities of Bukhara - Uratepa, YangiKorgon, and occupied these territories. When these territories were gone, the Emir of Bukhara appealed to Kaufman and asked to return the New Kurgan and promised to disperse the troops of Bukhara in return. Kaufman agreed, and demanded that he accepted and signed the peace treaty proposed by the Orenburg Governor- General with some amendments. The process of correspondence and exchange of views on the conclusion of this agreement took seven months. The Amir, in various ways and excuses, tried to delay accepting and signing of this treaty. The main purpose that the Emir waited for a period of time to sign the peace treaty was to win the time. At the same time, he sought ways to negotiate with Kokand, Kashgar, Afghanistan, Khiva in order to defeat Russia. He sent his ambassadors to Turkey for help, but did not received apositive response from them. This situation angered the Russians. When the offers of Russian authorities in Turkestan were rejected, they launched military action against Bukhara. The troops of Bukhara were defeated on May 1 at Chopanota hill, then in and Kattakurgan, later in and Karatepa, and on June 2 in the hill of Zirabulak. Bukhara was conquered. Then the emir Muzaffar sent a letter to Kaufman declaring his surrender. The fate of Bukhara was in the hands of the Russians. The Emir had no choice but to accept the Russians` demands.

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2. METODS The article is published on the basis of generally accepted historical and sociological methods - historical, comparative-logical, analytical, sequence, objectivity, objectivity.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS. Documents of the Republic of Uzbekistan "Turkestan General Governor's Office" (Fund 1, list 12, 1775) give information about the requirements of the 1873 agreement. The important collection of documents on the history of Russian-Bukhara relationswass from the working papers of the 400th Asian Foundation "General Staff of the Russian State Archive of Military History (GSRSAMH), the 1396th Foundation" Turkestan Military District Staff "and the 366th Fund" Military Ministry Office ", and important information was recorded and analyzed. Particularly, in Foundation1396 List 2 of 1495 lists, the exact number of inhabitants of the by the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries was given according to its gaps and districts. Information on the establishment of the Russian Consulate and the Russian Political Agency in Bukhara from the collections of the General Staff of the GSRSAMH (Fund 400) (Collection No. 1 of 878) correspondence and treaties (400th edition 24 list 879), correspondence of ambassadors of Bukhara (400th collection 24 list 1451), Russia's relations with Bukhara formally established by trade agreement of 1868 and peace treaty of 1873 (Collection 400, List 1 3801), introduced into the scientific field. The terms of the first peace treaty were suggested to the Emir of Bukhara on September 12, 1866, by the Governor-General of Orenburg Krijanovsky. 1]. This contract shows, Amir should not involve Kokand Khanate affairs, peace is ensured by the following terms and conditions or to prove commitment,it should include: a) in order to meet demands of Russian citizens in the territory of Bukhara and decide all the time, maintaining the position of the Russian head of caravan; b) permission to build caravanserai in Bukhara for storage of Russian goods; c) the Russian traders were supposed to pay the same taxes as the citizens of Bukhara. This peace treaty consists of 10 chapters which had been sent to Russian embassies by the Russian authorities to the treaty and sent to the Emir of Bukhara for examination and approval. However, at the appointed time, there was no response from the Emir of Bukhara to a peace treaty. The Russians knew that the Emir of Bukhara did not openly and willingly agree with these conditions. In response to this contract, on September 23, 1867, Russian troops invaded the cities of Bukhara - Uratepa, YangiKorgon, Jizzakh and occupied these territories. When these territories were gone, the Emir of Bukhara appealed to Kaufman and asked to return the New Kurgan and promised to disperse the troops of Bukhara in return. Kaufman agreed, and demanded that he accepted and signed the peace treaty proposed by the Orenburg Governor- General with some amendments. The process of correspondence and exchange of views on the conclusion of this agreement took seven months. The Amir, in various ways and excuses, tried to delay accepting and signing of this treaty. The main purpose that the Emir waited for a period of time to sign the peace treaty was to win the time. At the same time, he sought ways to negotiate with Kokand, Kashgar, Afghanistan, Khiva in order to defeat Russia. He sent his ambassadors to Turkey for help, but did not received a positive response from them. This situation angered the Russians. When the offers of Russian authorities in Turkestan were rejected, they launched military action against Bukhara. The troops of Bukhara were defeated on May 1 at Chopanota hill, then in Samarkand and Kattakurgan, later in Urgut and Karatepa, and on June 2 in the hill of Zirabulak. Bukhara was conquered. Then the emir Muzaffar sent a letter to Kaufman declaring his surrender. The fate of Bukhara was in the hands of the Russians. The Emir had no choice but to accept the Russians` demands. The treaty of June 23, 1868was more like an ultimatumrather than a peace treaty in character. The agreement signed by the Emir of Bukhara inevitably differentiated from the agreement that was not signed by the emir two years ago.

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The first draft of the treaty of September 1867 proposed by Krijanovsky, consisted of 10 sections: Section 1: shows the new borders between Russia and Bukhara; Section 2: send appointed persons to clarify the borders; Section 3: both parties assume border security; Section 4: assures that the Russian trade agents can freely walk in the Emirate of Bukhara; Section 5: allows Russian citizens to build a caravan at any place; Section 6: Equal rights of Russian citizens with Emirate citizens for payment; Section 7: gives Russian citizens the right to move to Bukhara and to acquire real estate; Section 8: considers the criminal cases perpetrated by Russian citizens by the Turkestan governor general and not the court in the Bukhara Emirate; Section9: the Emir was entrusted with protecting the Russian caravans from the invasion; Section 10:such requirements were made for the sanctity and breach of contract between the parties [3]. We would like to draw the researchers' attention to the articles of the treaty signed by the Russian military with the people of Tashkent. Abu UbaydullahTashkandi, author of the book “Khulasatul-akhvol”, explains: Heads of Tashkent met on the 27th of the month of DhulHijjah (May 23, 1865) before Russian troops entered Tashkent. They tried to enter the territory of Bukhara, but they were further divided into two groups.Mallakhan`sson(Sultan Said) was elected as Khan. But the second group leader, MulloSalihbek, sent a letter to the Russians, promising them to open the city gates. After the Kokand troops had left, a truce with Russia was reached. All the people in the city were united. MulloSalihbek agreed. The elders of the province came to the honor of General Uruswho opened the doors of peace and discussed these terms. They signed contract and the governors took the letter to the city and read it to the people on the highways. The first condition (let us briefly, R.H.). Russia neither interferes with religion or Shari'ah, nor does it harm or violate Shari'a. The second condition. Unrequested and unauthorized invaders and soldiers (soldiers - notably ours R.H.) are not allowed to enter Muslim homes. The third condition. Never let a year, or twenty years or a hundred years pass from the Muslims. The fourth condition. He should not demand payment from the bought lands of Muslims and the like, or inheritance from their ancestors. The fifth condition. He should not take anything from the market for sheep and cattle, camels, horses and the like…. The sixth condition. What Muhammad Muhammad S.A.V does not ask Muslims to do according to Sharia laws should not require from a citizen.Future agreements are based on the need to protect the political, military, regional interests of the Russian state and to strengthen Russia's position in Central Asia. Kaufman considered adding two new sections to this agreement. First of all, it was necessary to have the permission of Turkestan governor (Section 7) to ensure the free operation and patronage of Russian merchants in the cities of Bukhara and for Russian citizens to acquire real estate in the territory of Bukhara.[5]. Also referring to the border issue by Kaufman, he suggested not to include Yangikurgan in the border since the emir had said that if the Russians left Yangikurgan they would disperse their troops. The retreat was made to secure peace with the Emir of Bukhara. The terms of this agreement were sent by Kaufman to the Emir of Bukhara to settle border and trade matters. The question arises, to what extent are the legal rights of Bukhara as a subject of international law in this contract? Is Bukhara recognized as an independent state? This issue is covered in Chapter 11. It states that the Emir should work in coordination with the governor-general of Turkestan on political, trade and border issues. The solution to these issues was by word of mouth or by sending a trusted contact. The mode of operation in this way legally restricts the rights of the emir and the right to govern the state. We find the answer to this question in Kaufman's letter to the director of the Asian Department of September 16, 1867.

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In the letter, he says: “some points have not been touched at all. For example, we thought it was unpleasant or unnecessary to intervene in the political affairs of the neighboring khanates or other nations without our permission. The disadvantage is that we are not unaware of the dialogue with the Central Asian alliances, the unemployed. We may not be able to control this point of the contract. But the emir should think that his country's future requires close alliance with Russia. Each of his actions can have an adverse effect on our relationship and he may end up in an ineffective mood for him ”[6]. In the same condition, Kaufman negotiated between September 1867 and March 1868. The main reason for the prolongation of the agreement was that, first of all, the demands of the agreement have lowered the mood of the people; As for the Amir's personality, this treaty had put an end to his sovereignty. The terms of the agreement were not accepted or endorsed by the Emir of Bukhara. After that, the Emir of Bukhara sent a draft of his contract to Kaufman. In this agreement the Emir sought to preserve his rights. Above this peace treaty, Alexander Nikolaevich was addressed to the emperorpresented by the Emir of Bukhara, and was eventually finished with the name Amir SayyidMuzaffariddin. By this, the emir emphasizes that he is concluding a treaty with the Russian emperor and not with the governor general of Orenburg and section 4 of the treaty states that "the emir takes refuge in the Russian merchants and their trading activities." In this case, we can see that the emir strives to preserve our reputation. This peace treaty was dispatched on the eve of a new war between Russia and Bukhara, when Kaufman's inevitability took over Bukhara, removing it from the geographic map as an independent state, and the surrender of the Emir. This failure shattered the emir's hopes and thoughts. He had no choice but to agree to the terms of the treaty of May 11 and 23, 1868. The agreement signed by Kaufman on June 23, 1868 was different from the Orenburg project requirements. The new proposed contract had three sub-sections: 1) annexation of Samarkand and Kattakurgan districts to Russia; 2) delimitation of the territory of Russia and Bukhara; 3) Recommend the Border Issues to the International Commission [7]. Since then, a new era in Russian-Bukhara relations has begun. On numerous occasions, the emir had a vassal attitude toward Russia. This was due to the fact that the emir had no reputation in the khanate, he relied on the Russians to rule the khanate, the princes disobeyed him, and sought to become independent. The invasion of the upper part of by the Russians led to the loss of independence by Bukhara on irrigation. Although no part of the treaty on the relations of the Emir of Bukhara with foreign states has been expressed, the Russian authorities have always controlled it. When the governor-general of Turkestan heard that the ambassador of the Emir of Bukhara, Abdulkhay was sent to Turkey, he immediately warned the Emir. Amir immediately informed in writing that he would not make any other external contacts with the Sultan. Thus the vassalage of the Bukhara khanate to Russia gradually became a reality. Summarizing the aforementioned relations between Russia and Bukhara, as shown in the Treaty of 1868, the attitude towards Bukhara repeats the fate of those states that have become protectors in the history of relations. If we look at the history of international relations, when a strong state civilization does not want to include a lower state into its territory, then it will protectorate it. The big European countries do not want to include the weaker countries, because the introduction and establishment of a new way of governing in these countries requires a great deal of money, but for some reason it cannot spend that budget. Big states want to invade weaker state, but it cannot do so because it can provoke a rival state. We can see Russia's attitude towards Bukhara in the first of the above cases, Russia is "incapable of adding". In these cases, when it is not possible to attach, it is usually established by conventions or contracts. At the same time, the country as an independent state does not exercise its rights at its own

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International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 5, (2020), pp. 1417-1424 discretion. It is not possible to say that such contracts are concluded equal. On the contrary, it is called a contract under pressure from the military. The treaty of 1868 with Bukhara was of such character. As for the final analytical report of Russia's first agreement with Bukhara, it was aimed at protecting Russia's political influence in Bukhara, promoting and protecting Russia's dominance in trade markets in Central Asia. To this end, Russia began to protect Bukhara from other countries' commercial interests. From this we think that the relations between Russia and Bukhara are inextricably intertwined. However, in order to promote the mutual interests to merge, over time Russia had to turn its economic interests to Bukhara. The treaty of 1868 was not sufficient to make such a move. That is why Kaufman began to insist that in 1871 the emperor should sign a new agreement with Bukhara. Kaufman requested permission to clarify the borders with Bukhara and to solve the problems of Zarafshan district in writing with SayidMuzaffar [8]. Kaufman, unlike the treaties of May 11 and 23, 1868, preferred to include the following sections in the new contract. 1. Determination of the border with the territory of Bukhara in accordance with the border agreement of 1868. 2. The presence of the Russian trade agent in Bukhara and the representative of the Emir of Bukhara in Tashkent. 3. Some rules about trade patterns and passports. 4. Granting Russian citizens rights to engage in the processing of various professional and natural resources in the Bukhara region. 5. Commitment to extradited offenders. 6. The right to resolve disputes between citizens of both countries. In addition, Kaufman found it necessary to include secret sections in this new contract. Including: a) The Emir of Bukhara, while enjoying a friendly relationship with Russia, should not seek permission from the Russian government to enter into relations with other neighbors; b) In consultation with the Turkestan governor general in nominating candidates for public posts and positions on the border; c) The Emir of Bukhara should not allow Afghan or others to act arbitrarily in the Amu Darya crossing; d) Russian steamers should have their own pistols on the banks of the Amu Darya River, belonging to the Bukhara Khanate; e) the Governor-General of Turkestan considers his duty to protect the Emir of Bukhara from internal and external enemies, in the confidence of his Majesty the Emperor; f) the territory under the Emir's rule is inviolable by Russia; j) The governor-general of Turkestan has declared in front of the emperor SayyidMuzaffar the recognition of one of his children as heir. Amir's eldest son, Katta Tura, turned against his father and fled to Kashgar after the Russian occupation of , which completely deprived Bukhara of his right to rule. h) The Emir of Bukhara must prohibit the sale of captives in the markets of Bukhara for the benefit of the emperor. “Both these agreements (in Kaufman's view) were all that was required of Bukhara. The emir, knowing his desperation, agrees to these treaties to keep the state in his hands ”[10]. From Kaufman's contract with Bukhara, we can see that it was a great effort to surrender Bukhara. The move was to take advantage of the weakness of the Emir of Bukhara and to vassal it to Russia. But this action could not have been done openly by the Russian government. The escalation of relations with Bukhara will inevitably deteriorate diplomatic relations with England and fulfill the latent dreams of England, such as the expansion of northern Afghanistan.Therefore, the new agreement should not have caused anyone to think that Russia was going to conquer Bukhara. For this reason, Kaufman chose to include the "sensitive points" in the relations between Russia and Bukhara, which were secretly included in the affairs of the emirate in foreign affairs, government appointments, and the affairs of the Amu Darya. In

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International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 5, (2020), pp. 1417-1424 short, the governor-general of Turkestan intended to take over the foreign and internal control of Bukhara. This treaty, which was to be adopted on September 3, 1873, was discussed at a special meeting in St. Petersburg on November 4, 1872, where some of Kaufman's suggestions were rejected and allowed to: 1. In Zarafshan, as in other parts of Turkestan, the administration, taxes and fees are the same, and the announcement that Zarafshan district was annexed to the Russian Empire should not be used. 2. While our influence on the (empire of the Russian Empire is RH), we should not presume that Bukhara has taken over or incorporated this khanate. We must make sure that in all our endeavors, we want to be friendly to the Emir. 1. In suitable cases, probably some extra contracts are signed:in the cities of Bukhara trade agents are elected and in Tashkent Bukhara agent is chosen to introduce laws about trade, crafts, passport and refugee and control them. 4. Secret agreement with Bukhara prohibits followings: the emir should take responsibility to ban trade with slaves. This demand confirmed by the emir is added to the contract as an extra agreement. When contacting with Afghanistan and other countries, and choosing candidates, the emir must make a collaboration withthe Governor-General in selecting representatives who are in favor with Russian policy. If one of the children assumes a surety in the appointment of a successor, we can appoint him. Except the Katta Tura, because it was against us and his father. Were the secrets ofthetreaty discussed on November 4, 1872 reflected in the July 23, 1873 agreement? Of course, these segments have had their impact. In the first part of the agreement [12] we can see that on the one hand, the Russian government was annexing the lands of Khiva to the Russians for their assistance in the invasion of Khiva, not in the annexation of Bukhara land. On the other hand, in this section of the agreement, SayyidMuzaffarhon tried to convince the emir that the following restrictions on the territory of the Russians and Bukhara were carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Samarkand Treaty of May 23, 1868. These confirmations made the emir's dream of returning Zarafshan County a mirage.The second section outlines the following commitments that Russia and Bukhara have to assume. Each state has its own caravan routes to the north from Bukhara, to the Russian territory, to protect caravans and commerce in the Khiva khanate when crossing the right bank of the Amu Darya. They took it upon themselves. When the documents were based on this section, Kaufman promptly asked SayyidMuzaffar to establish an important garrison to protect against the attack by the Turkmen on the left bank of the Amu Darya, on Kawakli and on the right. The third section deals with the free movement of Russian steamboats and ships, along with the steamers and ships of Bukhara, in the section of the Amu Darya on the Bukhara Emirate. The fourth section deals with the right to establish a warehouse for Russian goods on the banks of the Amu Darya on Bukhara.In the fifth section it was noted that in Bukhara and in the whole territory of the khanate it is necessary to ensure the freedom of Russian trade and to protect the safety of Russian caravans and traders by the State of Bukhara. The sixth section states that only zakat can be obtained from all goods.The seventh section deals with the non-taxation of Russian transit goods.In the eighth section, the requirements set out in section 3 of the treaty of May 11, 1868, are partially reproduced. It goes on to say that Russian caravanserai may be used by Bukhara traders, such as Russian traders, in the cities of Turkestan, not in Russian cities, as stated in a pre-contract.In the ninth section, the requirements laid down in Chapter 4 of the Peace Treaty of May 11, 1868 are exactly the same. The tenth section provides for the fulfillment of trade obligations between Russian and Bukhara citizens under the control of the Bukhara government. The eleventh section shows that the practice of non-Shari'a craftsmanship and craftsmanship allows Russians to engage in Bukhara and Russian regions of Bukhara. In the twelfth section, the khanate demonstrates that Russian citizens have real estate in Bukhara, and that Bukhara residents have the same opportunities.

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In the thirteenth section, Russian citizens are required to provide tickets for entering and exiting Bukhara.The Fourteenth Section records the handing over of refugees from Russia to Bukhara to the Russian authorities.The fifteenth chapter specifies the appointment of a representative of the Emir in Tashkent to keep in touch with the Russian authorities in Central Asia. In the sixteenth chapter, it is stated that the same position can be appointed before the Emir.The seventeenth chapter prohibits arbitrary trade outside of Bukhara.The Fourteenth Section records the hand-over of refugees from Russia to Bukhara to the Russian authorities. The fifteenth chapter specifies the appointment of a representative of the Emir in Tashkent to keep in touch with the Russian authorities in Central Asia.In the sixteenth chapter, it is stated that the same position can be directed before the Emir.The seventeenth chapter prohibits arbitrary trade outside of Bukhara. Sayyid sent a copy of this contract to Muzaffar Khan, along with the following letter, stating: under the auspices of the Supreme Emperor of Russia, you will also run your own country. There is no interference in religion or Sharia, so that Muslims can freely go on hajj. " The treaty, adopted in 1873, is the main agreement that defines relations between Russia and Turkestan with Bukhara.This agreement will play a key role in the development of economic relations between Bukhara and Russia and Turkestan. Prior to the Revolution, this agreement was supplemented and amended accordingly.On September 23, 1873, a treaty was signed in between the Emir of Bukhara Muzaffar and the Governor-General of Turkestan Kaufman. According to Article 6 of the 1873 Treaty, 2.5% of all Russian goods belonging to Russian traders are coming to Bukhara or going from Bukhara to Russia. Under thesetreaties, Sharia norms in khanates were seriously violated and Russians were granted the right to be used by Muslim traders. No additional taxes and duties were imposed on Russian merchants except for the zakat. Article 7 of the agreement gives Russian traders the right to freely export goods from Bukhara to neighboringcountries. As many historians have pointed out, not two contracts were concluded between Russia and Bukhara (June 23, 1868 and September 28, 1873), but in fact there were three contracts. The first treaty between Russia and Bukhara was concluded on May 11, 1868, and was partially supplemented on May 23, 1868, by the representatives of both states -General-Governor of Turkestan Province, Commander-in-Chief of Turkestan Military District from Russia signed by the aide-in- chief Von Kaufman and the Emir of Bukhara Amir SayyidMuzaffarBahodirhon. The contract is divided into six sections and is known as the "Terms of Trade between Russia and Bukhara". The second treaty between Russia and Bukhara was concluded on June 23, 1868, which was not approved by the Russian Tsar, and therefore argues that it is not legally valid for some experts.Our conclusions on these cases are also corroborated by the information provided by the Russian Foreign Ministry on Bukhara in January 1910. “Russia's relations with Bukhara are formally determined by the trade agreement of 1868 and the peace treaty of 1873. These two documents formally define the rights of citizens of both countries. " This is exactly why the third agreement of September 28, 1873, comes. The third treaty between Russia and Bukhara was signed on September 28, 1873, which consisted of 18 sections and was called a friendly agreement. This agreement was not approved by the heads of both states.Both treaties (May 11, 1868 and September 28, 1873) remained in force until 1917. Now, in order to clarify the issue and make a scientific assessment, we will go into detail about each of the above-mentioned contracts.It is worth noting that before the conquest of Kattakurgan, the Russians sent a proposal for a truce with the Emir of Bukhara. In particular, on May 11, 1868, Governor-General of Turkestan, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkestan Military District, von-general von Kaufman, sent to the Emir of Bukhara SayyidMuzaffarBahodirhon the possible future terms of peace. Itconsistedoffivemajorconditions. In the first case, the Russian lands include the newly-occupied Samarkand city and its provinces, except for the Russian state-owned KashgarDawoni and the north of the Nurata Mountains. From the south, it is confined to the Shakhrisabz Mountains, and passes through these mountains, crossing the Zarafshan River Valley and the Nurata Mountains. The boundary with Bukhara was accepted by the terms of the proposed peace and the emir, and it was recognized that the seal had been approved by its seal. Only then will the border cross over to the highest point

ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST 1423 Copyright ⓒ 2020 SERSC

International Journal of Advanced Science and Technology Vol. 29, No. 5, (2020), pp. 1417-1424 of the Nurata Mountains to the west and to NurataCastle in the Bukhara region .The second condition of the peace agreement is that all Russian citizens, regardless of their religion, have the right to freely trade in Bukhara and other cities of the country. It also stipulates that citizens of the Emirate of Bukhara are still allowed to trade in the Russian Empire.The emir of Bukhara has also made a special mention of the protection of the caravans and property of all citizens of Russia and their complete control over the security of their territories. The third clause of the proposed peace treaty states that Russian merchants have caravans to store their goods, and in turn Bukhara traders are given the same right in Russian cities.The fourth condition of the peace treaty is that Russian traders at their own discretion should be allowed to have their own caravans in each city of the Bukhara Emirate in order to control the course of their trade and their taxation under the law. The fifth condition of the ceasefire of May 11, 1868, proposed by AdjutantGeneral von Kaufman, is that of all kinds of goods imported from and into Russia from Bukhara, 2.5% of the total value of goods in Turkestan 4. CONCLUSION After a short period, on May 23, 1868, Adjutant-General von Kaufman sent a new annex to the peace agreement from the city of Kattakurgan to SayyidMuzaffarBakhodirhon, May 11, and the secret provisions of the peace treaty was also sent. The new annex to the peace treaties of Kattakurgan dated May 23, 1868 states that the terms of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th invitations, which were made by the general-lieutenant von Kaufman and accepted by the Emir of Bukhara, cannot be changed. Only the condition of the 1st ceasefire is interpreted. In particular, condition 1 is proposed in the new case. The border between the Russian and Bukhara emirates is to the south from the highest points of the ShakhrisabzMountains to the ZarafshanRiver Valley, then to the west of Kattakurgan and across the Zarafshan River Valley and the Nurata mountain. Then the border is said to pass through the highest peak of the Nurata Mountains. The fact that Nurata's fortress was abandoned to Bukhara and that the territory from the KyzylKum Desert to the Bukon Mountains would go to Russia, and that all lands from those mountains to the foothills of the Yangidarya would go to Russia. It is recognized that all the land north and east of this designated line is under the Russian Empire and under the Russian Emperor, and south-west of that line is the border of Bukhara emir`s territory. REFERERNCES 1. Maksheev A.I. Historical Review of Turkestanand the offensive Russian movements in it. Part II, p.247. 2. Maksheev A.I. Historical Review of Turkestanand the offensive Russian movements in it. Part II, p.248. 3. The State of the Saviour-i Covenant of Bukhara (Russian version of the agreement between Bukhara and Russia). Secretary Amir Muhammad SiddiqHashmat bin Amir Muzaffar. // Manuscript, Your FASHI. fund. 251 COH / W.193-194-pages. 4. See Vohidov SH. History of Kokand Khanate in the 19th and early 20th centuries, p. Source: ZiyoevX. Fighting Russian aggression and rule in Turkestan (XVII-XIX centuries), pages 179 and later. 5. Collection of treaties of Russia with other states. 1856-1917,1952p.133-139 6. RDHTA., Fund 400, list 1, case 3801, pages 41-42. 7. Collection of existing treaties.St. Petersburg-; 1889, p.324. 8. RDHTA., Fund 400, list 1, case 3801, pp. 43-47. 9. RDHTA., Fund 400, Box 1, case 3801, pp. 51-53. 10. RDHTA, Fund 400, Box 1, case 3801, p. 11. RDHTA., Fund 400, list 1, case 3801, pp. 57-61. 12. Collection of existing treaties, St. Petersburg :, 1889, p. 321-326; conventions and agreements. Second edition, T.1., -St. Petersburg., 1902. p. 421–425. 13. Cold-fire, tracts, conventions and health. Secondedition, T. 1. p. 421-425. 14. Khalikova R. Traditional architecture of the XIX century of Bukhara. Journal of look to the past. ISSN 2181-9599 Doi Journal 10.26739/2181-9599. 2 (2019). –P. 4-10.

ISSN: 2005-4238 IJAST 1424 Copyright ⓒ 2020 SERSC