A comparison of the Internet usage of Chinese migrants in Italy
and Chinese residents in the PRC
DISSERTATION of the University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social Sciences and International Affairs to obtain the title of Doctor of Philosophy in Organizational Studies and Cultural Theory
submitted by
Sergio de Eccher
from
Italy
Approved on the application of
Prof. Dr. Daria Berg
and
Prof. Dr. Giuseppe Anzera
Dissertation no. 4586
Gutenberg AG, Schaan, 2017
The University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social Sciences and International Affairs hereby consents to the printing of the present dissertation, without hereby expressing any opinion on the views herein expressed.
St. Gallen, October 24, 2016
The President:
Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger
Table of contents
Abstract - Zusammenfassung______1
Introduction, Purpose of Research and Structure of the Thesis
1 Introduction: The four Gateways for managing the Internet studies in China______2
2 Review of the literature______11
3 Fieldwork background and previous studies on the topic: The starting point______31
4 Purpose of research and innovation in the field______42
5 Outline of the research______46
Chapter 1 The Methodology
1 Actor Network Theory and the Chinese Cyberspace______51 1.1 Actor Network Theory in a nutshell______53
1.2 The Classic Model of ANT (Latour, Callon; 1981, 1986)__55
1.3 ANT and the Chinese Internet censorship system______59
1.4 Using ANT in order to follow the Chinese Censorship within the Internet: Entrepreneurial vs Ecological version of ANT______61
1.5 Other actors thanks to the ecological version of ANT: The perception of the Chinese users______66
Chapter 2
Quantitative survey process
Foreword______69
1 Introduction: New research questions and different perspectives______71
1.1 Similar studies on the topic______74 1.2 The Boiling Frog Syndrome______76 1.3 Zhejiang Province and the Chinese community of Italy______79 1.4 The Chinese Community of Italy______80 1.5 Issues in the organization of the fieldwork and future developments______82 1.6 Data Analysis – The Chinese Community of Italy______96 1.6.1 Gender of the sample ______97 1.6.2 Age Classes of the sample ______97 1.6.3 Level of Education of the sample______98 1.6.4 Age Classes and level of education distribution___100 1.6.5 Level of education and gender distribution ______102 1.6.6 Jobs of the sample______103 1.6.7 Time of stay in Italy of the sample______105 1.6.8 Hours on Internet in a day (now that they live in Italy)______108 1.6.9 Most visited websites of the sample (In any language, now that they live in Italy)______109 1.6.10 Most used search engines (now that they live in Italy)______112 1.6.11 Most used search engines and age classes distribution______114 1.6.12 Most visited search engines and level of education distribution______116 1.6.13 Most used search engines and “only Chinese websites” distribution______118 1.6.14 Time of stay in Italy and most visited search engines distribution______120 1.6.15 Percentage of the usage of the Chinese websites (hosted in China) now that they live in Italy______121 1.6.16 Surfing other foreign cyberspace, now that they live in Italy______122 1.6.17 Surfing other foreign cyberspace and the level of education distribution______123 1.6.18 Surfing Italian websites______124 1.6.19 Social Networks______126 1.6.20 Blogs______128 1.6.21 Most searched topics of the respondents, now that they live in Italy______129 1.6.22 Discrepancies that the respondents perceive between the Chinese Internet and other Internet dimensions______132 1.6.23 Discrepancies and level of education distribution______134 1.6.24Discrepancies and time of stay in Italy distribution135 1.6.25 Discrepancies and gender differentiation______137 1.6.26 Discrepancies in detail______138 1.6.27 Discrepancies in detail and the gender differentiation______140 1.6.28 Discrepancies in detail and the level of education distribution______142 1.6.29 Discrepancies in detail and the age classes distribution______144 1.6.30 Discrepancies in detail and time of stay in Italy distribution______145 1.6.31 Overall perception of the Internet censorship______147 1.6.32 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and gender differentiation______149 1.6.33 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and age classes distribution______150 1.6.34 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and level of education distribution______151 1.6.35 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and time of stay in Italy distribution______152 1.6.36 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and surfing other countries distribution ______154 1.7 Chinese respondents still living in China______155 1.8 Data Analysis of the Chinese sample living in China______158 1.8.1 Gender of the sample______158 1.8.2 Age classes of the sample______158 1.8.3 Education level of the sample______160 1.8.4 Education level and gender differentiation______162 1.8.5 Jobs of the sample______162 1.8.6 Time spent on the Internet______165 1.8.7 Most visited websites of the sample______166 1.8.8 Most used search engines in China______168 1.8.9 Most searched topics of the sample______169 1.8.10 Most used social network apps______171 1.8.11 Blogs usage of the sample______173 1.8.12 Suggestions from the respondents to improve the Internet in China______173 1.8.13 Suggestions in detail______175 1.8.14 Surfing other countries______176 1.8.15 Perception of the discrepancies between the Chinese Internet and the rest of the world ______177 1.8.16 Perceived discrepancies and gender differentiation______179 1.8.17 Discrepancies in detail______116 1.8.18 Discrepancies in detail and gender differentiation______182 1.8.19 Overall perception of the Internet censorship____183 1.8.20 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and gender differentiation______185 1.8.21 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and age classes distribution______186 Chapter 3
Semi-structured interviews analysis
1 Introduction, methods, issues______189
2 Issues in the distribution of the questionnaires: Trying to understand with the help of the interviewees why the distribution of the questionnaires has been so difficult among the Chinese community of Italy______192
3 Blogs and microblogging: “Lost in translation”_____202
4 Chinese websites from China: the most preferred cyberspace______206
5 Most used search engines and most searched topics_210
6 A different perspective is necessary to analyze Chinese matters______215
7 Internet restrictions______219 8 Respondents’ perception of possible discrepancies with other Internet dimensions: the analysis of the four interviewees______231
Chapter 4
Conclusion
Considerations, future developments of the research, final remarks
1 Preliminary onsiderations concerning the quantitative survey process______252
1.1 Results and appropriate comparisons between the two samples: Positive aspects______256
1.1.1 Perception of generic discrepancies between the Internet in China and the rest of the world: Comparison between the Italian sample and the Chinese sample______257
1.1.2 Comparison of the discrepancies in detail between the two samples______259
1.1.3 Comparison of the two samples about the overall Internet censorship perception______261 1.2 Final considerations concerning the survey process: Negative aspects______265 1.3 Future developments of the research______268 1.4 Meaningful results concerning the qualitative interviews______270 1.5 Final Remarks______271 1.6 The five gateways for managing contradictions in the Chinese approach to the Internet______274
Works Cited______276 1
Abstract
In this thesis I will present the fieldwork that I have carried out from April to December 2014. It revolves around the pursuit of a plausible actor able to destabilize the current, granitic actor world conceived by the Chinese government. My preliminary assumption is that a Chinese Internet user, accustomed to pervasive Internet restrictions, might have undergone a change in his/her approach to the Internet possibilities, if he/she would experience a more open and foreign Internet dimension as the Italian one. Through a quantitative survey process (198 questionnaires collected within the Chinese community of Italy and 199 among some Chinese still living in China) and some significant qualitative interviews, I shall try to verify whether it is possible to hypothesize a change in the Chinese perception about the Internet restrictions in China.
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit werde ich die Feldarbeit vorstellen, die ich von April bis Dezember 2014 durchgeführt habe. Es geht dabei um das Streben nach einem plausiblen Akteur, der in der Lage ist, die aktuelle von der Regierung konzipierte granitische actor world zu destabilisieren. In der Tat ist meine Grundannahme, dass ein chinesischer Internet-Nutzer, der die allgegenwärtigen Einschränkungen des Internets gewöhnt ist, vielleicht eine Änderung in seiner/ihrer Einstellung zu den Möglichkeiten des Internets erlebt, wenn er/sie Erfahrungen mit einer offeneren und ausländischen Internetdimension wie die Italienische machen würde. Durch eine quantitative Umfrage (es wurden 198 Fragebögen innerhalb der chinesischen Gemeinde von Italien und 199 Fragebögen von Chinesen, die immer noch in China leben, gesammelt) und einige signifikanten qualitativen Interviews werden wir versuchen zu überprüfen, ob die Hypothese einer Änderung in der chinesischen Wahrnehmung der Einschränkungen des Internets in China möglich ist.
2
Introduction
1. The five gateways for managing the Internet studies in China
Chinese society is a complex and multifaceted entity (Li Feng; 2013), with several contradictions and innumerable nuances. All its peculiarities and conflicts replicate themselves exponentially in its cyberspace, being this virtual zone more contentious than reality (Guobin Yang, 2009). As a result, in the contradictory Chinese cyber-society (Gerstenberg F.; 2008), we can observe a lot of space and possibilities for its cyber-citizens. Furthermore, it is noticeable a shared and unexpected online freedom (Goubin Yang, 2012) greater than the opportunities of the “offline” Chinese society; even though it is remarkable the efficacy of the technical, ideological and legal efforts conceived by the CCP to constrain the Internet’s deliberative effects. Therefore, on the one hand we may superficially hypothesize that this fervent, but fragile, openness might bring about an imminent social change also in the Chinese society. On the flip side, even though we took the side of those commentators who favors the CCP in the management of the Internet machine1 (Timo Arnall; 2014), it is anyhow imperative that scholars should be aware of five macro aspects, before theorizing any short-sight assumptions concerning the liberating power of the Internet.
1 In TImo Arnal’s film (2014)the director deals with “the invisible infrastructures of the internet [and] “the hidden materiality of data [which explore] some of the machines through which the cloud is transmitted and transformed”. I have used his work here to emphasize that the management of the Internet in China is not only implemented by the CCP through the path of ideological and legal constraints but also by starting from its primitive and technical architecture as the creation of a peculiar hardware structure. http://www.elasticspace.com/2014/05/internet-machine 3
I shall call them gateways, or, by employing the Actor Network terminology, obligatory passage points (Callon, 1986) through which any researcher has inevitably to pass and to be concerned with them. Primarily, if the purpose of the research is to analyze the Internet and its intersecting repercussions on the PRC and on the life of more than 720 million users (721 m in 2016) 2, it is critical to center the investigation not only on the Internet itself but on the manifold processes related to the online environment embedded within an authoritarian State.
First Gateway: everything is connected. In China, more than in other authoritarian countries, it is not possible, nor suggested to separate the Internet from the economy sphere, the Internet from politics, the Internet from the evolution of the Chinese society, even the Internet from the enrichment and the modernization of the language/communication/culture dimensions. For example, the term “egao”, which can be translated with “digitized parody”, is a modern expression which encompasses various, non-separable, interdisciplinary realities, in which, as Yang and Gong (2010) argue, “issues of power struggle, class reconsolidation, social stratification, online community formation, and cultural intervention, along with the transformative power of digital technologies intersect” (Xin Yang and Haomin Gong; 2010, 3-4). This clearly suggests how the Internet can easily merge its effects with different, intermingling aspects of the Chinese society. Scholars and researchers have, as a result, to consider that in China the Internet is often the unique output towards the external world for
2 http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/china/ http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/03/world/china-internet-growth-2014/ 4
netizens3, commercial companies and organizations of various kinds in order to enjoy, communicate, do business as censorship has dominated and still dominates the Chinese public discourse and many other aspects of life since decades. We have to point out that public – offline – protests and collective meetings are strongly restricted in the PRC (King G., Pan J., Roberts M. E.; 2013) and, therefore, the Internet is reasonably the only instrument able to overcome the Chinese cyber-iron curtain. As a consequence, the ramifications of the Internet are immediately visible in several human activities within the Chinese society and words such as social media or cyberspace have become some of the essential dependent variables on which to base any analysis on politics, international relations, social sciences, economics, on the evolution of the modern language and so on ad infinitum. Nowadays, everything is connected and intertwined and, even more, in China. As an effect, every element of the Chinese society, economy and politics is able to peremptorily influence many other elements/actors involved or even the entire network, as the Internet is the hyphen able to connect all the different spheres.
Second Gateway: the peculiar Chinese regime. Scholars should not forget that any cause and effect coming from the Chinese society, Chinese cyberspace or Chinese economy are always filtered at the source by a strainer built with an invasive Leninist political structure. It is not possible, nor suggested and neither fruitful to carry out a research on Chinese matters
3 Netizen: Usually netizen is an active participant in the online community of the Internet (From ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA). For Michael and Ronda Hauben, netizens are people who “work towards building the cooperative and collective nature which benefits the larger world. These are people who work towards developing the Net” http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/606/527
5
forgetting that a political magnifying glass is necessary, able to focus on the ubiquitous presence of the CCP in every aspect of this nuanced society,. Above all the Internet - that nowadays is going viral within various fields of human activities - is strongly managed by the CCP through its peculiar authoritarianism (Baogang He, 2006). Every exploration on new technologies in China should necessarily start from the analysis of the Chinese government, of its structure and organization. Besides, it will be methodologically mandatory to dwell on the main laws/regulations regarding the control of the Internet in this country, by building, firstly, a solid political and legal framework from which every research on this field will come to life with a greater sense of scientific completeness.
Third Gateway: following the pendulum. The exploration of the Internet in China is like trying to follow a pendulum that swings from some logical aspects to many contradictions, from a certainty to the next paradox, from a little breach in the regime to a sudden closure of every communication between the State and its population. Therefore, this movement is often disorientating for any analyst on Chinese society as it can bring the most skilled scholar to a path, but then it makes him/her leave out other equally important perspectives, if researchers shall not use a focused but multidisciplinary analysis. Here below some short but sharp examples:
1) At the end of 2016, China had more than 700 million Internet users, a 2.2 % increase over the year before and a penetration rate of 52.2 %; further, Chinese netizens spent an average of almost 20 hours online per week (http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/china/). Concurrently, albeit the fundamental role of the Internet within the life of millions of Chinese 6
users so crucial now for their need to express ideas, feelings and viewpoints after centuries of pervasive censorship in every media (newspapers, radios, TVs), the “Great Firewall” is heavily spoiling their web-experience(Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch, Robert N. M. Watson, 2007). For example, the Internet censorship system built by the CCP is one of the most sophisticated array of techniques and means for the Internet control; further, its pervasive effects on the Chinese cyberspace include words-filtering, cyber-attacks, deletion of sensitive blog-posts and prohibition of many western websites. (OpenNet Initiative, 2012). Why this contradiction? Why is this precarious equilibrium working and Chinese users do not protest in the street for these “e-constraints”? Why is another Arab Spring not foreseeable in China?
If we continue exploring other layers of the Chinese cyberspace, we can notice another swinging of the pendulum because we can observe a further paradox in this process as 2) “the majority of Chinese netizens are either unaware of the Great Firewall or unconcerned by it” (Damm 2007, 282-28; see also, Fengshu Liu, 2010). Additionally, in China the Internet censorship – even when it is sometimes perceived by those netizens with a higher level of education - is quite accepted as the majority of Chinese users agree with the government policies about the Internet regulations and even support its vision of control over the domestic Internet (Guo Z., Feng C. 2012; Li Y. 2009). Besides, if we go deeper through other layers of the Chinese cyberspace by analyzing manifold contradictions, we can find a further surprising singularity.
3) Albeit the pervasive effects of the Internet restrictions and considering 600 million netizens active every day, the majority of scholars might expect 7
that the Chinese common attitude would be a regular employ of circumvention tools in order to overtake the GFW and to benefit from the full access to free information by connecting to the rest of the world. However, again, another paradox and hence another swinging, as a research in 2011 (Hal Roberts et al, 2011) established that almost the 95% of web page requests in China are towards websites that are hosted within China’s borders. Additionally, in another study by Hal Roberts in 2010, it was demonstrated that, “at most, only 3% of users in countries with pervasive Internet filtering, including China, regularly use circumvention tools” (Hal Roberts et al., 2010, 1-2). We probably could proceed in this way ad infinitum and find out thousands of contradictions, but let us take into account another pivotal example. If we consider the sophistication of the Internet censorship system, it is problematic to explain even for a beginner researcher the reasons why the CCP is employing the Internet as the milestone on which to base any future step of the country (Hachigian, 2015) as the government is actually doing, instead of shutting off this dangerous threat as Egypt did in 2011. The strategy of blocking the Internet in China might be logical in order to avoid dissidents to organize protests in the streets through the possibilities of SNS4. In the Egyptian case, the regime actually achieved the opposite result, as Hassanpour has demonstrated. In his remarks, he points out that often a sudden interruption of mass communication “accelerates revolutionary mobilization and proliferates
4 A social networking website is an online platform that allows users to create a public profile and interact with other users on the website. Social networking websites usually have a new user input a list of people with whom they share a connection and then allow the people on the list to confirm or deny the connection. After connections are established, the new user can search the networks of his connections to make more connections. A social networking site may also be known as a social website or a social networking website. (From Tecnopedia, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4956/social-networking-site-sns) 8
decentralized contention” (Hassanpour N., 2011; 1-2). Hassanpour, has argued that social media often “act against grass roots mobilization, discouraging face-to-face communication and mass presence in the streets” (Hassanpour N., 2011; 3-4) because they deflate the protest into a virtual political stage. CCP leaders have proved that they have been attentive in adapting their policies and strategies to the continuous social and political developments occurring outside the PRC, by facing social instability with a tight Leninist regime but upgraded with deliberative practices (Baogang He, 2011). Therefore, Chinese authorities have probably refined their tactics by taking into account the riots in Egypt; thus by allowing Chinese users to continue benefiting from a filtered and controlled Internet, but conceding some online democratic practices. Concurrently, they have continued prohibiting other habits, as the connection towards some foreign websites but, through another oscillation, without shutting off completely the Internet. The main strategy of the CCP is the offering of a combination of rewards and punishment to induce a particular behavior. On the one hand, the acceptance of the regime (this part is associated with the “command” attitude of an authoritarian government). On the other, social and economic improvements with better life’s condition and a domestic Internet with restrictive features but that are peculiar to the Chinese culture (language, style, online preferences typical of the Chinese urban youth (and, in this part, we can observe the peculiar deliberative process in action).
4) One more example, the Chinese economy is growing by 7/8% a year and it is one of the largest in the world, but we can observe another contradiction because the 18.5% of the population lives on less than a dollar a day (World Bank, World Development Report 2002). 5) Lastly, if we consider not only 9
the Internet, but also politics. The Chinese authoritarianism is based, for instance, on the One Party system and on its preservation. Therefore, unequivocally, no democratic turn is foreseeable in the next years but, with another swinging, the regime concedes some deliberative online spaces (e- consultations and e-polls, for example) similar to some practices of the Western democracies in order to be legitimated to survive and to avoid protests (Baogang He, 2006; Min Jiang 2010). In fact, as Gilley (2008), Yih- Jye Hwang and Florian Schneider (2011) have pointed out, scholars are continuously surprised by the extent by which the CCP apparatus is accepting the opening up of the Chinese public discourse and a growing social maturation of its citizens by allowing deliberative offline and online spaces. Further, although Chinese leaders continue to reject Western-style political reforms, it is anyhow astonishing that simultaneously they are liberalizing Chinese economy with a semi-capitalistic approach. Why these political and economic attempts of openness within a State which remains authoritarian?
Fourth Gateway: who is holding the pendulum and how? Unequivocally, in order to explore the Chinese Internet censorship system and the contradictions of the Chinese cyber-society, it is imperative not only to follow the oscillations of the pendulum, but, primarily, to understand who is holding it, who is so efficient to manage its oscillations with the purpose to maintain the status quo and the social stability. This is the key issue in order to understand the reasons why within China nowadays it is possible to notice a rich and contentious - but high controlled - cyberspace with the pervasive presence of the State and, concurrently, the acceptance by the majority of the population of the Internet regulations imposed by the CCP. 10
(Guo Z., Feng C. 2012; Li Y. 2009). This is the key issue to comprehend the reason why, although the Great Firewall is so sophisticated to avoid Chinese users to connect, for example, to Facebook, YouTube or to search for unfiltered information within the Chinese search engines, at the same time, it has been reported that “89% of Chinese Internet users strongly believe that they have full access to the information that is available on the Internet”. (From the Global Internet User Survey - Internet Society 2012).
Fifth Gateway: the individual unit. If, one the one hand, it is imperative to focus the exploration of the Internet in China by starting from the analysis of role of the State in managing the online information, therefore at a macro- level analysis, concurrently, as methodological crucial strategy, we have to take into account the individual unit. Firstly, because the large number of users in China might become soon a mass difficult to restrain. Secondly, a few studies are centered on the individual and the related potentialities. The exploration of the Internet at an individual level might let scholars glimpse imminent changes, as an effect, on the macro layers of the Chinese society as the economy, or, for example, the way of accessing to open information. This could alter the structure of the Chinese political system as it has always been based on a strong control of information thanks to the articulated organization of the Chinese propaganda system (Shambaugh, 1995).
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2 Review of the Literature
A controversy: cyber-utopians and realists. This research is set within the literature that explores the relationship between Internet’s usage and civic engagement within an authoritarian regime. Scholars and researchers have tended to adopt a dichotomous vision of the field, by emphasizing, on the one hand, the revolutionary role of the Internet or, on the other hand, totally minimizing its weight. Therefore, with the advent of this field of research, two schools of thought started being predominant in studying new technologies, social and political change in authoritarian countries. On the one hand, the so-called cyber-realists are those researchers skeptical about the real weight of social media in the political and social change (for example, Morozov, 2009, 2011, 2012; Gladwell, 2010, 2011; Zuckerman, 2011; Palfrey, Etling and Faris, 2009). They consider social technologies (social media like Twitter and Facebook, blogs, bulletin boards, forums) irrelevant gadgets, more useful for authoritarian regimes in order to control dissident leaders and discordant opinions. Alternatively, if new technologies are even able to have some influences, they act as a safety valve as these e- platforms can relieve pressure for political change by allowing dissident people, troublemakers or simple netizens eager for a social and/or political change “to vent frustrations into a marginal medium” (Hassid, 2012). Therefore, the dissent can melt its drives of freedom into a virtual, controllable environment.
The field of study and the resulting controversy started flourishing during the Jasmine Revolution, when this spontaneous social movement gave hope 12
to young activists in the Arab world, by empowering their desire of freedom and democracy, and by giving online users those tools (the Internet and SNS) to gain better chances of fighting against their authoritarian governments. Considering the Internet and its repercussion on Middle East, several scholars (for example, Sardar S., Shah A., 2011; Campbell D. G., 2011; Rasha A. Abdulla 2007, Hofheinz A., 2011) stated that online social activities have been able to create new spaces for political aggregation and communication in countries with little or no space for free speech or political consensus. For these commentators, the Internet in the Arab world was really an instrument to defeat dictators. Some declared that it was the main factor; others stated that the Internet was only one among many other aspects, but it played anyhow a pivotal role in the revolution. Several scholars of international relations and political communication as well as a lot of experts of social sciences interested in new technologies have often declared that the Internet nowadays is one of the most influential instrument able to liberate the world and to bring freedom in countries in which any road towards democratic practices had always been considered an utopia. The attempt of these researchers is to determine the effects and the positive influence of the Internet as a tool of freedom. Further, their exploration is based on the role of new technologies in affecting the achievement of political and/or social change. Cyber-utopians consider these kinds of devices as an indispensable tool for spreading ideologies and communication (DeBoer, 2011; Guy, 2011; Shirky 2011; Howard et al. 2011). As a result, online dissidents, human rights activists and several scholars confident in the liberating role of the Internet have the absolute belief that online communication is in itself emancipatory and that the 13
“Internet favors the oppressed rather than the oppressor”, as Morozov (2011), a realist, has on the contrary dubiously stated.
In cyber-utopians’ perspective, SNS enclose a pseudo-society in which young activists are wishful to change their lives, by subverting their authoritarian governments through web mobilizations and, as a consequence, offline protests, by using Internet as the ideal, preliminary stage for the contemporary political dissent. Thus, in the authoritarian countries, the only way to protest for millions of young people is mainly a virtual meeting on the web with the further target to organize protests in real squares and streets. Consequently, the Internet becomes the only virtual place from which some isolated dissident opinions can be transformed into a mature social movement. “This communication revolution is a social revolution, because the ordinary people assume an unprecedented role as agent of change.” (Guobin Yang, 2011)
On the other hand, for cyber-realists (Morozov, 2009, 2011, 2012) the Internet is employed by dictators and authoritarian governments to control dissident opinions, the access to online information and to spread State's Propaganda. These scholars (for example, McKinnon, 2008; Bandurski, 2008) argue that the power of the Internet shows that it is a critical space for political action for both sides. Therefore, the battle for control of this tool on both government and activists’ side indicates that there is a controversy between cyber-utopians (digital dissidents, human rights activists) and cyber-realists and, as an effect, the Internet cannot be identified only as an instrument for bringing freedom in authoritarian countries. 14
The Chinese “Grand Paradox”. After the advent of the Internet in China in 1994, Chinese politicians were bogged down with an old vision of politics. Therefore, in order to keep pace with the times and new technologies, they started upgrading their knowledge in terms of political communication, new forms of propaganda and credible legitimacy within a semi-capitalistic global economy. As a result, the Chinese government had to face manifold security threats in order to control new kind of political and social e- protests. Consequently, the security agenda had to be continuously expanded jointly with the State’s communication system. In China, for example, the Internet has become, mostly, a weapon in the hands of the State in order to spread false rumors, denigrate leading activists, suppress free speech, improve their surveillance techniques and disseminate cutting-edge propaganda. With the use of SNS, authorities and governments are now able to track posts and identify networks of supporters adverse to the CCP with the final purpose of repression (McKinnon, 2008). For example, SNS as Weibo or Youku are open to anyone. Therefore, agents of the State, simple supporters of the government or even the so-called 50 cents Party are hired by the CCP in order to masquerade themselves as ordinary netizens to spread false rumors, denigrate the foreign press or to accuse a movement adverse to the State of being controlled by foreign forces. Further, these Internet commentators can also guide conversations towards government- friendly arguments to sway the attention from users’ protests and complains. Therefore, whereas States continue to dispose of the monopoly of legitimate force, and whereas a sufficient consensus persists, for cyber-realists to talk for an Internet revolution is premature. 15
However, as Chinese society is a complex society, it is counter-productive to analyze the Chinese cyberspace only with a black and white perspective. It is not possible to marry only one theory and to take cyber-utopians’ or cyber-realists’ side in exploring Chinese matters because China is an enormous, multifaceted entity full of contradictions as mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. It would be a shortsighted methodological strategy, if scholars decided to analyze the role of the Internet in China only through the lenses of cyber-utopians scholars (Yang, 2006; Zheng, 2007; Tai, 2006; Hardy, 2011) or with a more realistic approach of those who contend that the Internet has limited influences in China due to the sophisticated government censorship (Mckinnon, 2008). These superficial visions ignore some essential elements of the Chinese cyberspace, as the online civic engagement on social issues, the rich blogosphere which includes some influential web-celebrities like Han Han, several web- entertainers as Qian Zhijun and Luo Yufeng and also the incessant dissent animated by peculiar personalities as Ai Weiwei, Cheng Jianping, Zeng Jinyan and many others. Furthermore, we have to consider also the online achievements through which young netizens are nowadays able to increase the power of the Chinese public discourse thanks to the Internet (Guobin Yang, 2011). Yet we need to consider a more ecological approach in order to understand the whole Chinese complexity: social media cannot “be interpreted as the main cause of such complex processes, nor can they be seen as completely uninfluential” (Anzera, Comunello; 2012).
Lagerkvist (2006) coined the term grand paradox in order to describe a unique simultaneous growth of authoritarian State control and social freedom on the Internet in China. The Chinese Grand Paradox resides on 16
Chinese government’s ambivalence for rigorous censorship on online sensitive contents and, concurrently, the awareness that only the incessant growth of the Internet usage can revamp the Chinese economy (Lagerkvist, 2006). The CCP government faces a dilemma regarding the Internet regulations and censorship (Hachigian, 2001). On the one hand, the authorities are aware that a growing cyber-civic engagement will threaten the CCP. On the other hand, the Chinese government, as Feng Sun has pointed out, “is directly sponsoring the development of the Internet economy based on its recognition that Internet development will boost domestic economic growth”, [which is] “essential for preventing civil unrest by fostering the CCP’s legitimacy in an increasingly cognizant population” (Feng Sun, 2013). Accordingly, as Min Jiang argues, “Chinese modern authoritarianism relies on a combination of patriotism and legitimacy based on performance rather than ideology” (Min Jiang, 2010). Only through the preservation of a regime able to continue to grow economically, is it possible to assuage dissident opinions and to maintain sovereignty.
The Grand Paradox is also related to the dictator’s dilemma concept (Tufeckci, 2011), which can be addressed as this: if an authoritarian government allows the Internet to spread within the country, it poses a threat to its regime. If it does not, its economy is cut off economically and socially from the world and the protest in any case will arise. Lagerkvist’s grand paradox (2006) and the dictator’s dilemma (Tufekci, 2011) are fundamental concepts to understand the peculiar way through which CCP consider the power and the danger of the Internet. Consequently, a pervasive and sophisticated Internet censorship program is necessary because, as Tufekci has pointed out, “the effect of selective filtering is not to keep out 17
information out of the hands of a determined public, but to allow the majority of ordinary people to continue to be able to operate without confronting information that might create cognitive dissonance” (Tufekci, 2011). Digital activism can generate high volumes of web traffic, which can be dangerous for the stability of the CCP but, at the same time, it is crucial for the business and all the Internet economy based boosted by the Internet’s usage. For example, commercial websites owners encourage netizens to participate in debates and other contentious activities, sometimes “they even strategically guide and stimulate controversial discussions in their online communities in order to pump up the web traffic” (Feng Sun, 2013). This strategy provoke two effects. The government with the help of the Chinese companies deflate the discontent within controlled and non-sensitive platforms and, at the same time, although Chinese netizens believe that, for the first time, they are benefiting from an open Internet dimension, on the contrary, they are mainly stimulating the advertisement machine with their mouse clicks. As a result, the CCP is able to employ the Internet as a safety valve, by giving the possibility to its citizens to express their negative feelings over a wide range of issues, particularly local corruption and social injustice. Therefore, a safety valve that can be opened by the government only to express dissident opinions about matters that do not affect the main values of the State, i.e. without questioning the fundamental creed of the Communist Party. For the central authorities, it is better to face and fight online protests instead of real offline unrests in the streets. Concurrently, the CCP can even observe a rejuvenation of the Chinese economy, which can indeed modernize its roots with the help of the new technologies, by bringing several old companies into the online dimension. 18
Analyzing Chinese cyberspace only from the cyber-utopians/cyber-realists approach, it is not ecological if our purpose is to grasp the richness of the Chinese cyberspace and it is not beneficial to fully understand the current and the future repercussions of the Internet potentialities in the PRC. Only with a hybrid approach able to describe the government’s balance between censorship and sponsorship on the web, is it possible to analyze the vacillations of CCP in considering the Internet’s usage as a threat or as a road towards the modernization of the country. At the same time, it is undeniable that three decades of economic and social reforms “have transformed China in such a way that the State can no longer dictate or monopolize the distribution of resources” as Guobin Yang has pointed out (Yang D., 2004) and without allowing some kind of public discourse.
The peculiar Chinese authoritarianism and the growth of the individual unit. Most importantly, it is imperative to take into account the framework of authoritarian deliberation conceived by Baogang He (2011) concerning the peculiar authoritarianism that the CCP is employing within the PRC, through which it is possible to observe a refined authoritarian regime able to manage all the new communication issues provoked by social technologies. In this kind of regime, we cannot deny a strong and pervasive presence of a Leninist authoritarian State in every aspects of the Chinese society, but concurrently, the Chinese apparatus is proving to be a modern and sophisticated entity. As a result, the regime is able to incorporate some primordial semi-democratic practices through a deliberative process in which the demands and the needs of its cyber-citizens are able to influence government’s policies due to their social interventions within e-platforms, forums and chatrooms. (Baogang He, 2006, Min Jiang, 2010) 19
The efficiency of modern Chinese authoritarianism resides on the government’s strategy to channel the Internet’s potentialities to obtain three “waves” able to build a new State’s legitimacy for the Chinese government. These waves are able to benefit from the power of the Internet to achieve three macro targets. 1) To modernize its economy (Hachigian, 2001). 2) To let the discontent be channeled into non-sensitive websites by creating a web environment focused on commercial websites (Min Jiang, 2010), or by deflating it within e-platforms in which the public discourse is allowed only about specific (social/local) issues/injustices (Goubin Yang, 2011). Lastly 3) to revamp the Chinese patriotism and ideology thanks to the viral power of the Internet (Chin-Fun Hung, 2010). These three “waves” are different, but intersecting effects of the Internet control exercised by the CCP with the target of strengthening the Chinese sovereignty and legitimacy and to limit, on the other hand, the possibilities of this media to expand citizens’ freedom.
In order to briefly summarize the Government’s means for the Internet control which can bring about crucial repercussions for the CCP (i.e. social stability, extension of the current political status quo and economic improvements) and to enrich the review of literature, I will build a my own theoretical framework. I shall employ Lessig’s framework of Internet control (Lessig, 2006), but adapted with some modifications of mine that are here beneficial to analyze also possible points/actors of change which are the centerpiece of this thesis.
In Lessig’s framework, extracted from his book “Code2”, he argues that there have always been some constraints affecting private citizens who are 20
eager to take advantage of all the benefits related to the exercise of their full freedom (Lessig, 2006). Moreover, he points out that, usually, freedom is associated with arguments against government. “Government, in the modern libertarian’s view, is the threat to liberty; private action is not” (Lessig, 2006). In his perspective, historically, governments have regularly tried, and often succeeded, to limit private actions and, as a consequence, liberty through three modalities of control. Firstly, through laws and regulations able to legally constrain people’s freedom, further through the role of the economy, which has always affected the trend of the society because of the prices fluctuation. Lastly, through social norms in order to obtain some political and social achievements, as the diffusion of the ideology of the regime, or the preservation of the social stability through governments’ official narratives. Additionally, in his book, after having illustrated the liberating power of the Internet, Lessig adds another constraint able to limit the possibilities of the Internet and new technologies, i.e. the hardware architecture or the software code. In his understanding, the Internet does not necessarily lead to more freedom, but as Tsui Lokman (2003) has also pointed out, although “the original characteristics of the Internet promote certain libertarian values”, nowadays the cyberspace cannot be considered only an instrument for freedom but it has mostly become a technology of control exercised by governments. Therefore, Lessig (2006) has built a framework of four modalities of control that jointly regulate the Internet potentialities for citizens’ liberty. In his perspective, the control and the regulation of the Internet can be achieved by way of the law, the market, social norms and, further, by the way of the hardware architecture or software code. In detail, Lessig (2006) points out that the original characteristics of the Internet are being eroded as he has indeed 21
demonstrated that the Internet is controlled or can be controlled by four modalities of control. (1) The law: which regulates by the threat of legal actions; (2) the market: which regulates by price; (3) the social norms: which regulate by the threat of sanctions by the community; (4) the architecture: which regulates by the choice of its hardware design or software code (excerpts from “Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace”, Lessig, 2006). About the last modality, he has underlined that the original characteristics of the Internet are mostly determined by the initial design of the architecture, which is constituted of a code.
The four modalities are here employed in order to gain a concrete vision of some of the procedures and practices that the government has at its own disposal to control the Internet in China. Lessig’s four modalities of control can be fruitfully employed to build a schematic framework in order to enrich my review of literature on the restrictions built by the CCP that are affecting the Internet in China and to glimpse some possible destabilizing element/actor. Further, in order to have a broader picture of the Chinese cyber-society, it might be beneficial to add a supplementary, parallel dimension in Lessig’s original version in order to build a tridimensional model.
The Internet in China is like a pendulum that swings from a sudden closure towards an unexpected openness, as we have briefly observed through some examples in the introduction. It often seems that the government is always walking on a precarious tightrope to remain in equilibrium between a State with a strong Leninist structure and the needs and the demands of a fervent Chinese cyber-society, so eager to embrace new kinds of social 22
empowerments through the possibilities of the low-price technologies (Guobin Yang, 2011, Ming Jiang 2012). Therefore, it is more alluring and worthwhile to use Lessig’s framework, by adding a further parallel binary or dimension in order to obtain a more accurate and dynamic picture. A picture of the Chinese cyber-society that can be better described not only through the original “Lessig’s pervasive control binary”, but also by using another binary, which I call here “the deliberative control binary”. The first one is the original binary used by Lessig to explore all the limitations of an open society in which a government is, as Cochram (2012) has pointed out, “normally responsive and tolerant and political mechanisms are likely to be transparent and flexible.” However, in order to explore its peculiar authoritarian regime (Baogang He, 2006; 2011) able to control the Internet with sophisticated means but, concurrently, to allow the population manifold paths for the self-expression (Min Jiang, 2010) a further binary is necessary. I shall call it “the deliberative control binary”, because, as I have mentioned above, in China it is possible to notice a continuous oscillation from a strongly authoritarian organization of the State towards a more open society in which some semi-democratic values and demands of empowerments are modernizing the Chinese mindsets (Chen, Shengyong. 2006). However, this modernization of the country is influencing also the CCP apparatus, which is now more attentive in incorporating some of these deliberative trajectories (T. Meng, J. Pan, P. Yang; 2014. Therefore, it is more newsworthy to present here not only the four, original, Internet’s constraints indicated by Lessig, which, for example, inhibit netizens to connect to the most famous western SNS or hinder the search for sensitive words through the Chinese search engines as Baidu and Sina. But it is mandatory also to focus on all the deliberative practices (for example, e-spaces allowed by the CCP to 23
netizens to express tendencies and viewpoints such as forums, e- consultation platforms, chat-lines) i.e. online spaces, in which a contentious blogosphere is developing, able to influence some of the government’s policies through e-petition and e-discussion (Min Jiang, 2010). Therefore, some of these semi-democratic practices shall be, on the contrary, included within the deliberative control category. Through these deliberative practices – even though they are strongly regulated and controlled by the State – ordinary people, the individual unit, can now obtain more freedom and social achievements even in China.
It is relevant to emphasize that the government continues controlling both binaries; i.e. whether the public discourse is allowed or not, or to what extent some social issues shall be included into its political agenda. We have to point out that, on the one hand, these new possibilities show us that even when some openness is admitted in the evolution of the public discourse or in the creation of a sort of bottom-up input able to influence State’s programs, it is – at any rate – always the State that holds the whip hand. Yet, even though these deliberative practice are strongly regulated and controlled by the CCP, they should not be ignored by scholars and researchers but, on the contrary, they have to be explored deeply and through a slightly different framework. Briefly, if we apply schematically the original Lessig’s framework, we can notice that the Internet is strongly regulated by the law, for example through all the invasive Internet regulations of the last 20 years. Besides, by the market through many legal constraints able to limit companies’ actions (for example, the Internet Cafè regulations are directives stating that the owner is responsible for monitoring the customers and filtering their contents. The owner must follow these regulations in order to 24
continue to work – Lokman Tsui, 2003). Therefore, Chinese firms have the duty to monitor and even self-censor their online contents, if netizens have the possibility to publish sensitive arguments adverse to the State within their own online platforms such as forums and chat-rooms. Further, the cyberspace is restricted by the architecture of the Internet itself. For example, in a study of 2011 concerning the structure of national networks of autonomous systems (the Internet service providers), it was established that the control that China applies over its network is exercised only through 4 autonomous systems to connect the 90% of its 240 million IP addresses (Hal Roberts et al, 2011). This suggests that monitoring a few connection points is optimal for controlling more easily the net (Hal Robets et al, 2011). Lastly, through Lessig’s framework, the Internet is regulated by social norms, i.e. by the official discourse of the State, which harshly recommends netizens what is morally and socially admitted through the official propaganda that spreads the Chinese ideology over the Internet (Chin-Fun Hung, 2010).
Nevertheless, it is equally true that there is a lot more to explore as here the focus is always on pervasive control without any other glimpse of openness in this monolithic actor world.
Here below, the original Lessig’s framework applied to the Chinese Cyberspace:
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Adaptation of Lessig’s framework taken from http://pne.people.si.umich.edu/kellogg/045.html fig.1 The code: Great Firewall, Internet filtering techniques, few ASN)
Social norms: Chinese Internet: The Economy (companies’ Government’s Lessig’s original self-censorship to control propaganda as Framework web contents in order stay the only allowed into business public discourse
Ct The Law: (several regulations and laws for the Internet control as the White paper or the
Measures of 2000)
As it is possible to observe, this framework is not suitable to capture all China’s different and intersecting nuances as it is only focused on control; on pervasive control. This picture gives a shortsighted image of the complex Chinese situation, as it is not able to depict the rich and contentious Chinese cyberspace and the importance of the individual unit.
Accordingly, it is more fruitful to emphasize that in China the control dimension is often harbinger of manifold hyphens towards unexpected 26
deliberative practices because the efficient Chinese regime is aware that a ubiquitous and blind censorship is not always the most appropriate strategy to prolong its status quo, its legitimacy and to forestall possible revolutions (Mckinnon, Min Jiang, Baogang He). Consequently, the exploration of the Chinese cyberspace through a more tridimensional approach, i.e. through a “deliberative control binary” means that although the Internet in China is strictly controlled, it is now possible to glimpse some effects of the liberating power of the Internet’s opportunities. For example, considering the Law: 1) it is possible to observe various spaces for the online public discourse concerning social and local issues or e-petitions/polls able to influence the State’s policies (Min Jiang). Considering the Economy/Market: 2) new possibilities thanks to the e-commerce for private companies able now to use the Internet to modernize the structure of the Chinese economy, to increase their revenues, to benefit from the global market and therefore, to improve, as an effect, also the Chinese population’s lives (Hachigian, Min Jiang, Feng Sun). Therefore we can understand that the Internet in china is “an Internet not based on the free circulation of information but on market information” as Julien Pain (2005) of “Reporters Without Borders” has pointed out. 3) Considering Social Norms: - even in a very closed ideological dimension fuelled by the incessant work of the Chinese propaganda machine (Shambau; Chin-Fun Hung, 2010)– we have to emphasize the development of online discussions and offline protests stimulated by a new Chinese patriotism as the Anti Cnn campaign or Anti- Japanese protest (Cohn, 2001; Pfaffenberger 2000). This spontaneous form of national dissent is able to revamp the pride of citizens in their nation and to seal the discontent as they protest towards a common external enemy. Lastly 4) considering the code: we can observe the sophistication and the 27
social improvement of the architecture of the Chinese Intranet capable to sustain the fervent needs and the demands of a population wishful to use a slightly more open Internet platform, in Chinese language, with a qualitative and quantitative supply more similar to the western counterpart. (See the Chinese, plagiarized version of many western websites as Youtube/Youku, Facebook/RenRen, and Twitter/Weibo). Here, below, my version of Lessig’s framework.
My updated version of Lessig’s framework
Pervasive Deliberative Control: The Code:
Control: The websites built for Chinese in Chinese Code: Great language and with Chinese characteristics
Firewall, in order to avoid them to connect to the Internet filtering western counterparts techniques, ASN)
Pervasive Control: Pervasive control: The Social norms: Economy: (companies’ self-
Government’s censorship to control web propaganda contents and stay into The Chinese business Internet: my hybrid
Deliberative control: Deliberative Control: The new Chinese Economy: (new kind of nationalism and economy thanks to the e- patriotism, which can commerce /better life seal the nation’s trust conditions) 28
Deliberative control: The Pervasive control: The Law: Online deliberative Law: The Measures of spaces allowed to users to 2000 or other Internet express opinions and to regulations communicate with the State
Fig. 2
For example, if we apply this proposed theoretical framework, the law does control the Internet in China, through extensive regulations, which gives the State the possibility to legally pursue users’ Internet behavior, if it infringes the law. At the same time, through deliberative practices, the Chinese authorities concede several online semi-democratic spaces by which people can benefit from a sort of freedom never achieved before (Min Jiang 2010). It is doubtless true that these online spaces are controlled by the Internet filtering system, by the Internet police and by many other techniques. However, it is concurrently undeniable that through these online spaces, Chinese users, the individual units are now able to change the state of things even in this closed society, by bringing to light social issues/injustices, as it had never happened before (Guobin Yang, 2011; Shih‐Diing Liu). Additionally, if we take into account the Market, it is unquestionable that Chinese companies have to self-censor users’ contents and sensitive posts in 29
their websites if they want to remain into business (Mckinnon. At the same time, now we can glimpse also a greater openness for private enterprises, which have the possibility to use the Internet to increase their revenues and, consequently, we can observe an overall social and economic improvement. It must be clear that, through this proposed framework, I do not want to state that the Internet is not fully controlled by the CCP and a democratic wave is embracing the Chinese society. On the contrary, I want even to reinforce the concept of the extreme control exercised by the government also when the Internet has some potentialities for people’s freedom. However, at the same time, from the tight meshes of the Internet censorship, it is possible now to descry rays of hope for a latent change. These possibilities of opening up the public discourse are strongly managed by the government because the CCP has been able to build a structure of control able to present, as Lagerkvist (2006) points out, “a dichotomy of a locked-in” public discourse associated with the old media, and the power of the Internet able now to “unlock the public sphere”. The Chinese cyberspace can be described as a continuous oscillation from a locked in scenario to an unlocking environment in which netizens are sometimes able to open the meshes of censorship (if the CCP allows them to do it) and again a re-locking mechanism when the CCP decides to intervene and to close any breach in the system (Lagerkvist, 2006). For example, the extent of deliberative e-spaces allowed to netizens to use the Internet in order to achieve some social improvements or to fight for some injustice (let us think about the police corruption) is just another concession to Chinese netizens from the government, just another form of control of the cyberspace’s public discourse which can be deflated within controlled web spaces. Inexorably, currently, the creation of online deliberative spaces is not a result obtained by netizens’ forces, but again 30
only another form of control exercised by the government to avoid social instability. It is a strategic kind of safety valve; but at the same time, it is harbinger of social change as well, even with political repercussions, if we consider some bottom-up processes able to influence some State’s policies.
Further, we can take into account the propaganda machine able to use the power of the Internet to promote the CCP’s ideology (Shamabaugh, 1995). It is interesting to explore how the government is employing new forms of indoctrination thanks to the boundless Internet channels as a glue to seal the nation (Chin-Fun Hung, 2010). However, concurrently, it is possible to notice that this pervasive ideology has brought about a spontaneous social wave, which has powered a new Chinese patriotic spirit. This nationalistic spirit can be perceived in chat rooms and forums as the Anti-Western and Anti-Japanese Campaigns, able to seal the urban youth’s discontent but also to challenge the official narrative of the State. Lastly, we have to emphasize the architecture of the Chinese cyberspace in order to explore, also in this case, the Internet in the double binary “pervasive control” and “deliberative control”. It is true that the CCP has built the most controllable Internet architecture in the world, but it is also undeniable that the government has decided to develop an alternative web-environment in Chinese language able to fully meet the demands of the Chinese web-surfers and, at the same time, to avoid netizens to connect to western websites. As it is possible to notice, there are continuous oscillations between the “pervasive control binary” and the “deliberative one”.
31
3 Fieldwork background and previous studies on the topic: The Starting Point
The Internet survey 2012. In the previous section, we have explored the theoretical background by which my preliminary research interest had sprouted by taking into account the peculiar political, social and economic picture of the Chinese society and its repercussions within the Chinese online environment (Scott E Feir, 1997; Séverine Arsène, 2012). Therefore, we have observed briefly how the Chinese government has been astute in the last twenty years to create a detached environment, i.e. not fully connected to the Internet of the rest of the world in order to preserve its territorial integrity over the global Internet (Min Jiang 2010; the White Paper of 2010). As an effect, the CCP has been able to build up an Internet environment with peculiar Chinese characteristics and with manifold restrictions in terms of access to free information and concerning the blockage of specific western SNS (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) and several information websites.
This has brought about the growth of a specific field of research, especially in Us concerning topics as: 1) the issues of freedom of thought within the Chinese domestic Internet, 2) the related struggle in accessing to impartial online information and 3) the positive effect of the Internet’s potentialities as possible element of change within the Chinese society). Further, the above review of literature confirms that “academic attention has mainly been paid to two areas: the political implications of the Internet for China and the development of telecommunications and Internet infrastructure” (Fengshu L; 2010)). However, as Fengshui has pointed out that there seems 32
to be a lack of interest in ‘micro’-level analysis that examines the experiences of the individual users (exceptions include Giese, 2006; McLaren, 2007; Wu et al., 2007; Yu, 2007; Zhang, 2002).
The focus of this research and its innovation are based on the more alluring and practical aspect of Chinese netizens’ behavior in approaching the Internet, i.e. the individual implications of the Internet on people, on Chinese population. Chase and Mulvenon (2002) have pointed out that the analysis of the Internet in China has often focus its attention on two main macro-areas of concern:
“Does the Internet provide dissidents with potent new tools that they can use to promote their causes, break through the barriers of censorship, and perhaps ultimately undermine the power and authority of non-democratic regimes? Or, on the contrary, is it more likely that those authoritarian governments will use the Internet as another instrument to repress dissent, silence their critics, and strengthen their own power?
“From Chase, Michael, James Mulvenon, and Nina Hachigian. 2006. Comrade to comrade networks: The social and political implications of peer-to-peer networks in China. In Damm and Thomas, eds. 2006. 64–101.”
My purpose for this thesis is to develop a deep insight concerning the effects of the Chinese Internet restrictions on the Chinese users’ habits and, secondly, on the Chinese people’s perception about their domestic Internet in contrast with the rest of the world. What do Chinese people think about their domestic Internet? Do they perceive any discrepancies in terms of Internet freedom or access to unbiased information? Is their usual employ of 33
the Internet different from the habits of the western netizens? Lastly and most importantly, what if we might analyze the Internet habits and the online behavior of a typical Chinese netizen implanted within a European country with a democratic Internet and far from the Chinese Big Brother?
In order to have a preliminary picture of the scenario, it is crucial to approach the issue from previous studies concerning the people’s perception of domestic Internet focusing on Chinese users peculiarities in contrast with users of other realities. One of the few and most comprehensive survey concerning the Internet behavior, which has involved thousands of users around the world is the “Global Internet User Survey 2012” carried out by The Internet Society. The Internet Society is “a trusted independent source of leadership for Internet policy, technology standards, and future development”. They “work to ensure the Internet continues to grow and evolve as a platform for innovation, economic development, and social progress for people around the world. It is important to underline that “while other ICT surveys focus on economic, infrastructure, or other Internet use indicators, the GIUS focuses on users, which are the source of innovation that has driven the Internet’s development, evolution and dramatic growth over the past four decades. Further, this survey has been “intended to provide a general overview of the behaviors and opinions of Internet users on various topics”. (From http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/global- internet-user-survey-2012).
This report has been one the first significant work over a wide range of Internet issues with the peculiar aspect of having involved 20 countries and thousands of Internet users. 34
My research interests have sprouted from the analysis of these data in order to verify 1) whether Chinese users living in China have similar Internet habits in comparison with the western counterpart. 2) Whether they consider peculiar (both in a positive or negative way) their domestic Internet or, on the contrary, they did not perceive clear and strong discrepancies in comparison with the rest of the world in terms of:
1) access to open and unbiased information 2) websites restrictions 3) Governments’ interventions in managing the Internet 4) General online preferences and Internet habits (time spent on the Internet, preferred topics)
This exploratory overview would be crucial because if Chinese users do not perceive any specific difference with the Internet of the rest of the world, further steps are mandatory to figure out the reasons why for their unawareness and, secondly, what might occur if a Chinese user could benefit from a more open Internet environment outside his/ her domestic Internet. This introduction takes also into account the studies and the research of Damm who has pointed out that “many Chinese netizens are either unaware of the Great Wall of Fire or unconcerned by it” (Damm 2007). The 2012 Internet survey may be interesting to validate this statement regarding the unawareness or indifference of the Chinese users in terms of the restrictions imposed by the CCP.
In this short analysis I have considered only the “strongly agree” sub- category in order to gain a fast but impressive overview of the context without focusing on the uncertain and blurred answers. It is worth 35
underlining that the samples here taken into account include - for the 71% – users coming from the “25 to 39 years old sub-category”, i.e. values equivalent to the sample that I have collected for my survey.
The starting point: For example, in statement A of the Global Internet User Survey 2012, i.e. “please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Access to the Internet allows me to freely express my opinions on all subject matters”, the 58% of Chinese Users strongly agree with this sentence. If we compare this value with a European country, Italy, we notice that the 47% of the interviewees are strongly agree with the same sentence and the Us sample has the 39% of their users who think in the equivalent manner. As a result, we can observe that Chinese users have a higher perception that they can freely express their opinions on all subject matters in comparison with Italy and Us. This an outstanding value considering the effective restrictions present within the Internet in China. Obviously, it is not possible to ascertain whether their response are altered by the fact of living within an authoritarian dimension and therefore my proposed fieldwork would be crucial to verify this aspect, by centering the analyzing of the sample on Chinese users employing the Internet from outside the Chinese domestic online environment.
In another declaration, “Access to the Internet allows me to seek any information on any subject matter that interests me”, the 64% of the Chinese sample strongly agree with the above statement. The Italian sample has the same value and the Us users have the value of 71%. This clearly suggests that, even in this case, Chinese users express the same moods and opinions of the western counterpart, i.e. apparently not perceiving any of the 36
issues present in the Chinese cyber-society. In a third statement, “I have access to all types of Internet applications and services to obtain information and express my opinions (e.g., via surfing, email, social media, videos, blogging)”, the 54% of the users of the Chinese sample strongly agree with the sentence. It almost mirrors the Us sample (52%) and it is higher than the Italian value (46%).
In statement D “Access to the Internet access should be considered a basic human right”, 58% of Chinese users strongly agree with this assertion. They mirror a higher value in comparison with Italy (45%) and Us (39%). In statement number 5 “My government has an obligation to ensure that I have the opportunity to access the Internet”, the 60% of the Chinese users strongly agree with the sentence, in comparison with the 53% of the Italian users and the 33% of the Us sample. This might suggest the acceptation of the Chinese users concerning the role of the government in managing the Internet, in comparison with a higher attitude of liberty in the Us sample. The following statement is, on the contrary, controversial: “Freedom of expression should be guaranteed on the Internet.” The 51 % of Chinese users strongly agree with the above-mentioned declaration. Italy has almost the same value and the Us sample is 42%. It is important to underline here the seeming need of freedom of expression coming from the Chinese sample. This declaration may mirror a situation in which they feel that they have less freedom within the Internet in comparison with the rest of the world, but it could also suggest that they feel that the government is capable to give this opportunity to the Chinese population. 37
In statement G, “the Internet is essential for my access to knowledge and education”, the 59% of the Chinese users strongly agree with this declaration; the value is much higher than the Us sample (45%) and the Italian sample (49%), suggesting that Chinese netizens apparently believe that they have full access to open information.
Statement h, i.e. “Services such as social media enhance my right to peaceful assembly and association”, it is interesting as it suggests a picture through which SNS are considered by Chinese netizens as the only way to meet other people within a virtual social stage. The Chinese value is 47% and it is much higher than the Italian one (37%) and the Us sample (32%). This might mirror a situation through which Chinese users strongly believe that the Internet is probably the only instrument to express feelings, moods and opinions in contrast with the American and the Italian society in which citizens can access to manifold forms of aggregation.
Statement I, i.e. “the Internet should be governed in some form to protect the community from harm”, suggests again that online users accept the role of the government in managing the Internet. As a result, it is logical to observe the value of 57% (strongly agree) in the Chinese sample. It might suggest that Chinese users perceive the Chinese State’ interventions within the Chinese Internet environment. The Italian value is similar (52%) suggesting a comparable situation in which the role of the State in the Italian case has always been predominant in managing the public affair. On the contrary, we have only the 28% of the American users who strongly agree with this assertion and this reflects a completely different context in which the libertarian view of the American citizens and the Us government’s 38
interventions on the society have always shaped an individualistic management of the “res publica”.
The next statement is one of the most interesting and controversial of the whole survey. It states, “I have full access to all of the information that is available on the Internet.” Chinese users with the 52% of the sample strongly agree with this sentence. Paradoxally, the Italian and the Us value is lower with, respectively, the 45% and the 46% of the users who strongly agree with this declaration. As it is possible to observe in several researches (McKinnon, King 2014) and considering that online information in China is often censored in manifold ways, this result is compelling as we would have expected different and opposite values. Through this statement, we can notice that Chinese users perceive that their access to open information is free and unrestricted, confirming what Damm (2007) has pointed out about the unawareness of Chinese regarding many of the Internet issues in China.
However, the following statement makes the exploration within the Chinese Internet habits more problematic and complex to analyze as in this case Chinese users even support the role of the Internet censorship. In statement L, i.e. “Censorship should exist in some form on the Internet”, Chinese users strongly agree with the 44% of the sample that censorship is necessary. The value is much higher than the Italian sample (26%), the American (22%) and if we consider the global value (35%) or the French result (23%), we can notice how the Chinese percentage is significant higher. This might be a paradox because, on the one hand, they strongly agree (52%) that they have full access to all the information that is available on the Internet (see previous statement) and, on the other hand, they strongly 39
agree (44%) that censorship is necessary. This is an illogical oscillation from the openness of a free and unbiased information to the necessity of an unavoidable closure of the freedom of thought. Regarding the role of Chinese people in supporting the concept of censorship within the online environment, it is interesting to report Guo and Feng’s (2012) research about their investigation on young people’s support for Internet restrictions in China within the broad conceptual approach of the theory of reasoned action (TRA). They have employed two concepts, authoritarian personality and third-person perception, in order to “examine dimensions pertinent to the unique social context of China such as party membership, Confucianism tradition, and one-child policy.” They have explored “dimensions of attitude and support for censorship among China’s youth”. Concurrently, they have also noticed that public “resentment toward state information control not only exists, but may very well be on the rise in recent years”. This may confirm a dynamic picture, as mentioned in several circumstances in this introduction, by which we can notice a continuous oscillation between an authoritarian ideological dimension and a modern and socially stratified milieu. This ambiguity will show us further illogical results and values and for this reason it may be beneficial the analysis of the Internet restrictions as perceived from Chinese people outside China and its social, legal and technical constraints.
In fact, the next assertion is even more absurd after the previous one, as it states “Governments in countries with no Internet censorship have a responsibility to keep the Internet free of censorship in countries where the Internet is being censored/controlled/ shut down”. Chinese users strongly agree (38%) with this declaration with a value higher than the Italian value 40
(32%), the American (23) and the global (20%). In the previous statement, Chinese users strongly agree that censorship is necessary and by this declaration, they now strongly agree that governments have a responsibility to keep the Internet free of censorship in countries where the Internet is restricted. Further studies are here mandatory to reach a deep understanding of the context.
In the following statement, we find another oscillation because we continue to have illogical results that contradict many of the previous values. For example, in this statement “Each individual country has the right to govern the Internet the way they see fit”, Chinese users strongly agree (43% of the sample) that a country with its own sovereignty has the right to govern the Internet as it wish. In this way,this sentence contradict the previous result by which they strongly agree that governments should have a responsibility to keep the Internet free in countries with the Internet censorship in function. In this section, only the 22% of the Italian users strongly agree with the sentence and the value is similar to the American result (26%). The global value is 33% and the French value is much lower (15%).
Additionally, in the subsequent question, “ How much do you agree or disagree that increased government control of the Internet would have each of the following effects” we find answers that are puzzling to decode. For example, in sentence b “It would put limits on the content I can access”, the 35% of the Chinese users strongly agree with this declaration, aligning their value with the Italian one (34%) and the American result (37%). This gives the impression that Chinese users sometime answer in a more open way but in other circumstances, as mentioned before, they often accept the 41
restrictions imposed by the government. This oscillation makes the analysis almost impracticable.
Moreover, if we analyze many of the following statements, the contradictions continue to destabilize a logical path. For example, in sentence C “It would make me fearful that my actions were under surveillance”, Chinese users (38%) strongly agree with the declaration in line with Italy (38%) and US (43%). Then, also in statement D. “It would limit my freedom of expression”, we have values that are similar for all the three countries analyzed. Chinese users who strongly agree are the 35% of the sample, the Italian value is 38%and the same result is for the Us. Even in statement E, “It would make the Internet too controlled” we find out values similar for all the three dimensions. Chinese users that strongly agree with the sentence are the 35% of the sample. The Italian value is 37% and the American one is 40%.
Yet, in the following statement another contradiction, another oscillation towards a sudden closure. In the sub-sentence H “[ the Internet control] would improve the content on the Internet”, Chinese users (30% of the sample) strongly agree that the content on the Internet would be even improved, in contrast with the Italian value (16%), the Us result (11%) and the global one (18%). This statement again contradicts the previous opinions that are, on the contrary, completely in line with countries with a democratic Internet environments. In order to validate these continuous oscillations, it is useful the following sentence: “People need to be able to access the Internet without data and content restrictions”, again Chinese users (the 41% of the 42
sample) strongly agree with this declaration, in line with the Italian value (44%) and the American one (36%).
Further studies and analysis are necessary to explore these contradictions. Why so many oscillations? Are the Chinese respondents lying in some sections of the survey because they live in an authoritarian dimension? This is a significant starting point, but the authoritarian context makes the exploration of the online Chinese habits complex to analyze. A further step is mandatory to focus the analysis of the Chinese users’ Internet preferences but the exploration has to be disconnected from the State’s influence in order to obtain a deeper insight of the role of the Internet on the individual unit without the limitations of the Chinese Big Brother.
4 Purpose of research and innovation in the field
Considering the path traced by the Internet survey 2012, my research commences from these contradictions but with the further target to explore the Chinese cyber-space by focusing the investigation on the individual unit. It is worth noticing that other surveys have been carried out with the purpose of analyzing the repercussions of the Internet on Chinese people at a micro- level. For example, Fengshu Liu’s (2010) work is centered on the exploration of online Chinese youth’s habits. Fenshui has focused its work on the observation of the Chinese young people and their usual employ of the Internet. In her understanding, “both men and women across the two age groups, used the net mainly for recreation — a term they used interchangeably with “entertainment’,‘pastime’ and ‘fun’”. When asked how 43
Chinese young netizens would define the Internet, a predominant reply was ‘just entertainment’”; and the majority of words that were related to the Internet in this survey were “play with the computer’, ‘play online’ or ‘my mother does not allow me to play (online)”. As we shall explore, the majority of Chinese use the Internet for their online recreation as videogames, movies, music, novels, chatting, blogs. It is also worth underlining that the Internet in this survey “was perceived as highly relevant for entertainment and expressive purposes, it was deemed much less useful in the other domains”. Further, the Internet in China is considered mostly a “manifestation of the material wealth enjoyed by the urban only-child community, for whom leisure consumption is increasingly integrated with high-tech as it is in wealthier societies”, denoting that the Internet is often related to consumerism and entertainment.
This survey is remarkable because it put emphasis on the implications of the Internet on the individual possibilities and it depicts a portion of Chinese urban youth. The analysis is centered on the social–biographical situation of the interviewees, as the pressure and boredom in their lives and the use of the Internet to overtake issues as the “only-child status, high parental expectations, the exam-oriented educational system, the competitive labor market, lack of authority in the family and society, hence limited space for individual expression”.
The innovation in my research is an attempt to relate the micro and the macro levels. My intent is trying to create connections between the individual unit, the Chinese user, the Internet and the Chinese government. As a consequence, this thesis is not centered on the exploration of the role of 44
the Internet in changing the status-quo of the Chinese society. The purpose of the fieldwork here carried out is to explore how Chinese netizens access to information within the Internet and how they use online technologies. Further, my intention is to verify whether some elements of change (on a personal level or on social relations) in the near future might be foreseeable, considering the repercussions of an open Internet environment on Chinese mindsets after manifold, intermingling foreign experiences occurred within a democratic Internet milieu.
As a result, the focus of my fieldwork shall be the analysis of the typical Chinese user’s perception related to the rigid Internet regulations effects in China after that a Chinese user will have experienced a more open Internet dimension in a foreign country. I will not state that the Internet is a medium of change, by taking the side of the cyber-utopians, but I will verify whether a mental process, a maturation in the behavioral attitude of an ordinary Chinese user might take place when a netizen will benefit from an open Internet-society. This thesis tackles the issue from another perspective in contrast with the above-mentioned picture of Chase and Mulvenon. The Internet itself must not be considered as an actor of change, but it is the user’s approach in employing it, which might be able to destabilize the current situation of indifference or unawareness about the Chinese Intranet issues perceived by Chinese netizens. The Internet must not be considered as a weapon in the hands of the government, nor, on the contrary, an instrument able to liberate the world. However, it can be a medium able to multiply the possibilities of anyone is able to employ it in the most efficient way, if a change in his/her approach may occur because of different and manifold reasons. 45
If Chinese people will start using and accessing the Internet with a more open approach and, most importantly, if they will continue to feel the need to use the Internet in this different way, rather than accessing the Internet as before their social maturation, in that case, we can hypothesize a change in the Chinese cyber-society. If, on the contrary, Chinese users will continue using the Internet in the same way as the majority of the Chinese population is doing now in China, i.e. by not perceiving all the issues of the current Chinese cyber-society, the government will be able to manage any possible isolate dissident as it is already facing even in the future. It is a matter of mental approach to the Internet’s employ. The Internet itself will not change the status quo, if Chinese Internet users remain brainwashed or they do not perceive issues as the freedom of speech within the Chinese cyberspace, and most importantly, as the free circulation of unbiased information. We have to consider that this process of social change due to a different behavioral attitude in approaching the Internet because of foreign web experiences might be foreseeable if and when always more and more Chinese netizens will start approaching the Internet in a different way. This might happen, for example, when Chinese will start benefiting - always with greater frequency - from intermingling experiences because of cultural exchanges, as the attendance of foreign universities or through careers in a different continent.
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5 Outline of the research
As a consequence, the most innovative part of this work is focused on the analysis of the quantitative questionnaires and the semi-structured interviews that I have carried out for the study of the Chinese behavior in approaching the use of the Internet within an authoritarian society and outside it.
As a matter of fact, through my fieldwork, I will try to verify, firstly, whether the perception of the concept of Internet censorship is similar to our Western conception, considering that “many Chinese netizens are either unaware of the Great Wall of Fire, or unconcerned by it” (Damm 2007, 282- 285; Fengshu Liu, 2010). Further, my fieldwork sprouts by taking into account that it is undeniable that in China the Internet censorship is quite accepted as the majority of Chinese netizens agree with the government policies about Internet regulations (Guo Z. and Feng C., 2012; Li Y. 2009). Secondly, I will explore whether we can observe differences in the users’ web experience concerning the access to information by comparing two samples: the first one includes Chinese netizens living within the PRC and the second one a portion of Chinese living outside, in Italy.
Considering some very recent studies (Harsh Taneja, Angela Xiao Wu; 2014) through which it has been demonstrated that usually Chinese users prefer visiting “websites they find culturally proximate and consequently access blockage matters only when these particular websites are blocked”, I shall verify whether a typical Chinese netizen implanted in Europe will be 47
subject to any changes in his/her way of approaching the Internet after having experienced a different online dimension. In other words, Chinese netizens seem to prefer surfing the controlled Chinese Intranet for language, cultural or geographical reasons even though they live in China or on the contrary, they surf from another country, Italy, for example. As a result, those who live in Europe that could access information through free websites, often continue to use Chinese restricted e-platforms. I shall try to verify this process and to figure out whether there might be any changes in terms of taste, search engines preferences and most used social sites in their approach concerning a new and open internet dimension, considering their age, their level of education, etc. Thirdly, and most importantly, I shall verify whether it is foreseeable a change in the perception of the Internet censorship issue by Chinese users, when they can benefit from an open Internet dimension as the European one. My assumption is that when a Chinese user benefits from the possibilities of an open Internet, in this study the Italian one, then his/her access to information might be different as he/she will be more aware of the discrepancies of his/her previous closed cyberspace. If this mutation in his/her perception shall occur, we can hypothesize even a change in the Chinese cyberspace, when this user will come back to use the filtered Chinese “Intranet” and will start missing the previous freer European cyberspace. My assumption is that new and stronger demands and needs of a more open Internet dimension will provoke a change in the Chinese cyber-society.
This research has a main purpose, i.e. to find out whether any actors, humans or non-humans (Latour, Callon Law), might be capable to destabilize the sophisticated Internet censorship system built by the Chinese 48
government. Indeed, I shall focus on the fieldwork that I have carried out during the 2014, from April to December, in which I had the opportunity to collect 397 questionnaires among the Chinese Community of Italy and the many Chinese still living in China, in the Province of Zhejiang. During that period, I had also the possibility to interview some Chinese netizens that are now living and working in Italy. As already anticipated, we will observe how an unconscious mental process concerning the Internet behavior of an ordinary Chinese user who has come to live in Europe might become a plausible element of change. Currently, the actor world (Latour , Callon, Law) conceived by the Chinese apparatus is based on the acceptance by population that the Chinese Intranet is the sole and best solution for millions of Chinese accustomed to decades of social isolation and censorship. However, the perception of something different, more open and freer in the rest of the world might instill new demands of freedom in those users who will benefit from a democratic internet dimension and, as an effect, implant these revolutionary ideas within all those Chinese mindsets who will come in touch with those concepts as well.
Further, this thesis will be focused on the building of an efficient and adaptable methodology able to frame the Chinese cyber-society, useful also for future studies on the field. As a matter of fact, before focusing on the fieldwork that I have carried out, it is fundamental to understand how the CCP has built, and it is even now refining, the most advanced system of Internet censorship in the world. The Chinese government has indeed succeeded in creating a technical, legal, economical and ideological framework through which it is able to rule efficiently the Chinese society and its cyber-dimension. In order to describe the main maneuvers that the 49
CCP is employing to control the Internet, I will use a framework built with the help of the Actor network theory (Latour, Callon, Law).
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Chapter 1 - Methodology
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Methodology
1 Actor Network Theory and the Chinese Cyberspace
The Internet is the most complex socio-technical hybrid entity in the world because it involves both human and non-human elements. People, information, systems analysts, designers, programmers, managers, computers, but also laws and regulations, rights and obligations, governments, censors, dissidents are only some of the many heterogeneous ingredients of an information system. Through the Internet, people interact through it and use it in order to connect their lives, their jobs, their hobbies, their business, and their desires. Thanks to the Internet, the circulation of information is possible always and everywhere…censorship and restrictions permitting.
An ANT approach can be beneficial in this research as the Actor Network Theory deals with the social-technical divide by denying that purely technical or purely social relations are possible, and considers the world to be full of hybrid entities (Latour 1996). If the purpose of this thesis is centered on China’s cyberspace and on the exploration of possible alterations within the current access to the Internet by Chinese users, it will be useful to explore this field considering both the human entities (e.g. politicians, netizens, and dissidents); the social elements (e.g. laws and rights, relationships among people, desires). Further, the technical ones (e.g. software, the Internet itself, viruses, hardware, social platforms, circumvention tools); but also behavioral and mental aspects as perception 52
(and we will focus on it in this work) in order to obtain a deeper view of the Chinese cyberspace and to understand the connections among medias and technology, human relations and State power, different behavioral/mental approaches to the Internet and the access to online information.
Secondly, through an ANT approach, it will be possible to explore the Chinese censorship system by chasing the circulation of information and knowledge in this controversial and limited cyberspace. It will be viable to follow from which point the concept of censorship starts or has started and through where it passes along the structure of the Chinese society and, lastly, where it is plausible to find weak points (e.g. dissident actors, bugs in the Internet code of a particular software, or even behavioral changes within some Internet users). Besides, using an Actor Network lens might be appropriate in order to concentrate “our investigation on issues of network formation, by exploring the human and non-human actors and the alliances and networks they build up” (Tatnall and Gilding 2005; Tatnall, Davey, 2000). It will be helpful to focus especially on the negotiations that allow the network to be configured by the enrolment of both human and non- human allies. Considering the Actor Network Theory methodological possibilities, we will find out that interactions and associations between actors and networks are the most fundamental aspect, and actors must be seen only as the sum or the effect of their interactions with other actors and networks (Law, Hassard; 1999). For example, it will be possible to understand how the government has succeeded in building the most sophisticated and pervasive Internet filtering system in the world without attracting attention and worry of Chinese population as its netizens are either unaware of the Great Firewall, or unconcerned by it (Damm 2007, 282- 53
285;see also, Fengshu Liu, 2010). Therefore, we will have the opportunity to figure out how the government has been able to seduce the population in order to let its citizens accept the current controversial Internet dimension. Indeed, as mentioned before, in China the Internet censorship is quite accepted as the majority of Chinese netizens agree with the government policies about the Internet regulations (Guo Z. and Feng C. 2012; Li Y. 2009). Further, ANT can be beneficial in order to explore how the macro- actor (the government) has been able to create an actor world through alliances and negotiations, by seducing the entities involved (netizens, companies, media) to let them enter its actor world. Lastly, an ANT methodology is appreciable in this multidisciplinary field because it gives voice also to the dissident actors of the network (which can be humans or non-humans like, for example an anti-surveillance app like Tor, or even a new attitude in using the Internet). We will able to give voice to those actors who will try betraying the initial alliance and to create another plausible actor world, for example, a more open Chinese cyber-society.
1.1 Actor Network Theory in a nutshell
Callon and Latour (1981) set about conceiving the idea of an actor world in which some entities become associated with one another to express their desires through a common spokesperson after having evoked Hobbes and his concept of social order achieved through a contract among individuals who agree to create an alliance. (Czarniawska, 2005; Hernes, 2010) 54
Briefly, ANT suggests that the work of science is not fundamentally different from other social activities; indeed ANT privileges neither natural (realism) nor cultural (social constructivism) accounts of scientific production, asserting instead that science is a process of heterogeneous engineering in which the social, technical, conceptual, and textual are puzzled together and translated (Law, 1999). Considered as a tool kit rather than a methodology, ANT can be described as the methodological outcome of an attempt to reconcile the nature-society division as postulated by the modern sociology. For example, Latour (2007) challenges the modernist epistemic separation of nature, from society, by arguing that “by dividing a fluid hybrid reality into convenient analytical sections, modernist’s create major and seemingly irreconcilable dualisms”. In Actor Network Theory, as a result, Latour (1996, 2007) tries to merge these conceptual divisions, by performing an analysis, which is able to work outside of the boundaries of an analytical sphere in order to establish a generalized symmetry between natural and social events and by abandoning all a priori essentialist distinctions. Indeed ANT researchers must employ a single explanatory frame when interpreting actants, human and nonhuman. Furthermore, ANT abandons the effort to discriminate types of cause and, instead, explains innovations by tracing out hybrid networks of association composed of human and nonhuman “actors” (Law, 1999). The principle of material relationalism states that all “entities take their form and acquire their attributes as a consequence of their relations with other entities” (Law, 1999:3). Divisions and distinctions are to be understood as effects, material and discursive outcomes and as such they should always investigated empirically by using the methodological principle of “following the actors and their actions” (Hughes, 1971). Related to these assumptions, it is also 55
important to underline the concept of agnosticism, which advocates abandoning any a priori assumptions of the nature of networks, causal conditions, or the accuracy of actant’s accounts (Latour, 1997; Law, 1999; Callon, 1986). ANT imposes impartiality and requires that all interpretations are unprivileged. The challenge posed by ANT is therefore to study and explain how the durable orderings are achieved, how facts become in that particular way, how order is performed, how things are put in place and stay that way, and how change comes about. (Law, 1999)
1.2 The Classic Model of Ant (Latour, Callon; 1981, 1986):
The process of creating an actor network is described below by using the categories and the vocabulary created by Callon in 1986. 1) Entering and passing the Obligatory Point of Passage: it is a gateway that needs to be traversed by an actant (human or non-human entity) who wants to participate to the program. 2) Forming a pact: an actant tries to lock other actants onto their appropriate roles and thus to form a power base for itself (Porsander, 2005). 3) Performing various negotiations; by using any kinds of strategies, for example, with seduction, transaction and silent consent, or even brutal force, an actant defines and interrelates various roles allocated to others. 4) Finding the Spokesperson: once the network has been created, it is necessary to decide who is going to speak for it.
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Schematically:
1) Problematization consists in building a system of alliances among entities (Callon, 1986, p. 206). During this phase, the instigating actor identifies a problem and defines a set of human and nonhuman elements—their nature, identity, and interests—in accordance with an initial program of action. The instigating actor, i.e. the macro-actor, defines (or redefines) a problem and offers itself as a solution. The goal is to make the new definition recognizable for others and makes its acceptance an obligatory passage point for entering the network. The creation of the alliance proposed by the macro actor must become an indispensable path for the achievement of the aspired result of the others actors. Indeed, the first phase, in order to create an actor world, sprouts when an actant tries to become indispensable to other actors by tempting/enticing them to pass an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986; Porsander, 2005) in order to achieve a specific result. 2) Problematization is indeed followed by interessement, during which the instigating actor, by employing various kinds of devices (Callon, 1986, p. 207) and strategies, tries to impose and stabilize the identity attributed to the other elements of the network and to attract them into the program, at the same time, by blocking other possible alignments, i.e. other plausible worlds. In this phase, each entity that has passed through the obligatory passage point is locked into place so that their reciprocal relations are invested by some interest (Gherardi, Nicolini 2005). Indeed, traversing an obligatory passage point is not sufficient to create an actor network. In this particular case, the Chinese government has the task to interest potential actants so that their concern in other alternative partners diminishes. For example, in the case of the Chinese cyberspace, the government has built a 57
filtered web environment for Chinese netizens, but if these users want to benefit from the connection to the Internet, they have to enter the network created by the CCP and to surf with all the related constraints. In this way, they are obliged to enter and pass a specific point; but it is worth underlining that the submissive actors are interested in passing through it as well, as there are no alternative programs for their existence (Porsander, 2005). If interessement is successful, it leads to enrollment (Callon, 1986, p. 208) through which the entities are coordinated and aligned in a new emerging network. 3) Translation is the process of converting entities, of making similar (such that one entity may be substituted for another) or simplifying (black-boxing or translating network elements into a single block) while retaining difference, as translation is not simply transfer (Latour, 2007). All these expressions mean that the main actor attributes to other entities an identity, interests, a role to play, a course to follow and projects to carry out (by imposing its plot to the other actors) within that particular network. As Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) have pointed out, “translation is both the movement of an entity in space and time, as well as its translation with from one context to another.” What it is important to underline is that Actor- networks unlike the World Wide Web, do not pre-exist the process of translation. As Latour (1996) pointed out, it would be more precise to talk about actor-networking rather than actor-networks in order to emphasize the relational effects “that recursively generate and reproduce themselves thanks to the maneuvers and strategies of translation” (Gherardi, Nicolini; 2005). In other terms, translation is performed through translating practices. In order to grasp the real meaning of actor network, it can be useful, in my opinion, to think about the network of railroads within a country. But we have immediately to reckon with the fact that the railroad network cannot be 58
described as an actor network world although all the cities are connected through a real, existing network (the railroads). We should think at an actor world as a world in movement, which builds itself through the dynamic practices of events and effects of the actors involved in its program of action. For example, if we think about the real time train schedule and we take into account its virtual building in practice, it surely can be considered as an actor network because a train travelling on the railroad has an effect on all the other trains involved in the network through its delays, its accelerations, its braking or stops. Therefore, all these happenings do have an effect on all the trains of the network: the sum of these effects, if there is also some contract or program that holds together the network (the railways of a specific company, for example) and a main actor, who has instigated the program, becomes an actor-world. Indeed, the effective functioning of the real time schedule with its interruptions, delays, slowdowns, (in the moment that the instigating actor is able to reach a positive outcome by stabilizing the network) in this case, the running of the train rides is an actor network world. The employ of an ANT approach in this thesis will be useful to grasp all the dynamic strategies that the government is employing for stabilizing a functioning actor world. The Chinese Internet actor world does not preexists but it can be achieved by the CCP thanks to a continuous and dynamic deployment of technical, legal, economic forces and concepts that lie at the basis of the government’s tactics. It is a world in movement, which can be built up thanks to the continuous translations of the Chinese economy, the Internet structure and all the Internet legislations in a way that these entities become submissive actors within the dimension created by the CCP. Nothing is already written and built and the government’s strategies must create a stabile actor world by stabilizing a dynamic and changeable reality. 59
As Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) argue, an ANT approach means that “the weaving of the network” [and] “its circulation cannot be considered separately at any point of the life cycle of the innovation” [and] “that translations continue throughout its existence”. Further Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) point out that any translation is the result of the active work of heterogeneous “carriers” (intermediaries or Träger) that (in the process) find a place or are locked into place. 4) Last phase: Betrayal: Both the human and nonhuman elements of a network may detach themselves from the initial program of action and define their identity, interests, and goals differently. As a result, their action may foster a re-articulation of the initial program of action and they can try to create a different and more plausible actor world or they may be reenrolled by an emerging anti-program aimed at achieving a different, often opposed, outcome. In this sense, translation is also betrayal, of origins and of solidity, as Ritzer (2005) has explained clearly in his encyclopedia of social sciences.
1.3 ANT and the Chinese Internet censorship system
Considering China’s Internet censorship system, an Actor Network research must commence by identifying some of the important actors, by starting with the Chinese Government as the macro-actor and by following the other actors along the network. The study of the Chinese situation from a political and a sociological point of view is useful to reveal the reasons why and how the system has been instigated and besides to identify some of the other 60
actors and the related effects able to modify the stability of the network. Further, it is worth focusing on possible and plausible other actors looking for the creation of other programs adverse to the State’s initial one, as circumvention tools, software bugs, dissidents or simple netizens as in this work. As Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) have pointed out, ANT investigates and describes “the strategies, tricks, maneuvers, actions and enterprises with which individual or collective actors undertake translations in order to consolidate the network that supports them and to make it as permanent as possible.” Consequently, an ANT approach means focusing on the strategies used by the CCP in order to consolidate the network that the government wants to stabilize, i.e. by using the Internet as a point of passage for all the other actors that the government needs to include in its actor-world in order to achieve its vision and its target. The CCP shall translate laws and regulations, software codes and a peculiar network structure; further, the market, dissidents and ordinary people and the media, i.e. human and non- human actors. An ANT approach means focusing on the maneuvers of the government to seduce, convince, oblige all these actors to pass a targeted obligatory passage point, by offering them some kind of interest through an initial program able to captivate them and lastly, to let all the submissive actors enter the network.
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1.4 Using Ant in order to follow Chinese Censorship within the Internet
Entrepreneurial vs Ecological version of Ant
In the classic version of Ant (in Callon’s vision, 1986) which is also called “the entrepreneurial version” by Gherardi and Nicolini (2005), an actor “seeks to define, from its own point of view, the number of other actors, their place in the world, their characteristics, the nature of their relations.” In the entrepreneurial version of ANT, the research is focused on a restricted set of actors, whose actions create associations, mobilize intermediaries, and stabilize a macro actor. This model privileges the main actor and a plot, which revolves around their actions (Gherardi, Nicolini; 2005). Consequently, if we employ this model, schematically, the Chinese Government translates the Chinese Internet structure, i.e. the architecture of the code (Lessig, 2006) (for example ASN points, search engines like Baidu, international gateways, filtering software). Further, the Chinese government translates the Internet propaganda machine and the online press, by creating a world in which the official ideology becomes a real non-human actor living in the actor world created by the CCP and influencing all the other actors. This actor, the ideology, affects the Chinese mindsets, by seducing them, by imposing a certain vision of the world dictated by the Party; further the Chinese government translates people, by controlling their opinions through the deletion of their sensitive blog-posts, through the work of the “50 cents party”, the Internet commentators who monitor and filter chats- 62
rooms and forums discussions. All these expressions means that Chinese Leaders attributes to all the other actors an identity, interests, a role to play, a course to follow and projects to carry out. Besides, the CCP is interested in managing the circulation of knowledge and information through the network, by using the Internet censorship system to control the access to information. The Chinese Government decides the way the Internet must work, the mode of use and the boundaries of the public discourse. The Chinese Communist Party has a vision and in this vision, every actor has a pre-given life. The CCP, the translator, is the spokesperson of the entities it constitutes. The government speaks in the name of the Internet and its structure, in the name of people, of censoring software, of censored search engines, of the Internet propaganda. The translator expresses their desires, secrets thoughts and hopes.
Problematisation: None of these entities has any future outside this specific actor world because the pervasive censorship program is ubiquitous and the government has been able to get rid of other possible and plausible anti- programs by showing its population that the government’s program is indispensable for the needs of the Nation. Concisely, the Chinese Government is the translator of all these entities and it presents its program such as it is the only credible manifesto with some real possibilities to succeed in stabilizing the whole network. Further, it shows the actors that it is indispensable for the achievement of their interests; in short and schematically, the CCP present to the Chinese actors this naïf narration: “if Chinese netizens are eager to stay connected to the Internet without the danger of the social tension of the West, we need to build a sort of Chinese Intranet. But, in order to build a particular-protected Chinese Intranet, we 63
must use only 4 ASN to better control the network architecture; then we must use filtered search engines and a web environment created with Chinese characteristics and for the spreading of our culture. Besides, we have to exploit the Chinese values, our language and fuel the Chinese Internet propaganda in order to protect our identity. Furthermore, we must create a peculiar “free from West press” able to safeguard our civilization from the barbarian and violent foreign vision of the world. As a result, we must use the Green Dam Youth Escort software to protect distorted visions of reality coming from the West world. By following these superficial problematisation patterns, the same process is adaptable for Chinese Companies. If they want to stay in business and to continue to benefit from the e-commerce, their CEOs must censor sensitive contents and follow the regulations of the government and so on ad infinitum.
In this classic version (Callon, 1986), ANT describes “the strategies and actions” through which the main actor, the government, undertakes translations in order “to consolidate the network that supports them and to make it as permanent as possible” (Gherardi, Nicolini; 2005). Latour (1987, 1988), Callon (1986a), Lea et al. (1995), and Graham (1998), have pointed out, “the emergence of actor-networks in heroic stories of ordering in which individual people or small groups of actors carry out the task of assembling the network and making it into a center of authority”. The translation maps out a geography of necessary points of passage for those elements who wish to continue to exist and develop. As Callon has argued (1986), “some link is necessary to make entities accept certain spokespersons and certain points of passage”. Entities are converted into inscriptions: reports of the CCP, memoranda, documents, surveys indicating, for example, that the Chinese 64
economy is increasing and Chinese lifestyle is improving. The Chinese government must orchestrate the circulation of documents, organizing meetings and symposia, by manipulating information within the Internet to show its population that its program is a success and a credible outcome. Translation cannot work if the circulation is not stable; the network is stabilized when all the actors accept the roles attributed to them and they are definitely locked into the actor network. About this process, it is important also to underline the ANT concepts of translation/seduction/violence in Chinese Society. In order to avoid social instability, the Chinese government (here some short examples) gives people the possibility to download free mp3, free videogames, and free movies without the copyrights issues of the West and further it gives the opportunity to buy cheaper products on online Chinese e-shops. Besides Chinese netizens have almost free broadband connection in some areas. This kind of authoritarianism is connected to the concept of “Panem et Circenses”. The “Panem et Circenses” system was used in the ancient Rome to keep social stability in the Roman Empire. The Emperor used to give bread and circus games to population to control dissident opinions, to keep population quiet. In this case, the translation can occur because population is seduced by the translator/government.
If a seduction process is not able to convince a submissive actor to enter the government’s program, then the translator can use violence as physical repression, cyber-attacks to dissident activist or even to arrest an ordinary user if these entities exceed the limits that the government has built up through its legal and political framework. The rhetoric used to narrate these stories of translation may be defined “entrepreneurial” since it resides on the role of powerful actors and their capacity to mobilize relevant resources 65
(Gherardi, Nicolini; 2005). Star (1991) and Michael (1996) point out that the classic version of ANT has the flaw to “focus on powerful actors disregarding how dissidents contribute to the stabilization of the network”. Further, Star (1991) warns “the danger of describing the actor network from the point of view of the big and powerful actors”.
Indeed, if we want to focus more on others actors, it would be useful to embrace also a more ecological approach. Gherardi and Nicolini (2005) describe the process in terms of “ecology of action”. The ecological model favors an approach that “privileges the actions over the actors and the fortuitous coming together and alignment of social worlds” (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2005). The rhetoric used to narrate these stories of translation may be defined “ecological” “because it focuses on “the intricacies of actors’ relationships and pays a greater attention to powerless actors or dissidents within the enrolled actors” (Gherardi, Nicolini; 2005). The concept of action is less focused on the model “actors making thing to happen, and more ecological, in the sense of putting emphasis on the context, on the reciprocal change of actors and situations, and on the negotiated nature of social order”, as Gherardi and Nicolini have pointed out.
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1.5 Other actors thanks to the ecological version of ANT: The perception of the Chinese users
If we consider the Ecological version of ANT, it is fundamental to focus on other actors involved in the actor world created by the CCP when our purpose is to find out plausible entities able to destabilize the current Chinese situation. Thanks to the ecological version of ANT (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2005), it will be possible to focus on actors that usually researchers do not take into account as their role is submissive within the program of a macro actor. In the case of this work, I shall consider as an actor a behavioral aspect of the ordinary Chinese user, i.e. his/her perception regarding the censorship issues within the Chinese Internet. If this submissive actor, i.e. the perception of any difference concerning the freedom of thought between one or more Internet dimensions, might be implanted in an open society, then it will be possible to foresee a plausible actor able to destabilize the entire network and to bring to betrayal other entities. For the fieldwork of this thesis, I have explored the perception of Chinese users concerning the Internet restrictions within the Chinese cyberspace, after that they have benefited from the Internet possibilities of the West. My assumption is that if a Chinese user might benefit from the possibilities of a democratic Internet environment, then his/her perception about the issues of freedom of speech and thought in China might change. I hypothesize that this mutation in the users’ awareness about the Internet censorship might be harbinger of a modernization of the overall Chinese mindset and, with the passing of time, even of the Chinese cyber-society by 67
bringing to betrayal other actants who will be seduced by a different and more open Internet dimension.
By exploring not only a macro actor, but also an “antagonist actor” in the network, it is possible to focus on those entities able “to put emphasis on the context, on the reciprocal change of actors and the dynamic interchange with the main actor”(Gherardi, 2005). Besides, these actors, the opponents to the macro-actor, are able to negotiate and battle with China’s government and try to change the whole network, by destabilizing and betraying the social order of the entire actor world. These entities could indeed create another actor world by bringing to betrayal other actors of the actor-world, by allying with western governments, for example, or by using particular software to avoid the Internet censorship. Alternatively, if we take into account this specific fieldwork, an initial submissive actor as the perception of some Chinese users implanted in Europe might tempt the mindsets of other young Chinese in benefiting from a more open Internet dimension and, with the passing of time, it might provoke a social maturation in their minds about their political awareness. Even software like “Tor”, which is a system intended to enable online anonymity, could become an actor able to break the chain. The ecological version of Ant fosters an approach that supports the actions over the actors. Therefore, it might be interesting to focus with a greater degree of deepness on the actions of the various actors rather than the description of the main actor; grasping the effect, the operations, and the play of the negotiations, of the alliances of the chain.
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Chapter 2
Quantitative Survey Process
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Quantitative Survey Process
Foreword
The survey process deals with a collection of data with the purpose to explore possible discrepancies in terms of Internet habits, online tastes and preferences by comparing two samples of Chinese users; one has been collected within the Chinese Community of Italy and the other one takes into account a portion of Chinese still living in China. Further and most importantly, the collection of data has been carried out by considering the Chinese netizens’ perception of the Internet restriction issues present in China, whose level is currently very low, considering the studies of Damm 2007; Guo and Feng 2011; and a survey from Internet Society 2012). The exploration has especially examined whether the awareness of the Internet restrictions issues in those Chinese users who have benefited from the Italian Internet dimension has increased thanks to the benefits of a democratic Internet environment. My assumption revolves around the hypothesis that a Chinese immigrant after having benefited from an open Internet dimension as the Italian one will have a different and deeper perception of Internet freedom issues present in the Chinese cyber-society. The collected data suggest a deeper perception of the problem of the Internet freedom in those netizens who have benefited from a more open Internet dimension. My intention is to compare the results in order to understand whether a mutation in a behavioral or mental process (conscious or unconscious) in employing the Internet might become a plausible actor (Latour; Callon) able to influence or destabilize the system in terms of a democratization of the future users’ practices in accessing the Internet. 70
We cannot take for granted that the growing perception inherent to potential discrepancies in terms of Internet freedom between China and other countries - which might have sprouted within a portion of users who have benefited from a more open Internet dimension - will have an effect on the current Chinese cyberspace. In fact, until now, the overall netizens’ attitude had remained in a submissive position as it has proved to be one the most trusted gear within the pervasive actor world conceived by the CCP for having participated silently and compliantly in the government’s program during these years. However, some meaningful results of this research might help us to glimpse significant elements of change and in the future we might hypothesize that a different, more mature approach to the Internet will be able to create its own actor world: an online environment more open and socially aware. My assumption revolves around the fact that, when this fresh attitude in using a more open Internet will contaminate other Chinese mindsets, we might witness a deep lure for millions of Chinese young people eager to embrace a new social and cultural Internet wave. As we will observe, it is interesting to notice some innovations in Chinese users’ personal opinions about the Internet regulations of their Motherland, about their approach to an open Internet dimension and their judgement concerning their previous Internet experience, after that these users will have benefited from a freer cyberspace within a democratic country. We will ascertain an unequivocal alteration concerning those Chinese netizens’ approach to possible Internet restrictions and filtered information after that they have experienced a different, more democratic and less controlled Internet dimension.
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1 Introduction: New research questions and different perspectives
Few studies and researches (except those carried out by Damm, 2007; Guo Z., Feng C., 2012; Li Y., 2009; Fengshu Liu, 2010 and conducted within a Global Internet User Survey - Internet Society 2012) have been focused on questions of this kind: 1) What do Chinese people really think about the Internet censorship issue? 2) Is it a vital issue for Chinese to know that several foreign websites are restricted during this era of economic growth and unexpected welfare in their country after centuries of poverty and social confinement? At the end of the day, largely thanks to the Internet’s potentialities, a considerable portion of Chinese is richer now; they can buy cars, houses and live in an almost western style dimension. Besides, they can communicate easily with the rest of the world through apps like WeChat or QQ, and they have the possibility to express their ideas and feelings thanks to Sina Weibo, for example, a microblogging platform, a hybrid between Facebook and Twitter. Therefore, unequivocally, we can say that, at least apparently, Chinese users are now part of the ongoing global computerization process of our time and no longer in the “Middle Kingdom” of the modernization as in the last centuries. As a result, 3) do they care about what we Europeans and Americans call “the Internet censorship issue” or “the distorted access to information dilemma” after having lived for centuries in a censored world? (Let us think about the old but well alive sickening commixture between media and politics). In addition and most importantly, 4) do they perceive what we perceive with our eyes, with our tradition, with our values, we who live in an European or American cotton 72
wool cultural dimension, when we talk about the Internet restrictions that (for us, European and American) plague the freedom of thought of a billion of possible future netizens? 5) And, if they do not perceive the Internet restrictions issues in their country, China, with our same sensibility, would it be possible to hypothesize that their perception could mutate if a Chinese person might be implanted into a different cultural and social milieu, for example, in Europe? 6) And, further, if his/her perception might get close to the European and American values in terms of freedom of speech and access to open information after having experienced our western society and having benefited from all the Internet potentialities, is it possible to glimpse some elements of change which might contaminate other Chinese mindsets living in China in the near future? Lastly and to conclude, 7) if this metamorphosis were viral, could the Internet also in the PRC change towards more democratic perspectives?
I have left here many questions open, for the moment, but this is already a good starting point because we can begin to change our perspective in analyzing the Internet censorship issue by trying to use, through this fieldwork, the eyes of a young Chinese about her/his current perception of the domestic and global Internet. If Chinese people do not perceive what we perceive and they do not care what we care about, for example, freedom of speech within the Internet, or free access to open information, then we should probably modify our way of investigation on all future researches concerning the Chinese Internet restriction issue, being the latter a topic which apparently does not affect Chinese netizens. It is methodologically useless to continue analyzing the Chinese Internet dimension at the present time and in the next years with our Euro-American perspective if we cannot 73
glimpse some changes within the Chinese young mindsets’ perception. If on the contrary we might hypothesize that a Chinese person established in an open society might be influenced by a democratic and open Internet dimension, then his/her awareness about the Internet restrictions could mutate and this factor be an element of change in the Chinese society as it could become viral in a few years. If new demands and needs of an open Internet dimension were usual and normal for dozens, hundreds and thousands of Chinese people with the passing of time, this process could be an opportunity of change within the Chinese cyberspace. Therefore, in a few years, our values and consequently our studies about the Internet freedom of speech and thought could become universal and not only Euro-American ruminations.
I have collected 397 questionnaires subdivided into two categories. One sample includes 199 Chinese living in China and the other one 198 Chinese people living in Italy. They have the same roots as both samples come or live in the province of Zhejiang. My purpose of research is to find out whether Chinese people are aware of some of the manifold discrepancies in terms of taste, habits, technical aspects and, moreover, Internet freedom in their motherland in comparison with the West and if not, my aim is trying to understand whether Chinese netizens might reach a deeper perception of these discrepancies after having been in contact with the Internet possibilities of the West world.
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1.1 Similar studies on the topic
The most remarkable and recent studies focused on the effective perception by the Chinese Internet users about the Internet censorship issues in their country, or other few researches about the awareness of the Chinese netizens to be monitored during their web experience revolve around the works by Damm, 2007; Guo Z., Feng C., 2012; Fengshu Liu, 2010; Li Y., 2009 and a Global Internet User Survey from Internet Society in 2012. From these researches, it has been established through questionnaires and surveys that the majority or almost the totality of Chinese netizens are indeed either unaware of the Great Firewall, or unconcerned by it (Damm 2007, 282-285; Fengshu Liu, 2010). At the same time, even when Chinese become aware of some of the myriad of Internet restrictions (for example, when the interviewee has a higher level of education), they accept and support it by agreeing with the government policies about its Internet regulations (Guo and Feng 2011; Li Y., 2009). These studies are quite alluring, but we have to deal with two considerations. Firstly, all the related surveys and interviews analyzed for these fieldworks have been collected in an authoritarian dimension. It is difficult for a respondent to answer objectively if in everyday of his/her life, the interviewee has to live within all the limitations of the pervasive official culture of the regime in which he/she can even be arrested for supporting a more democratic vision of the world adverse to the current political apparatus in charge. Secondly, these researches are not dynamic as they are not able to show how the situation might change or which future evolutions of the Chinese mindsets we have to 75
expect, if one or more elements could interfere with the current Chinese cyber-society.
On the contrary, what if a researcher had the possibility to carry out a fieldwork about the perception of the Chinese Internet restrictions within a country in which the control of the Chinese regime is not able to have effects on the Chinese mindsets and influence Chinese users’ opinions? What if quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interviews were carried out always with the target of Chinese people’s perception about the Internet freedom but in an open social dimension, with a free Internet, with their cultural and social roots implanted within a modern and fully democratic society? By analyzing the answers of Chinese people who live now in Europe since several years and then by comparing them with the same answers asked to Chinese people who continue to live in China, it will be possible to glimpse plausible elements of change able to destabilize the actor world created by the CCP. It will be interesting to determine whether the stay in an open society like, for example, Europe, Italy in the specific, might be a possible point of change in these Chinese mindsets. Since centuries, Chinese people have always been accustomed to live within the values of a Confucian culture and, after Mao, within all the issues of a strong Leninist society with clear authoritarian characteristics. Therefore, they are so accustomed to censorship that they have no more the awareness of it (Chang Ping, 2014).
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1.2 The Boiling Frog Syndrome
The story of the boiling frog is often used as a metaphor for the inability or unwillingness of people to perceive and then react to significant changes that occur gradually.
“If you drop a frog in a pot of boiling water, it will of course frantically try to clamber out. But, if you place it gently in a pot of tepid water and turn the heat on low, it will float there quite placidly. As the water gradually heats up, the frog will sink into a tranquil stupor, exactly like one of us in a hot bath, and before long, with a smile on its face, it will unresistingly allow itself to be boiled to death.” from Daniel Quinn's “The Story of B. An adventure of mind and spirit”
“If drastic change takes place abruptly, we notice and react to it. If it takes place gradually, over a few generations, we are hardly aware of it, and by the time that we are ready to react, it can be too late” Steven H Goldberg “Billions of drops in millions of buckets”
If we think about catastrophes, they are usually associated with phenomena like tsunamis, earthquakes or flooding. These are disasters that happen rapidly with immediately visible effects. In these cases, all humanity have always succeeded in reacting quickly in order to re-establish the normality. A sudden catastrophe is an incident, luckily, not so frequent but so different from the normal course of events that can be clearly perceived by a human 77
being, regardless the level of education, age, job, gender of the person who is witness of such a happening. A different behavioral process is involved when problems and challenges evolve incrementally and slowly (Pierson 2004), and when they only become visible from a long-term perspective. Jared Diamond (2005) recently referred to such changes as “creeping normalcy” pointing to changes, which are perceived as “normality if they happen in unnoticed increments” (Diamond, 2005). The concept was used to explain the varying adaptation capacities of human societies to long-term environmental changes (Schneider, Leifeld, Malang, 2008). The “boiling- frog” allegory is a powerful metaphor, which illustrate the inherent dangers of such processes:
In the boiling-frog story it is said that if a frog is thrown into a pan of boiling water, it will immediately jump out, but if you put a frog in a jar of warm water and gradually heat it to boiling, the frog will stay until it boils to death. The frog’s nervous system is apparently impervious to changes in temperature until their fatal consequence because it happens piecemeal incrementally. (Schneider, Leifeld, Malang)
Therefore, we can easily affirm that probably Chinese people are so accustomed to a pervasive process of distortion of reality, of blind propaganda and further of social and cultural isolation that they are no longer able to discern all the Internet restrictions with the same awareness of a citizen who has benefited, at least during the last 60 years, from the openness of the western democracies. However, what if we took that frog and we could remove it from the water that is boiling slowly and is warming 78
up? Additionally, what if we put suddenly that frog in the cold water? Out of metaphor, what if we could implant that actor/netizen or simple man or woman inside an open society with freedom of expression and, in our case, with a free Internet dimension? Chinese people are so accustomed to live within an authoritarian and censored society that their level of perception of (in this work) the Internet censorship is very low. Indeed, they cannot easily discern whether their web experience is monitored and their access to information filtered. We as scientific community have always hoped in the last years that one or more Chinese dissidents could change China from within, for example Cheng Jianping, or from outside, let us think about Ai Weiwei. However, only through a radical change inside the overall Chinese mindsets could we notice a real and palpable innovation in the Chinese cyber-society, also considering that often these dissents are intellectual who are no longer able to use the same language of millions of young netizens and therefore to influence their opinions. On the contrary, if we might suddenly introduce a Chinese person in the middle of an open society with all the possibilities of a free cyberspace, probably we could notice some changes in his/her approach to the Internet and, most importantly, these alterations could become viral as ordinary Chinese users live in the same cultural and social milieu.
My preliminary assumption is indeed that Chinese people will likely have a different perception and a deeper awareness of the issues that we are investigating and these effects will bring possible and plausible changes even in China. Because now, with the power of social networks, all those actors that come to Europe and to United States can transmit new values and new needs to their relatives, friends, parents, as Chinese people are always 79
connected through smartphones, pc, and tablets. If Chinese people might be aware that in their country the Internet restrictions are a fact and not a legend from the West, probably, they could start to change the state of things. If Chinese people might begin benefiting from a free Internet world and appreciate the quality of transparent information, probably, they could come back to China and fight more forcefully for their rights, their needs of a modern society because they would become more aware about something that was impossible to perceive before their social maturation. Unequivocally a new Arab spring will not occur in China, but perhaps a new cultural revolution might arise or is already arising in those mindsets of Chinese who are now living, working, studying and accessing to free information in Europe. This process of mental maturation in their perception of the Internet restrictions could bring probably a more modest, at the beginning, wave of change but a deeper, more effective and rooted revolution within some Chinese mindsets with the passing of the years than any other Arab Spring.
1.3 Zhejian Province and the Chinese community of Italy
For my fieldwork, I have decided to choose two samples: one is focused on the Chinese community of Italy and the other one comes from the Province of Zhejiang. I chose this strategy because both have the same roots as the Chinese community of Italy here analyzed comes from that area of China. Having both samples the same origins and thus, being quite homogenous, then it will be possible to investigate better on the causes of a possible social 80
and cultural change in the sample of Chinese living in Italy. It will indeed be possible to hypothesize some of the reasons that have brought any change in their mindsets as both samples have the same cultural, social, economic milieu.
FIG. 3 ZHEJIANG
1.4 The Chinese Community of Italy
The community of Chinese people present in Italy has grown rapidly in the past ten years. Official statistics indicate there are more than 320,000 81
Chinese citizens living in Italy, although these figures do not take into account the illegal immigration flux. A detailed study conducted in 2010 jointly by the CESNUR and the University of Turin (Berzano et al, 2010) on over 4000 Chinese people within the Chinese community of Turin established that 48% of them are women and 30% are minors. In Turin, the 90% of them comes from Zhejiang and this validates my data about the sample collected; 70% of them work in the restaurant industry and more than 20% in commercial activity. In the above study, it has been established that the Chinese Community living in Italy prefers watching Chinese Television and Chinese newspapers, but children are well integrated even if they have language problems. The city of Prato has the largest concentration of Chinese people in Italy, and as well as the whole continent of Europe.
Cities with significant Chinese communities based on Istat statistics:
Milan 18,918 (1.43% on total resident population)
Rome 12,013
Prato 11,882 (6.32%)
Turin 5,437
Florence 3,890 (1.05%)
Campi Bisenzio 3,018 (6.87%)
Reggio Emilia 2,925 (1.72%) 82
Bologna 2,654
1.5 Issues in the organization of the fieldwork and future developments
Preparation: The Chinese Community of Italy was the starting point
The hardest part of my fieldwork has been the preparation. The choice of the questions and the distribution of the questionnaires would deserve their own thesis, as they have been two complex stages. For the choice of the questions to be used, I had to face many attempts, as during some pretests, many of the preliminary chosen questions have been literally discarded by the Chinese respondents, as they did not want to answer at all.
Number of questions. Since the earlier steps, I have decided to use only 9 questions as I immediately realized that the time the Chinese respondents would have allowed to me in order to complete the questionnaire was at most the one related to the completion of nine questions, no one more. I tried to push this limit, but statistically, I have soon become conscious that the number 9 would have been the most appropriate, considering the time the respondents conceded to me to fill in the survey and the duration of their concentration and interest, as they usually used to answer during their job or their break time.
No closed answers. Another important aspect noticed during my fieldwork concerns the fact that it was not an appropriate strategy to include many “closed answers” within the survey. I have used this technique in one question, but I have soon realized that if they had been more than one, 83
Chinese respondents, so reluctant since the beginning of the questionnaire, would have completed it with even more haste and carelessness, by selecting some answers randomly. “By forcing” the respondent to write by his/her own hand something, surely he/she would have paid more attention. About the choice in practice of the questions, as I mentioned above, I had to prepare several pretests and the preparation of the final nine lasted at least one month with many attempts.
No sensitive questions nor the use of particular words or concepts. Since the beginning of my fieldwork, it has been evident that questions as: “what do you think about the government regulations concerning the Internet?” or “what do you think about the restrictions concerning free speech within chat-lines/forums and the restricted access to information in China?” would have never received an answer. Besides, this kind of questions would have surely casted me in bad light or even in danger, as I will explain below. Surely if a question had been too sensitive, no one would have answered. Indeed, I have tried several times to go direct to the issue by asking, for example: “How do you feel when you cannot search words as “free elections” or “Falun Gong” within the Internet?” “How do you feel when you cannot contact your Italian Facebook friends from China?” or, again, “What do you think when you read that your query cannot be processed because it is against the relevant Internet regulations of the State?”. However, all these questions had only the same effect: every time, Chinese respondents told me to shove off with insults and jostles or they remained completely in silence. So I had to go step by step, by trying to go deeper towards the purpose of the research without citing words like “government”, “laws and regulations”, every concepts related to politics as elections, 84
democracy, police, authorities, Communist Party or even simple words as “control”, “restrictions”, “religion”, “money”, “forbidden”. Consequently, after several preliminary tests, during which I had to discard the initial survey that I had in mind at the beginning of the process design, I could print my definitive questionnaire. It was in Italian, here below translated in English.
However, this move, i.e. the fact that I had to discard a lot of sensitive questions and words, then it would have proved later the most methodologically appropriate strategy. As we will see, by using no sensitive questions and concepts, the study of Chinese perception about the Internet is more accurate, not giving the respondents any of my preliminary assumptions and biases, which might have influenced their mindset and opinions, or caused only anger and embarrassment.
Questionnaire about your Internet behavior
(CHINESE LIVING IN ITALY)
Male/Female Age
Education level Job
Since how many years have you been living in Italy? 85
1) Now that you live in Italy, how many hours a week do you spend on the Internet?
2) What type of websites do you visit most while surfing the web?
(For example: News, Video sharing, web-shopping, Sports, Social networking, Blogs)
3) Are you a blog follower? If yes, which one?
4) Do you use social networks to stay in touch with friends or your family? If yes, which one?
5) Do you usually use search engines to find information? If yes, which search engine?
6) What kind of topics do you usually search in the Internet thanks to search engines?
7) Now that you live in Italy, do you surf also Italian websites or do you continue surfing only Chinese websites? If yes, which Italian websites?
8) Now that you live in Italy, do you surf also foreign websites? If yes, in which country?
9) Now that you live in Italy, do you think that your web experience is similar to the one you had in China? Are there any discrepancies? 86
The questions in detail. As it is possible to observe, there are no sensitive questions; only the last one shows a slightly higher degree of sensitiveness, as we will explain in detail later. The above questions are about the Internet behavior of the respondent, about some of his/her opinions concerning his/her experience on the Internet and lastly about the differences he/she is able to perceive when he/she compares the Chinese Internet dimension with one or more other foreign cyberspaces. For example, the survey starts very gently and then it proceeds gradually in order to seek the trust of the respondent: the time spent on the Internet, preferred websites, blogs, most used social networks. The first information are significant to frame the personality of the respondent who is filling in the questionnaire: age, job, level of education, and years of stay in Italy. Above all the parameters related to the level of education and the years of stay in Italy are relevant for the study of perception of censorship as they can help to establish whether there might be a connection between the level of education and the awareness of the Chinese Internet regulations when they experience a different and more open Internet dimension. In a similar way, it can be useful to analyze the value related to the duration of the stay in Italy. Probably for a respondent who has lived several years in an open society, we might expect a higher degree of awareness or, on the contrary, the respondent is now so accustomed to an open cyberspace that the European Internet dimension has become a common and natural experience also for him/her. The first four questions are about the time spent on the Internet, the most visited websites, the most used social networks and they let us know how the respondent is, for example, politically engaged or more interested in 87
futile and lighter websites. Furthermore, the first four questions are meaningful because the respondent can relax a little after the trading and the negotiations to convince him/her to begin the questionnaire. Besides, through this framework and design, the respondent can immediately realize that the questionnaire is anonymous and not related to government matters, immigration or financial police. A slightly higher degree of sensitiveness can be examined from question number 5: it is about the most used search engines. Thanks to this question it is possible to understand whether and how the Chinese respondent is able to access to the information search procedure through the Internet: which are his/her most used search engines?; are they Italian, English or American or does he/she continue to use controlled and restricted Chinese search engines also from Europe? Therefore, this was a pivotal question; also considering the comparison with the answers that I would have obtained from the “Chinese living in China” sample. This is crucial because if Chinese community living in Italy started to use “not restricted” search engines, it would be possible to glimpse a different kind of access to information, a kind of information not controlled, modified or brainwashed. This might bring about a new awareness in Chinese people mindset.
Another significant question is number 6. It refers to what kind of topics the respondent searches thanks to the search engines; are the Chinese respondents interested in entertainment, as TV shows and movies or music? Are they interested more in politics? In job searches? Thanks to this question, I have tried to understand their main interests, their concerns, their worries about their life, their job, and their needs after that they have come to live in Europe. Further, through the answers of this question, it is possible 88
to grasp what they feel most important to search, what information is more useful for them. Besides, by crossing this question with the one related to the search engines used, it can be possible to hypothesize whether their mindset is wishful to change. For example, if a respondent decides to use Google from Italy to search for topics like politics, human rights, free elections, it is clear his/her desire to know something impossible to search before, as the Chinese search engines are filtered at the source. Further, if we compare what they search with the same queries they use to ask in China, it is relevant to verify whether there are significant changes after the respondent has experienced a different Internet dimension.
Question number 7 and 8 are relevant to verify whether the respondent feels the need to broaden his/her horizons as well as his/her need to search sensitive topics in the previous question. Now that he or she lives in Italy, he/she has the possibility to surf any kind of websites from hundreds of countries. Therefore, does she/he prefer surfing only Chinese websites? Is he/she considering taking a hurry look also in foreign websites, i.e. websites not in Chinese language? Or now that she/he lives in Europe, does he/she prefer to use only foreign websites, as he/she feels free and he/she does not want to be controlled, restricted anymore? Or, as one last hypothesis, does the respondent who lives now in Italy prefer surfing Chinese websites, but she/he has sometimes the necessity to use also Italian websites to find information about his/her job, houses, government immigration policy, bus schedule, teaching materials; i.e. to solve the problems for everyday life? So does he/she use Italian websites only for necessity? From questions number 7 and 8, it is possible to figure out all these kind of information and much more. Without being sensitive, these two questions are fundamental to grasp 89
the wish of the respondent to open his eyes, to know more of the rest of the world, to try surfing within forbidden, from China, websites, or lastly to be more integrated with his/her new Italian society, by visiting Italian websites.
Question number 9 is the most sensitive one of the survey. As I mentioned above, I could not show any of my assumptions and biases because otherwise I would have influenced the respondent, or irritated him/her if he/she was, for example, compliant with the Internet regulations of the government. Additionally, as the fieldwork is about the perception and the awareness of the Internet censorship, then it was a better strategy to ask a vague question and let the respondent feel free to answer how she/he really felt in that moment. Consequently, the question “Now that you live in Italy, do you think that your web experience is similar to the one you had in China? Or, are there some difference?” is cunning because it shows no prejudices, it gives no negative connotations to the current Chinese situation, further it does not put the words into the respondent’s mouth but it gives the possibility to answer how he/she prefers. It is crucial because it allows grasping, most of the times, the awareness of the respondent about censorship even if she/he is lying as it is possible to compare this question with all the previous ones and therefore to observe any logical contradiction with the other answers. Further, through this question, I do not question morally or politically the respondent’s country and its policy about the Internet regulations but I let the respondent write freely.
Language issues. The majority of Chinese people living in Italy is not able to read Italian. They can speak it in some way in order to work, for example, in restaurants, pubs, bars, betting rooms; thus they do not have a high level 90
of knowledge of the language but they strive to talk and understand. However, surely, they cannot absolutely read it well. The situation is a little better with English, but here, we can observe the opposite problem: they can read a little but they cannot speak. Therefore, I had to translate my questionnaire in Chinese. For this task, I have contacted a couple of Chinese mother tongue teachers living in Italy since ten and six years. Here below, the reader can observe the effective design of the final questionnaire in order to understand in detail and visually the design of the survey that the Chinese respondents were asked to fill in.
Intermediaries. After the translation in Chinese, I started the distribution of the questionnaire. Soon I realized that it was not only a matter of language, as I immediately felt the mistrust of Chinese people again. Probably also my previous belief that they had not answered my questionnaire for a problem of language was not so unquestionable because when I started to deliver my questions by going into restaurants and Chinese shops, the Chinese people I met became very rude and quarrelsome in some cases worse than before. When the questionnaire was still in Italian language or English, they simply pretended to not understand and they used to deviate from my sight, by continuing to do what they were doing before, as arranging goods on the shelves or setting the tables of the restaurant. When the questionnaire was eventually translated in their native language, the majority of the Chinese people I had to survey for my fieldwork did not even want to keep in their hands my questionnaire, letting it fall to the ground when I tried to show it and put it in their hands. Usually when I used to start to talk about my research and I simultaneously gave my questionnaire to him/her, then he/she used immediately to call aloud a friend, a relative, a colleague and, in group, 91
they began to tell me to leave the shop, or the place in which I was. Probably they did not understand who I was, what was my role, and my job.
Once I had to escape from a very big Chinese depot in the industrial area of Padua – Italy because of the annoyance of one hundred Chinese who asked me to leave immediately that place. Later other more affable Chinese people told me that the majority of Chinese shops in Italy are unauthorized and Chinese entrepreneurs and employees are afraid of the “Guardia di Finanza”, the Italian Finance Police. Indeed, the majority of Chinese living in Italy comes to Europe through an illegal immigration flux and probably they believed that I was conducting some interviews with the purpose of knowing information they did not want to reveal. Furthermore, several Chinese restaurants in Italy do not often meet the severe Italian safety regulations about health and food. Soon I realized that the majority of Chinese Community of Italy would have not answered to any Italian interviewer.
Cultural issues. As, at the beginning, it was impossible to deliver my questionnaires to the Chinese community of Italy, I tried to contact some Chinese organization on the Italian territory, as for example the Confucius Institute of some Italian big cities or the Italy-China Foundation of Milan, in order to have some help for the distribution of the questionnaire. In my preliminary belief, this kind of organizations might have provided some preferential channels for the distribution to the Chinese community. Unfortunately I encountered the same negative attitude or that sort of code of silence perceived in many Chinese shops, restaurants and hairdresser boutiques. Obviously, the reasons of a similar attitude from these official 92
organizations were different in comparison with the reactions experienced in many Chinese restaurants and shops. In the latter case, Chinese respondents were probably afraid that I could be a police officer, for example, as they usually come to Italy through an illegal immigration flux. On the contrary, if we consider the role of the organizations that I have mentioned, I believe that the main problem was completely different and hinged to their tight relations with the Chinese government. Probably the employees of these organizations were embarrassed in assisting me in my research because they did not know how the government would have considered my research topic; therefore, they preferred to not answer to my emails.
My last chance to gain the confidence of the Chinese Community of Italy was trying to contact some Chinese mother tongue students that could assist me as intermediaries between the respondents and me. In Italy there are many ads website, as Bakeca.it or Kijii.it in which a lot of Chinese people, especially students, advertise themselves for private lessons of Chinese language. I sent more or less 150/200 emails in order to contact some of them and have their help for the distribution of my questionnaires. I thought that if the interviewer had been Chinese, or a native Chinese had been close to me during the preliminary parleys, probably the negotiations to begin at least to read the questionnaires would have been different and easier. Further, with some luck, I would have been able to collect my first questionnaires. Only 5 Chinese answered my emails but quite luckily they lived in different regions of Italy: in the North, in the Middle and in the South of the country: consequently, the distribution of the questionnaires would have been broader. I have to underline that I did not explain my whole research project in detail to these intermediaries but I told them in a 93
vague way that my research was about the discrepancies in the Internet behavior among different cultures living in Italy. Otherwise I could jeopardize my fieldwork again as I could not know whether my intermediaries were supporters of the Chinese government or compliant with its policies about the Internet.
These five Chinese students were able, under my strict and close supervision, to start to deliver my questionnaires. Sometimes I was allowed to be present during the negotiations, but in other (i.e. the majority of the times) difficult situations with high degree of mistrust, I could only see the scene from the other side of the street, as the Chinese respondents did not want to talk with me even if I was accompanied by a Chinese. Even more fortunately, my intermediaries and I were in telephone contact since they left-on their smartphones and I could record the conversation. Later I would have had the possibility to inspect what they said during the filling in of the survey thanks to the help of another Chinese translator. It is important to underline that usually the female intermediaries (3 out of 5) were better accepted by the respondents and they could obtain much better results than the numerous attempts done by the male counterpart.
Ethical issues. Unfortunately, I had not only to pay my Chinese intermediaries for the distribution of my questionnaires but also the respondents. The majority of Chinese, but it is better to say, almost every Chinese respondent I met, wanted to earn something for every completed survey; indeed, even if the completion of every questionnaire did not require more than a minute and a half, Chinese respondents, always, told me the same sentence, i.e. “I don’t do anything for nothing”. And even if I tried to 94
convince them that usually for these kind of researches, or for the universal social value of science and knowledge, nobody in the world would ask a cent, they were anyhow determined to obtain a little offering, a remuneration, a mite. To sum up, considering my Chinese intermediaries and every Chinese respondent I met, I can affirm that for one completed questionnaire, I had to pay 4/5 euros, sometimes more sometimes less, but 4/5 euro was the average price. There were also Chinese intermediaries that asked me 4 euro for the distribution and 4 euro to give to the respondent, but in those circumstances, I had to find other and cheaper intermediaries as the collection of 397 questionnaires would have been too expensive for a PhD thesis. The average price for the distribution was 2/3 euros for the intermediary and 2/3 for the respondent. In such cases, you have to travel with a lot of euro coins in your wallet.
A future PhD student or an expert of the field interested in this topic has also to keep in mind how the fact of paying the respondent might be methodologically dangerous. Indeed, I have to point out that I have met some Chinese respondents only interested in earning some money and in those occasions, I could not perceive their intellectual honesty to focus attentively on the questions. The researcher has therefore to verify carefully every time what kind of respondent is filling in the survey. The majority of the Chinese respondents let the scholar understand that, for their time, they have the right to be paid. It is their culture and their way to let you enter the long negotiation. On the contrary, if the scholar notices that the transaction is too short and too focused on the money that the respondent will earn, he/she shall be keen enough to discard the questionnaires completed by these respondents. 95
Time Schedule and travels. The whole fieldwork for the collection of the questionnaires lasted 8/9 months. For every questionnaire, the negotiations have been very long and complex. It is better to plan in advance possible and further researchers about this topic as the Chinese community has been very reluctant and not so helpful as I thought at the beginning of the preparation. It is also better to take into account all the expenses that the researcher shall pay out not only as a remuneration for the Chinese respondent and obviously of the intermediaries, but also for travels as ticket trains, hotel booking, and meals. Indeed, in order to have a broader mirror of the Chinese Community of Italy, I have collected the entire questionnaires throughout the Italian territory and as my intermediaries used to travel with me, I had to pay their tickets as well.
A work in progress. When I started to collect my first 50/60 questionnaires, I immediately noticed during the negotiations that the almost every respondent came from the Chinese province of Zhejiang. Indeed, I have soon realized that the majority of the Chinese respondents is strictly connected to this province. The majority of the respondents working in Italy in the commerce comes indeed from the Zhejiang Province because this area of China has deep roots in commercial activities as clothes shops and restaurants. For this reason, for the second part of my research, I asked every respondents living in Italy coming from the above-mentioned province to provide me at least 5 email addresses of relatives, friends or colleagues living in the area in which they used to live in China, in order to have the possibility to compare some aspects of the results collected. I thought that it would have been very meaningful to verify whether people, with the same cultural, social and linguistic roots - but who had encountered 96
a different Internet dimension - had undergone a change in their mindset, in their ideas, in their beliefs. At the same time, I contacted some Chinese Ngos working in the field of the Internet freedom in China to provide me some contacts in the Zhejiang area helpful to collaborate with my project as well. I have to point out that also the sample of Chinese respondents living in China claimed to be paid for every questionnaire and the price was more or less the same requested by the Chinese living in Italy.
1.6 Data Analysis – The Chinese Community of Italy
The sample collected during the last 8 months includes 198 respondents coming from the Chinese community living in Italy. Almost all of them come from the Province of Zhejiang, but four were born in Italy and another one lives here since the age of two years old. Other three respondents of the sample have never experienced the current Chinese Internet dimension as they have come to Italy before the advent of the Internet in China and until now, they have not still come back to their motherland yet. The 51.5% of the sample is female; the 48.5% of the sample is male as it is possible to see in table 1. As I will explain in detail later, we have to keep in mind that the sample collected in this research is not statistically representative of the overall Chinese Community of Italy for the above-mentioned complexity in collecting the questionnaire and for the impossibility in selecting a priori the sample. However, it is anyhow a significant starting point for the analysis.
97
1.6.1 Gender of the sample
Gender Total % f 102 51,5% m 96 48,5% Total 198 100%
Tab. 1
1.6.2 Age Classes of the Sample
Age class Total % Up to 19 14 7,1% From 20 to 30 102 51,5% From 31 to 40 44 22,2% From 41 to 50 22 11,1% More than 50 16 8,1% Total 198 100%
Tab.2
Concerning the age class, from tab.2, we can notice that the majority of the respondents, with the 51.5% of the sample, come from the category “from 20 to 30 years”. In second place, with the 22.2%, we have the category “from 31 to 40 years”. In third place, with 11.1%, we have the category of 98
“41 to 50”, but it is very close to the other remaining categories; 8.1% for the class of age “more than 50” and 7.1% for the category “up to 19 years”. We can observe that the majority of the respondents (51.5%) in this macro- category include university students and the most fervid workforce present in Italy, extremely active in some particular areas of the commerce as the food and the clothes industry. In addition, also the subcategory “from 31 to 40” (22.2%) is well represented and, probably, these respondents are those Chinese who came to Italy 10/15 years ago and they are well integrated with the Italian working society.
1.6.3 Level of Education of the sample
Level of education Total % degree 62 31,3% high school 85 42,9% middle school 28 14,1% primary school 23 11,6% Total 198 100%
Tab. 3 99
12% 31% 14%
43%
degree high school middle school primary school
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us that, largely, the respondents have a middle or high level of education. We can hypothesize that these respondents, thanks to their education, are able to feel and grasp any changes or differences in the society and are capable to compare their previous situation with the current one with a middle or high level of degree of awareness. Consequently, this part of the sample is well educated and probably is able to perceive the focus of my fieldwork, as a different and more open Internet dimension now that the respondent has come to live in Italy.
1.6.4 Ages classes and level of education distribution
Age classes Level of education f m Total Up to 19 years old degree 1 1 high school 3 2 5 middle school 4 2 6 primary school 2 2 Up to 19 year old - Total 9 5 14 “from 20 to 30” years old degree 29 24 53 high school 20 17 37 middle school 9 3 12 “from 20 to 30” years old - Total 58 44 102 “From 31 to 40” years old degree 4 3 7 high school 9 15 24 middle school 2 4 6 primary school 2 5 7 101
“From 31 to 40” years old - Total 17 27 44 “from 41 to 50” years old degree 1 1 high school 10 4 14 middle school 1 3 4 primary school 3 3 “from 41 to 50” years old - Total 12 10 22 “More than 50” years old high school 3 2 5 primary school 3 8 11 “more than 50 years old - Total 6 10 16 Total 102 96 198
Tab. 4
In table 4, I have crossed the age class and the level of education. The subcategories related to the level of education are well distributed; it is possible to notice that the majority of respondents within the “primary school” subcategory come from the “more than 50 years old” category with 11 respondents out of 23. It is logical and predictable that in Italy Chinese people with this age have a very low level of education in comparison with the other age classes. Probably they came to Italy several years ago with a low level of education and they had no possibility to improve it during their lives because they had to find a job in a different and foreign society, and the improvement of their education was the last of their concerns. About the “middle school”, the majority of the respondents with this level of education come from the category “20 to 30” years with 12 out of 28 but it is not a high value and it is well distributed with the other classes. For the category 102
“high school”, it is evident that the majority of them come from two categories, with 37 out of 85 from the category “20 to 30” and with 24 respondents out of 85 from the category “31 to 40”. With an even clearer and solid distribution, the subcategory “degree” includes, largely, those respondents of the “20 to 30” category with 53 out of 62.
1.6.5 Level of Education and Gender distribution
Level of Education classes Gender
f % m % Total degree 34 33,3% 28 29,2% 62 high school 45 44,1% 40 41,7% 85 middle school 16 15,7% 12 12,5% 28 primary school 7 6,9% 16 16,7% 23
Totale complessivo 102 100,0% 96 100,0% 198
Tab. 5
Then, in tab. 5, I have crossed the level of education class with the gender category and I found out that there are no significant differences if we compare the male and female counterparts, except a variation in “the primary school” ratio with a huge increase in the male category. 103
1.6.6 Jobs of the sample
JOBS Total % Food industry 55 27,8% Student 43 21,7% employee 15 7,6% Clothes/dress industry 14 7,1% game rooms/betting center 14 7,1% Entrepeneur/Manager/Freelance 13 6,6% Unemployed 11 5,6% VARIOUS 8 4,0% Beauty industry 7 3,5% IT industry 7 3,5% Hotel industry 6 3,0% Education/teaching/University 4 2,0% not answered 1 0,5% Total 198 100,0%
Tab. 6
The table above concerns the job categories of the Chinese respondents living in Italy. It is clearly possible to notice that the majority of the respondents (with the 27.8% of the sample) work within the food industry. In this subcategory, I have included all the Chinese people working in pubs, bars, restaurants and dining halls. These kinds of commerce are becoming 104
very popular in Italy as the majority of the old restaurants and bars have been acquired by Chinese families that are taking the place of the previous Italian owners. In second position, with the 21.7% of the respondents, we have the subcategory of Chinese students who are attending above all university courses. Then, we have three subcategories that are very close with, respectively, the 7.6%, 7.1%., 7.1% of the sample. The first of these three subcategories is “employee”. The respondents of this subcategory use to work in companies or offices as employees. They did not answer in a more specific way. Then, we find the 7.1% of the respondents who work in the clothes industry: i.e. the majority of them work in little dress shops. This kind of trade is very common in Italy and it is very competitive as the clothes sold in these shops are very cheap. Then, with the same percentage of 7.1%, we have the subcategory of games rooms and betting centers. It is another usual form of entertainment in Italy. These kind of centers are very popular because customers can bet on sports events such as soccer or they can also play videogames in the meantime. The other results have low ratio. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that the 5.6% of the sample is unemployed and the 6.6% answered that they are entrepreneur of freelance without giving any other details of their job. We have also to mention that the 3.5% of the sample works in beauty centers as, for example, hairstylist or beautician: hair coiffeur is a form of commerce that is expanding its business very fast in Italy for its low prices. With the same percentage, 3.5%, some respondents work in the IT industry and only the 2% of the sample in the education sector. They work as lecturers in universities or they give private lessons of Chinese language. I have included in the subcategory “various” (4% of the whole sample) some jobs as, architect, immigration advisory, insurance broker, camping garage owner, umbrella seller, driver, 105
that were difficult to categorize in one specific subcategory or problematic to include in one of the others.
1.6.7 Time of stay in Italy of the sample
Time of stay in Italy Total % Up to 1 year 16 8,1% From 2 to 5 years 81 40,9% From 6 to 10 years 49 24,7% More than 10 years 50 25,3% not answered 2 1,0% Total 198 100%
Tab. 7
This table above is very relevant as its values can be crossed with many other categories or subcategories analyzed during my fieldwork. Table 7 refers to the duration of the stay in Italy. I have hypothesized that the more the respondent has lived in Italy, the more its awareness about his/her Internet experience might be deeper and the possibilities of his/her current perception broader. The more the respondent is in contact with an open Internet dimension, the more his/her perception of their motherland restrictions might be higher. After some time in which the respondent has experienced a free Internet world with all its potentialities, I have hypothesized that he/she would perceive that there are clear deep differences in comparison with the strict Internet regulations of his/her motherland and he/she will not wish to come back to the previous dimension. Consequently the respondent might become harbinger of change when he/she will come 106
back to China or when he/she simply will talk/write through, for example, Wechat and QQ. Therefore, he/she can contaminate the monolithic approach to the use of the Internet of his/her relatives, friends and colleagues. Largely, the respondents of the sample have lived in Italy for a duration of 2 to 5 years, with 40.9% of the total. Then very close, we can notice the subcategories “from 6 to 10” and “more than 10 years” with 24.7% and 25.3%. Two respondents did not want to answer and the 8.1% of the respondents have lived in Italy for 1 year.
We have also to point out that the picture described above, concerning a plausible connection between the time of stay in a foreign country and the increase of the awareness about previous Internet restrictions is quite dynamic and nuanced. Indeed, I have notice during my fieldwork also an opposite phenomenon. The more the respondent is accustomed to an open cyberspace with all the possibilities of a democratic virtual stage, (i.e. after several years of stay in Italy) the more he/she will not able to notice any previous differences with the same sensitivity that he/she used to perceive when he/she had just arrived in Europe because, probably, he/she is now accustomed to the new and open Internet dimension. Indeed, those respondents who have stayed in Italy since several years, take for granted that now they have the possibility to use the Internet in a more open way and they perceive less all the restrictions in China. When the researcher makes the respondents notice this aspect, then the respondents are able to declare that in China there are indeed more restrictions but if we analyze this process unconsciously, the respondents start again to not notice them anymore. I believe that this mental process concerns, even in this case, the boiling frog syndrome but in the opposite situation. Chinese respondents 107
living in Italy since several years have started to not perceive the openness of the current free Internet in comparison with the more controlled Chinese one because, as it often occurs, only sudden happenings and changes have an effect on our brains. As we have already mentioned in the previous section, Jared Diamond (2005) referred to such changes as “creeping normalcy” pointing to changes, which are perceived as “normality if they happen in unnoticed increments” (Diamond, 2005). Therefore, the unconscious awareness of Chinese living in Italy concerning any discrepancies between two or more internet dimensions, now accustomed to an open Internet dimension, will again arise when they will come back to China, to their previous web experience in which a filtered dimension is (there) the normal situation. This might provoke an irresistible wave of protest, as these netizens will again perceive a sudden difference in approaching to the old Chinese restricted cyberspace. Their need of the previous, Italian or European Internet possibilities might be a destabilizing element in the Chinese cyber-society. We will come back to this process of reversal boiling frog syndrome later and in the conclusion. Furthermore, I have reported some cases in which the more the respondent has been living permanently in Italy since many years, the more he/she will be integrated with the society and usually he/she will start coming back to his/her motherland less frequently than before. Therefore, he/she will not be able to perceive, or will not be interested in noticing, differences with his/her past web experience. However, it will be crucial to verify what might occur when a more aware Chinese netizen will come to China after having experienced a social and political maturation. 108
Consequently, without making now assumptions that we will be able to verify through a further deepening of this research, we can currently sum up the reversal process of the boiling frog syndrome, by describing the evolution of the respondent’s awareness about the Internet censorship as a movement which raises its trajectory after a short time of stay in a new country, then it reaches its peak after a period of “2 to 5 years” and then it normalizes. Therefore, in the normalization phase, the perception of the respondent is not able to grasp differences with the past with the same initial sensibility, and after, for example, 10 year this process collapses very quickly and the respondents is even less aware of possible discrepancies. In any case, this process is harbinger of change. Even though a Chinese is no longer able to discern the differences with the past with the same precision and amazement as a Chinese living in Italy since 1 year, if he/she will come back to his/her motherland or simply talk with other Chinese, he/she will bring to every Chinese mindset that he/she will meet new demands and needs of a democratic Internet dimension, as he/she is accustomed to an open dimension. A dimension that is now normal and usual for him/her.
1.6.8 Hours on Internet in a day (now that they live in Italy) – Tab 8
Hours of Internet in a day Total % Less than 1h a day 12 6,1% from 1 to 3 h a day 47 23,7% from 3 to 6 h a day 74 37,4% More than 6 h a day 56 28,3% Not answered / not specified 9 4,5% Total 198 100% 109
This table is significant because it let us fully understand how the Internet has become relevant in the recent years for the Chinese people; the Internet for Chinese society is now an independent variable around which any research about this topic has to revolve. Every study about the Chinese society, every research about the Chinese legal system, Chinese politics, and Chinese media has now to consider the focal role of the Internet: it is absolutely necessary to take into account this variable because the Internet remains rightfully the only output towards the rest of the world for every user of the PRC. Largely, the respondents of this sample use to spend from 3 to 6 hours a day on the Internet with the 37.4%, but in second place, with even a higher result, the subcategory “more than 6 hours a day” with the 28.3% let us understand the fundamental role of this media within the Chinese life. Besides, with the 23.7% of the sample, we have the subcategory “from 1 to 3 hours”. The 4.5% of the sample did not answer and the 6.1% of the sample spend less than 1 hour a day on the Internet.
1.6.9 Most visited websites of the sample (in any language, now that they live in Italy) most visited websites Total % news 114 31,3% social 97 26,6% Videosharing 66 18,1% Videos/TV/Movies 26 7,1% Online shopping 24 6,6% Sports 10 2,7% Videogames/games 9 2,5% 110
Other/various 7 1,9% Bus schedule 3 0,8% Jobs Ads/professional related 2 0,5% Beauty 1 0,3% doesn't browse 1 0,3% Health/food 1 0,3% Not Answered 1 0,3% not specified entertainment 1 0,3% School/University 1 0,3% Total 364 100,0%
Tab. 9
Table 9 shows us the most visited websites of Chinese respondents living in Italy. The answers were subdivided according to macro-categories. The majority of the answers, with the 31.3%, were included in the category “news”. With the term news, the respondents mean that they are interested in any events of their motherland. I have reported that they are usually not interested in the news of the country in which they currently live and furthermore they do not use to read foreign online newspapers even when they are able to understand something (in this case, Italian magazines) because they think that foreign press gives often a negative connotation of what is happening in China. I could notice this aspect during the interviews related to this fieldwork but also during the conversations with the Chinese before the beginning of the questionnaire or immediately after. The Chinese respondents do not trust foreign media and press. As we will see below, the Chinese respondent living in Italy is sometimes interested in specific news 111
of the country in which he/she now lives concerning, for example, some new immigration laws, or some regulations for his/her job. In the second position, with the 26.6%, we have the category “social”. The Chinese respondents spend a lot of time in social websites above all through their smartphones. They use these websites or apps to stay in touch with their friends or relatives in China. We can say that they are always connected with their contacts thanks to these platforms. In third position, with the 18.1% of the sample, we can notice that the hobby of video sharing is common among Chinese people. They love to share videos, movies, and short video clips and if we consider that in fourth position we have the category Video/TV/movies, we can understand how the Internet is used for this kind of video-entertainment. About this form of entertainment, in several answers, Chinese respondents used to complain because in China there are no copyright issues for downloading movies as, on the contrary, in Europe or in Us. I have collected dozens of answers about this issue. Chinese people told me that in their motherland they are able to download a lot of movies free and without breaking the law or any copyright regulations. Another significant result refers to the category “online shopping” with the 6.6% of the sample. When we will analyze the answers of the Chinese respondents living in China, we will notice that strangely here in Italy this value is very low in comparison with the Chinese sample. The reason for this discrepancy is that in China, netizens use Taobao, but here in Italy it is not so easy to buy products from the PRC through this websites. However, during the last months in Italy, Chinese respondents have reported that some intermediary agencies assist Chinese in purchasing through Taobao and customers can pick up the items directly in these shops. Taobao is a very cheap form of e-commerce similar to Ebay, but Chinese 112
people can buy items with even more affordable prices and above all this website is in Chinese. The other results have very low values and, as you can see, they are no so significant.
1.6.10 Most used search engines (now that they live in Italy)
Search engines Total % google 57 28,8% baidu 49 24,7% baidu, google 44 22,2% doesn't use 29 14,6% baidu, 360 6 3,0% baidu, google, sougou 3 1,5% sougou 3 1,5% not answered 3 1,5% baidu, sogou 2 1,0% 360 1 0,5% baidu, 360, google 1 0,5% Totale complessivo 198 100%
Tab. 10
This table above show us the first sensitive data as it mirrors the wish of the Chinese respondents to use (living in Italy) - probably for their first time - a non-restricted search engine. This aspect might mean that they feel now the need to have access to free information through an open Internet dimension. This table is very impressive because if we consider that the 58.6% of the respondents do surf only Chinese websites of China for language and 113
cultural reasons, as we will see in the table below, it let us understand that it is anyhow fervent the determination of the respondents to broaden their horizons. Indeed, in the first position, with the 28.8% of the sample, the most used search engine is Google. Thus, Chinese respondents show us their will to use a free search engine and only in second position with the 24.7% of the sample, we find the Chinese search engine Baidu. This aspect can be a possible factor of future alterations in their approach to the access of the information, for example: a change transmissible to China thanks to those netizens who live in Europe and Us now and talk and write about this more open platform to their relatives and friends. Again, it is fundamental to underline the third position, as with the 22.2% we have “Baidu and Google”; i.e. these respondents even if they probably are accustomed to used their Chinese search engine par excellence, they have started to use also the non-restricted search engine of Mountain View. But, there is also a disheartened consideration as the 14.6% of the respondents never use search engines and this fact let us understand how the Chinese netizen is often brainwashed in his/her Internet experience, or most probably, there are respondents in this sample not accustomed to use search engines when they need to find info. The rest of the answers are not so significant as we have “Baidu and 360” with the 3% of the sample and the other results are under the 2%.
114
1.6.11 Most used search engines and Age classes distribution
Age classes From From From More Search Up to 20 to 31 to 41 to than engines 19y % 30y 40y 50y 50y Total 0, 0 0,0 2,3 0,0 0,0 360 % % 1 % % % 1 21 ,4 21, 38, 22, 12, baidu 3 % 22 6% 17 6% 5 7% 2 5% 49 14 ,3 2,9 0,0 4,5 0,0 baidu, 360 2 % 3 % % 1 % % 6 0, baidu, 360, 0 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 google % 1 % % % % 1 28 baidu, ,6 33, 11, 4,5 0,0 google 4 % 34 3% 5 4% 1 % % 44 baidu, 0, google, 0 2,0 2,3 0,0 0,0 sougou % 2 % 1 % % % 3 7, baidu, 1 0,0 2,3 0,0 0,0 sogou 1 % % 1 % % % 2 0, 0 0,0 15, 36, 87, doesn't use % % 7 9% 8 4% 14 5% 29 28 36, 22, 27, 0,0 google 4 ,6 37 3% 10 7% 6 3% % 57 115
% 0, not 0 2,0 0,0 4,5 0,0 answered % 2 % % 1 % % 3 0, 0 1,0 4,5 0,0 0,0 sougou % 1 % 2 % % % 3 10 0, 100 100 100 100 0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 Total 14 % 102 % 44 % 22 % 16 % 198
Tab. 11
This table is very important because it can explain better the previous discouraging result about those respondents who do not use search engines although they now live in an open Internet society. I have crossed the table “search engines” and the table concerning the age of the respondents. If we take into account the values above that I have underlined in red in the category “doesn’t use”, we can clearly notice that the highest value are related to the subcategories “from 41 to 50y” and mostly “more than 50y”. Indeed, if we analyze the category “doesn’t use search engines”, we find out that 14 out of 29 (almost the 50% of the category) respondents come from the subcategory “more than 50 years old” and other 8 out of 29 respondents who do not use search engines come from the subcategory “from 41 to 50 years old”. Most importantly, there are no value for the subcategories “up to 19y” and “from 20 to 30y”: this two results are very encouraging aspects for the future of a young generation that will be able to find info thanks to the Internet with an increasing easiness and awareness in the next years. I have 116
also underlined in blue that among those respondents who use only “Google” in order to search info within the Internet, there are no values for the subcategory “more than 50y”. This result and the previous one do validate my consideration about the age and the fact that some Chinese persons are not accustomed to search info through the Internet because of their old age. Another validation about the connection between the age and the use of the search engines arises if we consider the yellow results. Indeed, if we take into account the category “Baidu and Google”, we can notice that there are no respondents who use these two search engines in the subcategory “more than 50y” and this is quite impressive because these two search engines are the most used of the whole table. Always considering this last category (Baidu and Google), we can find only 1 respondents out of 44 in the subcategory “41 to 50y” and this shows again that there is a strong link between search engines and old age in this sample.
1.6.12 Most visited search engines and level of education distribution
Level of education Search engines degree % high school % middle school % primary school % Total 0,0 360 0,0% 1 1,2% 0,0% % 1 11,3 35,3 28,6 17,4 baidu 7 % 30 % 8 % 4 % 49 10,7 4,3 baidu, 360 0,0% 2 2,4% 3 % 1 % 6 0,0 baidu, 360, google 0,0% 0,0% 1 3,6% % 1 35,5 20,0 17,9 0,0 baidu, google 22 % 17 % 5 % % 44 baidu, google, sougou 0,0% 3 3,5% 0,0% 0,0 3 117
% 0,0 baidu, sogou 1 1,6% 0,0% 1 3,6% % 2 17,6 60,9 doesn't use 0,0% 15 % 0,0% 14 % 29 51,6 16,5 32,1 8,7 google 32 % 14 % 9 % 2 % 57 4,3 not answered 0,0% 1 1,2% 1 3,6% 1 % 3 4,3 sougou 0,0% 2 2,4% 0,0% 1 % 3 100, 100, 100, 100, Total 62 0% 85 0% 28 0% 23 0% 198
Tab. 12
In the first table about search engines, I had hypothesized that the discouraging value for the category “doesn’t use” was related to several reasons. In the previous table, we have noticed that the first fundamental aspect is related to the old age of the respondents. In this table, I have crossed the table about the “search engines” and the table concerning the level of education of the respondents. Thus we can observe another plausible reason: i.e. the level of education of the respondent. Indeed, if we take into account the red value, we can find out that 14 out of 29 respondents who do not use search engines come from the subcategory “primary school” and in the same subcategory, we can notice the lowest value (cyan color) for those who use Google as search engine. Considering also the green value in the subcategory “degree”, we can notice that 32 respondents with a degree out of 57 use Google as primary search engine. All these results validate that there is a strong connection between the use of search engines and the level of education. These last two tables are helpful 118
because they remind us that we will have to pay attention for future comparisons with the other sample and for any hypothesis that we would like to support. We shall use only homogenous samples because the results can be very different even in one single sample if we consider different aspects as the level of education or the age. Then, we have to consider every variable before making some assumptions.
1.6.13 Most used search engines and “only Chinese websites” distribution
Only Chinese websites not Both Only Only Search answere Chinese and Chine Italia engines d % Italian % se % n % Total 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 360 % % 1 % % 1 33, 12, 32, 0,0 baidu 1 3% 10 8% 38 8% % 49 baidu, 0,0 0,0 5,2 0,0 360 % % 6 % % 6 baidu, 360, 0,0 1,3 0,0 0,0 google % 1 % % % 1 baidu, 0,0 28, 19, 0,0 google % 22 2% 22 0% % 44 baidu, 0,0 0,0 3 2,6 0,0 3 119
google, % % % % sougou baidu, 0,0 1,3 0,9 0,0 sogou % 1 % 1 % % 2 doesn't 33, 3,8 21, 0,0 use 1 3% 3 % 25 6% % 29 100 33, 51, 12, ,0 google 1 3% 40 3% 15 9% 1 % 57 not 0,0 1,3 1,7 0,0 answered % 1 % 2 % % 3 0,0 0,0 2,6 0,0 sougou % % 3 % % 3 100 100 100 100 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 Total 3 % 78 % 116 % 1 % 198
Tab. 13
In this table, I have crossed the “search engines” table and the table “only Chinese websites” in order to verify whether there is a connection between the use of particular search engines and the practice of surfing only Chinese websites or both Italian/Chinese websites. Most importantly, whether there is a connection between the category “doesn’t use” and the category “Only Chinese website”. 120
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from 2 to 5 y baidu, google
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121
In this chart, I have crossed the most used search engine values with the table concerning the time of stay in Italy in order to verify whether there are differences if we take into account the permanence in our country and the most used search engine. There are no significant results to comment, but if we consider the “subcategory” “doesn’t use” we can notice that the value is higher for those respondents who live in Italy since more than 10 years and this factor is mostly related to the “age class”. This aspect is useful to understand that we have to analyze these data with attention before making hurried hypotheses. Therefore, in this case, I can validate my last previous assumptions, i.e. the respondents with older age do not usually use the Internet to search information. Google and Baidu and all the other values, on the contrary, are quite stable.
1.6.15 Percentage of the usage of the Chinese websites (hosted in China), now that they live in Italy. Tab. 14
Only Chinese websites of China Total % Both Chinese and Italian 78 39,4% Only Chinese 116 58,6% Only Italian 1 0,5% not answered 3 1,5% Total 198 100%
122
1.6.16 Surfing other foreign cyberspaces, now that they live in Italy other countries Total % Asia 4 2,0% Asia, US 2 1,0% Europe 6 3,0% no 161 81,3% not answered 1 0,5% not specified 4 2,0% US 12 6,1% US, Europe 8 4,0% Total 198 100,0%
Tab. 15
These two tables above are relevant because they show the level of integration of the respondents with the country in which they currently live and their desire to surf also other foreign websites. What if a Chinese could live in an open Internet dimension? Would he/she benefit from the openness of the new and democratic cyberspace? Would he/she begin to surf also foreign websites?
Unfortunately, the majority of the respondents with the 58.6% (table 14) of the sample prefer using only Chinese websites within China’s borders although they live now in Italy. However, we can observe also a promising value of 39.4%, which shows us that the respondents use both Chinese and Italian websites. The 0.5% of the samples uses only Italian websites, but he/she was born in Italy so this value is not relevant. Three respondents did 123
not answer. Unfortunately, the most discouraging value, if we focus on table n° 15, refers to the fact that the majority of the respondents, with the 81.3% of the sample, do not surf other foreign countries.
1.6.17 Surfing other foreign cyberspaces and the level of education distribution – tab. 16
Level of education prima other high middle ry countries degree % school % school % school % Total 0,0 Asia 3 4,8% 1 1,2% 0,0% % 4 0,0 Asia, US 2 3,2% 0,0% 0,0% % 2 0,0 Europe 5 8,1% 1 1,2% 0,0% % 6 100 no 31 50,0% 80 94,1% 27 96,4% 23 ,0% 161 not 0,0 answered 1 1,6% 0,0% 0,0% % 1 not 0,0 specified 3 4,8% 0,0% 1 3,6% % 4 0,0 US 9 14,5% 3 3,5% 0,0% % 12
US, 0,0 Europe 8 12,9% 0,0% 0,0% % 8
100,0 100,0 100 Total 62 100,0% 85 % 28 % 23 ,0% 198
124
In this table, I have crossed the category “surfing other countries” with the level of education. Here, it is important to underline (in cyan) that 9 respondents out of 12 who usually surf American websites come from the subcategory “degree”. Besides, in the subcategory “US and Europe” (in green), the 100% of the sample has a degree. These two values show us again how it is clear the connection between a particular mental openness towards a foreign cyberspace and the related level of education. On the contrary, in the subcategory “no foreign websites” (in yellow), only 31 respondents out of 161 have a degree (the 19.2% of the sample).
1.6.18 Surfing Italian websites – Tab. 17
Italian Websites Total % Doesn’t surf Italian Websites 103 50,7% Not specified 25 12,3% News 14 6,9% Entertainment (movies,videos, music) 13 6,4% Job/job Ads 10 4,9% University/school 9 4,4% ads 6 3,0% Online shopping 6 3,0% Lifestyle 5 2,5% Travels 5 2,5% General info 3 1,5% Italian Government regulations 2 1,0% Social 2 1,0% Total 203 100,0% 125
From this table, we can observe what kind of Italian websites the respondents prefer visiting. Firstly, it is pivotal to underline also here that the majority of the respondents, with the 50.7% of the sample, simply do not use Italian websites. This value validates my previous hypotheses about possible language barriers as also in this case we can notice that Chinese respondents prefer most surfing Chinese websites. In the second position, with the 12.3%, they prefer to not specify what they search or which websites they surf in the Italian Internet platform. In third and fourth position, with the 6.9% and 6.4% of the sample, we have the subcategories of “news” and “entertainment”. With news, the respondents mean that they are interested in generic news of their homeland and sometimes they read about China in the Chinese version of the online Italian newspapers. In the subcategory entertainment, I have included videogames, music and videos. If we check the other results, with values under the 5% of the sample, it is possible to notice that the respondents sometimes decide to use Italian websites for job needs, or in order to find a house, for university/school materials, for tourism and for some Italian regulations or the relevant laws of the country in which they live now.
126
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and fresh opinions and ideas coming from any part of the world. In addition, as we will able to ascertain in the interviews analysis, the fact of starting to employ with frequency Facebook might be a destabilizing element when these netizens will come back to China and will feel the need to contact their Facebook’s friends but they will be not able to do it as Facebook is forbidden in China. As we will observe in one of the interviews, the interviewee will be disappointed as he/she cannot use Facebook from China when he/she usually comes back to China for his/her holidays. This is even more intriguing as the interviewee proves to be aligned with the Internet regulations of the CCP. The other results of the chart are not significant.
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1.6.21 Most searched topics of the respondents, now that they live in Italy search what categories Total % lifestyle 62 21,3% news 37 12,7% various but not specified 31 10,7% online entertainment 30 10,3% search nothing 29 10,0% job search and job information 26 8,9% university and learning materials 15 5,2% travels 13 4,5% culture 12 4,1% online shopping 9 3,1% suggestions for the family 7 2,4% not answered 5 1,7% friends' profiles 3 1,0% italian government's policy 3 1,0% sports 3 1,0% 130
house ads 2 0,7%
Italian Language 2 0,7%
Technologies 2 0,7%
Total 291 100%
Tab. 18
What do Chinese respondents search now that they live in Italy? Before focusing on the table above, I believe that it is worth keeping in mind what we have observed in the previous tables, i.e. that the 28.8% of the respondents do use only Google now that they live in Italy. Therefore, we might notice a mutation in the usual preferences of the respondents also considering the fact that they now employ a different search engine, which could alter some aspects of their queries. Firstly, let us analyze the most searched topics from Italy and then in the next section, we will be able to verify whether there are differences in comparison with their Chinese web experience by analyzing the answers of the Chinese living in China.
With the highest value (21.3%) and with a huge difference with the value of the second position, we can notice that the category “Lifestyle” is the most searched topic. I have included inside this macro-category a lot of answers as: Fashion, clothes, health, hairstyle, food, fitness, happiness and gossip. These words concern the simplest, most futile and shallow aspects of our life as fashion, hairstyle, fitness, gossip and they are the mirror of a Chinese 131
generation interested in having fun, in being beautiful and fashionable and well dressed with stylish hairdo. This generation talks and comments a lot about “lifestyle” through social network sites and their smartphones. Some of the respondents used the word “happiness”. It is another significant concept as they now wish to live in a western style dimension; they want to have fun, and they are interested in their diet and health and in sports. In second position, with the 12.7%, they want to know more about news. I have asked them about this topic and they told me that they want to know about their motherland even if they live in Italy. They are not interested in politics but in what is happening in their country day after day. The 10.7% of the respondents did not want to specify what they search and, quite discouraging, the 10% of the respondents search nothing. Many of the respondents indeed are not interested in searching anything; they use the Internet to chat with friends through social networks or apps as Wechat/QQ or they play videogames. Also in this case, we can hypothesize that they are so accustomed to their previous Internet dimension in which information is distorted or it is even dangerous to search for something sensitive that they currently continue to use the Internet with the same modalities. Or, simply, their age and their low level of education, as we have seen above, are a cultural barrier which inhibits them to use the Internet in order to find info. The 10.3% of the respondents employ the Internet to search online entertainment and only the 8.9% in order to search a job. A very promising aspect is that the 5.2% of the respondents search for learning materials for university or school and this bodes well for the future level of cultural integration of Chinese young generations in Italy and for their cultural and social improvement. A quite curious aspect is the value for “online shopping”. Chinese netizens are usually very interested in online shopping 132
in their country because of the cheapness to buy everything through the Internet. Now that they live in Italy, only the 3.1% of the sample uses the Internet for online shopping. As mentioned above, the reason refers to the fact that in China Chinese people use Taobao but here in Italy it is not so easy to buy products from China through that website. We will see that this will be one of the huge difference with the Chinese respondents living in China. Lastly, with a 0,7% of the sample, it is very discouraging to notice that only 2 respondents out of 198 search for materials about the Italian language or visit websites related to the study of this language.
1.6.22 Discrepancies that the respondent perceives between the Chinese Internet and other Internet dimensions
Differences with other Internet dimensions Total % different 78 39,4% No difference 80 40,4% Doesn’t know 39 19,7% not answered 1 0,5% Total 198 100%
Tab. 19
With this table, we can glimpse some sensitive answers. It is about the respondents’ awareness that something in their new Internet experience is different in comparison with their Chinese previous one. Are there any discrepancies? It was an open question. I did not ask anything in particular and I let the respondent be free to write any difference he/she is able to notice. Therefore, I have included all the different answers into the above 133
categories. It is a general question: most of the times, as we will see later, the differences that the respondents are able to notice are not related to censorship or content restrictions but only to technical issues or to their personal taste. However, again, without any of my biases, it was important to let the respondent be free to answer. Otherwise, if I had asked to notice any matter concerning the Internet censorship now that the respondent can benefit from an open Internet, I surely would have received almost no answers or only distorted reports. With similar results, we have a split: indeed, with the 40.4%, the respondents do not notice any differences if they compare the Chinese Internet experience with the Italian one or with the Internet of other countries. In second position, but with almost the same value, we have the 39.4% of the sample that is able to notice some discrepancies. But considering that the 19.7% of the respondents are not able to answer because they do not know the answer, it is quite discouraging that the 60.1% (40.4%+19.7%) of the respondents are not able to see any differences or are not able to reply because the respondents simply do not know.
134
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syndrome section of this chapter). Indeed those respondents who have lived in Italy for 1 year or from 2 to 5 years were (with the 50% and 50.6%) able to feel differences in comparison with their previous Internet experience. Then the value about the perception of some discrepancies collapses with a 36.7% for the category from 6 to 10 years and with a 20% for the category more than 10 years.
We can hypothesize that the reason for this collapse - proportionate to the time of stay in Italy- refers to the fact that these respondents are now so accustomed to the potentialities of the West Internet dimension after having lived in Italy for years that they do not pay attention to one or more discrepancies anymore, being this dimension the normality for them now. Another important aspect of this table concerns the fact that the 46% of the respondents in Italy since more than 10 years do not know the answer. After talking to some of the respondents of this subcategory during the negotiations, I have realized that these respondents have lived so many years permanently in Italy, besides they do not usually come back to China and consequently they are not able to compare the two dimensions properly. Another aspect can be related to the fact that those respondents with more than 50 years old have a low level of education.
137
1.6.25 Discrepancies and gender differentiation
Gender Difference between two Internet dimensions f % m % different 37 36,3% 41 42,7% No difference 44 43,1% 36 37,5% Doesn’t know 21 20,6% 18 18,8% not answered 0,0% 1 1,0% Total 102 100,0% 96 100,0%
Tab. 20
This table above is about the perception of the discrepancies considering the gender of the respondents. The values are not significant. We have to underline that the “male” category is able to perceive slightly more the general differences ( 36.3% for the female sample and 42.7 for the male sample) between before and after, whilst the female category has a higher value for the “ no difference” answer with the 43.1% of the sample versus the 37.5% for the male sample.
138
1.6.26 Discrepancies in detail
Specify the differences – categories % no perception of censorship/similar experience/almost the same 35,9% doesn't know/never compared/only surfed in one country 18,4% different speed or different technical/costs aspects perception 17,1% General censorship perception 10,1% Specific censorship perception (youtube/google) 9,7% different taste content 7,8% not specified/not answered 0,9%
Tab. 21
This table offers some of the most sensitive data that I have analyzed. Here, I have asked the respondents to specify better the differences that they were able to perceive in the previous question without giving them any of my biases or prejudices. Indeed, they gave me a lot of different answers. Therefore, I have included every answer containing words or concepts related to censorship issues in two categories: “general censorship perception” and “specific censorship perception”, as I will explain the reason for this dichotomy below. Firstly, the large part of the respondents, with the 35.9% of the whole sample, have no perception of censorship; i.e. in their answers, I did not find out any words or concepts related to the Internet censorship, Internet regulations or Internet restrictions. This data is very significant because if we consider that in second position, with the 18.4% of the sample, the respondents were not able to answer, or they did not know the answer or they had never compared the two dimensions, the 139
54.3% (35.9%+18.4%) of the sample is not able to feel any differences or give an answer about the issue of internet censorship. In third position, with the 17.1% of the sample, the respondents answered that they perceive only different technical aspects, for example, different broadband speed, different fees/expenses (they complain about the cost of the bill in Italy); nothing more. The 7.8% of the sample is able to perceive that there are difference in the style of the European or US websites. Consequently, they use to perceive discrepancies about their personal tastes. For example, many of them affirmed that Chinese websites are definitely different because they are nicer and more beautiful as they have much more pictures, more links towards other websites and the general web experience in China is much more colored and richer. Only the 19.8% (10.1%+9.7%, see the explanation of this split below) of the sample were aware of some of the Internet restrictions in China and that now they can benefit from an open Internet dimension, or at least from the possibility to go in specific restricted websites that in China are not allowed, as Facebook or YouTube.
However, we have to do a distinction as only the 10.1% of the whole sample was able to recognize a general perception of the pervasive issues of the Chinese Internet dimension in which not only many foreign websites are forbidden but also the entire access to information is distorted as, for example, search engines can filter the queries of the user and the overall Internet is monitored. In this case, the respondents were able to use words and concepts such as, for example, “firewall”, “free Internet”, “freedom of speech, “too many restrictions in China” and I have included words like these in the category “general censorship perception”. On the contrary, the 140
9.7% of the respondents were only aware that in China some or few foreign websites as Facebook and YouTube are not allowed.
In the opinion of the respondents of this last sub-category, when they know that we Europeans or Americans are worried about freedom of speech issues or about the Internet censorship within the Chinese cyberspace, they think that we are amplifying the situation as in their perspective in China there is only a specific Internet censorship towards a few and specific websites that are clearly adverse to China. They cannot see other differences beyond the fact that the some foreign websites are not allowed, because, as they used always to tell me, in China they have the Chinese version of these websites and consequently they do not perceive this like an issue (let us think about the Chinese version of Youtube: Youku). To sum up, only the 10.1% of the sample is able to perceive the issue of a general and pervasive Internet censorship.
1.6.27 Discrepancies in detail and gender differentiation
Gender Specify the differences categorie f %f m %m different speed or different technical/costs aspects perception 19 16,8% 18 17,3% different taste content 10 8,8% 7 6,7% doesn't know/never compared/only surfed in one country 22 19,5% 18 17,3% General censorship perception 8 7,1% 14 13,5% no perception of censorship/similar 40 35,4% 38 36,5% 141
experience/almost the same not specified/not answered 1 0,9% 1 1,0% Specific censorship perception (youtube/google) 13 11,5% 8 7,7%
Tab. 22
Here above, we can observe the same last table but with the gender differentiation. We can notice that the values are well distributed and there are no relevant discrepancies, except the category “general censorship perception”. In this subcategory, it is significant that only the 7.1% of the female respondents were aware of a general censorship perception. The male counterpart could perceive a general Internet perception with the 13.5% of the respondents. The opposite situation is visible in the subcategory “specific censorship perception”; in this case, the female respondents with the 11.5% of the sample had a higher value than the male counterpart with the 7.7% of the sample. It is possible to notice that the male respondents were aware of a general and pervasive censorship within the Internet much more than the female counterpart who was more interested in noticing only specific censorship issues, which inhibit to surf particular websites as Facebook and YouTube.
142
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subcategory “degree”, the 23.4% of the respondents with a degree answered that they do not perceive any differences concerning the Internet restrictions between their web experience in China and the current one. However, again, we can notice a huge increase of the value with respectively 46.1%, 39.3% and 34.8 of the respondents with a high school diploma, with a middle school diploma and with a primary school diploma. It is a quite interesting aspect that, if we take into account the category “specific censorship perception”, only those respondents with a degree or a high school diploma are aware that some specific websites are not allowed in China. The respondents with middle school or primary school diploma were not able to perceive this aspect. Probably because they have and old age and have been living in Italy since several years and they do not pay attention to this aspect anymore. We have also to underline that the highest value of respondents who do not know the answer or they have never compared the two dimension come, quite logically, from the subcategory “primary school” with 9 out of 23 of the answers.
144
1.6.29 Discrepancies in detail and age classes distribution
Age From More Specify the Up to 20 to From 31 From 41 to than differences 19y % 30y % to 40y % 50y % 50 y % Total different speed or different technical/costs 16,2 aspects perception 4 28,6% 19 % 12 25,5% 2 8,7% 0,0% 37 12,0 different taste content 1 7,1% 14 % 1 2,1% 1 4,3% 0,0% 17 doesn't know/never compared/only surfed 11,1 43,5 56,3 in one country 1 7,1% 13 % 7 14,9% 10 % 9 % 40 General censorship 14,5 perception 0,0% 17 % 5 10,6% 0,0% 0,0% 22 no perception of censorship/similar experience/almost the 30,8 43,5 43,8 same 7 50,0% 36 % 18 38,3% 10 % 7 % 78 not specified/not answered 1 7,1% 1 0,9% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2 Specific censorship perception 14,5 (youtube/google) 0,0% 17 % 4 8,5% 0,0% 0,0% 21 100,0 100,0 100,0 Total 14 100,0% 117 % 47 100,0% 23 % 16 % 217
Tab. 23
In this table above, I have crossed the category “specify the differences” with the age of the respondents. It is important in this case to emphasize essentially the results about “general censorship perception” and “specific censorship perception”. In both categories, the respondents who were able to perceive these two different kind of Internet censorship come only from two age classes: “from 20 to 30y” and “from 31 to 40y”. If we consider the other 145
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that if we take into account the specific censorship perception this value is perceived more by those respondents who live in Italy from 2 to 5 years. Probably, they are now accustomed to a new dimension but they still remember their Chinese web experience in their motherland. The subcategory “up to 1 year” shows us that the respondents are not so practiced with the new and more open Internet dimension and probably they are not aware of the specific restrictions as YouTube and Google. The subcategory 6 to 10 years shows us that the respondent is now more accustomed to the new possibilities but he/she is starting to pay less attention to the phenomenon. The value “specific censorship perception” is not present in the subcategory “more than 10 years” because the respondents are now fully integrated with the new specific possibilities of this Internet platform as Facebook and YouTube. Another evident aspect is that the subcategory “doesn’t know/never compared/only surfed in one country” is distributed above all in the category “more than 10 years”. These respondents are those who have lived in Italy since many years. Probably they have not come back to China anymore, or they have come here before the advent of the Internet in China and they have never compared the two dimensions. Also their low level of education is a factor that has to be considered for this value. The other results are not significant.
147
1.6.31 Overall perception of the Internet censorship
Censorship perception related Total no 152 76,8% not answered 3 1,5% yes 42 21,2% not specified 1 0,5% Total 198 100,0%
Tab. 24
This table above is a sort of summary through which it is possible to have a broader vision of the respondents’ perception of censorship in Chinese cyberspace. These values recapitulate all the answers and comments collected during every questionnaire and the focus is the concept of the Internet censorship. If the respondent during the completion of the questionnaire has written some 1) words, concepts related in some way (with precision or only vaguely) to the Internet censorship; or 2) he/she has clearly hinted or insinuated through some jokes that he/she is aware of freedom of speech issues within the Chinese cyberspace ( for example, a respondent has written “The Chinese Internet would be perfect, if I had not to climb a wall sometime” ) or lastly, 3) the respondent has written that some specific websites in China are not allowed even if he/she is happy with the overall Chinese experience; then in these circumstances, I have included all these answers in a table called “censorship perception related”. This table can give a quick picture of the focal point of the questionnaire, i.e. through this table we can understand whether the Chinese respondents are aware of 148
something different related to the freedom of contents, or freedom of speech within the Chinese cyberspace.
Are the respondents aware of the Internet censorship now that they have experienced a free cyberspace in Europe? Do they perceive that there are evident differences concerning the freedom of speech and the access to information when they compare the Chinese Internet dimension with another one? Through this table, we can understand whether the Chinese respondent who now live in Italy is able to feel the concept of censorship. Thanks to the previous tables we were able to understand whether the respondent is able to perceive many kinds of discrepancies: technical ones and related to their personal taste, for example. The most important aspect of this table is that we can immediately understand whether the respondent is able to grasp only those differences that are the focus of this thesis: the Internet censorship or the fact to be monitored within their own Internet experience or, at least, the fact to have not the possibility to surf several foreign websites.
The 76.8% of the respondents do not perceive any differences or issues related to the Internet censorship. They do not feel that the Chinese cyberspace is more or less controlled than any foreign Internet in the rest of the world; and this is quite disconcerting if we consider that they now can benefit from an open Internet dimension.
Only the 21.2% of the sample was clearly aware of the presence of some sort of censorship, or at least some specific restrictions for some foreign websites, as we have seen above, like Facebook. Lastly, only one respondent did not specify any concepts or words related to the Internet censorship. 149
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This chart is controversial: I have crossed the Internet perception table with the time of stay in Italy. It is difficult to comment at a first glance, but we can explain it, as mentioned at the beginning of this analysis, like a process in which at the beginning the value of the perception increases, then it reaches its maximum peak between “2 to 5” years of staying in a new country. Further, after some years, “from 6 to 10” years, it normalizes and then it collapses after 10 years of permanence in a new dimension. Only 4 respondents out of 50 who have stayed in Italy more than 10 years were able to perceive the Internet censorship in China, but we can understand this value by considering that, as already mentioned before, after so many years that they have lived in Italy, they are so accustomed to this situation that they probably do not pay attention to any discrepancy with the past. Furthermore, often, those who live permanently in Italy since so many years, that they do not usually come back to China and consequently they do not compare the two dimensions. The higher values of awareness are visible in the subcategories “from 2 to 5” years and from “6 to 10” years. Probably because these respondents live since a few years in Italy and they feel the difference with a higher level of sensibility than any other Chinese who has been living since more time. The value of 2 out of 16 of the subcategory “up to 1 year” might mean that the respondents is still not accustomed to the new Internet dimension yet or he/she has not still tested a lot the new open Internet yet that he/she is not able to perceive the previous restrictions.
154
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US, Europe 2 6
US 7 1 4
not specified 1 1 1 1
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Asia, US 2
Asia 2 2
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no not answered yes not specified
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countries and therefore he/she is accustomed to compare two or more Internet dimensions. We have not solid data but if we consider the first level of the chart “Us, Europe” we can understand that 6 out of 8 respondents who visit American and European websites are aware of the Chinese Internet censorship restrictions. Then, 2 out of 4 (the 50%) respondents who visit Asian websites are able to perceive the Internet censorship in China. On the contrary, only 27 out of 133 respondents who usually do not visit foreign websites, but only Chinese ones, are able to perceive concepts related to the Internet restrictions issues. We have to say that we would need more data to validate these hypothesises.
1.7 Chinese respondents still living in China
Preliminary annotation: I have to point out that the questions conceived for the Chinese respondents living in China are very similar to the questions for the Chinese community of Italy, or logically adapted to the different location in which the survey has been carried out. It is important to emphasize that the distribution of the surveys in Italy has been performed by hand and the consequent negotiation to fill in the questionnaires was conducted with a “face to face” approach. On the contrary, I had employed an email distribution process for the distribution of the surveys in China. Further, it is newsworthy to point out that the question number 7 that we are going to examine in this section is not present in the survey conducted in Italy. Through this question, I asked the respondents to give some suggestions in order to improve the Internet experience in China. This 156
question is very important because I have tried to find out, from a different perspective, whether the respondents are able to perceive some freedom of speech issues in his/her country, without, also in this case, giving any of my prejudices and biases.
Questionnaire about your Internet behavior
(CHINESE LIVING IN CHINA)
Please, send back the questionnaire to
Male/Female Age
Education level Job
Area in which you live (city, suburbs, countryside)
Have you ever travelled outside your country?
1) How many hours a week do you spent on the Internet?
2) What type of websites do you visit most while surfing the web? (For example: News, Video sharing, web-shopping, Sports, Social networking, Blogs)
157
3) Are you a blog follower? If yes, which one?
4) Do you use social networks to stay in touch with friends? If yes, which one?
5) Do you usually use search engines to find information on the Internet? If yes, which search engine?
6) What kind of topics do you usually search through search engines?
7) How could your web experience be improved in your country? What would you suggest?
8) Do you surf foreign websites? If yes, in which country?
9) Do you think that your web experience is similar to the ones of the other countries? Better or worse? Why better? Why worse?
158
1.8 Data Analysis of the Chinese sample living in China
1.8.1 Gender of the sample
Gender Totale %
f 103 51,8%
m 96 48,2%
Total 199 100%
Tab. 1A
The other sample concerning the respondents of the Province of Zhejiang living currently in China is composed of 199 people. The 51.8% of the sample is female, the 48.2 is male: both two samples have a very similar gender distribution.
1.8.2 Age Classes of the sample
Age classes Totale %
Up to 19 years old 7 3,5%
From 20 to 30 y 124 62,3%
From 31 to 40 y 46 23,1% 159
From 41 to 50 y 10 5,0%
More than 50 y 12 6,0%
Total 199 100%
Tab. 2A
For the sample of Chinese living in China, the majority of the respondents, with the 62.3% of the sample, come, as in the other sample, from the class “20 to 30” and, in the second place, we find the category “31 to 40”. Therefore, it has been important to have almost the same distribution in the first two positions in order to better compare the results, having at least some homogeneous values. In this sample, we have only 7 respondents under 19 years old in comparison with the 14 respondents under the same age for the Chinese sample living in Italy. There are no significant differences for the category “more than 50 years” as we have the 6% for the Chinese living in China and 8.1% for the Chinese living in Italy. We have a relevant difference if we consider the class age “ 41-50 “ as only the 5% (10 out of 199) of the Chinese respondents belongs to this category in comparison with the 11.1% (22 out of 198) of the Chinese living in Italy. We have to underline that the respondents with more than 41 years are 22 (10+12, see above) out of 199 in the Chinese sample of China and in Italy 38 (22+16) out of 198, almost the double ratio. As I have mentioned above, these discrepancies in the age class, for example in this case, and in others, concerning the level of education, as we will see, let us understand how much we have to be cautious if our purpose is to compare the two samples. 160
1.8.3 Education level of the sample
Education level Totale %
degree 184 92,5%
high school 14 7,0%
primary school 1 0,5%
Total 199 100%
Tab. 3A
The differences with the Italian sample are here crucial as the 92.5% of the respondents of this sample has a degree (as mentioned above, under the class degree we have college, bachelor, master and PhD) in comparison with the 31.3% of the Italian sample. Unfortunately, it has been impossible to collect more questionnaires from people with other education levels. Probably because in China only those respondents with a higher level of education were interested in participating in this research; or interested in having the possibility to talk and express their opinion in support of or against the government (Some of the answers collected - 3 out of 199 - from this sample were openly in support of the government’s restrictions). In addition, only the respondents with a higher level of education had less fear of talking about this topic. Another hypothesis can be referred to the fact that only those respondents that own a degree in China have that sensitiveness and that cultural capability that both let them understand complex and not very defined concepts as censorship and freedom of speech 161
in an authoritarian society. It is interesting to notice that in an open society, in Italy for example, these problems were not detected. Indeed, among the 198 persons who filled in my survey, I met several people with middle or very low level of education who accepted to participate to my research. We need to consider this aspect and we have to take into account this different distribution considering the level of education also for future studies. It is worth underlining that in Italy it was easier to collect the surveys from people with different cultural levels. On the contrary, for the Chinese sample, even if I asked organizations and the Chinese living in Italy to let my questionnaire circulate also among persons or relatives with different ages and cultural levels living in China, at the end of the collection, the 92.5% of the Chinese sample had a degree and almost every Chinese with middle or low level of education did not want to participate in this research. We have to consider this aspect for our work and, if one of our task is to compare the results, we will have to take into account only homogenous samples, and, for example, consider only those respondents with the same level of education and age.
162
1.8.4 Education Level and gender differentiation
Level of education f % m % Total
degree 95 92,2% 89 93% 184
high school 8 7,8% 6 6% 14
primary school 0,0% 1 1% 1
Total 103 100% 96 100% 199
Tab. 4A
In tab. 4a, as it is possible to observe, there are no significant differences within this sample, if we compare the male and female counterparts.
1.8.5 Jobs of the sample
jobs Totale % employee 46 23,1% Student 30 15,1% Trade/Sales/investment 18 9,0% Various 18 9,0% IT industry 15 7,5% Education/teaching/University 13 6,5% Entrepeneur/Manager/Freelance 11 5,5% business/accounting/statistics 10 5,0% Food industry 8 4,0% 163
Government 7 3,5% medical industry 7 3,5% Hotel industry 6 3,0% Retired 5 2,5% Unemployed 4 2,0% not answered 1 0,5% Total 199 100%
Tab. 5A
This table above shows us the mirror of a multicolored job scenario of the Chinese respondents living in China. I have created some macro-categories and I have tried to include inside them all the different jobs that I registered as I did for the Italian sample. If we compare these jobs with the Chinese living in Italy counterpart, we can notice that here we have a more differentiated and richer picture. In Italy, the distribution of the results revolves around 2 macro-categories - food industry and students - and these two values jointly reach the 49.5% of the sample. Here, on the contrary, at the first place, we have “employee” with the 23.1% of the sample and in second position, with the 15.1% of the sample, the category “students”. Then, the situation is more complex and varied, as we can find in third place, with the 9% of the sample a category not present in the Italian sample: Trade/sales/investment. This shows us that the Chinese respondents living in China have a higher level of job, but it is logical because, as mentioned above, the 92.5% of the respondents have a degree in comparison 164
with the 31.3% of the Italian sample. Indeed, with the 7.5%, we have also the category “IT industry” with a higher value than the same category in Italy (3.5%). The category “Education/teaching/university is present here with the 6.5% of the sample (in Italy, 2%). On the contrary, the food industry is here represented by the 4% of the sample (In Italy we have this category at the first place with the 27.8% of the sample). Besides, the category “unemployed” has a lower ratio (2%), in Italy the 5.6%. Another category not present in Italy is “business/accounting/statistics” with the 5% of the sample. Therefore, we can notice through this table that the respondents of this sample benefit from better jobs and this mirrors their higher level of education in comparison with the Chinese living in Italy. The picture here is richer also because we are analyzing a more mature society that is modernizing its roots very fast. On the contrary, the respondents of the Italian sample have not only a lower ratio considering the highest levels of education, but they are also immigrants living in a foreign country and it is statistically common that the first generations cannot easily reach a deep and high level of social integration which is reflected by better jobs.
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1.8.6 Time spent on the Internet
Hours of Internet in a day Total % from 1 to 3 h a day 75 37,7% From 3 to 6 h a day 73 36,7% More than 6 h a day 43 21,6% Less than 1h a day 6 3,0% Not answered/not specified 2 1,0% Total 199 100%
Tab. 6A
In table 6a, we can observe the time spent on the Internet in a day. With almost the same results, with, respectively the 37.7% and 36.7% of the sample, the majority of the sample spends on the Internet from 1 to 3 hours a day and from 3 to 6 h a day. In Italy, the best result (with the 37.4% of the sample) was for the category 3 to 6 hours a day. Consequently, we have similar results. In Italy, the category “more than 6h a day” was about 28.3% of the sample in comparison with the 21.6% of the above sample. With these results, we can realize that the time of usage of the Internet is not proportional to the level of education as we have similar results between the two samples even though the respondents have a very different distribution in the education level.
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1.8.7 Most visited websites of the sample
Most visited websites Total % news 106 23,7% social 85 19,0% online shopping 74 16,6% Videos/TV/Movies 64 14,3% Videosharing 25 5,6% sports 22 4,9% Not specified entertainment 10 2,2% Other/various 9 2,0% Health/food 8 1,8% School/University 8 1,8% Videogames/games 8 1,8% Travels/Tourism 6 1,3% Culture 5 1,1% Music 3 0,7% real estate 2 0,4% Jobs ads/Professional Related 1 0,2% Other Various 1 0,2% Total 447 100%
Tab. 7A
In this table, we can observe the most visited websites of the respondents. At the first two places, we have the same categories (news and social) that we can find in the Italian sample, but with different ratio. Here “news” achieves 167
the 23.7% of the sample versus the 31.3% of the Italian sample and “social” in this table reaches the 19% of the sample in comparison with the 26.6% of the Italian one. At the third position, we have here “online shopping” with the 16.6% of the sample versus the value of 6.6% of the Italian sample. This is logical, as mentioned above, because in China, Chinese people use to buy any items at a very low price on websites like Taobao. In Italy, it is problematic to use the same Chinese online platforms with the same comfort and ease and Chinese are not well practiced with Ebay or Amazon also because they consider them not so cheap. As already mentioned, some Chinese agencies whose business is in Italy assist Chinese netizens in purchasing through Taobao from Italy. In addition, the customer can pick up the items within their stores in Italy.
Video sharing is here at the 5th place with the 5.6% of the sample and, on the contrary, in Italy, this category was at third position with the 18.1% of the sample. Probably, Chinese respondents living in Italy are more interested in sharing videos with their friends in China in order to continue to watch Chinese movies and videos also from Europe. This might mirror their need to stay in contact with their Chinese popular culture. Also in this table, it is interesting to notice that we do not meet substantial differences between the two samples even if the level of education is not homogenous.
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1.8.8 Most used search engines in China
Search engines Total % baidu 126 63,3% baidu, google 36 18,1% baidu, 360 13 6,5% google 7 3,5% 360 5 2,5% baidu, sogou 3 1,5% not specified 3 1,5% baidu, soso 2 1,0% baidu, sogou, soso 1 0,5% doesn't use 1 0,5% soso, 360 1 0,5% sougou 1 0,5% Total 199 100%
Tab. 8A
This table concerns the most used search engines in China. In order to analyze this table, we have to keep in mind that in the Italian sample, at the first place, we have Google with the 28.8% of the sample. Here, Google is used only by 7 out 199 respondents with a ratio of 3.5% of the whole sample. This means that when the majority of the Chinese respondents arrived in Europe, they decided to use a more open browser and not a Chinese restricted one. This is quite interesting and we can hypothesize that the “Italian” respondents have now the need to broaden their horizons 169
because they feel that if they search for information through Chinese search engines, the information is distorted or filtered. We are not sure about these conjectures, but it is evident the contrasting results in these two dimensions, also keeping in mind that for the Chinese sample the level of education is higher. In this table, at the first place, we find Baidu with the 63.3% of the sample. In Italy, Baidu is at the second place but with a collapsing value of 24.7% of the sample. At the second place, we have “Baidu and Google” with the 18.1% of the sample. This means that the respondents of this sample use both the search engines. In Italy, this ratio was 22.2%. Another very impressive aspect is that here we find that only the 0.5% of the sample does not use search engines. In Italy, quite strangely, we have a much higher value with the 14.6% of the sample. However, I have already explained this value by analyzing the level of education and the age of those Chinese respondents living in Italy that do not usually use search engines: they have a low level of education and their age is over 40 years old.
1.8.9 Most searched topics of the sample
search what Total % culture 11 4,0% Job search and Job information 23 8,3% lifestyle 42 15,2% news 51 18,4% not answered 2 0,7% online entertainment 47 17,0% 170
online shopping 14 5,1% politics 6 2,2% search nothing 1 0,4% social 1 0,4% sports 4 1,4% suggestions for the family 3 1,1% technology 5 1,8% travels 11 4,0% university and learning materials 15 5,4% various but not specified 41 14,8% Total 277 100%
Tab. 9A
What do Chinese living in China search through these search engines? The first aspect that I have noticed from this table is that at the first position we have with 18.4% of the sample the subcategory “news”: in Italy, the category “news” gets the 12.7% and it is at the second position. In second place, here, we have “online entertainment” with the 17% of the sample (In Italy 10.3%). At the third place, Lifestyle with the 15.2% of the sample (In Italy 21.3% and it was at the first place). This might mirror the need of the Chinese who live in Italy to take care of more futile aspects of life once they now live in the West, outside an authoritarian regime. We have also to consider that the Italian sample includes many levels of education and probably the respondents with middle and low levels of education are more interested in shallow aspects of life than those respondents with a degree. Nonetheless, the two ratio are not so different and therefore this aspect 171
might be not related to the education level. In fourth position, we can observe the category “Various but not specified” with the 14.8% of the sample (in Italy 10.7%). This might tell us that the Chinese respondents living in Italy are less afraid to declare what they use to search for. With 8.3% and 8.9%, we have almost the same results for “job search” and we can observe the same values when we analyze the sub-category “university and learning materials” with 5.4% (in China) and 5.2% (in Italy) of the sample. As in the previous table, we have a puzzling value of 10% of the Italian sample who does not search anything on the Internet in comparison with the 0.4% of the Chinese living in China. I would have expected the opposite result, but this comparison might be misrepresented as the very different level of education of the two sample. To compare this value, we have to take into account homogenous samples with the same level of education and age.
1.8.10 Most used social network sites and social apps
social network Total % qq 132 43,9% wechat 122 40,5% doesn't use 9 3,0% renren 8 2,7% microblogging 5 1,7% yy 4 1,3% blog 3 1,0% msn 3 1,0% not specified 3 1,0% 172
facebook 2 0,7% fetion 2 0,7% weibo 2 0,7% baidu hi 1 0,3% campus network 1 0,3% linkedin 1 0,3% skype 1 0,3% tencent 1 0,3% yahoo message 1 0,3% Total 301 100%
Tab. 10A
This table shows which social apps or websites are the most used ones by the Chinese respondents living in China. In this category, we have almost a split with the 43.9% of the respondents who prefers using QQ, and with the 40.5% of the respondents who usually chooses WeChat. In Italy, the results were almost the same; at the first place, we had WeChat and in the second QQ. The main difference with Italy, quite obviously, is that here Facebook has a 0.7% ratio, while on the contrary in Italy, it is employed by 36 out of 198 respondents (18.18%). In Italy, Facebook is at the third position and this aspect can be interpreted as the need of the Chinese respondents living in Italy to use a more open and not Chinese platform. This condition and the fact that in Italy the respondents are aware of specific websites not allowed in China are intriguing factors that reflect the need and the demand of these respondents to broaden their views and horizons. 173
1.8.11 Blogs usage of the sample
Blogs Total % no 125 62,8% yes 74 37,2% Total 199 100%
Tab. 11A
This table mirrors the utilization of blogs in Chinese cyberspace. Even in this case, the majority of the respondents do not follow a blog as in Italy. In Italy, the ratio about those respondents who do not follow a blog is higher but we have always to consider the level of education. In any case, these two tables related to blogs show us that the old blog structure has been abandoned and the more modern Sina Weibo platform is the most preferred one, as we will observe in the interviews analysis.
1.8.12 Suggestions from the respondents to improve the Internet in China
Could your web experience be improved Total % doesn't know 10 5,0% no 55 27,6% not answered 4 2,0% yes 130 65,3% Total 199 100%
Tab. 12A 174
With this table, I have tried to grasp whether the web experience of the respondents is satisfactory or it has some issues. Even in this case, I could not present a closed question by giving some of my prejudices because those respondents with a high nationalistic spirit would have never answered or if I had mentioned concepts as “Internet restrictions”, the respondents probably would have been annoyed or even scared by the question. Therefore, I asked vaguely whether the Internet in their country might be improved or not. Strangely, the 65.3% of the sample answered “yes”. We have to underline that, as it happened in the Italian sample, when I asked whether they think that their new Internet dimension is different in comparison with the previous one, in these results it is not ascertainable that the respondents are referring to “freedom of speech issues” or to “Internet restrictions”. Indeed, as we have observed and will see in this case, many of the answers are related to technical issues (speed, fees) and not to freedom issues. However, I have realized that a research has to go gradually when the fieldwork is focused on Chinese matters. Nothing is taken for granted. The researcher should remember to not ask too much to Chinese people, otherwise, he/she will lose their trust. Therefore, we have to be satisfied with the little we can achieve. Then, with the 27.6% of the sample, several respondents answered that their web experience in China is already satisfactory and it does not need any improvement. The 5% of the sample does not know how to answer and the 2% did not answer.
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1.8.13 Suggestions in detail
What do you suggest Total % different speed or different technical/costs aspects perception 99 48,1% different taste content 15 7,3% doesn't know 10 4,9% General censorship perception 22 10,7% not specified/not answered 60 29,1% Total 206 100%
Tab. 13A
In Tab. 13A, I have asked the respondents to give some suggestions in order to improve the Chinese web experience. Even in this case, I have included all the answers and comments about this question within macro-categories similar to the ones used in the Italian sample when I asked the dissimilarities that they could perceive in their new Internet experience. The majority of the respondents with the 48.1% answered that the main issues refer to technical aspects, as these respondents need more broadband speed, cheaper fees or websites better visually structured. The 29.7% of the sample was not able to specify how the Chinese Internet could be improved even though they answered that it definitely needs to improve and some respondents did not answer. The 7.3% of the respondents have declared that they do not like the current style of the Chinese platform, but they prefer other kind of websites: some told me that in China, the websites are too much colored and confused and that abroad websites look more professional. Other respondents complain that Chinese netizens are rude and uncivilized. 176
Therefore, this last sub-category refers to the “taste differences” perceived by the users. Then, with the 4.9% of the respondents, we have “doesn’t know”. It is important to underline that only the 10.7% of the respondents complain about their web experience because they clearly perceive that in China the Internet is not open, or there is no freedom of speech and the information is filtered at the source. We have to mention that in all these answers, nobody has ever mentioned that in China it is not possible to visit specific foreign websites as YouTube or Facebook, but they refer to more extensive and general issues as, for example, freedom of speech and distorted access to information. This aspect shows us that their need to surf these specific forbidden websites is not an issue: probably because they have never surfed these websites and they do not know their existence or most probably because they use the Chinese counterparts conceived to prevent the employ of circumvention tools as Tor, as we have explored in the last modality of control in chapter 5.
1.8.14 Surfing other countries
other countries Total % Asia 9 4,5% Asia, US 2 1,0% Asia, US, Europe 1 0,5% Europe 9 4,5% Europe, US 3 1,5% no 135 67,8% not answered 5 2,5% not specified 6 3,0% 177
US 29 14,6% Total 199 100%
Tab. 14A
This table shows us how much the Chinese respondents who live in China surf foreign websites in other countries. The 67.8% of the respondents do not surf abroad and if we compare this result with the data collected in the Italian sample (In Italy, Chinese respondents answered that the 58,6% surf only Chinese websites) we have a substantial difference that mirrors a more open situation in Italy. Probably, in Europe, the Chinese respondents feel freer to surf without too many worries to be controlled and monitored. It is interesting also to notice that the 14.6% of the sample surfs American websites. This aspect means that they probably use in some circumstances some kind of circumvention tools as Tor.
1.8.15 Perception of discrepancies between the Chinese Internet and the rest of the world
Differences between Chinese Internet and the rest of the world Total % doesn't know 72 36,2% No difference 23 11,6% not answered 5 2,5% different 99 49,7% Total 199 100%
Tab. 15A 178
The most critical aspect in this table refers to the fact that the 36.2% of the sample does not know whether there are differences between the Chinese cyberspace and other Internet dimensions. In Italy, the respondents have answered with a ratio of 19.7% of the sample and this might show us a greater awareness of the discrepancies in the Italian sample. We have also to underline that the value of 36.2% mirrors a situation in which in China it is difficult to compare two Internet dimensions properly for two reasons. Firstly, the majority of the Chinese living in China do not surf abroad for cultural, language and technical barriers, secondly many foreign websites are not allowed if you do not use a circumvention tool. It is also compelling that the 49.2% of the respondents is aware that in China the Internet experience is different from any other situations. Even in this table, we have to emphasize that this value refers to manifold factors and aspects. It is not always related to concepts as censorship and freedom of speech, but it is anyhow a very striking data because the Chinese respondents living in China are aware that the Chinese web experience is peculiar and it owns contradistinctive characteristics in comparison with the rest of the world. If we compare this last result with the 39.4% of the Italian sample, we can say that these two data are puzzling as we would expect that the perception of some differences should be higher in the Italian sample. Nevertheless, further studies - which shall include two more homogeneous samples with almost the same level of education classes and/or almost the same age classes - are needed to validate these data. We can make the same considerations if we take into account the “no difference” category, here the ratio of those respondents who answered “no difference” is 11.6%, showing us that only few respondents do not perceive discrepancies between China and the rest of the world. In the Italian sample, we have a huge jump to a 179
value of 40.4%. We have to remember again that the discrepancies that are noticed by the Chinese respondents are varied and not always related to concepts as censorship and Internet regulations. The majority of the respondents living in China complain about the low speed of the Chinese broadband, for example. Besides, we have again to underline that as the two samples are not homogenous about the level of education, these preliminary comparisons must be interpreted. For example, in the Italian sample, 43 respondents with a degree out of 61 (the 70,4%) are able to discern that there are differences between and China. However, we will come back later for a reasoned and logical comparison of these values.
1.8.16 Perceived discrepancies and gender differentiation
Differences between Chinese Internet and the rest of the world f % m Total doesn't know 36 35,0% 36 37,5% 72 no 10 9,7% 13 13,5% 23 not answered 3 2,9% 2 2,1% 5 yes 54 52,4% 45 46,9% 99 Total 103 100,0% 96 100,0% 199
Tab. 16A
In this table, we can observe the distribution of the answers taking into account the gender differentiation. There are no significant discrepancies, except the ratio of the values related to “no difference” and “different” category. We can notice that female respondents perceive more that there are differences with other countries (52.4% vs 46.9%) and the male 180
respondents think that there are no difference with a slightly higher ratio (13.5% vs 9.7%). The other results are similar.
1.8.17 Discrepancies in detail
Specify the differences Total % different speed or different technical/costs aspects perception 38 18,6% different taste content 29 14,2% doesn't know/never compared/only surfed in one country 71 34,8% General censorship perception 24 11,8% no perception of censorship/similar experience/almost the same 22 10,8% not specified/not answered 19 9,3% Specific censorship perception (youtube/google) 1 0,5% Total 100%
Tab. 17A
With this table, I have asked to specify which discrepancies they are able to perceive if they compare their Chinese web experience with one or more foreign Internet dimensions. Obviously, with the 34.8% of the sample, we can notice that several respondents do not know how to answer. This for three main reasons : 1) the respondent has never surfed another foreign cyberspace for cultural/language, or technical and legal reasons (plenty of foreign websites are forbidden; others are so difficult to visit as from China the connection towards the rest of the world can have often very low speed) and therefore the user is not able to compare two or more Internet situations. 2) the respondent is afraid of answering for fear to be controlled and punished 3) the respondent, as his/her web experience is limited (for 181
example he/she uses the Internet only for entertainment) , is not able to perceive any differences. At the second place, with the 18.6% of the sample, the respondents are able to perceive only technical discrepancies, as different Internet speed or different costs. In third position, with the 14.2% of the sample, the respondents are aware that in the other countries the Internet is different for its structure, its style. For example in China, the web is richer and more colorful and, on the contrary, they think that abroad has a more professional looking. Then with almost the same values, we have 11.8% for the category “general censorship perception” and with 10.8% “no perception of censorship. The first category that I have mentioned has a ratio similar to the Italian sample (10.1%). The category “no perception of the censorship/almost the same” has here 10.8% and if we compare this value with the Italian counterpart (35.9%) we have a huge difference. As I mentioned before, I think that this comparison is misleading for some reasons: 1) the two samples considered have a different distribution about the level of education (see above), then several “Italian respondents” have been living in Italy since so many years that they are now so accustomed to the new dimension that they have probably forgotten the Chinese web experience or, lastly, they have never experienced the Chinese cyberspace as they have left China before the advent of the Internet. Therefore, we need to use caution when the sample are not so homogenous. It is better to continue to analyze this sample and the other one per se, and we will try to compare the two dimension only in some aspects or at the end of the chapter when I will take into account solely those respondents of both samples with very similar characteristics, i.e. with the same level of education. 182
The 9.3% of the sample did not want to answer, but in Italy, only the 0.9% did not answer ad this can mirror a more open disposability now that they do not live in an authoritarian regime. What it is crucial here to underline refers to the fact that in this table only the 0.5% of the sample is aware of a specific censorship perception, i.e. he/she knows that in China some specific websites are forbidden. In Italy, regardless their level of education, the 9.7% of the sample is aware that in Europe many websites as Facebook and YouTube are allowed unlike China.
1.8.18 Discrepancies in detail and gender differentiation
Specify the differences f % m % Total different speed or different technical/costs aspects perception 20 19,0% 18 18,2% 38
different taste content 16 15,2% 13 13,1% 29 doesn't know/never compared/only surfed in one country 35 33,3% 36 36,4% 71
General censorship perception 13 12,4% 11 11,1% 24 no perception of censorship/similar experience/almost the same 10 9,5% 12 12,1% 22
not specified/not answered 10 9,5% 9 9,1% 19 Specific censorship perception (youtube/google) 1 1,0% 0,0% 1
Total 105 100% 99 100% 204
Tab. 18A
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Also in this table, we have the gender differentiation. There are no significant differences to comment.
NB: We have to point out that I have not crossed the table “specify the differences” with the level of education class as I did in the Italian sample because the 92.5% of the respondents living in China have a degree. It would have been no methodologically significant to analyze the distribution of the values by taking into account the level of education of the other subcategory as high school and middle school.
1.8.19 Overall perception of the Internet censorship
Censorship perception related Total % no 113 56,8% yes 28 14,1% doesn't know 26 13,1% not specified 26 13,1% not answered 6 3,0% Total 199 100%
Tab. 19A
In this table, as in the Italian sample, we can have a fast summary through which we can have a wider vision of the respondents’ perception of censorship. This table sums up all the answers and comments related to the concept of Internet censorship collected during every questionnaire. I have taken into account all the sentences, words, concepts of every section of the survey that refer to concepts as the Internet censorship, freedom of speech, 184
filtered information. If a respondent has written something related to this kind of sensitive issues in any section/box of the questionnaire, I have included all his/her answers/comments in this table. The majority of the sample with the 56.8% is not able to perceive that in his/her web experience there are issues of freedom of speech and filtered information. The 13.1% of the sample does not know how to answer, probably for fear or embarrassment. The 3% of the respondents did not answer. It is observable an interesting value of 13.1% that it is difficult to analyze as in their answers the respondents were vague and nebulous. Several of them told that they do perceive that in China there are differences (some of them told me that there are “gaps”) but I could not include these answers in any of the other categories except in the “not specified” subcategory. Even, in this case, the respondents were probably aware of the issue but scared to declaring it, but it is only a conjecture at the current stage of this research. In Italy the subcategory “not specified” has a ratio of 0.5% and this mirrors a new situation in which the respondents feels freer to express his/her opinion and points of view. Then, the 14.1% of the respondents are aware that there are issues of freedom of speech in China, or that the Internet is controlled and monitored by the CCP and netizens are not free as in other countries. At the same time, we have also to underline an important aspect, as 3 out of 199 respondents of this sample agree with the current Internet restrictions of the government. Indeed, they have clearly declared in the survey that they support the restrictive government policies about the Internet. This can be related to the fact that some of the respondents work, as it is possible to see in the table about the job, for the government. In any case, it is an interesting value (almost the 1.5%). Lastly, for any comparison with the Italian sample, 185
it is better to take into account the category “degree” for both sample in the next section.
1.8.20 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and gender differentiation
Censorship perception f % m % Total doesn't know 15 14,6% 11 11,5% 26 no 57 55,3% 56 58,3% 113 not answered 3 2,9% 3 3,1% 6 not specified 13 12,6% 13 13,5% 26 yes 15 14,6% 13 13,5% 28 Total 103 100% 96 100% 199
Tab. 20A
Concerning the gender distribution about the previous table, we can see that there are no significant differences between the male and female counterpart.
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1.8.21 Overall perception of the Internet censorship and age classes distribution
Censorship Up to From 20 to From More perception 19y % 30 % From 31 to 40 % 41 to 50 % than 50 % Total
doesn't know 0,0% 8 6,5% 4 8,7% 7 70,0% 7 58,3% 26
no 3 42,9% 77 62,1% 26 56,5% 2 20,0% 5 41,7% 113
not answered 1 14,3% 3 2,4% 2 4,3% 0,0% 0,0% 6
not specified 3 42,9% 18 14,5% 4 8,7% 1 10,0% 0,0% 26
yes 0,0% 18 14,5% 10 21,7% 0,0% 0,0% 28
Total 7 100% 124 100% 46 100% 10 100% 12 100% 199
Tab. 21A
In this table, we can immediately examine the age classes of the respondents who answered the previous table about the Internet censorship. It is important to notice that those respondents who are aware of some discrepancies about the Internet censorship belong exclusively to two categories: from “20 to 30” years old and “31 to 40”, the same two categories of the Italian sample. Even in Italy, there were exclusively the same two age classes that were able to perceive the censorship within the Chinese cyberspace. This data is quite interesting because it is extrapolated from the category “level of education”. This might show us that only those generations with these ages are able to perceive these issues and probably, to be actors of change. Then, the majority of the respondents who did not answer, with the 14.3%, are in the category “up to 19”. It is logical, as this category is probably not ready and mature to answer to this kind of question. For the answer “doesn’t know”, the higher ratio can be found in the categories “41 to 50” and “over 50”. Also in this case, we have similar results with the Italian sample. Probably these respondents are not interested 187
in comparing the Chinese cyberspace with other Internet experiences, or they are not so accustomed to test and benefit deeply from the Internet possibilities. The “no” category is well distributed along all the categories.
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Chapter 3
Semi-structured interviews analysis
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Semi-structured interviews analysis
1 Introduction, methods, issues
In this chapter, we will delve into the analysis of four of the most significant interviews collected throughout 2014 for the fieldwork carried out in Italy. The purpose of this analysis is to validate some of the results obtained through the quantitative survey process and further to better develop an understanding of the overall comparison - in terms of Internet habits and online preferences - between the sample of Chinese immigrants living in Italy and the sample of Chinese still living in China. Moreover, the aim is always centered on the attempt to find a possible actor of change able to influence the current Chinese cyberspace from a social perspective after that a Chinese user will have benefited from a less restricted Internet dimension as the Italian one. The process of influencing their domestic Internet might be provoked by new demands and needs of those Chinese users who have experienced a more open Internet and who have started to benefit (consciously and unconsciously) from its democratic possibilities, as we will observe also in these interviews.
I have to point out that it has been a complicate and complex journey to find out a proper portion of Chinese people living in Italy eager to freely talk about their previous and current Internet experience. Only after many attempts and negotiations, has it been possible to collect some but only a few impressive interviews. It is important to emphasize that among the 10 interviews collected and recorded, only four of them were alluring and 190
inspiring for this research. The others, more banal and insignificant, were discarded as no element could arise from the conversation for the reluctance and awkwardness of the Chinese people that I have met to openly talk about the Internet, possible Internet restrictions affecting the Chinese cyberspace, politics and in general about their usual web experience. In some occasions, it was impossible even to record a single question and answer, as the respondent was embarrassed and afraid in replying and, further, he/she often decided to leave the conversation after the very preliminary moments of the interview in which I was asking some general and non-sensitive info as the job or the age.
It is worth emphasizing that the viewpoints and the ideas of the following respondents should not be considered as a definitive axiom, but scholars and researchers should take into account all the respondents’ thoughts as useful starting points for future and more deepening studies and analysis with similar purposes; also in order to validate the following opinions and declarations.
In addition, it is worth considering that the choice of the final group of interviewees, even in this case as it has occurred in the selection of the respondents in the survey process, has not been predetermined a priori as I had no possibility to choose the interviewees by following preset patterns of selection. It would have been methodologically more appropriate to have at my disposal multifaceted actors to interview, instead of having to include in my sample only those few persons that randomly were interested in participating at the interview process, but this mirrors a situation in which it has been very problematic to find out Chinese immigrants eager to be 191
interviewed. I have also to point out that I have found out my interviewees during the questionnaire process as in those occasions, during the filling of the survey, I noted some very few elements more sympathetic in answering my questions and in listening to the explanations concerning some parts of my research. During the 9/10 months of collection, I found out only eight Chinese persons who were more engrossed in my research and therefore I decided to propose them a further step as the semi-structured interviews. Eventually only two of them wanted to complete the interview, the others, as already mentioned, decided to quit already at the beginning, after the very first preliminary questions. Therefore, in order to have at least a decent number of interesting interviews to analyze, I was fortunate to record a third interview with the help of a friend of mine working in Turin as Italian teacher for Chinese people who introduced a Chinese student to me eager to be interviewed. Further, I had the possibility to record a fourth, last interview because of the desire of one of my intermediaries to strongly be interviewed. I decided to include his/her conversation within the analysis for three reasons: firstly, even though this person had assisted me in the distribution of my questionnaires, as I have already mentioned in the previous chapters, I had never explained to my intermediaries the purposes of my research in detail and the degree of the sensitiveness of my work. Therefore, this interviewee/intermediary has never realized any of my preliminary assumptions, possible biases and opinions on the topic and, most importantly, the specific scope of my research. Secondly, as it will be possible to note in the following pages, the importance and value of his/her interview could not be ignored, also because this respondent has worked for years inside a security Internet agency in Europe. Thirdly, he/she is the sole interviewee of the lot not aligned with the government’s policies and is 192
completely adverse to the Chinese Government’s Internet legislation; consequently, I could not overlook this significant conversation as my target was to achieve a broader and more complex vision of the Chinese moods and opinions concerning the Internet in China.
I will analyze the interviews collected by subdividing them in macro areas of concern. I will often quote the original part of the interview, as I believe that the direct words of the respondent are more explicative than any other comment or mental rumination and reflection. I have also to point out that through the interviews collected I have faced more deeply some of the contradictions arisen in the questionnaires. Lastly, I have also to point out that all the interviewees asked to remain completely anonymous and to omit even the gender. For this reason, the reader will not have the possibility to know whether a respondent is male or female. However, this does not spoil the whole analysis.
2 Issues in the distribution of the questionnaires: Trying to understand with the help of the interviewees the reason why the distribution of the quantitative questionnaires has been so difficult among the Chinese Community of Italy
The first topic that I have decided to analyze with the help of the interviewees was the issue of the distribution of the 197 questionnaires among the Chinese people living in Italy. Considering also future researches on a similar target, i.e. a Chinese community living in a foreign country, it is fundamental to better understand the reasons why it has been so arduous and complicate to collect the final amount of questionnaires. The negotiations for every single survey have always been complex and arduous and without 193
the help of some Chinese intermediaries (mostly students) who helped me in the distribution of the surveys, the entire fieldwork would have been almost impossible to organize. Therefore, through the interview process, it was crucial to try realizing the Chinese reluctance in answering to my simple questions and the reasons why the Chinese respondents were so quarrelsome and rude when I tried to explain my research task.
It is interesting how the Respondent A tackles the issue. “Well, I think this is a peculiarity of the typical Chinese mindset and personality. Ordinary, mostly uneducated, Chinese people always think, for example: “but, what do you want? This is not a problem of mine”; Or, “Can I gain something from this situation? If not, shove off”. Then usually, Chinese people common mentality is focused on making their own business and they are not interested in other aspects that do not concern or affect their life. Then, you have also to consider that the majority of Chinese people working in Italy does not speak your language very well and they often do not understand what you are saying if this is not related to simple matters as, for example, their job. They expect you to order a cup of coffee and nothing else more. However, this is not the overall situation of Chinese people…”. It is important also this part. It is always Respondent A who is speaking. “You have also to consider that we are Chinese…”aliens” in a foreign country; for us, the Italian language is very difficult to learn. Besides, Chinese are suspicious that some Italian can cheat because we cannot speak and understand Italian very well. It is a problem of language… also for this reason, we are closed with the others. We are afraid we are not able to understand what the others say. 194
It is here evident the common mentality of the typical Chinese with a low level of education living in a foreign country, i.e. mostly interested in his/her job: the Chinese do not want to have problems, they prefer living in the shadow of their business, without attracting too much the attention of the others. Further, we can observe also a problem of language. For Chinese, it is a sort of cultural and social barrier, which inhibits them to fully experience a different dimension. Respondent B reinforces the concept. “I think that Chinese people are very shy and closed. They think most of the times about their business, their job and they do not want you to disturb them for any other reason. I have also to say that this attitude is often proportional to their level of education, but in general, the Chinese mindset is made up in this way.
Concerning the problems that I have encountered for the distribution of the questionnaires, it has often happened that when I used to go into Chinese restaurants, pubs, shops to explain my research, there were rare circumstances in which some Chinese people were interested and compliant about my survey. However, when I used to ask them to bring other questionnaires to their families, friends, and colleagues in order to help me in the distribution of the surveys, they immediately became very reluctant and closed again. In those cases, they told me that they could even bring my questionnaire to their wife or sons, i.e. inside their families, but not to other Chinese even though they were friends, colleagues and acquaintances. Moreover, this fact happened many times.
Even though a recent research about the role of the “word of mouth” in China has established its importance in disseminating events and news 195
within the Chinese people living in China (Max Magni; Yuval Atsmon, 2010), it would seem, on the contrary, that Chinese immigrants living in Italy do not use the same kind of basic communication present in their Motherland to spread info verbally among groups of people. The concept of word of mouth which characterizes typical forms of social connection so useful for the transmission of information throughout the lowest levels of the societies seems to be not well developed within the Chinese immigrants’ communities that I have met. Further and related to this aspect, I have also reported during my fieldwork that it is very rare that Chinese people meet other Chinese in places as squares and specific places to talk about their job, lives, and problems; i.e. there are no evident forms of aggregation in the Chinese community, at least in Italy. On the contrary, if we consider, for example, the Filipino community, i.e. another large community of immigrants living in Italy, it is evident that it is much more connected as numerous groups of families use to meet in the squares of several Italian cities during specific days of the week (see for, example, the research on the Filipino Community and on the ways of communication within this specific culture by Deirdre McKay; 2007). Therefore, we can hypothesize a closure in the social organization of the Chinese community present in Italy in terms of social connections among the Chinese immigrants and in terms of their aggregation in public spaces.
This aspect is confirmed by Respondent D. In this short passage, when Respondent D is talking about what kind of topics most of the times Chinese prefer to talk together, he/she underlines that they do talk, but not in public. “You cannot say bad words on the current government in public,[my underlining] you cannot write an article, for example, on the Internet about 196
the government, but you can discuss about corruption of the local government, but always not in public but in private or within the Internet forums. The structure of the government is unquestionable, but you have a little freedom to talk about the rest now. In public, obviously, you cannot say bad word concerning the CCP. Further, Respondent D continues speaking about to what extent the polemics against the government are admitted. “For example, we can make jokes about the government within the Internet. It is ok in that case! No problem, but I repeat, you cannot speak in public about sensitive issues. And in general we are not accustomed to join together in squares and public places.”
Considering also these data, it seems that a good portion of Chinese families, living in Italy, is verbally disconnected and detached from other Chinese groups or “clan”. This aspect should be explored with greater depth as this might be an alluring point of analysis, probably fundamental, if we think about these difficulties in the lowest layers of the verbal communication and their crucial importance at the burgeon of any protest or possible social, cultural and political revolutions, as it occurred in the Arab Spring. For example, John D. Sutter has pointed out that “when the Egyptian government shut down the Internet for five days during the protests, people on the streets turned to word of mouth [my underlining added], or they just looked out windows to see what was happening” (Sutter, 2011). See also the research by Xiaolin Zhuo, Barry Wellmann, Justine Yu; 2011.
Respondent A gives here an explanation. “Chinese people are very formal, dignified and closed. They know that other Chinese would, most of the times, consider your surveys and your questions inappropriate and untoward and 197
therefore, in their understanding, it is better to refuse your request of distributing other questionnaires. In general, however, we are very shy and closed with other Chinese that we do not know well. We have, on the contrary, very tight family relations. Inside our families, that are often very large, we build a very limited circle of trust and if you stay outside of that circle, it is very difficult to enter. For this reason, I think, it is very arduous and complicate that, for example, news, a particular happening or, in your case, the distribution of a questionnaire can spread outside that circle. And probably also the “word of mouth” concept that you were referring before as one of the most basic ways of social transmission of information is very confined and limited to our family circle. Therefore, it is very problematic to think that some info can be disseminated through this verbal form of communication. Everything has changed, on the contrary, with the Internet revolution, which has brought a voice to millions of Chinese. Respondent B agrees with this vision by adding “Yeah, Chinese are more detached from the others even if they are Chinese… I think it is our way of being. Respondent D, on the contrary, has a different point of view “I don’t think that we are more detached or disconnected among us in comparison with other cultures. Surely, we are shy and closed, but my family and other families do use to meet as well, mostly when we lived in China. The difference, probably, is that we do not meet in public, but we prefer restaurants and closed spaces. And surely, we do not use to talk about politics or particular problematic topics with the other families, but I would not say that we are not connected through a sort of “offline” social network. It could be true in Italy, but in China it is different”. 198
Recovering the point of Respondent A about the difference in the verbal communication between the Chinese groups living in foreign countries and other cultures, he/she added above that things are different if we consider the deepness and the ramification of the online communication of the Chinese culture of the last ten years. The online discourse in China has developed its roots during the last years and nowadays it has become the predominant form of communication within the Chinese culture. Let us think about the role of chat-lines, forums and SNS in developing a shared social awareness in China and several e-petitions to try facing some social issues. We can validate this difference between the Chinese immigrants’ verbal communication and the online Chinese discourse also by taking into account how the fieldwork of collecting the questionnaires in China, through an email participation process, was easier and participants were more affable than those Chinese that I met in Italy face to face.
Another aspect to be considered for future researches with similar targets and topic is the fact that almost every respondent asked for a little remuneration for filling up the survey. It was a very usual behavior among the Chinese people during the collection of the questionnaire. Respondent B explains better the question. “For Chinese, time is money and consequently if you use my time you have to pay…very simple. Sometimes I have seen in China, researchers and scholars interested in studying our culture that give some little presents to Chinese people in order to better (laughs) focus their attention on the survey or interview. Respondent D reinforces the concept of the complexity of distributing the survey among the Chinese and their need to be paid. “I think that there are two main reasons: one is that a Chinese usually doesn’t do anything for nothing. For 199
example, even if you were my friend, I would ask to be paid to help you. Then, secondly, we have a very tight and close circle of friends and relatives. Only inside that circle, we use to talk and even if they are close relatives, we do not want them to be embarrassed by inappropriate questions.
Respondent C is able to sum up all the considerations collected so far about the complexity in the distribution of the questionnaires and the struggles in convincing them to fill in the survey. “I think that there are four main reasons: firstly, Chinese do not speak Italian very well and they often do not understand what you are saying. Secondly, the majority of the Chinese came here through a flux of illegal immigration and they are afraid that you are a sort of police officer, or you work for the government. Thirdly, it is also true that we Chinese live permanently in a sort of “defense position”. We expect that the others, mostly, foreigners fool us…so we do not want to open ourselves with the others… and another reason… if Chinese know that they will not gain something from that situation, they are not interested in knowing what you are saying.”
The conversation with Respondent C was very open and frank and in his/her opinion the main reasons for the complexity in collecting the surveys revolve around the fact that in Italy Chinese people walk on a precarious tightrope because they are often illegal immigrants whose job might have some problems with the regulations of the country. “It is not only a problem related to the fact that you are Italian. When a Chinese observes a survey, he thinks that you want to know something about his/her job, money, life. A Chinese may think that you are interested in knowing more about his/her 200
taxes, for example, and Chinese entrepreneurs are often tax evaders, as many Italian entrepreneurs we have to underline…but additionally, a Chinese has probably come to Italy though an illegal flux, as I have already mentioned, and so things are even more complicated. You have to consider a Chinese restaurant boss, for example: probably, his/her business does not often meet every Italian regulations about health and food and about all the employment contracts of his/her employees that most of the times work off the records. Further, this person does not know your language very well; further, he/she is a tax evader, as said before. In addition, he/she probably breaks his/her back every day of his/her life to earn something for his/her family…and then you come and ask him/her to fill in a questionnaire… you are not talking to a literate university student.
Comments
The complexity in the distribution of the surveys in Italy concerns some main reasons: the majority of the Chinese respondents living in Italy do not have a very high level of education. Further, a good portion of Chinese living in Italy came to this country through an illegal immigration flux and now that they work in Italy, they often work in precarious conditions. For example, they work off the records; if they have a business, their commercial activity does not meet most of the times the regulations of the country in which it has been established. Often, Chinese entrepreneurs do not respect many labor laws and they are sometimes tax evaders. Therefore, 201
often respondents think that the researcher might be a police officer or an employee of the government whose task is investigating about their business. All the mentioned reasons do not concern with the peculiar Chinese culture but the issue is more related to the fact that they are immigrants in a foreign country; immigrants that are not still socially and culturally integrated with the new society yet. Probably, if future researches about this topic were carried out in a society in which Chinese people had a higher level of education or/and a more rooted social dimension, the collection of the questionnaire would be easier and less problematic.
I have still some doubts about the fact that the Chinese respondents wanted to be paid and further studies are needed. I am not sure whether this aspect does concern the overall Chinese culture or it is related to a low level of education. It is important to underline that also the Chinese respondents living in China (and, there, they had a much higher level of education as more than 90% of the sample had a degree and further they were not immigrants but citizens of a rooted society) requested to be paid.
Last important aspect to be considered for future researches is related to the above-mentioned issue in the Chinese immigrants’ verbal communication. Surely, further studies are needed to validate this difference in the verbal communication and in the problematics in assembling in public spaces, but my fieldwork in Italy might be important to put the first stone about this peculiarity. As some of the interviewees have confirmed, it is easier to share a survey through an email participation process, for example, than through the “word of mouth”. Indeed, I myself have noticed that it is almost impossible that a Chinese might bring a questionnaire by hand to other 202
friends and colleagues. These assumptions can be useful for a future quantitative research, in which it will be more convenient to distribute the questionnaires online. Also a research concerning the political engagement of Chinese people can benefit from what has emerged during these interviews, moreover, about the discrepancies in the aggregation modalities in public spaces, for example, in comparison with other cultures.
3 Blogs and microblogging: lost in translation
A very peculiar and intriguing aspect of the interviews concerns the part dedicated to the current blog’s popularity in China and among the Chinese living in Italy. It is worth emphasizing the issue I have encountered because it lets the reader realize how the role of the translator and of the researcher can be complex as they always should work tightly and try to not only dwell on specific words but analyze the whole concept that the word that we have to translate refers. Indeed, when I asked the Chinese teacher to translate the word “blog”, he did but, as it will be possible to observe below, there was a misunderstanding as that word is related to a concept that has been almost abandoned by Chinese nowadays. It was not an error of the translator, but a mistake related to the fact that often a concept of a specific cultural and social dimension, in this case the Chinese cyberspace, is very hard to be translated into a concept that is not present in another foreign dimension or, as in this case, it is only similar, as microblogging. I could realize my mistake only when I was interviewing the Respondent A and I was asking him/her whether he/she uses to follow a particular blog. Here, his/her reply. 203
“I don’t follow a blog neither here, nor in China…I use to follow Sina Weibo, a platform in which you can find a lot of blogs of friends but also of other important people. I do not follow a blog in particular. Sina Weibo is a social website in which you can find several persons and personalities. It is like Facebook and Twitter but it has some of the characteristics of the old blog structure.”
I was not able to grasp the difference between our European and American version of the blog and Sina Weibo. Even during the analysis of my questionnaires, the majority of the Chinese answered that they do not follow a blog. As I have studied the Chinese Internet culture since some years, this was a strange result, as I have always known that blogs were an important phenomenon of the Chinese cyber-culture. Respondent A was able to explain the misunderstanding. “We do follow blogs but not a personal blog now…not a specific blog… the act of following a personal blog of a specific personality happened some years ago not now. For this reason, I believe that the majority of Chinese answered that they do not follow a blog. Because nowadays, Chinese do not follow a specific blog…we visit social websites, the most famous is Sina Weibo, in which you can find many blogs and you can read a lot of stuff in there but not a specific blog of a particular person.
Evidently, it was a problem of translation and of matching two different concepts. The question in my survey, “你有在跟随某个博客吗？如果有
，是哪一个？” was not able to mirror a picture of the current Chinese cyberspace. Indeed Respondent A clarified the issue when he/she read the 204
question: “yes, I see… in this question, you talk about a particular blog… With 博客, the majority of Chinese, in my opinion, would think that you want to know whether they follow a specific or personal blog. If I had to answer to your question too, I would think that you are referring to the act of following a particular and specific blog of a person or, better, that you are referring to the daily act of using the Internet with the specific purpose of following a personal blog. Is it clear? We do follow blogs now, but not a particular one… we use to visit Sina Weibo and then, from there, we scroll pages randomly and we give a look at some blogs but not a specific one… I think that this is the difference between a blog and microblogging. I think that the concept of blog you are referring is an old and abandoned way for us, Chinese, to think about blogs. Now we use microblogging.
Even if the question had been translated by a young Chinese mother tongue and we had talked a lot about every single question before publishing the final translated questionnaire, there was a misunderstanding in relating two different concepts as blog and microblogging. Respondent A reassured me that it was not a problem with the translation. ”The translation is not wrong. If you ask me to translate the word blog, in this case 博客 is correct. However, blogs are not so popular nowadays in China. The word you are referring is not a current social phenomenon but it is the mirror of a form of e-communication of some years ago. 微博 (microblogging) is what we use to visit now and 新浪微博 (Sina Weibo) is the most famous platform of this kind.
This was a crucial point because I could realize how difficult the translation can be although the translator is a mother tongue. I think that, in this case, 205
there were some misunderstandings because here in Europe, we do not use, and probably we do not still have yet what the respondent call “microblogging” but we are still anchored to the old blog structure. Respondent A added “ yeah… the problem here is that probably Chinese people were not able to associate the word blog 博客 with the current and more used concept of microblogging. But, I have to say that I myself would have done the same wrong interpretation of the word. Sina Weibo is a hybrid between Facebook, Twitter… You can also find some similarities with the old blog structure but the overall experience is very different from the old blog. It is more dynamic, faster and interactive with the followers when they visit that particular webpage.
Respondent B was more direct in the conversation and outspoken in his/her speech. Here below, we can observe his/her point of view about blogs. “ah, blogs… old stuff, you know… ancient times… ah ah (laughs) Chinese run faster with technology… now we have microblogging… Sina Weibo is the most famous website of this kind. But blogs…no, absolutely… 7/8 years ago, even 10 years maybe we used blogs but now they have been almost abandoned. If you have to study the evolution of the social media historically is fine, but if your task is focused on the present time…forget blogs!
206
Comments
I think that this part of the interviews is very intriguing because it lets you grasp how a translation can be difficult and can put at risk the targets that the researcher had set at the beginning of the design process of the semi structured interviews. Fortunately, in my case, the focus of the questionnaires was not about blogs and therefore, my fieldwork has not been spoiled by this misunderstanding. On the contrary, this issue in the translation and in relating two slightly different concepts has been a warning for future studies about this topic. This part of the interview was methodologically fundamental because when the researcher has to compare two different cultures and two concepts that belong to one dimension but not to the other one, he/she shall pay attention and should not delegate his/her work of interpretation to a mother tongue translator, but they have to work closely together.
4 Chinese websites from China: the most preferred cyberspace
One of the most peculiar aspect experienced during the analysis of the questionnaires was that the majority of the respondents preferred surfing Chinese websites of their motherland. In order to better understand the reasons why, here below, it is possible to ascertain this close-minded behavior in the Internet experience and how a Chinese user is often detached from the society in which he/she lives now, in this case Italy. For example, 207
Respondent A underlines this aspect in one passage. “At first place, I continue to surf Chinese websites also from here, in second place, I prefer visiting foreign websites and lastly I rarely visit Italian websites for the university, for example. I use international websites, in English mostly, in order to book a flight or for a hotel room. However, I prefer using Chinese websites for all the rest. And from China it is quite the same situation… I use international websites in English for example www.booking.com but for the all rest I prefer surfing Chinese websites.
I asked whether this fact was related to a language barrier and the respondent A confirmed my assumption “ yeah…above all for the language but also because some info and news about our culture, our interests, our way of being Chinese cannot be found on the majority of the foreign websites. There are aspects of our culture and society that you can find only in Chinese or Korean websites. And then, also the structure of websites, their configuration, their colors are in my opinion better within the Chinese websites.
In Respondent’s B understanding, the fact of visiting mostly Chinese websites of China will weaken in the next Chinese generation who will come to live in foreign countries. “I think that the first generations of Chinese living in Europe will continue preferring Chinese websites for language reasons. The majority of Chinese who came to Europe many years ago has a not very high level of education and therefore they do not know Italian or English very well. I think that the next Chinese generations surely will be more integrated with this society and, with the passing of time, they 208
will start visiting always with greater frequency the websites of the country in which they live.
For example, Respondent B has a high level of education, he/she is a master degree student, and he/she speaks Italian very well. Further, her/his approach to the problem of the language within Internet is less fundamentalist and indeed he/she does use different Internet dimensions with easiness. “I teach Italian to Chinese people so I sometimes prefer visiting Italian websites in order to find info about Italy, to prepare a lesson. Then, I know also English very well so it is not a problem for me to visit other foreign websites. As I have the possibility to read in Italian, English, Spanish and Chinese, I prefer searching for a particular topic in its original language. I explain myself better: If I have to search for an Italian personality, I will use Italian search engines. If I have to search something related to China, I will use Chinese websites. I think that, in these cases, the information is more accurate.
Respondent C gives us an explanation about the fact that Chinese prefer surfing Chinese websites hosted in China. “Well, you know, I think the main issue here is the language and secondly the way that the Chinese Internet is configured and structured. Chinese websites are more colorful, have more pictures and links. In general, the web experience in China is visually more addictive. Why should ordinary Chinese people change their way in using the Internet if they have already what they need? They have the Chinese counterpart of every famous western social network, for example…why should they change something in their Internet experience? 209
And Respondent D has the same opinion: “I use mostly Chinese websites and the Italian ones only for necessity; for example if I had to buy a house! I think that the main problem with the other Internet dimensions is the language. For us, it is difficult to learn other languages. Respondent A confirms that Chinese do use Italian websites or the websites of the country in which they live only for necessity. “yeah…most of the times I use foreign or Italian websites only for these reasons, when I need… in all the other circumstances, I nearly always prefer Chinese websites, except when I watch American Tv series.”
Comments
The fact of surfing mostly Chinese websites hosted in China is related to two main reasons: the first one and more obvious cause is the language. A typical Chinese user does not often speak other languages so well to appreciate foreign contents. Further, we have to emphasize that the Chinese Internet experience is quite different in comparison with the European or the American cyberspace. This aspect has arisen often during the surveys, as Chinese websites are, most of the times, more colorful, richer, with many links towards other websites. Further, there are more pictures, more animated images to click. The overall Chinese Internet experience is more carnivalesque and kitsch. This also confirms the recent studies of Harsh Taneja and Angela Xiao Wu (2014) through which it has been demonstrated that usually Chinese users prefer visiting “websites they find culturally proximate and consequently access blockage matters only when these particular websites are blocked”. 210
5 Most used search engines and most searched topics
In this section, I examine with the help of the interviewees which search engines are the most used now that they live in Europe. Further, I will explore what kind of topics are the most searched ones within the Internet now that they live outside China and whether we can observe discrepancies between their current Internet behavior and the previous one. Respondent A admits in three passages that now that he/she lives in Europe has started benefiting from Google, but prefers using Baidu when the search is related to Chinese matters. “I think that Google here in Italy is better than our Chinese search engines if you have to check some general info. It is faster and you can find a lot of info. But if you search something exclusively related to China, Baidu is more complete. However, in order to search for general info Google is better… yeah, definitely”. Herein the second part: “I use Google here in Europe. On the contrary, in China, I use Baidu because Google does not work well, It is very slow there and sometimes you cannot use it at all. Lastly, in part three, Respondent A confirms that in Europe his/her favorite search engine is Google but, as several other Chinese, he/she prefers using Baidu when the target of the inquiry is about Chinese matters. “I use mostly Google but when I have to search something related to China I use Baidu also from here… The info in Baidu about China are more accurate and precise.” Respondent C, on the contrary, more mature and aware than the other respondents interviewed, clearly prefers Google when he/she has to choose a platform in which to search for some information. “I use unfiltered search engines to search for what I need as Google here in Europe. Not the “Chinese government” search engines, as Baidu! In China, you are almost forced to use Chinese search engines as they are faster and 211
then Google in China is connected to the Hong Kong server and it is not so fast.” Further, Respondent D gives us another point of analysis: “I use here from Italy both Google and Baidu, but mostly Google. In Baidu, many things are not correct!”. This suggests his/her awareness concerning the filtered and distorted results that a user can find within Chinese search engines.
Concerning the most searched topics, it has been soon evident in my questionnaires and during these interviews that the most searched arguments were the “online shopping” at the first place and “download movies” at the second. However, it is worth doing a distinction as in China, the online shopping is really a national hobby and in Italy, although the respondents would like to buy online with a greater frequency, the process is not so easy because buying within online Chinese shops is quite problematic from Europe for the long journey and for all the customs duties. However, we are now witnessing, as already mentioned and as it is possible to observe below, the birth of offline stores which assist customers in purchasing through these platforms. In addition, usually Chinese living in Europe do not like using foreign online shops as Amazon and EBay as they consider them too expensive. Even considering the topic “download movies”, we have to make a distinction, as Chinese often complain about the impossibility to download movies and mp3 free in Europe as they use to do in China with the same easiness, not having the equivalent severe copyrights restrictions of Europe and USA.
Respondent A has confirmed that he/she uses the Internet in order to watch movies and videos. “At the first place, definitely, I love watching videos, movies and TV series.” I have also asked whether he/she surfs also Italian 212
websites now that he/she lives in Italy, but, as reported in many questionnaires, he/she prefers other foreign websites for general info, as booking.com and he/she uses Italian websites only for necessity.” (a little embarrassed, smiles) Usually not. Sometimes I surf Italian websites for university matters.
Respondent C talks about this phenomenon ironically. “Yeah, Chinese are interested only in buying any sort of stuff within the Internet…buy, buy and buy again…forget the Arab spring or a revolution!” Respondent A has the same opinion and indeed he/she talks about the online shopping as a real national hobby. “yeah, I think it is our national hobby. We love buying online. It is very cheap in China and Taobao is one of the most famous websites about that.” I have also asked whether there is the possibility to buy from Italy through these Chinese websites, for example, Taobao and Respondent A confirms this opportunity. “In the last years, through some Chinese agencies here in Italy, you can buy through Taobao. These agencies receive the items that you have purchased on the website and then you can pick up what you have purchased in the agency. Logically you have to pay a little more but Taobao is so affordable that in any case it is very cheap. These agencies are still few but the phenomenon is growing”.
Concerning the difference in accessing to the download of free movies and free mp3 in comparison with the European and American tight copyrights regulations, Respondent C explains the situation. “Yeah, we don’t have in China a severe copyright regulation about this kind of entertainment. It is much easier in China than in Europe to download movies and mp3. Sometimes the Internet police shuts off some websites in which you can 213
download everything but you will not be punished if you download all these stuffs…the opposite situation happens in Europe and US… If you don’t pay for a movie, for example, you can be pursued if you illegally download movies”. Respondent B is on the contrary more cautious, even if he/she confirms this trend: “Yeah, it is easier to find websites (In China) in which you can download movies but often the Internet police decides to shut off these websites”
Respondent A illustrates again the difference between China and the rest of the world. “In China you can download any movies you wish without paying because we have not all the copyright issues of Europe and US.” In addition, “No Chinese would pay for downloading a movie. It is impossible this kind of business in China. No companies would try this business and so we can download everything without breaking the law”.
Comments
Two of the most searched topic in China and in Italy are “shopping online” and “downloading movies”. This mirrors a situation in which we can make some assumptions about the main concerns of the typical Chinese netizen. Even in the questionnaires analysis, it has been evident that the Chinese users, in both samples, are interested predominantly in having fun, watching videos and listening to music and, mostly, in online shopping (if we take into account the Chinese sample). Therefore, the main interests of the 214
modern Chinese user is the online entertainment and the shopping online. These might be crucial factors that we should investigate deeper if, for example, the purpose of the research is focused on the exploration of future developments of the political engagement of millions of Chinese users. At the present time, it is discouraging to witness that it is hard to hypothesize a conscious and impartial political engagement for this generation of netizens able to make, as a consequence, the Chinese society more mature and aware about sensitive issues. It is also for these reasons that I believe that only through an unconscious mental process of maturation and social awareness (for example, as I have hypothesized, a behavioral alteration provoked by the repercussions of a different and open Internet dimension), we might expect a change in the Internet behavior of the typical Chinese netizen. I have also to point out that the boost in the e-commerce and within all the online entertainment platforms in China is unequivocally pushed by the strategies and maneuvers of the government in order to divert people’s attention from more sensitive and problematic aspects of the Chinese society. The CCP is able, at the same time, to augment the Chinese economic development and seal the sovereignty of the nation, by giving its citizens what they really wish. Another validation about this last assumption concerns the fact that the government continues to tempt the Chinese in using the Internet with affordable prices, as Respondent A confirms. “I think that in China, the Internet is cheaper and faster and if you consider that in China with 600 rmb (84 euro) you can have the flat broadband for a year, you can imagine how the Internet is more affordable in our country. Ah, and another important aspect is that in China you can download any movies you wish without paying because we have not all the copyright issues of Europe and US.” 215
6 A different perspective is necessary to analyze Chinese matters
Another alluring area of interest analyzed during the interviews concerns the different perspective that several respondents suggested me in order to better analyze the Chinese cyber-society and in general all the matters of the PRC. The four respondents who were more interested in participating to the interviews were unanimous in warning that a different degree of scientific approach is needed in facing all the Chinese issues. For example, here below, it is possible to grasp the need of a new approach in the analysis of the Chinese dimension when the Respondent A talks about the decision of the government of arresting Ai Weiwei. “I did not know this guy, so I do not have a complete vision of the situation even if you told me some facts of his life. Anyway, what you have to learn if you want to investigate on Chinese matters with the best perspective is that you have to be undocked from your cultural, political and social background and get rid of your European prejudices. Do not face China with the perspective that something is fair and something is wrong, something is black and logically something must be white. China is a very complex society; we have more than a billion of people and it is unthinkable to govern a country with this attitude. Yes, probably the fact of arresting this person because he wanted to express his ideas against the government was not correct and fair. But consider this: what if this person could inflame a protest in China? What if an uprising could upset our society? It would be chaos as it happened in 1989. And if you go searching for Tiananmen facts in Baidu, surely you will not find what you are able to find on Google… And let me tell you something that probably will make you shudder: this is the best solution for Chinese. What 216
if some Chinese people read that an uprising has arisen? What if other Chinese chose to follow the same path and to join the protest? It would be chaos! We Chinese prefer this situation than possible other unpredictable realities.
In addition, Respondent B faces the issue of a needed different perspective that the researcher has to shape in order to better study the Chinese matters. In this passage, I ask respondent B to comment about the impossibility to use Facebook and Twitter from China and his/her point of view is meaningful in order to understand that often our western vision of the world is not transmissible to other multifaceted societies. “I see what you are saying, but please, reverse the situation. If you knew that the Italian government decided to censor some specific, limited (four you country) and very far Chinese websites because it thinks that they can be dangerous for the value of the State and for your protection…would you be so upset for this decision? Would this decision change your life? In your country you have probably several websites in Italian, in your language, with the same purpose of the forbidden ( hypothetically speaking) Chinese ones…so would you consider the fact of not having the possibility to surf that particular Chinese website as an enormous issue? Don’t lie…no, surely you would not see this forbiddance as an existential problem. Don’t you look at Chinese matters with your own perspective…you always lose something.
And when I objected that it is strange for us, Europeans and Americans, that the Chinese are not annoyed in knowing that some foreign websites are forbidden, he/she is able to explain a peculiar vision of the reality that often we underestimate. Respondent B: “but if Chinese even don’t know about 217
these forbidden websites, how can they be angry? I have already told you. We Chinese have the Chinese version of the American forbidden websites, and they are in Chinese. So what is the problem? Should we start to protest for something that is not so fundamental for our lives? For our culture?”
At this point of the conversation, I have tried to move the issue from the specific Internet restrictions argument (the impossibility to use Facebook, for example) towards a more pervasive problem encountered during some experiments in the Chinese search engines. For example, I have explained to the interviewees that often it is not possible to find sensitive information, specific words and concepts within the Chinese search engines, or, most of the times, it is more probable to find distorted visions of the world or half- truths. However, again, respondent B is able to let me understand that often our Eurocentric vision can lead towards superficial conclusions. “But what kind of information is filtered? The information that you, literate European, think that would be fair to find in our Chinese search engines, i.e. the information with an evident Eurocentric perspective. Again, you see, it is a matter of perspective. If you search values, rights, ideas, ways of living with a clear and strong Euro-American connotation, it is logical that we, Chinese, will filter these results because they do not belong to our culture.
It was also impressive Respondent’s B conception about the role of the free information within the Internet. I told him/her that during these months of fieldwork I have known a Chinese girl, with a bachelor degree, living in Italy and married with an Italian. During one of our conversations, it came out that in her opinion the Dalai Lama was a terrorist. I was amazed because for us, Europeans, but also Americans the Dalai Lama is a positive 218
personality and his life has always been focused on the pursuit of peace among peoples. However, this girl told me that she was sure about what she was explaining to me because she had informed herself a lot about the Dalai Lama, by reading and studying his story in several Chinese websites. I asked Respondent B to comment this anecdote and to give me some opinions about the fact that now this girl lives in Italy; I think that it is curious, but also discouraging that she does not feel the need to search for this kind of information also within the Euro-American websites, as Wikipedia, for example. Secondly, the reasons why this huge difference between our Euro- American vision of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese one. Respondent’s B reply can be very alluring in order to understand that often a different perspective is needed when we have to focus on Chinese matters. “Firstly, why do you think with absolute certainty that Wikipedia is right and our Chinese websites must be logically wrong? Secondly, many European or American journalists often write about Chinese matters without having tested with their own eyes our dimension. I have often read about Chinese matters on Italian newspapers and always I ask myself…what are they saying? Have they lived in China for one minute to judge our situation?
Comments
These passages here reported are very impressive as I could realize how blind a researcher can be if he/she continues to use only one perspective. What if my government decided to censor a website of a far country in a language that I cannot comprehend at all? Did this resolution change my life? Would I protest for this decision? When I have talked with the 219
interviewees about a different needed perspective, I have understood that we Europeans or Americans should be less proud of our culture and values and should try to not take for granted that everything that happens in our world is the main road for every culture. In this case, the respondent is right. If my government decided to prohibit me from surfing some very far Chinese website, I certainly would not organize a revolution for this resolution, even though, in this hypothetic case, my right of freedom would not, unequivocally, have been observed by my government. This passage of the interview is very useful and surely crucial for any researcher interested in Chinese Internet censorship. We cannot think that our most personal values and beliefs are the same in all the other cultures; we have to remember to reverse the situation in order to better understand what we are investigating. This process of reversing the issue has to do mostly with the specific Internet restrictions that we have analyzed during this project. We cannot take for granted that the impossibility of using, for example, Facebook from China is a huge universal problem that will let arise revolutions in China in the name of the freedom of thought.
7 Internet restrictions
This was the most sensitive argument of the interview. All the four interviewees were aware of the Internet censorship at various degrees of perception. For example, as we will observe, Respondent D seems to perceive only those restrictions, which affect particular and specific websites, as YouTube and Facebook. As the reader can observe, 220
Respondent D seems to be not aware of a pervasive and general Internet censorship. “I just know that I cannot use Facebook and YouTube from China…I do not feel that I’m controlled. I do not know the 50 cents party….never heard about it, nor that the information is filtered within the Internet”. But I have to point out - and later it will be possible to ascertain this aspect - that Respondent D is not probably telling the whole truth in this specific circumstance because in another passage of the interview, he/she reveals his/her real degree of perception. However, surely in all the other three cases, it seems that the respondents are able to perceive with a higher degree a general and pervasive Internet perception. Two respondents are quite aligned with the government policies about the restriction of Internet. Respondent C on the contrary is absolutely adverse to the decision of the CCP to filter the Chinese cyberspace. We have to point out that Respondent C has been living outside China since several years, he/she is in his forties (therefore, more mature in comparison with the other three interviewees) and, above all, he/she has worked for years in an Internet security software house. It is logical that his/her level of perception is much higher.
During our conversations, I started analyzing the issue by beginning to face the impossibility to connect to specific websites as Facebook and YouTube from China, i.e. I have started to tackle the problem of the Internet censorship by asking the respondents a comment about the Chinese specific Internet restrictions. Respondent A tackles the issue: “Yeah it is true… In China, it is not possible to connect to websites as Facebook or YouTube because the government decided that it was the best choice to regulate the Internet in this way. I think that the government does not want Chinese people to read news or events of China, happened in China, from foreign 221
websites because foreign press, foreign media, foreign commentators always say bad things about China. They tell distorted stories about our country. This is my opinion; I do not know whether this is the right interpretation of what the government did but I am pretty sure that it is for this reason that some websites are obscured. As we will see, three of the four respondents continue during the interview to justify the government’s attitude about Internet with different and interesting motivations.
I have tried to ask a personal opinion about the government regulations concerning the Internet and the majority of the times the respondents stayed on the defensive. In the following passage, it is possible to observe how Respondent A tries justifying the government about the specific restrictions of particular foreign websites. “I do not know whether the decision of the government is right or fair and, however, this does not bother me. We have to emphasize, on the contrary, that it is true that in Europe or in US, when you read news about China, these facts have always a bad connotation. For example, here in Italy, on Facebook, many times I have read some bad events or news about China with a lot of superficial comments about these happenings. I have rarely seen news with a positive connotation about our country. From the European or American Internet, China has not a positive image of a rich and beautiful country as it is, but news are always related to corruption, pollution, poor quality of its products, and the one child policy.”
As already mentioned, in every circumstance in which I tried to understand with the help of the interviewees the reasons of the government about the filtering of the Internet contents, I have witnessed various efforts from the respondents to excuse the Internet restrictions conceived by the CCP. 222
Respondent A, again in this passage, emphasizes the concept with an articulated and well-structured motivation: “Another reason for this policy can be the fact that the government does not want Chinese people to look at a foreign world in which there are possibilities and opportunities that in China people cannot reach and benefit.” In addition, he/she continues, “People have so many problems in China that it is better to not show them that in other countries there are probably better job conditions, better services, better civil rights, and better lives. Also because we have to be anchored at our roots and traditions. It is useless and even harmful for Chinese to see that in US, for example, people can benefit from many different rights if, in China, the majority of us cannot afford a car. We have to keep our eyes on China! Especially those Chinese people - who could not contextualize the Chinese situation and, therefore, accept and comprehend all the differences that characterize two or more different social dimensions - could get angry and begin protesting. I think that the government’s purpose is to avoid possible protests that could arise if Chinese started to compare China with the rest of the world.
Respondent D reinforces the concept. Also in his/her opinion, it is important to obscure the reality from the eyes of millions of Chinese because otherwise it would be difficult to manage its complexity. “It is just a policy of our country, our way of managing the reality. Our government thinks that it is the best way. If every Chinese in China could access to the full information flow, they would start thinking with his/her mind and, as the majority of Chinese people, are not literate, they could not understand and face our complex situation. I think that the government does not want chaos in our country. Our country is too complex, too big to be analyzed with the 223
same attitude of the other countries.” It is in this passage that it is possible to ascertain that probably Respondent’s D first sentence mentioned in the introduction does not reflect reality and he/she is aware of a general Internet perception.
Respondent B gives us on the contrary a clumsy reason to explain the specific Internet restrictions of the government: “I don’t know exactly… the official reason is that as in China everybody can use the Internet, i.e. children of any age, for example. The government wants them to protect because otherwise they could watch violent websites, or porno websites…something like that… the government decided to prevent children from watching the Internet. Then, respondent B continues: “we have our values… so we prefer protecting our children as we decide… the rest of the world is not our business… if you want your children to be free to surf without any control, you can decide to do so… and we can decide to obscure the foreign websites we do not like. Every government of every country decides to choose its way of using the Internet. Facebook or Twitter are forbidden in China for these reasons.
I was surprised because I could not realize the reason why the government decided to obscure Facebook and YouTube, for example, and other several foreign websites and not the Chinese plagiarized counterparts, as Youku and Ren Ren, for example. I could not grasp the difference. I was not able to understand why the CCP gives the possibility to build a Chinese Intranet with the equivalent peculiarities of the West. Wouldn’t it more politically easy to let netizens use the western counterparts, instead of continuing controlling the Chinese cyberspace night and day? But Respondent D is 224
able to explain this policy. “Yeah, we have the one party system and they control everything. You cannot say bad words against the government and through YouTube and Facebook you could have the possibility to do it. You could reach an unlimited virtual stage” At this point, I object that a Chinese netizen could also from Weibo or Ren Ren saying bad words against the government, but Respondent D is able to rebut by objection: “No, these websites are controlled by the government with the help of the same companies and providers which own them. The government can command, “Delete that message” and the company or the provider has to do if it wants to stay in business, to continue to work in the Chinese Internet. The Chinese government cannot ask the same order to YouTube or Facebook. For this reason, the CCP prevent us to connect outside, towards the rest of the world. We could use these platforms to spread bad news against the government. And the chaos would begin”. Also in this passage, we can ascertain that his/her first sentence, in which he/she told that he/she has never heard about these issues, are false. Probably, as it was one of the first questions, Respondent D was still embarrassed and constrained.
This conversation was pivotal to fully realize the government’s policy to filter particular websites and the reasons why the CCP is so interested in avoiding Chinese people to use western websites. In addition, respondent C reinforces the concept here above analyzed “the difference is that the Chinese versions of Twitter and Facebook are continually monitored and controlled and you cannot write whatever you want. On the contrary, in the foreign websites there is no control from the government” 225
Respondent D again explains why the government does not want Chinese surf foreign websites: “On YouTube there are many bad videos against China and the government doesn’t want us to watch these videos. On the contrary, in China any news that you can find on the Internet, on TV, on radio are always positive facts about our country. Usually, the press and all the media do not spread bad news concerning our country”
It was interesting to comprehend the role of the State and of the private companies in filtering the Chinese cyberspace. As Respondent C explains, it is fundamental to grasp the process of continuous negotiations between the State’s policies and the private companies’ targets, as we have explored in the four modalities of control in the first part of this thesis. Respondent C is able to enlighten our minds. In this passage, Respondent C talks about search engines, but the complicity between the State and the private providers is similar to the process of negotiation between the CCP and other e-companies: “These search engines are not only filtered, but completely managed by the State with the connivance of the Chinese Internet providers companies. These companies are not public but they are forced to filter their contents if they want to stay into business, if they want to work.” Further, Respondent C tries to explain why the government is so interested in doing this negotiation: “For the State’s security…it is simple. The Internet can be a threat, you have to domesticate it”.
It was still not clear yet the process of negotiation between the State and the private companies and therefore I asked for some clarifications and Respondent C was happy to reply. “In China, the Internet is a matter of licenses. If a company or a provider wants to open a new website, you have 226
to do a detailed agreement with the State through which the company shall follow the precise regulations of the government.” In addition, “Everything that is online in China must have a license. In my opinion, after having worked for years in an Internet security agency, also a search engine must have a license to display all the possible results. Google Hong Kong doesn’t have a license and for this reason it can display a few results in comparison with the Chinese search engines.
At this point of the conversation, I ask whether even search engines in China need a license only to display specific results of a query and omit others. Respondent C has a clear opinion: “In my opinion, yes. All the results of a query are the effect of a process of negotiation between the State and the company that owns the search engine; a negotiation between the State and the provider for example”. As I was shocked, I told respondent C that I would have investigated more this process, but he/she proudly added, “I repeat… every single byte in the Chinese cyberspace is a negotiation between the State and the Company that owns the website. There must be an approval for every info displayed in the Chinese Internet…remember”.
I believe that this is the main reason why the CCP is so interested in building a Chinese “Intranet” by not only plagiarizing the structure and the contents of the West Internet, but really translating them, not only linguistically, but also with all the values and the culture of the Chinese dimension. This is why YouTube has a Chinese counterpart, Youku; Facebook has Ren Ren, and so on ad infinitum. The concept of translation here above described can be fruitful analyzed with an ANT approach as, also in the ANT theory, we can observe that the main actor, the instigator 227
actor, translates all the other submissive entities, by deciding the appropriate roles for them, by managing reality at its will, by giving all the actors involved a credible vision. Therefore, the concept of translating the western versions of the most popular social sites means that the CCP is able to conceive a world through which every concept, information, byte, law and regulation and so on ad infinitum must be continually translated with the final target to be locked in the position decided by the Chinese authorities.
Respondent C, I remind, is the revolutionary actor of the group that I interviewed. As the reader will see in the comment of this section, Respondent C is the most mature, aware and open-minded of the Chinese that I have met during these months. Respondent C reinforces in this strong passage his/her opinions about the issue of the Internet censorship in China, by adding that there is an organized machinery that maintains this pervasive situation in which everything on the Internet is controlled. “You have to remember that in China, within the Chinese Internet, it is very difficult to find real news, real information… every news or information is always filtered at the source by the government. Often, there are Chinese journalists paid by the CCP who literally invent stories in order to spread distorted news within the Internet. The main purposes are or to divert attention from a problem or on the contrary, to focus the attention of people on a particular happening, for example, to inflame the nationalistic proud of netizens. Therefore, in the long run, Chinese people are no longer able to realize what is really true or completely false and consequently they become soon accustomed to this reality. A reality in which it is difficult to have an opinion on what is really happening. For Chinese people the Chinese reality is the only reality… is it clear? 228
I have often tried asking whether the fact of not having the possibility in China to use a foreign social app like Facebook was an issue related to the freedom of speech and thought, but almost every respondent reassured me that it was not the case because in China there are the Chinese versions of the foreign forbidden websites. The cunning strategy of the Chinese government is to give users a West-like dimension with all the opportunities of the foreign websites but with all the Chinese peculiarities and, above all, this plagiarized cyberspace is monitored and filtered. Therefore, Chinese users do not feel the need to use the forbidden websites because they can already benefit from the Chinese counterpart. Respondent B confirms my assumption when I ask whether he/she is annoyed because of the limitation of Facebook from China. “Through Twitter or Facebook, you can write bad things, bad words. You can find links towards other dangerous websites. However, in China, we have the Chinese version of Twitter, for example, or the Chinese version of YouTube and so, at the end of the day, it is not a problem. Even Respondent A is of the same opinion when I ask whether the fact of not having the possibility to use Facebook from China to contact his/her friends in Italy is an issue. “I have already told you that it doesn’t bother me…As I have already said…I can use an email or a message on WeChat”.
I have tried asking several times to the interviewees the main feeling of Chinese users about this situation, about the impossibility to use specific foreign websites, but also in this case Respondent B explains why this is not a vital issue for Chinese people. “I do not think that the majority of Chinese living in China know that there are forbidden foreign websites that they cannot visit from China. Simply, the majority of Chinese do not know 229
even their existence! When I lived in China, I did not know that Facebook was an American forbidden website. Simply, I did not know Facebook’s existence at all because I would have not thought to surf foreign websites! And above all, I had already the possibility to use some Chinese websites with the same purpose and so even if I had known about Facebook, it would have not been an issue for me as I would have preferred the Chinese version. Then, surely, there will be even in China, some young Chinese more in steps with the times and more technologically and politically involved who will know that some foreign websites are forbidden, but I think that the 70/80% of the Chinese population, simply, does not know the issue.
(Respondent B keeps on talking)
“Chinese persons in China have a Chinese version of Facebook and they prefer using this one also because all their contacts are inside these Chinese websites. So they do not feel the need to use a platform in which they have no contacts of friends, relatives…Further, Chinese people prefer using a website in Chinese language… wouldn’t you prefer using a website in your own language as well?
About the fact that the Chinese users simply do not know the ongoing situation about the Internet restrictions, Respondent C tells his/her opinion. “About the Chinese who do not know anything about the Internet censorship, I really believe that they do not know anything about this issue. They are so accustomed to the Chinese dimension and further they rarely benefit from the Internet of the rest of the world that they are ignorant on this subject. About those Chinese who support the Internet restrictions…well 230
what can I say? I think that they are ignorant about the topic too, but that they are very proud of their nation.
Again, we have a validation of the government’s strategy. The CCP has built a Chinese safe-Internet, by creating a West-like Internet dimension similar to the foreign most used platforms. The typical Chinese user does not feel the need to broaden his/her horizons by surfing foreign websites because, he/she can already have what he/she needs and most importantly in his/her own language. This has been the most artful move of the government. It is crucial herein to underline that the government cannot foresee what might happen if a Chinese user started benefiting from a different and more open Internet dimension, as this research has demonstrated. Would he/she continue using only Chinese websites? Or would he/she be more enticed in benefiting from the western social platforms?
Further when I have tried to push the conversation towards the main issue of the Internet censorship, as for example the impossibility to search for particular words within the Chinese search engines, i.e. the difficulty in accessing to the free and open flow of information, I have witnessed some peculiar answers. Respondent A told me “really? And what kind of words? I was surprised because this question was already strange as it should not be a matter of searching particular words because, in any case, every user should be able to search always and whatever he/she has in mind and I pointed out the issue. The answer also in this case was caustic. Respondent A : “it is for the same reasons that I explained before… if you cannot have 231
something, why in the world would you search for that thing? I think it is very simple.”
I tried explaining to Respondent A that after having tested the Chinese search engines in order to search some sensitive words or concept, as for example Falun Gong, the results of the queries were distorted or, alternatively, I could find no results as my search was against the relevant laws of the State. I asked a comment about this issue and Respondent A has no doubts about the positive role of the government policies. “You know, I do not know this problem because I would never think to search for a word like that. However, they (Falun Gong supporters) are against the government policies and it is logical that the government tries to protect its value and laws. Then, once, I remember that a supporter of this movement set himself on fire in a square in order to protest against the government. However, I do not care about these problems… once I was in Milan and in front of the Chinese Embassy, there were some Falun Gong supporters that were protesting against the Chinese government. I was annoyed… I do not care about these troubles… I have others things to think about!
At this point of the conversation, I explained that I did not want to go into the issue of Falun Gong. I was not there to say that the Falun Gong’s supporters are right and the government is wrong. Probably in some occasions, the Chinese government has even its own reasons to react against Falun Gong protests. However, I have tried to emphasize to her that always and in any case, an Internet user should have the right to access to any information he/she desires to search for: a free and not filtered information by any government in the world. But Respondent’s A objection was 232
impressive. “I see (Laughing)…What can I say? I feel sorry for you if you have this need. In China, it is not possible to think in this way.. Period.”
Probably a reader of this work will be confused about the typical attitude of the Chinese user who do not complain about this situation, who do not protest about all these limitations, but Respondent A is able to explain why, at the end of the day, the Chinese are not annoyed about this concern. “yeah… we cannot think to have everything we want in a few years. If you consider the past, we have something to be happy now.” And, also in this part, Respondent A keeps on talking about the issue. “This is the situation and we have to accept it. We are accustomed to this reality. It is not a problem. We have to be happy for what we have now in comparison with our past.” Even the “not aligned” Respondent C confirms what the other have said about the impressive fact that Chinese do not complain about all these Internet regulations. “You have to consider that Chinese are accustomed to a dimension in which the censorship in every media is usual. Censorship is part of our tradition and culture. After the openness provoked by the advent of the Internet, they started to benefit from a freedom never encountered before. Therefore, they are already happy with what they can benefit now, and even if the web is censored, the current situation is still better than the previous one… So, why should they protest? Now that they have something impossible to obtain in the past, they should complain and protest? Not at all… money and shopping are their creed.
Respondent D is even able to find positive aspects about the fact that the Internet in China is managed by the State: “there are positive and negative aspects about filtering the news…the bad part is that you should be able to 233
access to every kind of information. The good part is that is simpler to live in this way for the majority of Chinese. Italy has many parties and they discuss a lot and it takes long time. In China ordinary people prefer that someone told them how to behave, how to speak, how to think.”
8 Respondents’ perception of possible discrepancies with other Internet dimensions: the analysis of the four interviewees
This close-minded behavior and brainwashed attitude has been the standard approach in the analysis of the Internet censorship issue among 3 out of 4 respondents (respondents a, b, d) that I have interviewed. I have to point out that all the three respondents more aligned with the government are from 26 to 30 years old. Two of them are university students and one works in a betting center in the Northern Italy. Further, all these three respondents have been living in Italy from 2 to 6 years. On the contrary, Respondent D is more mature (40 years old) and works now as an intermediary between Italy and China in a big private company, after having worked for years in an Internet security agency. This last interviewee, in addition, is married with an Italian person. All the four interviewees have at least a bachelor degree and two of them are studying at University in a master course. I have also to emphasize that all the four interviewees asked to remain anonymous and to not show in this work of thesis any detail, which could identify them. They asked me (not immediately, but after some days) even to omit the gender! They have often reminded me that they have a family in China.
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Respondent’s A analysis
November, 2014, Trento (Italy)
Male, teacher, 30 years old, Wenzhou
This is probably the most interesting interview that I have collected during these months, not only for the focus of my fieldwork, regarding which I am about to comment, but also for other alluring aspects which can help the reader to better comprehend some of the Chinese cultural and social peculiarities. Indeed, the interviewee and I have talked, as already analyzed in this chapter, about the reluctance of the Chinese in participating in the survey and the respondent gives us some possible explanations. Then, another intriguing part of this interview concerned the role of the verbal communication among Chinese. The respondent tried to explain why, most of the times (in his/her opinion), among Chinese the spread of information is a very challenging process, as they do not use (at least in Italy) those common forms of communication, for example the word of mouth, at the lowest levels of the transmission of news and information among groups of people. In her understanding, Chinese prefer now using exclusively the Internet to communicate with other Chinese. Further, another interesting part of interview has been the passage (that we have analyzed above) in which I understand how difficult the process of translation can be even if the translator is a Chinese. As we have observed, there are concepts and words that are very troublesome to translate from language to language as, for 235
example in this specific case, the word “microblogging”; a new way of e- communication that we, European, are not well practiced in using.
If we focus on the analysis of Respondent’s A perception of censorship, his/her conversation gives us many elements to explore. Respondent A is not afraid or embarrassed and does not hold back in answering. Further, Respondent A is well aligned with the government’s Internet regulations. We cannot say that he/she is a supporter of the CCP’s decision to filter the Internet or that he/she agrees with it, nor that he/she is happy and proud of this situation. Surely, Respondent A accepts passively the current situation and, in several cases, understands the government’s points of views and its decision to protect its targets and values. Further, R. A is aligned with the government’s attitude against the foreign press and adverse to the foreign vision about the problems of freedom of speech in China. R. A excuses the government’s decision to censor the Internet with two interesting reasons. In his/her opinion, the government does not want the Chinese read news with a bad connotation about China coming from the foreign press because they do not reflect the reality of the country and, besides, can discourage the nation. Secondly, R. A thinks that it is counterproductive for Chinese users to watch and read that in the rest of the world there are economic possibilities and freedoms unthinkable to reach in China. In Respondent’s A opinion, if a billion of Chinese knew that in the rest of the world millions of people live in better conditions, this fact could destabilize the entire Chinese society. We have to remember that the Internet is probably the only output towards the rest of the world for millions of Chinese and this virtual telescope able to show other realities, as they were “alien” worlds, must be monitored and filtered, in Respondent’s A and in the government’s point of view. Chinese 236
people do not have other possibilities to give a look at the world. Therefore, the Internet can be a threat. The respondent and the government are well aware of this. Therefore, the respondent does perceive several of the restrictions about the Internet but accepts them passively and without complaining.
Is Respondent A brainwashed? We cannot affirm this precisely but surely when I have tried to push the focus on the issues of freedom of speech in China, R. A has always continued to blame the complexity of the Chinese society without being able to better explain future evolutions of the Internet possibilities. Another discouraging aspect is that R. A does feel controlled when he/she surfs the Chinese cyberspace. He/she tell us that he/she knows that she is monitored within the Chinese Internet and that the majority of Chinese are aware of this.
“I believe that every Chinese in China is always under control. It is impossible to use the Internet in the way that Arabs could. The Internet in China is in the hands of the government… they have the upper hand. Besides, as we talked some minutes ago, our verbal communication among friends and colleague outside our circle of trust is very superficial and fragmentary and so it would be very difficult that a spark of protest could germinate outside and, besides, the Internet dimension is too controlled.
At this point of the conversation, I ask respondent A again whether she/he feels under control during his/her Internet experience and his/her reply is significant. “Yeah… I definitely feel under control.” 237
I think that his/her sentence is very impressive. Respondent A knows that he/she is monitored but justifies the government’s decision to control his/her freedom within the Internet.
Possible actor of change?
Are there possible points of change now that he/she is benefiting from an open Internet dimension? Yes. Respondent A tells us that she loves using Google from Italy and that Google for the general searches on the Internet is better than Chinese search engines as it gives users a better experience. I think that this is an outstanding result for a person so aligned to the government’s policies about the Internet. His/her decision to use Google, even though he/she continues to use Baidu for all the Chinese matters, is very positive and harbinger of change. Probably unconsciously, Respondent A is able to understand the quality of Google’s services and the importance of an open access to unfiltered information. “Well, let me think… I do not know exactly… for example I think that Google here in Italy is better than our search engines if you have to check some general info. It is faster and you can find a lot of info.”
Further, at the end of the interview, Respondent A is able to foresee another possible, even if far, future of change in China for the next generations. “I’m optimistic and maybe in many years it will happen what you are saying… 238
but we Chinese are very slow in changing…remember! But yes, maybe something will change.
Respondent’s B analysis
November, 2014, Turin (Italy)
Female, 26, student, Wenzhou
Respondent B, on the contrary, was clearly annoyed and embarrassed by the situation. He/she is aware of the Internet censorship of his country but well aligned with the government’s policies about the Internet. However, in this case, he/she is not able to give us credible explanations about the government’s decision as the previous interviewee did. In his/her opinion, the government decided to filter the Internet or interdict some foreign websites as Facebook or Twitter for the protection of the Chinese children. It is not clear whether Respondent B really believes in what he/she is saying but I think, it is quite odd to use as main reason for the resolution of the CCP the fact that children could visit Facebook and Twitter and consequently they could be in danger for what they might read inside those websites. In my opinion, it is evident that he is not interested in this topic and in general in politics. He gave me the first official reason that the government uttered some years ago, as the government itself did with the same motivations in order to insert into Chinese new computers a software to monitor people’s preferences in their web experience (the Golden Shield Project). Further, in our conversation, he/she continued to say that in any 239
case the fact of censoring some foreign websites is not an issue because Chinese have their Chinese version of the forbidden websites. The previous interviewee gave the same motivation to explain that for them this is not a fundamental problem. This is one of the most alluring aspect to be considered for this and future researches, as the CCP has been cunning to organize a sophisticated machinery with all the most advanced techniques to control the Chinese cyberspace and a wise using of the plagiarized Chinese websites similar to the original western counterparts able to seal the possible discontent.
This interview was not easy to record and to quote in written words. Firstly because the respondent was always about to leave the conversation as he/she was embarrassed and annoyed about my questions. During our talking, he/she often gave a look at his watch as he/she had to go somewhere and then he/she continued to tell me that in 5 minutes would have left the pub for going to work. Secondly, during the interview, many of his/her answers were interrupted and fragmented as if he/she had something more to say or he/she were afraid of something. Therefore, some sentences had to be a bit reinterpreted and edited to better follow the logic of the parley. The interviewee decided often to come back to one of his/her previous thoughts and it was very difficult to understand his/her logical path as he/she jumped from one topic to another, while I was trying to focus on a new subject. I have tried to give a more logical dimension to the interview, by removing some of his/her interruptions.
Further, in this conversation, there are not so many interesting points as in the previous one. The respondent is not so eager to talk as the previous 240
interviewee but he/she shows the reader some alluring aspects useful mostly for any research about Chinese matters. He/she is able to explain to the researcher why a different perspective is needed when our purpose is analyzing Chinese matters. We have to take off our European glasses and to look at China with different lenses, as we have observed in the section above. We have to emphasize that he/she is aware of the Internet restrictions in the Chinese cyberspace: both the specific restrictions and the general restrictions. Even in this case, the respondent is well aligned with the government and tries to justify its policies but with less persuasion in comparison with the interviewee in the previous section by explaining with odd and eccentric arguments the reasons of these limitations.
Possible actor of change?
I think that the turning point of this interview occurred when the respondent declares that he/she is now using Facebook as main social network. He/she is annoyed and frustrated that he/she cannot use Facebook from China to stay in contact with his Italian friends. Respondent B has started benefiting from a different and unfiltered social network for the first time and he/she tells us that he/she feels the need to use it even when he/she is in China for holidays to contact some Italian friends. This could be the first point of change in his/her web experience. For the first time in the interview, Respondent B is no longer aligned with the government but is now complaining about this prohibition. I think that it is an outstanding result as he/she has always been well aligned with the government restrictions and 241
now there is a change in his mindset, a change harbinger of future evolutions in his need of freedom.
Here below, the entire passage of the interview.
I: “mmmm…yeah it does bother me…(he/she grins)…because now in Italy I have started using only Facebook… but for Chinese living in China is not a problem because they have..
(I interrupt his/her talking as he/she was repeating for the third time that in China netizens can benefit from the Chinese version of several forbidden foreign websites, so it is not an issue for them to not use Facebook or YouTube)
R: … the Chinese counterpart…yeah, I perfectly know it, as you have already told me many times…but let’s focus on you…you are annoyed now…aren’t you?
I: yeah… it is a bit frustrating not having the possibility to use Facebook…
R: and how can you affirm that?
I: because I have started using it…
R: because you have started benefiting something forbidden before…
I:.. yeah… I think so… 242
R: so probably, it is not only always a matter of perspective…but a matter of freedom…
I: (he does not reply. He/she snorts.)
Respondent’s C analysis
November, 2014. Milan (Italy)
Female, worker, 24 years old, unknown origin
Respondent’s C attitude is completely different. This respondent is more aware of the Internet restrictions and is not aligned with the government policies. It is worth pointing out again that Respondent C has been living outside China since many years and he/she arrived in Italy in 2001. Further, he/she has worked for several years inside an Internet security agency and has a degree in economics. Therefore, his/her level of perception of the Internet restrictions in China is very high. In addition, Respondent C is fully integrated with the Italian society and does not wish to come back to live to his/her motherland. Therefore, we can understand the reasons why he/she is so direct and without fear in facing the issue of the Internet censorship. Respondent C had decided to remain anonymous because he/she has still his/her parents in China and does not want to jeopardize their situation.
This is one of his/her sentences and it is possible to notice how Respondent C is direct and frank. For example, this passage is explicative: “in China, we 243
do not have “the Internet” as you know it…we have “China-net”…ah ah (laughs). Every information or news…any websites that you can find on the Chinese Internet is monitored and filtered by the government. If you search for something on the Chinese Internet, the results are filtered at the source
His/her interview has been very open and outspoken and I had not to limit the extent of the discourse about the Internet censorship as I did sometime with the other interviewees. This interview has been fundamental, as we have observed in the various sections of this chapter, to better comprehend the devilish mechanism behind the process of negotiation between the State and the private companies. They work together in order to filter the Internet contents; On the one hand, the CCP has been able to build a legal and political framework through which the government has the possibility with the law from its side to legally pursue the Chinese users’ behavior that does not comply with the dictates of the law. On the other hand, private companies, which, for example, own a forum or an e-commerce platform, have the duty to monitor any sensitive content that might be spread within their websites. The explanation of this process has been crucial to better comprehend the sophisticated organization of the censorship machine.
After having understood that he/she was more open in talking about this kind of issues, I asked why the majority of the Chinese do not perceive the issue of the freedom of speech within the Internet. Respondent C gives us an explanation: “ well, you know…Chinese people are very naïf in their web experience…they are mostly interested in fashion, gossip, shopping online, videogames, videos and music…so the problem of being controlled is not at the first place of their wish list. Further, some of them are afraid to talk 244
about concepts as censorship, freedom and so on…or better…more than afraid…not accustomed to think and talk about these problems.”
About a possible revolution in China as the Arab spring, Respondent C is caustic and realistic. “No, it is not possible, nor predictable. The majority of Chinese people are culturally and socially detached from the rest of the world. The majority of them do not even know what happened during the Arab Spring and surely the majority of Chinese people are not accustomed to compare what has happened there and what might occur in China, even if some circumstances, some problems were similar. I believe that they do not think, for example, “ah, yeah, if it can happen in Egypt, we can organize a protest in China too”. Simply Chinese do not think in this way. This is also a possible reason in order to understand how the government is able to manipulate so well Chinese mindsets.”
I have also tried to underatand with his/her help whether in China Chinese people talk about these problems. “No… it is impossible…I would be considered strange if I decided to talk in this way with my relatives. Further, they have not experienced what I have experienced in these years… they do not know the real meaning of the word freedom not having travelled around the world as I did. Besides, the majority of Chinese are not scholars or researchers interested in studying the Chinese matters as you are doing or as I have experienced having worked in the field for years… you have to consider this.” “The majority of Chinese were completely confined from the world until 15 years ago… you cannot think that in a few years they will become expert in the Internet freedom”. 245
Lastly, Respondent C decided to close the conversation with this explicative sentence. “Chinese nowadays are not so interested in politics but more in shopping! Ah, Ah!
Possible actor of change?
If I think at the concept of “actor of change”, i.e. an actor able to influence the current Chinese cyber-society, I believe that we have to take into account a human or non-human element with some particular characteristics or at least one of the following. 1) that is inserted within China or 2) that has still some strong connections with China through friends and relatives being in contact with SNS or social apps, or 3) that is an actor who wishes to come back to live in China. And all these characteristics have to be included inside an actor who has already benefited from an open Internet dimension. Further, all these three peculiarities mean that a possible actor of change will determine a maturation in the Chinese mindsets that he/she will meet in the future or with which this actor has some relationship. There must be a continuous connection between this actor and his/her victims of change. In all the other three cases, we can ascertain that the interviewees wish to come back to China in the future and, in any case, all three continue to have strong connections with their friends and relatives nowadays. Respondent C, on the contrary, is well integrated in Italy. He/she has married an Italian person and his/her life is (even in the future) settled in Europe. Respondent C rarely comes back in his/her motherland only to visit his/her old parents, besides 246
only once in a year and he/she does not want to expose them to danger, by infecting their mindsets with his/her predicaments and ruminations about the Internet Freedom. Therefore, I do not believe that Respondent C will influence many Chinese mindsets in the near future, also because, as he/she has noticed by him/herself, his/her way of thinking and living is completely detached from the Chinese culture after having lived several years outside China. Respondent C is too radical, too European and he/she is no longer able to use the same language of the Chinese still living in China. If we consider all the assumptions of this project, I think that Respondent C is not an actor of change. The fresh and unconscious mental process of awareness, which should contaminate other mindsets like a virus, has already been metabolized in his/her conscience and therefore, Respondent C is no longer in transformation but already transformed.
Respondent’s D analysis
November, 2014, Lecco (Italy)
Female, in her forties, worker, Wenzhou
This was apparently the least interesting interview of the lot, being the shortest one, but on the contrary, he/she was able to give some interesting points of analysis. Respondent D took a bachelor degree in English literature in China two years ago and now works in a betting center in Northern Italy. At the beginning of the interview, as we have observed in the previous section, R. D told me that he/she does not feel that he/she is under control 247
during his/her web experience but he/she only knows that it is not possible to surf Facebook and other foreign websites from China. “I just know that I cannot use Facebook and YouTube from China…I do not feel that I’m controlled. I do not know the 50 cents party, the Internet police….never heard about it.”
Then during the interview, Respondent D contradicted him/herself several times and at the end, it was evident that his/her awareness of the Internet censorship regulations was quite developed. Indeed, in this passage, it is clear that Respondent D is aware that there is something different in the Chinese cyberspace in comparison with the rest of the world. “It is just a policy of our country, our way of managing the reality. Our government thinks it is the best way. If every Chinese in China could access to the full information flow, they would start thinking with his/her and as the majority of the Chinese people is not literate, they could not understand and face the reality. I think the government does not want chaos in our country. Our country is too complex, too big to be analyzed with the same attitude of the other countries.” Also in this case, Respondent D is well aligned with the government regulations about the Internet. During our conversation, he/she has never complained about the impossibility to benefit from the possibilities of other and more open Internet dimensions, nor that he/she is bothered because it is impossible to use, for example, Facebook when he/she goes back to China, as Respondent B did.
The most important points of analysis during this interview were two:
1) With his/her help, I could clearly comprehend the reasons why the Chinese government is so interested in censoring some specific, foreign 248
social websites, as Facebook and Twitter and at the same time so eager to create a Chinese version of these forbidden platforms. Respondent D is very explicative and clear and his/her words are more direct than any other comment. “No, these websites are controlled by the government with the help of the companies. The government can command, “delete that message” and the company or the provider has to do it…The Chinese government cannot ask the same order to YouTube. For this reason, the CCP doesn’t want we to connect outside. We could use these platforms to spread bad news against the government!”
This statement might confirm also all the assertions concerning the negotiation process between the government and the private companies that Respondent C had addressed in his/her interview. Therefore, we have here two interviewees who have never met each other, who live in different cities, with different ages that are confirming the same process. Further, this following sentence confirms also that the CCP is using the best strategy to avoid netizens to surf abroad in search of the forbidden websites: “No, because we have our YouTube, the Chinese counterpart, which is called Youku. For Facebook, on the contrary, we have RenRen”. This was his/her reply to the question whether he/she is annoyed from the fact to not have the possibility to use Facebook from China.
2) Another important aspect that has emerged during the interview is fact that in China it is not so simple for Chinese to meet in public places, for example, squares, in order to speak about particular issues, or to protest against the government. This might confirm what Respondent A stated about the difficulty in the Chinese culture concerning some typical form of 249
aggregation in public places, as other cultures use to do. Here below, it is possible to observe three different passages in which the interviewee emphasizes the fact that Chinese cannot meet in public to discuss about sensitive problems. This way of behaving might have influenced in general the fact of meeting in public for other reasons as well.
“You cannot say bad words on the current government in public, you cannot write an article for example on the Internet about the government, but you can discuss about corruption of the local government.”
“The structure of the government is unquestionable, but you have a little freedom to talk about the rest now. In public, obviously, you cannot say bad word concerning the CCP.”
“For example we can make jokes about the government. It is ok in that case! No problem but you cannot speak in public about specific issues. And in general, we are not accustomed to join together in squares and public places. ”
Possible actor of change?
We do not have many elements herein to state that unequivocally Respondent D will able to change and influence other Chinese mindsets in the near future. His/her interview was quite short in comparison, for example, with Respondent’s A conversation. Respondent D is quite aligned with the government regulations, but not very interested in politics and, 250
mostly, it seems that the freedom of speech and thought issues do not bother his/her web experience. However, it is crucial one of his/her statement concerning the most used search engines he/she uses now that lives in Europe. “Google and Baidu, but mostly Google. In Baidu, many things are not correct!”
I believe that also in this case it is evident an unconscious transformation process in which the benefits of a more aware use of an open search engine is clearly perceived by the user. This might be his/her turning point for a future in which Respondent D will be more mature and aware in facing the Internet restrictions of his/her motherland. If this transformation process will continue, surely other and deeper elements of change will arise and, as we are all connected nowadays, a possible contamination is foreseeable.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion:
Considerations, future developments of the research, final remarks
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1 Preliminary considerations concerning the quantitative survey process
Before focusing on the development of deeper considerations of the survey process, we have to keep in mind some preliminary issues that we have to take into account for this research and for future and further studies. The distribution of the questionnaires and therefore the collection of the Italian sample has been very arduous and complex. The impossibility to select a priori the respondents of the sample by deciding to choose, for example, which level of education or which age class to include in the sample before the initial distribution of the survey, it has been unequivocally a huge methodological dilemma. Having had to collect randomly all the questionnaires that I could obtain, I had to make the best of things. The collection was so difficult that, in order to have an adequate number of completed questionnaires, I could not discard no one of them. My initial plan was to include in the sample only those respondents with similar characteristics in terms of age and education level with the final target to achieve a more homogenous sample. However, I had soon to change strategy if I wanted to reach a decent amount of survey and therefore I had to include every completed questionnaire without having the possibility to better refine the sample even a posteriori. Therefore, the more I continued to try collecting my questionnaires in order to have a decent number of them, the more I had to accept that the sample was not homogenous and proportionate. 253
Additionally, I have to point out how complex the collection was. In order to collect 198 surveys I had to travel along Italy for 8/9 months and during some weeks, I could only collect one questionnaire in a single week after difficult negotiations to persuade the respondents to fill in the questionnaire. Then, the high price for every single survey was another problem that I had to face. Probably with other funds and time, the collection would have been more proportionate. About this issue, the difficulties to reach a more proportionate and homogeneous sample have been encountered with the Chinese sample as well. On the one hand, I was able to collect more quickly the surveys in China as the Chinese respondents were happier to participate to my research than the Italian sample, probably because they did not talk directly to me and for this reason they felt safer than those Chinese respondents who were interviewed, face to face, by me and my intermediaries. The fact of answering the questionnaire inside their houses through an email process during their spare time is quite different than answering during their job, having a foreign inquisitor followed by his Chinese coadjutors. On the other hand, in China those who decided to answer the survey via email belong to a higher social and cultural class as the 92.5% of the sample has a degree in comparison with the respondents of the Italian sample with a degree (31.3%). These values are very disproportionate, but I have to point out, again, that for this kind of fieldwork it was impossible to select the respondents a priori and even to refine the Italian sample a posteriori by deciding to keep in consideration only those respondents with determined features, as I have reached an insufficient number of questionnaires. This premise is needed to let the reader understand that this research must be explored with all these limitations. It is a starting point for future studies but, undoubtedly, the 254
collection should be improved and refined without forgetting the complex and controversial Chinese cultural and social mindset.
If we focus on the results obtained within this sample, it is interesting to notice that this slice of the Chinese Community of Italy represents a manifold and contradictory cross-section of a portion of the Chinese society living in a foreign country. Most importantly, this segment of the Chinese society is not only living outside China with all the related problems of cultural and social integration but it is also facing a more open and free Internet dimension with all the consequent repercussions. As we have seen, some of the respondents have been living here since many years; they have more than 40 years old and they came here 15/20 years ago. These respondents have a middle or low level of education; they are quite integrated with the Italian society although they are not able to speak Italian very well. They are integrated mostly with their job as they, most of the times, have a solid work and business in Italy thanks to the purchase of restaurants and stores during the last years. These respondents are not well practiced with the Internet. They use it in order to stay in touch with their relatives in China or to play videogames. Their perception of the Internet censorship in China is very low; this low value can be observed mostly among those with a low level of education (primary and middle school). Further, they are not aware of what I call “the specific censorship perception”, i.e. the impossibility from China to connect to Facebook or YouTube and many other foreign websites. Then, another slice of the sample includes university students or graduates looking for a job. These respondents are from 20 to 30 years, they live here since 2 to 5 years and they usually are well practiced with the Internet. In this category, we can 255
glimpse some impressive points of change. Those respondents with a degree are clearly able to perceive the Internet censorship issues in their Motherland (28 out of 62, almost the 50%).
However, we have also to underline that we have a discouraging value of 76.5% of the whole sample (which includes every respondent) that is not able to perceive any concepts related to the Internet censorship and Internet restrictions. Nevertheless, if we take into account solely the respondents with a degree that I consider the future generations in which we can foresee the bricks for a new China, the value (almost the 50%) is reassuring if we compare it with the other sample in China, as we will see. Therefore, the situation is controversial. We can make some hypotheses; further studies focused on a more homogenous sample can validate my considerations. I think that if we had to take into account a possible actor of change able to break the monolithic Chinese cyberspace, we would have to focus on a Chinese netizen with a high level of education, with an age between 20 to 40 years old: a person who has experienced the foreign cyberspace after he/she has lived/studied/worked for some years abroad. Then, we would need time, because, as we will see in the chapter dedicated to the interviews, all these factors can build a road towards the modernity and a democratic cyberspace in China, but this road will probably need several years to mature.
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1.1 Results and appropriate comparisons between the two samples: positive aspects
In order to better analyze the Chinese sample of the respondents living in China and to try to hypothesize some general considerations about the two samples and lastly make some final assumptions, it is more methodologically appropriate, as mentioned above, to take into account two homogenous samples. As the majority (with the 92.5%) of the Chinese sample collected in China is composed by respondents with a high level of education, I have decided to consider only those respondents with a degree for the Italian sample in order to compare two homogenous samples. The results are indeed impressive. My preliminary assumption was that a Chinese netizen accustomed to a tight and pervasive Internet experience within an authoritarian country is not able to perceive evident discrepancies between his/her cyberspace and a foreign one and therefore he/she is not able to appreciate all the potentialities of a free Internet and an open access to information. Further, this netizen sometimes even supports the Chinese government policies about the Internet and for this reason, he/she becomes a gear of the whole Chinese mechanism, i.e. the actor world created by the government.
But what if we might put another gear in the devilish mechanism which moves the most sophisticated system of the Internet control in the world? This gear must be more mature, more open minded; this gear has visited other different and foreign countries, this gear is young and with a higher level of education than before. This gear will be ready to become viral and 257
contaminate the whole old mechanism and, probably, in some years will be able to create its own actor world, in which the Internet is a democratic virtual stage from which other and more substantial political changes can materialize themselves. The following comparisons take into account only those respondents within the category “degree” in both samples.
1.1.1 Perception of generic discrepancies between the Internet in China and the rest of the world: Comparison between the Italian sample and the Chinese sample
country Total China Italy doesn't know 67 4 71 Differences between two no 22 14 36 not answered 4 1 5 Internet dimensions yes 91 43 134 Total 184 62 246 Chi-square Test value df Sig. asint. (2 vie) Chi- Square of Pearson 21,443a 3 ,000 Likehood ratio 25,681 3 ,000 Number of valid cases 246 258
a. 2 cells ( 25,0% ) have an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.26
Differences are here significant.
This first table above concerns the discrepancies that the respondents are able to perceive about their Internet experiences in comparison with the other countries. For the Chinese respondents living in China (91 out of 184, almost the 50% of the sample) the Chinese Internet is different from abroad. With a higher result (43 out of 62, almost the 70%) the Chinese respondents living in Italy perceive that their previous Chinese Internet experience was different in comparison with the new one. Here we can find the first notable result, as the Chinese respondents living in Italy are much more aware that something in his/her previous cyberspace was different. We have to keep in mind that in this table we are analyzing generic differences that the respondent is able to perceive and therefore, we are not sure whether the respondents is referring to specific Internet censorship issues. Anyhow, the comparison is equally intriguing and compelling.
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1.1.2 Comparison of the discrepancies in detail between the two samples
country T
China Italy o t a l
different speed 37 15 5 or different 2 technical/costs aspects perception
different taste 24 10 3 content 4
doesn't 67 4 7 know/never 1 compared/only surfed in one country
General 24 14 3 censorship 8 Specify the differences perception
no perception 21 18 3 of 9 censorship/sim ilar experience/alm ost the same
not 15 2 1 specified/not 7 answered
Specific 1 14 1 censorship 5 perception (youtube/googl e) 260
189 77 2 Total 6 6
Chi-Square Value df Sig. asint. (2 vie) Chi-Square of Pearson 58,205a 6 ,000 Likehood ratio 62,124 6 ,000 Number of valid cases 266 a. 2 cells ( 14,3% ) have an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.34
Differences here are significant.
In this table, we can observe a comparison between the two samples concerning the differences in detail that the respondent is able to perceive. If we go to the point of the whole fieldwork, i.e. the Internet censorship perception, and we focus on the “general censorship perception” subcategory, we find out that only 24 out of 189 Chinese respondents living in China perceive it clearly (it is only the 12.69% of the sample). On the other hand, 14 out of 77 Chinese respondents living in Italy (the 18.1% of the sample) are able to perceive with a higher ratio the general censorship restrictions present in China. Also in this comparison, it is very promising the result, as the respondents living in Italy are much more aware that a pervasive Internet censorship is filtering the web experience in China. We can observe an even more encouraging result concerning the comparison 261
between the two sample about the category “specific censorship perception” (I remind that this category is about specific and targeted restrictions on particular foreign websites). Indeed, only 1 Chinese respondents living in China out of 189 (the 0.5% of the sample) is able to perceive this issue. On the contrary, the Chinese respondents living in Italy are aware of this limitation and issue with a much higher ratio, 18.1%. (18.1% versus the 0.5%)
1.1.3 Comparison between the two samples about the overall Internet censorship perception country Total China Italy no 104 31 135 Censorship perception not answered 5 3 8 related yes 28 28 56 Total 137 62 199
Chi-Square Value df Sig. asint. (2 vie) Chi-Square of Pearson 13,646a 2 ,001 Likehood ratio 13,195 2 ,001 Number of valid cases 199 262
a. 1 cells ( 16.7% ) have an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,49.
Differences are here significant.
The betrayal of a submissive actor able to destabilize the network. This is the last and most important comparison of the all fieldwork. It is about the overall perception of the Internet restrictions in China perceived by both samples. I remind that I have included in this category all the answers, comments, jokes, words related to the freedom of speech issues collected within the completion of the survey. Through this table, we find out that 28 out of 137 respondents living in China, with a ratio of 20.4% are aware that in China are present issues related to the freedom of speech and access to open information.
In Italy, the 45.1% of the respondents who have benefited for some years from an open Internet dimension were able to perceive that in China the Internet is somehow censored and monitored. It is more than double of the value.
For the category “no perception of censorship”, in China the ratio is 75.9% of the sample, i.e. almost the 76% of the respondents with a degree are not able to perceive that the Internet is filtered. In Italy, the ratio is still high, but it drops to the 50% of the sample with an impressive discrepancy. These results are quite impressive and they all show certainly that the Chinese perception of the Internet restrictions in China can mutate if a Chinese user benefits from a different, more open and foreign Internet experience. After having lived in Europe, a Chinese user can see through different and more 263
open eyes and thus have a more varied and deeper perception of the Internet censorship dilemma. Further, we can hypothesize that a Chinese netizen who has experienced a free Internet environment might become an actor of change able to destabilize all the Chinese cyberspace with his/her demands and needs of a new and fresh cyberspace also in China. The road is still arduous but there are here solid elements that let us envisage a different future Chinese cyberspace.
Another positive aspect that it is worth emphasizing refers to the fact that this entire fieldwork can be an alluring and tempting starting point for future, deeper researches. Every data and results here considered can be crossed with other values of this research or other samples. Another interesting factor concerns the fact that, probably for the first time, a scholar has the possibility to employ a different perspective in order to explore the Chinese cyber-society thanks to the opinions and the perception of a real Chinese user who lives in an authoritarian country and who is benefiting from a limited, filtered and monitored web experience. On the other hand, thanks to this research, it is possible to observe at the same time the mental evolution of a Chinese netizen who is experiencing now a more open society with all the potentialities of an unfiltered Internet and all the possible repercussions on the Chinese society. There is still much work to face as the collection of the samples must clearly improve in order to obtain homogenous samples to be compared. Further, other channels to better collect the surveys are urgently needed. If we think that I have spent almost 2500 euro for 400 questionnaires, something has to be changed for future and further studies about this topic. However, I have no methodological regrets as I had the possibility to validate my preliminary assumptions. If we 264
take into account a Chinese netizen with a high level of education and we implant him/her in an open society, it is evident an increase in his/her awareness and a deeper level of perception about the Internet censorship issues of his/her motherland. The data are clear and significant. His/her perception can become a living actor of change in the monolithic Chinese cyber-society; an actor able to bring to betrayal other entities operating within the initial program of the CCP (Callon, 1986); other Chinese mindsets living in China. This actor will have the possibility to contaminate friends, relatives and colleagues through his/her more mature awareness of the Internet censorship issues. This fresh and new actor, i.e. the perception of the Internet censorship issue, will have indeed the opportunity to seduce and attract new allies, i.e. other Chinese netizens, by showing them which potentialities the open Internet can offer. Further, with the passing of time, when always more and more Chinese will come to Europe and United States and will be enticed to benefit from an open Internet and from the free access to information, a more open Chinese cyber-society is foreseeable. Chinese people do not need more dissidents in order to hope for a change within the Chinese Intranet. They need a wider intermingling of foreign cultures and experiences.
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1.2 Final considerations concerning the survey process: Negative aspects
Chinese respondents living in Italy:
The first disheartened consideration concerns the fact that even a good portion of Chinese users living in Italy do not use European search engines. It is remarkable that the 14.6% of the respondents never use search engines and this fact let us understand how the Chinese netizen is often brainwashed in his/her Internet experience, or most probably, there are respondents in this sample not accustomed to use search engines when they need to find info. This is possible as some of the respondents are more than 50 years old and have a low level of education (primary and middle school). These aspects let us understand that we have to consider many factors and analyze with caution the whole Chinese situation about the Internet. If these respondents do not use search engines, it means that they do not search anything and they are not interested in the access to information in general through search engines. There might be many reasons for this daunting result: One motivation might be that they are so accustomed in China to find distorted information within the Internet or, as in some occasions, their query is completely blocked at the source that they do not try anymore to search anything. A second reason could be that they do not feel the need to inquire themselves or inform themselves after having lived for years in a tight regime. One last reason, as mentioned above, might concerns, most probably, the old age of the respondents and their low level of education, as they are not accustomed in general to search information through the Internet. These conjectures need to be compared with the results of the other 266
sample, but we have to keep in mind that we would need two samples more homogeneous (for example, with the same level of education).
A further discouraging value, if we focus on table n° 15, refers to the fact that the majority of the Chinese respondents living in Italy, with the 81.3% of the sample, do not surf other foreign countries. We can notice that only 27 respondents out of 198 do surf in Us or/and Europe. Other results are not relevant as they are under the 3%. Probably, both results are related to language issues. If we consider that the 58.6% of the respondents living in Italy prefer surfing only Chinese websites and also that 81.3% of the respondents do not want to browse foreign websites, we can hypothesize that there are both problems of language and cultural barriers. Otherwise, it is quite strange that these respondents do not feel the need to give a brief look at a new Internet dimension, for curiosity or just for the sake of seeing something that was previously forbidden.
Another crucial value refers to table 17. Here we can notice that there is a high value (63% of the sample; 50.7%+12.3%), which mirrors a clear indifference in surfing Italian websites or we do not know what Chinese respondents living in Italy use to search. Consequently, we have a wide dark side of the moon in which it is evident the Chinese reluctance to use a new and more open Internet platform, in this case the Italian Internet dimension, or they prefer to not share with us their Italian web experience. It would have been impressive to notice with a higher degree a stronger desire of the respondents to use a new Internet platform to broaden their horizons, or to expand their vision about the access to information. 267
In tab. 18, with a 0,7% of the sample, it is very discouraging to notice that only 2 respondents out of 198 search for materials about the Italian language or visit websites related to the study of this language. This value might mirror a low level of social integration with the country in which they live now and, considering also that I had to use Chinese intermediaries because most of the times it was impossible to communicate in Italian or in English with the respondents, we can understand that the Chinese community in Italy is not socially well integrated. The Chinese workforce in Italy is quite fervent and it is undergoing a solid development, but the parallel Chinese social integration is not proportionate.
Then, considering the perceived discrepancies between the European Internet dimension and the Chinese cyberspace, it is quite discouraging that the 60.1% (40.4%+19.7%) of the respondents are not able to see any differences or are not able to reply because the respondents simply do not know. The data here analyzed show us that only the 39.4% of the respondents are able to glimpse some differences, even if they now live in Italy and they benefit from all the potentialities of an open Internet dimension. It is quite discouraging, also considering that these discrepancies are most of the times not related to the concept of censorship as we are going to analyze.
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1.3 Future developments of the research
The limits of this research are known. The impossibility of selecting a priori the samples is a huge methodologically issue. Further, it is a remarkable dilemma also the difficulty to refine a posteriori the sample, by discarding those respondents not having the same features. The number of the survey was too scarce to filter the final amount of the questionnaires. Another aspect to be considered for a complete and deep perspective of this research is the short-term urgency of a comparison with a control sample. For example, it would be absolutely alluring to collect other questionnaires from another European country or from the United States in order to build a significant control sample able to validate my results or confute them. We have indeed to keep in mind that the biggest part of this research is focused on 198 Chinese living in Italy and, as I have already mentioned in this work, almost every one of them comes from the Province of Zhejiang. Besides, they work in little clothes shops, restaurants, betting center or they are students in the Italian universities. Therefore, we have not a wide and statistically proportionate portion of the Chinese population living in Italy. Further, the majority of the respondents are quite integrated with their job in Italy; indeed, they have often strong business in this country, but their level of social and cultural integration is not proportionate to their work, as, for example, their level of the Italian language is very low. It would be more significant to build a control sample composed by Chinese immigrants that are also (culturally and socially) integrated with a foreign society. It would be appreciable indeed to work on a control sample consisting of Chinese 269
persons that mirrors a portion of China more rooted with the society in which they live now; a sample more differentiated and varied. Probably, in this case, it would be also easier to collect the surveys and select a priori the sample.
I have already started the collection of a control sample more multifaceted. Until now, it includes only 16 Chinese respondents who live in different countries. They have all at least a degree and 5 of them have a PhD. Besides, 3 of them live in Germany, 5 of them live in Australia, 1 in Japan, 1 in New Zealand, 3 in Us, 1 in Belgium and 2 in Holland. What is peculiar to underline here, without bothering the reader with other numbers and statistics, is that the 50% of the sample is aware of the Internet censorship issue (in this value, there is both the general perception value and the specific perception value). This very preliminary result mirrors almost the same value of the Italian sample (45.1%), suggesting that my assumptions might be validated. Obviously, the road to build a significant sample is long but the very first preliminary results are promising for the future development of this research.
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1.4 Meaningful results concerning the qualitative interviews
The collected interviews reflect the overall results of the data analysis of my questionnaires. It is evident that when Chinese users are able to benefit from an open Internet dimension, for example in Europe, they undergo a change, at least unconsciously. They have started using western search engines, for example, and this is already a good starting point. It is true that all the three respondents who were aligned with the government at the beginning of the interview remain well aligned with the CCP also at the end of our conversation, but unequivocally something different and fresh has contaminated some of their absolute beliefs. Unequivocally, the act of using Google as primary search engine for their online searches, displacing Baidu from the first place of their favorite ones, is an outstanding result. In addition, the annoyance and embarrassment of Respondent B when he/she goes back to China and cannot use Facebook is another extraordinary achievement for persons like the Chinese people who are so accustomed to the passive acceptance of a decennial pervasive censorship in every media of the country. Their point of final maturation should be the awareness of Respondent C who is now fully integrated with all the benefits of an open and modern society. The road is still long, but at least, they have started following the same path.
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1.5 Final remarks
The fieldwork that I have carried out has been an exploration of a hidden dimension, the Chinese web experience. It has been very difficult to figure out how a typical Chinese user consider the Internet and to analyze his/her degree of knowledge in terms of Internet censorship. In addition, it has been even more arduous to study the Internet behavior of a Chinese user implanted in an open Internet society as the European one. From the beginning of my PhD studies, I have always thought that it would have been vital for a dynamic research that looks towards the future evolutions in the Chinese cyberspace to find out a plausible actor of change in this monolithic world. My initial purpose has been complex since the beginning (see the chapter about the collection of the questionnaires) but I have always been determined to prove that intermingling foreign experiences would have brought about a social maturation in those users that would have benefited from an open access to free information. Indeed, my preliminary assumption was that a Chinese Internet user accustomed to pervasive Internet restrictions might have undergone a change in his/her approach to the Internet possibilities if he/she would have experienced a more open and foreign Internet dimension.
I have compared two samples with the same cultural and social roots being both born in the province of Zhejiang. One sample is living/working/studying permanently in Italy and the other one continues to live in China. After the collection and the analysis of 397 questionnaires, it is possible to state that a Chinese Internet user with a high level of education 272
and with an age between 20 and 30 years old, implanted in an open Internet society with all the opportunities of a free web experience, is able perceive with a deeper degree of awareness (>45% than the sample living in China) some or all the Internet restrictions that previously he/she was not able to perceive or that was not interested in noticing, if we compare his/her current approach to the Internet with the attitude of Chinese people still living in China. Further, the analysis of the interviews has proved some of the equivalent alluring results, by showing a different approach to the search for information within the Internet. For example, the interviewees have started using Google as main search engine. Additionally, one of the interviewees complains that he/she cannot use Facebook from China and in my perspective, this is an outstanding genetic alteration in his/her approach to an open social site.
Indeed, those Chinese users with the above-mentioned characteristics in terms of education and age could perceive the Internet censorship issues with a higher value in comparison with their friends, relatives or acquaintances still living in China. I believe that, with all the limitations in the collection of the sample mentioned in the previous chapters, it is a remarkable and, in part, unexpected result. This plausible actor of change might provoke an effect on the Chinese cyberspace by influencing other Chinese mindsets, for example, by showing them an alternative and credible actor world in which free Internet and free information are at the core of a new web experience. This actor world will probably have the possibility to attract new allies by seducing them through new visions of the Internet and, therefore, new and fresh needs and demands of Internet freedom will arise also in the Chinese cyber-society. 273
Two further steps are necessary to enhance this research. Firstly, I will have to improve the collection of other questionnaires in order to try to assemble a more homogenous control sample useful to validate my data. I will need to collect as many surveys as possible but in less time and without spending the same amount of money. In addition, the collection should occur inside a western country in which the Chinese immigrants live within a more rooted social and cultural dimension. In Italy, the Chinese people that I met were surely integrated with their business, but often completely detached from the Italian society. They did not speak Italian very well and further they continued to live in isolation within this social dimension. Therefore, the collection of the surveys within a different western society might be very fruitful in order to validate my results. A second and final step to complete this work in progress should be inevitably the analysis of the web experience of those respondents who will come back to live in China after having benefiting from an open Internet dimension though other questionnaires and interviews. It will be crucial to verify their approach to the Chinese Internet after they have experienced an open access to free circulation of information in order, also in this case, to validate my assumptions and to observe all the repercussion within the Chinese cyberspace. However, the already obtained results are indicative and significant in order to glimpse an imminent destabilization within the current restrictive government’s actor world.
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1.6 The five gateways for managing the contradictions in the Chinese approach to the Internet
In the introduction I stated that for managing the Internet in China a research should consider five macro aspects to better focus the overall scenario of the Chinese Cyberspace. After this exploration within the Internet habits of an interesting portion of Chinese users who live in Italy and still in Chin, it is possible to confirm that:
1) The Internet is often the only instruments to explore the world and communicate for millions of Chinese. Chinese respondents and interviewees showed us their use of the Internet is strongly centered on their need to overcome the tight Chinese society, to know more about domestic news, to talk about corruption and local scandals, or simply to stay in touch with their family and friends at a cheaper cost; 2) The peculiar Chinese regime is strongly rooted within the respondents’ mindsets. Chinese respondents living in China and in Italy are often aligned with the Party and its ideology. They are glad to benefit from the possibilities allowed by their government and their criticism is very low. They tend to justify the harshness of the Chinese regime in terms of freedom of speech e by blaming the chaos that would occur because of a more open society; 3) Further, after this exploration, we can notice some of the paradoxes of the Chinese society in which the concept of self-censorship and censorship is present but at the same time it is evident respondents’ need to know more about the external world. They are aligned with 275
the government’s policies about the Internet but they have started to use Facebook for example, which is censored in China. They are now using American unfiltered search engines but they state that a huge amount of information that it is possible to find within these websites is against Chinese values. Therefore we can see many of the paradoxes explored in the introduction. 4) Lastly, the core of the research is the individual unit as the final gateway explored in the introduction. Chinese users, after having experienced an open Internet society, could alter the current status- quo within the Chinese cyberspace as this project has demonstrated with their increased perception of some of the issues of freedom of thought within the Chinese society.
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Curriculum Vitae – Sergio de Eccher
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Name DE ECCHER SERGIO
Address VIA TIZIANO VECELLIO 12A – 35010 CADONEGHE – (PD) Italy
Telephone (+39) 3475511448
E-mail [email protected] – [email protected]
Nationality Italian
Date of birth 14/09/1977
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
• Dates (from – to) 2/2012- next 02/2017
• Title of qualification: Phd in Organization and Culture
• Name and type of organisation providing education and training: University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
• Principal subjects/occupational skills covered: Organization, Management, Entrepreneurship, New technologies and Social media;
• Level in national classification Doctor of Philosophy (Phd) 302
------
• Dates 10/2010
• Title of qualification awarded Master Degree in Political Sciences (Vecchio Ordinamento)
• Name and type of organisation providing education and training: University of Padova
• Principal subjects/occupational skills covered: Political Sciences, International Relations, Economics,
Statistics
• Level in national classification Four years master degree
• Dates 07/1996
• Title of qualification awarded High School Diploma
• Name and type of organisation providing education and training: Liceo Linguistico Dante Alighieri
• Principal subjects/occupational skills covered: Language School (English, German, French)
• Level in national classification Five years high school diploma
303
WORK EXPERIENCE
• Dates (from – to) 12/2004 – 02/2012
• Name and address of employer University of Padua, Italy
• Type of business or sector University and Research
• Occupation or position held: Administrative Employee
My tasks were:
- to ensure the promotion, the organization and the administrative management of the Phd Schools and Courses, providing activities information and advices to internal referents (Directors / Coordinators of Schools and Courses) and external (students, external agencies)
• Dates (from – to) 09/2001 – 05/2004
• Name and address of employer: Università di Padova – Physics Department
• Type of business or sector University and Research
• Occupation or position held : Computer Consultant
I have worked for 3 years within the Project Mantegna (www.progettomantegna.it) established by
Department of Physics, University of Padova, by the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Padova and Rovigo and under the auspices of the Superintendence for the Historical and Artistic of Veneto and of 304
the Diocesan of Padua. The project envisaged the virtual restoration of the lost works of the famous artist Mantegna. Working in a staff of more than thirty people, we started in 2001 a virtual restoration that would have brought toward the real restoration carried out by expert restorers.
Compulsory Military Service
From 2/1999 – 12/1999 - Italian Red Cross
Principal subjects/occupational skills covered: Basic accounting office, delivery of food and clothes, frontoffice for general information
MOTHER TONGUE Italian
OTHER LANGUAGES
English
• Reading skills very good
• Writing skills very good
• Verbal skills very good
German
• Reading skills good
• Writing skills good 305
• Verbal skills satisfactory
French
• Reading skills basic
• Writing skills basic
• Verbal skills basic
Chinese (in learning)
• Reading skills basic
• Writing skills basic
• Verbal skills basic
Other Skills or interests:
Microsoft Office, Internet studies, Android, social media