. . . . .

Buses at Highway/Railway At- Grade Crossings

An assessment of risk associated with alternative crossing policies for at-grade highway/railway crossings.

Prepared for: City of April 7th, 2014

Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 THE QUESTION ...... 1 1.2 CROSSING TYPES ...... 1 1.3 ROAD SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT ...... 3 2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS ...... 6 2.1 TWO SIDES TO THE COIN ...... 6 2.2 CROSSING TIME AND EXPOSURE ...... 6 3 LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS ...... 7 3.1 OVERVIEW ...... 7 3.2 THE REQUIREMENTS OF LEGISLATION IN ...... 7 3.3 DEFENSIBILITY AND KEY PRACTICES OF INTEREST ...... 7 3.3.1 Compliance with the Railway Safety Act ...... 7 3.3.2 Compliance with RTD 10...... 8 4 THE LITERATURE ...... 9 4.1 OVERVIEW ...... 9 4.2 FINDINGS ...... 9 5 CURRENT PRACTICE...... 11 5.1 OVERVIEW ...... 11 5.2 SURVEY OF TRANSIT AGENCIES ...... 11 5.2.1 Agencies where buses are required to stop ...... 11 5.2.2 Agencies where buses are not required to stop...... 11 5.2.3 Agencies that did not reply: ...... 12 5.3 OPERATION LIFESAVER ...... 12 5.4 OTTAWA & : A UNIQUE CHALLENGE ...... 13 6 LEGISLATION ...... 14 6.1 OVERVIEW ...... 14 6.2 FINDINGS ...... 14 7 STOP OR NO STOP: A RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION ...... 15 7.1 OVERVIEW ...... 15 7.1.1 Advantages of stopping ...... 15 7.1.2 Disadvantages of stopping ...... 15 7.2 WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN? ...... 16 8 TECHNOLOGY AND RISK ...... 17 8.1 CROSSING RISK ...... 17 8.1.1 A national overview ...... 17 8.1.2 Statistics and the risk context ...... 17 8.1.3 Active crossing warning systems: The need for fail-safe operation...... 18 8.1.4 Warning systems and safety performance...... 18 8.1.5 The need for cost effective solutions ...... 19 8.1.6 Operating protocols and the transfer of risk ...... 20 8.2 SOME IMPORTANT RISK MANAGEMENT FINDINGS ABOUT CROSSINGS ...... 21 9 IMPLICATIONS ON THE CURRENT TRANSIT ROUTES ...... 23

ii MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

9.1 OVERVIEW ...... 23 9.2 IMPACTS ON REGULAR SERVICE BUS ROUTES ...... 23 10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 24 10.1 STOP OR NO STOP ...... 24 10.2 CROSSING WARNING SYSTEMS ...... 24 10.3 OTHER NECESSARY ACTIONS ...... 24

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: AT-GRADE CROSSING WITH PASSIVE PROTECTION ...... 2 FIGURE 2: ACTIVE CROSSING WITH LIGHTS AND BELLS – NO GATES ...... 2 FIGURE 3: ACTIVE CROSSING WITH GATE PROTECTION ...... 3 FIGURE 4: THE RISK MANAGEMENT SPACE ...... 4

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: GENERALIZED EFFECTIVENESS OF CROSSING WARNING DEVICES ...... 18 TABLE 2: FHWA WARNING SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ...... 19 TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF AT-GRADE CROSSINGS USED BY OC TRANSPO ...... 23

RIGHT TO MODIFY

The opinions expressed in this report are based on the best information available to us at the time of its preparation. We reserve the right to modify or add to our opinion if we are provided with additional information at any time.

iii MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The question This report sets out the findings from a review of operational procedures for the traversing of at-grade highway/railroad crossings (HR crossings) by OC Transpo- operated public transit buses in the , Ontario, . The study provides a risk-based overview of the two primary approaches that are widely used for these purposes in both Canada and the United States. It is not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, it reflects current practices that are extant in both countries and the established state of knowledge that supports these practices. As such, it is intended to provide supportive guidance to the City of Ottawa and its public transit branch, OC Transpo, in preparing a response to the following question:

Should OC Transpo implement a procedure whereby public transit buses would be required to stop at non-active at-grade railway crossings equipped with active warning devices at all times in order to verify the clearway prior to proceeding into and traversing the crossing?

This review examined the operational practices for OC Transpo’s regular service buses only and does not attempt to address Para Transpo.

1.2 Crossing types While many different types of technology are available for use as active warning devices for at-grade HR crossings, for the purposes of this report we distinguish three specific categories of at-grade crossings:

 Passive crossings: where no active train detection or highway warning devices are present, and the crossing is generally indicated by signing only, or in some cases, combinations of signing and pavement markings. At these types of crossings, the responsibility is on the driver to assess the crossing risk and – in accordance with rules of the road normally specified under the relevant provincial/territorial highway traffic act – traverse the crossing at the opportunity of their choosing. One of the key concerns associated with this form of crossing is that the decision on whether it is safe to proceed across the tracks is transferred solely to the driver. Currently, OC Transpo buses are required to stop in advance of all passive crossings to look for approaching trains. If the way is clear, only then can the bus cross the tracks. There are currently no scheduled routes using passive crossings.

1 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

Figure 1: At-grade crossing with passive protection

 Active crossings with no gate protection: where active train detection technologies are present and combine with various arrangements of signing, flashing lights, bells, and in some cases interconnected traffic signals, to provide road users with advance warning of the approach or actual presence of a train in the crossing. The concern associated with this crossing type is that the additional level of fail-safe1 offered by the presence of gate protection is not present in the crossing warning system. Currently, OC Transpo buses are not required to stop at these crossings when the warning signals are non-active.

Figure 2: Active crossing with lights and bells – no gates

1 A fail-safe or fail-secure device is one that, in the event of failure, responds in a way that will cause no harm, or at least a minimum of harm, to other devices or danger to personnel. Significantly, despite popular belief to the contrary, a system's being "fail-safe" does not mean that failure is impossible/improbable, but rather that the system's design prevents or mitigates unsafe consequences of the system's failure; that is, if and when a "fail-safe" system "fails", it is "safe" or at least no less safe than when it is operating correctly. Source: Wikipedia- Adapted from: “Fail-safe” Audio English.org/Dictionary/Fail-safe.htm and David B. Rutherford Jr. “ What do you mean –It’s fail-safe?” Evaluating Fail Safety in Processor-Based Vital Control Systems. American Public Transit Association. 1990 Rapid Transit Conference, June 1990, Vancouver, B.C.

2 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

 Active crossings with gate protection: where the crossing combines the protection devices used in active crossings with physical gates that lower and block the roadway on the approach of a train to prevent road users from entering the crossing until the train has traversed and sufficiently cleared the crossing. The failsafe mode at such crossings is also “gate down”, thus continuing to provide an impediment to road users from entering the crossing under crossing warning system failure conditions. Currently, OC Transpo buses are not required to stop at these crossings when the warning signals are non-active.

Figure 3: Active crossing with gate protection

In both of the active crossing types, drivers are provided with technologically-based guidance on the actual or impending presence of a train in order to help them better assess and manage the risk associated with traversing the at-grade railway crossing. At all railway crossings, the railway crossing itself belongs to the railway and any train upon the railway track has the absolute right of way.

1.3 Road safety and risk management In their report on the Highway 407 Safety Review – one of the first road safety audits carried out in Canada – the authors note:

A road would be completely safe if no collisions occurred on it. But crashes occur on all roads in use. It is therefore inappropriate to say of any road that it is completely safe. However, it is correct to say that roads can be built safer or less safe. Consider two alternative road designs, connecting the same two points and carrying the same traffic. The road design that is likely to have fewer or less sever crashes would be deemed to be the safer one.2

Two points are being made:

2 Professional Engineers Ontario. Highway 407 Safety Review. PEO. , Ontario. March 1997. p. 11

3 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

 If, by saying a road is “safe”, one means that there are no crashes upon it, then there is no such thing as a safe road since once it opens to traffic, collisions will begin to occur;

 The safety performance of road is defined by the frequency of crashes that occur upon it.

These points are fundamental and they apply to roads of all types, including those which incorporate at-grade railway crossings. They also imply that the primary goal of road designers from a road safety standpoint must be that of risk management.

When we talk about managing risk, we refer to the fact that the decision maker can take actions that can change the magnitude or chance of a loss taking place. Implementing risk management actions implies active behaviour involving attempts to adjust the components of the risky situation. With respect to roads and/or grade crossings, the actions may involve design choices, operational rules (speed limits, stopping conditions etc.), or other measures.

However, to attempt such actions requires a fundamental understanding of the components of the risky situation and their relative influences on possible outcomes under different circumstances. Risk management aims to provide information that will help decision makers to recognize and evaluate the risks, evaluate alternative actions, and to choose from among those actions. What is important to recognize is that the actions themselves are risky, and although our understanding of their potential impacts may be based on the best available information, there is no absolute certainty as to the outcome that will occur. The concept of managing risk in this type of environment can be best shown in graphical form as illustrated below.

Figure 4: The risk management space

Risk has two dimensions: some likelihood from low to high that an event will occur - as represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 4; and some impact that will result from the 4 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings event - the vertical axis ranging from low to high. As we’ve already seen, we can never completely erase all risk in all road situations. We do however strive to design facilities so that we operate in the green square in Figure 4. Where we cannot avoid some potential for a high impact situation such as a crash between a train and a road vehicle (the yellow or red risk area in the illustration), we try to reduce its likelihood to as low a level as possible. What is important to realize here is that to do so we must choose among alternative actions on a rational and factual technical basis, and that even in so doing, we cannot eliminate the likelihood of the event occurring except by completely changing the risk paradigm: for instance, moving from an at-grade crossing design to a completely separated crossing environment like an underpass or overpass. And even in this case, although we eliminate the possibility of a train/vehicle crash, other types of collisions will occur.

5 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 Two sides to the coin When we think of collisions at at-grade HR crossings, our attention often focuses on the crashes between trains and motor vehicles on the roadway. As John Glennon points out:

Reducing accidents at rail-highway grade crossings has long been a subject of public concern. No other kind of motor-vehicle accident has such a high severity, making this a safety issue of primary significance. The ratio of persons killed and injured to the number of accidents at grade crossings is forty times the same ratio for all motor vehicle accidents.3

Unfortunately, the dramatic nature of this statistic masks the fact that vehicle-train collisions are only one component of the crashes that occur at HR crossings. In his continuing discussion on this issue in the same text, Glennon notes that:

About five times as many accidents at rail-highway crossings do not involve trains. These accidents include rear-end collisions with vehicles stopped at the crossing, fixed object collisions with crossing devices, and run-off-the-road collisions by drivers losing control on rough crossings or on severely humped crossings. Therefore, remedial measures for reducing vehicle-train collisions must also not compound non-train-involved accidents.4

Not surprisingly because of the similarity of Canadian and American design and operations approaches to HR crossings, the American statistics cited above are generally reflective of the Canadian context as well. The fact is that mitigating measures – whether of a design or operating procedures nature – can significantly and negatively affect the safety of an HR crossing for vehicles in and around the crossing other than those that may ultimately be involved in a train-vehicle crash. As will be discussed later in this report, stopping regulations for vehicles on the approach to the crossing are one of those mitigating measures that give particular cause for concern.

2.2 Crossing time and exposure From a risk standpoint, the time required to completely traverse and clear an at-grade HR crossing represents an unavoidable period of exposure to the risk of collision with a train. The longer this period of exposure, the greater the likelihood that a train may arrive while the vehicle has entered and not yet completely cleared the crossing. Research clearly shows that exposure periods are longer when vehicles must stop before entering and clearing a crossing. Depending on the vehicle involved, such clearance times can be substantively extended by the practice. We discuss this matter in more detail in Chapter 4 of this report.

3 Glennon, J. Hill, P. “Roadway Safety and Tort Liability: Second Edition”. Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc. Tucson. AZ. 1996. p. 256 4 Glennon, J. Hill, P. “Roadway Safety and Tort Liability: Second Edition”. Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc. Tucson. AZ. 1996. p. 257

6 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

3 LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Overview Exposure to liability for agencies providing road and rail transportation services generally arises from a failure to comply with established practices in their field of endeavour. Railroad and roadway authorities have been found to have a general duty of care to users of their infrastructure. Public or private agencies that carry passengers for hire also share such a general duty of care for their passengers. Roadway drivers – whether operating in their own private service or as the operator in a vehicle providing public goods or person movement services – also have responsibilities and must obey traffic control devices, traffic laws, and rules of the road. If providing public services, they must also follow the relevant established practices and operating policies stipulated by legislation, regulation, and their employer.

3.2 The requirements of legislation in Ontario Any decision to require public transit buses to stop at non-active at-grade HR crossings equipped with active warning devices at all times in order to verify the clearway prior to proceeding into and traversing the crossing must comply with Provincial legislation. At present, the relevant Provincial legislation in Ontario – the Highway Traffic Act – does not require such action on the part of public transit buses at non-active at-grade HR crossings equipped with active warning devices. Nonetheless, the legislation does not prevent transit agencies from instituting such policies if they wish, and – as discussed later in this report – the situation in Ontario is that both practices, stopping and not stopping at such crossings, are used.

3.3 Defensibility and key practices of interest Assuming crossing practices comply with applicable legislation, the key to their defensibility appears to be the context within which they are implemented, and the compliance of this broader design and operating context with the generally accepted design, maintenance, and operating principles and practices that are extant in the community of relevance – in this case, usually the country and the province.

While a detailed discussion of these principles and practices is well beyond the scope of this review, the following key considerations are of primary relevance to the defensibility of any grade crossing policies or procedures.

3.3.1 Compliance with the Railway Safety Act The Railway Safety Act is federal legislation that was implemented in 1989. It sets the regulatory framework for addressing rail safety, security, and some of the environmental impacts of rail operations in Canada. Significant amendments were made to this act in 2012 and came into force on May 1, 2013. Further to this act, Transport Canada developed a set of grade crossing regulations that require road authorities and railway companies to conduct periodic detailed safety assessments at all unrestricted HR crossings. The Transport Canada document “Canadian Road/ Railway Grade Crossing Safety Assessment Guide” provides guidelines for such safety assessments and is intended to be read in conjunction with a companion document entitled “RTD 10 Road/Railway Grade Crossings: Technical Standards and Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Requirements”.

7 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

3.3.2 Compliance with RTD 10 As described in its foreword, RTD10 sets out minimum safety criteria for construction or alteration, maintenance, including inspection and testing, of grade crossings and of their road approaches and other land adjoining the land on which the railway line is situated insofar as the safety of the crossing may be affected. RTD 10 has been in draft form since it was first published in 1997. In spite of being in draft form, it has become a de- facto practice document widely used and cited in the industry and supportive of the legislated safety requirements underpinned by the Railway Safety Act and its associated grade crossing regulations. The current revision (1999) of the Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads5 (Canada’s national geometric design guide) specifically refers to RTD 10 and directs road designers involved in the design and construction of new crossings, or the modification of an existing crossing to consult this guide in their work:

The construction of a new railway grade crossing or the modification of an existing one must be undertaken according to the regulations found in the Canadian Transportation Agency of Canada, General Order No. E-4 “Standard Regulations Respecting the Construction of a Crossing of a Highway and a Railway At-Grade”.

The Railway Safety Directorate, Surface Group, of Transport Canada has published a manual (footnote reference to RTD 10 in original text) to provide guidance on the construction and maintenance of railway/road grade crossings. Reference to this document must be made to supplement information contained herein.6

Transport Canada is in the process of replacing RTD 10 with a document entitled Grade Crossing Standards dated February 2014 which was recently issued to road and rail authorities for comment. For the purposes of this report, we have continued to refer to these regulations as RTD 10 in recognition of their past role and because the differences between the two documents are relatively minor.

5 Transportation Association of Canada (TAC). “Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads”. TAC. Ottawa, Canada. 1999 6 Transportation Association of Canada (TAC). “Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads”. TAC. Ottawa, Canada. 1999. p. 2.3.13.1

8 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

4 THE LITERATURE

4.1 Overview As part of this assessment we conducted a literature review to identify research specific to the safety performance of special vehicles stopping at protected railway grade crossings. During the course of this review, it became clear that defensible technical information quantifying the road safety impacts of this practice is very limited and focuses mainly on school buses and hazardous load transporters.

4.2 Findings The seminal North American research in looking at the value of requiring certain types of vehicles (not just buses) to stop at HR crossings with active warning devices when the devices are not activated was funded and published in 1985 by the US Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). A good summary of the purpose and results of the study is provided in the forward to the work:

The purpose of this study was to determine the safety, economic, operational, and environmental consequences of requiring certain types of vehicles to stop at railroad crossings with active warning devices when the devices are not activated. The study included an assessment of the positive and negative impacts on train and nontrain-involved accidents, traffic operations, fuel consumption, delay, pullout-lane construction and maintenance costs, and environmental degradation.

Results of the study indicate that not mandating stops at railroad crossings with active devices when the devices are not activated would result in an annual reduction of both train and nontrain accidents for hazardous material transporters, school buses, and passenger buses. Not requiring stops would result in a net annual decrease in train-involved accidents for hazardous material transporters, school buses, and passenger buses of 2.6, 10.8, and 17.4 percent, respectively. The annual economic savings resulting from not requiring stops were estimated as $454,000 in accident costs, $1,241,000 in pullout-lane construction and maintenance costs, $12,267,000 in excess fuel consumption, and $1,510.000 in delay.7

The decrease in net annual train involved collisions (17.4%8) outlined in the reference above was the result of a decrease in collisions in which the train struck a vehicle. This overall decrease occurred even though there was a small increase (3.3%9) in accidents where the train was struck by a vehicle.

7 Consequences of Mandatory Stops at Railway – Highway Crossings: Report FHWA/RD-86/014, US Department of Transportation – Federal Highway Administration, 1985. Technical Documentation Page. Abstract. 8 Ibid. Page 158. 9 Ibid. Page 76.

9 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

In their book entitled Human Factors in Traffic Safety, Dewar and Olson discuss the 1985 FHWA study in more detail10. The study found that even though many jurisdictions require these types of vehicles to stop at HR crossings, there is a substantial degree of non-compliance among drivers of these vehicles. As noted above, the study also concluded that there is no safety benefit associated with this regulation and that requiring special vehicles to stop at HR crossings may actually lead to an increase in collisions.

Dewar et al note that the increase in non-train-involved crashes is attributable to the increased exposure time required for the longer and slower-moving vehicles to clear the track when starting from a stop (up to 20 seconds in some instances) and insufficient advanced warning to drivers in the general traffic stream that these special vehicles have stopped.

The only other substantive study dealing with selected vehicles being required to stop at HR crossings did not deal with the quantification of safety benefits that might result from not requiring such stops. Rather, this 1982 report funded by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)11 examined collisions involving hazardous material transporters and highlighted the fact that drivers involved in these accidents appeared to demonstrate an irresponsible or careless attitude at the crossings.

This echoes the more general findings of driver non-compliance with railway crossing devices, including work carried out by Caird et al for the Transportation Development Centre of Transport Canada12.

As Dewar notes:

It appears that non-compliance with traffic control devices at crossings is widespread, especially for STOP signs….Even when the appropriate (legally required) action is known, many drivers violate signals and gates if they see no train or consider it safe to ignore the warning. Driver familiarity and social norms (“everyone does it”) also impact compliance rates.13

The 1982 NTSB report also noted that at that time, grade crossing rules for hazardous material trucks differed from state to state and for the different crossing types (active and passive protection) across the country. In their recommendations, the NTSB recommended that these differences should be resolved to reduce possible driver confusion and the potential for driver error.

10 Dewar, R. Olson, P. “Human Factors in Traffic Safety: Second Edition”. Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc. Tucson. AZ. 2007. p. 395. 11 Lawrence E. Jackson, National Transportation Safety Board, “ Railway-Highway Grade Crossing Accidents Involving Trucks Transporting Bulk Hazardous Materials ”, ITE Journal, 1982 12 Caird, J.K. Creaser, J.I. Edwards, C.J. Dewar, R.E. “A Human Factors Analysis of Highway-Railway Grade Crossing Accidents in Canada). TDC. Transport Canada. TP13939. Montreal. Quebec. September, 2002. 13 Dewar, R. Olson, P. “Human Factors in Traffic Safety: Second Edition”. Lawyers and Judges Publishing Company, Inc. Tucson. AZ. 2007. p. 394.

10 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

5 CURRENT PRACTICE

5.1 Overview In this section of our assessment, we present the findings of a limited survey of the grade crossing policies of transit agencies from various locations in Canada. Our survey focused on the specific question being addressed in our review: the policies relevant to the crossing of at-grade HR crossings equipped with active warning devices by public transit buses. Due to the time-constrained nature of our work, the survey covers a limited sample size.

5.2 Survey of transit agencies Findings for this survey indicate that that both stop and no-stop practices are applied in North America. The following points summarize the policies of the transit agencies we have contacted to date.

5.2.1 Agencies where buses are required to stop The following transit agencies require buses to stop at all railway crossings whether actively protected (by any and all forms of active warning devices) or passively protected:

 TTC  Go Transit  City of Mississauga  Region of Waterloo 

5.2.2 Agencies where buses are not required to stop When buses are not required to stop, specific regulations are often slightly different from agency to agency. Where necessary we have provided a brief descriptive commentary of each “no stop” respondent.

Winnipeg Transit:

 Transit bus operators are not required to stop at active or passive HR crossings within the boundaries of the City of Winnipeg unless gates are down, lights are flashing, flagmen are on location, the crossing is controlled with a stop sign, or when an approaching train is close enough to pose a hazard to the bus.

 Railway crossings tend to create a bump hazard. In order to prevent personal injury and equipment damage, operators are instructed to reduce their speed to 30 km/h when crossing.

 Outside the boundaries of the City of Winnipeg, the same procedures as within the City of Winnipeg apply to active crossings but operators must stop at all passive crossings.

11 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

Edmonton Transit:

 Operators are not required to stop at HR crossings unless the gates are down, the lights are flashing, flagmen are on location, the crossing is controlled with a stop sign, or an approaching train is close enough to pose a hazard to the bus. Operators are required to slow their bus to one half of the posted speed limit on the approach to a crossing.

Calgary Transit:

 Buses do not stop at actively protected grade crossings unless the bells/lights and/or gates are activated. The agency is not aware of any passively protected crossings within the City limits.

Lethbridge Transit:

 Buses do not stop at actively protected grade crossings unless the bells/lights and/or gates are activated. The agency is not aware of any passively protected crossings with in the City limits.

Saskatoon Transit:

 Buses do not stop at actively protected grade crossings unless the bells/lights and/or gates are activated. The agency is not aware of any passively protected crossings within the City limits.

Strathcona County Transit (suburb of Edmonton):

 At controlled HR crossings buses are required to slow before the crossing and advance at a speed not more than one half of the posted speed limit.

5.2.3 Agencies that did not reply: Although the following transit agencies have been contacted regarding their grade crossing procedures, no information has been provided to date:

 Port Authority of Allegany County (Pittsburgh, PA.)

5.3 Operation Lifesaver Operation Lifesaver is a nationwide, non-profit public information and education organization dedicated to eliminating collisions, injuries, and fatalities at highway-railway crossings and from trespassing on railway rights-of-way. Their program provides information to professional truck drivers, school bus drivers, motor coach and transit drivers, emergency responders, and the general public.

The Operation Lifesaver literature contains guidance on a recommended stopping procedure for transit bus drivers who are required to stop at highway-railway crossings. This guidance does not distinguish between active and passive protected crossings. However, the authors of the literature do note that HR crossing policies do vary for transit buses in each Province and that local municipal or corporate policies may require further action: 12 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

Laws and regulations governing motor coach and transit drivers at highway-railway crossings may vary in each province. Be aware of your provincial legislation to ensure that you are in compliance at all times. Also, know that local law and company policy may require further action.14

5.4 Ottawa & Quebec: a unique challenge We note that the Quebec Highway Safety Code requires transit buses to stop at all active and passive protected HR crossings. This is not the case with the Highway Traffic Act in Ontario, or with OC Transpo per se. As OC Transpo provides service in both Ottawa and Quebec, and the Quebec-side transit company does likewise in Ontario, drivers from both companies must be aware of and adjust their actions as appropriate when moving in-service between jurisdictions.

It is our understanding that OC Transpo has not reported or experienced any incidents involving driver error resulting from this existing difference in policies regarding the stopping of buses at inactive HR crossings equipped with active warning devices. Nonetheless, we note that the previously mentioned (See Section 4.2) 1982 NTSB report by the United States Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)15 did point out that grade crossing rules for hazardous material trucks differed from state to state and for the different crossing types (active and passive protection).

In their recommendations, the NTSB recommended that where possible and appropriate, differences in operating procedures should desirably be resolved. Such resolution could help to eliminate possible confusion and the potential for error on the part of the specialist vehicle drivers to whom the regulations applied. Although this report was specific to hazardous material transporters it underlines the need to consider such differences carefully, and to ensure that the drivers involved in such situations have appropriate training, regular reinforcement, and the necessary knowledge to perform their tasks in the appropriate manner reliably and consistently.

14 Operation Lifesaver. “Instructors Guide”. 15 Lawrence E. Jackson, National Transportation Safety Board, “ Railway-Highway Grade Crossing Accidents Involving Trucks Transporting Bulk Hazardous Materials ”, ITE Journal, 1982

13 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

6 LEGISLATION

6.1 Overview As part of this review we were asked to review and examine the differences between the provision of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act and the Quebec Highway Safety code with respect to the requirement for transit buses to stop at inactive at-grade HR crossings.

6.2 Findings The following points summarize our findings with regard to provincial highway legislation governing transit buses in Ontario and Quebec:

 The Ontario Highway Traffic Act states that buses and other public vehicles are required to stop at HR crossings that do not have automatic warning devices, such as barriers or signal lights. The current OC Transpo operating procedures comply with this requirement. School buses must stop at all railway crossings whether or not they have signals or barriers.

 The Quebec Highway Safety Code requires drivers of buses, minibuses and hazardous material transporters to stop at all HR crossings whether protected in any form or not. The current OC Transpo operating procedures make provision for this requirement.

 In general in the North American context provincial and state legislation requires school buses and hazardous material transporters to stop at HR crossings. Although motor coaches (buses for hire) are often mentioned, public transit is rarely addressed.

14 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

7 STOP OR NO STOP: A RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION

7.1 Overview When considering the appropriateness of the current OC Transpo operating procedure for HR crossings with active protection, the overall risk environment at the crossings must be examined and the proven benefits considered. This includes considering the potential for both train/vehicle collisions and non-train related collisions at the crossing.

Intuitively, many people think that requiring buses to stop at inactive crossings equipped with active protection would offer some safety advantage. The reality however is that there does not appear to be any quantitative evidence indicating that stopping transit buses at these crossings improves road safety performance. To the contrary, the literature indicates that stopping these buses at appropriately equipped crossings will likely result in more collisions overall at the crossing.

To clarify the nature of some of the key trade-offs involved when considering the possibility of moving to a policy that requires transit buses to stop at all times when approaching an inactive crossing equipped with active protection, the following subsections provide a summary of some of the advantages and disadvantages associated with such a policy.

7.1.1 Advantages of stopping  The policy would be consistent with Quebec procedures. Consistency in procedures across jurisdictions simplifies the driving task somewhat and could help to eliminate possible confusion and the potential for error on the part of the specialist vehicle drivers to whom the regulations applied.

 The policy would be consistent with some, but not all, of the other transit agencies in Ontario. Such consistency between transit agencies allows for the exchange of knowledge and experience and the consequent potential for the improvement of operating practices and policies over time.

 In the event of a failure of the fail-safe mechanism of the crossing’s active warning system, such a policy may provide a secondary check that the grade crossing is clear.

 Currently, OC Transpo drivers are required to stop at passive crossings and not at crossings equipped with active protection. By requiring bus drivers to stop at all crossings, the bus driver’s decision process is simplified as the same procedure is applied to all crossings anywhere that buses in regular service are operating.

7.1.2 Disadvantages of stopping  The research indicates that such a policy would increase motor vehicle/motor vehicle grade crossing collisions due to an increase in traffic conflicts between stopped/slow moving buses and higher speed general traffic. Requiring transit buses to stop unnecessarily may also expose the City to liability in the event of a serious collision resulting from such action.

 Transit buses and their passengers would be subject to a higher risk of train crash involvement since buses crossing a railway trackset from a stop will require

15 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

substantially more time to clear the grade crossing than vehicles moving through without stopping.

 Requiring buses to stop on the approach to all inactive crossings equipped with active protection will increase driver workload16 for the bus operator. Increases in driver workload are typically associated with a greater potential for driver error.

 Stopping buses at inactive crossings equipped with active protection will have a negative impact on traffic operations and the overall capacity and level of service offered by the roadway in the vicinity of the crossing. This is due to the increased traffic turbulence generated by the braking, avoidance, and lane-changing actions of other traffic responding to the presence of a decelerating/stopping bus when such action is not required.

7.2 What does this all mean? All HR crossings, including those equipped with active protection, represent areas where the risk of collisions is greater than would normally be the case on a similar segment of roadway without a crossing. Among other things, that elevated risk is created by the physical presence and nature of the crossing, vehicle and other road user operations on the roadway and associated facilities, and of course, train activity on the tracks and the physical design of the crossing and its associated warning devices.

Whether road traffic or some portion thereof stops or does not stop at crossings equipped with active protection when the warning systems are inactive will have some influence on the level of risk noted immediately above. Assuming that such a crossing complies with or exceeds the provisions of the Railway Safety Act and its constituent regulations and advisory documents, and based on the findings of Chapter 4 of this report, a policy of not requiring buses to stop at non-active, at-grade, HR crossings equipped with active warning devices appears to contribute to a reduced level of collision risk when compared to a policy requiring buses to stop.

However, we note that the research does not distinguish between the various levels of active warning protection (crossings protected with gates, light and bells versus crossings protected with lights and bells only). This is of particular concern, as research also indicates that the various levels of active warning protection provide very different levels of safety effectiveness. This is an important consideration for transit, as the level of HR crossing protection provided can have a significant impact on passenger safety.

The following chapter provides a discussion on the safety performance of the various levels of HR crossing protection and their associated challenges.

16 Workload is the amount of work an individual has to do. There is a distinction between the actual amount of work and the individual's perception of the workload. Workload can also be classified as quantitative (the amount of work to be done) or qualitative (the difficulty of the work). The assessment of operator workload has a vital impact on the design of new human-machine systems. By evaluating operator workload during the design of a new system or iteration of an existing system, problems such as workload bottlenecks and overload can be identified. As the human operator is a central part of a human-machine system, the correction of these problems is necessary for the operation of safe and efficient systems. Source: Wikipedia - adapted from: Jex,S.M. ”Stress and Job Performance: Theory, Research and Implications for Managerial Practice.” Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd. (1998).

16 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

8 TECHNOLOGY AND RISK

8.1 Crossing risk 8.1.1 A national overview In 2012, there were 16,229 public crossings in Canada. This number has been decreasing steadily in the past decade and is down by about 18% from 2003 when there were 19,73217. There are private crossings to which this study does not apply.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) notes that of the 187 crossing accidents that occurred in 2012, twenty-five of those accidents resulted in fatalities. Those 25 accidents in 2012 resulted in twenty-nine fatalities compared to twenty-five fatalities in 2011, and to the five-year average of 24 fatalities per year. Pedestrians comprised 45% of the crossing-related fatalities18.

Of the 187 crossing accidents, about 39% occurred at what the TSB calls “public passive” crossings: a term that corresponds to the “passive crossings” noted earlier in this report. “Public automated” crossings – corresponding to the combined two levels of active crossing cited earlier – accounted for 49% of all crossing accidents. In commenting on this fact, the TSB notes:

There were 187 crossing accidents in 2012, up from 170 recorded in 2011 but down from the five-year average of 195. Accidents at public automated crossings (92) increased 6% from the 2011 total of 87 but decreased 7% from the five-year average of 99. Accidents at public passive crossings (73) increased 14% from the five-year average of 64. … The proportion of crossing accidents that occurred at public automated crossings decreased slightly from 51% in 2011 to 49% in 2012. Although there are nearly twice as many public passive crossings as public automated ones, the higher number of accidents occurring at automated crossings is due, in part, to higher vehicle and train traffic volumes at these crossings19.

8.1.2 Statistics and the risk context The national statistics outlined in Section 8.1.1 remind us that at-grade HR crossings are a source of direct risk for road users. As the TSB notes, the statistics also underline the fact that at crossings where traffic and train volumes are higher, we can expect to see greater numbers of crossing accidents. This doesn’t mean that the risk facing individual road users traversing an HR crossing is necessarily higher at the two types of active crossings than at passive crossings.

However, it does stress the requirement for enhanced levels of crossing warning and technology sophistication at these locations. It is also indicative of the critical need for both road agencies and railways to recognize and deal with any risks that may arise from their HR crossing activities. One way in which they manage these risks is by the deployment of active crossing warning systems where at-grade HR crossings occur.

17 Transportation Safety Board of Canada. “Railway Occurrences 2012”. Ontario. Canada. Table 7. p. 20 18 Ibid. p.7 19 Ibid. p. 7

17 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

Such systems advise motorists, pedestrians, cyclists, and other road users of the approach or presence of trains on the track.

8.1.3 Active crossing warning systems: The need for fail-safe operation Active crossing signal and warning systems are highly complex devices that are interconnected with related railway signaling, warning, and communications networks. In many cases, may also be interconnected to road agency traffic control devices such as traffic signals, to allow for the coordinated operation of both the railway’s warning and signaling systems, and the on-road traffic control systems operated by the road agency.

The technologies in active crossing warning systems have advanced significantly in the last decade in both sophistication and reliability. Installations of such systems generally have redundant levels of communication and power management, and failsafe modes that are designed to minimize the possibility of accidental vehicle intrusion into the crossing when a train is approaching and the warning system has failed. For example, the failure mode for a crossing equipped with active warning devices including gates involves the actuation of a gate-down position.

The use of reliable warning and fail-safe protection devices is fundamental to the deployment and support of a permissive “no-stop” transit bus crossing at non-active at- grade HR crossings.

8.1.4 Warning systems and safety performance There is a general recognition in the practice of at-grade HR crossing design that greater levels of sophistication in crossing warning systems usually result in improved safety outcomes. While it is difficult to generalize knowledge in this respect, overview guidance that was present at one time in the 1986 edition of the Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads, suggested the following coefficients of effectiveness with respect to accidents for various crossing warning devices20:

Table 1: Generalized effectiveness of crossing warning devices

Type of protection Coefficient Signs 1.00 Bells 1.53 Flashing lights 5.05 Flashing lights and bells 6.00 Automatic gates 17.53

The table is instructive in that it supports the generally accepted practice that enhanced types of protection can be used to provide greater levels of safety when required. Typically, practices extant in the field of HR crossing design today reflect this progression of safety improvement. However, the particular values of the crossing warning effectiveness coefficients shown in Table 1 are not intended to reflect the specific quantitative difference in number of crashes, fatalities, or injuries that will occur with the various alternatives.

20 Transportation Association of Canada. “Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads”. 1986 Edition. Ottawa. P. D51

18 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

Nonetheless, in a 2002 study carried out for Transport Canada, and entitled “A Human Factors Analysis of Highway-Railway Grade Crossing Accidents in Canada”, Caird21 points out that:

Countermeasure effectiveness can be established using a number of methods (See Hauer & Persaud, 198622).

As an example of such measures, the FHWA Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook provides guidance with respect to the effectiveness of active crossing warning devices in their discussion on Active Traffic Control Devices. In Table 2, shown below, “effectiveness” is defined as the percentage reduction in collisions due to a crossing improvement.

Table 2: FHWA warning system effectiveness

The three studies cited show similar trends in the percentage reduction of collisions resulting from moving: from passive to flashing lights (63% to 70% reduction); from flashing lights to automatic gates (66% to 69% reduction); and from passive to automatic gates (83% to 96%). Caird23 finds similar reductions for these types of devices from various sources in the literature.

8.1.5 The need for cost effective solutions Modern practice also reflects the fact investments in safety improvements through enhanced active protection must be defensible from technical, cost-effectiveness, and equity standpoints. In other words they must be tailored to the situation that is present (terrain, sight distance, traffic volumes, types of traffic, presence of pedestrians and cyclists, train volumes, train speeds, seasonal factors, etc.), and the risks that this situation presents. Such practices are now well established.24,25 Notwithstanding this fact, the current warrants that specify grade crossing warning device requirement do not

21 Caird, J.K., Creaser, J.I., Edwards, C.J., Dewar, R.E. “A Human Factors Analysis of Highway-Railway Grade Crossing Accidents in Canada.” Cognitive Ergonomics Research Laboratory. University of Calgary. Calgary, Alberta. 2002. p. 102 22 Hauer, E. Persaud, B. “Rail-Highway Grade Crossings: Their safety and the effect of warning devices.” Proceedings of the 30th Annual American Association for Automotive Medicine (pp. 247-262). Montreal. QC. 1986. 23 Caird, J.K., Creaser, J.I., Edwards, C.J., Dewar, R.E. “A Human Factors Analysis of Highway-Railway Grade Crossing Accidents in Canada.” Cognitive Ergonomics Research Laboratory. University of Calgary. Calgary, Alberta. 2002. P. 53 24 U.S. Department of Transportation. Federal Highway Administration. “Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings”. Highway/Rail Grade Crossing Technical Working Group). Washington. DC. Nov. 2002. 25 Transport Canada. “Grade Crossings Standards”. Ottawa. Canada. February 2014.

19 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings appear to specifically consider the unique risk environment26 in which transit agencies operate. For example, the risks present when a logging truck encounters an HR crossing are much different than those present when a loaded passenger bus encounters a crossing.

In our view, HR crossings used by regular transit service buses should be equipped with an active warning system that includes gates. The provision of gates provides an additional level of fail-safe to the rail crossing in the event of signal failure and also reduces the risk of driver error on the approach to a rail crossing with an activated warning system by providing a physical barrier indicating that the driver must stop because of an approaching train. It should be noted that in some instances, the provision of warning gates may not be warranted based on the strict application of the Transport Canada Grade Crossing Standards. In our opinion, the provision of gates at these HR crossing locations addresses some of the unique risks to which transit operators would be exposed to in the event gates are not present.

8.1.6 Operating protocols and the transfer of risk The activity of managing risk always involves two elements: the elimination/reduction of risk, and the transfer of risk. The elimination of risk at HR crossings may take the form of railway realignments that eliminate sight distance restrictions, changes in the vertical or horizontal alignment of a roadway to enhance speed management, the elimination of driveways or intersections in close proximity to the crossing, or many other similar activities that change the fundamental nature of the physical road or its associated crossing. As noted above, practices are well established in this regard.

The effect of changes in operating protocol however, may be subtler and may involve the transfer of risk, as well as a change in the nature of the risk to be dealt with. As a simple example, consider a bus driver progressing on a route with three railway crossings: an active crossing with gates; an active crossing with no gates; and a passive crossing. At each of these respective crossings, the operating protocol changes because of the changes in warning devices and the risk management responsibility shifts substantively from the crossing protective devices to the bus driver. In addition – assuming train and traffic volumes and speeds are similar at each location, the likelihood of a crash gradually increases through each progressive reduction in the level of crossing protection.

 At the active crossing with gates: Research and experience evidence suggests that the crossing with gates offers the best level of protection by a substantial margin. Although the driver retains ultimate responsibility for the risk exposure of the bus and passengers, this situation offers the lowest driver workload because of the presence of a sophisticated crossing warning system. It should be the least stressful of the three crossing situations for the driver, and – in the event of an imminent risk incident - the lower risk management workload should allow the driver to better respond to the developing situation.

 At the active crossing with no gates: Research and experience evidence suggests that at this crossing type the bus driver workload is higher because of the increased need for the driver to handle more of the risk management responsibility at the crossing. The crossing warning system without gates still

26 Paying passengers contracting for safe passage on public conveyances.

20 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

offers a real safety benefit. However, in this case, the likelihood of driver error increases because of the increased driver workload and the increased need for vigilance. Stress on the bus driver would normally be materially higher because of the increased responsibility. The increased likelihood of driver error gives rise to an increased likelihood of a crash and a reduced ability to deal with any failure on the part of the crossing warning mechanism.

 At the passive crossing: Here, driver workload and stress is highest as the driver assumes the full responsibility for managing the risk associated with the crossing. The potential for driver error increases and the ability to respond to and correct any such error is substantively reduced by the increased stress and workload, as well as the much-reduced time to make a decision and act27.

The essence of the bus driver’s responsibility at non-gated crossings, regardless of the driving protocol on the approach to the crossing (i.e. stop or drive-through), is one of perception, recognition, and action (decision-making). Unfortunately, as Dewar notes in a discussion of general driver behaviour at railway crossings:

At crossings with flashing lights, decision errors28 were estimated to be from 53% to 71%, while recognition29 errors were very frequent (77% – 85%) at passive crossings. Nearly 40% involved failure to detect the train30.

These types of observations can be found throughout the literature on grade crossing safety, and while one can recognize the inherent risk advantage at such crossings when the driver is a professionally trained and experienced operator working within a well- defined driving protocol, one must also recognize the increased stress and workload which is transferred to the bus driver in some operating situations, and also take into account the consequent increasing risk to public safety created thereby.

8.2 Some important risk management findings about crossings The discussion in this chapter led to a number of important findings with respect to managing risk at crossings:

1. HR crossings are still a source of substantial numbers of collisions at a national level. Their presence on any road system increases the risk to all road users using that facility, including those using active transportation modes;

2. Operators of public transit systems must be vigilant about their driving protocols and risk management measures on any of their routes that traverse HR crossings. Both internal risks, (risks to passengers and bus drivers), and external risks (risks affecting other road users) generated by the public transit activity of traversing the HR crossing must be considered;

27 Dewar, R. Olson, P. “Human factors in Traffic Safety: Second Edition”. Lawyers and Judges Publishing. Tucson Arizona. 2007. p. 397. 28 In this case, a decision error is an error in judgement by the vehicle driver. 29 In the context of drivers crossing a HR crossing, a recognition error is a breakdown in the detection or perception of information necessary to recognize the presence of an approaching train and to identify the action necessary to avoid a collision. 30 Dewar, R. Olson, P. “Human factors in Traffic Safety: Second Edition”. Lawyers and Judges Publishing. Tucson Arizona. 2007. p. 397

21 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

3. Different HR crossing warning devices have substantively different effects on crossing risk for public transit buses. The benefits from using the various devices must be considered from a cost-effectiveness standpoint and in consideration of the physical nature of the crossing and the operational characteristics of the road and rail traffic upon it. Notwithstanding this fact, the assessment of risk for public transit buses must be carried out not only in the normal context of public risk management, but in consideration of the fact that these vehicles carry substantial numbers of passengers who have contracted for safe transportation. These additional considerations are not accounted for in the current RTD-10 warning system specifications and warrants;

4. Changes in HR crossing warning devices will have a substantive effect on both the magnitude and types of risk to which public transit buses will be exposed. Risk effects will not only change in potential likelihood and magnitude, but some risks (and their corresponding risk management demands) will also be transferred from technological devices to other participants in the crossing, including most notably, the driver of the bus;

5. As public transit HR crossing activities and/or driving protocols are oriented to, or deployed in the context of, crossing warning devices that offer less positive control of driver guidance, (e.g. active warning with no gates, or passive warnings only), or result in lower levels of fail-safe warnings (e.g. no physical impediment to crossing entry for approaching road traffic), risk transfer effects on the driver are likely to increase the risk of driver error as well as the consequent likelihood of both train/vehicle and vehicle/vehicle crashes;

6. Repetitive risk transfer effects on drivers that increase workplace stress must be considered in assessing overall risk management measures – including the selection of warning systems and driving protocols at HR crossings.

Given the findings above, it is our view that gates should be considered an essential part of the grade crossing warning system at rail crossings used by regular service OC Transpo buses.

22 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

9 IMPLICATIONS ON THE CURRENT TRANSIT ROUTES

9.1 Overview As noted in the immediately preceding chapter, it is our view that gates should be considered an essential part of the grade crossing warning system at rail crossings used by OC Transpo regular service buses. As outlined earlier in this report, the absence of gates removes a level of failsafe from the grade crossing warning system. It also contributes to an increased risk of driver error on the approaches to at-grade crossings when the warning lights are activated as there is no physical barrier indicating that the driver must stop for an approaching train. It also increases driver workload, and the overall likelihood of a train/vehicle or vehicle/vehicle crash.

A review of the current regular transit service route network indicates that OC Transpo buses are exposed to a total of 20 at-grade crossings in the Ottawa area. These crossings have been categorized in the following table based on the form of grade crossing protection present.

Table 3: Summary of at-grade crossings used by OC Transpo31

Transit Use Crossing Protection Number of Present Crossings Active crossing with gates 14 Scheduled Routes Active crossing without gates 6 Passive crossing 0 Total 20

As indicated earlier in this report, our review focuses on regular OC Transpo transit service only and does not examine Para Transpo activities.

9.2 Impacts on regular service bus routes As outlined earlier in this report, the absence of gates removes a level of fail-safe from the grade crossing warning system. It also contributes to an increased risk of driver error on the approaches to at-grade crossing when the warning lights are activated as there is no physical barrier indicating that the driver must stop for an approaching train. It also increases driver workload, and the overall likelihood of a train/vehicle or vehicle/vehicle crash.

Providing gates as part of the grade crossing warning system at rail crossings used by regular service will impact six (6) existing transit crossings. The estimate of the number of HR crossings affected assumes that all of the crossings currently used by regular service buses comply with the requirements of Transport Canada Grade Crossing Standards32.

31 Technical Note: Review of at grade road/rail crossings in the City of Ottawa , OC Transpo Transit Operational Planning Unit, Iteration 8, February 27, 2014.

32 Transport Canada, Grade Crossing Standards, February 2014

23 MMM Group Buses at Highway/Railway At-Grade Crossings

10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Stop or no stop Assuming all actively protected HR crossings in the City comply with or exceed the provisions of the Railway Safety Act and RTD-10 and incorporate a failsafe mode, then the current crossing policy of not requiring buses to stop at all times at non-active, at- grade, HR crossings equipped with active warning devices in order to verify the clearway prior to proceeding into and traversing the crossing, is sustainable and appropriate at present.

10.2 Crossing warning systems  It is our view that OC Transpo buses in regular service should only use actively protected HR crossings equipped with gates. In some instances, the provision of warning gates might not be warranted based on the strict application of the Transport Canada Grade Crossing Standards. In our opinion, the provision of gates at HR crossings used by buses address some of the unique risks to which transit operators and their passengers would be exposed in the event gates were not present.

 It is also our view that in addition to the requirement noted above, OC Transpo buses in regular service should only be using HR crossings that comply with the applicable Transport Canada Grade Crossing Standards.

10.3 Other necessary actions As noted earlier in this report, the federal government has published new grade crossing regulations for comment that will replace the current Draft RTD 10 document currently in place and referred to in this report. It is our expectation that the final version of these regulations may affect the technical content and specific requirements of the regulations themselves, as well as the currently associated guideline documents such as RTD 10. When these new regulations and guidelines are finalized, whether through the Transportation Safety Board, Transport Canada, or by other means, then we strongly recommend that:

 All at-grade HR crossings in the City of Ottawa be re-examined for compliance with the new requirements of the Act and its associated regulations and guidelines;

 Should OC Transpo elect to implement a policy that requires transit buses to stop at non-active, at-grade, HR crossings at all times, road safety audits of each crossing involved should be conducted to identify opportunities to minimize the increase in collisions that will occur at these locations. A public education program should also be launched to inform other road users of this change in bus operating policy.

24 MMM Group