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The Constitution Listen to Chapter 3 on MyPoliSciLab 3 Study and Review the Pre-Test and Flashcards at myanthrolab Read and Listen to Chapter 2 at myanthrolab The Listen to the Audio File at myanthrolab ConstitutionView the Image at myanthrolab Limiting GovernmentalWatch the Video at Powermyanthrolab Read the Document at myanthrolab Map the Concepts at myanthrolab n 1789, Thomas Jefferson argued that a permanent and perpetual Constitution was impossible because “the earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceedsExplor frome the it, Concep as theyt atplease.” myanthr Therefore,olab Jef- I ferson argued that a new constitution be written roughly every nineteen years to reflect the will of the present. Simulate the Experiment at myanthrolab James Madison’s Constitution does not expire every nineteen years, but it does allow for amending. In 1978, Texas undergrad Gregory Watson discovered the text of a forgotten amend- ment that had been drafted as one of the original Bill of Rights, but only approved by eight states. Watson made it his goal to see the bill ratified, and in 1992, it was approved as the twenty-seventh amendment that states congressional pay raises do not take effect until after the Congress approving the raise completes its term. Speaker Tom Foley initially challenged the legality of the amendment because it was so old, but the Supreme Court ruled in 1939 that amendments without expiration dates wereRead still the eligibleDocument for ratification, at myanthrolab and that amendments,Margin as sample political questions, did not belong in theSample courts. Document Title Text Read the Four more proposed amendments await ratification: one from 1789 would change congres- Document The sional apportionment to allow one memberMap the of Concepts the House at my foranthr everyolab 50,000 state residents; Title of the Document Sample Concept Title Text another from 1810 would revoke the citizenship of any American accepting a foreign title; a third Goes Here at myanthrolab known as the Corwin Amendment from 1861 would have made it unconstitutional to abolish slavery (made irrelevant by the 13th Amendment); and a 1924 Child Labor Amendment which would explicitly allow Congress to regulate child labor in the states. All of these amendments are political, and represent efforts to alter a perpetual document to serve the needs of the political present. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 Identify the Assess the Outline the prin- Analyze the Explain how Analyze the sep- Outline the ar- Assess the pro- major principles obstacles to ciples on which economic and the Constitution aration of powers guments made tections provided of constitutional- nationhood, the Founders security issues structured and the checks for and against by the Bill of ism and trace its p. 71 were in agree- that the Founders the new and balances ratification of Rights and deter- evolution in the ment and char- faced and the government, established by the Constitution, mine the various United States, acterize their solutions they p. 82 the Constitution, p. 88 means through p. 69 areas of conflict, reached, p. 78 p. 86 which the Con- p. 74 stitution may be changed, p. 92 M03_DYE4032_10_SE_C03.indd 66 11/15/12 10:29 PM The American Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is also one of the dominant symbols of the American national identity. 67 M03_DYE4032_10_SE_C03.indd 67 11/15/12 10:29 PM w MyPoliSciLab Video Series Watch on MyPoliSciLab The Big Picture If you are going to read any chapter of this book, this is the one you must read to understand everything else. Learn about the different parts of 1 the Constitution from author Ronald Keith Gaddie, including how the government works, what rights it protects, and what the mechanisms are for change. The Basics What is the purpose of a Constitution? In this video, you will discover the reasons why the framers wrote the Constitution and how the Constitution sets up checks and balances, the protection of liberties, and the framework we 2 need for a functioning democracy. In Context Why is it unusual that the United States Constitution has governed so long in its present form? Fordham University political scientist Costas 3 Panagopolos explains why the Constitution is such a rarity and how it has succeeded in an evolving American society. Think Like a Political Scientist How do the institutions created by the U.S. Constitution operate and how has their role changed over time? Fordham University political scientist Costas Panagopolos examines this and other 4 emerging issues in the research and in the study of the Constitution. In the Real World How well does the system of checks and balances in the United States work, and is it actually fair? Real people voice their opinions on 5 whether or not they believe it is constitutional for Congress to check the power of the president—and vice versa. So What? In the past 227 years, the Constitution has only been changed 27 times. Is this indicative of a flaw or strength of this founding document? Author Ronald Keith Gaddie considers this question and explains why a second constitutional 6 convention is unnecessary. 68 M03_DYE4032_10_SE_C03.indd 68 11/15/12 10:29 PM Constitutional Government 3.1 in America 3.1 Identify the major principles of constitutionalism and trace its evolution 3.2 in the United States. 3.3 onstitutions govern government. Constitutionalism—a government of constitutionalism laws, not of people—means that those who exercise governmental power A government of laws, not people, C are restricted in their use of it by a higher law. If individual freedoms are operating on the principle that gov- 3.4 to be placed beyond the reach of government and beyond the reach of ernmental power must be limited and government officials should be re- majorities, then a constitution must truly limit the exercise of authority by govern- strained in their exercise of power over ment. It does so by setting forth individual liberties that the government—even with individuals. 3.5 majority support—cannot violate. A constitution legally establishes government authority. It sets up governmen- constitution tal bodies (such as the House of Representatives, the Senate, the presidency, and the The legal structure of a political sys- Supreme Court in the United States). It grants them powers. It determines how their tem, establishing governmental bod- 3.6 ies, granting their powers, determining members are to be chosen. And it prescribes the rules by which they make decisions. how their members are selected, and Constitutional decision making is deciding how to decide; that is, it is deciding prescribing the rules by which they on the rules for policy making. It is not policy making itself. Policies will be decided make their decisions. Considered 3.7 basic or fundamental, a constitution later, according to the rules set forth in the constitution. cannot be changed by ordinary acts of A constitution cannot be changed by the ordinary acts of governmental bodies; governmental bodies. change can come only through a process of general popular consent.1 The U.S. Consti- 3.8 tution, then, is superior to ordinary laws of Congress, orders of the president, decisions Mayflower Compact of the courts, acts of the state legislatures, and regulations of the bureaucracies. Indeed, Agreement among Pilgrim colonists the Constitution is “the supreme law of the land.” Americans are strongly committed to establish a government, setting the precedent of government by contract to the idea of a written constitution to establish government and limit its powers. In among the governed. fact, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had many important antecedents. colonial charters ◻ The Magna Carta, 1215 Documents granted by the English Monarch to individuals, companies, English lords, traditionally required to finance the king’s wars, forced King John to and groups of settlers in the new American colonies, authorizing a de- sign the Magna Carta, a document guaranteeing their feudal rights and setting the gree of self-government, setting the precedent of a limited government and monarchy. precedent of written contracts defin- ing governmental power. ◻ The Mayflower Compact, 1620 Pilgrim colonists, while still aboard the Mayflower, signed a compact, among them- selves and other passengers, establishing a “civil body politic . to enact just and equal laws . for the general good of the colony, unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.” After the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, in what is today Massachusetts, they formed a colony based on the Mayflower Compact, thus set- ting a precedent of a government established by contract among the governed. ◻ The Colonial Charters, 1624–1732 The colonial charters that authorized settlement of the colonies in America were granted by royal action. For some of the colonies, the British king granted official pro- prietary rights to an individual, as in Maryland (granted to Lord Baltimore), Pennsylva- nia (to William Penn), and Delaware (also to Penn). For other colonies, the king granted royal commissions to companies to establish governments, as in Virginia, Massachu- setts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. Royal charters were granted directly to the colonists themselves only in Connecticut and Rhode Island. These colonists drew up their charters and presented them to the king, setting a precedent in America for written contracts defining governmental power. The “Charter Oak Affair” of 1685–88 began when King James II became displeased with his Connecticut subjects and issued an order for the repeal of the Connecticut 69 M03_DYE4032_10_SE_C03.indd 69 11/15/12 10:29 PM Charter. In 1687 Sir Edmund Andros went to Hartford, dissolved the colonial govern- 3.1 Declaration of Independence The resolution adopted by the Second ment, and demanded that the charter be returned.
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