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Lust and Spiritual Contemplation according to Thomas Aquinas Toward a Life of Great Delight

Thomistic Institute Circles Conference: Aquinas on Contemplation Dominican House of Studies, October 10, 2020, Fr. Andrew Hofer, O.P.

Introduction:

In a 2017 ACPQ article, Rik Van Nieuwenhove called St. Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of contemplation “a sorely neglected topic in scholarship” (“Contemplation, Intellectus, and Simplex Intuitus in Aquinas: Recovering a Neoplatonic Theme,” 199).

An emphasis in all kinds of contemplation for Aquinas: pleasurable; e.g., proemium to Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus with its thema: “Be first to run home to your house; call out there and there play [lude], and muse upon your conceptions. (Sirach 32:15-16):

The zeal for wisdom has the prerogative that by pursuing its task it is the more sufficient unto itself. For in the case of external tasks a man requires the help of a great many, whereas in the contemplation of wisdom, the more someone persists on his own the more effectively he performs. Hence the Sage calls man back to himself in the words cited above, saying “Be first to run home to your house”—that is: let you who are troubled come back from external affairs to your own mind, before one is taken up with something else and is distracted in looking after it. Accordingly, Wisdom 8:16 says: “After entering my house, I will repose with her [i.e., with wisdom].”…

So then, once the inner house is completely cleared out and one is completely dwelling in it through concentration, the Sage sets forth what is to be done, adding “and play there.” We should here note that the contemplation of wisdom is suitably compared to play on account of two features found in play. First of all, play is pleasurable, and the contemplation of wisdom holds maximum pleasure [ludus delectabilis est, et contemplatio sapientiae maximam delectationem habet]. Accordingly, in Sirach 24:27 the mouth of Wisdom says: “My spirit is sweeter than honey.” The second is that the activities of play are not directed towards something else, but are sought on their own account; this is fitting in the pleasures of wisdom [in delectationibus sapientiae]. For sometimes it happens that a person takes delight within himself in considering those things which he desires or which he proposes to do. Now this pleasure is directed to something external he is striving to achieve. Yet if this were lacking or delayed, no small affliction is added to such delight, in line with Proverbs 14:13: “Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow.” But the pleasure [delectatio] pertaining to the contemplation of wisdom holds the cause of pleasure [delectationis] in itself. Thus it allows no worry, as though awaiting something it lacks. For this reason, Wisdom 8:16 says: “Her conversation has no bitterness; and it has no sorrow to live with her [i e., wisdom).” Hence Divine Wisdom compares its own delightfulness to play (Proverbs 8:30): “I was delighted for days on end, playing in his presence” [King trans., alt.].

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Explicit use of “spiritual contemplation” in Aquinas: On Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God. St. Thomas says, “nothing so impedes spiritual contemplation as bodily uncleanness” [nihil enim ita impedit spiritualem contemplationem, sicut immunditia carnis] (On Matthew 5, lect. 2).

What does the lustful want? STh II-II, q. 46, a. 2, ad 2, comparing folly (opposed to wisdom) with lust: “The lustful wants pleasure [delectationem], without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.”

What are objections to a project of comparing lust and spiritual contemplation regarding pleasures? One objection is that they are so different from one another!

The underlying principle of this project, pleasure of lust vs. pleasure of spiritual contemplation, is found in Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Angelic Salutation (Gen 3: “‘God knows well that when you eat of it [the fruit] your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods, who know good and evil.” The woman saw that the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eyes, and the tree was desirable for gaining wisdom” vs. Luke 2: “Blessed is the fruit of your womb”).

“The sinner often seeks for something which he does not find; but to the just man it is given to find what he seeks: “The substance of the sinner is kept for the just” [Prov 13:22]. Thus, Eve sought the fruit of the tree (of good and evil), but she did not find in it that which she sought. Everything Eve desired, however, was given to the Blessed Virgin. Eve sought that which the devil falsely promised her, namely, that she and Adam would be as gods, knowing good and evil. “You shall be,” says this liar, “as gods” [Gen 3:5]. But he lied, because “he is a liar and the father of lies” [Jn 8:44]. Eve was not made like God after having eaten of the fruit, but rather she was unlike God in that by her sin she withdrew from God and was driven out of paradise. The Blessed Virgin, however, and all Christians found in the Fruit of her womb Him whereby we are all united to God and are made like to Him: “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is” [1 Jn 3:2].

Eve looked for pleasure in the fruit of the tree because it was good to eat. But she did not find this pleasure in it, and, on the contrary, she at once discovered she was naked and was stricken with sorrow. In the Fruit of the Blessed Virgin we find sweetness and salvation: “He who eats My flesh... has eternal life” [Jn 6:55]

The fruit which Eve desired was beautiful to look upon, but that Fruit of the Blessed Virgin is far more beautiful, for the Angels desire to look upon Him: “You are beautiful above the sons of men” [Ps 44:3]. He is the splendor of the glory of the Father. Eve, therefore, looked in vain for that which she sought in the fruit of the tree, just as the sinner is disappointed in his sins. We must seek in the Fruit of the womb of the Virgin Mary whatsoever we desire. This is He who is the Fruit blessed by God, who has filled Him with every grace, which in turn is poured out upon us who adore Him: “Blessed be God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with spiritual blessings in Christ” [Eph 1:3]. He, too, is revered by the Angels: “Benediction and glory and wisdom and thanksgiving, honor and power and strength, to our God” [Rev 7:12]. And 3

He is glorified by men: “Every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father” [Phil 2:11]. The Blessed Virgin is indeed blessed, but far more blessed is the Fruit of her womb: “Blessed is He who comes in the name of the Lord” [Ps 117:26].

Thesis: A robust Thomistic consideration of lust and spiritual contemplation regarding their pleasures can give us insight into what we want and what God offers us to bring us to a life of great delight.

I. Concupiscentia et Delectationes (Concupiscence and Pleasures):

STh I-II, q. 30, is on Concupiscentia. a. 1: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1.11), “concupiscence is a craving for the pleasurable [appetitus delectabilis].” Now pleasure [delectatio] is twofold, as we shall state later on [STh I-II, q. 31, aa. 3-4]: one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason, the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure [delectatio] seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the word concupiscentia. Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

STh I-II, q. 30, a. 1, ad 1: The craving for wisdom [appetitus sapientiae], or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”

STh I-II, qq. 31-34, on Delectatio: q. 31—Pleasure itself; q. 32—the Causes of Pleasure; q. 33— Pleasure’s Effects; Pleasure’s Goodness and Evil (cf. Dolor or Tristitia in qq. 35-39).

STh I-II, q. 31, a. 4, whether pleasure is in the intellectual appetite: As stated above [a. 3], a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight. However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that “desire and joy [cupiditas et laetitia] are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish.”

STh I-II, q. 31, a. 5, whether bodily and sensible pleasures [delectationes] are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures [delectationes].: On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 118:103): “How sweet are your words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. 10, 7) that “the greatest pleasure [maxima delectatio] is derived from the operation of wisdom." 4

Pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known.

Comparing pleasures of the intellect with pleasures of the senses, pleasures of the intellect are without doubt much greater than pleasures of the senses. Intellectual knowledge is more perfect and more beloved; compare intellectual vision and bodily vision. Three ways of comparing pleasurable acts: the conjoined good, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself.

For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is ‘what a thing is.’ More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.

On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on (STh I-II, q. 35, a. 5).

Reply to the first objection: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because people need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority [plures hominum] cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.

Aside on delectatio: Where would you find the longest description of delectatio in the Scriptum on the Sentences? It has some prominence in the very first question concerning frui/uti, but delectatio most systematically appears when St. Thomas discusses heaven. And much of the discussion pertains to this life: In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 3: On pleasure (delectatio): a. 1 what is pleasure; a. 2. The cause of pleasure; a. 3. On the comparison of pleasure and sorrow (tristitia); a. 4. On the goodness or evil of pleasure and sadness; a. 5, on the comparison of spiritual and bodily pleasure. Here’s a sample:

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Threefold opinion on pleasure from the philosophical schools (In IV Sent. d. 49, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 3, co.) Epicureans: Pleasure is the greatest good, and all pleasure is good. Stoics and Platonists: All pleasure is evil. Aristotle and the Aristotelians: Some pleasures are good, some are evil, as pleasure follows on activity. Pleasure is the perfection of an activity (Ethics 10).

Addressing an ambiguity in Aristotle, Aquinas says pleasure is ordered to activity. Pleasure is a perfection superadded to activity, as comeliness is to youth (decor juventuti). Thus, no pleasure is the greatest good, but it belongs to the greatest good, which is happiness (felicitas).

II. Lust and its Pleasures

Observing that little attention has been given to recovering a Thomistic understanding of sin compared to Thomistic virtues, Jörgen Vijgen writes, “Thomas assigns a particular importance to luxuria or lust as instrumental in leading to an incorrect vision of the truth and to the inability to grasp a correct vision of the truth” (p. 275)

STh II-II, q. 153, sed contra: I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “a lustful man is one who is debauched [solutus] with pleasures [in voluptates]” Now sexual pleasures [voluptates] above all debauch [solvunt] a man's mind. Therefore, lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.

STh II-II, q. 153, a. 1, ad 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to sexual pleasures, which more than anything else greatly dissolves [resolvunt] a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says “lust is any kind of surfeit.”

Call to mind St. Thomas on marriage as maxima amicitia, greatest friendship, in this life (ScG III, 123). The marital act need not have any sin. If Adam and Eve had not sinned, their sex would have been even more pleasurable.

STh II-II, q. 153, a. 3: Lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of sexual acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

STh II-II, q. 153, a. 4: Now the end of lust is sexual pleasure [delectatio venereorum], which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.

STh II-II, q. 153, a. 5 on the daughters of lust: “blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world” (cf. Gregory the Great, Moral. 31.45). I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in 6 their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently, the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Blindness of mind: simple understanding of an end is hindered (Dan 13:56) Rashness: counsel of what is to be done is hindered Thoughtlessness: judgment of things to be done is hindered (Dan 13:9) Inconstancy: reason’s command to do what is to be done is hindered

Self-love and hatred of God: pertains to one’s inordinate pleasure and despising God who forbids that pleasure Love of this world and abhorrence or despair of the future world: “through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.”

III. Spiritual Contemplation and its Pleasures: The Song of Songs

Spiritual contemplation? Thomas uses the phrase only a very few times. But it still a fine phrase. Cf. “sapiential contemplation” proposed by Bernard McGinn. McGinn shows that wisdom is at the heart of contemplation, and says that Aquinas never uses the phrase contemplatio sapientialis. Spiritual contemplation at its typical height a simplex intuitus (simple insight/gazing) of the divine Truth with the Holy Spirit’s gift of wisdom. (Typical, because Paul’s rapture to see God’s essence is, for Aquinas, the absolute height of contemplation during this life.).

Van Nieuwenhove writes:

Aquinas’s notion of contemplation incorporates central insights from Aristotle. It is, however, overall far more inclusive. It can accommodate the contemplation of both the philosopher who pursues knowledge and wisdom through discursive reasoning, and the illiterate vetula who grasps and subscribes to central articles of the Christian faith—even though she may not be able to reason about them or refute arguments against them; she just sees their truthfulness. In In III Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad5 (no. 12831), Aquinas explicitly states that all Christians—most of whom do not have the philosophical or theological skills to engage in reasoning and demonstrative argumentation about what they believe—are called to participate in contemplation: “Although all those who are in the active life do not attain to a perfect state of contemplation, every Christian who is in a state of salvation must participate somehow in contemplation, for the commandment is given to all: ‘Be still, and see that I am God.’ (Ps. 45:11).” He interprets the third commandment (keeping the Sabbath) in terms of this universal call to contemplation Similarly, in Summa Contra Gentiles I, ch. 6, he rejoices in the fact that “inspiration [is] given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom [ut idiotae et simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam sapientiam et facundiam in instanti consequerentur].” It further explains why Aquinas considered the Virgin Mary as excelling in contemplation—a view that Aristotle undoubtedly would have found rather puzzling (224). 7

Debate about whether we can find “infused contemplation” in Thomas’s teaching. A key passage in the Commentary on John: “In another way, God is seen through a certain spiritual light infused by God into spiritual minds during contemplation; and this is the way Jacob saw God face to face, as it says in Genesis (32:30). According to Gregory, this vision came about through his lofty contemplation” (On John, lect. 11, no. 211).

A point of perspective: spiritual contemplation necessitates infusion: grace, theological virtues (especially charity), and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (especially wisdom). Cf. the distinction of wisdoms in STh I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3: “The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Spirit: ‘The spiritual man judges all things’ [1 Cor 2:15]. And Dionysius says [Div. Nom. chap. 2]: ‘Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things.’ The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.”

STh II-II, q. 180, on the contemplative life.

STh II-II, q. 180, a. 1: “I answer that, As stated above (II-II, q. 179, a. 1) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, q. 12, a. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above (I, q. 82, a. 4; I-II, q. 9, a. 1).

Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written “where your treasure is, there is your heart also” (Matt 6:21), sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the “love of God,” inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on his beauty [ad eius pulchritudinem conspiciendam]. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.”

Highest contemplation in this life. Paul’s rapture to see God’s essence. STh II-II, q. 180, a. 5; cf. STh II-II, q. 175, a. 3.

STh II-II, q. 180, a. 7, de delectatione contemplationis: On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation has no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness”: and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable” [amabilis valde dulcedo est].

I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [cf. I-II, q. 3, a. 5], because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that “all men naturally desire to 8 know,” so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above [II-II, q. 180, aa. 1 and 2], it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.

In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above [I-II, q. 31, a. 5], when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence it is written, “O taste and see that the Lord is sweet” (Ps 33:9).

Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more.” And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved.

Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written, “Thou shall make them drink of the torrent of your pleasure [de torrente voluptatis]” (Ps. 35:9). Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): “We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more delight than any of those things that are round about us”: and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind.”

Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., and Daria Spezzano have both recently written works on St. Thomas’s use of the Song of Songs, which he quotes 312 times.

What is the Song of Songs about for Thomas? The inaugural sermon Hic est liber gives Aquinas’s Plotinian adaptation of an Origenist tradition of the three Solomonic books. Applying Enneads 1.1.2.2-7, Aquinas finds four classifications of virtues: (1) the political virtues, for moderately using the things of this world and living among others in Proverbs; (2) the purgative virtues, for regarding the world with contempt in Ecclesiastes; (3) the virtues of the purged 9 soul, “wholly cleansed of worldly cares, delights [delectatur] in the contemplation of wisdom alone” in the Song of Songs; and (4) the exemplar virtues in God and pertaining to the wisdom in him.

Spiritual contemplation—Song of Songs. Spezzano writes: “The Song text that is perhaps most often cited by Thomas brings out even more what might be called an element of spiritual eros—a yearning, burning and urging dimension in his teaching on divine love. The text is from Song 8:6–7: ‘strong as death is love, jealousy as unyielding as the netherworld; its lamps are lamps of fire and flame. Many waters cannot extinguish charity, nor floods overwhelm it.’” Spezzano later writes on Aquinas’s use of this passage in his comments on Romans 8: “This citation of Song 8:6 follows a remarkable passage on the strength of Paul’s love for Christ, a love that impels him to preach:

He speaks this way to show how great is the power in him of divine love, and to lay everything out before our eyes. For this is the way of lovers, that they cannot hide their love in silence but assert and reveal it to their close friends and to their beloved, and they cannot confine the flames within their heart. They speak of them frequently, so that by constantly telling about their love they may gain some solace, and obtain some cooling of their immense ardor [In Rom 8, lect. 7].

Spezzano continues, “This passionate declaration gives insight into Thomas’s own motivation as a preacher and teacher. The fire of charity not only burns within but impels the lover of Christ to greater love and service of God and neighbor; its flames are always active.”

STh II-II, q. 188, a. 6: Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold. one proceeds from the fullness of contemplation, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7, “They shall publish the memory of your sweetness [memoriam suavitatis tuae eructabunt]” (Ps. 144:7) refer “to perfect men returning from their contemplation.” And this work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to others the things contemplated than merely to contemplate [contemplata aliis tradere quam solum contemplari] ….

When we hand on to others the things contemplated, we let them experience something of the sweetness of our pleasure and encourage them to taste and see for themselves.

Conclusion—Eucharistic Contemplation’s Pleasure as Pledge of Future Glory

What does the lustful want? Pleasure. God wants to give the lustful and all sinners pleasure, and it is a pleasure much greater, truer, and lasting than what is offered in sin. Life on earth has many difficulties, pains, and sorrows. God has ordained that we cannot live without some sort of pleasure. But if you simply want pleasure for its own sake, you will be miserable.

Pleasure accompanies and completes an experience of something perceived as good. During this life on earth, God wants us to perceive him as all good. In the Incarnation, we have God himself. He has taken upon himself all our sorrows to save us from sin and to give us even now a taste of 10 heaven in himself, given as our food for the journey. Think of Wisdom 16:20, included in St. Thomas’s Office of Corpus Christi:

℣. Panem de caelo praestitisti eis. ℟. Omne delectamentum suavitatis in se habentem. / Omne delectamentum in se habentem.

Fritz Bauerschmidt writes, “It is perhaps in Thomas’s Eucharistic poetry that the theological and the devotional come together most seamlessly” (p. 273; cf. exposition of the Adoro te devote in pp. 272-83).

Conclusion: We can by God’s grace turn away from temptations to lust and every other false or inadequate pleasure to be fed in spiritual contemplation by the Bread from Heaven, having every pleasure of sweetness within it, for a life of great delight.

Select Recent Scholarship:

Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian. Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Following Christ. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Blankenhorn, Bernhard, O.P. The Mystery of Union with God: Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2015.

------. “Mystical Theology and Christology in Thomas Aquinas,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 95.2 (2019): 299-315.

Bonino, Serge-Thomas, O.P. Saint Thomas d’Aquin, lecteur du Cantique des cantiques. Paris: Cerf, 2019.

McGinn, Bernard. “Contemplatio Sapientalis: Thomas Aquinas’s Contribution to Mystical Theology,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 95.2 (2019): 317-34.

Spezzano, Daria. “Its lamps are lamps of fire and flames”: Thomas Aquinas on the Song of Songs,” In Thomas Aquinas, Biblical Theologian, edited by Roger W. Nutt and Michael Dauphinais. Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, forthcoming.

Van Nieuwenhove, Rik. “Aquinas on Contemplation: A Neglected Topic,” European Journal for the Study of Thomas Aquinas 35.1 (2016): 8-33.

------. “Contemplation, Intellectus, and Simplex Intuitus in Aquinas: Recovering a Neoplatonic Theme,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 91.2 (2017): 199-225.

------. “‘Recipientes per contemplationem, tradentes per actionem’: The Relation between the Active and Contemplative Lives according to Thomas Aquinas,” The Thomist 81.1 (2017): 1-30.

------. “Searching for a Connection: Prayer and Contemplation ‘Broadly Conceived’ in Thomas Aquinas,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 95.2 (2019): 283-98.

Vijgen, Jörgen. “Mystagogy and Sin: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Luxuria and the Spiritual Life.” In Initiation and Mystagogy in Thomas Aquinas: Scriptural, Systematic, Sacramental and Moral, and Pastoral Perspectives, edited by Henk Schoot, Jacco Verbrugt, and Jörgen Vijgen. Leuven: Peeters, 2019.

Hitz, Zena. Lost in Thought: The Hidden Pleasures of an Intellectual Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.