Angus Britts. Neglected Skies: The Demise of British Naval Power in the Far East, 1922-42. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-68247-157-9.

Reviewed by Joseph Fonseca

Published on H-War (July, 2018)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

The clash between the imperial Japanese begins with the First World War, through inter‐ navy’s Kido Butai (Mobile Force) and Great war policy, military thinking and engineering, to Britain’s Eastern Fleet of the coast of Ceylon in fnish at naval battlefeld tactics and decision early April 1942, known as the Raid, making at the pivotal moment. Along that line, does not stir the same imagery as the likes of Mid‐ Britts’s pencil occasionally swerves, leading to way or Leyte Gulf. While the latter battles are rec‐ some interesting, if seemingly only tangentially ognized for their strategic importance and deci‐ related, chapters. siveness, Britain’s fnal major action before with‐ Regarding his main contention, that twenty drawing from the East has heretofore been char‐ years of political and strategic missteps led to the acterized as a minor engagement, a setback for unequal clash of the coast of Ceylon, Britts is the British navy and a trifing victory for Japan, thorough and convincing. He explores a variety of scarcely on par with the massive actions that contributing factors, both military and civilian, would follow it across the Pacifc and the Philip‐ for why the turned into the pines. In Neglected Skies: The Decline of British pivotal clash between empires that he argues it Naval Power in the Far East, 1922-42,Angus Britts was. The frst three chapters hit hard and fast. sets out to thoroughly debunk this line of think‐ Chapter 1 lays out the specifc actions of the bat‐ ing, presenting a novel characterization of the In‐ tle, clearly explaining the minutia of positioning dian Ocean Raid and the twenty years of British and of air raids to the degree that one not familiar political and doctrinal policies that led to it. with naval tactics can follow with relative ease. Britts argues that the scope and unique na‐ One can clearly see that the British ships were ture of the Indian Ocean Raid alone make it wor‐ outdated and slow, while in the air, the faster, thy of reconsideration, but goes a step further by lighter, and more maneuverable Japanese craft suggesting that this clash marked the end of hopelessly outmatched the British air defenses, British naval hegemony across the world. After however tenaciously they fought. Admiral Sir James Summerville fell back before Chapter 2 analyzes the fscal and political the Kido Butai in April 1942, the British navy troubles facing interwar Britain, revealing the would only return to East Asia in the literal wake Sisyphean task of maintaining military predomi‐ of the world’s then preeminent naval force: the US nance across a global empire while recovering Navy’s 5th Fleet. Neglected Skies traces a line that from the cost, both actual and societal, of the First H-Net Reviews

World War. Britts is convincing, most dishearten‐ Chapter 3 specifcally addresses the misstep ingly, in that it appeared there was little that of naval aviation by both analyzing the way the could be done to maintain a modern feet with the Admiralty chose to bargain with the RAF, and required capabilities. Ships, both the reftting of through an exploration of naval air engineering. older vessels and the construction of new ones, The Admiralty insisted on two-seater biplanes for are prohibitively expensive, and Whitehall’s re‐ the majority of the 1930s, while competing forces, covery plans meshed with the idea that war could specifcally Japan’s, were busy improving on de‐ be avoided for at least a decade. Encouraging that signs for single-seat monoplanes. By the time of line of thinking, the development of international the Indian Ocean Raid, the Japanese bombers, mechanisms for resolving disputes, namely, the dive-bombers, and especially their fghters, could League of Nations and the multiple naval limita‐ outmaneuver and outperform the British craft tion conferences, ensured that Britain’s navy with ease. would by no means be a modern feet by the time Thus, by the end of the third chapter, Britts confict once again engulfed the world. By the has explained well how and why the feet action time full-scale reftting and rearming was under‐ of the coast of Ceylon had ended the way it had, way, it was already too late. and by so doing, signaled the forfeiture of East While taking these factors into consideration Asian waters by Britain to Japan, until, as it is not‐ when deciding against appropriating blame, Britts ed, the US Navy could bring its full industrial zeros in on key factors that contributed directly to weight to bear. The remaining chapters of the the specifc defciencies that faced the British feet work move beyond this topic, to probe related in‐ of Ceylon, namely, that of naval airpower. He cidents and naval planning while maintaining summarizes himself quite well saying, “The poli‐ sometimes tenuous connections to the Indian cies pursued by Whitehall and the Admiralty dur‐ Ocean Raid. They are all equally interesting and ing the 1920s were to fundamentally weaken the well researched, but their place in this particular Royal Navy by ultimately preventing the efective volume seem questionable. regeneration of its warship strength and—in con‐ Chapter 4 relates the lessons learned, or ig‐ cert with the Air Ministry and the RAF [Royal Air nored, in the frst years of the war. Naval clashes Force]—to deny the the opportunity with Germany and Italy, both of whom eschewed to evolve beyond the level of a feet-support in‐ Mahanian ideas of decisive feet actions for the strument” (p. 27). Britts contends that Britain’s more sinister guerre de course, in which raiding failure here was the result of mismanagement of and pinprick attacks were favored, demonstrated air resources, developing interservice rivalry, and the difculty Britain faced in managing actions a stubborn attachment to naval doctrine that re‐ across such vast expanses of open water. Yet, in fused to see an air wing as anything other than a fghting across the Atlantic, across the North Sea, useful, if limited, support apparatus. The writing and in the Mediterranean, the Admiralty found of the importance of naval airpower was not yet that naval air was exceedingly efective, especial‐ on the wall, and Britts is careful to explore, ly in the case of the battle of Cape Mattapan. Simi‐ throughout subsequent chapters, how and why larly, the Admiralty learned quickly what damage Britain’s naval airpower developed how it did. He could be done to the success of naval operations is less forgiving when early battles against the Eu‐ should they fnd themselves within range of the ropean axis exposed the new preeminence of Axis’s superior aircraft coming from land-based naval airpower. airfelds. In fact the Admiralty admitted that if only the two Axis air forces had cooperated more

2 H-Net Reviews and been able to maintain sustainable air control, Chapter 7 returns to the Indian Ocean Raid to there would have scarcely been any way for the explore how and why this engagement resulted in British to succeed in the Mediterranean. The con‐ a loss of British dominance at sea. Here we move nection between this topic and the thesis of the toward the technical issues on display and once work is understandable, but it begins to drift into again reiterate the unfortunate state of the British a more general assessment of British naval ac‐ navy at the outbreak of hostilities. Britts reminds tions and the importance of airpower at sea. us of the inferior quality of the ships available in Chapter 5 explores the Japanese navy’s devel‐ the Indian Ocean, and that Japan’s Operation C, opment, and efectively explains how and why the which launched the raid, intending to fnd and de‐ Japanese brought an feet to the stroy the Eastern Fleet, had brought the carriers fght in 1941. The Washington Naval Conference’s of the Kido Butai, which completely mismatched restrictions and the sheer cost of developing a the available British resources. Britts also exam‐ navy to match that of the forced in‐ ines the diferent approaches to tactics taken by genuity, and while the Japanese navy continued to each feet, concluding that the concentrated Kido seek a decisive battle, the realization that naval Butai handily outdid the integrated British Fleet. airpower could make up for a lack of actual ton‐ Including a counterfactual assessment of what nage led to an increased push for development. could have been had Summerville’s forces been Here Britts also attempts to explain the rationale diferent highlights the almost impossible situa‐ behind Japanese strategic thinking. His sources of‐ tion the Admiralty faced in the East, especially ten seem appropriate for this task, relying as he when the conclusion, based again on a lack of does on secondary literature and translated post‐ naval resources, only marginally difers from war interviews. Yet he falters in his attempt to what actually occurred. Sufce it to say, Sum‐ counter the established scholarship regarding the merville’s withdrawal was the most prudent rise of militarism in Japan. His source, a postwar course of action, but one that still surrendered naval ofcer’s interrogation, does not sufciently control to the Japanese. override modern scholarship on the complexity of The last two chapters again deviate into relat‐ the struggles within Japan in the 1920s and 30s. ed but probably unnecessary discussions about Chapter 6 diverts to explore a diferent battle, the difculties facing Britain in maintaining con‐ the destruction of the ill-managed Force Z, which trol over its vast empire. The important conclu‐ in December 1941 sufered greatly in an attempt sion here is to note that Australian thinkers were to stem Japanese invasions in the Gulf of Siam. already well aware and concerned about the po‐ This chapter is interesting, as it explores how un‐ tential threat a Japanese-German alliance could refned and essentially racist expectations of Japa‐ pose to a distant and small colony like . nese naval and aviation skill contributed to the Reality saw these concerns realized as Japanese failure of the mission. Also highlighted are the naval superiority threatened the Australian coast lack of available resources and the overwhelming and the retreat of the Eastern Fleet meant Aus‐ fact that Japanese naval aviation, especially as tralia had to hold its breath and wait, fearful of an new airfelds in the Dutch East Indies were taken, invasion that thankfully never materialized. presented an almost impossible challenge in the Britts’s research is detailed, though the inclu‐ early years. Such was the number and skill of the sion of German, Italian, and especially Japanese Japanese pilots that Allied seamen scarcely had a sources would have enhanced the chapters dedi‐ moment’s respite as they attempted to navigate cated to them. This lack is less apparent in the the Dutch East Indies. chapter dealing with the European axis, as the fo‐

3 H-Net Reviews cus remains on Britain’s naval strategy and its ability to deal with emerging naval aviation threats. The chapter on Japan sufers more be‐ cause of Britts’s attempt to explain not only mili‐ tary planning but also growing nationalism and the rise of militancy within the nation. While sec‐ ondary sources are often sufcient, there seems to be an overreliance on postwar confessions of naval ofcers. Aside from these admittedly minor missteps, Britts uses numerous and appropriate sources, and his exploration of Britain’s naval de‐ velopment in the period is as thorough as one could wish. Britts’s work is a success. Though the average interested reader can glean all they need to in or‐ der to understand his argument from chapters 1 through 3 and 7 exclusively. The remainder of the work can best be seen as related, and interesting, essays that supplement the argument while not containing any of the key elements themselves. The inclusion of counterfactuals can be useful, and Britts employs them relatively well here to underscore the apparent defciencies in British material and strategic planning. Structurally, the odd placement of timelines and maps of battles throws of the pace of what is an otherwise well- written and clear work. The decision to frame cer‐ tain chapters around the contemporary or near contemporary publications of thinkers and strate‐ gists deviates enough to hamper the fow, but it does not diminish the quality of the work and oc‐ casionally succeeds at hammering home the fact that the issues under scrutiny here were not un‐ known at the time. Overall, Britts communicates the depth of naval strategy and the technicalities of naval aviation well enough that one unfamiliar with these things before picking up the work can easily make sense of what is an understandably complicated feld.

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Citation: Joseph Fonseca. Review of Britts, Angus. Neglected Skies: The Demise of British Naval Power in the Far East, 1922-42. H-War, H-Net Reviews. July, 2018.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=51587

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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