WHITHER THE ILKHANID ARMY? 'S FIRST CAMPAIGN INTO (1299-1300)*

Reuven Amitai

Introduction

The intention of this essay is not to discuss in depth the reasons for continued Mongol aggression towards controlled Syria, or even the factors behind the specific decision of Ghazan (1295-1304) to launch his first offensive when he did. In general, it can be said that long-standing Ilkhanid antipathy towards the mixed with traditional Mongol imperialism. 1 These, in turn, combined with Ghazan's anger at Mamluk support of the rebel Mongol general Siilemish in in 1298, 2 and a Mamluk raid launched against Mardin in Mongol controlled territory earlier in 1299. 3 In addition, Mamluk renegades who recently had fled to the , led by the former governor of , Sayf al-D1n Qjpchaq, played their

* This study was undertaken during the spring of 2000, whilst I was a fellow at Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) at the Hebrew University ofJerusalem. I would like to thank to the Director and staff of the IAS for their assistance during this time. Earlier versions of this paper were presented before the l\fongolia Society at Indiana University in April 2000 and the Seminar "Turco-Mongolia Nomads and the Sedentary World" at the IAS in May 2000. I am grateful to various colleagues for their comments at these talks. 1 On these, see -Preiss, "Mongol Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War against the Mamluks." 17ze and its Legacy, eds. Reuven Amitai­ Preiss and David 0. Morgan (Leiden, 1999), pp. 57-72. 2 John A. Boyle, "The Dynastic and Political History of the II-Khans," 17ze Cambridge History ef [henceforth CHir], vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 387; Bertold Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran: Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanenzeit, 1220-1350, 4th edition (Leiden, 1985), p. 83. :, Boyle, "Ii-Khans," pp. 386-7; Spuler, Iran, p. 83. The one Mamluk source to mention this raid, which evidently the Mamluks wanted to forget, is Abu 'I-Fida' (al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad 'Imad al-D1n Isma'1l b. 'Alf), al-MukhtaJar fl ta'nkh al-bashar (Istanbul, 1286/ 1869-70), p. 44. Ghazan, in his letter to Sultan al-Na~ir Mui).ammad in 70 I/ 130 I, adduces this as one of the main reasons for the campaign which led to his victory at Wadi al-Khaznadar; Karl V. Zettersteen, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Mamlukensultane (Leiden, 1919), p. 98. The most complete account of this raid is found in Wa~~af ('Abd Allah b. Fa9l Allah), Ta'nkh-i Wa,s,saf (= Tajziyat al-am,sar wa­ ta;;:jiyat al-a'.sar) (Bombay, 1269 H./1852-3; facsimile rpt. Teheran, 1338 S./1959-60), pp. 372-3. 222 REUVEN AMITAI part in encouraging the Mongol ruler to exploit the confused state of Mamluk politics at the time. 4 Finally, it is possible that Ghazan also sought to take advantage of the civil wars fought in the between the and prince Noghai, which effectively­ albeit temporarily-neutralized the danger of invasion from that front. At the same time, the Chaghatayid -a sometime enemy­ was preoccupied with an attack from the east.5 Ghazan, then, was presented with a window of opportunity, during which he launched an offensive (the first of three) into Syria. The justification for this and successive campaigns, employing both Mongol and Islamic rea­ sons, will be left to another study.6 The actual course of this campaign, particularly a detailed recon­ struction and analysis of the Mongol victory in which it resulted, is the subject of the present study. 7 Having established the course of the battle in some detail, I will compare it to the battlefield perfor­ mance of the Ilkhanid army in campaigns from a generation or two before. My intent, then, is to determine if the Mongol army present in greater Iran for much of the thirteenth century underwent a change over time, being as it was in a milieu somewhat different from Inner Asia. If in fact there was an alteration of some type, I will thereupon attempt to ascertain whether such a transformation was a result of a consciously adopted policy, as suggested by Dr. A.P. Martinez,8 or whether it occurred unintentionally, as part of a larger process of cultural change which the apparently

4 Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Ear[y (1250-1382) (London, 1986), pp. 91, 99; Boyle, "II-Khans," p. 386. 5 This is suggested by John M. Smith, Jr., "Nomads on Ponies vs. Slaves on Horses," Journal ef the American Oriental Sociery, 118 (1998), p. 60. 6 For an analysis of the Muslim legitimization of Ghazan's campaigns, see H. Horst, "Eine Gesandschaft des Mamluken al-Malik an-Na~ir im Ilban-Hof in Persien," W. Hoenerbach (ed.), Der in der Forschung: Festschrift far Otto Speis (Wies­ baden, 1967), pp. 348-70; see also my article, cited in note I. 7 For earlier discussions of the campaign, some of them very brief; see: A.C.M. D'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols (The Hague and Amsterdam, 1834-5; facsimile rpt., Tientsin, , 1940), vol. 4, pp. 230-41; G. Weil, Geschichte des Abbasidenchalifats in Egypten (Stuttgart, 1860-2), vol. 1, pp. 225-9; Henry H. Howorth, History ef the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century (London, 1876-1927; facsimile rpt., New York, [1965]), vol. 3, pp. 434-40; Spuler, Iran, pp. 84-5; Boyle, "II-Khans," pp. 387-9; Irwin, Middle East, pp. 100-1. See also the important comments in John M. Smith, Jr., '"Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?", Haroard Journal ef Asiatic Studies, 44 (1984), pp. 329-30. 8 A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the 11-Xanid Army," Archivum Euraisiae Medii Aeivi, 6 (1986), pp. 129-242, esp. 138-88.