October 2014

Excited Utterance

Gregory Taylor’s ex-girlfriend, Issue: Tambra Bacon, testified that shortly Did the victim’s report to the officer after their relationship ended, she function as an excited utterance, and was driving her new boyfriend’s car thereby constituted an exception to In this issue: when she saw Taylor standing in the the rule? Yes . middle of the road. After making eye Excited Utterance: contact with Bacon, Taylor walked At trial the State argued that the Question First in front of her vehicle, yelled out statements were admissible pursuant various insults, and threatened to kill to the excited utterance exception to Then Miranda her. As Bacon sped away, she saw a the hearsay rule. The defense re- gun in Taylor’s hand and heard what sponded that the excited utterance sounded like three gunshots. She exception was inapplicable because Miranda then drove to a nearby restaurant, Officer Davila testified that Bacon where she dialed 911. However, up- had calmed down at the time of their Questions on seeing a police officer nearby, conversation. Officer Carlos Davila, she hung up An excited utterance is “a state- and told him what happened. ment or excited utterance relating to Winning Officer Davila’s was a startling event or condition made generally consistent with Bacon’s. while the declarant was under the Courtroom Additionally, he testified that he ob- stress of excitement caused by the Testimony served bullet holes in the door of the event or condition.” § 90.803(2), F.S. car she was driving. Crime scene For a statement to constitute an technicians located bullets inside the excited utterance, three requirements vehicle driven by Bacon. However, must be met: (1) there must have enforcement did not find evi- been an event startling enough to dence of spent cartridges at the sce- cause nervous excitement; (2) the Legal Eagle ne, nor could they locate any wit- statement must have been made be- nesses. The trial court allowed Of- fore the declarant had time to con- ficer Davila to relate to the jury what trive or misrepresent ; and (3) the Published by: Tambra Bacon told him about the statement must have been made Office of the State Attorney shooting. while the declarant was still under West Palm Beach, FL The defendant was convicted of a the stress of excitement caused by the 33401 firearm offense and appealed arguing event. State v. Jano , (Fla.1988). B. Krischer, Editor that the officer’s testimony was inad- The excited state can exist for a th missible hearsay. The 5 D.C.A. did substantial amount of time after the not agree. event occurs. When assessing the

LLLOfficersegal Eagle should consult with their agency advisors to confirm1 the interpretation provided in this publicationOctober and to 2014 what extent it will affect their actions. Past issues of the Legal Eagle are available at //SA15.org under “Resources.” duration of the excited state, the slightly she was able to tell me [what even when she does not appear at court considers whether the declarant happened].’ As Davila spent time trial. This is called “ based had time for reflective thought and with Bacon, he observed her start to prosecution,” allowing the defendant the capacity for conscious misrepre- calm down. Specifically, he testified: to be prosecuted despite the victim’s sentation . ‘She wasn’t shaking as much. She absence. Obviously, this is of great “In determining whether the nec- did keep looking over her shoulder value in a domestic violence case. essary mental state exits, the length once in a while but she was able to— As always effective report writing of time between the statement and the pitch of her voice lowered so she is critical. As seen above Officer the startling event may be consid- was able to talk, you know, she had Davila’s testimony included the vic- ered. Only in exceptional cases self-control.’ Apparently, the trial tim’s physical condition (shaking, would a statement made more than court seized upon Officer Davila’s stuttering, looking over her shoulder) several hours after the event be made testimony that Bacon ‘calmed down and state of mind (nervous) at the in the stress of excitement caused by slightly,’ and concluded that her time she approached him to report the event. Other factors that the trial statements were not excited the shooting. judge can consider in determining utterances. Thus it is important that the LEO whether the necessary state of stress “Examining the evidence as a thoroughly document in the offense or excitement is present are the age whole, however, we find that this report the demeanor and emotional of the declarant, the physical and was an abuse of discretion. There condition of the victim (calm, crying, mental condition of the declarant, the was no evidence that Bacon had suf- shaking, hysterical, sweating, angry, characteristics of the event, and the ficient time for reflection, and the yelling). subject matter of the statement. If the evidence demonstrated that she was If a camera is available photo- time between the startling event and still in a state of panic as she related graph the demeanor. the statement is long enough to per- the events, which had occurred just If a digital recorder is available mit reflective thought by the declar- minutes before, to Officer Davila. tape-record the victim’s statement. ant, the burden is on the offering Although she may have calmed However, an excited utterance can- party to demonstrate that the declar- down enough to speak to Officer not be in response to investigative ant did not engage in reflective Davila, she was still shaking and questioning. thought.” C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evi- appeared excited. See, Hudson v. Assess verbal and non-verbal dence § 803.2 (2008 Edition). State , (Fla.2008) (holding that the communication of parties involved Court’s Ruling: fact that declarant’s voice did not and include in the report. The 5 th D.C.A. found that the facts sound excited was not determinative Ask the victim who she called presented at trial established the vic- of whether his statements met the immediately after the incident. This tim’s mental state caused by the requirements of section 90.803(2), could have important infor- stress of the shooting qualified her F.S., and noting that ‘some people mation, and can testify to the vic- statement to the officer as an excited remain calm of voice when under tim’s demeanor. The witness may utterance. “Here, Bacon testified that stress’). Under these facts, Bacon’s also be permitted to testify to the she saw Officer Davila immediately statements were excited utterances. victim’s excited utterance. after the shooting occurred and that Accordingly, we find that the admis- If the victim originally contacted she was ‘emotional, crying, upset, sion of the statements was not error. 911, acquire a copy of the taped call. [and] panicking’ when she told him AFFIRMED.” Photograph the condition of the vic- what happened. Officer Davila de- Lessons Learned: tim and the scene (clothing and ap- scribed Bacon’s demeanor consist- While the facts of this case included pearance) when relevant to corrobo- ently: ‘She was shaken up. You the victim testifying at the trial, the rate victim’s statement. know, talking really fast, stuttering. I benefit of the excited utterance ex- Taylor v. State tried to calm her down a little bit so ception to the hearsay rule is that it 5th D.C.A. (August 29, 2014) she could start telling me what’s go- permits the officer to testify to what ing on. And once she calmed down the victim told him that occurred

LLLegal Eagle 2 October 2014 LLLegal Eagle 3 October 2014 Recent Case Law

Talk First Then Miranda ing. She informed Wright that Hoop- interview. By the time Detective er had told her “everything,” and if Stroup read Wright her Miranda Amber Wright, and five others, was Wright continued to lie, she would rights, Wright had been at the sher- charged with the murder of Seth be treated “like a piece of garbage.” iff’s office for more than six hours. Jackson. Following up on a tip the Finally, Wright admitted her involve- Wright filed a motion to suppress her police went to the Wright house and ment in Jackson’s murder, largely as statements, arguing that they were met with Amber and her friends. described by Hooper, prompted by the product of custodial interroga- Amber and three others went to the Detective Stroup’s questions. At the tions, that she had not been Miran- station in a marked Sheriff’s Office conclusion of the second interview, dized before the first or second inter- vehicle, while Amber’s Mom fol- Detective Stroup arrested Wright for view, and that the failure to do so lowed behind in her own car. murder and handcuffed her. tainted the admissions made in the At the sheriff’s office, Wright had Shortly after the second interview third interview. While the State three videotaped interviews with ended, Detective Stroup realized that agreed to the suppression of the sec- Detective Rhonda Stroup. The first no one had Mirandized Wright. As a ond interview, it argued against sup- interview took place in a “soft result, she escorted Wright, in hand- pressing the first or third interviews. room.” Wright and her mother sat cuffs, back to the soft room for a The trial court agreed. together on a large couch, while De- third interview. At the start of the The 5 th D.C.A. disagreed. tective Stroup sat across from them third interview, Detective Stroup told Issue: in a chair. The conversation was Wright that she was giving her “the Did advising the defendant of her calm and patient. Detective Stroup’s chance to be the honest one.” Detec- Miranda rights prior to her third questions were factual in nature, and tive Stroup informed Wright that she statement cure the defect arising did not accuse or confront either had not been read her rights, and from the second interview? No . Wright or her mother. This first in- then presented a Miranda waiver Custodial Interrogation terview lasted about twenty minutes, form to Wright, noting, “This is and Miranda: but the video recording continued for something I have to do, OK?” Detec- Both the United States and Florida an additional hour. During that time, tive Stroup read the warnings on the Constitutions provide that a person Wright and her mother primarily form to Wright, ultimately asking, may not be “compelled” to be a wit- stayed in the soft room, which was “Do you understand these rights?” ness against himself or herself in any unlocked. Wright nodded affirmatively. Detec- criminal matter. To protect the right While Detective Stroup was out of tive Stroup then asked, “Having against self-incrimination, the Su- the room she interviewed Kyle these rights in mind, do you want to preme Court requires that any indi- Hooper, who confessed to the mur- talk about this? And if [so] put your vidual held for custodial interroga- der and implicated the others, includ- initials right there.” Wright com- tion must be clearly informed as to ing Wright. Detective Stroup then plied, saying, “Might as well get it his or her rights, including the “right returned to Amber for a second inter- all out.” After Wright signed the to remain silent, that any statement view. This time, Wright was moved waiver form, Detective Stroup ques- he does make may be used as evi- to a “hard room,” a more traditional tioned her calmly, frequently refer- dence against him, and ... [the] right police interrogation room. To this ring to inculpatory information to the presence of an attorney, either point, Wright had not been given the gleaned from their just-completed, retained or appointed.” If the rights Miranda warnings. un-Mirandized second interview. specified in Miranda are not respect- Detective Stroup began the second Wright’s answers were consistent ed, then no evidence obtained from interview by accusing Wright of ly- with her statements in the second the interrogation of a person in

LLLegal Eagle 4 October 2014 “custody or otherwise deprived of his interrogation, (3) the extent to which interview and, as a consequence, freedom by the authorities in any the suspect is confronted with evi- Miranda warnings were not required. significant way” may be used against dence of his or her guilt, and (4) “By the start of the third interview, that person. A defendant may waive whether the suspect is informed that circumstances had changed substan- these rights, but the waiver must be he or she is free to leave the place of tially. Wright had been arrested for made voluntarily, knowingly, and questioning. The interviewee’s age murder and handcuffed. The State intelligently.” Therefore, “unless and and prior contact with law enforce- does not dispute that Wright was in until [the Miranda ] warnings and ment and the criminal justice system custody at the start of the third inter- waiver are demonstrated by the pros- may also be considered. Ramirez v. view. At this point, Wright had been ecution at trial, no evidence obtained State , (Fla.1999). However, simply at the sheriff’s station for roughly six as a result of interrogation can be being questioned at a police station hours. Just fifteen to forty-five used against [the defendant].” “A does not necessarily imply that an minutes earlier, she had been sub- Miranda violation does not consti- individual is in custody.” jected to an un-Mirandized , intense tute coercion but rather affords a “We know that Wright was fifteen and accusatory interview, during bright-line, legal presumption of at the time of the interviews. …Only which she confessed. Though Detec- coercion, requiring suppression of all one detective was present during the tive Stroup read Wright the Miranda unwarned statements.” Oregon v. initial interview, which was conduct- warnings before starting the third Elstad , (S.Ct.1985). ed in the soft room. In that interview, interview and Wright agreed to Court’s Ruling: Detective Stroup’s tone was matter- waive those rights, Wright contends “The first issue we consider is of-fact and she did not accuse Wright that her waiver was ineffective and whether Wright’s initial interrogation of any crime or confront her with any tainted by her earlier, un-Mirandized by Detective Stroup was custodial. evidence of guilt. Wright’s mother .” Police are not required to give Mi- was present for the entire interview. “In Ross v. State , (Fla.2010), the randa warnings to every potential Their path to the room’s door was Florida Supreme Court reviewed the suspect. The warnings apply only to unimpeded and the room was neither law governing the effectiveness of custodial interrogations…For Miran- locked nor guarded. Wright was not ‘mid-stream’ Miranda warnings, da purposes, custodial interrogation informed that she was free to leave, meaning those delayed until after the means any ‘questioning initiated by but neither was she in handcuffs or start of questioning. Ross reiterated law enforcement officers after a per- otherwise physically restrained. Her the long-standing rule that places a son has been taken into custody or mother still had a cell phone. After ‘heavy burden’ on the State to show otherwise deprived of his freedom of the interview, Wright was left with that an interviewee who confesses action in any significant way .’” her mother for more than an hour, after Miranda warnings were given “The Florida Supreme Court has talked on the phone and tried to waived his or her rights knowingly adopted the objective, reasonable- sleep. The officer monitoring the and intelligently. Normally, this hap- person test to determine if a suspect interviews from another room did not pens at the start of an interrogation. is in custody and thus entitled to Mi- interrupt Wright when she talked on The court observed that Miranda randa warnings before questioning. the phone, and volunteered to assist warnings are not always sufficient This test requires the court to deter- Wright when she left the interview when their administration is delayed mine if, under the totality of the cir- room on her own. None of these cir- until well into an interrogation.” cumstances, a reasonable person in cumstances indicate to us that “Ross also requires us to examine the suspect’s position would not feel Wright’s freedom was impeded on a the other circumstances around the free to leave or to terminate the en- level similar to an arrest. A reasona- warned and unwarned statements. counter with police. To make this ble person, even a minor, would feel Specifically, we look at whether the determination, the court considers: free to leave. Under the totality-of- two statements were made under (1) the manner in which police sum- the-circumstances test described in circumstances sufficiently similar to mon the suspect for questioning, (2) Connor, we conclude that Wright indicate that the interrogation was, in the purpose, place, and manner of the was not in custody during the first actuality, one ‘integrated and proxi-

LLLegal Eagle 5 October 2014 mately conducted questioning’ and criminating statement, made just his rights. Detective Jones proceeded not two separate events. Here, much minutes before, could be used to read Parker his Miranda rights like the two rounds of questioning in against her.” again, and Parker indicated that he Ross , all the interviews were con- “In sum, the failure to Mirandize understood them and wished to talk . ducted in the same building, by the Wright appears to have been an hon- Parker described his version of the same officer within a short span of est mistake; however, the warnings, events and answered the detective’s time, and covered almost exactly the when given, were delivered in the questions by providing a series of same information. After receiving middle of a single, protracted round exculpatory statements. The detec- her waiver, Detective Stroup referred of custodial interrogation of an inex- tive’s subsequent insistence on repeatedly to Wright’s earlier state- perienced minor. We find that the Parker’s guilt prompted the follow- ments, and urged her to reiterate her State failed to show a knowing, intel- ing conversation: earlier statements and clarify incon- ligent and voluntary waiver of PARKER: Can you just tell me if I sistencies in the earlier interviews. Wright’s Miranda rights. As a result, need to get a lawyer or something? The only difference was the manner we conclude that the trial court erred I’ll tell you but I just don’t—I don’t of questioning: intense, accusatory when it admitted Wright’s third in- want to like— and confrontational in the second terview into evidence.” DETECTIVE JONES: Listen, that’s interview, but calm and patient in the Lessons Learned: your right. But what I’m interested in third. The second and third inter- In 2004, in Missouri v. Seibert , the is the truth,— views were separated by at most for- U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Parker then made numerous in- ty-five minutes (and perhaps as little propriety of a police practice for cus- criminating statements. In response as fifteen minutes), during which todial interrogation that intentionally to Parker’s questions about potential time Wright was arrested and hand- gave no Miranda warnings of the sentences, the detective said that was cuffed. Thus, we conclude that the right to remain silent and the right to “beyond the scope of what [he was] second and third interviews consti- counsel until the interrogation had allowed to give advice about, okay, tuted one ‘integrated and proximate- produced a confession. Thereafter, so [Parker was] going to end up talk- ly conducted questioning,’ and not when there was no turning back the ing to a lawyer.” separate events as the State asserts.” suspect was read his Miranda rights. Parker repeatedly expressed a de- “Finally, we consider Wright’s The Supreme Court affirmed the sire to write a letter of apology to the age, experience with the criminal suppression of the statements made victims, “I want to say I’m sorry. I justice system, intelligence and, per- after the late Miranda warnings. don’t know what to do right now. Is haps most significantly, whether the Wright v. State there—is there a lawyer in the build- police did anything to counter 5th D.C.A. (May 30, 2014) ing or am I going to have to f* * * * Wright’s probable misimpression sit in there and wait?” that her earlier, un-Mirandized state- Miranda and Suspect’s DETECTIVE JONES: No, you ments could be used against her. See, would have to call one. Listen, man, J.D.B. v. North Carolina , (S.Ct. Questions if you don’t want to do it—

2011) (noting minors fundamentally Deputy Buckley made contact with At the end of the interview, Parker different for certain Miranda purpos- Michael Parker at his apartment and was arrested. es). The fifteen-year-old Wright had read him his Miranda rights. Deputy The defendant filed a motion to only one prior encounter with law Buckley testified that Parker indicat- suppress his statements alleging that enforcement, though she could not ed he understood his rights. Parker the detective failed to answer his recall being Mirandized . This weighs voluntarily accompanied the officers questions in good faith as to his need against her understanding the signifi- to the police station for an interview. to get a lawyer. The trial court grant- cance of her Miranda rights. … The transcript of the interview ed the motion. st Finally, law enforcement did nothing showed that Parker was informed The 1 D.C.A. disagreed. to counter Wright’s probable and that he was not under arrest and he Issue: reasonable belief that her prior in- acknowledged that he had been read What is an officer’s obligation when

LLLegal Eagle 6 October 2014 a suspect asks questions about his “A suspect who has been ignored sponse of ‘listen, that’s your right. rights under Miranda ? or overridden concerning a right will But what I’m interested in is the Miranda Rights: be reluctant to exercise that right truth,’ complied with Almeida be- During custodial questioning, a sus- freely. Once the officer properly an- cause the response was simple, pect has the right to consult with an swers the question, the officer may straightforward, and true and in ef- attorney and to have an attorney pre- then resume the interview (provided fect communicated to Parker that he sent. Miranda v. Arizona , (S.Ct. of course that the defendant in the had the right to counsel and whether 1966). “If a suspect clearly and une- meantime has not invoked his or her to ask for one was his choice. We quivocally requests counsel at any rights). . . . A prefatory utterance further find with regard to Parker’s time during a custodial interview, the must be subject to the following prefatory question of ‘is there—is interrogation must immediately stop three-step analysis: (1) whether the there a lawyer in the building,’ that until a lawyer is present or the sus- defendant was in fact referring to his Detective Jones’s response of ‘no, pect reinitiates conversation.” If, on right to counsel; (2) whether the ut- you would have to call one’ satisfied the other hand, a suspect who has terance was a clear, bona fide ques- Almeida because it, too, was simple, knowingly and voluntarily waived tion calling for an answer, not a ru- straightforward, and honest. . . .We his rights makes an equivocal or am- mination or a rhetorical question; and agree that Parker was in fact refer- biguous request for counsel, police (3) whether the officer made a good- ring to his right to counsel when he officers are not required to stop the faith effort to give a simple and posed that prefatory question, [‘is interrogation or ask clarifying ques- straightforward answer.” there a lawyer in the building’] and tions. See Walker v. State , (Fla.2007) In State v. Glatzmayer , (Fla.2001), that his utterance called for an an- (finding that the defendant did not the Florida Supreme Court held that swer. However, we conclude that the make an unequivocal request for where the defendant asked the offic- detective made a good-faith effort to counsel when he said, “I think I ers if “they thought he should get a give a simple and honest answer. For might want to talk to an attorney” lawyer?,” the officers’ response that these reasons, the trial court erred by and later asked the agent if he needed it was the defendant’s decision was a granting Parker’s motion to suppress an attorney). Again, these are in- good-faith effort to give a simple and his statements. Accordingly, we RE- stances after a suspect has acknowl- straightforward answer because VERSE the trial court’s order.” edged his rights and has begun mak- “their response was simple, reasona- Lessons Learned: ing statements. ble, and true.” “Unlike the situation As a general rule nothing in Almeida In Almeida v. State, (Fla.1999) the in Almeida , the officers did not en- requires a law enforcement officer to Florida Supreme Court pointed out gage in ‘gamesmanship’; they did act as legal advisor or personal coun- that a suspect who asks questions not try ‘to give an evasive answer, or selor for a suspect. “Such a task is while being advised of his rights to skip over the question, or to over- properly left to defense counsel. To must be responded to in a fair and ride or steamroll’ the suspect.” require officers to advise and counsel direct fashion. “If, at any point dur- Court’s Ruling: suspects would impinge on the offic- ing custodial interrogation, a suspect The D.C.A. noted here that the detec- ers’ sworn duty to prevent and detect asks a clear question concerning his tive did not ignore the defendant’s crime and enforce the of the or her rights, the officer must stop the questions and gave straight, fair, and state.” interview and make a good-faith meaningful responses. “In the pre- What is required is that any unambig- effort to give a simple and straight- sent case, the issue turns on the third uous, unequivocal, direct question be forward answer . To do otherwise— step of the Almeida analysis: whether responded to by the officer. Where the i.e., to give an evasive answer, or to Detective Jones gave a good-faith defendant asked the question, “Do you think I need a lawyer?” To which the skip over the question, or to override answer to Parker’s prefatory question detective responded, “That’s not our or ‘steamroll’ the suspect—is to ac- of ‘can you just tell me if I need to decision to make, that yours, it’s up to tively promote the very coercion that get a lawyer or something?,’ or tried you.” Traylor v. State , (Fla.1992) was in- to override or steamroll him. We State v. Parker tended to dispel. conclude that Detective Jones’s re- 1st D.C.A. (August 22, 2014)

LLLegal Eagle 7 October 2014 How to Best Prepare for a Court Appearance

A calm, sincere, respectful, open, forthright attitude — no matter who’s asking the questions — will have you credibly winning despite confrontational questions

Law enforcement understands how a winning atude is crical to a winning performance in street confrontaons. Unfortunately, aorneys overlook this when it comes to preparing officers to “win” in court. I’ve seen way too many books and training by aorneys tled “courtroom survival” or “how to survive cross examinaon.” That’s wrong-headed thinking. That’s already giving power over to the opposing counsel. The goal in court — just like in the street – is to win, not merely to survive. Win What? While a winning atude is key to a winning performance, it’s also important to ask, “Win what?” When I ask this queson in my courtroom tesmony training, the most common answer is, “Get the convicon!” In the nearly 30 years I’ve spent working with law enforcement that’s what I’ve seen them do in court — try to help the prosecutor get the convicon. If you’re trying to help the prosecutor get the convicon, and you’re trying not to “hurt” the case — do you think that might affect how you tesfy? Absolutely. You appear biased to the jury (or judge). If a police officer ap- pears biased, do you think that helps or hurts the prosecuon’s case and likelihood of geng a convicon? When tesfying officers appear biased they’re scoring goals for the other team. Winning, Defined: The win for an officer in court — whether in a criminal prosecuon or civil ligaon — is that at the end of tesmony, the jury or judge must believe you. That’s it. But winning the credibility con- frontaon can be difficult when an experienced defense aorney’s white-hot, focused purpose is to discredit you. That’s because they know if they can raise a doubt about your credibility — be- cause of who you are and what you represent — it may raise a doubt about the enre case. How Jurors Determine Credibility: Most experts agree that communicaon is made up of what we say, how we say it, and our body language. O-cited research breaks down how important most people find those three means of communicaon: • What we say — the actual content of our speech — 7 percent • How we say it — tone, inflecon, modulaon, pitch, amplificaon — 38 percent • Non-verbal body language — what we do as we’re speaking — 55 percent One reason tesfy in person — rather than just have the jury read a transcript— is so the jury can see the last two components of communicaon, especially when you’re confronted by the defense. Most paern jury instrucons tell the jurors they should consider the witness’ manner, behavior, and atude on the stand in deciding the witness’ credibility. Reasonable minds

LLLegal Eagle 8 October 2014 can argue about the exact percentages above but officers understand the concept. They oen rely more on how people respond to their quesons and their nonverbal behavior. For discussion pur- poses, I’ll use the percentages above. Most Witness Preparation Misses the Boat: This breakdown of communicaon has amazing implicaons for whether jurors or judges believe you and whether you’re prepared to win the credibility confrontaon. If you get a pretrial meeng with the prosecutor, you’re probably going to spend your me on what you’re going to say. Get it perfect and you’re seven percent on your way to being believed. But this explains how an officer can tesfy to the objecve truth on the stand and sll get discredited by an experienced defense aorney. There’s also good news in this breakdown. It explains why an officer can make honest mistakes on the seven percent and sll be found credible by the jury. You don’t have to get the ‘what’ perfect for the jury to believe and trust you. So, how do you make the last two components of your communicaon credible? All About Attitude: Your atude determines how you tesfy and your body language. If you’re defensive, that’s how you’ll come across — regardless of what you say. What kinds of people are defensive? Guilty peo- ple. And that’s what the jury will see. The same will happen if you come across hosle, indignant, or angry. Check any losing atude at the courtroom door. What Makes a Witness Credible? Consistency . Jurors look to see if what you say matches how you say it and how you behave when you say nothing at all. Respeculness . The witness shows respect to the process and others – the judge, both aorneys, the jurors. She doesn’t make sarcasc comments or expressions. If in the audience, she listens respecully to other witnesses. Not Arrogant . Arrogance suggests you don’t listen to or value others’ ideas and opinions and you put yourself above them. Jurors find credible witnesses who treat them as equal, intelligent adults. Before You Go to Court: Ask and answer the most important queson every me. It will help you get the winning atude in place. Then think about how to be credible. A calm, sincere, respecul, open, forthright a- tude — no maer who’s asking the quesons — will have you winning confrontaons quesons credibility.

Editor’s Note: This article was authored by Val Van Brocklin. She has been a regular contributor to a number of law enforcement publications and has been featured in the Calibre Press Online Street Survival Newsletter , Police Chief magazine, The Law Enforcement Trainer magazine, and The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette. This article first appeared in PoliceOne.com September 17, 2014.

LLLegal Eagle 9 October 2014