USAID/OTI BURMA TRANSITION INITIATIVE

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT (OCTOBER 2017 – MARCH 2018)

APRIL 2018

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by DAI.

USAID/OTI BURMA TRANSITION INITIATIVE

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT (OCTOBER 1, 2017 – MARCH 31, 2018)

Program Title: Burma Transition Initiative Sponsoring USAID Office: Office of Transition Initiatives Contract Number: AID-OAA-I-14-00010/AID-OAA-TO-16-00006 Contractor: DAI Date of Publication: November 5, 2018 Author: DAI

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS ...... 2 INTRODUCTION ...... 3 PROGRAM STRATEGY ...... 4 POLITICAL CONTEXT ...... 5 ACTIVITIES TO HIGHLIGHT ...... 7 ENHANCING THE ABILITY OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS TO ENGAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS...... 7 REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF THE DRIVERS OF INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICT ...... 9 ENHANCING ACCESS TO SERVICES FOR SURVIVORS OF EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ...... 11 PROGRAM BUDGET QUICK FACTS ...... 12 LESSONS LEARNED ...... 13

1 ABBREVIATIONS

CSO – Civil Society Organization EAO – Ethnic Armed Organization FPNCC – Federal and Political Negotiations and Consultation Committee GoM – Government of IQC – Indefinite Quantity Contract KIA – KNLA – Karen National Liberation Army LDU – Lahu Democratic Union MIDO – Myanmar ICT for development Organization MRYA – Mandalay Regional Youth Association NCA – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement NMSP – New Mon State Party NRS – Northern Rakhine State OTI – Office of Transition Initiatives PPR – Program Performance Review PWD – Person With Disabilities RA – Rolling Assessment RCSS - Restoration Council of Shan State SHG – Self-help Group SMT – Senior Management Team SOW – Scope of Work SRS - Strategy Review Session SSA – SWIFT – Support Which Implements Fast Transitions TAP – Transition Activities Pool TNLA – Ta’ang National Liberation Army UN – United Nations UNFC – United Nationalities Federal Council UPC – Union Peace Conference USAID – United States Agency for International Development UWSA –

2 INTRODUCTION

In March 2016, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/ Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) awarded a Myanmar task order under the Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) IV Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) mechanism that would establish and manage a quick response mechanism supporting activities that deepen and sustain reforms and foster legitimate, inclusive processes for peace and national reconciliation in Myanmar. The task order would succeed and continue the work of the OTI Burma task order under the SWIFT III IQC which was awarded in September 2012 and closed in August 2016. The first task order sought to increase participation and inclusion in the reform and peace processes and address critical impediments to the transition. The subsequent award continues to build off these same objectives aimed at deepening and sustaining Myanmar’s transition to democracy. The SWIFT IV award was made to the SWIFT III incumbent, DAI Global, LLC. During this reporting period, the program, also known as “Kann Let,” had its option year exercised and is now three years in length, running through March 2019, and has a ceiling of $28.7 million. The Kann Let program supports local partners and the Government of Myanmar to1: • Enhance the ability of key stakeholders to engage in the peace process • Strengthen engagement on areas affecting fundamental freedoms • Reduce the influence of drivers of inter-communal conflict and strengthen the capacity to promote intercommunal harmony The Kann Let program works closely with stakeholders in the political and reform process such as local civil society organizations (CSOs), grassroots organizations, local and national government, and media groups to advance peace and democratic reforms.

1 The three program objectives listed here represent new versions of previous objectives that were refined during the June 2017 Strategy Review Session and agreed upon in the weeks after.

3 PROGRAM STRATEGY

Consistent with the U.S. Government’s Principled Engagement policy, the Integrated Country Strategy approved in January 2014, the USAID/OTI Burma program broadly seeks to deepen and sustain reforms and foster legitimate process for pursuing peace. To support this goal, USAID/OTI has increased participation and inclusion in the reform process and addressed critical impediments to the political transition, specifically reform and peace issues necessary for Myanmar to become a truly inclusive, multiethnic union. In June 2017, the Kann Let program revised Program Objectives, target issues, approaches, and actors during a three-and-a-half-day Strategy Review Session (SRS) held in Bagan, Myanmar. Through contextual analysis, the program revised and collapsed its four previous Program Objectives into three overarching Program Objectives that aim to deepen and sustain reforms and foster legitimate processes for pursuing peace. In January 2018, the program held a Rolling Assessment (RA) during which the Senior Management Team (SMT), in collaboration with Kann Let Field Advisors, further refined the sub-objectives in light of USAID/OTI strategic priorities for the final year of implementation. The updated objectives are as follows: • To enhance the ability of key stakeholders to engage in the peace process • To strengthen engagement on areas affecting fundamental freedoms • To reduce the influence of drivers of inter-communal conflict and strengthen the capacity to promote intercommunal harmony

4 POLITICAL CONTEXT

The reporting period of October 1, 2017 through March 31, 2018 was marked by the continuation of problems in Northern Rakhine State, which forced 700,000 predominantly ethnic Rohingya across the border into refugee camps in Bangladesh. The crisis has led to a significant spike in ethnic and religious tensions between Buddhists and Muslims, including violent outbreaks in mixed communities across the country. Growing nationalist sentiment has emboldened military leaders and the , precipitating an increase in operations against ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Kachin and Northern Shan, and some in southern Chin state. Two new EAOs signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), however despite the veneer of progress, the process itself is largely stalled by the Tatmadaw who have denied EAOs the ability to hold state and local-level dialogue as part of the formal dialogue process. In addition, the Union Peace Conference, supposed to be held in December, was postponed and moved several times with a final date still unconfirmed.

The crisis in Rakhine State has been met with widespread international condemnation, with the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights declaring the situation a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson echoing the statement following a visit to Myanmar in November 2017. The Government of Myanmar (GoM), including the senior leadership of the NLD and military, has uniformly denied the accusations, even as additional evidence of atrocities surface in the media. The State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, resisted pressure to address the human rights abuses and voiced support for the military, led by Commander-in Chief Min Aung Hlaing. Her refusal to act prompted some of her closest advisors to denounce her actions, including long-term friend, and US Diplomat, Bill Richardson, who left the advisory board for the Rakhine State crisis in January 2018, calling the government’s response “whitewash”. There has been no indication how the GoM will move to implement all the recommendations of the 2017 report released by the Kofi Annan-led Rakhine Advisory Commission, which aimed at addressing the drivers of conflict in Rakhine State.

Despite a bi-lateral agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh in November 2017 to begin the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, the process has stalled. This is due to, what many consider, unrealistic eligibility requirements for returnees, the systematic destruction of Rohingya land by the Myanmar military, and an unwillingness of refugees to return due to fears of continued persecution. The Myanmar government currently requires refugees to produce evidence of their residency in order to return, including physical documentation of land rights, national identification cards, and photos of property, the majority of which were destroyed during the clearance operations. To date, only 600 refugees have been verified for repatriation, out of the 8,000 submitted to Myanmar for review by Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the situation for the Rohingya population residing in refugee camps continues to worsen due to the lack of sanitation and poorly constructed informal structures, which may not withstand the impending monsoon.

There is a spillover effect from the events in Northern Rakhine State which has caused a dramatic increase in inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions across the country, sometimes tipping over into violent clashes in several areas. On January 16th, local police clashed with residents of Mrauk-U, Rakhine State, who were protesting the local authorities’ decision to ban celebrations of the 223rd anniversary of the fall of the Rakhine Kingdom. The police fired into a crowd of demonstrators who were marching on government offices leaving seven dead and at least twelve injured. On March 20th, a mob of 30 Buddhist residents in Lemyethna Township, Ayeyarwady Region, attacked a group of Muslims, destroying many of their stores, reportedly due to anger over the local marriage of a Muslim man and Buddhist woman.

There have been outbreaks of violence in other parts of the country provoked by incendiary rhetoric by nationalist monks, compounded by widespread hate speech and fake news stories being spread on social

5 media. U-Wirathu, a popular nationalist monk, affiliated with the Ma Ba Tha movement, resumed his anti- Muslim speeches following the expiry on March 9th of a public speaking ban. This has included exacerbating tensions by voicing support for Kyi Lin, who is on trial for the assassination of prominent minority lawyer, U Ko Ni, outside the Yangon International Airport on January 29th. A few prominent, moderate monks, such as Ashin Issariya, condemned U Wirathu, saying that his views were misleading the public and were not representative of the tenants of Buddhism. However, Muslim populations in Myanmar, particularly the remaining minorities in Rakhine State, live in fear of further violence. Media freedom has also been curtailed, as evidenced by the arrest and prosecution of two Reuters’ journalists in December 2017 for their investigation into mass graves in Rakhine State, citing their violation of the colonial area Official Secrets Act. At the time of writing, the journalists remain imprisoned without eligibility for bail.

A formal ceremony was held in Nay Pyi Taw on October 15th to commemorate the second anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). However, the third official Union Peace Conference (UPC), or 21st Century Panglong Conference, originally planned for December, has been repeatedly postponed, and is tentatively scheduled for May 2018. The peace negotiations have been stymied by a resurgence in Tatmadaw operations against key signatory and non-signatory EAOs, leading to renewed clashes with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Shan State Army (SSA), and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). In response, a number of signatory EAOs refused to attend the UPC, citing the military’s violation of the NCA and several preexisting bi-lateral ceasefire agreements.

Despite these confrontations two additional EAOs, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), signed the NCA in February, raising the total number of signatory EAOs from eight to ten. These events, in addition to the creation of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), a coalition of non-signatory EAOs led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), has led to the diminishing in stature of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). Notwithstanding these obstacles to a timely UPC, a number of State and Regional-level CSO forums were held during November- December 2017, culminating in a national-level forum held in Nay Pyi Taw in January 2018. It is unclear if the next UPC will actually take place given deepening fissures between EAO representatives over NCA violations, opposing priorities for political negotiations, and the Tatmadaw refusal to let some local level dialogues take place.

6 ACTIVITIES TO HIGHLIGHT

ENHANCING THE ABILITY OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS TO ENGAGE IN THE PEACE PROCESS

INCREASE UNDERSTANDING OF FISCAL FEDERALISM AMONG WOMEN LEADERS

As Myanmar considers evolving into a federal governance system, it is difficult for people to imagine what federalism in practice might look like. The topic is particularly difficult when discussing fiscal federalism, as there is a limited understanding of the economic issues as they relate to political dynamics. As the peace process continues, fiscal federalism has become an increasingly prevalent issue that needs to be better studied, understood, and debated. To be able to substantively participate in the peace process, women delegates to the 21st Century Panglong Conference, and their advisors, Participants with Professor Paul Hobson at the Fiscal Federalism Workshop, Yangon requested targeted training to better understand the thematic issues and contribute to the negotiations. With USAID/OTI support, the Women’s League of Burma conducted a three-day workshop on fiscal federalism from 19-21 February at Green Hill Hotel, in Yangon. In attendance were 47 representatives from women’s organizations across the country, including from Lahu, Ta’ang, Shan, Kachin, and Kuki communities. Dr. Paul Hobson, a technical expert with experience advising on regional fiscal federalism reform processes in China and Malaysia, delivered the workshop and covered topics including: responsibilities for tax collection, equitable distribution of natural resource revenue, and gender-sensitive budgeting. Additionally, he mapped out options for further advocacy in relation to fiscal federalism in Myanmar using comparisons of similar solutions in Canada and other countries.

Attendees were particularly enthusiastic and inquisitive on the topics discussed, given their relevance to local issues and upcoming peace negotiations. During the question and answer (Q&A) sessions, participants grappled with concerns such as: how state-level institutions can establish greater control of natural resources in their area; the relative advantages and disadvantages of decentralization; and the shared responsibility for the cost of basic service provision in their areas. It was evident that the understanding of this key thematic area significantly improved as a result of the modules. Attendees agreed on the following next steps: the formation of a thematic study group, awareness raising activities among their constituencies, and the development of policy papers to document their stance on specific fiscal issues.

7 PEACE AND FEDERALISM AWARENESS TRAINING IN KACHIN STATE In reviewing the peace and reform processes of Kachin State, there has been a significant demand from Shan ethnic communities to engage with relevant ethnic armed groups, civil society organizations, and the Government of Myanmar (GOM) to share their perspectives on the peace process. It is widely believed that the level of awareness of the peace process for Shan stakeholders living in Kachin State is comparatively low. Additionally, the Shan population’s lack of knowledge about federalism and sub-national federalism is a potential spoiler for the peace process as they are unable to formulate and communicate their positions to relevant stakeholders.

Therefore, USAID/OTI supported a local CSO, the Nam Kiyo Foundation, to conduct a series of trainings and strategic workshops in Myitkyina and Bhamo, Kachin State, to build the capacity of the Shan ethnic communities to engage in key thematic areas. The Nam Kiyo Foundation organized its first, four-day training in Myitkyina from 17-20 Jan 2018. Out of 41 participants, one-third were women, and participants included representatives from Shan ethnic based CSOs, religious groups, literature and culture associations, and political parties. During the lecture, trainers used case studies from different countries to provide practical examples of other federalist systems and how they were created. Participants were also asked to brainstorm key topics highlighted in Q&A sessions, such as, “Constructive methods stakeholders should use to engage in the Kachin State dialogue process.”

The Nam Kiyo Foundation collaborated with Kann Let to develop tailored pre- and post- tests to measure changes in the knowledge of the participants. The analysis by the M&E team found that the average scores increased by 25%. Moreover, the training provided an opportunity for the Shan ethnic minority in Kachin State to come together and discuss their opinions about the future of the state- level dialogue process. Shan CSOs reported that they had a better understanding of their weaknesses. They also reported how effective networking could improve their advocacy strategies. Finally, the participants produced action plans to inform next steps in representing their respective communities in the peace process. Peace and Federalism Awareness Training, Myitkyina, Kachin State Trainings on the peace process for Shan CSOs, religious groups, and political parties in Kachin State and Sagaing Region, are expected to increase knowledge and capacity of participants to actively engage in community discussions and in future political dialogues. It is assumed that the lack of understanding of key topics was an impediment to the capability of the Shan community to effectively engage with majority ethnic groups and participate in future political discussions.

8 REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF THE DRIVERS OF INTER- COMMUNAL CONFLICT

STRENGTHENING YOUTH LEADERS’ COORDINATION TO PREVENT INTER- COMMUNAL CONFLICT There have been numerous outbreaks of violence in Mandalay Region in recent years due to escalating tensions between religious groups. The drivers of these tensions are rooted in historical mistrust and negative perceptions of each other, which were exacerbated by the violent military crackdown in Rakhine following the August 2017 attacks. In particular, youth leaders were found to be increasingly susceptible to hate speech and rumors, which have been widely circulated through social media and other local channels. Youth leaders are also known to be instrumental in facilitating inter-communal engagement and advocacy initiatives. USAID/OTI supported the Mandalay Regional Youth Association (MRYA), a local CSO, to conduct a fifteen-day training of trainers (ToT) workshop on inter-communal conflict resolution and peace building. The ToT took place from 16 Feb – 2 March 2018 with fifteen youth leaders, one-third of whom were women, from conflict- prone Townships including Kyauk Sae, Tharsi, Meikthila and Yamaethin. The interactive training modules covered key topics related to democratic citizenship, the role of civil society organizations in peace building, and conflict resolution through pluralism. Furthermore, the ToT focused on facilitation skills to enable the participants to deliver eight, three-day multiplier trainings in their Participants on Granduation Ceremony at MRYA Office, Mandalay home areas, which are scheduled to begin in early April. The lack of opportunities for youth leaders to study these concepts and engage with other stakeholders is a key impediment in the effort to promote diversity and tolerance and prevent inter-communal conflict in the region. By helping youth leaders engage on key concepts- the role of civil society in Myanmar's democratic transition, pluralism, peace building and facilitation- the participants are better equipped to promote inter- communal harmony through improved knowledge and stronger networks.

STRENGTHENING INTERFAITH COOPERATION AND PEACEBUILDING

Tensions have been growing in Tanintharyi Region, and Myeik Township within this region has a history of peaceful coexistence among its residents of diverse faiths - Buddhist, Muslim, Christian and Hindu - and various ethnic groups - Bake, Arab, Malay, Thai, Mon, Rakhine, Kayin, and Talia. However, tensions across the country have raised concerns among local communities about future threats to this fragile coexistence. Ma Ba Tha's mobilization is increasing in the area, and the presence of ethnic armed groups in the vicinity further threatens to destabilize the area. Local interfaith leaders, community leaders, and civil society organizations have expressed the need to network and formulate strategies to promote interfaith cooperation and prevent inter-communal conflict in the area. Metta Let Kann, was formed in 2012 by diverse faith groups in Myeik, to prevent the outbreak of intercommunal conflict. USAID/OTI previously supported Metta Let Kann in organizing a forum in

9 May 2017 to strengthen interfaith cooperation and peacebuilding in the area. Since then, the network has conducted numerous interfaith dialogue workshops, interfaith visits, and other conflict mitigation activities. The current initiative builds on previous activities and focuses on the following areas: strengthening capacity to effectively promote religious tolerance among communities, preventing inter-communal conflict through the provision of workshops on interfaith cooperation, and conflict prevention for key social activists in the four townships within Myeik District (Myeik, Palaw, Tanintharyi and Kyunsu townships). The first of five workshops on interfaith cooperation was held in Myeik in March 2018, with both Muslim and Buddhist participants, 60% of whom were women. Notably, it was facilitated by graduates of a USAID/OTI supported ToT program on ‘Community Information Management to Reduce Inter-Communal Violence’ conducted by Search for Common Ground and Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO). The performance of the facilitators was ranked highly by attendees. The limited capacity of social activists and local leaders in the region of Myeik and their lack of awareness of interfaith cooperation concepts makes communities more vulnerable to violent conflict. By providing training to social activists and local leaders on the concepts of interfaith cooperation and conflict prevention, they will be better equipped to identify the drivers of conflict in their communities, promote interfaith harmony, and diffuse tensions as they arise, thus mitigating potential conflicts.

10 ENHANCING ACCESS TO SERVICES FOR SURVIVORS OF EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

ENGAGING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN THE PEACE PROCESS

In Kayah State and Bago Region, many people with disabilities are excluded from community- and state-level governance and decision-making processes. In particular, persons with disabilities (PWDs) are often excluded from peace-building processes taking place at local and regional levels. Although advances have been made in terms of raising awareness about the needs of PWDs at the community level and in the government, there are still few well-organized or supported organizations and entities that can advocate for or engage PWDs in governance and peace processes. Where such groups do exist, they lack the knowledge and capacity to become involved in governance or peace process efforts or to influence related policy at the local or state level.

USAID/OTI previously funded World Education to establish ko htu ko hta, or self- help groups, for PWDs and their family members. Self-help group objectives initially focused on identifying economic empowerment opportunities and income generation for PWDs at the community-level. The current project expands and builds the capacity of self-help groups to work with local and state-level stakeholders to increase the involvement of PWDs in the peace process. Simultaneously, the project provides funding and facilitation for state-level working groups that convene stakeholders and government in Distribution of Service Provider Directory to Persons with Disabilities , Kayah order to increase awareness, advocacy, and State engagement of PWDs in governance and the peace process at multiple levels.

The ability of PWDs and self-help groups to advocate for better representation was inhibited by weak organizational structures and limited awareness of how to engage effectively with civil society actors. Through Kann Let’s support to strengthen their organizational structures, clarify roles and responsibilities, and improve their understanding of the peace process, PWDs have increased representation in peace dialogues. Enhanced participation in CSO networks is anticipated.

11 PROGRAM BUDGET QUICK FACTS

Over the reporting period from October 1, 2017 through March 31, 2018, the Kann Let program cleared 60 activities that total an estimated $5,389,617. NUMBER OF SECTOR TOTAL VALUE GRANTS Peace $1,827,359 17 Women Peace and Security $340,080 7 Inter-Communal Harmony $3,075,823 34 Leahy $146,355 2 Grand Total $5,389,617 60

The chart below demonstrates the proportion of programming broken out by sector during the reporting period.

Leahy 3%

Peace 34%

Inter-Communal Harmony 57%

Women Peace and Security 6%

12 LESSONS LEARNED

The reporting period saw a significant social and political upheaval due to the ongoing crisis in Rakhine State, the resulting spike in tensions between Buddhists and Muslims, and the uptick in clashes between the Tatmadaw and EAOs in Kachin, Northern Shan, and Chin States. These events necessitated a programmatic shift in order to adapt to how the context evolved, particularly in relation to constricted levels of access and an uncertain path forward for the peace process. Furthermore, the Rolling Assessment (RA), held in January, marked a further refinement of Kann Let’s desired program level changes (PLCs) to streamline strategic priorities in preparation for the final twelve months of programming. The key lessons learned from this process included: • Increased focus on policy formulation and advocacy: The RA highlighted the significant impact of activities under the Peace Objective aimed at increasing participation in peace process events and enhancing the preparedness of key stakeholders to engage constructively in the dialogues. In particular, substantial progress was made toward improving the internal capacity of EAOs and political parties to articulate and formalize their policy frameworks. Greater emphasis will be placed on this stream of programming to consolidate these gains over the next twelve months. • Taking stock of influence on potential peace spoilers: One program sub-objective was previously aimed at creating greater awareness among the Bamar ethnic majority, to educate them on the benefits of an inclusive peace process and mitigate potential spoilers which might stem from a lack of support for further reforms. While Kann Let found that there was some interest in the themes of peace and federalism amongst the target population, it remained a longer-term issue with limited opportunities for the program to achieve significant impact in the remaining period. Consequently, the team agreed to evaluate progress-to-date and communicate lessons learned to the USAID mission and other organizations working on these issues. • Expanding the capacity of key stakeholders to promote intercommunal harmony: Kann Let’s previous ramp down of intercommunal harmony awareness activities allowed the project to put a greater emphasis on providing communities with the tools and skills necessary to mitigate conflict in their areas. Program teams conducted geographic and stakeholder mapping, specifically in relation to this objective, to contribute to more targeted and tailored interventions. • Adapting to the crisis in Rakhine State: The military restricted access to large parts of Northern Rakhine State, making it nearly impossible for organizations to continue any existing programs in the area. However, Kann Let was able to support small-scale relief operations through CSOs with a presence in affected populations. In addition to the displacement of 700,000 predominantly Rohingya Muslims, and deep-seated tensions that led to outbreaks of violence in Mrauk-U and Sittwe, the lack of access necessitated a strategic shift in the promoting intercommunal harmony strategy. Continued volatility between Muslim and Buddhist residents prompted the program to minimize their interaction and focus on mitigating further unrest among the broader population. • Learning agenda considerations: In advance of Kann Let’s close-out, the team has put forward recommendations and a timeline plan for how to capture and communicate impacts and lessons learned across programming streams.

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