DOCSLIB.ORG

Differential Virtue Discounting: Public Generosity Is Seen As More Selfish Than Public Impartiality

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Differential Virtue Discounting: Public Generosity Is Seen As More Selfish Than Public Impartiality Differential virtue discounting: Public generosity is seen as more selfish than public impartiality Gordon T. Kraft-Todd*a, Max Kleiman-Weinerb, Liane Younga aDepartment of Psychology, McGuinn 300, 140 Commonwealth Ave, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 ; bDepartment of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 *Corresponding author: [email protected] Abstract There is a paradox in our desire to be seen as virtuous. If we do not overtly display our virtues, others will not be able to see them; yet, if we do overtly display our virtues, others may think that we do so only for social credit. Here, we investigate how virtue signaling works across two distinct virtues—generosity and impartiality—in eleven online experiments (total N=4,586). We demonstrate the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, that this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality. Further, we provide evidence for the mechanism underlying these judgments, showing that they are mediated by perceived selfish motivations. We discuss how these findings and our novel terminology can shed light on open questions in the social perception of reputation and motivation. Keywords: virtue signaling, virtue discounting, reputation, generosity, impartiality, virtue Introduction Virtue signaling—i.e. conspicuous, public displays of admirable moral behavior—has only recently entered the cultural lexicon (Bartholomew, 2015). The term was coined—and is often used—to pejoratively describe a class of behaviors (e.g. "outrage": Crockett, 2017; Spring, Cameron, & Cikara, 2018) enabled by social media where actors invest minimal effort to widely broadcast their support for a cause. Though some defend such behavior by claiming that it can raise awareness of a cause, many remain skeptical because it enables actors to reap reputational rewards without meaningfully contributing to change. Such skeptics engage in what we call virtue discounting, i.e. the devaluing of virtuous behavior to the extent that ulterior, selfish (e.g. reputational) motivations can be inferred for actors’ behavior. The phenomena of virtue signaling and virtue discounting predate social media. Various spiritual and philosophical traditions have debated the merits of public displays of virtue (as discussed in De Freitas, DeScioli, Thomas, & Pinker, 2019). Previous research demonstrating these phenomena generally treat virtue as a single dimension: generosity (e.g. Barclay & Willer, 2007). Yet, in treatments of virtue both ancient (e.g. Aristotle’s virtue ethics) and modern (Graham et al., 2011), virtue is not considered a unitary construct, but a collection of conceptually distinct morally admirable traits. We depart from previous work by asking: are some virtues more subject to skepticism than others? Here, we present the first evidence of differential virtue discounting: different virtues are discounted to a different degree. Specifically, we show that participants engage in greater discounting of generosity than of impartiality. Why do people virtue signal? Individuals demonstrate concern for their reputations, i.e. how they are perceived by others (Emler, 1990). A virtuous reputation, specifically, can grant individuals higher social status (Bai, 2017), which can in turn lead to greater wealth and well- being (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). We define virtue as a stable trait demonstrating other- regarding preferences through prosocial (i.e. other-benefiting) behavior. There is ample evidence that when individuals’ behavior is observable to others, e.g. done in public, individuals are more likely to behave prosocially (in the lab, e.g. Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; and in the field, e.g. Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013). People do not merely react to being observed, but also actively engage in managing others’ impressions of them (Jones & Pittman, 1982). It is therefore unsurprising that people attempt to signal their virtue (e.g. Barclay & Willer, 2007; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016). It is worth noting, however, that most previous demonstrations of virtue signaling have focused on a single virtue—e.g. generosity (Barclay & Willer, 2007), trustworthiness (Jordan et al., 2016), or impartiality (Kleiman-Weiner, Shaw, & Tenenbaum, 2017)—while little research exists comparing virtue signaling across virtues. Why (and how) do observers sometimes discount actors’ virtuous behavior? Given the benefits of a virtuous reputation, people may be motivated to exaggerate or falsely signal their virtue. Our distaste for such behavior may explain our condemnation of moral hypocrites, who espouse moral virtues in public but fail to act on them in private (Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017). Virtue discounting relies on the human capacity for theory of mind, i.e. the ability to reason about others’ mental states (Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). Of particular relevance here, this enables us to consider actors’ motivations, which in turn affects our moral judgments (Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). When observers infer selfish ulterior motives for prosocial behavior, they perceive actors less favorably (e.g. Newman & Cain, 2014). One cue to such inference is when observers know that actors know that they are being observed: observers can then infer that actors are motivated by the selfish desire to achieve a good reputation, rather than by their virtue (Barclay & Willer, 2007). Here, we propose to replicate these findings, showing that observers will discount public displays of virtue (H1, see Methods). Expanding on this prior work, we explore perceptions of selfish motivations by decomposing the concept into “negative” self-oriented motivations (e.g. for reputational benefit) and “positive” moral motives (e.g. to signal a desired social norm). We expect these to be negatively correlated (see Methods and Table 3). We further expand on previous research by exploring virtue signaling and virtue discounting across two virtues that have been conceptually distinguished (Shaw, 2013): generosity, which we define as trait willingness to confer benefits to others at cost to oneself; and impartiality which we define as trait desire to treat others equally and without bias. These virtues have also been empirically distinguished (e.g. Shaw, Choshen-Hillel, & Caruso, 2018). As discussed above, there is ample evidence that people signal generosity (Barclay & Willer, 2007), but there is also emerging evidence that people signal impartiality (Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2017), and that this emerges early in development (Shaw & Olson, 2012). We believe that generosity and impartiality might be further distinguished by the extent to which they are discounted. Our tentative directional hypothesis is motivated by the intuition that there might be greater selfish motivations for being perceived as generous compared to impartial. Despite the growing body of work demonstrating the reputational benefits for being seen as impartial (for a review, see Shaw, 2016), there is a large literature demonstrating the reputational benefits for being seen as generous (for a review, see Barclay, 2013). It could be the case that the latter outweigh the former: consider, for example, an observer’s desire to interact with an actor who is seen as an exemplar of each virtue: while the observer could at most expect fair treatment from an extremely impartial actor, they might expect special treatment from an extremely generous actor. Thus, if an actor is perceived as generous (even if they are not), this might make them more attractive than if they are perceived as impartial. In sum: people stand to benefit from having virtuous reputations, and are therefore motivated to signal (and perhaps exaggerate) their virtue. Because virtue is not monolithic, but is comprised of conceptually distinct virtues, there may be heterogeneity in the benefit of having a reputation for different virtues. Due to the potential for false signaling, observers are likely to be skeptical of virtue signals to the extent that they infer ulterior selfish motivations for actors’ behavior. Finally, the extent that observers discount different virtues may depend on how selfish they think actors’ motivations are for publicly signaling these virtues. General Methods All online experiments were conducted using Qualtrics survey software, a convenience sample of participants were recruited using the crowdsourcing tool Amazon Mechanical Turk (Arechar, Kraft-Todd, & Rand, 2017). Data analysis for all studies was completed using STATA 13, and informed consent was obtained from all participants. We excluded duplicate Amazon worker IDs and IP addresses to prevent analyzing multiple observations per participant. The pre- study procedure was to ask participants to provide their mTurk IDs and transcribe a sentence of difficult-to-read handwritten text (the latter to prevent bot participation and discourage low-effort workers, a commonly used method on this platform; e.g. Kraft-Todd & Rand, 2019). In total, we requested N=4,000 participants (N=100/condition), but because some participants may have completed the survey but failed to enter their completion code to mTurk (thus allowing others to complete the survey), the final sample was N=4,012 participants (47.0% female, average age=35.8 years) across all nine experiments presented in the primary analyses. Participants completed the study
Load more

Recommended publications
  • I-Ii, Question 55, Article 4
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-16578-6 — Commentary on Thomas Aquinas's Virtue Ethics J. Budziszewski Excerpt More Information i-ii, question 55, article 4 Whether Virtue Is Suitably Dei ned? TEXT PARAPHRASE [1] Whether virtue is suitably dei ned? Is the traditional dei nition of virtue i tting? “Virtue is a good quality of the mind that enables us to live in an upright way and cannot be employed badly – one which God brings about in us, with- out us.” St. Thomas respectfully begins with this widely accepted dei nition because it would be arrogant to dismiss the result of generations of inquiry without examination. The ultimate source of the view which it encapsulates is St. Augustine of Hippo, but Augustine did not use precisely this wording. His more diffuse remarks had been condensed into a formula by Peter Lombard, 2 and the formula was then further sharpened by the Lombard’s disciples. Although St. Thomas begins with the tradition, he does not rest with it – he goes on to consider whether the received dei nition is actually correct. The i rst two Objections protest calling virtue a good quality. The third protests calling it a quality of the mind . The fourth objects to the phrase that it enables us to live rightly and the i fth to the phrase that it cannot be employed badly . Finally, the sixth protests the statement that God brings it about in us, without us . Although, in the end, St. Thomas accepts the dei nition, he does not accept it quite in the sense in which some of his predecessors did.
    [Show full text]
  • Aristotle on Love and Friendship
    ARISTOTLE ON LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP DAVID KONSTAN Philia is exceptional among ancient Greek value terms for the number of still unre- solved, or at least intensely debated, questions that go to the heart of its very nature.1 Does it mean “friendship”, as it is most commonly rendered in discussions of Aris- totle, or rather “love”, as seems more appropriate in some contexts? Whether it is love, friendship, or something else, is it an emotion, a virtue, or a disposition? The same penumbra of ambiguity surrounds the related term philos, often rendered as “friend” but held by some to include kin and other relations, and even to refer chiefly to them. Thus, Elizabeth Belfiore affirms that “the noun philos surely has the same range as philia, and both refer primarily, if not exclusively, to relationships among close blood kin” (2000: 20). In respect to the affective character of philia, Michael Peachin (2001: 135 n. 2) describes “the standard modern view of Roman friendship” as one “that tends to reduce significantly the emotional aspect of the relationship among the Ro- mans, and to make of it a rather pragmatic business”, and he holds the same to be true of Greek friendship or philia. Scholars at the other extreme maintain that ancient friendship was based essentially on affection. As Peachin remarks (ibid., p. 7), “D. Konstan [1997] has recently argued against the majority opinion and has tried to inject more (modern-style?) emotion into ancient amicitia”. Some critics, in turn, have sought a compromise between the two positions, according to which ancient friend- ship involved both an affective component and the expectation of practical services.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CARDINAL VIRTUE of JUSTICE in a TIME of PANDEMIC This Is the Second in a Series of Four Reflections on the Cardinal Virtues, Presented by Fr
    THE CARDINAL VIRTUE OF JUSTICE IN A TIME OF PANDEMIC This is the second in a series of four reflections on the Cardinal Virtues, presented by Fr. Anthony Barratt, STL, PHD, ChD, from the Upstate New York Area We continue our reflections on the four cardinal virtues; remembering that they are called “cardinal” virtues because everything hinges on them (the word cardinal originally means a hinge or foundation). This time, let us explore the virtue of justice. It may seem strange to think of justice as a virtue, since we often think of justice as more of a thing or entity, or as a system or process. Two things may help us here. The root of the word justice comes from the Latin “ius”; a word that means “right” or “making right”: That is right as in being correct or true (rather than making a right turn, or even our human rights). Furthermore, the Catechism (n. 1807) defines the virtue of justice as “the moral virtue that consists in the constant and firm will to give their due to God and neighbor.” It is a much needed virtue, especially with all the stresses and strains of our uncertain times and the ongoing pandemic. For example, I think that many of us often find ourselves saying that there is no respect anymore; whether it be how people are treated, rudeness, a lack of respect for life, all the negativity and animus in politics, road rage, or whatever. What we are really talking about though is a lack of the virtue of justice.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary Or St. Augustine's City of God | Augustine of Hippo | Virtue
    City of God St. Augustine Book I Preface Augustine explains how he wants to tackle the “glorious city of God” in his work. By this he means he wants to defend his God is the only true God and to show others who believe in other deities that they need to change their views. He praises God and all his works. Chapter 1 He gives a very brief history of Roman times as it relates to worshipping God. Additionally, he goes on to discuss how many people take God and his works for granted. Chapter 16 Here we see some of the first shades of Augustine’s beliefs. He writes: “the only difficulty is so to treat the subject as to satisfy at once modesty and reason” showing his focus on the need for modest means. He goes on to say how the true virtuous life is in the soul and not worldly pleasures. The body and its desires and needs are secondary to those of the soul. Chapter 18 In this section he discusses the contradictions between the body and the soul when controlled by others. He writes that even though the body many be controlled by others (that is, even though you may be forced to do something by another person), no one can ever control your will. He focuses on “purity” of the soul and writes on that matter: “If, on the other hand, it belongs to the soul, then not even when the body is violated is it lost.” As long as the soul remains pure and virtuous then nothing that happens with the body matters.
    [Show full text]
  • What Do We Mean by Virtue?
    What Do We Mean by Virtue? Robert Watts Thornburg This university chaplain takes a pragmatic approach to the ques - tion, “Can virtue be taught in the university? ”, which may seem cynical at first glance. There are significant difficulties in answering the question, including the lack of an adequate definition of terms, the overwhelming influence of Christian and western approaches to the question, the “unvirtue” experienced by many learners and the innate resistance of stu - dents to hearing the word “virtue.” Constructive solutions include avoid - ing theoretical propositional approaches, fostering moral seriousness, making discussion immediate and relevant to learners and, finally, creat - ing communities in which to pursue the search. Not “Virtue” but “virtues” are possible to teach and are already evident in student populations. VIRTUE: what a sweet romantic word! The very notion of putting the words “virtue” and “university” in the same sentence strikes many folks I know as an oxymoron. When, as a University Chaplain, I mention the word “virtue” to students or staff, they give me the quiet benign smile that says: “That’s the kind of thing you people (translate: clergy) always want us to talk about.” Therein lies the problem, and my own difficulty in dis - cussing the question of teaching virtue in any university setting. The word itself carries much baggage, a great variety of meanings springing from Robert Watts Thornburg has just retired after 23 years as dean of Marsh Chapel and university chaplain at Boston University. Educated at DePaul University and Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary, he also studied with Paul Tillich at Union Theological Seminary.
    [Show full text]
  • Rosalind Hursthouse, on Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999
    Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. x, 275. Reviewed by Gilbert Harman, Department of Philosophy, Princeton Univer- sity Virtue ethics is atype of ethicaltheory in which the notion of virtue or good character plays a central role. This splendid new book describes a “program” for the development of a particular (“Aristotelian”) form of virtue ethics. The book is intended to be used as a textbook, but should be read by anyone interested in moral philosophy. Hursthouse has been a major contributor to the development of virtue ethics and the program she describes, while making use of the many contributions of others, is very much her program, with numerous new ideas and insights. The book has three parts. The first dispels common misunderstandings and explains how virtue ethics applies to complex moral issues. The sec- ond discusses moral motivation, especially the motivation involved in doing something because it is right. The third explains how questions about the objectivity of ethics are to be approached within virtue ethics. Structure Hursthouse’s virtue ethics takes as central the conception of a human be- ing who possesses all ethical virtues of character and no vices or defects of character—”human being” rather than “person” because the relevant char- acter traits are “natural” to the species. To a first approximation, virtue ethics says that a right action is an action among those available that a perfectly virtuous human being would charac- teristically do under the circumstances. This is only a first approximation because of complications required in order accurately to describe certain moral dilemmas.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethics Kanfan Ethics Uflitarian Ethics Communitarian/Virtue Ethics Computers And
    3/17/14 A Brief History of Western Philosophy “To know the good is to desire the good.” Socrates 400 BC Plato virtue “Weakness of the will” Ethics Aristotle 350 BC “the good life” (1200: Thomas Aquinas makes Aristotelian philosophy the core of Catholic theology.) “Categorical axiomatic imperative” Kant 1750 utilitarian Bentham 1800 “Veil of ignorance” Mill 1850 “Virtues come from Rawls 1970 MacIntyre 1980 social practices” “The greatest good for the greatest number” Social Implicaons of Computers Kan4an ethics U4litarian ethics • Categorical Imperave: • The greatest good for the greatest number. – Treat people as ends, not means. • Ac4ons are judged by (probable) results, not purposes. – Ac4ons must be universalizable. – A good act has good results, on balance, for everyone. • Everything else can be derived from these • U4litarian philosophers like to pose dilemmas: axioms. – “Your spouse and your child are thrown overboard and you only have 4me to save one of them. Which one?” – Example: Telling lies isn’t universalizable because if everyone did it, nobody would believe the lies. • People today who don’t think very hard tend to become u4litarians by accident. Don’t do that. • Rawls: the Veil of Ignorance – If you’re a u4litarian, it should be because you’ve chosen – Imagine you don’t know whether you’ll be rich or to. poor; black, white, or brown; male or female; etc. Communitarian/Virtue ethics • The goal of ethical philosophy isn’t to judge individual ac4ons, but to live “the good life” overall. • Ac4ng well comes from good habits–the virtues–not from deliberaon on the spot.
    [Show full text]
  • Virtue and Happiness: a Philosophical Inquiry
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Wits Institutional Repository on DSPACE VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY Muhammad Assadallah Schuitema 320900 A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 16th March 2015 1 Abstract The position that holds that virtue, as a good, is sufficient for happiness has had illustrious exponents in the past. We will refer to this position as the sufficiency thesis. In recent times however this position has fallen into disfavour. This is largely due to the strong intuition that certain goods other than virtue are necessary for happiness. We will refer to this as the problem of external goods. The point of this paper is to respond to the problem of external goods by articulating an understanding of virtue as involving the ability to occupy a “distanced perspective” within which the virtuous agent becomes detached from external goods insofar as he comes to view them as indifferent. My articulation of this understanding of virtue will be based upon what I take to be the core of the Stoic description of virtue. 2 Declaration I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination in any other university.
    [Show full text]
  • Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand Too Little?
    WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository 1-2002 Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand Too Little? Nathan Nobis University of Rochester Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/acwp_aafhh Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Other Anthropology Commons, and the Other Nutrition Commons Recommended Citation Nobis, N. (2002). Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does consequentialism Demand Too Little?. Social Theory & Practice, 28(1), 135-156. This material is brought to you for free and open access by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI Studies Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand Too Little? Nathan Nobis Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester I will argue that each of us personally ought to be a vegetarian.1 Actually, the conclusion I will attempt to defend concerns more than one's eating habits in that I will argue that we should be "vegans." Not only should we not buy and eat meat, but we should also not purchase fur coats, stoles, and hats, or leather shoes, belts, jackets, purses and wallets, furniture, car interiors, and other traditionally animal-based products for which there are readily available plant-based or synthetic alternatives. (Usually these are cheaper and work just as well, or better, anyway.) I will argue that buying and eating most eggs and dairy products are immoral as well. (Since it's much easier
    [Show full text]
  • KANT on the RELATION BETWEEN DUTIES of VIRTUE and of RIGHT1 Ruhi Demiray and Sorin Baiasu
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Keele Research Repository KANT ON THE RELATION BETWEEN DUTIES OF VIRTUE AND OF RIGHT1 Ruhi Demiray and Sorin Baiasu 1. Introduction The relation between law and ethics has been a perennial problem in social and political philosophy. One can even argue that the major division within the field of Western legal philosophy, i.e. the division between legal positivism and the natural law theories stems from a disagreement over whether legal normativity is conceivable as independent of ethical normativity. The history of the debate between natural law theories and legal positivism is too long and the positions taken in this debate turn out to be too intricate to be presented in detail here. However, for the purpose of this introduction, a focus on Immanuel Kant is sufficient; although the significance of role he played in the development of ethics and political philosophy cannot be exaggerated, he nevertheless seems to present a position concerning the nexus between ethics and law which is so intricate that even his most dedicated readers cannot agree on which construal is most accurate. A particularly controversial issue within Kant studies is how we are to make sense of the Metaphysics of Morals, the work in which Kant presents his political and legal philosophy in the most systematic and elaborate fashion. One can argue that, if this difficult work did not exist, we would probably consider Kant as a figure proposing only a reconstruction of the political sphere, both national and international, along the lines of the ethics of autonomy he vindicated as being of universal validity.
    [Show full text]
  • How Virtue Signalling Makes Us Better: Moral Preferences with Respect to Autonomous Vehicle Type Choices
    How virtue signalling makes us better: Moral preferences with respect to autonomous vehicle type choices Robin Kopeckya,b, Michaela Jirout Košováa,b, Daniel D. Novotnýa,c, Jaroslav Flegra,b, David Černýa,d aThe Karel Čapek Center for Values in Science and Technology b Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czechia cFaculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice, Czechia dInstitute of State and Law, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czechia Corresponding author: Robin Kopecky, [email protected], Faculty of Science, Charles University, Vinicna 7, 128 00 Prague 2, Czechia Data Availability: https://osf.io/y7t5q Abstract Autonomous vehicles (henceforth AVs) are about to be introduced to the mass market. However, many moral questions concerning AVs still remain. One of the issues has to do with the choice between AV types that differ in their built-in algorithms for dealing with situations of unavoidable lethal collision. These situations will probably be rare, yet they will happen and are of concern to governments, manufactures, and the potential users of AVs. It does not appear to be possible to avoid questions about how these algorithms should be designed. We present the results of our study of moral preferences (N=2769) with respect to three types of AVs: (1) selfish, which protects the lives of passenger(s) over any number of bystanders; (2) altruistic, which minimizes the number of casualties, even if this leads to death of passenger(s); and (3) conservative, which abstains from interfering in such situations. We differentiate between scenarios in which participants are to make their decisions privately or publicly, and for themselves or for their offspring.
    [Show full text]
  • Augustine's Contribution to the Republican Tradition
    Grand Valley State University ScholarWorks@GVSU Peer Reviewed Articles Political Science and International Relations 2010 Augustine’s Contribution to the Republican Tradition Paul J. Cornish Grand Valley State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/pls_articles Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Cornish, Paul J., "Augustine’s Contribution to the Republican Tradition" (2010). Peer Reviewed Articles. 10. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/pls_articles/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science and International Relations at ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Peer Reviewed Articles by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. article Augustine’s Contribution to the EJPT Republican Tradition European Journal of Political Theory 9(2) 133–148 © The Author(s), 2010 Reprints and permission: http://www. Paul J. Cornish Grand Valley State University sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav [DOI: 10.1177/1474885109338002] http://ejpt.sagepub.com abstract: The present argument focuses on part of Augustine’s defense of Christianity in The City of God. There Augustine argues that the Christian religion did not cause the sack of Rome by the Goths in 410 ce. Augustine revised the definitions of a ‘people’ and ‘republic’ found in Cicero’s De Republica in light of the impossibility of true justice in a world corrupted by sin. If one returns these definitions ot their original context, and accounts for Cicero’s own political teachings, one finds that Augustine follows Cicero’s republicanism on several key points.
    [Show full text]