Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses
April 2005 / $4
EARN MCLE CREDIT The Intersection of Probate and Family Law page 29
Class Wars Los Angeles lawyer Brad W. Seiling explains how successful class action lawsuits can result in malpractice claims page 22
PLUS New Punitive Damages Tax page 14 Solvent Tenants in Bankruptcy page 18 Trademark Infringement Damages page 36 Together We’re Stronger …and better able to fill your insurance needs
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April 2005 Vol. 28, No. 2
FEATURES
22 Class Wars BY BRAD W. SEILING In the wake of a recent appellate decision, class counsel may face a greater likelihood of malpractice claims and attacks on class settlements
29 Tales of Two Courts BY HOWARD S. KLEIN Family court proceedings may give rise to issues that eventually must be settled in probate court
Plus: Earn MCLE credit. MCLE Test No. 136 appears on page 31.
36 Marked Recovery BY ANTONIO R. SARABIA II The new provision for statutory damages in trademark infringement cases has already created a substantial body of case law
41 Special Section Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses
The magazine of The Los Angeles County LosAngelesLawyerBar Association DEPARTMENTS
10 Barristers Tips 79 Computer Counselor Invoking the procedure for judicial Technology trends affecting the practice disqualification of law BY GAVIN HACHIYA WASSERMAN BY GORDON ENG
14 Practice Tips 84 Closing Argument Assessing the impact of the new law on A Washington fable for our time punitive damages BY KEITH PAUL BISHOP BY JAMES J. FARRELL AND JEREMY G. SUITER 81 Classifieds 18 Practice Tips Filing bankruptcy by solvent tenants to cap 82 Index to Advertisers landlords’ claims Cover photograph by Tom Keller BY DAVID S. KUPETZ 83 CLE Preview LosAngelesLawyer VISIT US ON THE INTERNET AT http://www.lacba.org/lalawyer E-MAIL CAN BE SENT TO [email protected] JudgmentsEnforcedJudgmentsEnforced EDITORIAL BOARD Chair GARY RASKIN Articles Coordinator Law Office of Donald P. Brigham R. J. COMER JERROLD ABELES 23232 Peralta Dr., Suite 204, Laguna Hills, CA 92653 ELAINE R. ABBOTT P: 949.206.1661 DANIEL L. ALEXANDER HONEY KESSLER AMADO F: 949.206.9718 ETHEL W. BENNETT [email protected] AV Rated CHAD C. COOMBS KEITH E. COOPER ANGELA J. DAVIS KERRY A. DOLAN GORDON ENG GENEROUS REFERRAL FEES PAID PER STATE BAR RULES DANIEL A. FIORE JOSEPH S. FOGEL MILLIONS OF $$ RECOVERED FROM EMPLOYERS* STUART R. FRAENKEL MICHAEL A. GEIBELSON NO RECOVERY ¥ NO FEE TED HANDEL Alan Burton Newman DEAN HANSELL • Sexual Harassment JEFFREY A. HARTWICK HARVARD LAW ATTORNEY • Pregnancy Leaves STEVEN HECHT KATHERINE M. HIKIDA FREE PHONE CONSULTATION • Racial & Age Discrimination ROXANNE HUDDLESTON • Family Medical Leave LAWRENCE J. IMEL • Disability Discrimination JOEL T. KORNFELD 800-572.6062 JOHN P. LECRONE www.newmanslaw.com • Wrongful Termination HYACINTH E. LEUS *This does not constitute a guarantee or warranty, or prediction regarding the outcome of your case. PAUL MARKS ELIZABETH MUNISOGLU Mr. Newman will personally handle your referrals. RICHARD H. NAKAMURA JR. DENNIS PEREZ His direct phone number is (310) 578-6229. GERALD F. PHILLIPS THADDEUS M. POPE JACQUELINE M. REAL-SALAS SUE CAROL ROKAW KURT L. SCHMALZ DAVID SCHNIDER GRETCHEN D. STOCKDALE KENNETH W. SWENSON CARMELA TAN BRUCE TEPPER PATRIC VERRONE STAFF Publisher and Editor SAMUEL LIPSMAN Senior Editor LAUREN MILICOV Senior Editor ERIC HOWARD Art Director LES SECHLER Director of Design and Production PATRICE HUGHES Advertising Director LINDA LONERO Account Executive MARK NOCKELS Advertising Coordinator WILMA TRACY NADEAU Administrative Coordinator MATTY JALLOW BABY LOS ANGELES LAWYER (ISSN 0162-2900) is published monthly, except for a combined issue in July/August, by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 261 S. Figueroa St., Suite 300, Los Angeles, CA 90012, (213) 896-6503. Periodicals postage paid at Los Angeles, CA and additional mailing offices. Annual subscription price of $14 included in the Association membership dues. Nonmember subscriptions: $28 annually; single copy price: $4 plus handling. Address changes must be submitted six weeks in advance of next issue date. POSTMASTER: ADDRESS SERVICE REQUESTED. Send address changes to Los Angeles Lawyer, P.O. Box 55020, Los Angeles CA 90055. Copyright ©2005 by the Los Angeles County Bar Association. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is pro- hibited. Printed by Banta Publications Group, Liberty, MO. Member Business Publications Audit of Circulation (BPA). The opinions and positions stated in signed material are those of the authors and not by the fact of publication necessarily those of the Association or its members. All manuscripts are carefully considered by the Editorial Board. Letters to the editor are subject to editing.
4 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 Working together to take you where you want to go.
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LexisNexis and the Knowledge Burst logo are registered trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., AL7797 used under license. © 2005 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. LOS ANGELES LAWYER IS THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION 261 S. Figueroa St., Suite 300, Los Angeles, CA 90012-2533 Telephone 213.627.2727 / www.lacba.org ASSOCIATION OFFICERS: President JOHN J. COLLINS President–Elect EDITH R. MATTHAI Senior Vice President CHARLES E. MICHAELS Vice President GRETCHEN M. NELSON Treasurer DON MIKE ANTHONY Assistant Vice President DANETTE E. MEYERS Assistant Vice President MICHAEL E. MEYER Assistant Vice President ALAN K. STEINBRECHER Immediate Past President ROBIN MEADOW Executive Director STUART A. FORSYTH Associate Executive Director/Chief Financial Officer BRUCE BERRA Associate Executive Director/General Counsel W. CLARK BROWN BOARD OF TRUSTEES LINDA D. BARKER JOHN M. BYRNE THOMAS P. CACCIATORE LUCI-ELLEN M. CHUN CLAIRE CIFUENTES KATESSA CHARLES DAVIS KERRY J. DOCKSTADER JEFFREY W. ERDMAN GARY A. FARWELL JAMES R. FELTON RICHARD B. GOETZ LAURENCE R. GOLDMAN TOMAS A. GUTERRES BRUCE G. IWASAKI SAMANTHA PHILLIPS JESSNER MITCHELL A. KAMIN HERBERT KATZ ELISHA FARA LANDMAN LAWRENCE E. LEONE CINDY J. MACHO ELAINE W. MANDEL PATRICK MCNICHOLAS WINSTON A. PETERS MARK L. SHARE DOMINQUE R. SHELTON BRIAN K. STEWART KIM TUNG ROBERT G. VAN SCHOONENBERG GAVIN HACHIYA WASSERMAN SCOTT E. WHEELER JULIE K. XANDERS AFFILIATED BAR ASSOCIATIONS BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOCIATION BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES, INC. CENTURY CITY BAR ASSOCIATION CONSUMER ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES CULVER/MARINA BAR ASSOCIATION EASTERN BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY GLENDALE BAR ASSOCIATION ITALIAN AMERICAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION JAPANESE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER LOS ANGELES IRANIAN AMERICAN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION JOHN M. LANGSTON BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE COURTS BAR ASSOCIATION KOREAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAWYERS’ CLUB OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY LESBIAN AND GAY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES LONG BEACH BAR ASSOCIATION MEXICAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PASADENA BAR ASSOCIATION SAN FERNANDO VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION SAN GABRIEL VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION SANTA MONICA BAR ASSOCIATION SOUTH ASIAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SOUTH BAY BAR ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, INC. SOUTHEAST DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CHINESE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION WHITTIER BAR ASSOCIATION WOMEN LAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES
6 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 Is A Malpractice Insurance Crisis Looming In Your Horizon? Are You Ready?
Over 15 11 carriers have withdrawn from the California market. Will your carrier be next? The changes in the marketplace are troubling. It is an unknown future. Non-renewals are commonplace. Some carriers can’t secure sufficient reinsurance to operate their professional liability programs. A major carrier was recently declared insolvent. Other carriers have been downgraded by A.M. Best. Severe underwriting restrictions are now being imposed. Rates are not certain. It’s all very unsettling.
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CHARITABLE / RELIGIOUS / EDUCATIONAL ach year we dedicate many pages of Los Angeles Lawyer magazine • 100% success rate for over 33 years. to the business of the practice of law. This month, two articles ad- • Only a 10-day turnaround to dress important issues that are related to this complicated and essen- complete the Federal and State E tial subject. applications. One of the hardest things for a lawyer to swallow is a claim that he or she committed malpractice because the result the lawyer obtained, although • Lower overall cost–no one is better favorable to the client, was not good enough. That is exactly what happened last at getting the job done right the year in a class action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs’ counsel obtained a $90 million first time! judgment for their clients. In this month’s cover story, Brad W. Seiling explores the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Janik v. Rudy, Axelrod & Zieff, in which EXPERIENCE / KNOWLEDGE / CONFIDENCE the appellate court reversed the sustaining of a demurrer and held that a complaint properly states a cause of action for professional negligence when an attorney fails Marshall A. Glick to consider and assert additional claims that could have increased the recovery in an underlying case. attorney at law Although in the Janik case the malpractice claim was asserted by parties who were 6345 Balboa Blvd., Suite I-300 not, but wanted to be, included as members of the class and therefore as clients of Encino, CA 91316 the attorneys who litigated the class action on behalf of the class, it is not difficult (818) 345-2223 to apply the court of appeal’s rationale to many other factual scenarios. Indeed, by [email protected] holding that nonclients may assert a claim for malpractice on the grounds that an www.glicklaw.com attorney failed to consider or pursue claims that may have resulted in a benefit for the nonclients, arguably the appellate court has created an expanded duty for lawyers that is extremely broad in its scope. The question now is whether courts will limit the Janik decision to its specific facts or apply it expansively to other scenar- ios outside the realm of class actions. Whatever occurs in the future, one of the lessons that should be taken from the Janik case is that even a good result may not satisfy a lawyer’s professional obligations to his or her client. Professional Punitive damages awards have been under attack on many fronts. The clamor for “tort reform” usually includes a desire to restrict severely the availability of puni- Arbitrator tive damages for plaintiffs. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court held in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell that in most cases a punitive damages and Mediator award that exceeds compensatory damages by more than 10 times is unconstitutional. In August 2004, the California Legislature enacted Civil Code Section 3294.5, which requires that 75 percent of all punitive damages awards be paid to the state Steven Richard Sauer, Esq. of California. The state must hold 25 percent of its portion of an award to compensate the plaintiff’s attorney. In their article, James J. Farrell and Jeremy G. Suiter analyze the application and ramifications of Section 3294.5. They explain that the statute explicitly applies only “He is truly a master to judgments and not settlements. In addition, the statute is limited to cases that were filed after August 16, 2004, and that are finally adjudicated (including all appeals) in his art.” before July 1, 2006. As a result of its short life span, the statute may not result in the receipt of any money by the state. However, the California Legislature may elect to extend the sunset provision of the statute. If that occurs, and Section 3294.5 is Settled over 5,000 Federal effective for several more years, its effect will be significant for lawyers and their clients. and State Litigated Cases At the very least, the statute does create interesting wrinkles for cases filed after August 16, 2004. Indeed, the statute affects the analysis a lawyer undertakes in making a business decision even to accept a case that includes a potential for the recovery of punitive damages. 323.933.6833 What does not need to be analyzed is that the business of the practice of law con- tinues to become more complex. In the future, we at the magazine will do our best Fax 323.933.3184 to help explain the changes. ■ E-mail [email protected] Gary S. Raskin is a principal of Garfield Tepper & Raskin, where his primary area of practice 4929 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 740 Los Angeles, CA 90010 is entertainment litigation. He is the chair of the 2004-05 Los Angeles Lawyer Editorial Board.
8 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 “I missed the deadline? Aaarrggh!” Don’t get caught with your pants down—DOD your dates first
Now, you can drastically reduce malpractice exposure Think about it—no more worries of calendar vs. court while saving countless hours of time. Introducing days, local vs. federal holidays, or counting backwards Deadlines On DemandTM (“DOD”), the first nationwide and forwards—DOD does it all. Plus you can bill-back legal deadline calculation service. your clients for the minimal DOD research charges. DOD is fast, accurate and inexpensive. It’s powered Why run the risk of missing critical dates? Protect your by CompuLaw,¨ the leader in court rules-based clients with the same CompuLaw-checked deadlines calendar technology. that the big firms have used for decades. Visit www.deadlines.com and DOD your dates today! Access DOD to check your deadlines. No need to purchase, install or learn software—just log onto the DOD website. Enter basic case information and watch The Premier Legal Deadline DOD instantly display your deadlines. You can SM ¨ Calculation Service import your dates into Outlook, or any application TM supporting iCalendar files. (888) 363-5522 | www.deadlines.com
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Copyright © 2005, Deadlines on Demand LLC, all rights reserved. U.S. and foreign patents pending. CompuLaw® is a registered trademark of CompuLaw LLC. Barristers Tips BY GAVIN HACHIYA WASSERMAN
Invoking the Procedure for Judicial Disqualification
THE STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION under Code of Civil recusal does not result, then a statement of disqualification becomes Procedure Section 170.3(c) is used “when a judge who should dis- necessary. qualify himself or herself refuses or fails to do so.” Described as “out- Nevertheless, a judge may not be aware of facts that require dis- side the usual law and motion…rules,” the section is the basis for a closure, or a judge may simply err. A judge who recently left a law unique procedure for disqualification.1 Every attorney in criminal or firm, for example, may not realize that a party to a current case was civil trial practice should have a basic understanding of judicial dis- once a client of a lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the qualification's numerous grounds and unique procedure. Lawyers may private practice of law within the previous two years.4 Or a judge may inquire on the record in order to elicit facts that can generate a not realize that a lawyer involved in the proceeding is associated in recusal or offer grounds for or against proceeding under the section. the private practice of law with a brother-in-law.5 Disqualification issues arise whenever the facts that support them do. The statement of disqualification must be written and verified, Disqualification is proper even after an adverse summary judgment has been granted.2 Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.1 sets grounds for disqualification under eight sub- The grounds for disqualification and their definitions require sections. Seven of these refer to objective cri- teria—for example, whether the judge has a financial interest in the case as defined by close reading—and sometimes a passion for genealogy. Different statute. However, Section 170.1(a)(6) includes more subjective language: “[A] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt relationships matter for different grounds for disqualification. that the judge would be able to be impartial.” Whatever subsection may apply, the grounds for disqualification and their definitions require close reading—and objecting to the hearing or trial by the judge and setting forth facts sometimes a passion for genealogy. Different relationships matter for constituting grounds for disqualification. The statement “shall be pre- different grounds for disqualification. Under Section 170.1(a)(1), sented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the for example, a judge shall be deemed to have “personal knowledge facts constituting the ground for disqualification.”6 If investigation of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding” and thus be and confirmation of preliminary facts take time, the statement should disqualified if a material witness is the judge’s spouse, is related to the clearly show compliance with the timing requirement. Successive judge or the judge’s spouse within the third degree (e.g., a niece or statements of disqualification are restricted to newly discovered nephew), or is married to a third-degree relative. grounds.7 In contrast, Section 170.1(a)(5) does not automatically disqual- ify a judge if a lawyer in the case is the spouse of a third-degree rel- Service of the Statement ative. On the other hand, subsection (a)(5) automatically disqualifies A copy of the statement of disqualification “shall be personally a judge when a lawyer is in practice with a sibling-in-law of the judge. served on the judge alleged to be disqualified, or on his or her clerk, Furthermore, if none of these specifics correspond with the case at provided that the judge is present in the courthouse or in chambers.”8 hand, the provisions of 170.1(a)(6) may apply.3 The server and the court clerk need to understand that the judge is Important facts often arise during an attorney’s initial research on being served, not merely receiving a courtesy copy. For this reason, a trial judge, so composing a checklist for issue spotting and fact gath- the server should receive detailed instructions from the attorney on ering can be helpful. Newer judges are covered by more subsections effecting the service and a number to call if any problems arise. For of Section 170.1 than longtime bench officers, but the prior recusals example, a temporary court clerk may refuse the statement or direct of more experienced judges may be available online to savvy searchers. the server to the filing window. Calling the courtroom clerk in Whatever research a lawyer may conduct, a judge is in the best advance helps smooth the process, confirming the clerk’s under- position to know personal facts relevant to disqualification. Judges standing of the process and the judge’s presence for service. The are required by Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Ethics to “disclose server should confirm the judge’s presence and record the clerk’s on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their name. lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, The judge who is served with a statement of disqualification has even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for disqualification.” 10 days to act. The judge may 1) strike an untimely or legally insuf- Judges should regularly review the grounds for disqualification when considering a case. If counsel becomes aware of facts supporting dis- Gavin Hachiya Wasserman is managing partner of Wasserman & Wasserman, qualification and brings those facts to the judge's attention but LLP and is assistant vice president of the Barristers.
10 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 BRIAN RABINOVITZ PAYS ATTENTION ficient statement, 2) consent to or deny the statement by filing a written verified answer admitting or denying any or all of the alle- gations in the statement and setting forth additional facts, or 3) pass the case on to a judge agreed upon by the parties. Inaction is deemed consent to disqualification.9 If the judge and court counsel file a writ- ten verified answer, the issue must be decided by another judge. Generally, a Section 170.3 issue that arises in Los Angeles Superior Court is decided by an Orange County Superior Court judge. Attorneys should know that Section 170.4 limits the actions of a challenged judge and that the underlying action may be stayed. The judge who is assigned a Section 170.3 issue may decide the disqualification on the statement, answer, “and such written argu- ments as the judge requests, or the judge may set the matter for hearing as promptly as practicable.”10 If the hearing is held, the par- ties and challenged judge may argue the issues and the court “shall…hear evidence on any disputed issue of fact.” No challenge is per- mitted against the assigned judge, although a recusal by the assigned judge is possible. A polite call to court staff may reveal the assigned court’s policies, if any, on argument, evidence, and hearings. For example, it is the policy of one Orange County court that frequently hears disqualifications not to set hearings but to allow argument and evidence to be submitted without leave of court. This Orange County court also reserves the option of disregarding material it deems irrelevant. SECURE All filings on the disqualification are made in the courtroom in Orange County. The assigned court’s decision on disqualification may be reviewed only by writ of mandate within 10 days’ notice of the decision.11 At the beginning of a case and as it devel- ops, an attorney’s due diligence may uncover EVIDENCE a judge’s family or professional ties to a party involved in a case or simply create a reason- able doubt regarding whether the judge can STORAGE COMPANY, INC. be impartial. Therefore, an attorney may need to effect the filing of a statement of dis- qualification. ■ Serving Southern California since 1980 1 Urias v. Harris Farms, 234 Cal. App. 3d 415, 422 (1991). Automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, appliances 2 Id. at 421-22. 3 See Johnston v. Brown, 115 Cal. 694 (1897) and CODE CIV. PROC. §170.1(a)(6). and other items of evidence. 4 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.1(a)(2); Urias, 234 Cal. App. 3d 415. 5 See CODE CIV. PROC. §§170.1(a)(5), (a)(8)(b); Visit us at Hartford Casualty Ins. v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 4th 250, 253 (2004). See also 28 U.S.C. §455; Mangini www.secureevidencestorage.com v. United States, 314 F. 3d 1158 (2003). 6 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.3(c)(1). 7 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.4(c)(3). 8 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.3(c)(1). 1-800-924-2883 9 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.4(b). 10 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.3(c)(5). 11 CODE CIV. PROC. §170.3(d).
12 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 Practice of law… meet business of law.
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LexisNexis and the Knowledge Burst logo are registered trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. It’s How You Know is a trademark of LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. AL7616 © 2004 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Practice Tips BY JAMES J. FARRELL AND JEREMY G. SUITER
Assessing the Impact of the New Law on Punitive Damages
TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION led to a revolution in this country almost 230 years ago. But taxation by litigation in California has gone virtually unnoticed for the past several months. On August 16, 2004, with little public attention, the state enacted new Civil Code Section 3294.5, which mandates that 75 percent of punitive damages awards in California be paid into the state’s coffers. At first glance, this revolutionary new law seems to be consistent with the growing belief that massive punitive damages awards— which inherently exceed actual damages—give plaintiffs an unwar- ranted windfall. But the plaintiffs’ bar supports Section 3294.5—no doubt because its members will receive a guaranteed share of puni- tive damages awards that nearly equals their clients’ share, in addi- tion to their other fees. The new law may also result in larger puni- tive damage verdicts if juries learn that the state will receive most of the award. Conversely, because the 75 percent “tax” applies only to final judgments, Section 3294.5 gives defendants facing punitive damages substantially increased settlement leverage. By settling and eliminating the state’s payment, a defendant could pay the plaintiff his or her anticipated 25 percent portion, plus a portion of the 75 per- cent that would have otherwise gone to the state, and keep the remainder of the 75 percent. These conflicting results are not surprising because Section 3294.5 was not intended to reform the court system. Rather, its sole objec- tive is to generate revenue—as much as $450 million—for cash- starved California.1 Indeed, in the language of the statute, the legis- Public Benefit Trust Fund.3 The state must hold 25 percent of the fund lature notes that “extraordinary and dire budgetary needs have to compensate the plaintiff’s attorney, and the state may use the forced the enactment of this extraordinary measure to allocate tem- remainder of its portion for any purpose that is “consiste[nt] with the porarily for the state’s Public Benefit Trust Fund a substantial por- nature of the award.”4 The plaintiff’s attorney is entitled to receive tion of any punitive damages paid from a judgment during the lim- the 25 percent of the state’s portion on July 1 of the next fiscal year.5 ited time period specified in the statute.”2 This statutory contingency fee is deemed to be the plaintiff’s attor- However, it is unclear whether California will ever collect a dime ney’s income for state and local taxation purposes6 and does not pre- under the new law. Section 3294.5 applies only to cases filed after clude any other fees negotiated with the plaintiff. After paying the August 16, 2004, and “finally adjudicated”—including the resolution state’s 75 percent share, the defendant must notify the plaintiff’s of all appeals—before July 1, 2006. Only a limited number of puni- counsel of the amount of that payment and pay the 25 percent tive damages cases may be resolved within that narrow 22-month win- remainder of the punitive damages award to the plaintiff through his dow. Moreover, Section 3294.5 may generate more legal fees than state or her counsel.7 revenues, because it could be subject to several constitutional chal- Section 3294.5 contains three procedural safeguards. First, to lenges. Plaintiffs will lose most of their punitive damages award prevent the state from taking advantage of the law, California may under the new law, so they may argue that the statute constitutes an not be a party in interest to, intervene in, or participate as amicus curiae unlawful taking or violates equal protection. Defendants may face in “any action in which [the state’s] sole interest is the potential higher punitive damages verdicts as a result of the new law, so they recovery of a portion of a punitive damages award.”8 Second, to avoid may challenge the statute on due process grounds. But no matter how judicial bias, the money deposited into the Public Benefit Trust Fund much revenue Section 3294.5 ultimately generates, every California may not be appropriated to “the courts or judicial programs.”9 litigator should understand this important new law and its strategic Third, to minimize juror misconduct, the jury may not be told that implications, which will affect every case seeking punitive damages a portion of a punitive damages award would go to the state; how- filed in California this year. ever, a juror’s independent knowledge of this fact will not disqualify Section 3294.5 provides a procedure for the allocation of all punitive damages that are awarded in a final judgment. The defen- James J. Farrell is a partner and Jeremy G. Suiter is an associate in the Los dant pays the state’s 75 percent portion of the award to the director Angeles office of Latham & Watkins LLP, where they both specialize in secu- of the Department of Finance for deposit into the newly created
RICHARD EWING rities and professional liability litigation.
14 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 that juror or otherwise provide a basis to set would pay $1 million (100 percent) but the statute apportioning punitive damages to the aside the jury’s punitive damages award.10 plaintiff would receive only $250,000 (25 state: By its own terms, Section 3294.5 has a percent). As a result, one likely effect of [A]ny interest the plaintiff has in a narrow window of applicability. The statute Section 3294.5 is that the number of settle- punitive damages award is a creation applies only to actions that are filed on or after ments will increase.17 of state law.…The Indiana legislature August 16, 2004, and are “finally adjudi- The statutory contingency fee provision has chosen to define the plaintiff’s cated” before July 1, 2006.11 The term may create a significant conflict of interest interest in a punitive damages award “finally adjudicated” means truly final, and between client and counsel on the issue of set- as only twenty-five percent of any includes “the resolution of all mandatory or tlement. A plaintiff expecting a punitive dam- award, and the remainder is to go to discretionary appeals, the resolution of any ages award may want to settle for an amount [a state fund]. The award to the Fund motion for attorney’s fees on appeal and any that is smaller than the potential verdict but is not the property of the plaintiff.…As appeals therefrom, and the issue of final greater than the 25 percent share the plain- a result, there is no taking of any prop- remittitur.”12 This short 22-month time period tiff would otherwise receive under Section erty by the statutory directive that the means that the new law may have little 3294.5. The plaintiff’s attorney, on the other clerk transfer a percentage of the puni- impact. Large punitive damages cases can hand, has an incentive not to settle because tive damages award to the Fund.28 take more than 22 months just to get to trial the attorney’s recovery could be far greater if Only one takings challenge has succeeded. and can last even longer if the defendant the statute, and its 25 percent statutory con- The Colorado Supreme Court struck down its exercises its right to bifurcate the liability tingency fee, is applied. state’s punitive damages apportionment and damages phases.13 The median time to In the scenario of the $1 million punitive statute as an unconstitutional taking of the conclude an appeal would be another 16 damages award, consider the consequences if plaintiff’s property.29 Crucial to the court’s months.14 Thus, it is unlikely that a large the plaintiff’s attorney charged a contractual decision was the fact that the state “affir- case will be “finally adjudicated” before the contingency fee of 40 percent. If Section matively disavowed, pursuant to the statute July 1, 2006, sunset deadline. Even relatively 3294.5 is applied to that award, the attorney itself, ‘any interest in the claim for [punitive] smaller punitive damages cases may elude may be entitled to both 25 percent of the damages …at any time prior to the payment the statute’s grasp through continuances or state’s portion and 40 percent of the plaintiff’s becoming due.’”30 Because the statute pro- other procedural delays. portion of the punitive damages award. This vided that the state’s payment did not become Of course, the legislature may extend the means that the attorney would receive due until after the plaintiff obtained judgment limited life of Section 3294.5, bringing more $287,500,18 and the plaintiff would receive and did not require the judgment to name the cases within its scope. The legislature stated $150,000,19 while the state would receive state as a creditor, the court concluded that that this new law “shall not be construed to $562,500.20 But if the parties settle the puni- the plaintiff obtained a protected property establish any policy, precedent, presumption, tive damages component for $300,000, interest in the entire amount of its punitive or inference in any case or any other setting, thereby eliminating California’s portion and damages award upon entry of that judg- including future legislatures, regarding the the 25 percent statutory contingency fee, the ment.31 As the court explained, “The legis- award of punitive damages [or] its alloca- attorney would receive just $120,000,21 and lature may well abate or diminish a pending tion.”15 Nevertheless, if Section 3294.5 suc- the plaintiff would receive $180,000.22 That civil action, but when that claim ripens into cessfully generates revenue, it could become settlement would increase the plaintiff’s recov- judgment ‘the power of the legislature to dis- a permanent addition to the Civil Code. ery by $30,000 but cost his or her counsel turb the rights created thereby ceases.’”32 California’s budget woes may make this $167,500. As a result, a leading legal institute Although other courts have criticized the potential revenue source too tempting to has concluded that “allowing the plaintiff’s Colorado decision, California’s Civil Code relinquish. attorney some contingent share of the state’s Section 3294.5 could face a similar challenge award creates a potential conflict with the because it grants the state punitive damages Settlements and Conflict of Interest interests of the plaintiff.”23 These competing awarded in a “final judgment” without defin- Because Section 3294.5 applies only to puni- financial motivations of plaintiffs and their ing the state’s interest in the award. Further, tive damages that are “awarded pursuant to counsel may create a new ethical dilemma.24 the California Supreme Court has observed a final judgment,”16 parties may wish to enter that the legislature lacks the authority “to take into a settlement agreement prior to the entry Legal Challenges away rights which have been once vested by of final judgment. This approach could ben- Similar punitive damages apportionment a judgment.”33 Nevertheless, the legislature efit both sides, particularly in cases in which statutes in other states have been challenged could easily remedy any constitutional infir- punitive damages have already been awarded on various legal grounds. One of the most mity that exists in Section 3294.5 by amend- in a verdict. The settlement could be struc- common attacks by plaintiffs is that appor- ing the statute to clarify that the plaintiff tured so that the defendant would pay, and tioning punitive damages to the state vio- does not acquire a property right in the state’s the plaintiff would receive, an amount that is lates the takings clause of the U.S. Consti- portion of the punitive damages award, or greater than the 25 percent share that the tution or an equivalent provision of a state that the state has an interest in the punitive plaintiff would receive under the statute but constitution. The takings clause prohibits the damages award upon entry of the verdict. is less than the total amount of punitive dam- government from taking private property for Both provisions have passed constitutional ages that the defendant would have to pay public use without providing just compen- muster in other cases.34 under the judgment. sation.25 Because property rights protected by Plaintiffs have also challenged punitive Consider, for example, a verdict for $1 the takings clause are created by state law,26 damages apportionment statutes under the million in punitive damages. As a purely eco- these challenges have generally been rejected excessive fines clause of the U.S. Consti- nomic matter, both the plaintiff and the defen- on the ground that a plaintiff has no property tution.35 In Browning-Ferris Industries of dant would prefer a settlement that requires right in a punitive damages award if a state Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., the the defendant to pay $300,000 (30 percent) statute assigns a portion of that award to U.S. Supreme Court observed that the exces- to the plaintiff, rather than a judgment sub- the state.27 As the Indiana Supreme Court sive fines clause applies “primarily, and per- ject to the statute, under which the defendant explained in a decision upholding an Indiana haps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 15 and punishments.”36 Accordingly, the Court in a final judgment rather than in a settle- provide a basis to disqualify that juror or set held that the clause “does not constrain an ment.44 Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court aside the jury’s punitive damages award.53 award of money damages in a civil suit when rejected the argument that Georgia’s appor- Thus, the statute acknowledges the risk of the government neither has prosecuted the tionment law violated equal protection prin- improper influence created by the knowledge action nor has any right to receive a share of ciples because it applies only to punitive dam- that the state will take 75 percent of a puni- the damages awarded.”37 ages awarded in product liability actions.45 As tive damages award but prohibits the dis- Seizing on this qualification in Browning- the supreme court explained, “[T]he trial missal of a juror who has that knowledge— Ferris, one federal district court has held that court was correct in its finding that the statute as long as it was gained before the trial. The Georgia’s punitive damages apportionment treats plaintiffs in various tort actions dif- possibility of independent knowledge will statute violated the excessive fines clause ferently. However, all similarly situated plain- likely increase over time, particularly if the leg- because it required the plaintiff to deposit a tiffs and defendants, including those in prod- islature extends the life of Section 3294.5, and portion of his punitive damages award into uct liability actions, are treated equally by the the apportionment process is delineated and the state treasury.38 But other state and fed- statute.”46 In light of these consistent judicial discussed in news reports about punitive eral courts have rejected similar challenges, rejections of equal protection arguments damages verdicts in California. As a result, holding that the statutes in question did not offered by plaintiffs, it is unlikely that Section defendants who already face a median puni- violate the excessive fines clause because the 3294.5 violates the equal protection clause. tive damages verdict in California that is state 1) could not intervene in private litiga- But plaintiffs may not be the only parties three to six times higher than the national tion and thus had no prosecutorial power, and who challenge Section 3294.5. Defendants average54 may soon see punitive damages 2) did not control the amount of punitive also may challenge the statute on due process verdicts increase if juries attempt to increase damages sought or awarded and thus had no grounds. With respect to punitive damages, their awards to provide more money to the interest in the award until it is made.39 Some the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution state or to offset the plaintiff’s share that is courts also drew a distinction for those stat- prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive lost to the state. ues directing that the award must be deposited or arbitrary awards.47 In determining whether Recent court decisions reflect a growing into a state fund with a specified purpose, a punitive damages award is excessive or national trend to reduce the perceived wind- rather than the state’s all-purpose general arbitrary under the due process clause, courts fall that plaintiffs receive from large punitive treasury.40 Given that Section 3294.5 similarly must consider three factors articulated in damages awards. Section 3294.5 may be the prohibits California from intervening in pri- BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and next step in that trend, although it was vate litigation seeking punitive damages and reaffirmed in State Farm Mutual Automobile enacted simply to generate revenue for requires that the state’s portion of any puni- Insurance Company v. Campbell: 1) The rep- California. Regardless of how much revenue tive damages award be deposited into a spec- rehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, it generates, every practitioner should be ified fund, a constitutional challenge based on 2) the disparity between the actual or poten- familiar with this important new law because the excessive fines clause may be difficult. tial harm suffered by the plaintiff and the of its potential impact on litigating punitive A third challenge by plaintiffs is that puni- punitive damages award, and 3) the difference damages cases, including settlement strategy, tive damages apportionment statutes violate between the punitive damages award and conflicts of interest, and the amount of and equal protection requirements. The equal the civil penalties authorized or imposed in frequency of punitive damages awards. ■ protection clause of the U.S. Constitution similar cases.48 If the jury was influenced by provides that no state shall “deny to any per- other arbitrary factors, such as prejudice or 1 See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST OFFICE, CALIFORNIA son within its jurisdiction the equal protection bias, then its punitive damages award violates SPENDING PLAN 2004-05 55 (Sept. 2004), available at of the laws.”41 This “provision creates no sub- due process.49 http://www.lao.ca.gov/2004/spend_plan_04/0904 _spend_plan.pdf. stantive rights,” but instead “embodies a Ostensibly to prevent an arbitrary award, 2 CIV. CODE §3294.5(a). general rule that States must treat like cases Section 3294.5 prohibits a jury from being 3 CIV. CODE §3294.5(c)(1). alike but may treat unlike cases accord- “informed that any portion of a punitive dam- 4 CIV. CODE §3294.5(b)(1). The statute does not explain ingly.”42 Provided that the law in question ages award will be paid to a government what this quoted phrase means. does not burden a fundamental right (such as fund.”50 This prohibition is consistent with 5 CIV. CODE §3294.5(d). 6 the right to vote) or target a suspect class (such appellate court decisions from other jurisdic- CIV. CODE §3294.5(f). The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that for federal taxation purposes, the por- as race), then the law would be upheld if it is tions holding that it is reversible error to tion of a verdict or settlement paid to the plaintiff’s rationally related to a legitimate government inform a jury by way of jury instructions, attorney pursuant to a contingency fee agreement is the purpose.43 verdict forms, or closing arguments that the income of the plaintiff and not the attorney. Comm’r Many courts have rebuffed equal protec- state will receive part of any punitive damages of Internal Revenue v. Banks, ___ U.S. ___, 2005 WL tion challenges to statutes similar to Section award pursuant to an apportionment statute.51 123825 (Jan. 24. 2005). 7 CIV. CODE §3294.5(c)(2), (c)(3). 3294.5. For example, the Missouri Supreme As one of those courts explained, any knowl- 8 CIV. CODE §3294.5(e). Court rejected the argument that Missouri’s edge of the potential apportionment can 9 CIV. CODE §3294.5(b)(1). apportionment statute, which applies only encourage the jury to 1) “award punitive 10 CIV. CODE §3294.5(g). to final judgments, violated the equal pro- damages for an improper reason—to enhance 11 CIV. CODE §3294.5(h) & (i). 12 tection clause because it discriminated against a state’s account,” and 2) “deliberate on the CIV. CODE §3294.5(h). 13 CIV. CODE §3295(d). plaintiffs who do not settle. As the court plaintiff’s share of punitive damages and add 14 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2004 COURT explained, there were several possible “legit- [an] additional amount to compensate for STATISTICS REPORT 19 (2004), available at imate reasons for the legislature to distin- the portion distributed to [the state.]”52 http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents guish between punitive damages awarded by However, an exception contained in /csr2004.pdf. court judgment and punitive damages recov- Section 3294.5 threatens to undermine its 15 CIV. CODE §3294.5(a). 16 CIV. CODE §3294.5(b). ered through settlement,” including the desire cautious—and constitutional—approach. The 17 Rather than settle for a smaller portion, however, to encourage settlement, and the fact that it exception provides that a juror’s indepen- some plaintiffs may try to recover their entire punitive would be easier for the state to collect its dent knowledge that a portion of a punitive damages award by filing their action in federal court. portion of punitive damages that are awarded damages award goes to the state will not If §3294.5 is “procedural” rather than “substantive”
16 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 for purposes of the Erie doctrine, then federal courts 23 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS STUDY, 1242 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 6 F. need not apply the statute, and California will have no ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: 3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993); Hoskins v. Business Men’s right to share in the punitive damages award. See gen- APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE Assurance, 79 S.W. 3d 901, 904 (Mo. 2002); Spaur v. erally Snead v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 259 n.49 (Apr. 15, 1991). Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W. 2d 854, F. 3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001). In fact, California 24 See generally Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys 868-69 (Iowa 1994). is barred from appearing in any action for the sole pur- Ass’n v. Woodside, 7 Cal. 4th 525, 546 (1994) (dis- 40 See Burke, 780 F. Supp. at 1242; Spaur, 510 N.W. pose of collecting such an award. See CIV. CODE §3294 cussing CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-310(B)). 2d at 869. (e); see also Finley v. Empiregas, Inc. of Potosi, 28 F. 25 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 3d 782, 784 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that similar 26 See Logan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 42 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997). language in Missouri Revised Statutes §537.675 pre- 136 Cal. App. 3d 116, 125 (1982) (citing Board of 43 Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F. 3d 1052, 1088 (9th Cir. vented state of Missouri from appearing in federal Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 546, 577 (1972)). 2003) (internal quotations omitted). diversity case to which it was not a party to request 27 See, e.g., Shepherd Components, Inc v. Brice Petrides- 44 Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W. 2d 424, 432 (Mo. portion of plaintiff’s punitive damages award). While Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W. 2d 612 (Iowa 1997). federal courts have not yet scrutinized §3294.5, they 1991); Cheatham v. Poole, 789 N.E. 2d 467 (Ind. 45 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E. 2d 635 (Ga. are likely to hold that §3294.5 is a substantive statute 2003). 1993). that applies to punitive damages awarded in federal 28 Cheatham, 789 N.E. 2d at 473. 46 Id. at 639 (emphasis in original). diversity cases. Cf. Finley, 28 F. 3d at 784 (describing 29 Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P. 2d 262 (Colo. 47 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 district court’s application of Iowa’s punitive dam- 1991). U.S. 408, 416 (2003). ages apportionment statute to punitive damages award 30 Id. at 272 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §13-21-102(4)). 48 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574- in federal diversity action); Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. 31 Id. 75 (1996); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. Supp. 2d 1108, 1131 (D. Or. 2000) (applying Oregon’s 32 Id. (quoting McCollough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 49 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417-18. punitive damages apportionment statute to punitive 123-24 (1898)). 50 CIV. CODE §3294.5(g). damages award in federal diversity action). 33 People v. Barwick, 7 Cal. 696, 700 (1936) (quoting 51 See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F. 3d 497, 512- 18 $287,500 = $187,500 (plaintiff attorney’s statutory McCollough, 172 U.S. at 123-24). 13 (8th Cir. 1993); Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., contingency fee of 25% of state’s $750,000 portion) 34 See Fust v. Attorney Gen., 947 S.W. 2d 424, 431 476 S.E. 2d 565, 570-71 (Ga. 1996); Honeywell v. + $100,000 (plaintiff attorney’s contractual contin- (Mo. 1997) (upholding MO. REV. STAT. §537.675 Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P. 2d 1019, 1022 (Or. gency fee of 40% of plaintiff’s $250,000 portion). (1994)); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P. 3d 1232, 1990). 19 $150,000 = $250,000 (plaintiff’s 25% portion of $1 1247 (Or. 2002) (upholding OR. REV. STAT. §18.540 52 Ford, 476 S.E. 2d at 571-72 (citing Honeywell, 797 million award) - $100,000 (plaintiff attorney’s con- (1996)). P. 2d at 1021-22)). tractual contingency fee of 40% of plaintiff’s $250,000 35 U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 53 CIV. CODE §3294.5(g). portion). 36 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 54 See DR. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & ANTHONY 20 $562,500 = $750,000 (state’s 75% portion of $1 mil- Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989). P. ARCHIE, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA lion award) - $187,500 (plaintiff attorney’s statutory 37 Id. at 264. 2005, REFORM AGENDA: BUSINESS & ECONOMIC contingency fee of 25% of state’s $750,000 portion). 38 See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. STUDIES 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www 21 $120,000 = 40% of $300,000. 1563, 1577-78 (M.D. Ga. 1990). .pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/entrep/2004/Reform 22 $180,000 = 60% of $300,000. 39 See, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, _Agenda.pdf.
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 17 Practice Tips BY DAVID S. KUPETZ
Filing Bankruptcy by Solvent Tenants to Cap Landlords’ Claims
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 502(b)(6) provides a cap on claims of lion, and 15 percent of this amount is $1.8 million. Since the 15 per- landlords for damages under long-term real property leases. Businesses cent amount is greater than the amount of rent reserved for one year such as retail chain stores often file reorganization cases under chap- and is less than rent for three years, the landlord’s claim would be ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to take advantage of this cap capped at $1.8 million. when closing unprofitable locations. These cases generally involve insolvent entities that are facing many difficult financial issues and Solvent Chapter 11 Filings challenges. There is no question that insolvent entities may file bankruptcy to take Courts recently have addressed whether a solvent entity may advantage of this cap. However, access to bankruptcy protection is commence a chapter 11 reorganization solely to reject its one and only not conditioned on insolvency.5 A debtor does not have to demon- real estate lease and limit its landlord’s lease termination damages strate insolvency under either a balance sheet test (liabilities in excess claim. While courts uniformly recognize that chapter 11 is available to solvent enti- ties, in two recent decisions—In re Integrated The common thread that runs through the case law is that the question Telecom Express, Inc.1 and In re Liberate Technologies2—the use of chapter 11 by solvent entities solely to apply the Section of good faith is based on the totality of the circumstances. 502(b)(6) cap was limited to situations in which the debtor was facing some level of financial distress. The Section 502(b)(6) cap is designed to limit lease termination of assets) or under a liquidity test (unable to pay its debts as they come claims to prevent landlords from receiving a windfall at the expense due).6 While the Bankruptcy Code does not limit chapter 11 relief to of other creditors. Depending upon the length of a lease, the landlord’s insolvent debtors or those who suffer any particular form of finan- claim for future rent could be enormous and dramatically diminish cial distress, courts have held that this “does not mean that all sol- the return to other unsecured creditors.3 Section 502(b)(6) limits vent firms should have unfettered access to Chapter 11.”7 the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of The lack of any bankruptcy solvency test is rooted in the reality a lease of real property to: that, at times, solvent entities suffer from financial distress.8 In fact, (A) The rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for “[i]t is not uncommon for debtors to be solvent under the balance sheet the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, test, and yet to have severe financial problems.”9 Congress rightfully of the remaining term of such lease, following the earlier of— believed that entities should be eligible for relief under chapter 11 (i) the date of the filing of the petition; and before becoming insolvent under a balance sheet test: “The prospects (ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee sur- for reorganizing a debtor in financial difficulty are much better when rendered, the leased property; plus the debtor is still solvent than after it becomes insolvent.”10 (B) Any unpaid rent due under such lease, without accelera- Accordingly, the absence of an insolvency requirement allows enti- tion, on the earlier of such dates. ties to enter chapter 11 before facing a financially hopeless situation. The Section 502(b)(6) cap should be a relatively simple calculation. Nevertheless, to safeguard the integrity of the purpose of chap- First, the court calculates the total rent reserved4 under the lease from ter 11, courts have created a good faith doctrine.11 If a chapter 11 the earlier of the date of the tenant’s bankruptcy filing or the date on bankruptcy petition is not filed in good faith, a bankruptcy court may which the landlord repossessed or the lessee surrendered the leased prop- dismiss the petition “for cause” or convert the chapter 11 case to a erty. Second, the court calculates 15 percent of the total due under the chapter 7 liquidation case pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section lease. Third, the court compares this 15 percent amount to the rent 1112(b).12 The good faith determination is made on a case-by-case reserved under the lease for one year following the earlier of the basis that focuses on the totality of the circumstances and involves bankruptcy filing or repossession or surrender of the leased property. a fact-intensive inquiry.13 The cap is the greater of the two, subject to the 15 percent amount In examining the question of good faith, courts generally address not exceeding the amount of three years of rent. For example, in a sce- two primary areas: 1) whether the bankruptcy petition serves a legit- nario in which the debtor is current on all lease payments and has five years remaining, and the rent reserved under the lease is $100,000 per David S. Kupetz is a partner in Sulmeyer Kupetz, a Los Angeles and Menlo Park month, the total amount of future rent is $6 million, of which 15 per- firm. He specializes in crisis avoidance consultation, troubled transactions, cent is $900,000. The rent reserved for one year is $1.2 million, so the workouts, debt restructurings, business reorganizations, bankruptcies, cap is $1.2 million. If instead of five years there are 10 years remain- receiverships, assignments for the benefit of creditors, and other insolvency ing under the same lease, the total amount of future rent is $12 mil- matters.
18 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 imate bankruptcy purpose, such as preserv- proceedings will maximize the value of the claimed to have been insolvent, although this ing a going concern (along with employees’ debtor’s estate for creditors, and solely to depended on whether claims of insiders were jobs) by avoiding the piecemeal liquidation of take advantage of a provision in the allowed. The Third Circuit in PPI held that a the enterprise or otherwise maximizing the Bankruptcy Code that limits claims on long- chapter 11 petition and liquidating chapter 11 value of the debtor’s estate, and 2) whether term leases….”19 The debtor had $105.4 mil- plan filed for the primary purpose of capping the petition was filed simply to create delay, lion in cash and $1.5 million in other assets a landlord’s lease termination damages claim harass or impose hardship on creditors, or at the time it filed its chapter 11 petition. did not contravene the good faith require- otherwise obtain a tactical advantage in liti- The landlord asserted a claim of approxi- ment. In its Integrated Telecom Express deci- gation.14 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals mately $26 million. The debtor listed other sion, the Third Circuit stated that “PPI stands has explained the development of the judi- miscellaneous liabilities of approximately for the proposition that an insolvent debtor cially created good faith requirement: $430,000 and had exposure in connection can file chapter 11 in order to maximize the It is easy to see why courts have with a class action lawsuit of up to $5 million value of its sole asset to satisfy its creditors required Chapter 11 petitioners to act (any liability in excess of that amount was while at the same time availing itself of the within the scope of the bankruptcy covered by insurance). Thus, the debtor was landlord cap under §502(b)(6).”24 laws to further a valid reorganizational not suffering financial distress and was highly Also, in Integrated Telecom Express the purpose. Chapter 11 vests petitioners solvent and cash rich at the time it filed a Third Circuit distinguished Sylmar Plaza as a with considerable power—the auto- chapter 11 petition. Applying the Section case in which solvency was at issue and chap- matic stay, the exclusive right to pro- 502(b)(6) cap, the landlord’s claim would be ter 11 was used to maximize value for cred- pose a reorganization plan, the dis- reduced from $26 million to $4.3 million, and itors. The appeals court stated that “although charge of debts, etc.,—that can impose the shareholders of the debtor would enjoy the the debtors appear to have come out solvent significant hardship on particular cred- benefit of this reduction. In addition, the case in Sylmar Plaza, there is no indication that itors. When financially troubled peti- involved a smoking gun—a board resolution they would have come out solvent had the tioners seek a chance to remain in and letter of counsel composed prior to the bank’s claim not been limited, or that solven- business, the exercise of those powers bankruptcy filing stating that, if the land- cy was a foregone conclusion when the peti- is justified. But this is not so when a lord was unwilling to settle, the debtor would tion was filed.”25 petitioner’s aims lie outside those of the file a chapter 11 petition and cap the land- Although Sylmar Plaza did not involve Bankruptcy Code.15 lord’s claim under Section 502(b)(6). Section 502(b)(6), the Ninth Circuit in that The majority of chapter 11 debtors are The Third Circuit found that the chapter case addressed a plan in which the sole pur- insolvent and, in those cases, the good faith 11 petition was not filed in good faith since the pose was to enable the debtors to “cure and doctrine is generally not implicated. In con- debtor was not in financial distress, and the fil- reinstate” an obligation under Bankruptcy trast, when the debtor is solvent and files a ing would not preserve any value for the Code Section 1124(2). In so doing, the debtor chapter 11 petition in order to use Section debtor’s creditors that would have been lost avoided an approximately $1 million con- 502(b)(6) to cap its sole landlord’s claim, absent the filing. According to the appeals tractual liability for default interest owed to thereby enhancing the recovery of the debtor’s court: the debtor’s secured creditor bank. The Ninth shareholders (as opposed to its creditors), To be filed in good faith, a petitioner Circuit rejected the bank’s argument that a courts have struggled with the application must do more than merely invoke some chapter 11 plan lacked good faith when it left of the good faith doctrine. In chapter 11 distributional mechanism in the the debtors solvent while allowing them to cases involving multiple leases, the issue is less Bankruptcy Code. It must seek to cre- reverse and avoid paying default interest to likely to arise since these cases will involve ate or preserve some value that would the bank, stating that “[g]iven the specific more than just a two-party dispute, and there otherwise be lost—not merely distrib- power to cure defaults, it makes no sense to is a greater likelihood of more complicated uted to a different stakeholder—out- treat a plan invoking that power as lacking financial issues and problems. side of bankruptcy. This threshold good faith.”26 inquiry is particularly sensitive where, The Northern District bankruptcy court’s Recent Case Law as here, the petition seeks to distribute finding in Liberate Technologies27 that fil- Prior to 2004, courts examining whether the value directly from a creditor to a com- ing bankruptcy solely to use Section 502(b)(6) commencement of a bankruptcy case for the pany’s shareholders.20 did not constitute the requisite good faith purpose of using a particular provision in the The Third Circuit determined that the emerged from a situation in which the debtor Bankruptcy Code constituted bad faith found question of good faith was antecedent to the had ongoing business operations that were that, absent other factors, it did not.16 Against application of Section 502(b)(6), stating: suffering significant losses and faced several that backdrop, it is important to understand “§502(b)(6) and the legislative policy under- pending lawsuits. However, the debtor had the reasoning of Integrated Telecom Express17 lying that provision assume the existence of $212 million of unrestricted cash on hand and Liberate Technologies,18 in which the a valid bankruptcy, which, in turn, assumes and had total liabilities between approximately Third Circuit Court of Appeals and a a debtor in financial distress.”21 Finding that $59 million and $167 million, depending upon Northern District of California bankruptcy the petition was not filed in good faith, the the outcome of the pending litigation. court, respectively, held that filing chapter 11 Third Circuit dismissed it. Accordingly, the debtor’s cash exceeded its solely to use Section 502(b)(6) to cap a single The Third Circuit distinguished Integrated liabilities by between $45 million and $153 landlord’s lease termination damage claim Telecom Express from its earlier decision in million. Further, the debtor had received an does not, by itself, establish good faith. Solow v. PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI offer from an entity willing to purchase the In Integrated Telecom Express, the Third Enterprises (U.S.), Inc.)22 and from the Ninth debtor’s business assets without a bankruptcy Circuit addressed a situation in which “a Circuit’s decision in Platinum Capital, Inc. v. filing. Chapter 11 petition [was] filed by a financially Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P.)23 Facing a motion to dismiss the chapter 11 healthy debtor, with no intention of reorgan- on the grounds that the debtors in those cases petition as a bad faith filing, the debtor izing or liquidating as a going concern, with were in financial distress and may actually asserted that it needed bankruptcy relief no reasonable expectation that Chapter 11 have been insolvent. In PPI, the debtor because of pending litigation, operational
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 19 losses, its desire to cap its landlord’s lease ter- were approximately three years remaining had been filed under chapter 7 of the mination damage claim, and problems in before the lease would expire, and the debtor Bankruptcy Code, the landlord’s claim would selling its assets. The bankruptcy court did not want to continue paying the landlord be capped—because bad faith does not con- rejected each of these reasons. The court the monthly rent through the expiration date stitute cause to dismiss a chapter 7 case—and found that the pending litigation did not despite the fact that it had adequate funds to the fact that the debtor was solvent and filed create a present need for bankruptcy relief do so. In its decision, the bankruptcy court under chapter 11 should not change that because 1) it did not threaten the continua- summarized applicable California landlord- result. tion of the debtor’s business, 2) the debtor tenant law: Chameleon Systems suggests that, when a might never incur significant liabilities from Under California law…[the landlord] debtor is liquidating its assets, a potential the lawsuits, and 3) the debtor could pay had the option of accepting the sur- means for completely avoiding the good faith any judgments without liquidating business render of the property and then hav- issue would be for the debtor to file under assets. The court further found that the ing the state court fix the damages for chapter 7 instead of chapter 11. Section debtor’s lack of profitability and the prospect the breach of the lease. This would 502(b) is not tethered to chapter 11. It applies of further losses did not show a present need have adjudicated the total damages equally to chapter 7 cases. The problem, for bankruptcy relief when the debtor had the suffered by…[the landlord] as a result however, is that entities other than individu- present ability to pay all its debts without of the breach of the lease. Rather than als do not receive a discharge in chapter 7 or liquidating business assets. Moreover, the pursue this course of action…[the land- liquidating chapter 11 cases.32 Moreover, debtor’s own evidence showed that the debtor lord] elected its other option, to con- according to one bankruptcy court and did not need chapter 11 protection to effect tinue to consider…[the debtor] its ten- echoed by others, “the Bankruptcy Code sim- a sale of its assets as a going concern, accord- ant and to seek to collect rent on a ply does not contemplate that equity security ing to the court. Also, the court noted that monthly basis…[for approximately holders will share in the distribution of the allowing the chapter 11 case to proceed another three years].29 estate in cases under Chapter 7—any sur- would impose real hardship on the debtor’s After filing its chapter 11 petition, the plus is to be distributed to the debtor.”33 landlord since the debtor sought to reduce the debtor filed a motion seeking to reject the In Liberate Technologies, the court amount of the landlord’s claim from $45 lease and cap the landlord’s claim at $1.816 explained that “Section 502(b)(6) limits dis- million due under state law to the capped million. The landlord responded by filing a tributions in the bankruptcy case; it does not sum of $8 million allowed under Section motion requesting that the bankruptcy court preclude enforcement of the liability outside 502(b)(6). In dismissing the chapter 11 case, dismiss the case as a bad faith filing. While of bankruptcy where there is no discharge.”34 the court found that the debtor’s proposed recognizing that reorganization of an ongo- As a result, in a case in which the debtor does use of Section 502(b)(6) was simply a neu- ing business or the liquidation of assets are not obtain a discharge, capping a landlord’s tral factor that did not establish either good valid purposes for filing chapter 11, the claim in the bankruptcy estate under Section faith or bad faith. Chameleon Systems court noted that, in this 502(b)(6) may not prevent the landlord, after case, there was no ongoing business, and the all creditors have been paid in full, from seek- Chameleon Systems and Chapter 7 liquidation of assets had been completed ing its share of surplus funds returned to the By contrast, in In re Chameleon Systems, prior to the filing of the chapter 11 petition. debtor. This result might be avoided, even in Inc.,28 an earlier decision, another Northern The court focused on whether the debtor’s fil- a liquidating chapter 11 case, if the debtor suf- District bankruptcy court held that a solvent ing was a legitimate use of the Bankruptcy ficiently continues in business under its plan debtor could use chapter 11 to cap lease Code or whether the debtor was attempting in order to obtain a discharge.35 damages. The debtor in that case filed its to unreasonably deter and harass creditors Another problem with the chapter 7 chapter 11 petition for the purpose of reject- simply as a litigation tactic.30 The court approach is that, unlike chapter 11, an inde- ing its sole real estate lease and then cap- acknowledged that: pendent trustee is automatically appointed to ping the landlord’s lease termination damage [T]he resolution of this dispute involves marshal and distribute the debtor’s assets, claim under Section 502(b)(6). The debtor had a possible windfall no matter what and this may not appeal to the board of dir- no ongoing operations, no income, and no the decision. If the court decides in ectors of a debtor of questionable solvency if employees other than a consultant it had favor of the debtor and allows the millions of dollars of cash remain on hand. hired to wind down its affairs, liquidate its bankruptcy to continue the claim will However, chapter 7 is an option that should assets, and settle various obligations owed to be capped and it appears that addi- influence the negotiations between the parties. creditors. The debtor had in excess of $4 tional funds will flow to shareholders A better understanding of the alternatives million in its bank accounts and, other than of the debtor. On the other hand if the might even help the parties avoid any sort of its $4 million-plus obligation to its landlord, case proceeds under California law, excursion into bankruptcy jurisdiction. the debtor’s total outstanding obligations the debtor is presented with a Hobson’s The common thread that runs through amounted to approximately $25,000. Unlike choice. Chameleon must stay in exis- the case law is that the question of good faith Integrated Telecom Express and Liberate tence for another two or three years, or is based on the totality of the circumstances. Technologies, the debtor would have been pay…[the landlord] now whatever it This requires a fact-intensive inquiry on a insolvent if the landlord’s claim was not demands to terminate the lease regard- case-by-case basis. In situations in which 1) capped. However, if the Section 502(b)(6) less of what might happen in terms of a petition is filed solely as a litigation tactic cap were to be applied, the debtor would mitigation later in 2004, 2005 or 2006. in a two-party dispute or 2) the sole intent of have cash substantially in excess of the amount In the latter case, if the property is a solvent debtor that is not suffering from of its debt. rented in the next 2 years for any financial distress is to avail itself of the Section Prior to filing its chapter 11 petition, the amount the landlord will receive a 502(b)(6) cap, the recent decisions suggest debtor attempted to surrender possession of windfall and the debtor will not be in that the court may find the requisite good faith the premises to the landlord and to negotiate existence to complain. Either way there lacking. Accordingly, counsel should advise a termination of the lease, but the parties is the possibility of a windfall.31 debtors to find other bona fide reasons for fil- were not able to reach an agreement. There Ultimately, the court found that if the case ing a chapter 11 petition and to continue to
20 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 engage in business pursuant to a chapter 11 plan in order to obtain a discharge. ■ Sick of the Stock Market Roller Coaster?
1 In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F. 3d 108 Invest in Safe 1st Trust Deeds at 10% to 11% Yields (3d Cir. 2004). Investments from $200K to $300K 2 In re Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. 206 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 60% to 70% Loan to Value 2004). 3 See Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.) Inc. (In re PPI Enters. • Profesional Borrowers (U.S.), Inc.), 324 F. 3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2003); In re • 1 to 4 Residential Properties Klein Sleep Prods., Inc., 78 F. 3d 18, 28 (2d Cir. 1996). • In Business Since 1977 4 For a charge to constitute “rent reserved,” three re- quirements must be met. The charge must be 1) desig- nated as “rent” or “additional rent” in the lease or pro- Call 562.439.3344 vided as the tenant’s/lessee’s obligation in the lease, 2) related to the value of the property or the lease, and 3) must be properly classifiable as rent because it is fixed, WOODY FINANCIAL REALTY Ask for Dave Woody DRE License #01154109 regular, or periodic. In re McSheridan, 184 B.R. 91, 99- • 100 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995). 5 See Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 121 (cit- ing In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F. 3d 154, 163-64 Quo Jure Corporation 1-800-843-0660 (3d Cir. 1999)). www.quojure.com 6 In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 510 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. LAWYERS’ WRITING & RESEARCH [email protected] (In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P.), 314 F. 3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2002); In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F. 2d 160, 170 (7th Cir. 1992)). When you can’t do it yourself, but you still need a brief or 7 Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 121-22; see memo done—and done well, by experienced attorneys who also Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. at 211 (citing SGL are skilled writers—turn to Quo Jure Corporation. Carbon Corp., 200 F. 3d at 163). 8 See Marshall, 300 B.R. at 512-13; Integrated Telecom Quo Jure provides premium legal writing and research services Express, 384 F. 3d at 122. to practicing attorneys. Our work has contributed to million- 9 Marshall, 300 B.R. at 512. dollar settlements and judgments. Oppositions to motions for 10 Id. at 513. 11 summary judgment are our specialty. Call for a free analysis See Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. at 211 (citing In re TM The Winning Edge Marsch, 36 F. 3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994)). and estimate. 12 See Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 118 (cit- ing SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F. 3d at 159-62; Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc.), 324 F. 3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2003)). 13 See Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P.), 314 F. 3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2002); Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 118. 14 See Marsch, 36 F. 3d at 828. 15 SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F. 3d at 165-66. 16 Sylmar Plaza, 314 F. 3d at 1075; PPI, 324 F. 3d at 211- 12; Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 128; In re Chameleon Sys., Inc., 306 B.R. 666, 669-71 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004); Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. at 215. 17 Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d 108. 18 Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. 206. 19 Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 112. 20 Id. at 129. 21 Id. at 128. 22 Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc.), 324 F. 3d 197 (3d Cir. 2003). 23 Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P.), 314 F. 3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). 24 Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F. 3d at 123 (empha- sis added). 25 Id. at 123. 26 Sylmar Plaza, 314 F. 3d at 1075. 27 In re Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. 206 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004). 28 In re Chameleon Sys., Inc., 306 B.R. 666 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004). 29 Id. at 669. 30 Id. at 670-71. 31 Id. at 671. 32 See 11 U.S.C. §§727(a)(1), 1141(d)(3). 33 In re Rimsat, Ltd., 229 B.R. 910, 913 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998); see also Georgian Villa, Inc. v. United States (In re Georgian Villa, Inc.), 55 F. 3d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1995), and 11 U.S.C. §726(a)(6).34 In re Liberate Techs., 314 B.R. at 218 n.9. 35 See 11 U.S.C. §1141(d)(3).
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 21 CLASS To ward off objectors, class counsel may solicit the guidance of judges and mediators in the settlement process
by Brad W. Seiling WARS
funny thing hap- the class’s recovery, even though those claims Janik poses for class action settlements, it is pened to a law were not part of the trial court’s certifica- useful to understand how the court of appeal firm on the way to tion order. Janik appears to be the first could conclude that seemingly successful class collecting a $90 reported California decision recognizing that counsel potentially breached their duties to the million judgment class counsel can be liable in malpractice class. The underlying litigation in Janik was in favor of its cli- based on its successful representation of a cer- one of the seminal cases in the area of wage ents. One of the tified class. The duties articulated in Janik and hour law in California. The case involved clients—a member extend beyond actions for legal malpractice a class action against Farmers Insurance on of a certified class and potentially raise a new obstacle to class behalf of more than 2,400 claims adjusters to of more than 2,000 insurance claims settlements. recover nonpayment of overtime wages. The Aadjusters—sued the attorneys for malpractice. Class settlements are often criticized and complaint, which was filed in 1996, asserted The California Court of Appeal has allowed challenged as collusive deals between greedy a single cause of action under the Labor the claim to proceed as a second putative class counsel out to line their pockets and Code. In 1998, the trial court certified a class class action. This recent appellate decision unscrupulous defendants trying to buy an of all claims adjusters who worked for raises some obvious questions. Where could inexpensive resolution of claims alleging seri- Farmers from October 1, 1993 (three years these attorneys possibly have gone wrong? ous injury to consumers. The sweeping ratio- prior to the filing of the complaint), to the date When is a $90 million judgment not enough? nale announced in Janik would apply equally of trial. The court of appeal’s answers to these ques- to class counsel that settle class claims, even After notice was sent and class members tions have wide-ranging significance in class if they achieve substantial benefits for the were given the opportunity to opt out of the action litigation. class. Dissatisfied class members (and the In Janik v. Rudy, Axelrod & Zieff,1 the counsel who represent them) now may attack Brad W. Seiling is a partner in Manatt, Phelps & court of appeal held that class counsel owed class counsel for breaching duties to a set- Phillips and is cochair of the firm’s Unfair Comp- its clients (members of the class in the under- tlement class by selling out the class’s claims etition Practice Group. He specializes in the defense lying litigation) a duty to consider and assert too cheaply. of class action lawsuits and lawsuits brought under the Unfair Competition Law. KEN SUSYNSKI additional claims that could have increased Before examining the conundrum that
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 23 class, class counsel successfully moved for exclusive forum to challenge the adequacy of issue presented in Ferguson was whether a summary adjudication on the ground that class counsel’s representation. The initial stipulated dismissal of punitive damages alle- the members of the class were not exempt determination of whether counsel were ade- gations as part of an $80 million class set- from overtime regulations. This favorable quate to represent the class—a prerequisite to tlement constituted malpractice. The supreme ruling was affirmed on appeal.2 any certification order—was very different court held that lost punitive damages were not A jury then awarded the class approxi- from the determination of whether class coun- recoverable as compensatory damages in a mately $90 million in unpaid overtime wages, sel actually adequately represented the class legal malpractice action, but the court did not and that judgment was affirmed on appeal.3 throughout the litigation. The trial court in analyze the scope of class counsel’s duty to Class counsel had won a substantial award for the underlying class action never considered members of the class. Janik expressly states the class and in the process had made new law whether class counsel had adequate reason to what may have been implied in Ferguson— in the area of wage and hour class actions. forego asserting a UCL claim.6 class counsel can be held liable for failing to These results would not seem to support a There were many good reasons why the pursue claims on behalf of a class. malpractice case, but that is exactly what attorneys chose not to risk asserting a UCL In addition to recognizing new potential happened next. claim after obtaining favorable rulings on liability for class counsel, Janik also has After the trial, a second putative class certification and summary adjudication on lia- potentially broad implications for class action filed a malpractice suit alleging that class bility. When counsel filed their original com- settlements. Commentators and courts have counsel breached their duties to the class by plaint in 1996, it was not clear whether back expressed concerns that class action settle- failing to assert a claim under California’s wages were recoverable as restitution under ments offer an opportunity for attorneys to Unfair Competition Law, codified at Business the UCL. Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration generate fees without any effective monitor- and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq., Products Company,7 the California Supreme ing by class members, particularly when the which carries a four-year statute of limitations Court’s decision recognizing that unpaid settlement has been reached prior to class period—one year longer than the limitations wages could be recovered as an item of resti- certification.12 period under the Labor Code. By not amend- tution under the UCL, was decided in 2000, There also is concern that defendants may ing the complaint to assert a UCL claim, after the trial court had certified the class in use the settlements to buy their way out of class counsel allegedly deprived the class of the underlying litigation. Class counsel did not serious situations in a relatively nominal way millions of dollars of additional unpaid wages. believe that it was even possible to amend the or to structure settlements to achieve a The trial court sustained the attorneys’ complaint to assert a claim recognized by “tremendous sales bonanza” for themselves demurrer without leave to amend and dis- the Cortez decision, and counsel certainly while providing little relief to the settlement missed the malpractice action. The demurrer would not have wanted to risk reopening class.13 This criticism applies particularly to contended that the trial court’s certification the issue of certification or to otherwise jeop- coupon settlements, which require class mem- order in the underlying litigation proscribed ardize their favorable rulings on the merits.8 bers to redeem coupons for the defendant’s the bounds of any duty the attorneys owed to Notwithstanding the “sound strategic rea- products in order to realize the benefits of the the class, and unnamed class members had no sons for not seeking to amend the complaint settlement. right to demand that class counsel assert after the Supreme Court decided Cortez,” A new legal subspecialty has developed in additional claims.4 the Janik court held that whether such tacti- recent years: lawyers who make a living rep- The court of appeal reversed, finding that cal decisions amount to a breach of a class resenting class members who challenge the the plaintiff had stated claims for negligence counsel’s duties to the class presents a ques- settlements of their class actions.14 These and breach of fiduciary duty. The court tion of fact that could not be resolved on attorneys insist on modifications to settle- rejected the attorneys’ argument that their demurrer.9 ment terms as well as fees for themselves in duty to the class was limited to competently exchange for their clients’ decision to drop prosecuting the claims that the court certified. Sweeping New Duty their objections to final approval of the set- Class counsel, like all attorneys, have a duty The court’s rationale confirms the central tlement. Clearly, “objecting has become big to at least consider and advise their clients of role that the UCL plays in consumer litigation. business.”15 related matters that could be pursued to UCL claims are common in consumer class Dealing with these objections can be avoid prejudice to the client: action cases, even if the comparatively limited extremely costly, particularly if the trial court In the context of a class action, both remedies available under the UCL (particu- permits discovery into the settlement process the representative plaintiffs and the larly the limited monetary remedies in light and the terms of the settlement.16 Litigating absent class members similarly are of recent California Supreme Court rulings) challenges to settlements delays finality for entitled to assume their attorneys will mean that a UCL claim adds little to a class’s defendants and usually puts a hold on any consider and bring to the attention of potential recovery. That a plaintiff can take award for attorney’s fees. For that reason, at least the class representatives addi- advantage of the four-year statute of limita- defense counsel and class counsel regard tional or greater claims that may exist tions under the UCL in itself would justify objectors and their lawyers as expensive nui- arising out of the circumstances under- asserting a UCL claim in almost every con- sances who threaten to derail settlements lying the certified claims that class sumer case. Indeed, in light of Janik, plaintiff’s that required countless hours to achieve. members will be unable to raise if not lawyers act at their peril if they do not allege In their defense, settlement objectors often asserted in the pending action. The a UCL claim in a class action lawsuit. achieve beneficial modifications to class set- class members are entitled to assume Underscoring the importance of the UCL is tlements or derail settlements that courts ulti- their attorneys are attempting to max- nothing new.10 mately concluded were not in the interests of imize their recovery for the conduct What is new is the sweeping new duty that the class.17 In these cases, the objectors raise they are challenging and that they are the court of appeal imposed on class counsel. issues that may not otherwise have been pre- not, without good reason, failing to The California Supreme Court previously sented to or considered by the trial court in rul- assert those claims that will do so.5 had considered a malpractice case against ing on a stipulated application for settlement The court of appeal also rejected the argu- class counsel in Ferguson v. Lief, Cabraser, approval.18 Regardless of how one regards set- ment that the class action litigation was the Heiman & Bernstein LLP.11 However, the tlement objectors, they are here to stay.
24 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 Janik provides a new angle for attorneys the parties submitted the matter to a respected is often very difficult for defendants. Clients seeking to challenge class action settlements. independent mediator in itself is frequently want to know the bottom line, and in class An argument that a proposed settlement is not cited as a factor in favor of approving class action settlements, the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fair and reasonable to the settlement class settlements.22 fees award forms one of the most significant would support a malpractice claim against Negotiate fees after substantive terms. components of the bottom line. Both sides class counsel as well as a direct challenge to Whether the parties negotiate the settlement may be reluctant to engage in protracted set- the settlement. There is no reason to think that between themselves or retain a mediator, the tlement discussions without addressing a future class members—and the counsel who substantive terms of the settlement—class material term. But rushing to deal with fees represent them—will not use Janik’s rationale definition, form and content of class notice, first or tying an agreement to substantive to challenge class settlements. consideration to the class members, proce- terms to a particular fee award may expose the settlement to chal- Protecting Class lenge (or at a mini- Settlements from mum, close scrutiny by Attack the trial court). There are many ways for Submitting the counsel to protect class question of fees to the settlements from collat- trial court eliminates eral attack. Of course, any argument regard- no single step—or even a ing collusion. While the combination of steps— taint of collusion evap- will insulate a settlement orates, plaintiffs’ coun- from collateral attack or sel and defense counsel ensure its approval. often are unwilling to Ultimately, whether a set- place this important tlement survives and issue entirely in the class counsel can avoid hands of a neutral third malpractice liability party. In a settlement, depends on the fairness defendants can cap of the settlement to the their exposure for fees, class.19 Class members but they have no such will have no basis to assurances if they allow complain if the settle- the trial court to decide ment is fair and has not the issue entirely. caused the relinquish- Conversely, class coun- ment of any substantial sel may prefer the cer- legal rights without ade- tainty of knowing that quate justification. The the defendant will not following are effective oppose its fee request ways to enhance the to having to litigate its chances of defeating any entitlement to fees. attack on a class action There are ways to settlement. reduce the risks to both Use a mediator. Using a sides of submitting the mediator to oversee set- fee issue to a third party tlement negotiations adds for resolution. For a layer of protection for the interests of class dures for redeeming consideration, and example, a baseball-style arbitration proce- members and thus undercuts a claim that injunctive relief (for example, requiring dure may be appropriate. In this procedure, the settlement was collusive. The trial judge changes in the defendant’s business prac- each side presents one number for consider- may feel more comfortable approving a set- tices)—should be the first order of business. ation, and the judge or arbitrator must select tlement that has been mediated before a neu- The issue of attorney’s fees should not be one of the two numbers. Alternatively, each tral third party, particularly if the mediator is placed on the table until after the substantive side could propose a number that forms the one whom the trial judge knows and respects. terms have been resolved. range between which the fee award will fall. Courts have cited the parties’ use of a medi- Attorney’s fees often are one of the most If the trial court is unwilling to resolve these ator as a factor in finding that a class settle- controversial components of a class settle- issues, the matter could be referred to a third ment was fair, reasonable, and not collusive.20 ment, and a substantial stipulated fee award party for determination. Regardless of the There are limits to how much mileage the can provide a tempting target for settlement procedure, placing the issue of fees into the parties can get from using a mediator. objectors or malpractice plaintiffs attacking hands of a third party makes it much more Declarations from the mediator describing the the settlement as a sellout of the class by difficult for an objector or malpractice plain- mediation process or opining on the fairness class counsel. The mediator’s presence can tiff to sell the argument that class counsel of the settlement may not be admissible in any undercut these arguments and underscore breached duties to the class in favor of their subsequent proceedings.21 Indeed, the medi- the adversarial nature of the settlement own fees. ator may not even be willing to provide such process. Don’t skimp on class notice. Preparing a a declaration. Even without a statement of Waiting to negotiate class counsel’s fees comprehensive class notice can also protect support from the mediator, the mere fact that until the substantive terms have been resolved the settlement and class counsel from collat-
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 25 eral attack. Here is where defense counsel can attorneys may seek guidance from the findings generally recite the requirements for be helpful. Many defendants try to cut cor- court.”28 There is absolutely no reason not to settlement approval without delving into spe- ners on class notice to save potentially sub- heed that advice. cific issues. That is perfectly understandable stantial costs.23 Other defendants hope to Parties should inform the trial court of because most class settlement approval hear- minimize the response rate and thus reduce their settlement negotiations and the para- ings proceed without opposition or objec- the ultimate payout. These are short-sighted meters of the settlement terms they are con- tion. Those general findings may not, how- concerns that could threaten the settlement. sidering. This approach brings the trial court ever, satisfy a subsequent court faced with a The notice is often the first and only time into the settlement process—even if the trial malpractice action against class counsel. the class receives any information about the judge is not actually mediating the case— For that reason, class counsel should put case or the settlement. Courts have adopted and may enhance the likelihood of approval. themselves in the shoes of an objector or flexible standards for determining whether The judge may even spot issues that could pre- potential malpractice plaintiff and consider class notice is adequate. In general, notice sent problems when the settlement is ready for what aspects of the settlement might raise con- must be given in a manner that has “a rea- approval. cerns in a subsequent collateral attack. Those sonable chance of reaching a substantial per- Some trial judges may be reluctant to issues should be presented to the trial court centage of the class members.”24 The notice offer what might be regarded as advisory in the settlement approval papers and at the should be as broad as possible to avoid sub- rulings on matters that are not properly before preliminary and final settlement approval sequent charges that the class did not receive them on a noticed motion or other recognized hearings. Draft final approval orders also adequate notice of the rights they were relin- procedure. The federal Manual for Complex should include specific findings on these issues. quishing. The notice should be sent in a way Litigation suggests that on occasion “a judge Encourage objectors to speak now or forever that is most likely to reach members of the set- might retain a special master or a magistrate hold their peace. Potential objectors often con- tlement class. judge to examine issues regarding the value tact counsel to raise their concerns with a pro- Personal notice, if practicable, is always of nonmonetary benefits to the class and their posed settlement before filing formal objec- the best form of notice—both to satisfy due fairness, reasonableness and adequacy,”29 tions. It may be tempting for the proponents process concerns and to insulate the settlement although such appointments are rare.30 of a class settlement to ignore these objectors from collateral attack. Posting the notice on Trial courts are supposed to act as “fidu- and hope they simply go away. The better a company’s Web site or publishing the notice ciaries” of absent class members.31 Disclosing course is to insist that any objector submit for- in newspapers or magazines have been rec- the reasons why counsel seeks guidance from mal objections to the trial court and appear ognized as valid means of notice and may con- the court and appealing to the court’s unique at the final approval hearing. tribute to insulating a settlement from col- role as protector of the interests of absent class Res judicata and collateral estoppel prin- lateral attack.25 members may dispel some of the reluctance ciples apply to judgments in class action The contents of the notice are also impor- of courts to get involved. Citing Janik also cases,33 including judgments that result from tant in avoiding subsequent challenges. may be compelling. Concerns about the trial class actions settlements.34 Objectors who “[N]otice given to class members must fairly court’s willingness to provide settlement guid- have appeared and had their concerns con- apprise members of the terms of the pro- ance should not, however, dissuade counsel sidered and addressed by the trial court in the posed compromise and of the options open from making the inquiry. Counsel who refrain underlying class action case will have a dif- to dissenting class members.”26 All class from asking for the trial judge’s help may ficult time relitigating the same issues in a sub- notices briefly describe the nature of the never know what the judge is thinking until sequent malpractice case.35 Indeed, the find- action and the settlement terms. In light of it is too late. ings against them should serve as collateral Janik, settlement notices also should describe Request detailed findings from the trial court. estoppel and bar relitigation of those same any claims that are not being pursued or that Counsel should request specific findings from objections in a subsequent action.36 the class could pursue but for the settlement. the trial court concerning the fairness of the If possible, the notice should set forth the settlement, the adequacy of class counsel’s rep- Malpractice and Other Concerns reasons why these claims are not being pur- resentation, the lack of collusion in the set- The appropriate response to a malpractice sued. Providing this detail will make any tlement process, and the decision not to pur- action filed before final approval of a class set- challenge to the settlement more difficult sue certain claims or forms of relief in tlement is to seek an immediate stay or dis- because class members will have been advised exchange for the settlement. These findings missal of that action on the basis of another of the rights and claims that they relinquished could be used in a subsequent action as col- action pending. While such a contempora- under the settlement. lateral estoppel. Indeed, the Janik court sug- neously filed malpractice action likely is pre- Involve the trial court in the process. Trial gested that such rulings could serve as a com- mature, the case will ripen once judgment is courts—particularly judges in the complex plete defense to a subsequent malpractice entered approving the settlement. The trial civil departments throughout the state—take action: “If the issue on which the malpractice court in the malpractice action should be an active role in class litigation to protect complaint is based has been considered and apprised that counsel appears to be engaged the rights of absent class members. Court determined in the class action proceedings, the in forum shopping and should be forced to lit- oversight of settlements protects class mem- rulings of the class action court will be bind- igate the concerns in the context of settlement bers “whose rights may not have been given ing on the members of the class and preclude approval. due regard by the negotiating parties.”27 This reconsideration of those matters in another Most class settlements provide that the action by the court may provide an early line forum.”32 trial court will retain jurisdiction over enforce- of defense to any collateral attack on a class Of course, asserting this defense assumes ment of the settlement. In light of Janik, pro- settlement. In fact, the Janik court encouraged that the class action court made the requisite ponents of a class settlement should ask the class counsel to enlist the trial court to resolve findings. Existing class action procedures— trial court to retain jurisdiction over collat- questions about the scope of its duties to the both at the certification stage and the settle- eral challenges to matters related to the set- class: “If class counsel has any question con- ment stage—require courts to examine the tlement. That would provide a basis to trans- cerning the course that is required by the adequacy of class counsel’s representation of fer any subsequent malpractice case to the duty it owes to absent class members, the the class. More often than not, the trial court’s same judge who approved the settlement in
26 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 the first place. The judge who found that class counsel adequately represented a set- tlement class and approved the settlement may be much less inclined to allow a mal- practice action to proceed than a judge con- sidering the matter for the first time. Janik is not merely a problem for the plaintiffs’ bar. It is undoubtedly tempting for the defense bar to savor a case that exposes their adversaries to lawsuits by disgruntled clients. This may seem to be a welcome pay- back for all of the times defense counsel has had to deal with disgruntled clients com- plaining about the costs of class action liti- gation and settlements. Nonetheless, this view is shortsighted. Any vehicle that opens the door to challenges to class action settlements ultimately will affect defense counsel and the clients they represent in class action settle- ments. Anita Rae Shapiro Another unintended impact of Janik may SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER, RET. be to increase class settlement demands. RIVATE ISPUTE ESOLUTION Plaintiffs’ counsel may seek to insulate them- P D R selves from subsequent attacks by demanding PROBATE, CIVIL, FAMILY LAW higher amounts in settlements and refusing to PROBATE EXPERT WITNESS enter into settlements that do not provide relief to every class member. Coupon settle- TEL/FAX: (714) 529-0415 CELL/PAGER: (714) 606-2649 ments, which many defendants like but which E-MAIL: [email protected] have been criticized by courts and commen- http://adr-shapiro.com tators, may fall further out of favor because FEES: $300/hr their low redemption rates may leave large numbers of class members with a reason to complain about the settlement. Settling a class action lawsuit is never easy. Class counsel and defense counsel must Coming this June in Los Angeles Lawyer first deal with each other in contentious nego- tiations that often follow protracted litigation. They must face the trial court twice, first at Lawyer-to-Lawyer Referral Guide the preliminary approval hearing, then at the final approval hearing. During that process, For listing or advertising information, call 213.896.6507 they also may have to deal with objectors. Deadline: April 25th Now, there is the possibility of contempora- neous or subsequent malpractice lawsuits. Counsel negotiating class settlements owe a duty to each other to make sure that the set- tlement is not subject to collateral attack. Working together to structure a settlement and a settlement process may ensure approval of the settlement and insulate it from collat- eral attack. At the end of the day, no one wants to face the $90 million question. ■
1 Janik v. Rudy, Axelrod & Zieff, 119 Cal. App. 4th Office 930 (2004). 2 Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 87 Cal. App. 4th 805 space to (2001). 3 Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115 Cal. App. 4th 715 share in (2004). 4 Janik, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 936. 5 Id. at 941-42. South 6 Id. at 945-46. 7 Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Bay Cal. 4th 163 (2000). 8 Janik, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 946-47. 9 Id. at 947. 10 Since November 2, 2004, no discussion of the UCL For information, call (310) 540 -1771 • $1,350 without phone or secretary
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 27 is complete without referring to Proposition 64—the (Judge Posner observed that class settlements, which are not have the power to sanction an attorney appearing voter initiative that changed the previously broad often presented to the class as a fait accompli, pose sig- on behalf of a client as a vexatious litigant. Id. at standing provisions under the UCL. With the passage nificant problems for abuse because “lawyers for the 1196. See also In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 of Proposition 64, plaintiffs must have suffered an class, rather than the clients, have all the initiative F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2001), aff’d, 267 F. 3d 743 injury in fact as well as a loss of money or property in and are close to being the real parties in interest….”). (7th Cir. 2001) (Dissident attorney who objected to set- order to sue a defendant for violation of the UCL. 13 In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel tlement solicited more than 90% of all opt outs.). Proposition 64 also eliminated the ability of private par- Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F. 3d 768, 787 (3d Cir. 15 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, 4 NEWBERG ON ties to represent others unless the parties comply with 1995) (Third Circuit found that district court abused CLASS ACTIONS §11.55, at 168 (4th ed. 2002). class action procedures. Practitioners should note that its discretion in approving the class settlement because, 16 See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Proposition 64 actually makes Janik even more impor- among other reasons, the coupon settlement did not Litig., 594 F. 2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that trial tant in UCL litigation. Since class action procedures will provide adequate value to class members.). court abused its discretion by not permitting objectors apply to any UCL suit prosecuted on behalf of others, 14 See Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F. 3d 1194 to conduct discovery to show that settlement prejudiced the duties articulated in Janik potentially apply to all (9th Cir. 1999). In Weissman, the Ninth Circuit reversed interests of the class); see also 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS suits brought under the UCL. a district court order prohibiting an attorney from ACTIONS, supra note 15, §11.57 (detailed discussion on 11 Ferguson v. Lief, Cabraser, Heiman & Bernstein LLP, objecting to class action settlements. The district court an objector’s right to independent discovery). 30 Cal. 4th 1037 (2003). characterized the attorney as “something of a class 17 See General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 12 See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank action settlement gadfly.” The Ninth Circuit reversed Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F. 3d 768. & Trust Co., 834 F. 2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1987) the restrictive order on the ground that trial courts do 18 See Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974-75 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (finding by dis- trict court that objectors’ counsel had conferred a sub- stantial benefit on the class by extending the coupon redemption period from 180 days to one year). 19 Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F. 2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). In class action litigation, California courts routinely look to federal authority for guidance. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821 (1971). 20 Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001). 21 See Foxgate Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramaela Cal., Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 1 (2001) (holding that statements from a mediator regarding a party’s conduct during mediation proceeding were not admissible in connec- tion with a motion for sanctions). 22 See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1139 (1990); Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996). 23 See, e.g., In re Lorazapem & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 2002) (The court reported total notice costs of $8.250 million for a class that included more than 1.2 million members.). 24 Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 974 (1975). 25 Wershba, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 251 (upholding class notice as adequate under circumstances in which defen- dant mailed or e-mailed notice to class members, pub- lished notice in USA Today and MacWorld, and posted notice for more than 30 days on its Internet Web site). 26 Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 134, 151-52 (1975). 27 Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F. 2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982). 28 Janik v. Rudy, Axelrod & Zieff, 119 Cal. App. 4th 930, 946 (2004). 29 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH 329 (Federal Judicial Center 2004); available at http://www.fjc.gov. 30 THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 64- 65 (Federal Judicial Center 1996). 31 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp., 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1151 (2001). 32 Janik, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 946. 33 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706 (1967); Payne v. National Collection Sys., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 1037, 1047 (2001). 34 Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1065 (1998). 35 See, e.g., Mortimer v. River Oaks Toyota, 278 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1996) (Plaintiffs who objected but did not opt out were subject to the preclusive effect of the judgment in a settled class action.). 36 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F. 3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (A finding that nationwide class was inappropriate acted as col- lateral estoppel in state court proceedings.).
28 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 MCLE ARTICLE AND SELF-ASSESSMENT TEST By reading this article and answering the accompanying test questions, you can earn one MCLE credit. To apply for credit, please follow the instructions on the test answer sheet on page 31.
by Howard S. Klein Tales of Two Courts Legal changes in marital status can have a dramatic impact on existing estate plans
atters that involve a combination of probate law and family law issues are common. Crossover issues can arise when clients require services regarding property owner- ship, estate planning, incapacity, family court proceedings (including marital disso- lution, legal separation, and nullity), and death. The convergence of probate and fam- ily law issues can be confusing to the lawyer who practices in one area but not both. TheM Family Code contains the statutory law of marriage, dissolution, separation, and nullity, while the Probate Code addresses the capacity issues relating to those topics. In addition, the effect of marriage or divorce upon an existing estate plan is covered in the Probate Code, while the determination of per- missible estate planning during a family court proceeding is set forth in the Family Code. Thus, prac- titioners must consult both codes for an understanding of many crossover issues. A subsequent marriage, for example, generally has a dramatic effect on existing wills and trusts. The omitted spouse who married the decedent after execution of a “testamentary instrument” (defined to include the decedent’s will or revocable trust) will normally receive the equivalent of an intestate share of the “decedent’s estate” (defined to include a probate estate and all property held in a revo- cable trust that becomes irrevocable on the death of the settlor).1 However, certain conditions mandate that the omitted spouse will take no share of the estate. These conditions include: a showing that the the decedent’s failure to provide for the omitted spouse was inten- tional, so long as the intention appears on the face of the testamentary instrument;2 evidence that the decedent provided for the spouse in other ways;3 proof that the surviving spouse made a valid waiver of probate rights;4 or a showing that a valid premarital agreement contains a waiver of probate rights.5 Like subsequent marriages, judgments of marital dissolution and nullity and judgments of legal sep- aration that terminate the marital property rights of a party may alter existing wills and nonprobate trans- fers, including living trusts. With regard to wills, unless a testator’s will expressly provides to the con- trary, dispositions, powers, and nominations favoring the former spouse are revoked by such judgments.6 The revoked will, however, is subject to revival by the testator’s remarriage to the former spouse.7 For estate planning documents other than wills, a change in the spousal status of the beneficiary is
Howard S. Klein is a partner of Feinberg Mindel Brandt Klein & Kline, LLP, where he heads the Probate and Trust Department and handles family law matters. He is a certified specialist in estate planning, trust, and probate law, and is a commissioner on the State Bar Estate Planning, Trust, and Probate Advisory Commission.
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 29 key. For example, a nonprobate transfer to the mentally competent to make a will if the capacity for the proposed action. Second, transferor’s former spouse in an instrument individual suffers from a mental disorder, the court must determine that the proposed executed before or during the marriage fails such as delusions or hallucinations, that inter- action will have no adverse effect on the if, at the time of the transferor’s death, the for- feres with the testamentary act.16 estate, or that the estate remaining after the mer spouse is not the surviving spouse.8 The Further, a court’s determination that a proposed action is taken will be adequate to exceptions to the rule occur when there is person is of unsound mind or lacks the capac- provide for the needs of the conservatee and clear and convincing evidence that the trans- ity to make a decision to do a certain act, such those persons legally entitled to be supported feror intended to preserve the transfer9 or a as the execution of a will or trust, must be by the conservatee.21 The duty to support court order maintaining the transfer exists at supported by evidence of a deficit in at least the conservatee’s spouse and children can the transferor’s death.10 “Nonprobate trans- one of several specified mental functions— factor heavily into the probate court’s deci- fers” is a term that not only applies to living including alertness and attention, information sion whether to grant substituted judgment trusts but also to Totten trusts (bank accounts processing, thought processes, and the abil- powers.
Incapacity issues arise in estate planning when a person under conservatorship— > the conservatee—wishes to make a will or trust, or when the conservatee’s conservator wishes to make a will or trust for the conservatee.
that designate a beneficiary), Payable-on- ity to modulate mood and affect—and by Another issue involving incapacity arises Death (P.O.D.) accounts, and like accounts evidence of a correlation between any deficits when a conservatee wishes to marry. Like described in Probate Code Section 5000, but and the act in question.17 the right of a conservatee to make a will, the not life insurance policies.11 The term “sur- When the conservatee lacks the capacity capacity to marry is unaffected by conserva- viving spouse” has been defined as a spouse to make estate planning decisions, the Probate torship, absent an order to the contrary.22 An whose marriage has not been dissolved or Code’s “substituted judgment” provisions18 unmarried adult not otherwise disqualified is annulled and whose marital property rights come into play. These provisions enable the capable of consenting to and consummating were not terminated by court order.12 A legal conservator or other interested person to marriage.23 Thus, unless the order establish- separation order not terminating property petition the probate court for an order autho- ing the conservatorship disqualifies the con- rights does not affect a will or nonprobate rizing or requiring the conservator to take servatee from marrying, or there is a subse- transfer.13 action on behalf of the conservatee for one or quent order to that effect,24 the conservatee Incapacity issues arise in estate planning more of the following purposes: 1) the ben- retains the right to marry. Like the determi- when a person under conservatorship—the efit of the conservatee or the estate, 2) the min- nation of a person’s lack of capacity to make conservatee—wishes to make a will or trust, imizing of prospective taxes or expenses of a will, a judicial determination that a person or when the conservatee’s conservator wishes administration upon the conservatee’s death, lacks the capacity to marry must be sup- to make a will or trust for the conservatee. or 3) the making of gifts that the conserva- ported by evidence of a mental function The starting point for analysis is the law stat- tee would have been likely to make.19 In deficit, which by itself or in combination ing that nothing shall be construed to deny a addition, the provisions include a nonexclu- with other mental function deficits signifi- conservatee the right to make a will.14 sive list of 13 possible substituted judgment cantly impairs the person’s ability to under- Furthermore, a person who has a mental dis- acts and activities.20 These involve several stand and appreciate the consequences of his order may still have the legal mental capac- with real implications for the conservatee’s of her actions regarding the marriage, and ity to execute a will or trust.15 However, an spouse and children, such as making gifts to there also must be evidence of a correlation individual is not mentally competent to make the spouse and the children; conveying or between those deficits and the act of mar- a will if the individual did not have suffi- releasing the conservatee’s contingent and riage.25 If, after marriage, the conservator cient mental capacity to 1) be able to under- expectant interests in property, including seeks to establish the validity of the mar- stand the nature of the testamentary act, 2) marital property rights; creating, revoking, or riage, the conservator may initiate a family understand and recollect the nature and sit- modifying trusts; and making a will. court proceeding for this purpose and to have uation of the individual’s property, or 3) The court may make a substituted judg- the marriage declared valid.26 remember or understand the individual’s rela- ment order only if the court determines two tions to his or her living spouse, descendants, pairs of issues. First, the court must find that Restraining Orders and Estate Planning and parents and those whose interests are either the conservatee is not opposed to the Arguably the most frequently encountered affected by the will. Also, an individual is not proposed action or, if opposed to it, lacks legal crossover issue between family law and pro-
30 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 MCLE Answer Sheet #136 MCLE Test No. 136 TALES OF TWO COURTS
The Los Angeles County Bar Association certifies that this activity has been approved for Minimum Name Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1 hour. Law Firm/Organization
1. An omitted spouse who married the decedent after ceeding occurs after a bifurcated judgment terminat- Address the execution of the decedent’s living trust receives an ing marital status, the family court retains jurisdiction City intestate share unless there is an intentional failure to over division of the community property. State/Zip provide for the spouse—whether or not the intent True. E-mail appears on the face of the trust. False. Phone True. 12. A nullity proceeding does not survive the death of False. the petitioner. State Bar # 2. A judgment of marital dissolution revokes all pow- True. INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBTAINING MCLE CREDITS ers and nominations favoring the former spouse in a False. will unless the will expressly provides to the contrary. 13. Absent entry of a bifurcated judgment terminating 1. Study the MCLE article in this issue. True. marital status, upon the death of one of the parties, the 2. Answer the test questions opposite by marking False. title presumption of right of survivorship is applicable the appropriate boxes below. Each question has only one answer. Photocopies of this 3. A nonprobate transfer to the transferor’s former to the joint tenancy property of the parties. answer sheet may be submitted; however, this spouse, in an instrument executed before or during the True. form should not be enlarged or reduced. marriage, always fails if at the time of the transferor’s False. 3. Mail the answer sheet and the $15 testing fee death, the former spouse is not the surviving spouse. 14. The death of either party to a marital dissolution ($20 for non-LACBA members) to: True. proceeding terminates an existing spousal support Los Angeles Lawyer False. order unless the parties have otherwise agreed, whether MCLE Test 4. A paranoid schizophrenic may have the capacity to orally or in writing. P.O. Box 55020 execute a will or trust. True. Los Angeles, CA 90055 True. False. Make checks payable to Los Angeles Lawyer. False. 15. The right of the obligee parent to collect child sup- 4. Within six weeks, Los Angeles Lawyer will 5. The court’s determination of incapacity to make a will port from the estate of the deceased obligor parent con- return your test with the correct answers, a or trust must be supported by evidence of a mental func- tinues as long as a valid child support order is in place. rationale for the correct answers, and a certificate verifying the MCLE credit you earned tion deficit. True. through this self-assessment activity. True. False. 5. For future reference, please retain the MCLE False. 16. An order for payment of child support is modifiable test materials returned to you. 6. The probate court may make a substituted judg- following the death of the obligor parent. ment order only if the court determines that the pro- True. ANSWERS posed action will have no adverse effect on the con- False. Mark your answers to the test by checking the appropriate boxes below. Each question has only servatee’s estate. 17. The conservator of a person’s estate may file a one answer. True. marital dissolution proceeding on behalf of the con- False. servatee if the conservatee is capable of expressing a 1. ■ True ■ False 7. A judicial determination of a person’s lack of capac- wish to dissolve the marriage on grounds of irrecon- ■ ■ ity to marry need not be supported by evidence of a cilable differences, whether or not the conservatee 2. True False mental function deficit. has expressed that wish. 3. ■ True ■ False True. True. 4. ■ True ■ False False. False. 5. ■ True ■ False 8. Standard (or Automatic) Temporary Restraining 18. If a conservator who is the conservatee’s spouse 6. ■ True ■ False Orders—Family Law (ATROs) are binding on both par- files a nullity proceeding, the conservator must file ■ ■ ties to a family court proceeding upon the filing of the and serve a notice with the probate court within 30 days 7. True False petition. of filing the nullity. 8. ■ True ■ False True. True. 9. ■ True ■ False False. False. 10. ■ True ■ False 9. The preparation of a new will during the pendency 19. A conservator has the power to manage and con- 11. ■ True ■ False of a family court proceeding is not a violation of the trol the conservatee’s share of community property, and 12. ■ True ■ False ATROs. the conservatee’s spouse has the right to manage and ■ ■ True. control his or her own share of community property. 13. True False False. True. 14. ■ True ■ False 10. A party to a legal separation proceeding who serves False. 15. ■ True ■ False his or her spouse with a notice of immediate revoca- 20. If an incapacitated spouse is under conservator- 16. ■ True ■ False tion of the parties’ revocable living trust is not in vio- ship and the well spouse refuses to comply with a pro- 17. ■ True ■ False lation of the ATROS. bate court support order, the probate court has the ■ ■ True. authority to divide the community property. 18. True False False. True. 19. ■ True ■ False 11. If death of a party to a marital dissolution pro- False. 20. ■ True ■ False
Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 31 bate is the effect of the filing of a family law (after giving the required notice), so that the probate homestead, and other purely pro- proceeding on the right of a party to that former joint tenancy assets will be held by the bate matters. proceeding to initiate estate planning or to parties as tenants in common, with each The impact of the death of a party to a dis- revise existing estate planning documents. party having testamentary power over his or solution proceeding absent entry of a status This is because of the Standard (or Automatic) her one-half share. judgment is not the same as the death of a Temporary Restraining Orders—Family Law • Terminating P.O.D. and similar accounts, party during a nullity proceeding. This pro- (called ATROs) that appear on the back of the so that the client’s spouse is not the beneficiary ceeding involves a completely different issue: Judicial Council form Family Law Summons. in the event of the client’s death during the dis- whether a valid marriage existed in the first The ATROs are binding upon the petitioner solution proceedings, and the client has tes- place. Thus, the nullity proceeding survives when an action for dissolution, legal separa- tamentary power over those assets. the party’s death.34 tion, or nullity is filed and are binding upon • Withdrawing half of the contents of jointly An issue related to these jurisdictional the respondent upon service of the petition and held bank accounts, while leaving the other considerations is the effect of the death of a summons.27 One ATRO precludes any trans- half to the control of the other spouse. party to a family court proceeding upon the fer, encumbrance, or disposal of community • Preparing a new unfunded revocable trust characterization of marital property, partic- or separate property without the written con- together with a pour-over will to add the ularly property held in joint tenancy by the sent of the other party or an order of the client’s assets to the new trust at the client’s spouses. Absent entry of a bifurcated status court, except in the usual course of business death. With the unfunded trust and pour- judgment of dissolution or a judgment of or for necessities of life. It further requires the over will, no transfers will be made to the new legal separation, the right of survivorship is parties to give each other five business days’ trust during the family court proceedings, applicable to joint tenancy property unless a prior notification of proposed extraordinary thus preserving the status quo. However, if the party rebuts the title presumption or estab- expenditures and to account to the court for client dies during the proceedings, his or her lishes a transmutation of the property into all extraordinary expenditures made after the will adds to the new trust all assets belong- some other form of ownership.35 By con- ATROs are in effect. Another ATRO pre- ing to the client that were formerly in the trast, when death follows a judgment on sta- cludes cashing, borrowing against, canceling, revoked trust, together with the client’s share tus, the community property presumption transferring, or changing beneficiaries of any of the joint tenancy, P.O.D., and similar assets continues to apply to property held in joint insurance policies. Thus, if certain estate plan- over which he or she acquired the right of tes- form.36 Further, the deceased spouse’s com- ning activities occur after the effective date of tamentary disposition. While those assets munity share passes through the probate the ATROs and without the consent of the would have to be administered in the dece- estate to his or her devisees and heirs, and not spouse or court approval—such as, for exam- dent’s estate—that is, a probate estate—at to the surviving spouse, absent rebuttal of the ple, creating and funding a living trust for least they would pass to the client’s desired community property presumption or estab- the benefit of persons other than the spouse, beneficiaries and would be under the stew- lishment of a transmutation.37 or replacing the spouse with another bene- ardship of the client’s desired fiduciaries. The The death of a party to a family court ficiary on a life insurance policy—the party family court will likely scrutinize any and all proceeding has varying effects upon existing performing those acts is in contempt of court. of these transactions for compliance with the orders for spousal support and child support. Under Family Code Section 2040, some interspousal fiduciary duties of Family Code According to the Family Code, death of either activities are expressly not restrained by the Section 721. But they are permissible within the supporting or supported party terminates ATROs: 1) the creation, modification, or the language of Family Code Section 2040 an existing spousal support order unless the revocation of a will, 2) the revocation of a and, more critically, they do not affect the sta- parties have “otherwise agreed” in writing.38 nonprobate transfer, including a revocable tus quo of the marital assets during the pen- Some court decisions, however, make it unclear trust, pursuant to the instrument—provided dency of the family court proceedings. what “otherwise agreed” really means. For that notice of the change is filed and served example, a court held that the failure to list on the other party before the change takes Death and Family Court Proceedings death or remarriage of the supported spouse effect, 3) the elimination of a right of sur- A marriage is dissolved by death as a matter as terminating events meant that the parties vivorship to property—provided that notice of law. Moreover, if there is no entry of a had “otherwise agreed” that death or remar- of the change is filed and served on the other bifurcated judgment terminating marital sta- riage should not be terminating events— party before the change takes effect, 4) the tus before death, any pending action abates although one might argue that the parties’ creation of an unfunded revocable or irrev- upon the death of a party, and the family failure should not rise to the level of agree- ocable trust, and 5) the execution and filing court is divested of jurisdiction regarding sta- ment.39 Similarly, a court held that the failure of a disclaimer pursuant to Probate Code tus or anything else.29 Judgment, however, to list death as a terminating event along with Sections 260 et seq.28 may be entered on any issues already decided a requirement in the lower court’s judgment The ATROs, along with these unrestrained by the family court.30 Except for those issues, that the supporting spouse maintain life insur- activities, suggest some estate planning strate- no further order is possible regarding property ance in the amount of the present value of the gies to consider when divorce is imminent or rights, support, attorney’s fees, or costs.31 support obligation meant that death and the even after a dissolution petition has been A wholly different result occurs if death life insurance requirement were “otherwise filed. For lawyers representing a client who is follows entry of the judgment terminating agreed” to as nonterminating events.40 about to be involved in a dissolution or is marital status. Under this circumstance, the Practitioners should be aware that, even already a party to one, these strategies include: family court’s jurisdiction to decide any if spousal support terminates due to the death • Preparing a new will that revokes the for- remaining issues, most importantly the divi- of the payor spouse, a family court order for mer will and designates a different executor sion of community property, is unaffected.32 the purchase of an annuity or life insurance and new beneficiaries. The deceased spouse’s estate will be substi- policy or establishment of a trust to provide • Revoking an existing living trust (after giv- tuted as a party to the dissolution proceed- for the supported spouse remains enforce- ing the requisite notice) and then returning the ing.33 However, the status judgment does not able.41 However, the obligation to pay med- revoked trust’s assets to the parties. divest the probate court of its jurisdiction ical insurance premiums to provide proper • Severing any joint tenancies of the spouses over issues of succession, family allowance, healthcare for a supported spouse has been
32 Los Angeles Lawyer April 2005 WESTCOAST 2005
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