C HAPTER 13 INSTALLATIONS

Fuel cycle

Manufacture of the fuel and its subsequent reprocessing after it has passed through the nuclear reac- tors constitute the fuel cycle. The cycle begins with the extraction of uranium ore and ends with storage of a variety of originating from the irradiated fuel or from the industrial operations involved and utilising radioactive materials.

The uranium ore is mined, purified and concentrated into yellow-cake on the mining site. The instal- lations involved use natural uranium, where the uranium 235 content is about 0.7%. They are not subject to BNI regulations.

Most of the world’s reactors use uranium which is slightly enriched with uranium 235. For example, the pressurised water reactor (PWR) series requires uranium enriched to between 3 and 5 % with isotope 235. Prior to enrichment, the solid yellow-cake is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas during the conversion operation. This is done in the Comurhex facilities in Malvési (Aude départe- ment 1) and Pierrelatte (Drôme département).

In the plant at Tricastin, the uranium hexafluoride is separated into two streams using a gaseous diffusion process, one relatively rich in uranium 235 and the other depleted.

The enriched uranium hexafluoride is then converted into uranium oxide to allow manufacture of fuel assemblies in the FBFC plants at Romans-sur-Isère. The assemblies are then placed in the reactor core where they release power by fission of the uranium 235 nuclei.

1. Administrative division of the size of a county.

351 After about three years, the spent fuel is removed from the reactor and cooled in a pit, first of all on the plant site and then in the COGEMA reprocessing plant at La Hague.

In this plant, the uranium and from the spent fuels are separated from the fission prod- ucts and the other actinides. The uranium and plutonium are packaged for interim storage before subsequent reuse. The radioactive waste is placed in a surface repository if low-level, or in interim storage pending an appropriate disposal solution.

The plutonium produced by reprocessing can be used to make fuel for fast neutron reactors (as was the case in the ATPu at ), or MOX fuel (uranium and plutonium mixed oxide), used in French 900 MWe PWRs, in the Marcoule MELOX plant.

The vast majority of the plants in the cycle belong to the group, which primarily consists of the COGEMA and -ANP groups. The uranium-based fuel manufacturing plants are operat- ed by FBFC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Framatome-ANP. The COGEMA group organisation com- prises an executive committee and four activity areas (Mines-chemistry, Enrichment, Processing-recy- cling-engineering, Services) grouping 11 business units (operational result centres), corporate functions and an operational committee. Fuel cycle BNIs depend on the business units covering Chemistry (Comurhex, TU5, W, COGEMA Miramas), Enrichment (Eurodif), Processing (COGEMA La Hague) and Recycling (ATPu, MELOX).

Fuel cycle industry throughput (1)

Facility Material processed Tonnage Product obtained Tonnage

Comurhex Pierrelatte Uranyl nitrate (based on UF4 249

reprocessed uranium) UF6 0

U3O8 0

COGEMA Pierrelatte Uranyl nitrate (based on 5 803 U3O8 1,744 TU5 facility reprocessed uranium)

COGEMA Pierrelatte UF6 (based on depleted 16 767 U3O8 produced 11,335

W plant uranium) U3O8 stored 10,353

Eurodif Pierrelatte UF6 (based on natural uranium) 21 509 UF6 (depleted uranium) 19,627

UF6 (based on enriched uranium) 868 UF6 (enriched uranium) 2,804

FBFC Romans UF6 (based on enriched natural 882 UO2 (powder) 423

uranium) UO2 (fuel elements) 443

UF6 (based on enriched repro- 38 UO2 URE-fuel elements 37 cessed uranium)

MELOX Marcoule UO2 (based on depleted 164 MOX (fuel elements 145 uranium)

PuO2 12

COGEMA La Hague Reprocessed spent fuel Vitrified waste packages elements produced UP3 683 UP3 (number of containers) 453 UP2 800 (number of 450 UP2 800 429 containers) NU produced 944

UP2 400 0 PuO2 produced 11 Spent fuel elements 1 233 unloaded into pit

(1) The table only deals with throughput in fuel cycle BNIs and excludes the COGEMA W plant.

352 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

1MAIN TOPICS COMMON TO ALL INSTALLATIONS

1  1 Fuel cycle consistency

The ASN supervises the overall technical, safety-related and regulatory consistency of the industrial choices made with regard to fuel management. The question of the long-term management of spent fuels, mining residues and depleted uranium is a very real one and it is important to take account of all contingencies and uncertainties.

EDF has to undertake a forward-looking study in cooperation with the fuel cycle companies, pre- senting elements concerning compatibility between current changes in fuel characteristics or spent fuel management systems and fuel cycle installation developments.

The data presented by EDF and reviewed to date, provide significant clarification of how the fuel cycle operates and the safety issues, in particular adding the technical and regulatory limits that changes to fuel management policies could bring about, subject to adequate justification.

In order to maintain an overview of the fuel cycle, these data will have to be periodically updated. For any new fuel management system, EDF will be required to present a feasibility study, accompa- nied by a revision of the “nuclear fuel cycle” dossier, specifying and justifying any differences.

Through this forward-looking approach, the ASN aims to avoid saturation of the plant interim storage capacity that has happened in other countries, and prevent the licensees from using older installations as an palliative interim solution, owing to their less stringent regulatory and technical authorisations.

1  2 Regulatory framework for the facilities

As time passes, so the fuel cycle installations change. The ASN ensures that the technical solutions adopted by industry have and continue to have no safety and radiation protection consequences for the workers, the population and the environment. However, and aside from technical considerations, the regulatory framework of the installations may turn out to be no longer appropriate to the activi- ties actually carried out in them.

For a number of years now, the ASN has therefore been implementing various procedures to offer a better legal framework for the workings of the main installations: revision of the authorisation decrees and discharge licences for the COGEMA La Hague site and revision of the discharge licences for the Tricastin site.

This should continue in the coming years, in particularly through drafting of an authorisation decree for the CERCA installation on the Romans site, which had previously simply been covered by the notification system (see point 231).

353 1  2  1 Scope of operation of the La Hague reprocessing plants

The revision of the La Hague site nuclear installations authorisation decrees, which was completed on 10 January 2003, is a technical decision designed to allow changes to the activities in the installa- tions in satisfactory conditions of safety and environmental protection, and in conformity with the regulations. The reference fuel elements for which reprocessing was envisaged at the time of publi- cation of the old decrees were relatively unrepresentative of the fuel elements actually loaded into the reactors. This difference will be accentuated in the future. This revision was therefore needed to manage current fuel throughput. The authorised modifications will combine improved nuclear safe- ty with greater environmental protection through the use of the best techniques available.

COGEMA La Hague – general view

Furthermore, the greater diversity in the nature and origin of the materials and substances to be pro- cessed, exploiting the potential of each of the UP2 800, UP3 and STE3 facilities for recycling, process- ing, packaging or storing radioactive substances (effluent, waste, scrap, etc.) and of the nuclear mate- rials (uranium, plutonium, new fuels) from other facilities, could prove to be of benefit during dismantling or when retrieving legacy waste from.

The decrees published on 11 January 2003 in the Official Gazette define a new operating framework for the facilities and article 5 requires that any extension of the current operating framework within this new framework, receive specific authorisation issued by interministerial order. The actual opera- tions to process the fuels, substances and materials authorised by interministerial orders must, as presently, be the subject of an operational agreement for each particular processing campaign out- side the previously authorised domain. This enables account to be taken of the time elapsed between the authorisation to extend the domain and the actual processing operation performance and checks to be made on the compatibility of the performance conditions envisaged by the licensee with installation safety and protection of persons and the environment. The interministerial orders specify that the operational agreement will be issued by the Director General for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection.

In 2003, environmental defence associations took legal action to obtain cancellation of the decrees authorising the requested modifications and the water intake and effluent discharge licences for the La Hague installations. So far, only one of the cases has been judged and the Conseil d’Etat (supreme administrative court) rejected the request for revocation of the 10 January 2003 decree authorising COGEMA to modify STE3.

354 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

In 2001, environmental defence associations also took action to obtain recognition of the illegality of operations to import, dispose of and reprocess spent nuclear fuel from the Australian ANSTO nucle- ar research reactor. Claiming that reprocessing took too long, the plaintiffs asked that the assemblies be returned to the country of origin, on the grounds that they should be regarded as waste. In a decision of 12 April 2005, the Caen court of appeal partially overturned a judgement of the Cherbourg court dated 3 February 2003 and considered that the nuclear fuel in question did consti- tute radioactive waste under the terms of the Environment Code, and ordered COGEMA La Hague to produce and to communicate to the plaintiff organisations the operational authorisation for repro- cessing the stock of fuel, failing which COGEMA should terminate the presence of all of these mate- rials on French soil. Reprocessing of the assemblies concerned began on 9 June 2005. The above-men- tioned order by the Caen court of appeal was confirmed by the Cour de Cassation (supreme court of appeal) on 7 December 2005.

1  2  2 Discharge licence revision

The ASN initiated revision of certain water intake and effluent discharge licences, with a view to correcting three types of unsatisfactory situation:

– old plants, where the licence application for regularisation purposes has not been entirely reviewed by the authorities and where discharge levels are controlled in the context of a contractual system;

– installations where effluents are discharged via purification plants belonging to other nuclear licensees. Such installations do not have their own specific discharge licences;

– installations where the discharge licences are to a varying extent disproportionate with respect to technical possibilities and actual discharge rates involved or are incompatible with foreseeable plant modifications.

The orders of 12 August 2005, concerning discharges from the Comurhex, Eurodif and Socatri instal- lations, are the end-result of a process that was started in 1997. The dossiers presented by the licensees were the subject of a public inquiry, which began on 15 February and ended on 23 March 2001. The procedure and in particular the public inquiry showed no reason to oppose the various applications.

At the beginning of 2003, the operators of the COGEMA Pierrelatte and Comurhex facilities realised that handling of certain products could lead to release of tritium, or even carbon 14, which was not provided for in the above-mentioned applications. These operators submitted a new discharge licence application, which will be the subject of a public inquiry in 2006.

Tricastin site – general view

355 1  3 Incident management and operating feedback

The detection and processing of significant events that have occurred in operation of the installations play a fundamental safety role. The lessons learned from correcting these unusual occurrences lead to new requirements applicable to safety-related items and to new operating rules. Licensees must there- fore set up reliable systems for the detection, correction and integration all safety-related events.

The following graph presents the trend in the number of significant events reported by fuel cycle installations.

ASN monitoring of these events and how they are managed by the licensees in particular enables it to identify: – events recurring on the same installation; – events requiring operating feedback to other installations to confirm or invalidate their generic nature, in other words affecting or likely to affect several installations belonging to one or more licensees.

With respect to experience feedback, the ASN sent out a letter on 22 August 2005 to inform all licensees of an event which occurred during filling of the “Padirac” waste transport casks, which, if incorrectly supervised, could lead to damage of the inner container at closure. This letter also asked for notification of the steps taken to remedy this type of problem in the BNIs that use these casks.

In 2005, the 26 July 2004 contamination event in MELOX (see point 232) was also re-rated at level 2 on the INES scale.

1  4 Licensee responsibility

Nuclear installation safety is primarily based on the supervision carried out by the licensee itself. In this respect, for each installation, the ASN checks that the organisation and resources deployed by the licensee enable it to assume this responsibility.

356 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

The restructuring of the AREVA group led to increased vigilance in this area, in particular with respect to the small installations. It is important that the fact of centralising resources, particularly financial resources, enables each nuclear licensee to can continue to assume its responsibility as licensee.

In addition, to increase licensee accountability and to rationalise its supervisory actions, the ASN asked COGEMA to propose an internal authorisation system allowing changes to the installation or the safety reference system which do not compromise the overall safety demonstration. Only opera- tions which do not fall outside the scope of the authorisation decree or the technical specifications of the installation could be dealt with using this process. Significant modifications will still be submitted to the ASN for approval. 2005 was an opportunity to implement this process on the La Hague units in the final shutdown phase.

2MAIN INSTALLATIONS

2  1 Uranium conversion and processing plants

To allow production of fuels usable in the French reactors, the uranium ore first has to be converted

into UF6 and then enriched.

2  1  1 Comurhex uranium hexafluoride preparation plant

The ICPE (installation classified according to the environmental protection regulation rather than the nuclear installation regulation) part of the Comurhex plant in Pierrelatte is designed to manufacture uranium hexafluoride. This manufacturing uses natural uranium in the ICPE part of the installation and reprocessed uranium in the BNI part. This latter mainly consists of two facilities:

– the 2000 facility, which converts uranyl nitrate from the reprocessing plants into UF4 or into U3O8;

– the 2450 facility, which converts the UF4 (whose uranium 235 content is between 1 and 2.5 %) from

the 2000 facility into UF6. This UF6 will be used to enrich the reprocessed uranium for recycling in the reactor.

Comurhex – general view

357 Structure 2450 was shut down by the licensee in 2002.

Since then, 235U levels have been limited to strictly lower than 1 % for all activities in the COMURHEX BNI, which could enable the licensee to benefit from downgrading to an ICPE rather than a basic nuclear installation.

In a letter dated 8 December 2004, the licensee also confirmed its intention to close the 2000 struc- ture and move to final shutdown of the entire BNI no later than 31 December 2008.

2  1  2 COGEMA TU5 facility and W plant

COGEMA operates on the Pierrelatte site BNI 155,which comprises: – the W plant (ICPE within the BNI boundary) for conversion of depleted uranium hexafluoride

(UF6) into uranium oxide (U3O8), which is a solid component offering safer storage conditions;

– the TU5 facility for conversion of uranyl nitrate (UO2 (NO3)2), produced by reprocessing spent fuel,

into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) or into uranium oxide (U3O8). However, the current technical con-

figuration of the installation is not compatible with the production of UF4.

The installation can handle up to 2000 metric tons of uranium per year.

The uranium from reprocessing is partly placed in interim storage on the COGEMA Pierrelatte site and partly sent abroad for enrichment.

TU5 – general view

Planned developments

The P0 interim storage project is being studied by COGEMA and could give rise to a licence applica- tion in the near future. The P0 would be intended for the interim storage of civil materials currently stored in classified BNI facilities also operated by COGEMA on the site, together with the uranium produced by reprocessing in the TU5 facility.

358 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

2  2 Uranium enrichment plants

2  2  1 The uranium isotopes gaseous diffusion separation plant (Eurodif)

The isotope separation process used in the plant is based on gaseous diffusion. The plant comprises 1,400 cascaded enrichment modules, split into 70 sets of 20 modules grouped in leak-tight rooms.

The gaseous enrichment principle consists in repeatedly diffusing UF6 gases through porous walls called “barriers”. These barriers give preferential passage to the uranium isotope 235 contained in the

gas, thereby increasing the proportion of this fissile isotope in the UF6 at each passage.

Each enrichment module has a compressor for raising the UF6 gas to the required pressure, an exchanger removing the heat produced by compression and the actual diffuser containing the barriers.

The U235 enriched diffused gas flow is routed to the next higher module. The depleted, non-diffused flow is routed to the lower module. These modules or stages, grouped in four gaseous diffusion plants, constitute the enrichment cascade.

The UF6 is introduced in the middle of the cascade, with the enriched product drawn off at one end and the depleted residue at the other.

Safety review of the plant after twenty years of operation

Following the safety review conducted in 2000, the licensee in 2002 forwarded the dossiers concern- ing the seismic resistance of the plants. Additional investigations were necessary to determine the seismic behaviour of the U annex building, where the enrichment cascade feed and draw-off opera- tions are carried out, taking account of the seismic movement determined according to the new RFS 2001-01. The investigations show that the seismic resistance of the U annex building needs to be improved and the licensee proposed measures designed on the one hand to reinforce the civil engi- neering structures and on the other to limit the quantities of radioactive materials present in these buildings. The licensee intends to limit the quantities of liquids present and to apply for the corre- sponding authorisation in 2006.

2  2  2 The GBII ultracentrifugation enrichment plant project

The ultracentrifugation process should eventually replace gaseous diffusion. COGEMA has transmit- ted the safety options dossier for the future ultracentrifugation enrichment units. This dossier was analysed by the ASN and its technical support organisation. The licensee also forwarded the prelimi- nary safety analysis report for the installation which, from 2007, is scheduled to gradually replace the Eurodif plant. Commissioning of the three planned production units will take place from 2007 to 2016.

This planned new plant was the subject of a public debate which ended on 20 October 2004 and led to no opposition to the project. This installation will be covered by a public inquiry in 2005 as part of the authorisation application process.

359 Review of this project involved the nuclear safety authority visiting nuclear facilities throughout Europe that use the same technology and initiating exchanges with its foreign counterparts concern- ing the corresponding safety considerations.

The Almelo ultracentrifuge plant The GBII project

2  3 Nuclear fuel fabrication plants

After the uranium enrichment process, the nuclear fuel is made in different installations, depending on its

final destination. The UF6 is converted into uranium oxide powder so that after processing it can be made up into fuel rods, themselves subsequently assembled to form fuel assemblies.

Depending on whether the fuel is intended for PWRs, fast reactors or experimental reactors, and depend- ing on the fissile material it contains, it is manufactured in one of the following establishments: FBFC at Romans-sur-Isère or MELOX at Marcoule, this latter plant being designed to produce fuel containing plu- tonium.

2  3  1 Nuclear site at Romans-sur-Isère

The two basic nuclear installations, BNI 63 and BNI 98, installed on this site, on which they share a certain number of common resources, belong respectively to the CERCA and FBFC companies, which form part of the Framatome-ANP group fuel division. Under the terms of decree 63-1228 of 11 December 1963, as amended, concerning nuclear installations, the FBFC company is the site’s sole nuclear licensee.

BNI 63 comprises a series of facilities for the manufacture of highly enriched uranium fuel for exper- imental reactors. BNI 98 production, consisting of uranium oxide powder or fuel assemblies, is intended solely for light water reactors.

Fuel element fabrication plant (BNI 98)

In 2002, the licensee submitted an application to increase production capacity, leading to modifica- tion of the prior authorisations dating from 1978. The modifying decree will be sent for signature in early 2006 and is the end-result of the procedure implemented under the above-mentioned decree of 11 December 1963, in particular including a public inquiry, which began on 2 June and ended on 11 July 2003.

360 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

FBFC – pellet incorporation into fuel rods

At the same time and in order to meet the objectives of the safety review carried out in 2003, the licensee proposed renewing and modernising its industrial tool. After review by the Advisory Committee, this project was accepted by the ASN. The resulting site modernisation process should run until 2008.

CERCA company plant (BNI 63)

The CERCA company plant, one of the oldest French nuclear sites, predates publication of the above-mentioned 1963 decree on nuclear installations. This installation was simply declared for regu- larisation after publication of this decree.

The ASN wishes to see the requirements applicable to operation of this plant covered by a decree, as is the case with the FBFC company’s fuel fabrication plant. The procedure could be started when the application is submitted for modification of the installations and could be based on the safety review for this plant currently in progress.

In March 2005, the licensee also submitted an application for commissioning of an HTR (High Temperature Reactor) pilot fuel unit. This activity is part of the generation IV reactor R&D pro- gramme in which the Framatome-ANP company is a participant.

2  3  2 MELOX plant at Marcoule

With the cessation of industrial production in the Cadarache facility (ATPu), MELOX is now the only French nuclear installation producing MOX fuel, consisting of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides.

After releasing a decree authorising the plant annual production capacity to be raised from 101 tons of heavy metal (or 115 tons of oxide) to 145 tons of heavy metal, to absorb the ATPu’s order book, the licensee in August 2004 presented a further application to increase the production capacity to 195 tons. This application from the licensee will undergo a public inquiry in spring 2006.

Using the rods manufactured in the Cadarache ATPu facility, the MELOX plant also fabricated the four assemblies for the EUROFAB project. As the plutonium isotopes used in this context do not comply with the requirements of the plant’s authorisation decree, this campaign was authorised by a decree of 4 October 2004. The campaign ended with the March 2005 shipment of four assemblies and the manufacturing scrap.

361 MELOX – preparation for package loading

Radiation protection

Since 2000, the external collective and individual doses received by the workers have been rising. This is due both to the change in the actual radiological content of the materials used (plutonium resulting from reprocessing of higher burnup fraction fuels) and the rise in the plutonium oxide content of the MOX fuel.

In the context of the above-mentioned capacity increase, the ASN is particularly attentive to ensur- ing that the licensee continues with and reinforces actions to optimise radiation protection to keep the rise in doses received under control.

In 2005, the 26 July 2004 event was re-rated at level 2. This was the first such occasion in the fuel cycle installations since 1999. This event is described in detail below.

Level 2 event ont the MELOX site

On 26 July 2004, a technician was contaminated by radioactive substances during an operation carried out using a glovebox. While he was trying to free a mechanical device, it suddenly fell onto his hand. The resulting wound was decontaminated and required minor surgery. The X-rays taken revealed no fracture.

This event was provisionally rated at level 0 on the INES scale on 27 July 2004.

Subsequent to this event, the measurements taken and the 50-year committed dose rate assess- ment showed that the annual dose limit on the technician’s hand had been exceeded.

These findings led the ASN to re-rate this event at level 2 on the INES scale.

This event had no consequences either on or outside the site and the surface and atmospheric contamination checks carried out on the installation proved to be negative.

362 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

2  4 Reprocessing plants (COGEMA establishment at La Hague)

2  4  1 Presentation of the establishment

The La Hague plant, designed for reprocessing of fuel irradiated in the power reactors (GCR then PWR) is operated by COGEMA, which replaced the CEA as nuclear licensee under the terms of a decree of 9 August 1978. The plant is located on the north-western tip of the Cotentin peninsular, 6 km from cape La Hague and 20 km west of the town of Cherbourg. It covers a surface area of 220 hectares, on a plateau culminating at 180 m above sea level. It comprises an additional 80 hectares in Moulinets valley, down to the seashore. The COGEMA site adjoins the ANDRA site (Manche repos- itory) to the east. The BNIs were installed on land made up of sedimentary rock (sandstone and shale) situated on a deep base of granite.

In 1959, the CEA decided to build reprocessing plant UP2 400, designed to reprocess spent fuel from gas cooled reactors. It became operational in January 1967 at the same time as the STE2, the role of which was to purify liquid effluent before discharge into the sea. In 1974, the CEA was authorised to modify the UP2 400 plant to allow reprocessing of PWR spent fuel. Finally, in 1981, COGEMA was authorised to build the UP2 800 plant (primarily for reprocessing French fuel), the UP3 plant (for reprocessing foreign fuel) and a new liquid effluent treatment plant, STE3.

The various facilities in the UP3, UP2 800 and STE3 were commissioned from 1986 (reception and interim storage of spent fuel) to 1994 (vitrification facility), with most of the process facilities becom- ing active in 1989/1990.

Under the terms of the decrees of 10 January 2003, the individual capacity of each of the two plants is 1,000 t per year of initial metal (U or Pu), with the total capacity of the two plants being limited to 1,700 t.

COGEMA La Hague – general view

363 The COGEMA La Hague site thus houses the following installations: – BNI 33 covering plant UP2 400, the first reprocessing unit, and AT1, a prototype installation current- ly being dismantled; – BNI 38 covering effluent treatment station n° 2 (STE 2); – BNI 47 covering the Élan II B facility, a CEA research facility currently being dismantled; – BNI 80 covering the HAO facility, the first PWR fuel reprocessing unit; – BNI 116 comprising the UP3 plant, initially intended for reprocessing foreign fuels; – BNI 117 comprising the UP2 800 plant, initially intended for reprocessing French fuels; – BNI 118 comprising effluent treatment station n° 3 (STE3).

Spent fuel reprocessing in the UP2-400 plant has now stopped. The production facilities in the UP2 400 plant have all been shut down.

2  4  2 Operations carried out in the plant

The main processing chain of these facilities comprises reception and interim storage installations for spent fuel, plus facilities for shearing and dissolving it, chemical separation of fission products, final purifi- cation of the uranium and plutonium and waste treatment.

First operations at the plant consist in delivery of transport packages and interim storage of spent fuel. Upon arrival at the reprocessing plant, the packages are unloaded, either underwater, in a pit, or dry, in a leak-tight shielded cell. The fuel is then stored in pools.

After shearing of the rods, the spent fuel is separated from its metal cladding by dissolving in nitric acid. The pieces of cladding, which are insoluble in nitric acid, are removed from the dissolver, rinsed in acid and then water and trans- ferred to a packaging unit. The solutions taken from the dis- solver are then clarified by centrifugation.

The separation phase consists of initial separation of the fis- sion products and the transuranic elements from the urani- um and plutonium contained in the solutions, and then of La Hague – fuel assembly being lowered the uranium from the plutonium. into the cooling pit, TO dry unloading shop cell After purification, the ura- nium, in the form of uranyl nitrate, is concentrated and stored. This uranyl nitrate is intended for conversion into a solid compound

(U308) in the Pierrelatte TU5 installation.

After purification and concentration, the plutonium is precipitated by oxalic acid, dried, calcinated into plutonium oxide, packaged in sealed boxes and placed in interim storage. The plutonium can be used in the fabrication of MOX fuel. The plutonium from foreign fuel is returned to the licensees in the country of origin.

The production operations, form shearing up to the finished prod- ucts, utilise chemical processes and generate gaseous and liquid effluents. This operations also generate what is called “structural” waste.

La Hague – T1 shearing The gaseous effluent is given off mainly during cladding shearing and dissolution shop and during the boiling dissolving operation. These discharges are supply cell

364 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

processed by washing in a gas treatment unit. Certain residual radioactive gases, in particular kryp- ton, are checked before being discharged into the atmosphere. The liquid effluents are processed and generally recycled. Certain radionuclides, such as iodine and less active products are, after checking, sent to the marine discharge pipe. The others are sent to facilities for encapsulation (glass or bitu- men).

Solid waste is packaged on the site. Two methods are used: compacting and encapsulation in cement.

In accordance with article L. 542-2 of the Environment Code concerning radioactive waste manage- ment, radioactive waste from irradiated fuels of foreign origin must be shipped back to its owners. Radioactive waste from irradiated fuels of French reactors is sent to the Soulaines (Aube) repository or stored pending a final disposal solution.

The main authorisations issued

The ASN has issued COGEMA La Hague with various authorisations, some of which are recalled below.

The La Hague plant facilities • UP2 400 plant HAO/North: underwater unloading and spent fuel interim storage; HAO/South: shearing and dissolving of spent fuel elements; HA/DE : separation of uranium and plutonium from fission products; HAPF/SPF (1 to 3): fission product concentration and interim storage; MAU: uranium and plutonium separation, uranium purification and storage in the form of uranyl nitrate; MAPu: purification, conversion to oxide and initial packaging of plutonium oxide; LCC: product central quality control laboratory.

• STE2 Installation : collection, treatment of effluent and interim storage of precipitation sludges.

• UP2 800 plant NPH: underwater unloading and interim storage of spent fuel elements in pit; C pit: pit for interim storage of spent fuel elements; R1: shearing of fuel elements, dissolving and clarification of solutions obtained; R2: separation of uranium, plutonium and fission products (FP), and concentration of FP solutions; R4 : purification, conversion to oxide and first packaging of plutonium oxide; SPF (4, 5, 6): interim storage of fission products; BST1: facility for secondary packaging and interim storage of plutonium oxide; R7: fission products vitrification facility. • UP3 plant T0 facility: dry unloading of spent fuel elements; D and E pits: interim storage pits for spent fuel elements; T1: shearing of fuel elements, dissolving and clarification of solutions obtained; T2: separation of uranium, plutonium and fission products, and concentration/interim storage of FP solutions; T3/T5: purification and interim storage of uranyl nitrate; T4: purification, conversion to oxide and packaging of plutonium; T7: vitrification of fission products; BSI: plutonium oxide interim storage; BC: plant control room, reagent distribution facility and process control laboratories; ACC: hull and end piece compacting facilities.

• STE3 facility: effluent recovery and treatment and interim storage of bituminised packages.

365 • UP3 and UP2 80 plants By delegation of the Ministers for Industry and for the Environment, the Director General of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection signed the following interministerial orders: – of 8 February 2005 authorising COGEMA La Hague to receive, unload, store and reprocess fuels assem- blies based on enriched reprocessed uranium, called “URE”, in the UP2-800 and UP3 plants; – of 29 March 2005 authorising COGEMA La Hague to receive and store fuel assemblies for test and research reactors in the UP2-800 plant; – of 29 March 2005 authorising COGEMA La Hague to receive and process fuel assemblies for test and research reactors in the UP3-A plant; – of 29 March 2005 authorising COGEMA La Hague to receive, store and reprocess nuclear materials and radioactive substances in the UP2-800 and UP3 plants; – of 8 July 2005 authorising COGEMA La Hague to receive, store and reprocess unused MOX fuel assemblies from fuel fabrication plants, in the UP2- 800 plant; – of 8 July 2005 authorising COGEMA La Hague to La Hague – loading of TN 28 packaging package and store unused MOX fuel assemblies from fuel fabrication plants, in the UP3-A plant.

The Director General of the ASN also issued the following operational approvals: – of 30 May 2005, for reprocessing of “aluminide” RTR fuel assemblies based on a mixture of uranium and aluminium (UAlx), in the UP3-A facility; – of 27 June 2005, for performance in STE3 of a series of bituminisation tests on sludges taken from silo 550-14 (production of about fifty bituminised drums); – of 31 August 2005, for receipt and unloading, in the NPH facility, of TN 9/4 type packagings designed for dry transport of spent fuel assemblies from boiling water reactors; – of 29 July 2005, for startup of a new process for preparation of basic effluent concentrates in order to facilitate vitrification.

2  4  3 Site discharges and environment monitoring

Discharges from La Hague, notably liquid discharges, have on the whole, been decreasing over the last ten years, whereas production has increased. This decrease was obtained thanks to technical enhancements within the plants.

The effluents discharged in this case differ from those from a nuclear reactor and the quantities are larger, as it must be remembered that: – the La Hague plant reprocesses fuel from about a hundred nuclear reactors; – this reprocessing involves spent fuel shearing, followed by nitric acid immersion, whereas maxi- mum fuel containment is assured in a reactor. The processing of the radioactive materials contained in these fuels consequently produces different effluents.

The 10 January 2003 order authorising COGEMA to continue with water intake and liquid and gaseous effluent discharges for operation of the La Hague nuclear site, includes discussion meeting clauses for

366 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

reduction of the impact of chemical and radioactive substances, thereby complying with the objectives of the Sintra declaration, issued in 1998, within the framework of the OSPAR convention.

It should be noted that the new limits defined in the order of 10 January 2003 already lead to a sig- nificant reduction in the impact on the most exposed population groups: the maximum dose calcu- lated for these groups is reduced to 0.02 mSv per year. However, the licensee will be required to sub- mit a dossier at the beginning of 2006 to justify the means to be employed to further reduce discharges and optimise the impact of its activities. The discharge limits and conditions will then be revised within a period of one year.

In addition, the COGEMA La Hague complex publishes a quarterly record of results of measure- ments carried out in the context of environmental surveillance. This document is sent to the French and British authorities and to the special standing information committee for the COGEMA La Hague complex.

The quantity of fuel reprocessed has risen from about 400 t in 1987 to about 1112 t in 2005, with a maximum of about 1670 t in 1996 and 1997.

La Hague – environmental monitoring: sampling of algae and grasses

367 The 2005 discharges and a reminder of those in 1999 are presented below

Gaseous discharges Limits in Limits in Forecast for 19991 discharges 20052 discharges (TBq per year) order of 1984 order of 2003 20063

Tritium 2,200 150 80 72.1 84.3

0.11 0.008 Iodines 0.02 0.0066 0.0059 (halogens) (halogens)

Rare gases including 480,000 470,000 295,000 301,000 279,513 krypton 85 (gases other Carbone 14 than tritium) 28 18,8 17 18

Others 0.074 0.000 12 0.0014 0.00012 0.000 2 β and γ emitters (α and β (α and β emitter emitter α emitters aerosols) 0.000 01 aerosols) 0.000 0019 0.000 0018

1 For 1,562 tons of fuel reprocessed 2 For 1,115 tons of fuel reprocessed 3 For 10,300 tons of fuel reprocessed 4 This limit is applicable from 12 January 2005, until which time the annual limit remains set at 0.074 TBq

Liquid discharges Limits in Limits in Forecast for 1999 discharges 2005 discharges (TBq per year) order of 1984 order of 2003 2006

Tritium 37,000 18,500 12,900 13,500 14,344

Iodines / 2.6 1.83 1.42 1.607

Carbon 14 / 421 9.93 8.27 9.50

Strontium 90 122 0.5 0.4 220 2.16 Caesium 137 83 0.71 0.85

Ruthenium 106 / 15 7 5.84 5.5

Cobalt 60 / 1.54 0.32 0.23 0.4

Caesium 134 / 2 0.058 0.06 0.06

Others β and γ 1,700 605 29.6 6.6 10.5 emitters

α emitter 1.7 0.176 0.040 0.022 0.026

1 This limit value takes account of total carbon 14 discharges in the liquid effluent, assuming elimination of all gaseous discharges. 2 The limit is 2 for normal discharges and 10 for discharges linked to shutdown and dismantling (MAD) and recovery of legacy waste (RCD). 3 The limit is 2 for normal discharges and 6 for MAD and RCD discharges. 4 The limit is 1 for normal discharges and 0.5 for MAD and RCD discharges. 5 The limit is 30 for normal discharges and 30 for MAD and RCD discharges. 6 The limit is 0.1 for normal discharges and 0.07 for MAD and RCD discharges.

The following table evaluates the impact of the annual discharges, in terms of effective dose, on the “reference groups”, in other words the groups of persons among the population for whom exposure from a given source is relatively uniform and who are representative of the persons who receive the highest doses from this source.

Evaluation of annual impact of releases on the reference groups

Limits in Limits in Actual 1999 Actual 2005 Forecast for order of 1984 order of 2003 discharges discharges 2006

0.120 mSv 0.020 mSv 0.011 mSv 0.010 mSv 0.010 mSv

368 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

Finally in 2005, an inspection was conducted from 10 to 14 October, to check the conformity of the environmental monitoring carried out around the La Hague site with article 35 of the EURATOM treaty. On this occasion, the quality and the stringency of the supervision by the licensee and the Authorities was highlighted by the European Commission..

3END OF LIFE INSTALLATIONS

3  1 Plutonium technology facility (ATPu) and chemical purification laboratory (LPC) at Cadarache

Owing to the fact that the resistance of these facilities to the seismic risk specific to the Cadarache site cannot be demonstrated and their incompatibility with current seismic design rules, COGEMA halted industrial activities in the ATPu in mid-July 2003. The effectiveness of this shutdown was con- firmed by the ASN’s inspectors during the course of an unannounced inspection on 1 August 2003.

This shutdown commits the ATPu and the LPC to a common decommissioning and dismantling pro- cess to be covered by a decree. In 2006, for each of these two installations, the licensee will therefore be required to submit the dossier specified in article 6 ter of the above-mentioned decree of 11 December 1963 and the impact assessment required by the Environment Code.

Since industrial production ceased in the installation, the licensee has been making the necessary modifications to be able to start packaging the scrap from previous fabrication work as well as other discarded materials containing plutonium and present in other installations on the Cadarache site, for shipment to COGEMA La Hague. These operations should last until the end of 2006.

In July 2004, the ATPu was also authorised to produce rods for four test assemblies based on American military plutonium, as part of the EUROFAB project. The purpose of this project was to demonstrate the feasibility of eliminating surplus American military plutonium stocks in the form of MOX fuel. In March 2005, all the assemblies produced, and the waste arising from their fabrication, were returned to the United State. The relatively small operation, which has a limited safety impact, does not call into question the cessation of industrial production in the ATPu.

Radiation protection

The operations to package old materials containing plutonium, owing to the rise in their americium level, mean that the licensee is required to reinforce its radiation protection measures.

3  2 Former COGEMA La Hague installations

3  2  1 Retrieval of legacy waste

Unlike the new UP2 800 and UP3 plants, most of the waste produced during operation of the first plant, UP2 400, was placed in interim storage without packaging for disposal. The operations involved

369 in recovering this waste are technically difficult and require the use of considerable resources. The problems linked to the age of the waste, in particular its characterisation prior to any recovery and reprocessing, confirms the ASN’s approach to the licensees which is to require that for all projects, they assess the corresponding production of waste and plan for processing and packaging as and when the waste is produced.

Further to review of the former waste recovery programme by the Advisory Committees for laborato- ries and plants and for waste at the end of 1998, the ASN asked COGEMA in 1999, to undertake retrieval of the sludge in the STE2 silos, the waste in the HAO silo, and the waste in the 130 building silo.

The ASN notably asked COGEMA to present as soon as possible firm commitments regarding the start- up date for these operations, to submit estimated schedules for the operations with the associated R&D actions and to present an annual report indicating progress made on the work in question. In November 2005, the Advisory Committees for waste and for plants reviewed the La Hague establish- ments waste management policy, and in particular the solutions envisaged by the licensee for recovery and packaging of the legacy waste stored on the site.

STE2 sludge

In recent years, processing of STE2 sludge has been the subject of research and development work, in particular with a view to determining the methods for retrieval and transfer required prior to any packaging.

• Sludge recovery from silos

The recovery and transfer trials carried out in recent years, between one of the silos of the STE 2 facili- ty and the STE 3 facility, demonstrated the efficiency of the equipment developed by the licensee. Improvements were however made in order to optimise the excavation operations. At the end of 2005, a similar device was installed and started up on another silo, for joint recovery of sludge from both of them.

• Sludge packaging

The packaging system today adopted by COGEMA consists in bituminisation using a process employed in the STE3 facility. In 2002, COGEMA was authorised to carry out sampling in one of the silos with a view to conducting bituminisation tests on about twenty drums in the STE3 facility in order to validate the adequacy of this process. The result of the analysis conducted in 2003 by the ASN and its technical support organisation showed that major developments were still needed before indus- trial retrieval of the sludge could take place.

In 2004, the licensee therefore forwarded additional justifications to enable packaging to start as of 2005. It also agreed to produce 3000 drums in the first three years of operation, while continuing to investi- gate alternative solutions. Before authorising industrial recovery of sludge from the silos, the ASN asked the licensee to validate the scenarios given in the safety analysis file transmitted in 2004, by car- rying out experimental trials. These trials are based on the production of about fifty instrumented drums. Experience feedback from these trials, consisting chiefly of temperature recordings, should shortly be transmitted to the ASN. If the scenarios of the 2004 dossier are validated by these experi- mental results, operational approval could be given for industrial scale recovery.

• Alternative processes

In August 2005, the licensee presented the ASN with its latest research into alternative processes. The areas studied were vitrification, ceramic encapsulation, cement encapsulation and the drying process (DRYPAC). The first two were ruled out owing to technical feasibility problems, while the last two require additional research into prior drying of the sludges.

370 C HAPTER 13 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS

La Hague – STE3: automatic transfer of bitumen containers

HAO silo

The nuclear installation safety is primarily based on the supervision carried out by the licensee itself. COGEMA is considering dealing with the hulls and end-pieces in this silo by compaction. The first step would consist in characterisation of these hulls and end-pieces prior to retrieval, sorting and transfer of the waste to packaging units.

The programme to characterise the fines and resins, which began in 2002, is still in progress. The report on washing and characterisation of hulls and end-pieces should be sent to the ASN soon.

Recovery requires prior dismantling of the equipment installed on the silo slab, construction of the recovery cell and qualification of the equipment to be used. Initial dismantling work should begin in 2006. In 2005, through inactive testing, the licensee also qualified the gripper and the “approach” rake.

Recovery work should be complete en 2018.

Silo 130

COGEMA is currently developing a mechanical waste retrieval system in this silo and is improving its knowledge of this waste.

This project is linked to the creation of a dedicated disposal facility and definition of an associated waste package. These recovery operations will not therefore be able to take place before 2010 and will involve a number of phases, with packaging of waste containing graphite and then the other waste. The retrieval systems will be likely to change during the course of the various phases, depending on the materials encountered and the retrieval conditions.

Old fission product solutions stored in the SPF2 unit in the UP2 400 plant

To package fission products from reprocessing of gas-cooled reactor fuel, in particular that containing molybdenum, COGEMA opted for vitrification with a specific glass formulation. Initial hot pot vitrifica- tion tests showed significant corrosion of the melting pot (lifetime of about 30 to 40 packages). Research therefore turned towards cold pot production of this glass. The particular advantage of this technique is that higher temperatures can be reached, enabling new glass formulations to be used. Sensitivity studies concerning the reference formulation are still continuing today. ASN representatives also visited the CEA’s “cold pot” R&D installations at Marcoule. Commissioning of the first cold pot on the La Hague site is scheduled for 2010, with packaging operations scheduled to start in 2011.

371 Other waste

In September 2002, COGEMA sent the ASN a safety case about the characterisation and stowage of the waste drums present in the ATTILA pit. In August 2003, COGEMA was authorised to carry out these operations, which were completed in 2005. The results will shortly be sent to the ASN. On the basis of the characterisation results, the licensee draws up the dossiers for a new installation for sorting waste drums. Once sorted, the waste can be sent to the appropriate disposal channels.

3  2  2 Final shutdown of BNIs 33, 38 and 80

Most of the old facilitites on the site will need to be decommissioned prior to dismantling. After equipment rinsing, the units on the main process lines in the UP2 400 facilities are no longer in oper- ation. The licensee has taken the necessary organisational steps for transition of these installations to the surveillance phase, pending the decommissioning procedures.

Within this framework, on 30 December 2003, the licensee notified its decision for 1 January 2004 cessation of processing of spent fuel in the UP2 400 facility. This notification was accompanied by a dossier presenting the operations planned for the final decommissioning phase (CDE) in the various facilities concerned in this plant.

The CDE phase enables the licensee to carry out certain operations to prepare the installation for the dismantling phase. These operations must be either covered by the operational reference system, or be authorised by the ASN. In the case of the HAO/Sud and MAPu facilities, the licensee submitted the safety analysis files for removal of certain equipment (in particular gloveboxes and shears) which is no longer needed. Some of these operations began in 2005 and will continue in 2006.

The ASN also urged COGEMA, on several occasions, to speed up submission of the decommissioning and dismantling (MAD/DEM) dossier for BNIs 33, 38, and 80. The licensee acted accordingly and set up the ORCADE project. The licensee’s current approach will involve the production of the MAD/DEM file in several stages.

4OUTLOOK

In 2005, the fuel cycle front-end installations experienced no significant safety problems.

The effluent discharge licences for the Tricastin site installations were published in the Official Gazette in September 2005, marking the end of a procedure initiated in 1997.

Finally, the periodic safety review of the Romans-sur-Isère nuclear site should be continuing with the safety review of the CERCA company facilitites (BNI 63), scheduled for 2006.

The ASN still has a positive opinion of the rigorous and responsible attitude of COGEMA’s operation of the La Hague installations. It continues to attach considerable importance to supervision of safety and radiation protection of this establishment by devoting nearly 10% of all its inspections to it. This is in particular justified by the nature and quantity of radioactive materials stored on the site. Finally, among the priority subjects, the ASN is keeping and will continue to keep a close watch on the recovery of legacy waste and the decommissioning and dismantling of a certain number of old facili- ties in the UP2 400 plant.

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