Regularizations in the European Union: the Contentious Policy Tool

I n s i g h t LEGALIZATION: GETTING IT RIGHT

DECEMBER 2011 SUMMARY Though contentious, regularization remains a frequently utilized policy tool to address the European Union’s rising number of unauthor- Regularizations in the ized immigrants. The methods — and aims — of offering regularization vary, as do the European Union: immigrant groups targeted. In simplest terms, regularization grants legal status to unauthor- The Contentious Policy Tool ized immigrants living and working illegally in a particular country. Proponents say that it re- duces crime by, in effect, regulating the “under- By Kate Brick, Migration Policy Institute ground” or informal labor market, and that it provides a humanitarian safety valve to people otherwise stuck in limbo. Since 1996, over 5 million people have been regularized through I. Introduction a variety of methods, from mechanisms built into policy frameworks, to “one-off” programs focused on a discrete group of people or time period, to the granting of legal status on an In recent decades, many Member States of1 the European individual, case-by-case basis. Union (EU) have looked to regularization measures as While regularization policies were initially a way of addressing the rising number of unauthorized implemented by northern European countries immigrants within their borders. Since their emergence (e.g., France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) in the 1970s in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and to regulate underground labor markets and the United Kingdom, regularizations have been used as grant unauthorized workers legal status, in the a corrective device — in the absence of comprehensive past two decades the trends have shifted. Now migration policies — to address the mismatch between northern European countries use regulariza- the number of immigrants legally2 permitted entry and tion almost exclusively for humanitarian pur- those who migrate regardless. EU Member States use poses, and southern European countries (Spain, regularization policies to manage the informal economy Greece, and Italy in particular) have large-scale and irregular employment and to achieve humanitarian regularization programs that focus on migrant goals by granting legal status to unauthorized immi- workers. Despite the policy tool’s frequent use, grants — asylum seekers in particular — as an alterna- regularization has been the subject of much tive to removal. debate, both in the court of public opinion and in the highest political bodies of the European How is regularization defined? To what ends is it used? Union (EU). In the past decade, the EU-level Who is eligible? These are as much political questions as dialogues have highlighted the view that regu- they are sociological and economic ones. The terms and larization negatively impacts neighbor states conditions of regularization seek to balance the need for and, on a large scale, is not politically digestible. unauthorized immigrants to be counted as legal and be That said, since an EU-wide policy on the use accounted for against public pressures — both across the of regularization promises to be unpopular, European Union and within its individual states3 — from countries are likely to continue implementing those who do not view “amnesties” favorably. Reflecting it on a case-by-case basis within the context this conflict, there is little coherent agreement within the of their own political, economic, and social European Union on the definition, conditions, and scope dynamics. of regularization. This inconsistency further reflects increasing controversy over the implications of regularization for workers in a specific sector), political and how it should be used. Proponents of objectives, target populations (tolerated regularization argue that it increases tax persons, migrant workers, children born revenues, grants crucial legal status and into irregularity, etc.), and programmatic rights to people who have been living and details (offeringregularization temporary versus per- working in a given country for years (and normalizationmanent residence, for example). What is are unlikely to leave), and regulates the un- consideredadjustment of status in Italy may be derground economy. As such, it aids public in Spain, and in Germany security objectives by preventing worker simply an . That said, exploitation and discouraging the unlawful all regularization systems have the same activities that often occur in an unregulated objective: to grant legal status to people labor market. Those opposed argue that who lack it. regularization encourages illegal immigration by implying that not only are there no A. Terms and Use consequences for breaking4 the law, but that it is, in effect, rewarded. regularization

Controversy aside, the use of regularization The term encompasses a measures has increased since they were variety of routes to temporary or perma- first introduced, particularly in southern nent legal status; potential beneficiaries Europe. The majority of programs (73 per- may include not only unauthorized percent) were implemented between 1998 and sons, but also people who are formally or 2008 in 18 EU states; since 1996 over5 5 informally “tolerated” by governments million people have been regularized. This that have granted them temporary or underscores the fact that the flow of irregu- transitional status. The process of adjust- lar migrants has steadily increased since ing status is labeled differently across EU such measures were first implemented, and states. While this Insight outlines several because of this, states continue to prioritize terms in use within the European Union, their own economic goals despite a com- it does not offer an exhaustive or official plex political reality in which discourse on taxonomy. Often third-country nationals the EU level opposes such methods. As this who are legally residing normalization,in a nation under a Insight will show, there is a marked dispar- temporary arrangement or tolerated status6 ity between the EU-level dialogue focused are regularized through by on curbing regularization and the actual which they are given superior legal status practice of EU Member States. through7 either a temporary or permanent permit. This differs from the traditional II. What is Regularization? understanding of regularization, in which legal status is given to an unauthorized mi8 - Terms and Approaches grantTolerated who status lacks official status altogether.

most often refers to people The goals and rationales underpinning whose removal order has been suspended, regularization programs vary significantly and is commonFormal practice toleration in Germany and across Europe. Different programs have Austria, as9 well as Poland, Slovakia, and different eligibility requirements (some are Romania. falls short 2 for entire immigrant groups, others only of full regularization, as no official resi- Insight

10 dence permit is granted. Those who are nomic rationale as well as a humanitarian formally tolerated include asylum seekers one, and others are purely labor focused. whose applications have been rejected but Labor-focused regularization programs whose lives would be at risk shouldDuldung they aim to retain workers who are considered be returned to their country of origin. In economically beneficial or who workMartelli in Germany, tolerated status, or , Lawoccupations13 perceived to experience labor does not provide for residence rights, al- shortages. Italy’s passage of the lows for only limited welfare benefits, and in 1990 reflected dual economic and prohibits regular employment11 and free humanitarian purposes. Its goal was to movement within the country. However, value family unification, guarantee Geneva toleration led to normalization in Ger- Convention protection of those from many and Austria in the 1990s through persecuted regions, and14 allow migrants to a two-stage process in which tolerated fulfill labor shortages. persons were first offered short-term residence permits (Austria) or suspension One-off programs can vary in their dis- of their expulsion orders (Germany), and tribution. Some are for entire classes of then later 12permanent legal status (see Ap- people. For example, in France in 1997 pendix 1). and 1998, immigrants who had been in B. Approaches: Programs versus the country for seven years or longer, or Mechanisms who had significant family ties in France, were granted legal status in order to facili- tate their economic and social integration. Other programs target specific sectors of Oneprograms distinction mechanisms useful in categorizing the labor force (such as Italy’s 2009 law regularization measures is that between that regularized people who15 worked as and . Generally, home nurses or caregivers), and still programs (also known as “one-offs”) others are applied on an individual or refer to one-time measures that respond case-by-case basis. Most programs have to particular circumstances (such as a been created through legislation, the sudden increase in asylum applications) main exceptions being France and a 2006 or restrictive policy changes that have cre- German program, adopted as a “common16 ated a large group of immigrants without position” by the Council of Ministers. Be- status. Mechanisms, by contrast, are often tween 1973 and 2008, 68 programs were part of a broader migration policy frame- implemented in Europe; a few targeted work, and can be either permanent or multiple groups of people, and over half 1. open-ended. Programs were based on labor regulation. Of those people granted regularization during this Programs period, 87 percent17 were unauthorized 2. labor migrants. Mechanisms often target specific catego- ries of people (rejected asylum seekers, Mechanisms families in irregular situations, and other cases of humanitarian concern), exist for a became prominent in the limited time, and are not part of a regular 1990s in response to the “asylum crisis” policy framework. Some programs have that followed the dissolution of Yugosla- a humanitarian focus, some have an eco- via. Typically, they are implemented on 3 Figure 1. Number of People Regularized through Programs, EU-27, 1996-2007

Denmark, Hungary, 14,519 Luxembourg, Poland

Ireland 16,693

Sweden 17,000 Total: 3,244,382 Netherlands 29,177

Belgium 46,855

UK 40,000 67,871 Germany Countries 83,411 France 254,699 Portugal 424,800 Greece 1,032,357 Spain 1 ,217,000 Italy

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000

Granted Regularization

Note: Data missing for Greece (1997, 2001) and Lithuania. Source: Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler, Regularisations in Europe: Study on Practices in the Area of Regularisation of Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the EU, 31.

a smaller scale and involve “earned” le- tained an ongoing system of regulariza- galization based on long-term residence tion that grants long-term residence to or humanitarian considerations, such migrants who have been in the country as in the case of asylum seekers whose continuously for 14 years, and to families applications have been rejected but who with small children who have been in cannot be deported without risk to life the country for seven consecutive years. and limb, immigrants with health issues,18 Long-term residence grants migrants the and people with binding family ties. As same social 20and economic rights as Brit- seen in Figure 2, France and Germany ish citizens. have utilized this method in the greatest numbers, but it should be noted that 21 The criteria of both regularization of the 27 EU countries have used mecha19 - mechanisms and programs are simi- nisms, albeit often on a small scale. The lar, and often include requirements for 4 United Kingdom, for example, has main- the length and continuity of residence; Insight

Figure 2. Number of People Regularized through Mechanisms, EU-27, 1996-2007

Others 3,280

Austria 4,226 Total: 287,767

Poland 6,088

Greece 7,092

Countries Hungary 7,524

Belgium 39,644

France 101,479

Germany 118,434

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000

Granted Regularization

Note: This chart is based on information provided by 16 Member States on 28 mechanisms. These numbers should be taken as estimates, as the accuracy of government-provided data can be question- able. Source: Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, Regularisations in Europe, 35.

current employment or proof of future tract for future employment. For some employment; and issues of humanitar- regularization programs in Spain and22 ian concern, such as the undue length of Italy (in Italy in 2002, for example), asylum procedures, inability to return to employers had to apply for regular- the country of origin, or health and fam- ization on behalf of the unauthorized ily reasons. Some regularization systems immigrant. Meanwhile, the length of take into account the immigrant’s inte- residency requirement varies. Often, gration into the receiving society as well programs focused on regularizing labor as nationality and academic21 or profes- migrants require only that a person have sional qualifications. been in the country prior to23 the enact- ment of the regularization. Humanitar- The criterion most frequently empha- ian programs, by contrast,Chevenement are character - sized in cases of economically focused izedLaws by longer residency requirements. regularization is proof of employment, For example, France’s either through employer sponsorship, stated that, to be considered for documentation of continuous employ- regularization, unauthorized immigrants ment over a designated period, or a con- must have lived continuously in France 5 27 for seven years. Subsequent French sustained public pressure. These pro- regularization mechanisms, focused on grams ranged from the very small and families and children, required fewer targeted — such as the United King- years of residency but included age 24 dom’s Domestic Worker Regularisation and school enrollment stipulations. Programme, which ran for ten years and Similarly, in the Netherlands in 2007, regularized fewer than 200 people — only those asylum seekers who had re- to France’s 1998 Chevenement Laws, sided in that nation continuously since which regularized 87,000 people mostly 2001were25 eligible to receive a “general for purposes of family reunification (see pardon.” Appendix A).

III. Regularization Trends Today, most northern European countries do not politically endorse the idea in the European Union of regularization as a sound migration policy tool to address unauthorized labor migrants. Countries such as Over the past few decades, there has France, Ireland, Poland, Denmark, the been a regional shift in the purposes of Netherlands, Austria, and Germany have regularization programs, and in the na- vocally opposed regularization, particu- tions implementing them. What started larly large-scale one-offs, despite having decades ago as a policy tool used to used them in the past. France legalized accommodate and account for needed over 100,000 people between 2000 and labor in northern Europe has become 2006 through mechanisms, but since politically unviable in that region. Now 2007 has only maintained mechanisms the majority of economically focused for migrants in specific professions. regularization programs are to be found Similarly, the Netherlands abolished the in southern Europe, where the num- permanent regularization of unauthor- ber of unauthorized immigrants (most ized resident workers in 2003, after28 of them there to work) has increased26 implementing it for over ten years. exponentially in recent years. Most Although the United Kingdom contin- northern European countries ceased to ues to regularize migrants on an ad hoc use large-scale regularization measures basis through its long-residence conces- to regulate labor after the 1990s, when sion mechanism, policymakers oppose EU-level debates publicized opinion on the idea of large-scale regularization their adverse effects on neighboring programs, preferring to regularize countries (citing, for example, addi- immigrants on a case-by-case basis or tional inflows of people). By the end of through discrete, small-scale programs that decade, political will to regular- focused29 on extraordinary circumstanc- ize was limited, and in some countries es. programs were implemented only in response to public pressure to address Sweden is also vehemently opposed the living and working conditions of un- to regularization, but for a different authorized migrants. It might be argued reason. Sweden has the most open labor that France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and migration policies in Europe, and op- the United Kingdom put such programs poses regularization on the basis that 6 in place in reaction to protests and it should be unnecessary. This position Insight

Law for Asylum and the Refugees deviates from other northern EU coun- ian in nature. Bulgaria’s tries that wish to restrict labor migra- , as amended in 2005, tion more generally, but continue to use provides for regularization mechanisms regularization programs for humani- that grant asylum, humanitarian status, tarian purposes. Belgium, Denmark, and temporary protection; Cyprus and Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Latvia only rarely grant temporary resi- the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United dence permits on humanitarian grounds Kingdom have all implemented30 pro- (though since 2005, only 30 residence grams for hardship cases, unsuccessful permits have been issued in Latvia); asylum seekers, and war refugees (see Malta grants humanitarian permits to Appendix A). asylum applicants and rejected asylum seekers; Romania offers extended resi- Similarly, there are few regularization dence permits and temporaryAct toleration;on the programs in Eastern Europe. Poland and andStay theof Aliens Slovak Republic provides formal Lithuania are the only eastern EU coun- tolerationAmendment though32 to theits 2002Law on Temporary tries with official31 programs (which are Refuge . In 2002 Slovenia passed very small). Mechanisms that exist in an the other eastern countries are limited , allowing Bosnians to obtain per- in scope and are primarily humanitar- manent residence and other rights. Figure 3. Number of Programs Implemented by EU Countries, 1973-2008 (68 in total)

UK, 2 UK SI SI, 1 UK, 3 20 SE, 1 SE SI, 1 PT PT, 2 PT, 2 PL NL, 1 NL 15 LU, 2 PL, 3 LU

LT, 2 LT NL, 2 IT IT, 1 LT, 1 IE 10 GR, 2 PT, 1 HU IT, 2 FR, 1 LU, 2 GR IE, 1 FR ES, 3 HU, 1 IT, 2 ES 5 UK, 2 FR, 1 DK, 1 GR, 3 DK NL, 1 ES, 1 NL, 2 DE, 2 DE LT, 1 LU, 1 DK, 1 FR, 1 FR, 1 IT, 1 IT, 1 BE, 1 BE, 1 ES, 1 BE BE, 1 FR, 1 ES, 1 AT, 1 AT, 1 DE, 1 AT 0 To 1977 1978-1983 1984-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007

Source: Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 20.

7 IV. Conclusion

While economically based regularization became unpopular in northern The debate over the merits and short- Europe, it increased in both magnitude comings of regularization systems and scope in southern Europe in the shows no signs of abating. Those face of increasing migration flows from opposed claim that not only do such North and sub-Saharan Africa. Govern- systems reward illegal immigration, but ments in southern Europe advertised it they have not always been successful in to the public as a means of controlling meeting their purported aims. In some the illegal employment of large numbers cases (particularly in southern Europe) of immigrant workers,33 and thus curbing implementation has been poorly man- the informal market. Regularization aged, restrictive requirements have led measures implemented in Italy, Spain, to under-enrollment and the falsification and Greece accounted for 84 percent of of documents, and temporary residence known applications to EU regularization34 permits have lapsed, leaving migrants in programs between 1997 and 2007. unauthorized limbo once again. Italy regularized the highest number of people, followed by Spain and Greece. These and other concerns are reflected Meanwhile, in Portugal over 200,000 in the European Union’s increasingly people were regularized between 2001 more conservative stance on regulariza- and 2004. tion. Overall, there has been a shift away from general amnesties through large- Southern Europe’s regularization mea- scale programs, as was seen in earlier sures are not occurring in a political decades, to the targeted regularization vacuum; countries here are highly sensi- of specific groups of people (for humani- tive to the surrounding debate, both at tarian or strategic economic36 reasons) the state and EU levels. To that end, the through mechanisms. Meanwhile, language used to describe these mea- there have been repeated EU-level pro- sures is carefully crafted. Italy and Spain, posals to limit Member States’ freedom the Europeande facto Union’s top “regularizers,” to implement regularization programs. have come to refer to their recent ac- These are driven by the belief that one tions as . Such actions include Member State’s regularization policies Italy’s 2006 measures and Spain’s 2005 affect its neighbors, as the immigrants program, which granted legal status to regularized are then free to move about over 570,000 immigrants who35 had lived the entire European Union. The Council there for two years or more. Facing Decision 2006/688 required members EU-level criticism, Spain in 2006 an- inform the EU Commission of planned nounced that it would no longer imple- regularization policies that could37 po- ment major one-off regularization pro- tentially impact other states. Subse- grams, an action distancing it from the quently, in 2008, the FrenchEuropean Presidency much-criticized large-scale “amnesties” includedPact on Immigration a provision andbanning mass regu- for which southern Europe (and Spain in larization in its draft of the particular) had become known.

8 Insight

Asylum

. Ultimately, this provision was over which they have no control (some removed to secure necessary support cities and regions such as in Germany from Spain, but the general consensus and France have discretion over these was in its favor, and the final language of types of policies, but most do not). the pact allowed for only case-by-case38 — not general — regularization. At the same time, both individual Mem- ber States and the European ReturnUnion haveDi- Despite overall EU support for limiting emphasizedrective the importance of recogniz- the use of regularization, the fact that ing humanitarian cases. The Italy and Belgium both implemented , a recent EU policy, contains rules large-scale regularization measures in governing when Member States can 2009 demonstrates that EU rhetoric may grant immigrants the right to stay — for not reflect the reality on the ground. It example, on grounds of compassion or seems that, at the state level, govern- humanitarianism,39 but only as an excep- ments will continue to act in their own tional measure. According to a survey best interests. This divergence with undertaken by the International Center EU-level proposals may be even more for Migration Policy Development, how- pronounced at the local level. Several cit- ever, EU governments are not in favor of40 ies have publicly favored regularization a uniform EU policy on regularization. — notably London, where all mayoral Further divergence can be expected as candidates in 2008 advocated it. There is each country uses regularization as a growing unrest within city governments policy tool to reduce its stock of unau- faced with large unauthorized popula- thorized migrants. tions resulting from national policies

9 Appendix Appendix A. Regularization by Country, Year, and Total Number of Programs, 1973–200841 Total Number Program Total Number Type and Permit Targeted Regularizations Year Applications Offered Population Granted Illegally 1990 30,000 30,000 Program (E)a employed workers Normalization Bosnian war Austria Program (H)b,c refugees under 1998 85,000 85,000 (permanent temporary residence) protection Total 115,000 115,000 Unauthorized 1973–75 8,420 7,448 Program (E) migrants

Long-term asylum seekers; nondeportable 1995–99 6,137 6,137 Program (H) aliens; other humanitarian cases Belgium Long-term asylum seekers; nondeportable Program (H) aliens; other 2000 55,000 37,900 (long-term resi- humanitarian dence) cases/persons with substantial ties

Total 69, 557 51,485

War refugees

1992– 4,989 4,989 Program (H) from the former 2002 Yugoslavia

Denmark Kosovar 2000 3,000 3,000 Program (H) refugees

10 Insight

Total 7,989 7,989 Unauthorized 1973 40,000 40,000 Program (E) migrants (employment)

Program (E) Unauthorized 1981–82 150,000 130,000 (permanent migrants residence) (employment)

Long-term asylum seekers who 1991 50,000 15,000 Program (H) entered before 1989

France Family members; Chevenement foreigners with- Laws out dependents; 1997–98 135,000 87,000 Program (H) refused asylum (permanent seekers and de residence) facto refugees; ill persons

Families with 1 2006 33,538 6,924 Program (H) or more children in school Total 408,538 278,924 Asylum seekers who Program (H) entered before 1996 7,856 7,856 (residence per- 1990 and had mit) more than 8

d years residency

Rejected asylum seekers who

Germany 1999 18,258 18,258 Program (H) entered before 1993

Long-term 2006 71,857 49,613 Program (H) tolerated persons Total 97,971 75,727

11 Program (E) Unauthorized 1997 371,641 N/A (six-month migrants permit)

Program (E) (“green card”: 1998– Unauthorized 228,200 219,000 1–3 years renew- 2000 migrants able residence and work permit)

Program (E) (6-month work Unauthorized 2001 367,500 341,300 and residence migrants Greece permit)e

Persons with 2005 90,000 90,000 Program (E) expired permits

Unauthorized 2005 96,400 95,800 Program (E) migrants

Subcategories 2007 20,000 20,000 Program (E) of unauthorized migrantsf

Total 1,173,741 N/A

Unauthorized migrants 2004 1,540 1,194 Program (E/H) (workers and

Hungary family)

Parents of Irish 2005 17,900 16,683 Program (H) children Ireland

Total 19,440 17,877

12 Insight

Unauthorized 1982 12,000 12,000 Program (E) migrants Program (E) Unauthorized 1986–88 118,700 118,700 (temporary work migrants permit)

Martelli Law Unauthorized Program (E) migrants 1990 234,841 234,841 (2-year (workers and residence) students)

Unauthorized Program (E)

migrants 1995–96 256,000 238,000 (1- or 2-year (workers and

Italy residence) students)

Program (E) Unauthorized 1998 308,000 193,200 (temporary work migrants permit)

Unauthorized Bossi-Fini Law migrants Program (E) 2002 702,156 650,000 (caretakers and (temporary1-year domestic permit) workers)

Unauthorized 2006 500,000 350,000 Program (E) migrants Total 2,131,697 1,796,741 Residents who arrived after 1996 54 51 Program immigration law

and did not meet requirements

Unauthorized

Lithuania 1999 385 157 Program (E) migrants

Unauthorized 2004 103 77 Program (E) migrants

Total 542 285

13 Unauthorized workers 1986 1,100 1,100 Program (E) (Spanish and Portuguese)

War refugees 1994 470 470 Program (H) from the former Yugoslavia

War refugees 1995 996 996 Program (H) from the former Yugoslavia

War refugees

Luxembourg 1996 1,500 1,500 Program (H) from the former Yugoslavia

Program (H) (6-month residence permit Rejected asylum to find employ- seekers; other 2001 2,882 1,839 ment, after which unauthorized longer-term migrants residence permit possible) Total 6,948 5,905 Unauthorized 1975 18,000 15,000 Program (E) migrants

Cases rejected 1978 180 180 Program (E) under previous measures

Unauthorized 1979 1,800 1,800 Program (E) migrants

Unauthorized Netherlands 1999 7,604 1,877 Program (E) migrants

Long-term 2004 2,300 2,300 Program (H) asylum seekers

Long-term 2007 30,000 25,000 Program (H) asylum seekers Total 59,884 46,157

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Unauthorized 2003 3,508 2,747 Program (E) migrants

Unauthorized 2003 282 282 Program (E) migrants wishing

Poland to leave Poland Unauthorized 2007–08 2,022 177 Program (E) migrants Total 5,812 3,206 Program (E) Unauthorized 1992–93 80,000 38,364 (temporary migrants residence) Unauthorized 1996 35,000 31,000 Program (E) migrants Program (E) (1-year residency permit with possibility of

renewal up to Unauthorized 2001 185,000 185,000 4 times; after 5 migrants years, applicant automatically Portugal eligible for permanent residence)

Brazilian unauthorized 2003 19,408 19,408 Program (E) workers (Lula agreement)

Unauthorized 2004 40,000 19,261 Program (E) migrants Total 359,408 293,033

Rejected asylum 2006–06 31,000 17,000 Program (H) seekers Sweden

Total 31,000 17,000

15 Erased 1999 12,000 12,000 Program (H) personsg

Bosnian refugees under Slovenia 2002 2,400 2,200 Program (H) temporary protection Total 14,400 14,200 Program (E) (1-year Unauthorized 1985 38,181 34,832 renewable migrants residence and work permit)

Unauthorized Program (E & H) migrants 1991 130,406 109,135 (3-year (workers and residence) family members)

Unauthorized Program (E & H) migrants 1996 25,128 21,382 (5-year (workers and residence) family members)

Spain Program (E) (1-year tempo- Unauthorized 2000 247,598 199,926 rary residence/ migrants work)

Program (E) (1-year Unauthorized 2001 351,629 232,674 temporary migrants residence)

Program (E) (1-year Unauthorized 2005 691,655 578,375 renewable migrants residence) Total 1,484,597 1,176,324

16 Insight

Citizens of Commonwealth 1974–78 1,809 1,809 Program and former colonies Citizens of Commonwealth 1977 462 462 Program and former colonies Long-term 1999 12,415 11,140 Program (H) asylum seekers (backlogs) Long-term

2000 11,660 10,235 Program (H) asylum seekers (backlogs) United Kingdom Long-term 2004 9,235 9,235 Program (H) asylum seekers (families) Long-term 2005 11,245 11,245 Program (H) asylum seekers (families) Long-term 2006 5,000 5,000 Program (H) asylum seekers (families) Total 51,826 49,126 EU 20,654,071 4,062,279h Total

Notes: a “E” indicates employment-based or labor-market-oriented programs. It should be noted that “E” programs did not necessarily require proof of employment, but rather are aimed at regularizing those without authorization for purposes of the labor market. b “H” indicates humanitarian-based programs. c Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, Appendix B, 7. d It should be noted that Germany implemented ten regularization programs for tolerated migrants between 1991 and 2005 that are not included above. For more information on these programs, see Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, Appendix B, 54. e The initial permit was only for six months but was extended four times; therefore in reality it lasted for two years. f Subcategories included those who had received Greek schooling as pupils, parents of pupils, and claimants of Greek ethnicity who had been rejected. See Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, Appendix A, 59. g “Erased persons” refers to former permanent residents from Yugoslavia’s successor states who failed to obtain permanent residence after independence. h This number does not reflect the total, since figures for Greece’s 1997 regularization were not available. All regularization numbers come from Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” but details on the various programs come from the above sources. It should be mentioned that figures on regularizations varied across the Kraler report, the European Parliament briefing, the Baldwin-Edwards/Kraler REGINE report, and the Levinson study. This table reflects the numbers found by Kraler, unless otherwise noted. Source: Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 37–38; European Parliament, “Trends on Regularisation of Third Country Nationals, 8; Levinson, The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants; Rijpma and Pastore,“ Review of Current International Approaches.” 17 Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Andrew Viteritti, whose previous background research was a valuable contribution to this paper, which was commissioned by the Transatlantic Council on Migration for its meeting held in November 2010 in Wash- ington, DC. The meeting’s theme was “Restoring Trust in the Management of Migra- tion and Borders” and this paper was one of the reports that informed the Council’s discussions.

The Council is an initiative of the Migration Policy Institute undertaken in cooperation with its policy partner, the Bertelsmann Stiftung. The Council is a unique deliberative body that examines vital policy issues and informs migration policymaking processes in North America and Europe. The Council’s work is generously supported by the following foundations and governments: Carnegie Corporation of New York, Open Society Foundations, Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Barrow Cadbury Trust (UK Policy Partner), the Luso-American Development Foundation, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foun- dation, and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

For more on the Transatlantic Council on Migration, please visit: www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic.

18 Insight

Endnotes Regularization legalization 1 is the term most frequently used in European policy circles; in the United States, the term is typically used. 2 Albert Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option or Part and Parcel of a Comprehensive Policy Response to Irregular Migration?”(IMISCOE Working Paper no. 24, International Centre for Migration Policy Develop- normalización ment, February 2009), http://dare.uva.nl/document/138178. 3 In Spain, for example, the massive 2005 regularization was termed a (or “normalization”) to avoid the negative connotations associated with the term “regularization.” See European Parliament, “Trends on Regularisation of Third Country Nationals in Irregular Situation of Stay across the European Union,” Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Briefing Paper, European Parliament, January 2008, 38. Regularisations in Europe: Study on Practices in the Area of 4 Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 13. Regularisation of Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of the EU 5 Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Albert Kraler, . REGINE (Vienna: normalization normalización ICMPD, 2009), 30–1; Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 20. 6 The term should not be confused with Spain’s use of to describe the regularization that took place in 2005, when over 570,000 unauthorized migrants were regularized and given temporary residence permits that could be renewed. This term was coined by Kraler and Baldwin-Edwards. See Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 37; European Parliament, “Trends on Regularisation of Third Country Nationals,” 37. 7 Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 15. 8 This paper will consider the normalization of tolerated persons as regularization, even though individual governments may not considerRegularisations it as such. This in follows Europe the Baldwin-Edwards conceptualization of regularization, which includes the adjustment of status from tolerated to temporary or permanent legal residency; see Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , 7 9 Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 24. Regularisa- 10 tionsThose in w Europeho have been granted formal toleration receive a document stating that removal has been suspended and that they may provisionally stay until a certain date. Ibid.; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , Appendix B: Country Profiles of 22 EU Member States and the USA, 53. Regularization and 11 EmployerJorrit Jelle Sanctions Rijpma and as MeansFerruccio towards Pastore, the “ReviewEffective ofGovernance Current International of Labour Migration: Approaches Russian with Federation Regard to and InternationalRegularization Experience and Disincentives for the Employment of Irregular Migrant Workers,” in

(Moscow: International Labor Organization, 2009), 70, www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/regularization_en.pdf. 12 In Germany there are mechanisms to regularize tolerated persons who have been in limbo for many years. See also Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 8. 13 Ibid., 22. 14 Patrick Weil, “All or Nothing? What the United States Can Learn from Europe as it Contemplates Circular Migration and Legalization for Undocumented Immigrants” (Immigration Paper Series 2010, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC).

19 International Migration Outlook,

15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris SOPEMI, 2010); 70, www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2010_migr_outlook-2010-en. Regularisations in Europe 16 Rijpma and Pastore, “Review of Current International Approaches,” 75; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , Appendix B, 54. Regularisations in Europe 17 Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 23. 18 Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , 9. 19 The six countries that do not use mechanisms are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, and Slova- kia. It should be noted that the Netherlands stopped using mechanisms in 2003. Kraler, “Regularisation: The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants: Literature Survey and Country Case A Misguided Option,” 26. Studies 20 Amanda Levinson, (Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford, 2005), Regularisations in Europe www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/Reports/Regularisation%20Report.pdf. 21 Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , 21. The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants 22 Ibid. 23 See Table 1 in Levinson, , 76-84.

24 France’sRegularisations mechanisms for in exceptionalEurope regularization on a case-by-case basis continue, and the criteria have changed with subsequent laws in 2006 and 2007. For more information see Baldwin-Edwards and International Migration Outlook Kraler, , Appendix A: Country Studies, 10-4. Irregular Migration in Europe 25 OECD, , 71. 26 See Christal Morehouse, (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, The Regularisation of Unauthorized Migrants 2011). 27 Levinson, , 5. 28 Ibid., 27. 29 Ibid., 31. 30 Hardship cases refer to circumstances where a migrant would be faced with significant hardship if deported. This is usually in reference to separation of children from their parents or severe health prob- lems. 31 More recently, in August 2011, a new regularization program was signed into law in Poland. It gives unauthorized migrants a six-month period to submit an application (beginning January 1, 2012), with successful applicants granted a two-year residence permit and entitled to work without requiring ad- Regularisations in Europe, ditional authorization. 32 See Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, Appendix B: Bulgaria, 27; Cyprus, 31; Lat- Migration Information Source via, 78; Lithuania, 88; Malta, 95; Romania, 124; and Slovenia, 134. 33 Amanda Levinson, “Why Countries Continue to Consider Regularization,” , Migration Policy Institute, September 2005, www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=330. Regularisations in Europe 34 Kraler, “Regularisation: A Misguided Option,” 31. 35 Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , 41; European Parliament, “Trends on Regulari- sation of Third Country Nationals,” 37. 36 These mechanisms have run parallel to programs in Spain and Greece, and have replaced programs in 20 Insight

Regularisations in Europe

Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom. See Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, , 44. 37 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2006/688/EC of 5 October 2006, article (2)(1)(OJ L 283/40 of 14.10.2006),” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:283:0040:0043:EN:PDF. 38 Euractiv, “The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,” www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/european-pact-immigration-asylum/article-175489; Council of the European Union, “European Pact on Immigration and Asylum,” September 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st13440.en08.pdf. 39 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Com- mon Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nation- Regularisations in Europe: Study on als,” COM (2005) 391 final, Brussels quoted in Kraler, 5. Practices in the Area of Regularisation of Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals in the Member States of 40 theInternational European UnionCenter for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD),

(Vienna: ICMPD Policy Brief, February 2009), 6. 41 This table reflects only the number of people regularized through official programs. It does not include regularization through mechanisms or informal means.

21 About the Author

Kate Brick is an Associate Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), where she works with the International Program and the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Prior to joining MPI, Ms. Brick was the Program Associate for theLocal MexicoGoes National: Institute Challenges at the Woodrow and Opportunities Wilson International for Latino ImmiCenter- forgrants Scholars, in the Nation’swhere she Capital edited and coauthored the study

Ms. Brick received her master’s in international affairs, with a focus in social policy and immigration, at Columbia University’s School of Internation- al and Public Affairs. While pursuing her degree, she worked with the Open Society Institute, the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, Unbound Philanthropy, and the International Rescue CommitteeRefugee (IRC). Resettlement in the United States: An Examina- tion of Challenges and Proposed Solutions She is a coauthor of the report , produced for IRC. Ms. Brick received her BA, magna cum laude, from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs in Latin American Studies.

22 Insight

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23 MORE FROM MPI:

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is an independent, This Insight, prepared for the Migration Policy Institute’s Transatlantic nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank Council on Migration, follows the release of a legalization series addressing dedicated to the study of the how, in the US context, to shape, structure, and administer a legalization movement of people worldwide. program. The research was offered with the intent of providing a blueprint on the issues that the US Congress would need to consider in crafting The institute provides legislation and that the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and analysis, development, and other stakeholders would need to address in its implementation. evaluation of migration and Papers in the MPI US legalization series analyze how any broad legalization refugee policies at the local, program should begin with a registration process that rapidly identifies, national, and international levels. It screens, and processes potential applicants; how various unauthorized aims to meet the rising demand populations would fare under differing legislative scenarios; past US legalization programs, including those in the 1986 Immigration Reform and for pragmatic responses to the Control Act; and legal and policy issues to be considered in structuring challenges and opportunities that successful legislation. migration presents in an ever The legalization series can be found at: more integrated world. MPI produces the Migration www.migrationpolicy.org/ Information Source, at research/usimmigration.php www.migrationinformation.org.

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