I

THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE CERTIT UDE OF FA ITH ACCORDING TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAN by John R. Connolly, B.S. A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University in Partial Fulfillment of the Re­ quirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

Milwaukee, Wisconsin June J 1966 i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page I. AN IN'I'RODUCTION TO THE PROBLBM...... ••• 1 The certitude of faith in its super­ natural and psychological dimensions. Cer­ ti tude a.s a complex, reflex, notional assent. and its characteristics. The relation be­ tween th.e psychological and supernatural di­ mensions of faith. The justification of c~r­ titude - how probable evidence leads to the unconditional assent of certitude?

II. 'i'HE ERROR OF RATIO NA LIS ~l ...... 14 The Nineteenth Century: the age of ration­ alism. Newman's e,ncounter with rationalism in­ fluences the course of his justific.ation of cer­ titude. The two forms of rationalism which New­ man encountered: Richard \ihately at Oxford and William Froude during his days as a Catholic. The common errOr of both forms of rationalism. and Newman's a pproaoh to the justification of ce,rti tude. III. THE UNr V'ItRSITY SERMONS IN DEFENSE OF CERTI TUDE •• )0 The University Sermons: Newman's justifi­ cation of certi tude in light of his response to the rationalism of Whately. Three interpreta.. tive principles of the University Sermons. The relationship between faith am reason. How faith in its certitude goes beyond the ~roba­ bility of its evidence .. the moral disposition and love. The University Sermonsa.nd t-lewman' s emphasis ot the moral factors involved in the process of arriVing at certitude. IV. THE GRA MMA R OF ASSE NT IN DEFE NSE OF CERTITUDE ••• 49 The Gramma,r ot Assent; Newman's justifica­ tion of certitude in reaction to the rationalism of William Froude. The error of Froude: certitude is rational and an i mmoral use of ones intellect.. i1

Chapter ?age " ual fa.culties. Froude 's r ationalism led Newman to the heart of his explanation of certitude - the distinction between inference and assent. Newman' s analysis of inference - formal, i nfor­ mal, and natural. The justification of the mind' s unconditional assent upon prob a b l ~ evi­ dence and conditional inference through t he operation of the Illative Sense. The nature a.nd activity of the Illative Sense . The per­ sonal aspect of the Illative Sense . The Illa­ tive Sense of the r ationality or reasonableness of certitude .

V. CONCLUS I ON : NE ytl~1MP S J US TI FICATION OJ!' CERTITUDE AND ITS CONSEqUENCES...... 6.8 The moral disposition and the Illative Sense are two factors developed by Newman in his re­ action to rationalism to j~stify how man can make an assent of certitude upon evidence which is merely probable . This is Newman's justification of certitude and it unfolds two consequences - his well-balanced concept of faith and his highly personal notion of faith. 1

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AN INTRODUCTION TO TH E PROBLEM

When a man makes the assent of faith, do es he dv so with a confidence and an assurance that excludes all fear of doubt - in short, does his faith possess certitude? John Henry New­ man was particularly interested in this question, and, from an investigation of his writings on faith, it appears that he is of the opinion that faith does possess such a certitude. But going further than this, Newman claims that this certitude is perfectly valid and justifiable, and completely in harmony with the psychological processes of the human person. Newman begins by accepting the certitude of faith as a fact of experience; he never attempted to prove or demonstrate the existence of this certitude. He observed it in others and saw it within the depths of his own being . In the Apologia

1!2 Vita ~, Newman describes the certitude that came to him through his conversion to Catholicism. I have been in perfect peace and contentment; I have never had one doubt. I was not cons cious to myself, on my conversion, of any change, intellectual or moral, wrought in my mind. I was not conscious of firmer faith in the fundamental truths of Revelation, or of more self commRnd; I had not more 2

fervour, but it was like coming into a port after a rough sea h and my happiness on that score I remains to thfs day without interruption . It was the certitude of faith that freed him from doubt and brought him an enduring peace. Newman never questioned the . existence of t his reality. Faith is also a supernatural reality and Newman always insisted upon the supe rnatural dime nsion of faith. The vis­ ion of faith, which relates man to the three divine persons and is the only way he can come to know God as He is, 2 is by its very nature absolutely gratuitous ,. . a gift of grace. Faith is not something that man can achieve by himself, but it i.s freely given by the grace of God who has chosen him to b'e1ieve.3 As such the ultimate certitude of faith is supernatural. The certitude of faith, an effect of divine grace, is primarily based upon the authority of God. 4 Ulti­ mately a man does not believe because he can prove the object

1 John H. Newman, Afo10gia Pro Vita Sua (New York: Long­ mans, Green and Co., 19 8), p. 1"20.- - 2Sy1vester P. Juergens, Newman, Psychology 2f. Faith, pp. 123-26. Juergens cites this passage from Newman, "Nature can­ not see God •••• grace is the sole means of seeing him." New­ man, Discourses to rU xed Congreeations (London: Longman s, Green and Co . ~, 1~1) J p. 189. 3phi1ip Flanagan , Newman, Faith and the Believer (West­ minster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, i946)~.-r26. 4 ~., p. 127. ) of faith, but solely because God has revealed it. The absolute and perfect certitude of divine faith does not rest on reason- I ing or human motives, but solely on the fact that God, the Eternal Truth who can- not deceive n0r be deceived, has spoken. 5 The Word of God is the ultimate certitude of faith.

NO'I1 certitude is not a quality that is restricted to supernatural faith, for a man can have many natural certi­ tudes. There a.re many truths other than supernatural re­ alities to which a man can give an assent of certitude. Certitude. then, is a natural phenomenon in harmony with the psychological structures of the mind. The assent of certitude can be given to such a concrete proposition as. "I shall die one day." "Britain is an island ." or "There is :a war on in Vietnam." Since faith is an aasen t to pro. positions signifying concrete realities. its certitude has a counterpart in the ordinary psychological processes of the mind. This is the psychological dimension of certitude. Newman's analysis of the na.ture of certitude on the psychological dimensi on is contained primarily in the Grammar 2! As sent. Here Newman describes certitude in terms of assent with certitude being radically an assent without doubt - an unconditional assent. In order to understand the nature of certitude as assent, it is first necessary to understand what Newman means by assent. Assent is the unconditional acceptance of what has al­ ready been apprehended as true. This apprehension of the

5I bid •• Flanagan cites t his quote of Newman taken from the ThesIS ~ E!2!. Gregorianum, Vol. XVIII. thesis # 10, p. 236. 4

truth is the necessary concomitant of assent,6 and the con­ I dition under which assent is given. Assent, being based upon apprehended truth, like truth itself admits of no de­ grees;7 it is an "either, ort! reality. Either you assent to a proposition or you do not; there is no in the middle. Newman never really defined a ssent, but he did give several desct'iptions of it in the Grammar of Assent such as, "an adherence to a pro position without reserve or doubt", 8 and, "the unconditional acceptance of a proposition as true. n9 Assent, although it does not admit of degrees, is fur­ ther diversified and can be classified according to real, if it is an assent to a proposition representing concrete reaJ-ity, or notional, if assent is given to an abstract proposition.10 Viewed from the point of view of conscious­ ness, assent can also be classified as simple and complex assent. Simple assent is i mplicit and unconscious, given without direct knowledge or full advertance of the mind.11 On the other hand, co mplex assent, being a deliberate assent to a simple assent, whether notional or real, is a reflex

6John H. Newman, An Esaa in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, Green an e07; ~7r; pp. 8 and 1;7. 7- Ibid., p. 174. 8lJ:2.!£., p. 172. 9Ibid., pp. 8, 172, and 259. 10 ~., pp. 9, 35, and 75. 11!2![., pp. 188-89, and 210. 5

and conscious assent.12 The nature of t he certitude of f aith can only be urtder- stood if it be examined under its aspect as a co mplex assent. Newman distinguishea between simple and complex assent. Sim­ ple assent i~ the non-reflex acceptance of a proposition,13 r \ . the person assents to a truth, but he J.S not reflectively aware that what he is doing is assenting to a truth. He accepts the proposition as true without reflecting upon vmat he is doing. That simple assent to Newman is not cer- I titude is quite evident for in the, Grammar ...... of Assent he contrasts the two. 14 Simple assent is called "material certitude" the matter from which certitude flows, the basis of certitude.15 In order to become a certitude simple ass~nt must be reflec't ed upon and made conscious.16 Although it is not certitude, simple assent is the basis and founda­ tion of certitude. As a conscious reflex assent to a simple a ssent, certi­ tude does not exclude simple assent, but includes it.17 Cer­ titude is a complex act which is made up of reflex assent and simple assent.18 However, it is this conscious reflex a,spect,

12~., pp. 190, and 194-95. 1.3 Newman, Oranmar of Assent, p. 189,. 14 ~., p. 210. 15.!!lli!. 16 Ibid., pp,. 211-12. 17 Ibid., pp. 190, and 194-95. 18- lill., p. 216. 6

its quality of being a complex assent, that distinguishes ( certitude f rom simple assent and is the essential element I in certitude. As Newman defined it, certitude is "the per­ ception of a t rut h with the perception that it is a truth, f)r the consciousness of knowing a s expressed in the phra.se 'I know that .I know' .19 Certitude is therefore an assent to a truth with the awareness that wh at one is assenting to is true; it is always a reflex act. As a reflex assent certitude is an assent to a notion- a1 proposition. The predicate of a reflex assent is always the abstract term "true". For example, "that I shall die one day is true", is a reflex asse'nt, and, since its predi­ cat.e is a general t(l!!rnl, it is a notional assent. 20 Certi­ tude then is also a notional assent with the proposition to which this assent is given being either real or notional. On the psychological dimension, therefore, it is of the na­ ture of t he certitude of faith that it be a complex notional assent to truth. Certitude combines the keenness of simple assent am the persistence of reflex assent and it is as such a very complex act.21 Certitude is an assent to a truth with the awareness that what one is assenting to is true. Since the object of

19-Ibid., p. 197. 20-Ibid., p. 214. 21 Ibid., p. 216. 7

certitude is truth, it has the quality of being correct; it is a "right conviction with a consciousness of being right". 22 It is a law of t he mind to seek truth and, when it finds it, to take possession of it and never let it go. Having found truth the mind rests in truth and, therefore, "/h en the mind reaches certitude, it persists in that state. Certitude is persistent and never fails; this is the char a cteristic of certitude which Newman called its indefectibility.~J Newman affirmed this characteristic to show that the assent of cer­ titude is reasonable, ' not a mere, extravagance of the intellect,24 and that the mind which is mace for truth, "can attain truth, and, having attained it, can ke ep it, can recognize it, and pre,serve the recognition. ,,25 It is t his per sistence, the quality of indefectibility which assures endurance, that in­ dicates the truth of a certitude. If a certitude persists, it 1s true; if it does not persist, then it is false. New- man did not mean to say that there are no false or mistaken convictions or that certitude 15 infallible. Newman quite clearly held that some certitudes were false, and that certitude does not possess nor need 1nfal11- 26 bility. Having insisted t hat it was wTong to confuse the

22Ib1d., p. 221. 2)~. 24Ibid• 25~., p. 222. 26Ibid• s

two, Newman made this distinction between certitude and infallibility. Certitude is a disposition, not a faculty,( of the mind relative to a definite and pa rticular proposi­ tion, whereas infallibility is a faculty and rela tes the mind to "all possible propositions in a given subject- matter." 27 Infallibility is a general gift applicable to every particular case that may arise, but certitude is di­ rected to a definite co ncrete proposition.28 To say that a man possesses cert.itude is not to affirm therefore that he possesses infallibility.2 That certitude is not infallibility is also evident from the fact that a man's ce~titudes are often f alse and mistaken and have to be changed.30 Certitudes can be false and e.s such they are faults, but they a re faults not because they are supposed certitudes but because they are founded on faulty reasoning. As an assent certitude is always preceded by a process of reasoning vmich presents truth to the mind. If there is any error in certitude it is the reasoning that

27 Ibid., p. 224. 28 -Ibid., p. 225. 29Ibid • 30Ibid., p. 223. "It is a fact of daily occurrence that men change their certitudes, that is, what they consider to be such J and are as confident and well-established in their new opinions as they' were once in their old." 9

is at fault and not the assent, for it is a l aw of the mind to give assent to what reasoning presents as true.31 Mis-f taken certitudes which result from false reasoning do exist, but this does not constitute a proof that certitude is it­ self a perversion or extravagance of man's nature.32 To deny the reasonableness and validity of certitude because of the existence of mistaken certitudes would be like dispensing with all clocks just because some of them go wrong from time to time)3 When it came to distinguishing between true and false certitude Newman admitted that "there was no interior, immediate test, although indefectibility, a characteristic of certitude, served as a kind of negative test - if the cer­ t! ~ude does not persist, then it is false .34 But perhaps the best safeguard against false certitude is that it be given only after careful examination and investigation. In its perfection, then, certitude is quite obviously a very complex reality. As an indefectible reflex notional assent based upon examination and investigation, certitude, in its highest expression, is rather demanding. Because of its own high demands and the restriction of the limited sub­ ject - matter to which the assent of certitude can be given, genuine certitude is not as common as one might expect,35 but that certiu~de exists on the psychological level is beyond

31, 1£!£., p. 229. 32 ~., p. 23.3 • .33 Ibid • 34- Ibid., pp. 255-56. 35l2!&e, pp. 236-37. 10

a shadow of a doubt to Newman . 36 Certi tude, then, a ccording to Newman can be said tel have two dimensions, one superl19 tural and the other psycho­ logical. However, the two , being distinct but not separate, exist as two aspe cts of a single reality - that real ity be­ ing the relationship which exists between the three divine persons and the human person. The supernatural dimension is not somethi ng added to the ps ychological, rather it is a transformation of the psychological. That the two dimensions are inseparable is clear from Newman 's analysis of the rela­ tion between t he s upernatural and the natural. So intima tely are they connected that it would be vain t o attempt a solution of the problem on the su pe rnatural level without any reference to the parallel problem on t he l"'.atural plane)? The super­ na tural certitude of faith is a process par allel i n reality to natural certi tude. Thus there is an analogy between the two dimensions of certitude.38 Newman considered the solution of the natural or psychological problem (hotT the mind arrives a t natural certi tude) as an indispensable guide in the solution of the same problem on the 8uperm tural dimension)9 Therefore, an analysis of certitude on the psychological dimension is the

36Ibid., p. 239. 3? A.J. 'BoE'!kraad, The Personal con}!uest of Truth Accord- ing to J.H. Newman (Louvain: Editionsauwelaerts, 1955), pp. j4-!57 38 Np.'::man, Grammar of Assent, pp. 239-40. 39soekraad, Personal Conquest 2£ Truth , p. 35. 11

basis for an examinati on of the certitude of fai th in ita totality ,40 as a psychological and superna. tural reality"; As an unconditional assent, certitude goes beyond the

probability of the evidence which c ~m be brought in support of it. 41 This is partially due to the fact that the evidence provided by the inferential process which precedes the assent of certitude is always condi tional and probable . Certitude grows out of probabilities and Newman clearly saw t his.

l~y argument is in outline as follows: that that absolute cer­ titude which we were a·bIe . to possess" ,whether as to the truths of natural theology, or as to the fact of a revelation, was the result of an assemblage of conculTing and con­ vergi ng probabilities, and that, both according to the .constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker, that certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that

40Ibid. 41'0 say that certitude goes beyond the probability of t he evidence which c&n be hl'ought in support of it is not to say that faith is an irrational process. Rather it emphasizes the unique character of the act of faith ... that it is an act of the whole person and not merely an assent to a proposition that 1s logically conclusive and totally demonstrable, Newman, Grammar 2l. Assent, p. 179. Assent for Newman is unconditional; it is an I!either. or" reality - but inference is always con­ diti onal and tl).e best inferential process can only provide evidence which is prob 5 bl~. The unconditional assent of cer­ titude is based upon inference which is conditional and evi­ dencewhich is p robabl~. The force of the personal assent of certitude is stronger than the probability of the evidence warrants. The assent of certitude seems to rise hi gher than its source and go beyond the probability of its evidence. This seems to be the point of Newman's argument against Lockets de­ grees of assent in the Grammar of Assent, pp. 162-179. Locke holds that it is illogical and immoral to "carry our assent above the evidence that a proposition is true" to have tta sur­ plusage of assurance beyond the degrees of that evidence." Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 163. Newman disagrees with this position and seems to hold that the assent of certitude does go beyond the degrees or probability of the evidence. 12

probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, mt~ht create a mental certitude; •••• / The certitude of faith, like all certitude, is founded upon evidence Which of itself can only give probability.43 Now how can this unconditional a ssent of certitude which exceeds the influence of its evidence be validly given' Such an operation seems more like sentiment, supe rstation, or pre- judice than valid activity of a rational being. The man enamored of reason is quick to question the validity of such an activity a s certitude. Because it does not flow directly from the evidence it seems to be unjustifiable or at least based upon very shaky grounds. Newman was very much aware of tM,.s difficulty and, through his encounter with the rationalism of his day, he was forced to meet this objection - that the certitude of f aith or certitude in any matter was invalid and unjustifiable. It is his answer to the rationalism of the nineteenth cen- tury that led Newman to his justification of certitude, parti­ cula.rly the certitude of faith. In order to justify this cer­ titude, Newman had to show how the mind could go beyond the · probability of the evidence to a certain assent. It was ob­ viously not within the capacity of evidence to produce an

42Newman , Apologia, p. 20. 43 The certitude of faith for Newman is an assent based upon probable evidence. Newman finds this assent in many concrete ma t ters and believes it to be justifiable. Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 176. Going further he clearly states that certitude is grounded upon evidence which of itself can only give probability. "I prefer to rely on that of an accu­ mulation of various probabilities; but we both hold (that is, I hold with him), that from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof1 sufficient for certitude." Newman, Grammar of ARsflmt. p. 411. 1)

unconditional assent of certitude upon its own power. No sort of evidence can f orce a ma n to as sent with certitude, in faith or in any matter. There must be some other factor 9r factors that enter into the formation of the assent of certitude. Since it i s such a unique act involving the whole person pe rhaps these "other factors" can be found with­ in the }:erson. This is how Newman chose to a pproach the problem. In order to show how certitude could .go beyond the probability of the evidence, Newman looked within the person. It is, then, the pur pose of this thesis to exami ne the personal el emen ts tha t enter into certitude, showing how New­ man developed them through his encounter with rationalism, in order to justify how certitude goes beyond the probability of its evidence~ Because of the close relationship between the natural and the supernatural, and since the su p~ rnatural di­ mension transforms the p-sychological dimension in certitude, t his thesis shall be limited to an examination of faith in its psychological dimen ~ion. As a result it will be seen how Newman justified the certitude of faith in its totality, on the psychological and supernatural dimension. 14

I

THE ERROR OF RATIONALISM

One of the predominant spirits of the age in which New­ man lived was that of rationalism. An unbounded confidence in the power of human reason is one of the characteristic notes of the Nineteenth Century. Following in the traditions of the Eighteenth Century, the Rationalistic Age,l the Nine­ teenth Century produced various forms of rationslism. It was the age of the philosophical deists, the historical liberals, and the scientific naturalists.2 This was Newman's century,

1 A. J. Boekraad, The Personal Conquest of Truth According to John Henry Newman, (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1955), p. 69. Boekraad states that such a label is most appropriate for the Eighteenth Century, In fact, he states, "we may al­ most describe ft. religion as 'the cult of reason'". Also confer M'. Pattison, Tendencies O.r Religious Thouf!8t in England, 1688-1750., ES25~ and ReViews, (London: Vol. IX, 61-;-pp. 254- )29), see Pi .Also in an article on "Faith" in James Has­ tings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, (New York: Char17s Scribner's Sons, Vol. V. pp. 689:'9'4. 1924), the author descrJ.bes the rationalism of the Eighteenth Century in the following words: "Rejecting the traditional doctrines of Christianity, it put in their place the simple and self evident ideas of reason as the one valid content of religious faith." (p~ 69)). 2John F. Cronin, Cardinal Newman: His Theor~ of Knowledge, (Washington: Catholic university of America, 193 ), from pp. 10-16, Cronin traces the development of these three phases of English rationalism and their influence upon Newman. To some extent this threefold division of Rationalism is an over sim­ plification" In an article on "Rationalism" in Hastings, Enc clopedia £! Religion and Ethics, (Vol. X, pp. 580-8) J, it 1s pointed out how difTICult it is to trace the history of rationalism and to order the rationalists in a strict historical order. "The threads cross too much". (p. 581). However, the article views rationalism as an element of ne gative criticism rooted in a rival religion, or a new school of philosophy or science. (pp. 580-81). 1S

t t he nineteenth; his lif e. f rom 1$01 to 1890, almost apanned it. Rationalism was t he spirit of the times in which N/w­ man lived, and any a t tempt to explain h is t hought without t ak ing this into co nsideration is bound to be inadequate. Ne\'mw.n 'ilas a man of hi s time s, but i n no sense could it be said that he let himself be passively molded by them. Always keenly sensitive, Newman was especially aware of the t hought patterns of his own day. He saw the value of human · reason; yet he could also see the danger involved in exagger­ ating its power. Being a controversalist by na ture, Newman could not remain silent in the face of error. He always felt it his duty to speak out in the defense of truth even when it se~med to put him in opposition to his own times. We are ourselves. necessary parts of the existing system, out of which we have individually grown into being, into our actual position in society. Depending ,therefore, on the times as a condition of existence, in wishing for other tiCle s we are , in fact, \'lish- iug we had never been born. Moreover, it is ungr'ateful to a sta te of society, from wh ~ch we daily tmjoy so I'llany bene­ fits, to r a il ngainst it. Yet there is nothing unbecoming, unmeaning , or ungrate­ ful in pointing 0ut its f aults aT.d y;1sh­ ing them away. 3 Fashioning the times as well as being formed by them, Newman was irxieed "one who shaped the spirit of his a ge as much aa he was shaped by it. ,,4

3John H. Newman , Fifteen Sermons Preached Before The University of Oxford, (London: Longmans, Green and Co.~91e), p. 67. - . 4aoekraad, Personal Conquest 2l Truth, p. 68. 16

The spirit of rationalism, therefore, meet with Newman's opposition. To Newman rationalism was one of the major/err­ ors of his time, and he opposed it whenever he encountered it. He engaged in this struggle against rationalism through­ out his entire life. He encountered it at Oxford as an Ang­ lican, also in his reading of the phi losophy of John Locke;5 he had to face it in his correspondence with the British scientist ,\iilliam Froude, and in Paley's Evidences f or Chris­ tianity.6 In its va rious forms rationalism constituted one of the maj or problems of Newman's intellectual l i f e.7 Some authors even go so far as to see the struggle as the unify­ 8 ing theme of Newman's life. Wi lfrid Wa rd maintains that

5Throughout the Grammar of Assent, Newman points out his differences with Locke on assent and certitude, An E ssa~ In Aid of a Grammar of Assent, (London: Longmans , Green an CO., T9T7J; confer pp.-r60-64, 174, 316-17. 6 . Newman's response to Paley's approach to Christianity is most adequately expressed in Newman' 5 own w:>rds: "If 1 am asked to use Paley's ar gument for my own co nversion, I say pl ainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism ; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching t heir hearts . ", Grammar of Assent, p. 425 • . - 7cronin, Newman, Theory of Knowledge, p. 24. "It remained in the forefront of his thought from the time of his conver­ sion from it in 182e until years later when he received the Cardinal's hat."

eBoekraad, Pe rsonal Conquest 0 f Truth , p. 26, "This more­ over is precisely that which gives-Such a unity to his life, namely, the struggle against a Liberalism which either con­ sidered faith as a necessary conclusion to a chain of logi­ cal arguments, or, conversely , put religion back into the realm of pure sentiment." 17

this idea was the unifying thought of all his works.9 New- man himsel f, i n a discourse on the day on "bieh he received the Cardinal's hat, swnmed up his Catll ol1c lif e as an en­ deavor to resist the s pirit of rationalism in r eligion.10 It was his encounter with rationalism that influenced the course which Newman's justification of certitude took. Ra tionalism attacked certitude as being invalid. Newman encountered this attack in two forms. The first of these exaggerated the principle of strict l ogical reasoning so much that it practically excluded }he existence of any other process in man. This type of rationalism puts the truths of revelation to the test of pure reason, and only those truths th~t survive this rigid examination remain credible. In this system there is really no pl ace for the r eality known as f aith; it is entirely unnecessary. Reason alone: is sufficient. To Ne\','In8.n these men exer cised a dangerous and false liberty of thought: ••• subjecting to human judgment t hose revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions ~hich rest for thei r reception simply on the external authority of the Divine \fIord. 11

9Wilfrid Ward, Last Lectures, The Unity of N e~man's Works, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1m), pp. ~-48. 10Cronin, Newman, Theory of Knowledge, p. 12, originally from Ward. The Life of John Henry eardinal New:nan, (New York: Vol. II, 19~.-p:-4bU.--,ne date of the address was Ma y 12, 1879. 11 Newman, APolo~1a Pro Vita Sua, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 88.------18

Subjecting the f acts of reve l ation to the strictest logical processes, that of f or mal reasoning and logica l d-emonstrIa t i on, this approach , if consistently pursued, will lead to the to­ tal destruction of revealed religion. Instead of revealed mysteries wh ich lead the mind beyond the scope of its strict logical reasoning powe rs, the f a cts of revelation are re­ duced to truths v{hich are merely conclusions of a formal reasoni1"}g process. In such a system faith i s reduced to a 12 conclusion of a l ogical syllogistic r easoning process. The credibility of th e truths of faith, then, is only as strong as the evidence which rea son brings to support t hem. Dut, in reality, the evidence which reason provides is always probable

anq open to new findings. To subject faith t o such a reason~ ing process places faith i n t he real m of the probable and

ma kes certitude i mpossible . The only valid app ~oac h to re­ ality is t hrough reason and demonstration; such a rationalium leaves no room for any of t he moral or pe rsonal elements in man . The second type of rationalism which Newman encountered , is a f orm of scientific r ationalism. It is ch aracterized by an extreme devotion to the physical 8c1ences.13 The influenc~ of science during the Nineteenth Century was overwhelming,

12H• Francis DaVis, Newman on Faith and Personal Certitude, Journal of Theological Studies, \nxtord: vcr. XII, pp. 248-59, . 1961 ), p • 249. 1Jcronin, Newman, Theory of Knowl edge, p. 14. 19

and, Newman, ever conscious of the wo rld in which he lived, was aware of the good and bad points of this scientific/trend. Conscious of the unity of truth, Newman realized that the growth of scientific knowledge was inevitable and good. But, on the other hand, he was also aware that the scientists had fallen into some false v1e\'/s concerning the power of reason. The scientist, approaching reality through experience and observation, works with evidence that is probable and c~nc1udes only as the evidence permits. Living in a world of theories and probabilities the scientist is always open to new discoveries and hence he can rarely, if ever, assent to any proposition with absolute certitude. To do so would be ', going beyond the probability of the evidence and this, for the scientist, is an irrational procedure. This method is perfectly valid when applied to scientific matters, but it is detinitAly invalid when applied to matters , such as faith, which are beyom t he scientific order. In Newman's day, and st111 in the moo ern world, there was a tendency for the scien­ tist to extrapolate, to apply his dliscipline to subjects out­ side the realm of science. When the scientific discipline , which only concludes to probabilities a nd theories, is applied to faith, it reduces faith to probability and opinion and ,makes certitude impossible. The reasoning is as follows: since it is beyond the rational power of scientific reason­ ing to conclude to rertitude, the assent of certitude is irrational and beyond the intellectual processes of the mind . 20

Not only does this form of rationalism deny the certitude of fai th, but it denounce s carti tude in any realm of human len­ deavor as being irrational and unintellectual. This encounter ..:b ieh Newman had with rationalism is a growing and developing experience. Consequently there is a certain progression in the rationalism which Newman encountered. In attempting to show this progression, the influence exerted upon Newman by the thought of two men shall be traced. The two•. men arG Richard vfuately and William Froude. Each repre- sents one of the two forms of rationalism which Newman en- countered, and each represents a different pe riod in his life.

In the Apologia E!2 ~ ~ Newman mentions several pro­ positions subscribed to by Oxford rationalists during his uni­ versity days. Four of them read as follows: 1. No religious tenet is important. unless reason shows it to be so . ~ 2. No one can believe what he does not understand. ). No theological doctrine is any thing more than an opinion \~ich happens to be held by bodies of men. ~ 4. It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had br~1,lght home to him by actual proof. 4 ' These four propositions are illustrative of the Oxford ration­ alism which Newman was to enedunterand oppose. This is re­ presentative of the first form of rationalism mentioned

14Newman , Apologia, p. 294. 21

before;1 5 one of its leading exponents was Richard Whately.16

After Whately had captured NeW11l8U'S mind for a bri/f period, their rela tionship ended wi til the two in disagreement.

The years, from 1825 to 1$28 , in which ~nately was to exert an influence over Newman are specified by Newman himself. The years I speak of as those of my intimacy with him were from 1825 to 1 8 ~8, during the first of which I was his Vice-Principal at Alban Hall. His influence over me ceased alto­ gether in 1828, being superseded bY17 that of Mr. Keble and Mr . Froude ••• This encounter with Whately was one of the first influences to which Newman was subjected as a Fellow of Oriel.18 Whately was greatly enamored of the value of reason, es­ pecially the force of formal logic. A few phrases from his book on logic give an_illustration of his type cjf t hinking, "The most appropriate intellectual occupation of man, as man, is evidently reasoning,,,19 and again, "The judgments of com­ mon sense are conjectural.,,20 For Whately the correct way to

15 See p. 17.. 16 Sylvester Juergens, Newman on the PSYChOlO,y of Faith in the Individual, (New York: Macm1!lan Co., 1928 , JUergens points out that Whately was one of the best known spokesmen of the Liberal school at Oxford. Further on he cites two of the four proposi tiona mentioned above in the text as tenets of the Oxford Liberals of Newman's day, pp. 3-4. 17J •H• Newman, A Letter to Monsel, Oct. 10, 1852, (Un­ published), quoted by Boekraad, Personal Congue st .2! Truth. p. 19, See also Apologia, p. 8. 18 Juergens, Newman, Psychology.2! Faith, p. 241. 19Richard Whately, Elements of Logfic, (London: Reprinted from ninth edition), p. x. quotedrromoekraad, Personal Conquest of Truth, p. 73. 20 ~., p. xii. 22

true knowledge was through formal reasoning and logical de­ monstration. It wa s upon these lines that he was to ex'r­ cise an influence u~on Newman. Originally Newman had been attracted to the Evangelical a pproach to religion, "but soon he was dissatisfied "'lith it in his heart, because it was too vague, too 'misty' in its views.,,21 Newman's mind demanded more than a religion of sentiment and emotion; such a religion was too shallow for him; he wanted to penetrate the depths of reality and grasp the real meaning of things.22 In the logic of Whately, New- man saw a means of adding clarification and precision to his religious thought. So from Whately he learned formal logic, and "to think for himself and to write cautiously and clear­ ly. ,,23 Newman describes this influence in the Apologia ..E!:2

Vita ~." He, emphatically, opened my mind, and taught me to think and to use my reason •••••• He had done his work towards me or nearly so; when he had taught me to see wi th 2~ own eye s and to walk with my own feet. As a result of this influence of Whately, Newman was drawn out of the narrO\,l views of religion in which "Evangelicalism"

21 Boekraad , Personal Conquest 2! Truth, p. 89. 22- Ibid., p. 90. 23 Juergens, Newman, Psychology 21. Faitr., p. 241. 24 Newman, Apol~gia, p. 8. 23

naturally tended to confine him.25 / But Newman eventually found that he could not go all the way with Whately. The realization of the excellence of reason had brought Newman an increase in candor and reality, but such a ga.in was not wi t hout its dangers. Newman began to feel that t he prize had been purchased at the price of a loss of reverence and depth. He was himself drifting into a rationalism which he did not like. The truth is, I was beginning to prefer intellectual excellence . to moral; I was drifting in the direction of liberalism. I was rudely awakened from my dream at the end of 1827 by two g~gat blows­ illness and bereavement. Newman himself realized that he and Whately were too different to remain on the same line for very long.27 After 1826, when Newman resigned as his Vice-Principal at St. Albans, their paths began to take diffE:rent directions. The formal break between the two came in 1829 over the matter of Peel's re­ election at Oxford.28 Newman's break with Whately constituted his definitive

25Juergens, Newman, Psychology of Faith, p. 243. 26 Newman, Apolo&ia. p. 11. 27 .!!?!!.. p • g. 28,Ibid •• p. 11. 24

split with the proponents of rationalism.29 Once and for all he broke with the forces of Oxford rationalism. This experi­ ence at Oxford ha.d a profound effect upon Newman, for it brought him face to face with the conflict between religious faith and rationalism. It was this crisis that "brought home to him strongly the opposition between rationalism and the religious 'ethos,."30 Newman chose the religious "ethos", and it was a choice that was to determine the course of the rest of his life. It was this choice that made him a life­ time opponent of rationalism.31 It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this experience which Newman had at Oxford.32 It exposed to him the fallacies of ration­ alism and the danger of the unmitigated application of reason,

29It seems that not all agree completely on Whately's position. Douglas Ehninger in an introduction to Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, i9OJ), states "Whately himself was by profession a churchman and by dedication a life-long defender of religion against the attacks of rationalists and the scepticism of science", p. ix. Ehninger, in a footnote, goes on to associ­ ate Whately with the Tractarian movement, "Through close friendship with Pusey, Keble, Hawkins, and Froude he was associated with the Tractarian movement, although not him- self a Tractarian in the st rict sense of the term." R.W. Church, however, speaks of Whately as being one of the most prominent of the liberal writers, The Oxford Movement, (Lon­ don: Macmillan and Co., 192Z), pp.~6. Boekraad also places Whately in the camp of the rationalists of the Liberal School, Personal Conquest of Tnuth, pp. 73-74. Whatever be the merit of Ehnlngeris appri!sal of Whately, it seems quite clear that Newman considered Whately responsible for a Liberalism in reli­ gion which influenced Newman himself for a short period, Apologia, pp. 11-15. 30J •H• Walgrave, Newman The Theolofian trans. by A.V. Littledale, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 957), p. 34. 31~. 32- Ibid., p. 33 25

in the form of logical demonstration and formal inference, / to matters of religion and revealed truth. This encounter with Whately represents Newman's con­ flict with rationalism while he was in the Anglican Church. His direct encounter with the next man, William Froude, be­ gins in the period in which Newman seriously was thinking of becoming a Catholic.)) For the most part they continued their correspondence until Froude's death in 1879. Froude was a representative of the second form of rationalism men­ tioned in this chapter)4 Newman's correspondence with this man is also a very good illustration of his encounter with rationalism during his days in the Catholic Church. Unlike Whately, Froude was not a churchman, but a scientist. In matters of religion he was somewhat of a free­ thinker. His whole approach to reality was through the sci­ entific method. He did not see how the mind could go beyond probability in its judgments.- The certitude of faith always was to remain an enigma to him. In their correspondence New- man attempted to show Froude that the human mind could and did go beyond probability to certitude. Froude, however, was

)JG• H. Harl'er, Cardinal Newman and William Froude, A Correspondence, (Baltimore: John HopkIns Press, 1933), pp: 14-13. Harper cites thnt Newman's correspondence with the Froudes began around 1844-45. Most of the e~rly letters were addressed to Mrs. Froude, but they seem to have been written to William as well. 34navis, Newman, Faith and Certitude, p. 25 0. The author states that Froude wa"S"""representative of that school of rationalism which applies reason too strictly to matters of faith and religion. 26

not to be sha k e~ed f rom his strong convictions and he re­ mained a religious sceptic until his death in 1879 )5 / Despite their intellectual differences, t he relation- ship betl1een NeWman B,nd Froude always remained war m and friendly. Froude 'fras not a scoffer nor an iconocla st, but an English gentleman, and "the gentleman counted much with Newman."36 He was not a tough minded scientist on the war­ path against religion, rather, he possessed a sincere desire to discover whatever truth there was in religion.37 As a result, Newman and Froude \-le re always open and respectful of one another's positions. Ever since Newman took the ;roudes into his confidence in his own religious trials th~re remained a close bond between him and the entire fam­ ily. Newman was largely responsible for Mrs. Froude and four of the Fraude children's conversion to Catholicism. This proved to bea great trial for ivilliam, but it never \ caused any real strife between Newman and him. Such was the relationship of the t .wo men who argued so forcibly about the evidence for religious faith a'nd the possibility of its cer- titude. Their entire correspondence revolves around the question

35Harper states: "In spite of his softness of personal manner, Froude never relinguished his 'tough minded' attitude, and to the end of his life he remained firmly agnostic, scep­ tical even of the possibility of absolute certainty in secu­ lar a s well as religious matters.", Newman, Froude Correspon­ dence, p. 8. 36- Ibid., pp. 10-11. l7Ibid. 27

of 'the evidence for faith a nd its certitude. As a scientist Froude first examined the evidence and then concluded c!ccord- ingly. To hi m t h e credi bility of one's judgments were only as forceful as the evidence which one could bring in support of it. Taking a dictum from Faraday, F'roude subscribes to the following statement: ••• the force of certainty of our conclusions ought to be proportioned to the force of the ~vidence by which they are supported.)8 In effect, this made all our judgments probable, mor. or less so as the evidence was stronger or weaker. This is the con­ text in which Froude subscribed to Butler's phra.se, "To us, probability is the guide of life."39 The human mind could

never go beyond probability in its search for truth. For Froude there was no p08sioilityof any real certi­

tude. In no realm of thought could the human min

)a...... lbid ., p. 139 • 39I~id., p,. 125,. 40-Ibid., pp. 119.. 20. 28

\Im ich i s never absol ut el y concluol ve , and. theref ore i t s j u,dg- mente can never be uncondi t iont\l or truly cert8.in. I ccor ding t o Fr oude a ny at t empt of the man of fait h to clai m a cert i t ude beyond the probabil i ty of t he evi dence is not hi ng but pr ejudice and "an i nst.ance of an i mmoral temper or of a n irunoral use of the faculties . ,,41 Fait h al ways r e- mains in the r ealm of probability . or f r oude the only type of f a ith that i s ,'lOrthwhile is one that f ul ly r ealizes t he doubtfulnes s of its co nclusi ons, yl9 t "acts neve r theless con­ f idently on the best and wisest conclusion it can form••• ,,42 f aith and doubt ar e c oncomitant. The best the mind seems to be able to arrive at is a f a i rly certain opi nion. To clai m thGl t f aith reaches cer titude i s nonsense. The mi nd " accord­ i ng to Froude, ca n ne ver arrive at certi tude about a nything. Our conclus ions al ways must remai n probabl? and the mind !'!lust be ever open to a ccopt new evidence. Both fo rms of rat i onalism, What e1.y' s brand ana t he type t hat Frouds r epr esents, a ttack cer t i tude hecau se it produce:s an assent which goes beyond the probability of its evidence. As sent 15 thus made proporti ona te to the evidence. Evidence become s t he all i mportant eleme nt in aSlJentj if the evidence is there J t hen the mind wi ll be ovorwhel med and a ssent will automa tically follow. But since t he evidence provided through t he i nfer enti al process is a l ways condi tional, more or l ess credible, subject to modification, and admitting

41Ibid., pp. 121-22. 42Ib1d ., p. 122. 29

degrees, then, t.'1e assent, proportionate to such a n i nf er ence, r will also be conditional and subject to degrees. The possi- bility of an unconditional assent , and therefore a real cer­ titude in faith , or any matter , is denied. Newman vehemently opposed t his a spect of rationa lism . He knew that he possessed certitude within his own mind, and . he knew that the ordinary believer possGs sed a si!nila r certi- tude. He proposed to show t hat t his certitude was valid . To do this, he had to show how the mind could go beyond the probability of the evidence to a certain assent . This ~eant showing that evidence was riot the all important element in the assent of certitude, ~nd that other factors, factors wi~in the person, entered into the process of a.rri ving at certitude. \,y'hat these factors are shall be seen in the following chapters. )0

/

THE UNIVERSITY SERMONS IN DEFENSE OF CERTITUDE

Newman's encounter with rationalism was a progressive and developing phenomenon; so a lso was his answer to rationalism's attack upon faith and his defense of ~ertitude. As a result, the explication of Newman's endeavor to rescue faith and its

certitude from the error of rationalism is a ~ather complex and burdensome task. Admittedly the devision of Newman's life into two specific periods, his Anglican days and his life as a Catholic, greatly oversimplifies the progression of his thought. However, for the sake of consistency, and in order to show the development involved in his thought, the same procedure shall be followed in tracing Newman's justification of certitude.

In answering Whately's brand of rationalis~, which sub­ jected the truths of faith to the test of strict reason, New­ man purposed to show that faith, although it is reasonable, is not a reasoned act directly proportionate to its evidence, and that other factors enter into the complex act of faith which enable it to go beyond the probability of its evidence. The purpose of this chapter shall be to examine Newman's jus­ tification of faith and its certitude which evolved during his )1

struggles with r at ionalism a s a n Anglica.r. . Newman ' s repl y to ! this t ype of rat ionalisr£l i s contained prima r i l y in his Oxford University Sermons . 1 Before going i nto further detail on the notions of faith and certi tude f ound in t he University Sermons, it will be use­ ful to I'::i ve a. f ew interpr et ative principl es. Fi rst of all, Newman's method i n t he Sermons i s experiment al.2 The Univer­ si ty Sermons are a l aboratory i n which Newman t ested and worked out his t hought on faith and its relatedness to reason. His thought contained therein was the outcome of accident al 'Nrit­ ings strung out l oosely over a period o f about ten years, from ) 1S) 1 to 1$ 41 • Newman does not even start out with a tenta- tive'. definition of faith.4 He begins with expe rience and with faith and its certitude as fact s exis ting within hi mself and others. A second principle flows f rom the first. As po inted out, the University Sermons extend over a pe riod of years. Conse­ quently, the noti on of faith f ound in them i s not a st atic one

1Newman •s answe r to Wha t ely' s t ype of r ational i sm i n t he matter of faith i s contained primar i l y, but not excl us ively, in the Oxford University Sermons (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,1 918 ). Much I s contairifl d In hi s Parochial and Plain Ser­ mons (London: Longmans, Green and Co., eight volUiiles, 1920:"24), n1sLectures on Justification (London: Longma ns, Green and Co., 1924) ana In tne t\IC volumes of the Via Media (London: Long- mans, Green and Co., 192)). - 2John A. Elbert, Evolution of Newman's Conception of Faith (Philade~ phia: DolphIn Press, 1932), p. 79. -- :3 lill., p. J? .. 4.Ibid., "They (University Sermons) are an exploring ex­ pedition-Into an all but unknown country and do not even ven­ ture on a definition of either Faith or Reason on starting ." 32

but progressive and evolutionary. An isolated passage cannot be taken as Newman's notion of faith in the University se~mons. His thought on faith is definitely progressive,5 and it can­ not be adequately understood if separated from its evolution­ ary framework. In the University Sermons, Newman's notion of faith grows in accuracy and precision, yet with the last one in 1841 the notion is still incomplete and .unfinished. 6 It has yet to be polished by the thought of the Grammar £! Assent.? In light of this evolutionary nature of Newman's thought on faith in the Sermons, the concrete situation in which this thought develops becomes most significant. In order to appre­ ciate the full dimensions of his thought, one has to be fully cognizant of the existential condition which produced it. Newman was keenly observant and always open to the concrete situation. His thought can never be completely isolated or abstracted from concrete realities. At time s it is difficult to sa y which influenced the other the most, whether the form

5Ibid., p. )8, Elbert specifies this progression as a graduarTissening or decrease in Newman's opposition to reason. He states tha t in the University Sermons Newman emphasizes the practical aspect of f a ith \

of his thought was specified by the concrete situation or

I vi ce-versa. Awareness of the concrete nature of Newman's thought is the third interpretative principle which must be kept in mind in order t o understand the notion of faith pre­ sented in the University Sermons. The problems with which Newman is faced in the Univer­ sity Sermons are rather complex. First of all he is react- ing against Whately's rationalism, encountered by Newman at Oxford, which subjected the truths of faith to the proof of reason. Newman strongly reacted against this type of rati on­ alism. Faith could never be compl~tely subjected to reason, to do so would reduce faith to a reasoned act, a conclusion of a syllogism. Newman saw the error of t his p,osition and opposed it. In the University Sermons , Newman attempted to show how faith and reason are distinct and yet very much re­ lated at the same time.S In germ, Newman's thesis was that, although faith is a reasonable act, an exercise of reason which can go beyond t~e probability of its evidence to a kind of certitude, nevertheless it is not a reasoned act. Newman proposed to Show that faith is reasonable, but not rea~oned. The affirmation of the distinction between faith and reason introduced another problem, and,that is, how faith can be reasonabl e and yet demand less evidence than reason. This

SIbid., p. 40, "In the University Sermons, therefore he proposea-to complete this conception. He does t his principally by comparing faith to reason itself, showing us, in how far it deviates from the reasoning process and how these deviations are to be accounted for without infringing on the reas9nable character of faith." 34

question involves showing how faith can go beyond the pro- / I bability of its evidence to an assent of certitude. Newman attempts to solve this problem in the University Sermons through the operation of love and what he calls the moral dispositions. Herein lies the heart of Newman's defense of certitude in the University Sermons, but before de l ving into this mat.ter. it will be revelant to examine Newman's analysis of the relationship and distinc'tion betwe~n faith and reason. In examining the University Sermons, it is seen that one of Newman's primary concerns is to ascertain what precisely is the rela tionship between faith and reason.9 Newman's con­ cern for this problem grows out of his own encounter with rationalism. Whately, along with the trend of the times. overemphasi~ed the value of reason, and Newman reacted by toning down the role of reason. In the beginning of the ser­ mon !h! Usurpations 2! Reason, Newman plays down the value of reason in religion and faith. 10 This seems to be Newman's first reaction to rationalism, and it is quite natural. Ra­ tionalism overemphasized reason; Newman's response was to deemphasize it. However, Nevmlan did not wish this deemphasis

9John H. Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the Uni­ versity 2! Oxford (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 19~.--Yn an ear y sermon entitled "The Us-urpation of Reason", Newman proposes "to make some remarks upon the place Which Reason holds in relation to Religion •••• (p. 58). From the titles of two lat~r sermons, "Faith !B& Reason, Contrasted ~ Habits ~ Mind" (p. 176) and "The Nature of Faith In Rera tion to Reason" rp:-202; it is evidentthat thfsis a toPIc of specia! concern to Newman in the University Sermons. 10 ~. t , pp. 55-56. 35

to degenerate into a denial of a pl ace for reason in religion ! and .t,'aith. Reason does ha.ve a pl ace in ma t t ers of faith ~ and it is his intention to find out exactly what is rea son's role 11 in faith. In r elating faith and reason, it is qu ite evident that more than anything else Newman wishes to af firm tha t there is a definite distinction between the t ,OI/O . Newman, i n one of his earlier sermons (1 8J 1 ) ,12 ma intains that any existing opposi­ tion between faith and reason 1s due to a f ailure to understand the distinction between the two. This opposition between Faith and Reason takes pl ace in two ways , when either of the two encro,~hes upon the province of the other. ) Wh en faith is i mposed ullon the realm of reason, and when rea ... son encroaches upon the province of faith, a warfare between faith and reason follows. A true and proper distinction has to be maintained if the two G. re to exist together in harmony. The affirmation of the disti.nction between faith and rea­ son is a simple task; the delineation of the distinction is a more complicated and involved ma t ter. In 1831, Newman 's dis­ tinction between faith and reason is quite Simple and yet rather impreCise. Faith seems to be relegated to rt'.an 's moral nature ,14 while reason is located in ma n's intellectual nature.

11 Ibid., p. 63. 12 .ills!., ttl!!.! Usurpations !21. Reason", p. 54. 1J Ibid., pp. 58-59. 14- -Ibid., p. 59. 36

But the expression of th is distinction is very i mprecise , a nd I therefore the diet i nction remains r a ther nebulous ill With his s er mon Faith and Rea son, Contrasted. a s Habits of .....-. -- -Mind (1 839), the distinction seems to become somewhat clearer. Faith and rea son do not seem to be quite as independent of one another in NeVillan ' s mind &5 they we re in 1 8J 1. Faith should not be considered independent o f reason or as a compl etel y new mode of a.rriving a t truth; the gospel does not alter t he con­ stitution of our nature but elevates a nd adds to it.15 While affirming the role of moral d ispositions in faith ,16 l'Je\'.rl1an denies that faith is but a moral quality.l? He seems to be less willing to emphasize the moral a s pect of f ait h than he was .1n 1831. More emphasis is given to the intellectual as­ pect of faith, the very factor he seemed to pl ay down 1n 1831. The expression of t he di s tinction is much clearer than it was in 18)1. Faith, unlike reason, is not the. conclusion of a process of rea eouing.18 "Fai th, then is not t he same method of proof as Reason.,,19 Because it is supernatural, faith is. therefore, somet h ing higher than reason.20 The t ruths of reason are arrived a t through experience j f s.ith comes t hrough testimony. "As then testimony is distinct from

15 ~., p .H31 . 16 . lblod., p . 1ge .

17 ,..Tb loa' 1 ., p . 182 •

18~iII'Ib' d p . 1'19 • 19Ibid., p . 180. 20lbid• 37

experience~ so is Faith fro m Reason. n21 In another sermon delivered in 1839~22 Newman again/ in­ sists upon t he distinction between faith and reason. Here he grants faith a certain autonomy~ maintaining that it is com­ plete in itself a nd not dependent upon any process of reason. ing previous to it.23 Although the distinction between faith and reason is nffirmed, f ait h , in this sermon~ is quite de­ finitely spolen of as an exercise of reason.24 "Thus Faith is the reasoning of a religious mind ••• tt25 Newman wishes to justify the validity of f ait h as an exercise of reason and takes great pains to defend it against such charges as being "illogical", "a faulty exercise of Re ason", and "the reason­ ing ,of a ';{eak mind. "26 Faith is an exercise of reason, yet it is "distinct from what are called philosophical inquiries, intellectual systems, courses of argument, and the 1ike."27 Although it is a process of reason, faith is not a formal

2~Ibid.- 22 Ibid., p. 202 This sermon entitled "The Nature of Faith In RelatIO'ii to Reason" was delivered just a"Week after--aie ser­ mon "Faith ana Reason, Contrasted As Habits of Mind" previous- ly cited. - --- 23 ~., p . 202. 24Ibid., p. 207. 25 Ibid. J p. 203. - . 26Ibid•• P . 208. 27 Ibid., p. 212. )8

logical reasoning process.28 Faith is not the reasoning of / demonstration, and, as a result, "it will ever seem to the world irrational and despicable ••• ,, 29 However, whatever the objections, faith is a process of reason and is in accord with the psychilogical constitution of the human mind.JO Faith, as a principleo! belief, 1s therefore something entirely natural, i.e. perfectly in accord with human nature. It is not something extrava­ gant or irrational "as i f it were a mere fancy or feeling, which some per­ sons had and others had not" ••• (P.S. I, 190) and it must and does find a legi­ timate place among the other mode. of man's pursuit of trut.h.)1 At this point, it is quite evident that Newman holds that ., faith is "rational"', i n accord with human reason; faith is "reasonable". It io equally certain that by "reasonable"

Newman does not mean "reasoned" t that is, proven by a pro­ cess of strict explicit demonstration.J2 For Newman, faith is "reasonable" but not "reasoned". So far it is evident that faith is a rational process distinct from the logical process of demonstrative reason, but

28 Elbert, Evolution of Newman's Faith, p. 40. "Fa,ith stands opposed to a proceSs of explicit reason, that is, neither in its nature nor in its grounds, does it take on the character or form of a logical process of demonstrative reasoning." 29Newma.n, University Semons, p. 21e. JOElbert,Evolution g! Newman's Faith, p. 22. J 1 Ibid.. p. 16. ,2' ill!1., p . 22. 39

exactly upon what is this di stinction based? It is the answer

( to this quest i on that introduced the second problem whicH New- man faces in the Unive,rsity Sermons, how faith i s able t o go beyond the probability of the evld6nce in the assent of cer­ t i tude? Newman puts hi s f inger upon this when he describes what he calls t he popular view of the distinction between faith and reason)) The reasoning of demonstration requires strong evidence; i n fact , the evidence of demonstrat i on is so overwhelmi ng that the concl usion arrived at demands accep­ tance as true. Faith seems ready to accept less evidence than demonstrative reasoning, and it seems to be quite con­ tent to make its assent upon much weaker evidence t hat rea­ son p.emands}4 That fai t h for Newman does require some evi­ dence 1s certain ,35 but it does r.ot require nearly the evi­ dence found in formal demonstration.36 Row can this be? How can faith require less evidence than reason and still claim to be rational and conforma ble to reason? Newman poses t his question himself and gives the answer. The answer is t hat faith works on wh at Newman calls antecedent considerations and, because of this, it requires

33 Newman , Universi ty Sermons, p. 165. 34Ibid• . 35Sylvester P. Jue rgens, Newman.2!! the p sychOlo~~ ot Faith l!l.!:!l!. Individual (New York: Ma cm1i!in C.o ., 19 ), p. 197. 36N8'11na,n, University Sermons, pp. 253-54. 40

lessev1dence t han reason does. l Faith, then, as I have said, does not delrand evidence 80 strong as is necessary for what is co mmonly co nsid­ ered a rational conviction, or belief on the ground of Reason; and why? For t his reason, because it is mainly swayed by antecedent considerations)7 These antecedent considerations seem to be certain presll.rnp- tions, "previous no tices!! , "prepossessions", and (in a good sense of the word) "prejudices" ,38wh1ch are present within the mind of the believer previous to the act of faith·. The rational groun:ia of fa1th are in the mind of the indiv1dual)9 Asa result of those antecedent considerations the mind is, as it were, predisposed to believe even before it receives the 'evidence, 40 and, for that reason, it can assent upon evidence which is less conclusive than needed for logical demonstratiop. The antecedent considerations thus supply for the deficiency of the evidence and maintain faith as a ,; 'I'M reasonable act.41

------~------37Ibid.,- p. 187. j8-Ibid• 39;Ibid., p. 26 4. 40Elbert, Evolution of NewmantsFaith , p. 64. Elbert points out that in hfs work TWo Essals on Biblical and .Q.u Ecclesiastical Miracles (London: Longmans, Green anno., 1915},Newman 5~tes that antecedent probabilitl can but recommend the eva.dence to our attention (p. 246), Elbert himself states, "Fredispositionsand presumptions, even when they are in accord wi th a religiously-trained conscience» can gi va nothing more than subjective probability more or less great (p. 64)." 41 Ibid •• p. 62. 41

These antecedent consider-ations are, in t urn, r ooted in f (lnd derived from the predisposition of the individual for the reception of religious truth.42 Newman refers to t his pre­ disposition asa "presentiment of mind,,4) or a "moral dispo­ sition" .44 Anteceden t coneiderations are t he produots of the mind of the individual ~lho possesses moral dispositions fa­ vorable to aocepting religious truth. That moral dispositions are operative in faith seems quite evident to Newman • The external evidence f or the credibility of revelation is t he same for all me n, yet why is it that some men believe and others do not? It can.'1ot merely be due to the evidence, for it is the same for all: there must be something within the per~on influencing his acceptance or rejection of religious truth.45 This is the work of the moral disposition. The man with favorable moral dispositions will be predisposed to accept the evidence for revealed truth; the man of bad moral dispositions will be equally biased in his rejection of it. In the judgment of a rightly disposed mind, objects are desirable and attainable which 1rre11g1ous/~n will consider to be but fancies.~

42-Ibid., p. 6) 4) Newman , University Semons. p. 21). 44Ibid., p. 239. 45Juergens, Ne\1man, P ~ChOlo gy of Faith, pp. 164-65. "They believe on grounds witfi1nemselves-,-not merely or rr.ainly on the external testi mony on \'tl.ich religion comes to them." Also see Newman, University Sermons J p. 264, where he states that the rational grounds of faith are in t he mind of the individual. 46Newman, University Sermons, p. 191. 42

Mere evidence alone is not the formative factor i n faith, ra­ ther it 1s the evj.d·ence received with favor abl e moral diipo­ sitions.47 The importance of t he moral d!. s position in t he act of

fait..~ is ~eenby the central pl ace which Newman gives it in t he University Sermons. Faith 1.8 an act of reason "done in a moral disposition" . 48 It is an act of reason which i s the product of a rel igious mind. 49 The moral disposition is the precise factor wh ich distinguishes faith f rom. a process of explicit reasoning and l ogical demonstration and z ives it i ts specific character.50 It i s t he moral disposition which f.i ves "likelihood" to the message. "In fact, it is the crux of the quest i on of the nature of f a ith. ,,51 As t he distinguishing factor between faith and explicit reasoning, it is the presence of t he moral disposition which . enables f aith to accept less evidence than reason. Little evidence seems to be required if the right moral dispositions

47Elbert, &volution of Newman's Faith, p. 67. The moral dispositions seem to be rooted In conscience. Conscience as internal uuthority of faith creates the predisposition for faith. A precise analysis of the relationship between con­ science and the mo ral dispositi.on wo uld be very enlightening, but such an endeavor goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 4SNewman, Un i versity Sermons, p. 239. 49-Ibid., p. 20). 50Elbert, ...... Evolution.;;,;;;,;=-..- -of Newma-n's Faith , pp . 41 and 4) • 51 Ibid., p. 41. 43

are present.52 A correct moral judgment provides the circum - stances in which a faint proof may be more availing than a £trong one. 53 In fact, \...rhe n a man is longing for a revelation from the djpth s of his heart , he requires vtJry feeble evidence -- almost none a t a1l . 54 Ne"\<'t'l:liB n, in suftP ort of this viewpoint, recalls St.

Paul f s definition of faith 8..8 "the substance of t hings hoped for

(Hebr. 11; 1). «'Faith is the realh~ ation that what one hopes a nd wishes to be is true J not "the realizing of things proved by evi­ dence. n55 Its desire is its main e vidence; or as the Apostle expressly g oes on to say. it makes its own evidence, "be!ng the evidence of things not seen.'" In such a view of faith the evidence is subordinated to the mind and not the mind to the evidence, wh ich is s.s it should be. Be­ cause of the moral disposition, the role of evidence in faith is limited. The person is not limited by the probability of the evidence; he can go beyond it. In faith, the evidence is sub­ ordinated to the moral disposition. By pl a cing it in such a secondary position, Newman does not mean to deny t he value of evidence in faith. For Newman faith is ahrays grounded in evidenc·e.57 If faith is to remain

52Juer gens, NEH lman . Psychology!2I. Faith. p . 197. 53 Netiman. Universitx Sermons, p. 191. 54Juer gens. NeWF..an , Psychology E1. F~i th, p . 16,3. 55 Ne\>'man, University Sermons, p. 190. 56-Ibid• 57-Ibid., p. 191. 44

reasona.ble, it must be grounded in evi dence. That Newman. de ... j oands so me evidence f or faith is fairly certain. 58 The nature of t his evidence is not quite so clear, at l east not in the University Sermons. That it is not the evidence of formal de rn onstration~e e ms r at her evident.59 \>ihat it consists of positivtily speaking is a matter of some confusion, a confu­ sion \'ihlch Newman does not seem to be able to r esol v a clearly in t he University Sermons.60 Though the precise nature of t his evidence is somewhat obscure, the necessity of some evi­ dence to maintain the reasonableness of fai t h i s det~nded by Newman's notion of fai t h . Though the precise nature of this evidence brought to b e a~ in behalf of faith is obscure, there is one characteris­ tic wh1ch it possesses about which Nevmlan seems to be certain,

58Juergens, Newman, Psychology of Faith, p. 212. "Newmam does not hold that mere internal eviaence alone can practically prove the divinity of Christianity. There must be at least enough external evidence to ascertain the existence of what claims to be a supernatural revelation." 59-1b1d • 60Contributing to t his confusion is Newma n's seemingly scornful a ttitude towards traditional e.pologetics and miracles. Newman adm1ts that apologetics does have a limited service in creating £~i th (see Juergens, Newman, PS YCholOS £! Faith, (p. 214); however t he. greatly laments the exaggeratI on 0.£ thIs science (see NeHman , Un i versity Sermons, pp . 195-96). As for m1racles, Newman accepts them as evIdence (see .Juergens, li!!­ ~, P$ I C h~ObY of Faith , p . 197 and Newman, University Ser­ mons, p. 1 . ); however, he does not grant them the concluslve­ 'liiS'S that many apologi .sts of hi s day gave to t hem (see Flana­ gan, Newmfm, Faith .!ll£ the Believer t Westminster: Newman Bookshop, 1946). Newman's clearest analysis of what he means by the evidences of Christia.nity does not come until his last chapter of the Grammar !at. Assent. 45

and t hat i s t hat in i tself t he· evi dence of f a it.h is but pro­ 61 babl •• The ground of f aith ii.eams t o be pr obabili t y. Pro­ 62 babi lity i s its life . Faith i s "creat ed in t he mi nd ; not so much by facts,. a s b y probabi l ities ••• 1,6) The evidence upon \"ihich fait h is g r ounded r ert.ains in t he realm of proba­ bility. How t hen can faith , which is gr ounded in evi dence that cannot go beyond probabi lity, be certain'? HO\'J can i t be a ny

GlOre t han ~reo p inion ? Newman t s intention ,.qa s to aff irm t hat f a ith is a oertain kno\d edge, 64 but Wl e t her he a. ct u.e.ll:Y does this in the UrJ iversity Sermons is another ma t ter.65 It is true that by itsel f probable evidence ca n only produce. opinion. Of itself probability cannot produce stability and certitude. That safeguard whioh gives stability to faith is love of

61 Elbert, Evolution pi N~wmants r'aith, p . 57. 62 Newman, Univer,sity Sermons, p. 200. 6)Ib1d., p . 19 1. 64r~1d., p. 298. Here Newman denies t hDt faith judges and dec · es "in the way of opinion". 65Elbert, Evolution of NeWlIlan's Faith, Pit 81. Elbert in­ s ists t hat at dire time Newman' snotion of faith dtd not go beyol.ld opinion. "And what Newman, at t his time J calls 'faith t could not be rated hi gher than me re o.pi nion especially since he gr ounds it on probabilities. tf From my o\'tTI i nvostigat1on it does not seem t hat Newman ever rially considered f aith to be merely an opinion. but that, at the time of the University Sermons. Newman f ound i t very di fficult tv justify t he certi­ t ude he knew faith pos sessed. 4.6

Chri st.66 It gi.ves fait h discipline a nd "protects i t from bi~otr y , credulity , and fanaticism."67 Lov~ seems to cl'ar the air and remove the chaos t hat usually results from pro- babt lity. F'ait h gains its irection , firmness , consistency, and precision f r om love . 6S By gr anting f i r mness and con- sistency, love gives fait a kind of certitude. This theory of certitude is perhaps the weake st el ement in Newman 's notion of faith at t h:!.s time . Newman intends to teach that faith is certain , but does his notion of love ade­ quately explain the. certi t ude of f a ith? That he really res­ cues faith from opinion and probability i s doubtful. His thought on the notion of certitude is not as developed as it will be l at er o,n in his l1fe . 69 At t his period of his lif e,

~e wman's conception of faith dif: ers littlo from an opinion; I!whatever certitude is possessed is merely subjective in character and springs not from evidence, but from 10ve.1t70

66Newman , University Sermons. This iR Newman 's answer in the Univer~it.z Sexmons. "The safeguard of faith is a right state-of heart. This 1s what protects it from bigotry, cred­ ulity, and fanaticism. It is holiness, or dutif ulness, or the new creation, or the s piritual mind, however we word it, which is the quickening and illuminating principle of true faith, giving it eyes, hands, and feet . It is love which forms it out of the rtlrle chaos into an image of Christ; ••• " p. 234 •••• li lt acts , because it is Fait h , but the direction, firmness, consiste!1cy , and preCi sion of its acts, it gains !'rom Love." p.250. According to Elbert, p. S1 , t his is also Newman ts answer in the !!! Media, pp. S7-88. 67-Ibid •• p . 23lh 6S-Ib!d •• p. 250. 69Elbert, Evolut.ion .2f. Newman' 5 Faith, p . 74. 70Ibld.- 4'.

ove does not se em to be <-I satisfactory expla 1'1.ati Qn of t he bi:t- / sis of certitude i n faith.

Such basical ly is Ne'."ffl'lan r :.l notion of fa:' t h i n he Univer-

51 t y ~ _ . ... ~._ answer to the form of r ationali sm Hhich he encountered a s a n Anglican. His primar Y reaction aga i nst r ationalism is to deewphasize r eason affir ming a ll the '.",hile t hat f .n ith is rea sonable , althoup;h not rea soned . Fait h i s not rea soned a ct and, as such , it is di stinct f r om r eason. How- ever, fait h is a rational and rea sonable act, f or i t is grounded in r eason and based upon evidence. Although based upon evi­ dence ., evidence is not the only, nor the pri!!lE. ry, factor upon wh ich the certitude of faith is based. Faith is a certain kno~'ledge, a n assent W1ich goe s beyond the probabi lit,y of t.he evi dence which i s brought to support it. I n t he Univer sity

~ermons. • Newman shows how two other factors. the moral dispo­ siticm of the believer and love, influence the process of cer­ ti tude and enable tile mind to give an assent which goes beyond ':.he proo(:J.bl lity of the eviden ce. Both of the.se factors are rooted within the moral nature of the parson. The explanation of the operation of the moral disposition and its influence in the process of arriving at an unconditional assent in faith 1s

one of the most important observations rthich Ne ..~a n makes in the UnivE!rsity Sermons. III reacting against the Anglican rationalis m, Newman, in the University Sermons, deemphasized rea son and stressed the moral factors within the person which enable faith to go beyond its evidence to an uncondi tional 4e

assent of certitude. How13ver , the Univer sity Sermons do not / conta in Na v.fman' s final wor- d on the justification of certitude.

s pointed out. his t heory 011 the role t hat love pla.ys in arriving a t certi tude is very inadequata . No" n!~ mor e ma-

ure thought ('ILl the justificati on of certitude will not come

he Gr ammar .2£ ..n...... _"'.. "'...... '" 49

/

'l'l1E GRANMAR OF' AS SENT I N DEFENSE OF CERTITUDE

In the University Sermons, Newman faced the errors of Whately and the Anglican liberals; defending faith against r ationalism, he a ttempted to show that, besides rational t there was a highly personal side to faith and its certitude, namely the moral dispositions. Newman insisted upon the reasonableness of faith and its certitude 1n the University

Sermops, yet he was force~ to face the issue again in his controversy with William Froude over the rationality of the certitude ot faith. The purpose of this chapter shall be to show how' in the Grammar ~~A~_ s_s_e_n_t, Newman, reacting against the rationalism of Froude, justified certitude as a valid intellectual process of the mirx1. Froude insi sted that real c erti tude, in any realm of thought was an invalid process of the mind and an immoral use of one's facul ti e s. In the Un! versi ty Sermons, Newman di d not sufficiently explain how the certitude of faith wa,s in harmony with the ordinary reasoning processes of the mind. Rooting the certitude of faith in love, as he does in the University Sermons, Newman did not very satii:factorlly maintain the reasonableness of faith from the point of view of its certitude. 50

The inability of Newman's theory of love as the safeguard of I faith to justify t he certitude of f Bith wa s pointed out i n t.he l ast chapter. Newma n did adequately ma intain the reasonabl e­ ness of t he a ct of f a ith and af f irmed its certi t ude, but, as to the explanation how t his certitude squared with t he r ation­ al processes of the mind, his thought was clearly inadequate at the time of the Uni versi ty Sermons. This inadequacy Glore and more became evident to Newman through his correspondence

~lith the English scientist, William Froude. Froude i nsi sted that the mind could not arrive at real certi tude in any realm of human thought and judgment. Judg­ ments were dependent upon evidence, and Froude mai ntained that . even evidence which seemed most convincing and most con­ clusive might itself be found wanting.1 According to Froude's mentality, there was almost a moral obl igation to doubt every proposi tion am conclusion.2 His doubts were sacred t.o him, and he felt that t hey deserved "to be cherished as sacredly as our be11efs_") It was invalid for the mind to give an 'mconditlonal assent to a ny proposition, and, theref ore, the achievement of permanent certitude became an impossibility. It was this teaching of Froude that brought home to New­ man the insuff iciency of his own expl anation of the certitude

1G • H. Ha r per, Ca rd inal Newman ,a nd William Froude, A. Correspondence (Baltimore: John Ho pniis Pres.s, 193)), p . 9. 2Ibid• j Ibi d., p • 1 21 • 51

of falth. Insisting upon the f allacy of Froude's mode o·f thinking, Newman clearly saw that it was erroneous, but he! did not think it such an easy matter to show how it was 50 . 4 In a letter dated January 2, 1860, Newman, quite candidly admits that he finds it dif ficult to answer Fr oude , and that he is dissatisfied with anything he has written upon the matter so far . 5 Froucle's objections to the reasonableness of certitude has the disconcerting ef fect of pointing out the wea kne saes a nd inadequacies of Newman ' s own explana. tion of the certitude of faith. The Universi ty Sermone; did not produce an adequate explanation of the reasonableness of the certitude of faith, and neither did Newman 's correspondence with Froude. Although NeWIT,sn did not work out a satisfactoryjustif1- cation of the certitude of faith in his correspondence with Froucla, these letters did give the inspiration and direction to his answer which was to come in the Grammar of Assent. As ear~y as 1860, Froude urged Newman to set down an argument in behalf of the certitude of religious bellef.6 tfllat Froude was really urging ttewnan to do was to write the book \\hich ulti­ mately appeared as the Grammar £! Assent . 7 The inspiration

4Ibid., p. 127. "I think it 1s a fallacy - but I don't think 1t"easy to show it to be so." 5 Ibid., p. 127-28. 6 -Ibid... p. 129. 7 Ib ia ., p. 21. 52

for the Grarn.\'lIar 2! Assent grew out of the dialogue on certi­ tude which was carried on in the correspondence between New- man and Froude .

Th~ direction which the answer was to t ake , no less t han the inspiration, Can also be traced to the Newman, Frouds cor­ respondence. In the light of his correspondence \vith Froude.

N e~'I1l18.n 69.\01, once and for all, tha't it \18.5 i mpo ssible to attempt to justify the rea sonableness of the certitude of faith on 8 scientific principles. If Froude , being a scientist who based his whole a pproach to reality upon the prineiples of science" was a sceptic denying allY type of real certitude, then, it was quite evident that tho justification of the cer­ titude of fa:f.th was not to be grounded in a rigoristic appli­ cation of scientific principles. The strict scientific approach depended too much upon the value of the external evidence and not enough on the in­ ternal aspects of certitude. Newman saw that certitude,. an unconditional a ssent, was a highly personal act and that. in addition to evidence , other elements, factors of a more per... sonal nature, entered into the process of arriving at certi.. tude. This is the a pproach that N'e"Vnnanchooses to follow in the Grammar !21. Assent . He looks within the person to see what it is that enables the mind to make an unconditional assent in the face of probable evidence. In this manner he attempts to show how the resulting certitude is valid,

gIbid.,- p. 1". 53

reasonabl e, and perfectly in accord with the processes of the mind . This is how Newman hopes. to justi f y certitude in the _Gr:.;a;;,;;;mma_=-r .2! As sent. The existenoe of the certitude of f ait h , a phenomenon ex­ perienced in himself and t hrough the observation of others, WP S not questioned by N(lwman In the Grammar g! Assent, but accepted as an undeni able fact. 9 It \faS the justification of t hi s oer- ti t ude , a "manifesto" of i ts valiuity ...mti reDsona.bl eness J that

Newman proposed i n the Grammar of Assent. He tiSS Pll r t i cl\ larly ~ - .. . int erested in showinG!;. that t he cortitude of t he ordinary uned- ucated believer, in spi te of his lack of knov

9philip Flanagan, Newma.n, Faith ~ the Believer (West­ minster J Md.: Newman Booksfiop J 1946) J p.~ • 10 . . . Edmond D. Benard, ! Preface !2 Newman's Thl')olo€jY (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1946) J p. '72. In the Grammar of Assent, Newman is not primarily concerned with the sclenti1Tc proofs of Christianity, nevertheless he does not deny them as Benard points out, "Newman does not deny the traditional proofs for the existence of Ood. nor does he depreciate scientific apologetics; he simply maintains that the faith of a man un­ versed in these matters is both certain and valid.u It is a question of understanding the main purpose of the Grammar £! As sent. 54

die . " I n epproa,chi nr-. the problom in / Ne i>-.Jn1an is concerned \rlit l1 s hewing the validity of the m 1 n~ f certitu.de in cone rete rna tterB . 11 The certitude of faith. be­ ing Bueh a concrete certitude , a t least from t he psycholo1t.ical viewpoint, is a VD.lid process of the mind , r a t:l.on;ll and . there­

fore . reasonable . In the Graltlrrl9. r 2l Assent I Na\.... n l.'lrl proposes

to lead t he reader through a vp. ry t~d1ou s and slow procesD to justification of the reasonableness of certi tude. Froude's type of rati onalisr.l, \'1hich gave inspi ration and direction to the Grammar .2! /\s5ent, in denying certitude made assent proportionate to inference. ccordine t o Fr oude the deEr ee of t he aB ~ ent was directly proportionate to the rorce of the evidence provided through the inferential process .

Through his o~m scientific Ob~H) rvati ons, F'roude . ecein!'.. that evidence was ahmys probable and open to change, came t o be­ lieve that the lnind could arrive at no certain conclusion in any realm of thought. That Ne\

the st.rength of assent given to each propos! tion varies ~li th 12 thp. 'strength of the inference on vmich the assent f ollows ; ••• n To go beyond the probability of the evidence t o a certain con- elusion was for Locke, as it was for Proude, an invalid

11Planagan, .Faith -and ==--;;..;..;;,;:..Believer, p. 92. . 12 John H. Newman, An EaseY ill Aid 2! !. Grammar £! Assent (London: Longmans, Green ana., 1m). p. 160. 55

process. Accordlng to Locke , it is not only illogica l, but i mmor al to "car r y our assent abo;re the evidence t hat a Pl"'­ osition i s true . ,,1; NeNman could not go along wit h t his p. n- lysis. To h:i.!ti this i nterpretation of the relationshi p be­ tween inference and assent seemed "theoretical and unreal.,,14

Thr ough his own observation of experience, Ne w'IDan re~ , ­ lized t hat in mo ny concrete matt ers tho ~:\ i nd gave its unc on- dl t ional assent Cven "'Then the evidence was not absolutel canclua! va or l OFl: i cally de:nonstrative. Such co ncrete pro­ ositions as nB ritain is an i sl and," or "I shall die," are adherG d to by t he mind wi t h cerUtude even t hough only prob­ able arguments can be br ought i n support of them. 15 These roposi tior.s cormot be proved conclusively or demonstrat ed lORically, yet the mind assents to them with certitude. Trust­ i ng the oper~ tio n of t he mind \m ich experience t aught him to be r eal, Newman , in opposition to Froude D,nd Loc ke,16 believed t hat t his certitude wh ich went beyond t he probabi lity of the evidence \'i2 S ju::>tifiable and in accord with the rational pro­ CG ssea of the human mind. Experience t augh.t t hat an inferen­ tia l process which produced only pr obable evidence could pro­ duce an unconditional assent of certitude. It ws s this t hat

1) lQ.!9. •• p. 163 .

141.bJ:.2.. J p. , 64 • 15-Ibid., p . 294-301. 16Flanagan. Fa i th a,nd Believer, p. 93. According to Flana­ gan' s interpretation, Newman agrees with Locke and Froude that such certitude goes beyond the evidence, but he differs with t hem in that he holds it to be justif ied. 56

led Newman t o the heart of his explanati on of carti t ude, the distinction between inference and assent. I The distinction between inference and assent was the foun- dati on upon which Newman built the rest of hi s explanation of tbe defense of certi tude. That this was a key i nsight can be seen from Newman' s own evaluat i on of it. At l ast, Wh en ,.1 was up a Olion over the Lake of Geneva, it struck. me: "You are wrong in beginning with certitude .. certitude is only a kind of assent - you should begin with contrasting assent and inference. t1 On t hat hint I spoke findi ng it a key to my own i deas. f7 The importance which this distinction played in Newman's thought in the Ora n~ r £l Assent can be seen in the fir st chapter where he outlines the method and purpose of the book. 18 An under­ standing of his analysis of assent and inference is essentiel to the understanding of Newman's justification of the reason­ ableness of certitude. From an exami nation of Newman's analysis of inference and assent, it is evident that he considered the two to be both related and distinct. They are related in this, that inferenoe is a necessary condition of assent and precedes it; acts of assent require previous acts of inference as "sine qua non"

17John H. Newman, Autob1ofiraahical Writin~s, ed. by H. Tristam (New York:Sheed andsr:, 1957), p. ~O taken from an article by J.D. Bastable, The Germination of Belief with­ in Probability According to NeWman, PhilosophiCal Studies;­ TVol. II, pp. 81-111 ), p.-ro4. 18 Newman, Gramma r 2! Assent, p. 7. 5'7

conditione. 19 However, their relationship is not one of cause and effect.20 A cause should be proportionate to its ef~ct, but, as pOirlted out, in many cases the assent goes beyond t he inferential process. If the relationship were one of cause and effect, the eff ect would be greater than the cause in many cases. An act of assent requires an act of inference, but there does not exist a relationship of strict proportionality between the two.. As sent can go beyond inference and here is the basis of the distinction between the two. Inference is always probable and conditional, but assent can go beyond the probable evidence to an unconditional acceptance of the pro­ position. As sent is unconditional, whereas infere:lce is con­ di ti,onal. 21 Newman's analysis of assent and its relation to certitude was explained in the first chapter, now it remains to explicate his notion of inference. Inference is a process of rea,soning, either implicit or explicit, whereby the mind proceeds from premises to conclusions and the conditional adherence to that conclusion. In the Grammar of ...A.-s.-se .. n..,t ... , Newman distinguished three phases ot inference, natural, informal and formal. Formal inference is a process of verbal reasoning;22 not as opposed to mental reasoning, but as attempting to express,

19 . Ibid •• p. 20. 20Ib1d .• 21 - . Ibid •• p . 8. 22- lbid. ~ pp" 263-64. 58

as adequately as possible, the reasoning in words . Logic and syllogistic reasoning are t he scientific expression of t his type of inferenee.23 The more abstract and notional the pro­ position involved in this type of reasoning process are, the more effective does this reasoning become . 24 Formal infer­ ence, whose most adequate expression is found probably in mathematics,25 is more at home in the realm of mental ab- stractions. But, since t he "abstract can only conduct to abstract,,,26 this reasoni ng process breaks down in the matter of ascertaining concrete facts. In concrete facts, formal inference can only conelude probabilities and for two reasons: "first because its premises are assumed, not proved; and secondly because its conclusions are abstract and not con­ cret~. 27 Formal inference cannot lead the mind to certitude in concrete matters.28

23 ~., p. 264. 24~., p. 265. " ••• , -in oc.her words, the nea,rer the propositrOris concerned in the inf erence app,roach to mental abstractions, and the less they have to do with the concrete reality, lind the more closely they are made to express exact, intelligible, comprehensible, communicable notions, and the less they stand for objective things, that is, the more t hey are the subjects, not of real, but of notional apprehension, -SO! much the mora suitable do they become for the ' purposes of inference." 25Ibid., p. 278. Newman points out that even ma thematics can be SUbject to i mpe rfections in its process of investigation.

26 Ibid., p' .• 2 6~o. 27Ibid., pp. 268-69. 28 l£!£., pp. 278-79. 59

The method by wh ich t he mind is able to become certain of wha t is true :i.n the concrete is through that reasonini process which Newman r eferred to as infor mal inference. In­ f ormal inference is a reasoning process whi ch conve rges t o­ ward :i conclusion, from probabi lities wh ich "arise out of t he / nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review.29 The premises of this mode of reasoning are concrete and individual, varying with dirferent minds,30 and t hey cannot be reduced or converted to the abstract premises 1 upon which formal inference is bHsed.3 I n t his reasoning process, the conclusion is not actually att ained, but, as it were, foreseen and predicted;)2 its premises do not "touch it logiCally,")' but "converge to it.,,'4 Though this is the process of inference that reaches truth in the concrete, it does not supersede formal infer­ ence, but is "one and the same with it.")S Informal infer- ence, however, is no longer in the realm of abstraction, but reaches into the realities of the concrete and individual case)6 Furthermore, informal inference, more or less

29Ibid., p. 2$8. 30Ibid· •• p. 2 93. 31 ~., p . 288. 32Ib1d.., p.321. 331!?!,g. 34-Ibid• '5 Ibid., p. 292. 36Ibid • 60

implicit.3? co nsiots of several acts and is recognized by a pro ce ss , which distingutshes it from natural inference, another mode of arrivinp; a t truth i n t he concrete. Iatural inference , which reasons from concrete facts to concr~te fa cts without any medium between the antecedent and t he consequent,3S i s an instinct i ve process of reasoning in the concrete. Contrasting the two, na tural i nference seems to be less conscious t ha.n infor mal inference .39 In fact. natural inference is almost totally unconscious and non­ reflective,40 therefore, it is difficult to express exactly its nature. Since inf ormal inference. is the most proper way to truth i n the concrete, little more will be said of natural inference. Re turning to infor ma.l inference, it, like all inference. is conditional t o the extent that its conclusions are depen­ dent upon. its premises.41 Informal inference is the most adequate process of arriving at truth in the concrete, how- ever, since it remains conditiona~. it is not assent, for assent 1s always unconditional. This being the relationship between in£erence and assent, how then does the mind , in con­ crete ~~tters. move through informal inference which 1s

3?Ibid.- .38 Ibid., p . 330.

19Francis Bacchus, l:!2!! to Read ~ "Grammar 91. Assent t tf !h! Month (CXLI!I. February,-r9~ p. 11).

40Newrnan , Grammar aL .-A;,;;os.. s.-e ... nt... , p. 332. 41 Ibid .• , p . 293 . 61

condi t.ional to an assent whi ch is unconditional and certain? / This basically is t he question, how does the mi nd arrive at truth in the concrete, \n t h wh ich .Newman began the G l~amma r of Assent. Up 'to thi s point he has mere,ly expressed the prob- l am i,n: terms of inference and assent . Assent t i n concrete ma t ters, i s preceded by informal i nference whose co nclusions are conditional to the extent t.hat they are probabiliti es converging toward a tl""uth. In making a j udgment of truth in t he concrete, the mind moves f rom the evidence of converging probabilit1e s to a.n assent rdhich is unconditional and certai n . Obviously the evidence , which is only conditional., cannot of itself produce a certain assent, t he connect i on between con­ di tional i nference and. unconditional a .seent mus t be f ound elsewhere. For Newman the answer was found i n the activity of the living .mind which can read the evidence, and then look beyond to a point which t he evidence can indicate , but wh .i ch it can­ not quite l"ec1ch. 42 I t is no t t he argument t hat reasons ; rather, 4 it is the mind - the whole man . .3 Although the evidence it- self ca.nnot demand certitude. t he mind can interpret the evi­ dence and see the true a nawer. 44 Therefore , certitude is not generated by t he evidence, but by the activity of the living

42Flanagan, Faith and Believer, p. 95. 43 Ne WIl".a n, Grammar.2!. ltssent, pp. 31 8 and 353. 44Fl an&gan, Faith !!lS! Believer. p. 10,3. 62

raindwhich can recognize the ne ce ssar y connection between the ( accumula tion and convergence of the evidliHlce and tha truth of the conc lusion .l~5

'l.'his faculty by which the living mind arr'ivee at certi­ tude in concrete matters Ne\'ilP.an calls the Illative Sense. I have already said that the sole a.oo final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matters is comm itted to the pe rsonal action of the r atiocinative faculty , the perf ection or virtu.e of which, ~ have called the Illative Sense •••• + The Illative Sense is the sole !1' criterion1! for discerning truth in the concrete.47 It is the Illative Sense which accum­ ulates the probable evidence. perceives the probabi lities a s a vth,ole, 48 recognizes that the conclusion toward. which they converge cannot be other t han true,49 and then judges the con­ clusion to be true . Through the operation of the Illative

ansa the mind pa5SGS from probable evidence to a jud~ment of -ruth in the concrete.50 Going beyond the premises, the Illative Sense leads the mind beyond the probability of t he evidence to the conclusion

45 -Ib id ., p. 101. 46.Ne \"JOan , Qrammar $1!. Assent, p. 345. 47 Ibid• 48 Ib:\d. , pp. 301 and 321. 49Flanagan, Faith -and ------Bel iever, p. 101. 50Newman, Grammar E.! Ass en~, p. ;21. 63 of a truth . , i s is not to sa y t hat t he Illative Sense needs no evidence.51 o\<-l€ver, the evidence, wh ich is pr ovirl l through i nfol'lual i nf erence, i s a l wa ys proba ble and can ne ver of i tself conclude t o a t .rutb . Pr obable evidence can onl y tend to ~~ard a conclusion. s the polygon , \,fh ich i s inscribed i n a circle t ends to become tha t circ le etS its si d~ s a r e diminished, but va nishes before it coincides 'l'1ith the circle, neve r gets be-

~ nd a tendency to be come a circle s o a lso probable evidence 52 neve r gets beyond t he tendency to co nclude to a truth . But the Illative Sense can l ead the mind beyond this tendency ~o a conclusion t o a truth. In comprehending the premises, the Illative Sense perceives t he l egit imate conclusion in a nd th roueh t he premises;53 it retl ohes a conclu.sion abov~ and be­ yond the probable evidence.54 Through the Illative Se nse the mind can arrive a t truth in the concre,te. It can do thie be-

51 Fl anagan, Falth and Believer. p. 105. Newman never de­ nied that the IllatIve ~ense needed evidence to function. Fla­ nagan speaking of the lllative Sense haa this to 58.Y . "It acts under the influence of the evidence. and judges \'ihether or not the truth of the c onclusion is demand.d by the presence of that evidence. which it grasps not in its d.istinct parts but t aken as a ~rhole." (p. 105). However, t he evidence \'1ith which it functions 1s probable ,and for that rea son Newman insists that the chief external evidences for Christia.nity are not mir a cles, but the cumulation of converging probabilities. Juergens, Newman, PSlchology 2! Faith, p. 217. 52wewman . Grammar ~ Assent, pp. 320-21. 53 Ibid., p . 301. t:4- "I Ibid ., p. 316. 64

cause it has the poweL' to l ead t he Hlind beyond t h e probability of the evidence and to rele ~ s e it from a sl s. vish depende.,£c upon its premises . In concrete matters t he mind can go f ro conditional inf erence t o unconditionol a ssent , it can g O bo- ond probability to cer·ti t ude and the re • it can is due to that intellectual power known as t he Illa tive 8 6113 e . That Newman conside:red the Illative 3ens6 an intellectual

unction 1s qulte clear for he refers to it os the po ~,;er of judging and c oncluding in its perfection. 55 It is not just a feeling or moral quality, but a rationcimtive faculty ,56 valid function of the mind. he Illative Sense , as an o per~ - tion of the i ntellect. is a faculty of knowing ; a cap3city for knowledge .57 Being an intellectual function and a power of knowing, the conclus iOfl.S of the Illative Sense are not merely practical, but judgments of ~ruth . Therefore, the Illative is a rational operation, perfectly in accord wit h the reasoning pI'ocess es of t he mind . whereby the mind concludes to a truth in concrete matt e r s . 'rhe Ill a.ti va Sense i s the justification of the m.ind's Qrrival a t truth in the Concrete. Not only 10 the Illative Sense an intellectual proces",. but it is a highly personal j udgment. Newman himself describes

55 I hi d. ., p .. 3 53~ .. 56 "'1" -lM '145 ~ •• p. '" .. 57 J . J\ rtz, Ne wman Contr i.bution To Theory .2! KnowledSje, PhilosophY 'roday, Vol. IV, (pp. 12-2;; 1960), p. 19. 65

c: the activity of the Illative Sense aa pe.csonal acti o.. ! . J I To act like a pel' SOH ~ na t one's act i ons express t he

innermost uniquene~ s of h.is inciividual concrete existence.

s a person one 1.5 unlque ; ere is no other like hi m - no one to re pl ace hi/J . o personal is the judgoent of the Ill ative Sense that it is i nd ividual to each man .

t i .8 seated in t he mind of t he individual f who 1s thus his own law t his own teacher, and his own judgo in those special ca~~s of duty which are )er60na1 to him.

'1'he judgrnent of the Illa tive Sensa is some ~/h a t unique wi t h

84l c h man , reflect-illg hil;) own individuality aa ud f or t his reason Boekraacl de scribes t. he Illative :::l anse as 60 L eing ealPflatica.l 1y porsonal .

As a highly p~r8 onal act ivity, ano~le r aspect of the I lla tive Sense can be ltleertecl here. a m , that is , t hat the

jud ~~ent of the Illative Sense is alwa ys free. This , i n turn,

leads to 11 second functlon of the Illative Sense , its role as the sanction of assent . To say tha.t t he Ill ative Sense is the sanction of assent is not t o say that it provides r eward and

punishment , but t hat it pr ovides ~~e motive for the free

58r:e tlll1an, GI'ammar of Assent,' p. 355. !" lanagan also gives evidence to the fact that Newman considered the I llative Sense to be an operaticn of a personal nature, Flanagan, Faith !!!S! Believer, p. 105. 59lB.!...., d p. 254. 60A•J • Boekraad, .It!..! Personal Conquest £! Truth According 12 ~ Newman (Louvaln: EdItIons Nauv/elaerts, 1955), p. 302. 66

assent of the person . The Ill ~tive SensCI can f unction s s a / sanction pr eci s el y because it l eads the mind to truth and t o r efuse a ssent :'n the f a ce of obvious and e vident t 1'ut h is a vio1at ~_ on of t he facultie s of th0 mind . Uhon confronted \.'l i th truth a !'!lan has u duty to asscIlt ;61 i n f.:let , NQ'l'mall considered it a fundamental I t.HI of ti~ e mind to a8s ent in the face of truth . 62 This is not a destruction of man' s freedom, but i ts h i ~~e s t expreSS ion , for a man i ost f ree ,,{hen he chooses the t r uth . By l eadi.ng the mi nd to t ruth and the n illduc in its a ssent » t he :::llativc Sense become s the br idge by ~.,h ich the mind P.!l 5S6S f r om ccnditional inference to an unc.:onditio"- a l assent to t r ut h in the concrete .

Unconditional as~en t i n the concret e is t hus a valid operatlon of the mind; it i s r ooted in t he mind , in the 1n- tellectual p o w~ r of the I lla tive Sense , and i s t.heref'oJ."'$ per­ fectly in har mony Ylith t he r ational a ctivity of the human mind . r om t he psycholog ical point of' view, faith is also a n assent to truth in the conet'ste , and. from th.is po i nt of vie". i ts r ationa.lity i s also rooted in the Illative Sense . Therefore , t he assent, of f aith is r a t i onal and i n a ccord vd ,t h the r eason- i ng pr oce ~ses of t he mind , but a r ational procEl se that i s hi ghl y personal .

The mind t the,n, can go beyond the probability of the e vi­ dence to a cer tai n conclusion , because of the a ctivity of the

1 'lJl!'£:n Gr a.mma r of As sent, p . 41 2 . Ne t -- ...... ;;;..;;;.= 62l bi d.t p. 347. 67

Illative Sens.e , 1 i,a a personal Udg:m€ilv . Certitt:.de . I thu s j"1lB tified on the b(", sis of the jud.t:... ne nt f t he Ill .s: t ..l. ve Sense t.(aich is inter ':'or and in the person. In t he Ill a - tive Sense Ne .. IIMtn s a p~H~ tellectual [ector which j ustifies the rat.ionelHy of certitude and aIlS,'lers the ra- tiona11stic ob j ections of Froude and others t Lat certitude is irrational - an invalid pr ocess of the mind . Such basic- ally is New1llan's jusi.,ificatio .9i J\ ssent • 68

I

CONCLUSION ! NE\'l1\1J\N ' S JUSTIFICATION OF CERTITUDE AN D ITS CONS EQ UENC ES

The purpose of this thesis has been to show ho w Newman justified the certitude of faith. Approaching the problem from 'the point of view of the analogy between the psycholo­ logj,cal and supe rnatural, t he psychological aspect of certi­ tude was vie\1ed as the analogue and basis of the supernatural reality of the certitude of f aith. The justification of the certitude of faith has, then, been limited to a justification of t he psychological process 'by which man arrives at certi­ tude, in faith and any other realms of thought. But a justi­ fication of the psychological a spect of certitude is indeed a justification of the certitude of faith in its totality. By justifying the assent of certitude to truth as a natural process, one provides the basis for t he justification of the assent of certitude to supernatural realities. In order to justify the assent of certitude on the psy­ chological dimension, Newman had to show how man could go beyond the probability of the evidence to an assent of certi- 69

tude - how conditional inference could produce an uncondi­ tional assent: Since the evidence which inference produ£ed was only probable and could not ef fect the unconditional assent of certi tude of itself, there must be other factors involved in the process of arriving at certitude. In attempt­ ing to show how man could go beyond the probability of the evidence to a certain assent, Newman looked for other factors vmich were involved in certitude. By j ust i fying the process whereby man could give unconditional assent upon conditional inference and probable evi dence, he would thereby be justi­ f ying certitude in its psychological dimension . Therefore, t he discovery and explication of t hese other f act ors were essential to Newman' s jus tification of the certitude of faith. In his writings in defen se of the assent of f aith against r~ tionali~m , Ne\;.m.an came up with two such f a ctors wh ich enabled man to go beyond the probnbility of the evidence t o an assent of certitUde. These two factors, already explained in the text, are the moral disposition and the Illative Sense. Both factors are reali tie s that are internal and wi thin the person making the assent of certitude, and both are presented by Newman as elements wh ich enable a ma n to go beyond the pro­ bability of the evidence to an assent of certitude. The moral disposition is a personal state or frame of mind which pre­ disposes a person to believe and enables him to assent on pro­ bable evidence - to accept l es s 0 e vi d ~n ce than reason does.1

1See Chapter III, p. 42. 70

On the other hand,the Illative Sense is that personal in­ tellectual judgment wh ich leads one from probable eVide/ce to an unconditional assent of certitude. Both the moral disposition and the Illative Sense are elements which are internal and personal. In its psychological dimens i on , then, certitude is not justified primarily by the weight of the ex­ ternal evidence, but by the internal personal f actors that are involved in the process of arriving at certitude. As the justification of certitude in its psychological dimenSion , the moral disposition and t he Ill ative Sense are, therefor e, the justification of the certitude of faith i n its total di- men.s10n. : From the development of t he moral disP03ition and the Illative Sense in his def ense of certitude, two other i mpor­ tant consequences are observable. 'rhe first is that Newma n in his defense of certitude always tried to maintain a balance between the intellectual and moral aspects of faith. It is true that at time s, in order to meet the demands of the con­ crete existential situation, he emphasized one aspe ct more than the other; but never to t he extent of de.nyin~ the other. In the University Sermons \

they actually destroyed faith ), Newman, the refor e .; in ans\"Jer­ ing this error had to ploy down the intellectual or r ati{nal aspect of faith and emphasize the moral. The existential situation demanded such an answer. But even in the Univer- sity Sermons, Newman also insists upon the rational and in­ tellectual aspect of faith. Maintaining that faith is truly an exercise of reason;2 Newman describes it as the "reasoning of the religious mind . ,,3 He takes great pains to defend faith against charge s of being irrational and unintellectual.4 Although Newman emphasizes the moral aspects of f31th in t he University Sermons, it is evident from his insistence upon

the r-easonableness of fa it~ . that, in his notion of fait h , he

is ~eek ing a balanced concept involving a n interpl ay between the moral and intellectual aspects of man .

In the Grammar £! Assent with ~~e explication of that personal intellectual pOl'ler of judging and concluding truth v/hich he calls the Illative Sense, Newman tends to emphasize the rational and intellectual aspects of faith. Aga in the background or environment in \\tJ.ich he is ""riting specifies the emphasis of his response. Here Newman is defending C'9r­ ti tude against the rationalism of F'roude who maintained that

certitude, in fai t h or any other realm of thought, ~1as ir- rational and an i mmoral use of man's intellectual powers. In

2 John H. Newman , Fifteen Sermons Preached Be fore the University £! Oxford (London: Longma ns, Green and Co.,~1g), p. 207. 3ill!., p. 203. 4See Chapter III, p. 37. 72

answering this type of objection, Newman quite naturally em­ phasized the intellectual aspect of faith; he was trying/ to show that its certitude was i ntellectual and rational. How- ever, in emphasizing the intellectual aspect of faith, NeMnan, attempting to maintain a balanced notion of faith , does not fail to mention the moral aspects of faith. The Illative

Sense is itself uniquely pe rsonal ~md individual involving man totall y, in his moral as well as intellectual p Ol.... ers .

Toward the end of the Grammar ...... of Assent , Newman restates the importa.nce of the predispositions of the mind, the ral dis- position, when he sets do wn specimens of the state of mind which he demands of t hose who would seriously inquire into t he .. truth of Chris tiani t y . 5 Therefore, neither in the Uni,versi ty Sermons , nor in the

Grammar £1. Assent, did Ne~.,rr.an sepa rate t he moral and intellectual aspects of faith . Because of t he concrete situation he mi gh t have emphasized one more than the other, but he al.oJays sought a balance, affirming that faith was both an intellectual and moral act - an activity that involved the tot al man, a response of the whole person. This leads to the second consequence which can be drawn from Newman 's development of the moral dispOSition and the Illative Sense in his justification of certitude, and, that 1s, that Newman's notion of faith , from the point of view of the beli~ver, is a co mmitment of response involving the whole

5 Ibid", pp. 417-18. 73

person - all t he phases of his being . Certitude engages man l in his intellectual a nd moral powe rs; for Newman this means that the whole pe rson is involved in thE:: assent of certitude. Newman, never defined f aith in terms of a personal cO lil.mittment, but t hr oughout hi s writings in the de f ense of f ait h and its cer titude, he describes faith in personal terms . The moral

disposition and the Illative Sense are both factors that i illustrate Newman 's consciousness of the personal nature of f aith and i ts certitude. There is little do ubt that for New- man faith and its certitude were deeply personal acti vities. I ndeed, it wa s t hr ough the }.Iersonal qualities of t he moral disposition and the Illative Sense t hat Newman justified the " cer ti tude of fa ~ t h on t he psychologi cal dimension. This justification of certitude on the psychological dimension showed t hat certitude involved man in the total dimension of his being - hi s moral and intellectual capacities, in order that man might go beyond the probability of the evidence to an assent of certitude. As the foundation and basis of the supernatural reality of faith , whose ultimate certitude is the Word of God, the justification of the psychological di­ mension is indeed a justification of the certitude of faith in its totality, the psychological and supernatural dimensions. Such, in sumcr.a tion, is the manner in which Newman justified the certitude of faith and defended faith and its certitude against t.he errors of rationalism. 74

l

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