MScBA Master’s Thesis

The Management of a System Innovation: Process Promotor, Trust, Public Meetings and Legitimacy A Case Study of Blauwestad

By

Marieke Tillema

1st Supervisor: Dr. H. Snijders 2nd Supervisor: Dr. T.L.J. Broekhuizen

University of Groningen Faculty of Management and Organisation MSc in Business Administration Strategy and Innovation

December 2006

PREFACE

This study has been carried out at the Faculty of Management and Organization of the University of Groningen and is the final part of the Master Strategy and Innovation. The main issue of this Master thesis is to give an overview of success factors for managing the preparation phase of a system innovation.

I would like to thank the people that have helped me writing this thesis. First, I owe many thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Hendrik Snijders, whose theoretical insights, help, and feedback were very valuable to the research. I also would like to thank Dr. Thijs Broekhuizen for his input as second supervisor. Furthermore, I want to thank all the respondents, which were willing to collaborate: Mr. Van den Burgh, Mr. Jansema, Mr. Kleine, Mr. Knijpstra, Mr. Puijman, Mr. Steentjes, Mr. De Vries, Mr. Van der Werf, and Mr. Zeevaart. At last I thank my father and Abe for making some grammatical corrections.

Groningen, December 2006

Marieke Tillema

2 ABSTRACT

The subject of this research is the management of system innovations. A system innovation is an integral renewal that demands the share of knowledge and different skills, and involves a broad range of stakeholders. By means of a case study of Blauwestad, a new land use project in the east of the province of Groningen, it is investigated which factors could influence the success of a system innovation. We only pay attention to the preparation phase, which takes place one step before actual realisation and in which resources are obtained and actors are involved. The existence of a process promotor, trust, public meetings, and legitimacy are all factors considered in this study.

Key words: System innovation, process promotor, trust, public meeting, legitimacy

3 CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 5

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...... 9 1.1 Promotors...... 9 1.2 Trust ...... 12 1.3 Public Meetings...... 14 1.4 Legitimacy ...... 16 1.5 Conceptual Model...... 18

3 METHODOLOGY ...... 21 3.1 Case Study Methodology...... 21 3.2 Sampling ...... 21 3.3 Interview Techniques...... 23 3.4 Data Analysis ...... 23

4 CASE STUDY ...... 24 4.1 Case Description ...... 24 4.2 Blauwestad as a System Innovation...... 27 4.3 Results...... 28 4.3.1 Promotors...... 28 4.3.2 Trust...... 30 4.3.3 Public meetings...... 32 4.3.4 Legitimacy...... 34

5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ...... 36 5.1 Conclusion ...... 36 5.2 Limitations ...... 37 5.3 Further Research ...... 38

REFERENCES ...... 39

APPENDIX ...... 42

4 1 INTRODUCTION

Every period of time knows a large number of major social issues, which ask for new problem solving methods. These problems are embedded in specific institutions, structures and values. To solve these issues, institutions, structures and values have to be changed, and the whole underlying construction has to be overhauled (de Bruin et al., 2003). Examples of such social issues are integral water management and urban renewal. Also, the amount of space required for transportation, economic activities and housing is increasing as a result of the growth of the economy and the population (Hillebrand et al., 2003). Traditional solutions can be improved significantly (Dammers et al., 2002). Within society, traffic, transport and water management incremental improvements take place constantly, but structural problem solving methods do not get off the ground easily (Dammers et al., 2004). In order to cope with the tension between the dynamics of the economy and the quality of space and other social issues it is necessary to make drastic and strategic changes, so-called ‘system innovations’. These innovations will be the subject of this paper. In this study we investigate the case Blauwestad, a new land use project in the east of the province of Groningen.

In order to define a system innovation it is necessary to describe innovation first. In this paper I will use the definition of West & Farr (1990): ‘An innovation is an introduction or application of ideas that is new for a specific industry, organization or group that creates advantages’.

The value of the innovation will be determined by its selectors (Wijnberg, 2004). There are three possible selection mechanisms. The first one is market selection, in which consumers are the selectors and producers will be selected. The second one is peer selection, in which opinions of other producers (peers) determine the outcome of the competitive process. The last type is expert selection. Here competitive success or failure is determined by the opinions of a group of people who are not consumers or producers but who have particular knowledge or expertise (Wijnberg, 2004). In case of the particular system innovation considered in this research, Blauwestad, all three selection mechanisms are present. Potential purchasers of the houses which are built, as well as the building contractors, can be seen as market selectors. However, this group is not considered in this study, since we only look at the phase before the selling of land and houses. Peer selection stems from other project managers who choose Blauwestad as an example, and expert selection is found with independent people who have specific knowledge of, for instance, ground or water projects. Wijnberg (2004) describes different types of innovations. An innovation can involve a product innovation, a process innovation, or both. A system innovation, the specific innovation considered in this research, is an example of a process innovation.

5 The most important characteristics of a system innovation according to literature (Dammers et al., 2002, Rutten & Oosten, 1999, Quist & Vergragt, 2000, Quist & Vergragt, 2004) are: - A system innovation is about ‘integral renewal’ which means that a system innovation does not only involves ‘hard’ innovations, such as machines, but that it also involves ‘soft’ innovations, such as principles, rules and organisation structures; - It encompasses a long time span; - It requires the effort of many and different stakeholders; - It demands a change of perspective and culture by the stakeholders; - It involves a combination of different innovations.

I will define a system innovation as follows (Rutten & Oosten, 1999, Quist & Vergragt, 2004): ‘A system innovation is an integral renewal which exceeds the organisation or sector, which demands the share of knowledge and different skills, and which involves a broad range of stakeholders’

In this paper emphasize is placed on the management of a system innovation. However, the remaining question is how a system innovation could be managed successfully. In this paper the management view on system innovation about the existence of different parties is used to search for answers on the following main research question:

‘What are success factors for managing the preparation phase of a system innovation?’

The research goal is: ‘To gain insight into the success factors for managing the preparation phase of a system innovation and to give recommendations regarding improving this process’

A system innovation can be phased using the six project phases of Kor & Wijnen (2001). These are subsequently: the initiative phase, the definition phase, the design phase, the preparation phase, the realisation phase and the after care phase. In the initiative phase the question is why something must be done to a specific problem. In the definition phase the attainability is discussed and a programme is formulated. In the design phase a project design is made to solve the problem. After these three phases it is clear that the project has started. In the preparation phase people get involved, educated employees are engaged to do their work in the realisation phase and resources are obtained. The decision to seriously consider a project has been made. With that decision a learning process starts that will continue throughout the life of the project for everyone involved (Khan & Gerrard, 2006). In the realisation phase the real work is accomplished. Finally, the after care is necessary to maintain the outcome (Kor & Wijnen, 2001).

6 This paper will emphasize the management of only one specific phase in the process of a system innovation: the preparation phase. The preparation phase takes place only one step before actual realisation, that is, the actual start of the construction work, and many things have to be done to obtain resources, to involve actors and to get a shared vision among the stakeholders. This phase is very important because conflicts and resistance have to be managed which is crucial to get the project started. When considering the case Blauwestad, the preparation phase starts at the moment deputy Beukema declared the project was going to take place, in 1997. It ends in the beginning of 2002, when an execution organisation, Blauwestad B.V., was founded.

System innovations are very hard to manage, because they are difficult to plan and always work out differently. Although system innovations can not be managed to realize complete control, they can be managed to bring about adjustment and influence (Dirven et al., 2002). The outcome of a system innovation is usually the result of bottom-up processes in Western cultures, that is, the aggregated behaviour of the different stakeholders and their choices (Janszen, 2002). Because these stakeholders play an important role in the process of a system innovation, it is necessary to describe them.

A system innovation involves and affects many different parties such as public agencies, landowners, industry and commerce, environmentalists, special interest groups, potential customers, and the community in general. These stakeholders influence each other through interaction and via networks (Quist & Vergragt, 2000). In this paper s takeholders are defined as ‘all those people and organisations that have an interest at stake in a specific topic, problem, solution, field etc which can affect that stakeholder or that can be affected by that stakeholder’ (Quist & Vergragt, 2000, p.4). In case of the Blauwe Stad several stakeholders exist; the province of Groningen, nature organisations (Stichting Groninger Landschap and Staatsbosbeheer), three municipalities (Reiderland, Scheemda and Winschoten), building contractors, water authorities, potential buyers, citizen, landowners and farmers. In this paper the focus is only on a few of these stakeholders, namely the local inhabitants, including farmers and citizens. This is done because from this group resistance was expected to come up. Therefore, it is interesting to see how the project management has dealt with these stakeholders. When there is written about stakeholders in this paper, the group of citizens and farmers is mentioned, unless otherwise stated.

In this research I will search for a number of critical success factors in managing the preparation phase of a system innovation. I will do that using an exploratory and qualitative research method. By analysing different theories on (system) innovation, promotors, decision-making, legitimacy and trust I will attempt to present a set of recommendations on how to improve the management of the process of a system innovation.

7 The paper will comprise two parts. The first part is a theoretical framework, in which I will describe various factors that influence the success of managing the preparation phase of a system innovation. These are: the existence of a process promotor, trust, public meetings, and legitimacy. On the basis of this, I will form hypotheses. In the second part, the empirical study, I will test these hypotheses using a real case: Blauwestad. In the concluding chapter the results of this research will be discussed and some critical pointers and recommendations for future research will be presented.

Methods The theoretical part of this paper consists of an analysis of literature on the topic. An important data source is the catalogue of the university library of Groningen. Literature concerning management and organization studies in particular are relevant here. Furthermore, a lot of documentation is found in the electronic library of Economics, Management & Organization, which contains journals, catalogues and databases. For the empirical part, data are collected by means of a case study. The case study is focused on a Dutch regional (land-use) project; Blauwestad, a project which aims at strengthening the regional-economic structure of the area, to create extra opportunities for the storage of water, and expanding recreational use and quality of nature. This project differs from other new land use projects by its unusual way of development. One reason for this is that various stakeholders are involved who have different opinions. Later on, it will become more obvious why the project is so different from other projects. Empirical data will be gathered with the municipalities and other parties/companies dealing with Blauwestad. I had interviews with various related persons, such as divisional heads and project managers. Case study data are also gathered by means of the Internet and other secondary sources.

8 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several factors influence the success of the management of a system innovation in the preparation phase. These are: the existence of promotors, trust, public meetings, and legitimacy. Throughout this chapter several hypotheses are constructed which will be tested in the next chapter, the empirical part.

1.1 Promotors A system innovation brings forward several problems. System innovations bring together the different interests of many parties (De Bruin et al., 2003), which can be the source of disagreement between these parties. During the preparation phase it becomes clear to what extend conflicts and resistance have arisen, and measures are taken to overcome these conflicts (Dammers et al., 1999). Preventing and overcoming resistance is important during the preparation phase (Vrakking, 1995). One crucial factor in this is the existence of (a) promotor(s) (Hauschildt & Kirchmann, 2001). A promotor contributes to the innovation by sponsoring it, and by emotionally and materially supporting the development process (Markham et al., 1991). In this research a promotor is defined as ‘a role where individuals are strong advocates for a project and generate positive behavioural support for an innovation during its development or work on behalf of the project in the face of organizational neutrality or opposition’ (Markham et al., 1991, p.219).

Some authors label a key person to promote innovations as a champion, while others label them promotor, but they all are the same individual. In literature the need of a key person to promote innovations is well described (Howell & Higgins, 1990, Jenssen & Jørgensen, 2004, Lawless & Price, 1992). However, these champion approaches (Schön, 1963, Chakrabarti, 1974, Howell & Higgins, 1990) lack a theoretical concept. It is simply stated that a system innovation process without a champion will not succeed or at least will have poorer results. One model that does fit a good theoretical concept is the promotor model of Witte (1977). This model introduces a separation of key functions and key persons. According to Witte (1977) the innovation process can not be managed by a single key person. Innovation usually gives rise to massive resistance, stimulating different types of conflict. This massive resistance stems partly from unawareness and partly from unwillingness on the part of individuals passively affected by or actively involved in the innovation. Specific conflict management must be used to overcome this resistance, using different kinds of power. Personal commitment of specific members of the organization, who act as ‘promotors’, is necessary to solve conflicts (Witte, 1977). According to Witte (1977), the most favourable situation for overcoming barriers to innovation is a structure in which two roles are fulfilled: one to overcome barriers of will, and one to overcome barriers of capability. These roles are performed by a ‘promotor of power’ and a ‘promotor of know-how or technology promotor’. The ‘technology’ promotor has to contribute explicit technical knowledge to the process, while the ‘power’ promotor uses hierarchical power to

9 protect the innovation from opposition and to establish it in front of resistance. In the process he is not involved full time, since he has the task of making the idea realizable and uses his authority only in case it is needed. Both promotors have to work closely together to handle barriers to innovation and provide enthusiastic support for the new idea, which means a two-centre theory of innovation (Witte, 1977).

Power promotor Technology promotor

Barriers to innovation

Fig. 1 ‘Two-centre theory of innovation’ (based on Witte, 1977)

In most simple innovations, two promotors are sufficient to handle the different barriers. But when innovations and organisations get more complex, it is the question whether power promotor and technology promotor can handle all the conflicts together in order to come to a successful innovation. According to Hauschildt and Kirchmann (2001) a third key person is needed when particularly complex material is to be handled or the innovation project is to be accomplished in large, complex organizations. They claim problem complexity and system complexity demand a third promotor, the ‘process promotor’. The process promotor can handle further barriers which come up next to large innovations (Hauschildt & Schewe, 2000). He has the task of handling the barriers of non-responsibility and indifference which are primarily caused by organisational resistance to the new idea. In this research a process promotor is defined by ‘an active and intensive mediator between the technology promotor and power promotor’ (Hauschildt & Kirchmann, 2001). The process promotor is the director of the innovation process. He determines its organisational procedures. He calls in the power promotor whenever serious oppositions arise which he is unable to overcome with his own potentials (Hauschildt & Schewe, 2000). The process promotor derives his influence from organisational know-how, and he knows who could be influenced by the innovation. The process promotor is capable of translating the language of innovative technology into the language usually spoken and understood in the organisation. He is called the ‘champion of innovation’, able to turn an idea into a plan of action. He has specific diplomatic skills and knows how to approach and convince all sorts of stakeholders on a one-to-one basis (Hauschildt & Kirchmann, 2001).

Other authors also emphasize the importance of the process promotor, next to a technology promotor and power promotor, to establish a successful innovation. Although they use different words for process promotor, they all represent the same key person. One definition that is used several times in

10 literature is ‘project champion’ (Achilladelis et al., 1971, Rogers, 1995, Nah, Zuckweiler, & Lau, 2003). Rogers (1995) emphasized the importance of a project champion to innovation success. He claimed that for costly, visible, or radical projects this champion needs to be a powerful individual with a high function in the organization. Furthermore, the project champion’s transformational leadership skills play a crucial role in implementation success, as he must constantly resolve conflicts and canalize resistance (Nah et al., 2003). Another definition authors use to describe the most important promotor in the innovation process is ‘business innovator’. Rothwell (et al., 1974) describes this person as the individual who is actually responsible for the overall progress of the project within the management structure. He might sometimes act as the ‘technical innovator’ as well as the ‘chief executive’, another name for power promotor. The research of Rothwell (et al., 1974) concluded that this individual’s power, respectability, status and experience were particularly important correlates of innovation success (Rothwell et al., 1974). Business innovators provide support, access to resources, and protection from organizational interference as innovations emerge (Achilladelis et al., 1971). According to (Stjernberg & Philips, 1993), the success of an innovation depends on the energy and insights of a strongly committed ‘soul-of-fire’. This person plays an important role in gaining organizational acceptance of the innovation. He can contribute to the innovation process by enabling people affected by the development activities to involve themselves in the same way as he or she is involved (Stjernberg & Philips, 1993).

From the foregoing paragraph can be concluded that a third promotor, the process promotor, is a very important person in handling barriers to innovation, such as resistance. But the question is why the technology promotor and power promotor alone are not sufficient. Hauschildt and Kirchmann (2001) claim they are also valuable, but their job is mainly to give support to the process promotor. Additionally, Attewell (1992) says technology champions are informal experts whose main responsibilities are just doing work and experimenting with new technology. Beath (1991) also states technology champions lack the necessary authority and/or formal resources. Maidique (1980) contributes to this discussion in saying the importance of the different roles change when the firm or process gets more complex. In small projects the technological entrepreneur fulfils all the functions of the three types of champions. In integrated firms, power promotors begin to serve as integrators between technical champions and top managers. When the project diversifies and enters unfamiliar fields the process changes and the process promotor emerges, bridging the gap between the top managers, technical champions and power promotor (Maidique, 1980). According to Little (1985), the technical promotor carries an idea from the initial concept through to development into a viable product, while the power promotor provides a business framework for this technical idea. But the process promotor is most important, as he sponsors the idea at the highest level, using his influence to protect it, move it along and grab the opportunity to exploit it (Little, 1985).

11

Apparently, authors agree on the importance of a process promotor in an innovation process. System innovations are very complex because of the large number of variables and actors, the combination of different innovations, and the system changes when implementing it in society (Quist & Vergragt, 2000). It requires a lot of resources and it enters new, unknown fields. Therefore, a process promotor is needed to manage this complex innovation.

Power promotor Process promotor Technology promotor

Barriers to innovation

Fig. 2 ‘The process promotor acting as mediator in overcoming further barriers to innovation’

The process promotor is placed between the other two promotors because he has the task to mediate between them (Hauschildt &Kirchmann, 2001). There exists two-way-communication between power promotor and process promotor and process promotor and technology promotor. As a result the process promotor can take care of placing all promotors in one line. In this way he obtains new knowledge, which he can use in conversations with stakeholders and opponents. As a process promotor he can act as an ‘independent’ person, trying to convince stakeholders by showing that he understands them. He is the main person who wants to bring the project to an end, and has a mandate for this, and therefore he promotes it enthusiastically. However, he also knows he has to be open to stakeholders and be trustworthy. He has to unlock doors, such as obtaining resources (Achilladelis et al., 1971), and have contacts with a wide network. As seen in the figure, a process promotor is not the only one who can influence barriers to innovation. A power promotor can also remove barriers, by using his power to make things done. And the technology promotor can influence barriers by thinking how technology problems can be solved.

This leads to a hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Above all a process promotor is required in leading the system innovation process and overcoming barriers

1.2 Trust It is hard to implement system innovations in a traditional top-down manner, at least in western cultures. A system innovation process requires that all kinds of stakeholders cooperate and that

12 initiatives are taken from the bottom up as well as top down (Hillebrand et al., 2003, Van den Bosch, 2005). Both leaders as stakeholders have influence on the decision making process. This has to do with their complex substance and with the growing number of relevant actors (Hillebrand et al., 2003). Because system innovation is attended with large-scale changes of functions, major concerns are at issue (Dammers et al., 2004), and it is difficult to satisfy all various parties. Some parties support the innovation, while others are neutral and some want to block it (de Bruin et al., 2003). As a result, resistance to the implementation of the innovation can lead to large delays. Heavy conflicts, which are almost inevitable, could arise and the system innovation can be obstructed (Janszen, 2002, Dammers et al., 2004). All stakeholders have different ideas about the desirability of the system innovation.

Because a system innovation can only take place due to a collective action of the different stakeholders, it is crucial to obtain stakeholder commitment and consensus. Furthermore, a system innovation can only be successful if this is based on a common vision and idea (Van den Bosch et al., 2005). Communication plays an important role in this process of involving stakeholders and reaching consensus between them and the project managers (Quist & Vergragt, 2000). Good communication and information is essential to inform all the stakeholders about the innovation (Vrakking, 1995). An inadequate involvement of the affected parties can intensify the potential for conflict and reinforce inequalities (Medeiros de Araujo & Bramwell, 1999). Insufficient attention for the concerns of stakeholders also leads to disagreement about the implementation of a project. Managers should try to acknowledge the concerns of all stakeholders and seek in a dialogue to reconcile conflicting interests (Olander & Landin, 2005). To achieve this state of consensus, one factor is very important to be present: trust.

Trust is essential to many cooperative innovative activities. One reason for this is that the level of trust in an organisation has a major influence on the level of community support for the project (Khan & Gerrard, 2006). Trust is the willingness to rely on other parties (Mayer et al, 1995). Therefore, trust is necessary when an individual has a conflicting incentive and does not want to cooperate. In such situations, distrust blocks even the attempt at collaboration and creating consensus. In case of system innovations, there are always stakeholders who disagree with the project. Some could even obstruct the coming of something new. Then, communication with these parties is very important. Communication builds trust between organisations and stakeholders (Parry, 1976). Managers and promotors must interact with extremely sceptical stakeholders, because with no evidence, potential parties are not likely to trust the innovator very soon (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Therefore, trust must be built to decrease uncertainty. A successful communications program can establish an informed community that is comfortable with the concept of the project, knowledgeable about the issues involved and supportive of the program to be implemented. Next chapter will provide some conditions for building trust among different parties.

13 Innovative ideas also get easily off the ground when stakeholders and managers discuss and exchange thoughts in an atmosphere of trust. Consensus occurs only when there is a high degree of trust among the stakeholders of a system (Parry, 1976). Stakeholders and managers can think of new perspectives and search for agreement about issues, which find expression in strategies for the relevant region (Dammers et al., 2002). Actors are more willing to take into account other concerns and want to create a win-win situation. Parties know their different opinions, but also know that they could reach compromise (Dammers et al., 1999).

The role of trust is essential to all social transactions where ignorance or uncertainty about actions and outcomes are involved. A system innovation is an extreme case of where such social problems exist. Trust, reliability, and reputation are techniques of achieving cooperation based on mounting familiarity and evidence (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Thus, the less information or evidence there is, the more the need for trust. Trust is a critical first-level determinant of the success of innovations because, by definition, there is an absence of information and proof regarding the new activity.

Hypothesis 2: Trust between different parties is crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation

1.3 Public Meetings Trust can be built by clear communication, openness and being fairly tolerant when dealing with disagreeable actions of others (Dammers et al., 2002). The timing of communication activities is essential because trust can only be built over time (Khan & Gerrard, 2006). Therefore, it is important to start early with a communication program. Delays in passing on information may give rise to rumours, increase levels of anxiety and cause stakeholders to question the project’s motives and intentions. Such reactions will seriously undermine stakeholder trust and be harmful to the project (Khan & Gerrard, 2006). Next to the timing of communication activities, trust has shown to be maximised when:

Dialogue is sustained;
Stakeholders have independent sources of information;
Stakeholders are involved early;
Stakeholders can ask questions;
Information is available for everyone;
Behaviour is non-coercive;
Everyone’s opinion matters and there is willingness to listen to all views (two–directional communication);

14
Stakeholders have some level of control in the process by actual accomplishing changes in decisions (Khan & Gerrard, 2006).

The adoption of new projects is a social process shaped by others to advance their respective interests via persuasion and coercion (Hall & Rosson, 2006). In the case of a system innovation, managers must win the approval of (organizational) stakeholders. Without their support, it is very hard to get the innovation started (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Thus, innovators need strategies for encouraging a trusting party’s beliefs in the shared expectations and competence of the manager. A communication method project managers can use to involve stakeholders and build trust must satisfy above conditions. Several techniques are useful. One manner to involve stakeholders is to only collect their opinions by means of surveys or questionnaires (Medeiros de Araujo & Bramwell, 1999). Interviews with selected stakeholders could be important for obtaining relevant information, because they gain insight into the views of a wide variety of stakeholders (Quist & Vergragt, 2000). It is less complex than involving stakeholders in direct dialogue. However, it is largely a one-way process with little discussion between stakeholders and project managers and consensus among them is never reached using this method.

One method that includes the advantages of interviewing and also contains most conditions necessary for trust, is the use of public meetings . Although different definitions are used in literature, in this research the following description of a public meeting is given:

‘A public meeting is an open meeting to any member of the community which allow stakeholders to comment on specific issues and communicate with other stakeholders, experts and officials, thereby influencing the outcomes to some extent ’(McComas, 2003; Adams, 2004)

Holding a public meeting is among the most common and traditional method for involving the public in the management of a project. They enjoy legitimacy with officials and the public and are relatively quick, simple, and inexpensive to organize (McComas, 2003). Public meetings provide forums to engage in meaningful, open discussion about related interests. They are especially useful for a project manager who is sincerely interested in receiving feedback on the project and establishing a two-way communication system with meaningful dialogue (McComas, 2003). Independent experts, social organisations, companies and local authorities, but also ‘outsiders’ meet and give answers, and share experiences and trust (Dammers et al., 2002). Public meetings can enhance the political power of stakeholders and, consequently, improve governmental responsiveness to citizens (Adams, 2004).

Public meetings must be held under specific conditions so that success is stimulated. As said before, the timing of communication is essential (Khan & Gerrard, 2006). A public meeting must be organised before actual public discussions begin and important project decisions have been made, and after

15 stakeholders have developed a set of recommendations and opinions (Adams, 2004). One argument made in literature in opposition to public meetings is that stakeholders’ comments do not influence any outcomes at all, so meetings must be very open. This also depends on the one who is organising the meeting. Project managers must actually listen to the stakeholders and be open for suggestions, so that stakeholders could influence a decision in some cases. They must show they are willing to change decisions in some cases. A third condition which must be taken into account is the number of people participating in the meeting. Although a fixed number of participants is not mentioned in literature, it is clear that with too much stakeholders showing up at the meeting, it is very difficult to have face-to- face interaction and discussion that deliberation proponents desire (Adams, 2004). A project manager must take this problem into consideration when organising a public meeting, even though he does not know exactly how many people will attend.

Involving stakeholders and reaching consensus is thus not as easy as it seems. Trust, communication and timing play important roles when dealing with this problem. During the preparation phase of a system innovation in rural areas stakeholders are involved and consensus must be reached. Therefore next hypothesis is formed:

Hypothesis 3: Organising public meetings early, with open dialogue and discussion, is an efficient method for involving stakeholders of a system innovation in the process and creating trust

1.4 Legitimacy System innovations are new activities which require specific management since there are no examples of how to handle them, and how to deal with different involved stakeholders. Among the numerous problems facing the start off of an innovation, the lack of legitimacy is critical, as their conformity to established institutional rules and standards may still be in question (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). According to Aldrich and Fiol (1994) organizations have to acquire legitimacy because it is a crucial element in the creation and survival of new organizational forms, such as a system innovation. In this paper legitimacy is defined as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Thus, legitimacy is the extent to which people perceive that it adheres to accepted principles, rules, norms and way of doing things (Aldrich &Fiol, 1994). Founders of entirely new activities lack the experience and credibility that compose the fundamental basis of interaction. System innovations have a lower chance on survival because there are no role models, and managers and promotors must establish ties with an environment that does not understand and accept the existence of the innovation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).

16 Two forms of legitimacy exists (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994); cognitive legitimacy and socio-political legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy means taken for granted an activity is. One can measure cognitive legitimacy by calculating the level of public knowledge about a new activity. Socio-political legitimacy refers to the value placed on an activity and to ‘the process by which key stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials accept a venture as appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws’ (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994, p. 648). Socio-political legitimization thus shapes how entrepreneurial activities (whether productive, unproductive or destructive), are perceived by stakeholders (Hall & Rosson, 2006). One can measure socio-political legitimacy by assessing public acceptance of the innovation, government subsidies to it, or the public prestige of its leaders. Without widespread knowledge and understanding of the new activity, innovators may have difficulty maintaining the support of key persons and organizations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).

Studies of organizational legitimacy have focused primarily on a firm's ability to acquire and maintain socio-political approval (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Hannan & Carroll, 1992). However, this aspect of legitimacy may not be the most relevant to the legitimacy issues facing founders of entirely new activities. An entirely new activity begins, by definition, with low cognitive legitimacy. Without widespread knowledge and understanding of their activity, entrepreneurs may have difficulty maintaining the support of key constituencies. After acquiring cognitive legitimacy it is necessary that stakeholders accept a new venture, in order to realize social basis for the new activity. Attaining socio- political legitimacy is important because the managers must win the approval of (organizational) stakeholders. Then, managers should aim at gaining socio-political legitimacy, which is the process by which key stakeholders accept a new venture, given existing norms (Hall & Rosson, 2006). These norms are different for regions and people. For example, in case of the Blauwestad, most people did not want to flood land, because in the Netherlands it is very exceptional to do that. Socio-political legitimacy is dynamic; what are considered appropriate principles and standards will vary over time, reflecting changed social mores and values (Hall & Rosson, 2006). The habitants of the region of Blauwestad are reluctant to changes, especially as it considers their land. However, the land is mostly infertile. Therefore some people think high quality houses should be built to give the region an impulse. Thus, legitimacy is needed to make possible cooperation between stakeholders to develop the region. According to Aldrich & Fiol (1994) legitimacy is an important issue that influences the success of a new activity. Access to capital, resources, and markets are all partially dependent on the level of legitimacy achieved by an innovation. With increasing legitimacy, social basis is created for the new activity. Stakeholders accept and support the system innovation, so managers have less resistance with implementing the innovation.

17 Hypothesis 4: The presence of legitimacy is crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation

1.5 Conceptual Model This part gives a summary of the four hypotheses considered before resulting in a conceptual model. Different factors influence the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation. These are; the presence of a process promotor, amount of trust among involved parties, legitimacy and, indirectly, use of public meetings. Relations between these factors are now discussed.

Presence of Process Promotor First of all we have hypothesized that a process promotor is required in leading the system innovation process and overcoming barriers to innovation. He or she could have influence on the success of a system innovation by trying to overcome resistance by promoting it enthusiastically. The relation between a process promotor and the success of a system innovation is thus indirect, as a process promotor could only try to build trust among stakeholders and to establish some kind of legitimacy. Of course there are other manners to influence the success, but because in this research the emphasis is on the preparation phase, we only look at the process around the creation of social basis, which a process promotor can actively advance.

The relation between a process promotor and building trust is one-directional. A process promotor influences the amount of trust among different parties, using different methods. Given the lack of information and prior behaviour regarding a system innovation, a process promotor does not base initial trust-building strategies on objective external evidence. They must build a knowledge base that outsiders will accept as legitimate, and yet they have no external source of validation from which to argue. Rational argument is necessary, which is based on inferential moves and deliberation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). One method that a process promotor can use is organising public meetings.

The relation between the presence of a process promotor and legitimacy is also one-directional. In order to gain legitimacy, a process promotor has to promote the new activity heavily. He or she has to inform all the stakeholders in order to acquire that the system innovation is taken for granted (cognitive legitimacy). After that, the process promotor has to convince the stakeholders to accept the new project and that it is appropriate and right (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).

Amount of Trust among Parties A second hypothesis was aimed at the presence of trust, as being very crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation. In the model, this factor is surrounded by other elements.

18 Trust is influenced by the presence of a process promotor and the existence of public meetings. It has a two-directional relationship with legitimacy, and it influences the success of a system innovation.

Acquiring legitimacy is formed by the interpersonal processes of achieving trust (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). With no evidence, potential parties are not likely to trust the innovator very soon. But if stakeholders trust the managers and process promotors, the chance of gaining legitimacy is higher. They believe the information promotors are giving and are earlier convinced that the system innovation is a necessity.

Trust is a critical first-level determinant of the success of innovations because, by definition, there is an absence of information and proof regarding the new activity. The role of trust is central to all social transactions where there is ignorance or uncertainty about actions and outcomes. A system innovation is an extreme case of where such social problems exist. Thus, the less information or evidence there is, the more the need for trust.

Existence of Public Meetings The third hypothesis is about organising public meetings in order to create trust. This statement already assumes that public meetings influence the amount of trust. Organising public meetings could affect trust, and thus the success of a system innovation, on different ways. A few examples of conditions that increase the amount of trust are; sustaining dialogue, presenting open information, and giving stakeholders the opportunity to comment.

Legitimacy Legitimacy influences both the amount of trust and the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation. When legitimacy is high, it means that many stakeholders accept the venture as appropriate and right and it is taken for granted (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). There is enough information and evidence and therefore, trust is already present. The need to create more trust is reduced to a minimum.

As already hypothesized, legitimacy could influence the success of a system innovation. It is a crucial element in the creation and survival of new organizational forms. Access to capital, resources, and markets are all partially dependent on the level of legitimacy achieved by an innovation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). With increasing legitimacy, a social basis is created for the new activity. Stakeholders accept and support the system innovation, so managers have less resistance in implementing the innovation.

19 Existence of public meetings

Success of Presence of a Amount of trust preparation phase of process promotor among parties a system innovation

Legitimacy

Fig. 3 ‘ Conceptual Model’

I have come to this new model since I have not found any theory considering above factors in relation to the management of a system innovation. Other studies about system innovations (Dammers et al., 2004; & Quist & Vergragt, 2000) describe different related subjects like developmental rural planning (Ontwikkelingsplanologie), backcasting, and the initiating of system innovations. Therefore, I think this model is a contribution to literature about management and innovation.

20 3 METHODOLOGY

This section describes the methodology for gathering and analysing empirical data in this study. Explained is why a specific way of doing research, the case study, is chosen. Also the used sampling and interview technique are explained. How the data is analysed is described in the last subsection.

3.1 Case Study Methodology In this research a case study is used for investigating formulated hypotheses. Case studies are used extensively in social science research, as well as in evaluation research, thesis and dissertation research (Yin, 2003). Case studies may involve both qualitative data as quantitative data (Yin, 2003). However, this research is a qualitative study since I wanted to know what kind of feelings, thoughts and opinions the respondents had about different subjects in order to give an answer on my research question. The case study method allows investigators to ‘retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’, such as organizational and managerial processes (Yin, 2003, p.2). It is used to gain in-depth understanding focusing on process rather than outcomes, and on discovery rather than confirmation. The main purpose of this research is to provide a grounded theory and make suggestions for further investigation in the field of strategic management and system innovations.

3.2 Sampling Mostly, a case study comprises several cases, but in this research only one case is studied. To avoid limited research, I used multiple sources. For data collection I made use of secondary sources, such as literature concerning management and organization studies, websites (from both Blauwestad as opponents, for instance the VCP, a communistic political party), magazines, newsletters and a television program. Furthermore, I collected primary data by means of open-ended interviews. Since this research is qualitative, the number of interviewees does not have to be very large, though a clear picture had to be given by questioning representatives of every involved group of stakeholders. Therefore, and because of limited time, I have chosen to question nine respondents.

For selecting which persons I should interview, I first wanted to know which groups, persons, or organisations were affected by or involved in the new project during the preparation phase. These were: the management of the Blauwestad, public parties, private parties, such as building companies, and of course the local inhabitants. The biggest challenge was to find people who have played a (major) role in the preparation phase, and then make them willing to cooperate. I definitely wanted to speak to three persons of the three municipalities, a farmer and citizen, one managing director of Blauwestad, someone working for a nature organisation and an involved employee of a technical organisation. In this way a pluralistic view of the project is given.

21 I used the snowball effect for knowing which persons I should contact for an interview. I approached different people so they could recommend other persons, and so on. I first contacted a project leader of municipality Reiderland, Mr. Zeevaart. He was willing to cooperate and suggested me to talk to Mr. Jansema, alderman of municipality Winschoten, Mr. J. Kleine, ex-director of project organisation Blauwestad, and Mr. A. De Vrieze, director of a technical advice agency InVraplus. In about the same time I also questioned project leader Mr. Van den Burgh of municipality Scheemda, which added Mr. Knijpstra of organisation DLG (Service Rural Areas), who acquired land for the project. This person advised me to contact the first farmer that had left the area, Mr. Van der Werf. With these names I already had an almost complete list of respondents. I contacted them and everybody was willing to cooperate, except for the director of InVraplus, but another employee, Mr. J. de Vries, was able to replace him. Because I wanted to interview another citizen, I contacted Harry Steentjes. He was chairman of different farmer organisations and also had a cattle farm in Oostwold. To complete the list of respondents I contacted the corporation Groninger Landschap, as being an important affected nature organisation. I interviewed Mr. Puijman, area manager of the land in the region of Blauwestad.

Name Organisation Function Date of Reason to interview Interview R. van den Municipality Project leader 3 October ‘06 Involved since 1990 as Burgh Scheemda project leader of Scheemda F. Knijpstra Dienst Landelijk Land acquirer 5 October ‘06 Dealt with farmers Gebied about how to buy their land, since 1997 J.B. Zeevaart Municipality Project leader 6 October ‘06 Involved since 1998 as Reiderland project leader of Reiderland Van der Werf Farmer 17 October ‘06 First farmer that was bought out. Involved from 1989-1997 J. de Vries InVraplus Assistant project 18 October ‘06 Assistant of project leader leader A. de Vrieze, infrastructure since 2001 S. Puijman Groninger Area manager 18 October ‘06 Cared about interests Landschap GL since 2001 H. Jansema Municipality Alderman 25 October ‘06 Involved from 1994 as Winschoten alderman and civil servant of Winschoten J. Kleine Blauwestad & PAU Ex-director 30 October ‘06 First director project organisation Blauwestad, involved since 1989 H. Steentjes LTO Noord Farmer/chairman 31 October ‘06 Chairman different farmer organisations and citizen of Oostwold, involved since 1990 Table 1: List of interviewees

22 3.3 Interview Techniques As said before, besides secondary data, I attempted to collect data by conducting semi-structured, open-ended interviews. By using this technique, respondents could reply freely in an orderly fashion. Open-ended interviewing is a method to obtain subjective opinions, experiences and hidden stories. Flexibility and surprise are also components of this method. I have chosen for a semi-structured technique, because totally structured methods provide less flexibility in interrogating. A completely unstructured method provides too little structure for the data collection of this research.

Since I wanted to create a clear picture of different subjects related to system innovations, it was necessary to ask all interviewees comparable questions. Therefore, I made a general questionnaire for most respondents, but I used a reduced version for the farmers. They were asked only a few open questions, since they could not know as much inside information and procedures as the other respondents, although the essence of the interview stayed the same. The general list contained around twenty short open questions, which could lead to further discussion. So, interviewees could give their opinion and had some influence on the content of the questionnaire. The survey consisted of two general questions, after which five different questions were asked about the existence of promotors. The next four questions were about resistance and legitimacy, and after that five questions involved trust and openness. At last, the interview was ended by some general questions. The questions were all based on the theory in chapter 2. I tested the interview with the first respondent, Mr. Van den Burgh. Thereafter I adjusted it, so I would get relevant answers. The list of interview questions is placed in the appendix of this paper.

3.4 Data Analysis I interviewed nine respondents during one month, October 2006. The interview of twenty open-ended questions lasted approximately one hour till one-and-a half hour. I tape recorded all the interviews, since a tape recorder enables a better rendition of what has been said during the interview, but not without a written plan (Yin, 2003). Therefore, I prepared a script with a white line between the questions so I could write down short notes during the interviews. Thereafter, I listened to the tape recorder again and typed up the answers literally. I made a large schedule with shortened questions and answers in relation to the respondents. In this way I could recognise immediately if there were given similar answers, or, in contrast, remarkable responses. The results of the interviews are described in next chapter.

23 4 CASE STUDY

In this chapter the hypotheses will be tested by comparing them with a real case; Blauwestad. First the case Blauwestad is portrayed after which the results of the interviews will be described.

4.1 Case Description At the moment, the new project Blauwestad (Blue City) is realised in the east of the province of Groningen, in the region Oldambt, which encompasses the municipalities Reiderland, Scheemda, Winschoten, Menterwolde and a part of Delfzijl. Blauwestad is built in the middle of the three municipalities first mentioned, bordered by the villages Winschoten, Beerta, Finsterwolde, Oostwold and Midwolda.

The idea of Blauwestad Since the end of the eighties the Oldambt has to contend with major economic and social problems. The region dealt with a few thousand hectares uncultivated agriculture land. In the past this land was used for breeding potatoes, beets and grain. This is the result of the EU-policy which encourages the fallowing of land. Because many adolescents and educated people left the Oldambt for this reason, the population aged and the social-economic structure deteriorated. To break this downward spiral architect Jan Timmer came with a remarkable plan in 1989. Together with Haasken, civil servant at the regional direction of the ministry of Landbouw, Natuur, en Voedselkwaliteit (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality) in Groningen, he is strongly committed to the destiny of the Oldambt. His first idea was to create a lake of 3.000 hectare, which stretched out from Scheemda to Drieborg till the frontier of Germany. But this plan was reduced soon to an idea of only 1.350 hectare, since the first plan was not feasible. According to the plan the agrarian region should grow into a region with great perspectives on recreation and manifest itself as an attractive living area. Alongside the borders of the lake, on peninsulas and private islands magnificent living villages should be situated. Along the shores some space should be used for forestation and nature.

Timmer and Haasken approached deputy Beukema, responsible executive of town and country planning in the province, to present their idea and he immediately became enthusiastic. Beukema advises to have only bilateral conversations with key persons and to wait for a good opportunity for bringing the idea into publicity. He thinks the idea is very interesting and recommends examining the attainability. It appears that the plan would only be achievable with enough subsidies, but the likelihood of obtaining these subsidies is minimal.

24 After an intensive conversation period Beukema and Timmer organised a press meeting to illustrate their plans. The plan was received by the public with mixed feelings. There was scepticism, disbelief and confusion. Therefore, Beukema went to the area to hear reactions and to obtain new ideas. Local inhabitants called the idea ‘un-Dutch’ since Dutchmen do not flood land that has been taken from the sea. Another often heard argument was that fertile ground should produce food products. The agrarian sector resisted the plan from the start. If the plan was to be executed, farmers would have to leave the area. Farmers found themselves in different situations. Some had a successor, others had not. For all these farmers a solution had to be found. Farmers that already wanted to discontinue their business were more interested in selling their land. Although not all of the farmers agreed with the plan, they all wanted to change the current situation in the region, and make it flourish once again. Not only farmers resisted the plan. The local communistic party, the VCP, refused to accept the idea. They protested heavily with banners, statements on their website and on meetings. Nowadays, the party still opposes the project.

Timeline In 1990 minister Alders of the ministry of Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment) pays attention to the liveability issues in rural areas. He presents an idea to tackle the liveability in six rural areas, under which the Oldambt. Subsequently, the municipalities in the Oldambt, the province of Groningen and the state agree on designing a regional plan. In 1994 the province and municipalities give their opinion about the plan and the province orders building companies and architects to draw up some ideas for the restructuring of the Oldambt. During a public meeting minister Kok of finance receives an overview of these ideas. Two building companies present a design, which shows a shortage of 20 million euros.

In 1994 the province and municipalities established the ‘Stichting de Blauwe Stad’ (Foundation the Blue City), which must elaborate the plan and examine the attainability. This foundation collaborates with some building companies and together they established the ‘Consortium de Blauwe Stad’ (Consortium the Blue City). To obtain some assurance about the sources for subsidies, the Stichting de Blauwe Stad contracted a few companies to take part and bear some of the risks. In 1994 Blauwestad was added to the regional plan. Housing should take place in Reiderland, Scheemda and Winschoten.

With a report in 1997 the foundation announces to be positive about the attainability. Beukema declares the project officially started by pronouncing the words “‘t Gait deur” (the project will continue). The province and municipalities give permission to execute the project. They found the ‘Stuurgroep de Blauwe Stad’ (Steering committee the Blue City) to help integrating Blauwe Stad in the region and in the surrounding villages. Also a Project Organisation Blauwe Stad is established, to manage the execution of the project, which later became Blauwe Stad B.V. In the meantime the town-

25 planning procedures are started and the land acquisition has begun. Inhabitants are informed by newsletters and public meetings.

In 1998 the three municipalities present the inter-municipalities development plan, which take as starting point a lake of 800 hectare, 200 hectare for 1200 to 1800 houses in the highest market segments, new opportunities for recreation and 350 hectare new nature. During a public meeting different people explain their criticism. An often heard point of critique is that luxurious houses are build for people outside the region, while there are not enough affordable houses of good quality for people currently living in the region. The farmers also express their disapproval. The heaviest criticism comes from the communists, which have many followers in the area. They do not want ‘rich men behind the dikes’.

In 1999 a plan of restructuring was made. A partly revised development plan deposits for public inspection and everyone in the region could object to it. Fifty objections were handed in. Only two complaints were taken into account. The Dienst Landelijk Gebied (Service Rural Areas) in Groningen organised the land acquiring. Again there was resistance among the farmers and they agreed on not co- operating. Nevertheless, DLG succeeded in acquiring the land. It approached the farmers one by one and talked about their future perspectives, successors, migration and termination. It also offered the farmers an attractive settlement for buying out.

In 2001 the province approved the development plan. In November 2001 the execution was officially started with a ‘tree plant day’. Simultaneously, the involved authorities and the building companies signed a cooperation agreement. In 2002 they were combined to one execution organisation; Blauwestad B.V. A multifunctional centre was opened, which served, as a large bill board for Blauwe Stad, and it still does. In 2006 the name Blauwe Stad is changed in Blauwestad.

Costs The project of Blauwestad will cost around 200 million euro, excluding the building of houses. Of this amount, 35 million will be covered by the government, of which 3.27 million will be covered by the local authorities. The province of Groningen has contributed an amount of 90 million euros. A consortium of building corporations - consisting of Ballast Nedam Bouwborg BV, BAM Vastgoed and Geveke Bouw BV - will cover the remaining sum. The consortium will also take care of the building of houses. The purchase of land and the cost of infrastructure have to be financed by the sale of building-parcels. There is already a lot of interest in the houses, the cheapest of which will be sold for 300.000 euros and the most expensive for around 750.000 euros.

26 When Blauwestad is realised in 2011, the Oldambt will physically look very different. Agricultural land is replaced by a lake, a forest and other nature. On 100 hectare nature recreation facilities would arise as well as other infrastructure. 1200 to 1800 luxurious houses will be built, stretched out over four living areas: reed lands, grass-lands, forest and village. The revenues of the houses must cover the costs of water and nature. The project aims at prosperous older people from all over the Netherlands, but also at people from Germany. The ambition is to stop the flow of educated people out of the area and to attract wealthy people to come and live in the Oldambt. The expectation is that 400 jobs are created as a result of the project itself and another 400 jobs as the result of a positive effect of Blauwestad as an attractive living area.

4.2 Blauwestad as a System Innovation In this research Blauwestad is considered to be a system innovation in rural areas. By describing the different characteristics of a system innovation in relation to Blauwestad, it is explained why the project really is a system innovation. Blauwestad is an integral renewal which exceeds the organisation or sector (Rutten & Oosten, 1999). It encompasses a whole region involving three municipalities, Scheemda, Winschoten and Reiderland. It demands the share of knowledge and different skills (Quist & Vergragt, 2004) between project leaders, environmental organisations, building organisations, municipalities and the involvement of other affected stakeholders, such as farmers and citizens. Soft innovations, such as principles and rules, are used to give structure to the project. Another feature of a system innovation is that it encompasses a long time span (Dammers et al., 2002). In case of Blauwestad the project takes over twenty years, with the start in 1989 and the finish in 2011. It also demands a change of perspective and culture by the stakeholders. In this case the local inhabitants have to adjust to the new situation, which not is supported by everyone.

According to Beukema (Wachtmeester, 1997) Blauwestad is a system innovation because a change of function will take place which is new for the Netherlands. It is a settlement of the primary agrarian function which was replaced by qualitative living, tourism and recreation. The finance of the lake is the largest problem of the project. There is no existing guideline about flooding the land, in contrast to impoldering, because it is totally new idea. The necessity for extensive collaboration between municipalities is also an example of a characteristic of a system innovation Dammers (et al., 2004) enumerates several examples of Blauwestad to explain why it is a system innovation. One characteristic of a system innovation according to Dammers et al. (2004) is geographical renewal. In the case of Blauwestad 1350 hectare agrarian land is reformed to an enormous lake of 800 hectare, admirable living areas with luxurious houses and 350 hectare new nature. The function integration, another characteristic, is expressed in the interconnected and high- quality living-, work- and recreation environment. During the realisation of the project, a change of

27 culture is also occurring. An area that was characterized by decline and rebellion is changing into an area which solves problems itself, and which is an example for other regions.

4.3 Results In this part the results of the case study are described. Every factor mentioned in the theoretical part, process promotor, trust, public meeting and legitimacy, is separately described in relation to the results of the interviews and other sources, such as books, the Internet, and articles about the Blauwestad.

4.3.1 Promotors Hypothesis 1 posited that a process promotor is required in leading the system innovation process. In examining the presence of promotors in the preparation phase of a system innovation process, the interviewees were given the following options:
to name not a single person in the preparation phase of the innovation process with the three different promotor characteristics;
to name all or a few persons in the preparation phase of the innovation process whom they thought met the description of a power, a process, or technology promotor.

Although in this research it is not questioned whether a technology or power promotor is required in the system innovation process, it does not harm to mention if the interviewees had the same opinion about who played these roles in case of Blauwestad.

Technology promotor When asking which person or persons enthusiastically promoted the technical side of the project, people reacted not very divers. Six out of nine mentioned the same person, next to two who did not know, and one who listed a totally different person. However, there is a reasonable explanation for this outcome. Six respondents regarded the managing director of an infrastructural advice agency as technology promotor. This person was involved in the process from the day it became clear that the project was going to take place, in 1997. He already had experience in working at different technical organisations, and therefore his company was selected to take care of the infrastructural part of the project. During the process his ideas, knowledge and fanaticism gave direction to various technical plans. The two respondents, who did not know which person could be a technology promotor, were both people who did not work closely with building organisations or other technical institutions, as being farmers in the region. As a result, they could not mention any technology promotor. Another interviewee listed a different person than the other respondents, since he worked at a nature organisation and believed this organisation had its own technical promotor, which can also be true.

28 Power promotor In case of the power promotor, there was also agreement among the interviewees. Seven respondents mentioned the same person having the characteristics of a power promotor, while two listed other names as being the power promotor. Most respondents mentioned deputy Beukema of the province of Groningen as power promotor. These people thought of him as responsible director for starting off Blauwestad, and having a large network. Beukema had many relations which he could contact to get things done. An example of this is his contact with minister Kok for obtaining subsidies for the project. He actually drove the minister around the region to illustrate the economic position of the east of Groningen. Another example was given by the first farmer who left the region. When he talked with land acquirer Knijpstra, he found out that Beukema had an enormous influence on the procedure, since the land acquirer had to talk to the deputy every time something important had to be decided. In 1997, deputy Beukema was also the one who finally determined that the plan was going to take place.

Since Beukema was present at the time the idea of Blauwestad came up, and was already gone when most obstacles were vanished, not every interviewee had worked with this man. This could clarify why one interviewee - an employee of an infrastructural advice agency who was involved since 2001 - mentioned only people in his own field of activity as being a power promotor. These persons managed the technical part of the project, so they could actually be seen as power promotors in this working area by the respondent. The other interviewee who mentioned a different person worked at a nature organisation. He mentioned the managing director of his organisation, Stichting Het Groninger Landschap, as a power promotor. However, since the managing director has some influence in his organisation, he also could be seen as a power promotor. Furthermore, the interviewee was involved in the process from 2001, and therefore he did not work with deputy Beukema as well. Altogether, it can be concluded that deputy Beukema was a power promotor for the overall process.

Process promotor The most important question remains. Was there anyone in the process present who could be recognized as a process promotor? The interviewees were asked if there was any important person (or persons) in the process who promoted the system innovation enthusiastically, if the innovation was realized without this person, and if he or she actually had influence on overcoming barriers in the process, such as resistance. Six out of nine persons listed the same person. One listed a person of his own organisation, another one mentioned various persons and a third one did not know. Deputy Beukema was listed for different causes. The deputy was called a key figure and he went to every meeting-room to carry out his message personally. He stepped forward to lead the meetings and fully believed in the project. One respondent even said that without this belief, the faith of the plan was very insecure. Beukema ‘embraced’ the idea and developed it further by doing research. At one moment, Blauwestad was even called ‘the lake of Beukema’ (Wachtmeester, 1997). He went to local

29 inhabitants to talk to them in person, and he really listened to everyone and tried to overcome resistance and problems. The project leader of Scheemda described Beukema as ‘someone who had feeling for potential resistance and who could convince people to cooperate’. He knew exactly what (groups of) people thought of the plan, and he was very approachable. In the beginning, he also knew which people to bring together to form a ‘klankbordgroep’ (representation group), in order to represent every group of stakeholders. Altogether, it became clear that Beukema has been the process promotor for the project Blauwestad, by possessing many characteristics of this role.

Not all of the respondents agreed on the outcome. The infrastructural assistant listed another person of his own organisation as being a process promotor. As already mentioned, he was not involved in the project at the same time as Beukema was. He listed this person, because he was his supervisor and this man showed enthusiasm for the technical part, while overcoming technical problems. So it was not that strange that the respondent mentioned him as being a process promotor. The respondent who listed different persons as being a process promotor worked at a nature organisation. Again, this interviewee was not involved in the process at the same time as the deputy. It is possible that it was not very clear to him which person possessed several characteristics of a process promotor. Therefore, he mentioned a list of people, such as the current managing director of Blauwestad, with each having some characteristics. At last, the first farmer who left the region did not know which person played a role as process promotor. An explanation for this is that this person was not deeply involved in the project. He stayed at distance until he needed a land acquirer for buying his land. After reaching a settlement the farmer left the region and thus he was too far away to keep informed about the progress of the project.

4.3.2 Trust Hypothesis 2 stated that the presence of trust between different parties is crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation. To find out if this hypothesis is true, interviewees were given the opportunity to:
mention directly if they felt there was some kind of trust present between them en other parties in the preparation phase of the system innovation process;
mention if there were characteristics of trust present in the preparation phase of the system innovation process.

The second point refers to indirect questions about the characteristics of trust, such as openness, dialogue and two-way communication. This way ensures that a good picture is illustrated of the presence of trust among the parties of system innovation. To examine this hypothesis, interviewees had to answer several questions.

30 Respondents were first asked how was dealt with (possible) resistance from different parties by the management of Blauwestad. Eight out of nine interviewees gave comparable answers, and the other one, area manager of Het Groninger Landschap, did not know since he was involved in the process after resistance was almost overcome. He also had little contact with (potential) opponents, such as local inhabitants. In general, respondents were very satisfied with the way resistance was prevented and kept under control. They answered the management of Blauwestad did many things to prevent and overcome resistance among involved parties. First of all it was necessary to prevent potential resistance as much as possible. Therefore Blauwestad chose an open strategy which involved local inhabitants, including farmers, from the very beginning, when Beukema determined that Blauwestad would become reality and that there was no way back. The management of Blauwestad realised that the project was a very drastic plan considering that most people from the east of Groningen did not like the idea of flooding cultivated land. Therefore discussion was not avoided. From 1997 different meetings were organised, such as information evenings, participation meetings, and meetings for a specific group of local inhabitants. These were held to provide general information about the progress of the project, to give people some influence on development plans and other decisions, and to inform a particular group of people about the future of their living area. When local inhabitants were not satisfied with some decisions, they could declare this. They could easily go to the information centre or approach a person of the management of Blauwestad to ask something. Then, Blauwestad tried to come up with alternatives or solutions, when she thought it was a real problem. However, when things were not dissolvable, this was also stated clearly by the organization. The ex-director of project organisation Blauwestad underlined that the management of Blauwestad was very open to everyone, but also very clear, and the organisation always took people very seriously. Real resistance was found with the local communistic party. They demonstrated with banners along the road to the information centre when the queen opened the tap to let the water into the lake. Although Blauwestad tried to convince this party from the need for a new project during public meetings, the party could not be persuaded. Thus, the VCP is still a party who keeps rejecting the project. Also resistance was found with the farmers in the region. They did not understand why cultivated land had to be flooded, and they also did not want to leave their farms. In contrast to the VCP, farmers did not show their feelings and stayed relatively calm. After lengthy private conversations with some persons of the management of Blauwestad, such as Beukema and the land acquirer of DLG, most farmers rested with the plan, having reached a settlement about their future. These conversations were held at the house of the farmer, and during these talks trust was build between the two parties. In short, resistance was overcome by Blauwestad by being open to everyone, individual contact, organising meetings, coming up with alternatives and solutions, not avoiding discussions, and being approachable.

31

A second question was about how discussion was lead and what was done with stakeholders’ ideas and opinions. Unpredictably, all of the nine interviewees answered the same. They all agreed that there were open discussions and dialogue, and that the management of Blauwestad actually listened to opinions of stakeholders, although not everything was possible. Most respondents illustrated some cases to demonstrate that plans were changed because of the participation of local inhabitants. A dike was moved to make it look smaller, and a cycle bridge was built to still connect two places. Most mentioned was a case about a whole street of people who had to leave. During the progress of the project it became clear that one specific street would be flooded, which contradicted earlier announcements. Because of heavy opposition by the residents, it finally led to a removal of the complete street. Nowadays, former neighbours are still neighbours with new houses.

On the question about the presence of trust, all of the nine interviewees answered that there was trust among the different parties, although five people mentioned that trust had grown during the first period of time. In the beginning especially farmers had little trust in the management of Blauwestad. One farmer explained that the cause of this distrust was that there was no satisfactory agreement about the acquiring of land. Therefore, a new plan was made by the agricultural organisation, and a new organisation was founded, which was named HAK (Reallocation with an Administrative Character). The task of this organisation was to reallocate the land of the farmers, while taking care of wishes of farmers. Farmers trusted this corporation, since it was founded by colleagues. DLG (Service Rural Areas), an organisation working for Blauwestad, cooperated with HAK to buy land. In this manner, trust also increased between farmers and DLG. Moreover, five interviewees listed trust and openness as key success factors for this first phase of Blauwestad. This was also due to the management of Blauwestad. Beukema, for example, went in person to farmers to talk with them at home, as well as the land acquirer of DLG did. The fact that the responsible director, Beukema, went to farmers in person could have been decisive in overcoming resistance in some cases.

4.3.3 Public meetings The third hypothesis posited that organising public meetings early, with open dialogues and discussion, is an efficient method for involving stakeholders of a system innovation in the process and creating trust. To examine whether this hypothesis holds or not, interviewees were asked about the influence of stakeholders, the presence of discussion and consensus, and the existence and timing of meetings.

In previous subsection about trust the influence of stakeholders on managerial decisions of Blauwestad is already briefly described. A few examples of decisions were given which local inhabitants have influenced. All respondents stated that the management of Blauwestad gave plenty of possibilities for

32 stakeholders to participate in the decision making, which has contributed to a social basis. People could give comments on different ways, but it became clear throughout the interviews that the most common method was to speak directly to the management of Blauwestad at public meetings. The management organised these meetings to inform everyone and to stimulate discussion, and entered it with an open mind-set. Blauwestad came with solutions for problems, and when people were not satisfied with it, they could speak out. Most local inhabitants stayed calm, but every group of people had its own spokesmen. They were treated seriously, since every person would receive a normal answer to his or her question. The management actually listened to comments, wrote them down, and tried to find a solution for them. Although being very open and willing to listen, it was clearly pointed out that not all comments could be honoured. However, the project leader of Reiderland mentioned that consensus was sought continuously during meetings. Many decisions were changed because of pressure of local inhabitants. He gave an example of one group of people who would definitely not leave a certain area, and since it was not invincible to keep it intact, the area was not flooded. So, in general, good consultation was present at public meetings.

As stated in the theoretical part, the timing of organising public meetings is essential. Therefore, we investigated at what time public meetings were held in case of Blauwestad. It became clear that public meetings were held from the very beginning, round 1993. At that time people were involved to give their opinion about the first idea, but there was no certainty about whether the project was going to take place. In 1997, when it was clear that Blauwestad would take place, public meetings were held to invite people to comment on development plans and on how the project should progress. Most interviewees stated that meetings were organised on strategically moments, such as when the design sketch was ready and a zoning plan was made. When someone in the management of Blauwestad felt that some rumours went round in the region about potential decisions, meetings were organised immediately to clarify these issues. So, during the preparation phase many different public meetings were organised. There were even organised meetings for a particular group of local inhabitants in order to discuss about some decisions which only influenced their living area. Sometimes independent people were invited to inform the public about an important issue. A specialist has told about a nature area in Beerta, for example. The management also took into account the size of the meetings. Sometimes a meeting was visited by a large number of stakeholders. Then, the meeting was split in half, so everybody could give their comments. Nowadays, public meetings are still organised, although the number has declined. A farmer mentioned that his neighbourhood is still called together regularly to give their opinions about some ideas for the region. It must be noticed that not all respondents were involved from 1997, so two respondents could only give their opinion about public meetings from 2000 and further.

33 4.3.4 Legitimacy At last we have hypothesized that the presence of legitimacy is crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation. Because legitimacy consists of two elements, namely cognitive and socio-political legitimacy, we have to measure them on different ways. Socio-political legitimacy is measured by assessing public acceptance of the innovation, and governmental subsidies to it, while cognitive legitimacy is measured by calculating the level of public knowledge about a new activity.

Interviewees were asked if they and others agree on the plan of making a giant lake in the east of Groningen. Six out of nine agreed on the plan, but these persons were merely working for the project. The other two interviewees disagreed on the project first, but nowadays, they accept it. They were both farmers who had to sell their land. One has moved to another city and the other could stay, although he had to buy new land in another village. They do not oppose the project anymore, since they have accepted the new situation. One reason they mention for this is that they are treated very well by the management of Blauwestad. All of the respondents declared that the communistic party VCP resisted the plan heavily, as well as citizens, and especially farmers. They had several reasons to oppose the project. The first motive was the fact that in the Netherlands no land should be flooded, because there was always tried to win land from water. Another motivation for resistance was that fertile land should also not be flooded. A third reason the VCP mentioned was that no rich people from the west of the Netherlands belonged to this region. And at last it is obviously that local inhabitants did not wanted to leave their houses. However, at the end of the preparation phase of Blauwestad, most farmers accepted the new situation. Reasons for this were the openness of the management of Blauwestad, dialogues, discussions, and the existence of trust. However, socio-political legitimacy is also measured by governmental subsidies for a new activity. In the beginning, 70 million guilder was needed to get the project started. Minister Kok was concerned about the region and he decided to contribute 32,5 million guilder to the project. Without this investment the project could not have started.

Another question was aimed at the spreading of information. When and how did the stakeholders know about the project, and did they know enough? Did they have the feeling that everybody who had to be informed really was informed? In short; was there any public knowledge about the new project, and thus cognitive legitimacy? As mentioned under the heading of public meetings, all of the interviewees listed that they were informed very early. In 1989 there were already rumours that a lake would be created in the region of the Oldambt, which became true in 1997.

34 The management of Blauwestad invested heavily on the spreading of information, as mentioned by a few interviewees. According to the respondents very different methods were used to inform everybody about the plan: - the existence of an information centre; - a website of Blauwestad; - open (participation) meetings for everybody; - (participation) meetings for a specific group; - a book called ‘Blue spots’; - a TV programme; - news letters; - ‘kitchen table conversations’; - radio

A few respondents mentioned that the farmers were informed by an informal line, next to the information of the management of Blauwestad. These were people who had personal contact with the farmers, such as a project leader of the municipality Scheemda, the land acquirer with an agrarian background, and the farmers themselves. Agricultural corporations are well organised, and therefore they are also involved and exchange information with farmers. So, in fact, everybody who had to know something about the plan could be reached. The interviewees had the feeling they obtained enough information, and when people still wanted to know something, they could always go to the information centre to ask someone.

35 5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The focus of my study was the management of a system innovation. Especially the dealing with resistance among stakeholders in the preparation phase was of interest. The question is whether the presence of different factors, process promotor, trust, public meetings and legitimacy, influence the success of this preparation phase of a system innovation.

In order to give an answer to my research question, I will now discuss the findings of the case study with regard to my hypotheses based on theory. I will also state some limitations of my investigation and make suggestions for future research.

5.1 Conclusion I found that, looking at the presence of promotors, a process promotor is required to manage a system innovation in the preparation phase. Although the power promotor is essential for having some hierarchical power in the innovation process and a technology promotor is important for managing the technology side, there is someone needed who stands for the innovation and manages resistance. He is the one all different stakeholders know and can talk to, and this person is the one who is responsible for getting the plan started. However, I also found that the process promotor is not someone who is present during the total innovation process. After the preparation phase this person is not needed any more. He has started the innovation process by bringing all the different parties together, creating access to resources and reducing resistance to a manageable size, while enthusiastically promoting it and getting all parties on one line. When this basis is set, power promotor and technology promotor can manage the process further. The whole system breaks up in various subsystems, which all have their own promotors. Hypothesis 1 is thus confirmed; a process promotor is important to manage a system innovation in the preparation phase.

Hypothesis 2 was aimed at trust among parties. I found that the project management did many things to prevent resistance. She was very open to everyone, had individual contact, held meetings, came up with alternatives and solutions, and encouraged discussion. The process promotor went to different farmers to talk with them in person. The results also showed that there were open discussions and that the management of Blauwestad actually listened to opinions of stakeholders. The organization changed plans on the basis of their comments, although not everything was possible. Without doing these things, many farmers and citizens would have resisted the plan heavier, and the project would harder to put through. Now, they felt being understood and listened to. Also there was trust between other parties of the project, such as between municipalities and nature organisations. Trust played thus a significant role in the preparation phase of the project Blauwestad. So, also hypothesis 2 holds; trust is important for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation.

36

For establishing trust, you can make use of different methods. I hypothesized that public meetings are an efficient method for establishing trust and involving stakeholders in case of a system innovation. I found that many public meetings took place during the preparation phase of the project. Also the conditions for organising a good public meeting were present in case of Blauwestad. Stakeholders were informed early; managers listened and were open to the public, and small meetings for specific groups were held. Large meetings were split up so not too many people were present at one meeting. From the results I can conclude that it definitely has improved the amount of trust among stakeholders. So, hypothesis 3 holds; a public meeting is an efficient method for involving stakeholders of a system innovation in the process and creating trust.

At last I have looked at the amount of legitimacy. I stated that legitimacy is crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation. I investigated whether there was any legitimacy present at the preparation phase of Blauwestad. Results showed that both cognitive and socio-political legitimacy existed. Although acceptance was low in the beginning because of farmers and citizens who resisted the plan, approval had grown over time. Blauwestad was subsidized by the government and the only party which stayed against the project is a communistic political party, the VCP. Also information about the Blauwestad was widely spread by different sources. Therefore, every stakeholder could be reached with new knowledge and resistance was controlled. However, Blauwestad is still not broadly known, but this is a problem for now. In case of the preparation phase gaining legitimacy was very important. When stakeholders did not accept the new project and got not enough knowledge about its progression, it would be unlikely the Blauwestad got off the ground as fast as it did now. We therefore can confirm hypothesis 4; legitimacy is crucial for the success of the preparation phase of a system innovation.

5.2 Limitations This case study investigated one system innovation in the Netherlands. However, by only considering one specific case the problem of generalizability may arise. Social and cultural differences may play a role between projects within regions in the same country, so this study could not apply for all regions of the Netherlands. It also does not apply for all foreign countries, since there are major cultural differences between countries, such as power distance. This study does not investigate how to manage a system innovation as a whole. It only focuses on specific factors which could improve the success of the innovation in one phase. This is due to time and size constraints. Using data from a single respondent might not provide optimal data. This problem is controlled for by using data from people of different organisations and positions. However, more local inhabitants, employees, and other persons could be asked to make the study more representative. Moreover, the

37 changing perceptions of respondents may cause historical biases. To overcome this problem, same questions are asked considering different periods. Farmers are questioned how they feel now and how they felt previously about the project, for example.

5.3 Further Research In this study only one case, Blauwestad, is investigated. To make a study more generalizable, it is necessary to consider more cases about new system innovations in the Netherlands, and interview more respondents. The research can also be expanded to make it more representative for other countries. Then, it is required to consider different factors as well, such as power distance and other cultural differences. For a more complete study other phases of a system innovation could be investigated in relation to the success factors considered in this research. Therefore, it is required to question other stakeholders as well, such as building organisations and buyers.

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40 Quist, J. N. & Vergragt., P.J. 2000. System Innovations towards Sustainability Using Stakeholder Workshops and Scenarios. Paper for Policy Agendas for Sustainable Technological Innovation, 3rd POSTI International Conference. London, United Kingdom. Quist., J. & Vergragt, P. 2004. Backcasting for Industrial Transformations and System Innovations Towards Sustainability: Relevance for Governance? Proceedings of the 2003 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Environmental Policy Research Centre: Berlin. Rogers, E. M. 1995. Diffusion of innovations (4th ed.). New York: The Free Press. Rothwell, R., Freeman, C., Horlsey, A., Jervis, V.T.P, Robertson, A.B., & Townsend, J. 1974. APPHO updated – project SAPPHO phase II, Research Policy , 3: 258-291 Rutten, H., & Oosten, van, H.J. 1999. Innoveren met ambitie . NRLO-rapport nr. 99/17, Den Haag. Suchman, M.C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review , 20(3):571-610. Schön, D.A. 1963. Champions for radical new inventions. Harvard Business Review , 41: 77-86. Stjernberg, T., & Philips., A. 1993. Perspective: Legitimacy and Souls-of-fire as critical factors of change and viability. Human Relations , 10: 1193-1219 Vrakking, W.J. 1995. The implementation game. Journal of Organizational Change Management , 8(3): 31-46. Wachtmeester, M. 1997. Natuur bouwen, aangenaam recreëren en riant wonen in een vernieuwd Oldambt? Spil , 143-144(1): 44-48. West, M. A. & Farr, J. L. 1990. Innovation and creativity at work: psychological and organizational strategies . Chichester: Wiley. Wijnberg, N.M. 2004. Innovation and organization: Value and competition in selection systems. Organization Studies , 25(8): 1413-1433 Witte, E., 1973. Das Promotoren-Modell . In Hauschildt, J., & Kirchmann, E. 2001. Teamwork for innovation: the troika of promotors. R&D Management, 31(1):41-49. Witte, E., 1977. Power and innovation: a two-center theory. International studies of Management Organization , (7): 47-70

41 APPENDIX General Questionnaire

1. Wat is/was uw functie bij Blauwestad? 2. Hoe lang bent u al betrokken bij Blauwestad? 3. Welke personen waren volgens u het belangrijkst in de voorbereidingsfase van het project (kunnen zowel voor als tegen het plan zijn)? Aan welke acties is dat te zien? 4. Zijn er personen/groepen die gezien kunnen worden als belangrijkste trekker van het gehele project van de Blauwestad? Zo ja, wie en hoe? Wat is uw top 3? 5. Zijn er invloedrijke personen/groepen aanwezig op hoog niveau die betrokkenen enthousiasmeren over het project? Zo ja, wie en hoe? Wat is uw top 3? 6. Zijn er technische mensen aanwezig die betrokkenen enthousiasmeren over de technische kant van het project? Zo ja, wie en hoe? Wat is uw top 3? 7. Hoe en door wie zijn alle relevante personen, organisaties en groeperingen benaderd en betrokken bij de Blauwestad? 8. Waar was het enthousiasme het grootst? Hoe uitte zich dat? 9. Waar was weerstand het grootst? Hoe uitte zich dat? 10. Wat werd er instantie gedaan (door projectleiding?) toen bekend werd dat er verzet heerste onder de inwoners, agrariërs en groeperingen? 11. Hoe heeft diegene dat aangepakt? Was er ruimte voor overleg? Was er vertrouwen tussen de partijen? 12. Op welke manieren werden inwoners en agrariërs over de vorderingen van het project op de hoogte gehouden? Vond u deze voldoende? Waarom wel/niet? 13. Wanneer werden er voor iedereen toegankelijke informatiebijeenkomsten gehouden? Hoe vaak en hoe zagen deze eruit? Was er ruimte voor discussie? 14. Wat werd er gedaan met meningen en ideeën van inwoners? Kunt u daar een voorbeeld van geven? 15. Is er een omslag in het denken van de burgers en agrariërs geweest? Wanneer en hoe uitte zich dat? 16. Vindt u dat er uiteindelijk een vorm van overeenstemming is ontstaan tussen de inwoners, agrariërs en projectleiders van Blauwestad? Waarom wel/niet? 17. Vindt u dat de projectleiding van Blauwestad op de juiste manier heeft gehandeld wat betreft het tegengaan van weerstand? Waarom wel/niet? Wat had anders gekund? 18. Wat zijn volgens u succesfactoren geweest voor het managen van weerstand en van het project? 19. Wie beveelt u aan om ook te interviewen over dit onderwerp? 20. Wat ben ik volgens u vergeten te vragen wat niet over het hoofd gezien zou mogen worden?

42 Questionnaire farmers

1. Wat vindt u van de Blauwestad? En vroeger? Hoe komt dat verschil? 2. Wanneer werd u voor het eerst direct bij de Blauwestad betrokken, door wie en waarom? 3. Had u vertrouwen in de mensen van de Blauwestad die met u gingen praten? 4. Bent u naar bewonersbijeenkomsten geweest? Zo ja, wat vond u daarvan? Werd u voldoende op de hoogte gehouden? 5. Wat werd er gedaan met meningen en ideeën van inwoners? Kunt u daar een voorbeeld van geven? 6. Vindt u dat de Blauwestad op de juiste manier heeft gehandeld wat betreft het contact met de agrariërs? Waarom wel/niet? Wat had anders gekund? 7. Wie zag u als de leider(s) van het project? 8. Wilt u nog wat toevoegen?

43