Anita Shapira. : A . The Schusterman Series in Israel Studies. Waltham: Press, 2012. 528 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-61168-352-3.

Reviewed by Shlomo Aronson

Published on H-Judaic (March, 2013)

Commissioned by Jason Kalman (Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion)

This book begins with the social-political-cul‐ donesia’s Ahmed Sukarno or Ghana’s Quame tural birth of in Europe, and continues Nkrumah.[1] The choice of Shapira’s secondary with its role in and almost to the sources is arbitrary. She omits major works, such present. It discusses two important dimensions of as Yoseph Heller’s Israel and the Cold War from Zionist and Israeli history along with the author’s the War of Independence to the Six Day War: The straightforward historiography: Israel’s economic , The , The Arab-Israeli and cultural history (mainly literature and poet‐ Confict and Soviet Jewry (2010). Shapira’s ry). Unfortunately, the book ofers little explana‐ methodology is narrowly descriptive and lacks tion or insight concerning Israeli politics, the on‐ both an analytical or comparative approach based going crisis of political and social divisions, or Is‐ on related historical knowledge. Additionally no rael’s transition from a renowned success story to archival research has been undertaken, thus rele‐ a controversial one in the eyes of many at home vant primary sources are also overlooked. and abroad. As such, the book remains incom‐ Every analysis of historical phenomena, such plete in certain vital areas, including the intellec‐ as Zionism, must begin with the timeframe in tual history of Zionism, Israel’s wars, domestic which it evolved, which in this case were the politics, and foreign afairs. crises in traditional Judaism starting in the eigh‐ The book is largely based on secondary, well- teenth century, and not just the changing sociopo‐ known literature available in English, such as litical environments that Shapira describes. Ju‐ David Vitals’s The Origins of Zionism (1980) and daism succeeded in preserving its medieval sub‐ Anita Shapira’s own publications. She does not re‐ stance while other civilizations developed mod‐ fer to her most controversial work that compared ern forms that included theories of government, Israel’s polity under David Ben-Gurion to a “guid‐ new institutions, secular values, philosophies, and ed democracy” ruled by an Israeli version of In‐ sciences. Judaism, however, experienced the birth H-Net Reviews of Hassidism, not mentioned by Shapira, whose foundations? “Free will” produced an amazing ad‐ mystics are still venerated, traditions worshipped, mixture of the past before the past, that is, the re‐ and rift with rabbinical Judaism still existent. vival of the and return to the Both perspectives (rabbinical and Hassidic) are homeland and to the book of books, values of the needed in order to understand Jewish behavioral eighteenth-century Enlightenment, including pro‐ traits in modern Israel, as well as the structure gressive ideas infuenced by Jean-Jacques and content of traditional Jewish education, fami‐ Rousseau, and nineteenth-century social democ‐ ly life, and the search to alter them that began racy interwoven with the universal values of the with the Jewish Enlightenment. The crisis in tradi‐ biblical prophets, all of which combined to pro‐ tional Judaism in eastern Europe, however, drove duce an individual decision to transform modern many Jews to an intellectual abyss and the birth Jewish existence into reality in Palestine. Later of the talush (the alienated), who removed them‐ this could be described as the arbitrary product of selves from tradition but found no meaningful a context that was over before the necessary insti‐ outlet outside it. This was a recurrent theme in tutions, rules of conduct, and theory of govern‐ the works of major writers, such as Uri Nissan ment, all of which were missing in historical Ju‐ Gnessin, Yoseph Chaim Brenner, and perhaps daism, had time to fully develop in Palestine. Un‐ Franz Kafka. More than a few discovered Theodor fortunately, much of this is bypassed in Shapira’s Herzl’s political Zionism in a process in which a presentation. key role was played frst by Baruch Benedict Moving from the philosophical foundations of Spinoza and his criticism of the Jewish religion secular Zionism to Ottoman Palestine and World (but not to the abandonment of Judaism’s moral War I, Shapira’s narrative skips over the fact that values), and later by Micha Josef Berdichevsky. this period, when it was active on the ground un‐ The frst goes unmentioned in this book, and the til the outbreak of the Great War, was very short. second is poorly represented, alongside Ahad The war brought with it the “Small Holocaust” of Ha’am, a disciple of Herbert Spencer. Ahad Ha’am the Jews in Russia, the Bolshevik Revolution, and combined Spencer’s optimistic social Darwinism serious threats and setbacks to the tiny Zionist en‐ with Jewish national spiritual values. Yet his phi‐ terprise in Palestine. For all practical purposes, losophy was rejected in favor of Berdichevsky’s the of November 1917 was is‐ criticism of Jewish Diaspora life that declared it sued too early, or too late, to allow a smooth pretentious but dying, and postulated the free will process of nation building, while the interwar of individuals who are capable of liberating them‐ years produced new forms of Zionism that refect‐ selves as a matter of cultural-political survival. ed ideas on the Far Right and the sentiments Here Friedrich Nietzsche’s ontology based on the prevalent in Europe that were adapted to a cer‐ individual’s “will to power” was adopted through tain degree by Ze’ev Jabotinsky and others, who at Berdichevsky’s mediation, but without its aristo‐ frst identifed with Benito Mussolini’s Fascism. cratic, antidemocratic traits that later became one The Social Democrats concentrated on unique co‐ of the sources of Far Right Zionism. A double- operative endeavors, such as the kibbutzim, but edged syndrome emerged, explaining much of the the battle between Left and Right continued to energy and motivation of Israel’s founding fathers rage until and World War II, leaving and their criticism of Jewish traditions and ways in its wake scars that have still not healed. How‐ of life. In positive terms, the issues were: how ever, in this work the ensuing legacies and myths could one retain Jewish identity without an abid‐ of the Right are barely touched on in the relevant ing religious faith, which values could be extract‐ timeframes. ed from historical Judaism and what were their

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The Holocaust and the ’s response to it fort undertaken by this leadership was doomed. are discussed in the book but but only after the The Allies perceived Jewish eforts as threats to or fact. The Yishuv’s reactions while the Holocaust interference with their own interests and priori‐ was occurring are not treated. Many elements in ties, so that these eforts merely boomeranged the legacy of Jabotinsky (died in 1940) who or‐ against the rescuers, while the Nazis retained dered his followers in the (the IZL) to fght complete control over the victims. Later, the parti‐ the Nazis, not the British, were rejected or partial‐ tion of the country became a political necessity, ly adopted by : in 1937, the not only to gain a crucial international consensus British Report recommended the that would pave the way to Israel’s birth but also partition of Western Palestine, while Jabotinsky because the Holocaust had destroyed most of the claimed that both sides of the River consti‐ millions who were supposed to have joined the tuted the Jewish Homeland and should be ob‐ Zionist vanguard in unpartitioned Western Pales‐ tained by force if necessary. The two pivotal tine. Be that as it may, the rejection of partition events (the Holocaust and Begin’s “revolt” against was shared by Ahdut Ha’avoda, the nationalist left the British) created an ideological-historical syn‐ wing of the Zionist Labor Movement under the drome that colors Israeli security policies to this leadership of Yitzhak Tabenkin. This was a group day. Combined with religious-nationalist ideolo‐ from whose ranks came a number of highly infu‐ gies and an inherent sense of ethnic discrimina‐ ential military and political leaders, such as Yigal tion toward the mass immigration of Jews from Is‐ Allon (whose biography was published by Shapi‐ lamic countries to the State of Israel by the prag‐ ra) and Yitzhak Rabin. They would play an impor‐ matic European social democratic elite, this syn‐ tant role toward the Six-Day War and its ramifca‐ drome predated the Holocaust in part but as‐ tions. sumed a distinct political, territorial, and strategic As described by the author in a chapter deal‐ signifcance related to the Holocaust and its osten‐ ing with Begin’s ascendancy as prime minister, sible lessons during the May 1967 crisis, in the the Holocaust was a center piece of his govern‐ post-Six-Day War period, and in the Yom Kippur ment. Yet her narrative misses the vitriolic, moral‐ War until today. istic, and territorial-political signifcance of his Following the lead of the militant, quasi-Fas‐ onslaught against the Labor leadership during the cist Stern Group, the IZL’s commander, Begin, as Holocaust and afterward, coined in terms of a Jabotinsky’s self-appointed heir, declared his “re‐ conspiracy. Begin accused the mainstream Zion‐ volt” against Britain. This was rationalized on the ists of negligence and collaboration with the basis of Britain’s closure of the gates of Palestine British in order to maintain their political control to Adolf Hitler’s refugees before and during World over the Yishuv. His “revolt,” he argued, would War II due to Arab military and political pressure, have facilitated the rescue of Jews by enabling and was touted as the proper answer to British them to immigrate to Palestine in the middle of policy and a model for future actions. However, World War II, and allow the establishment of Jew‐ since it was the Nazis who actually shut of Jewish ish statehood in the territory that he and his immigration from occupied Europe at the begin‐ movement cherished--both sides of the Jordan ning of the “Final Solution” in 1941, Begin’s rebel‐ River. Begin’s vision, however, was totally de‐ lion was pointless and, from the political point of tached from reality. Later, he pruned his territori‐ view, extremely damaging. This was especially al claims to Western Palestine alone. Yet the no‐ true when Begin and the Stern Gang accused the tion of Zionist “negligence” and collaboration Yishuv leadership of failing to rescue the Jews of with Britain and the Nazis during the Holocaust, Europe regardless of the fact that any rescue ef‐ as allegedly proven after the war, became an on‐

3 H-Net Reviews going ideological, political, and security-related Center and made him the target of the politiciza‐ weapon in the arsenal of the Likud Bloc, and vari‐ tion of the Holocaust. Thanks to the parliamen‐ ous religious-nationalist groups couch their cur‐ tary Left, Begin was able to emerge from the polit‐ rent criticism of territorial concessions to the ical sidelines where he had been consigned ever in terms reminiscent of Begin’s “revolt” and since the misfred “revolt” of 1944 and his public the Holocaust. campaign against the Reparations Agreement The acquisition of an unconventional deter‐ with West Germany because of his threats to use rent, i.e., the pursuit of the atomic bomb, was one force in order to prevent its adoption by the Knes‐ of Ben-Gurion’s lessons from the Holocaust and set. the 1948 War of Independence, and became his Shapira’s discussion of Ben-Gurion’s behavior quest beginning in 1949. Although this is a major ahead of the 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign and his domestic and foreign political issue, and one dis‐ role ahead of the Eichmann Trial is detached from cussed in the relevant volumes of the Foreign Re‐ primary sources. Similarly, the author’s treatment lations of the United States and other archival of the “Lavon Afair”--a public scandal in the early sources at much length, Shapira devotes two lines 1960s that contributed to the demise of Ben-Guri‐ to it in her narrative. Ben-Gurion’s relentless pur‐ on--overlooks Ben-Gurion’s pursuit of constitu‐ suit of an alliance with in order to obtain a tional reform along British lines, and his quest for French nuclear reactor (which would be built spiritual content for a nascent society consisting near Dimona in the Negev) ahead of the 1956 of a diversity of tradition-based immigrants from Suez-Sinai Campaign is surprisingly absent in the Muslim countries. Accused of “statism,” i.e., the text. The related story of American-Israeli rela‐ transformation of the state and its institutions tions and Washington’s ceaseless eforts to curb into supreme values, Ben-Gurion found himself the project, as part of its anti-proliferation cru‐ assailed by his political enemies and so-called sade until 1969, are also missing, as is President spiritual leaders, mostly Hebrew University pro‐ Richard Nixon’s decision to accept Israel’s nuclear fessors. Some opposed the nuclear project, while capability provided it remained undeclared. others feared it would lead to confrontation with Shapira maintains that Ben-Gurion’s main the United States and Soviet Union. Others excori‐ sources of legitimacy for the Jewish state were the ated the government for its further connection , and the territorial signifcance thereof, and with West Germany, while still others, such as the the Holocaust, justifying the survivors’ quest for historian Jacob Leib Talmon (a specialist in the sovereignty and security. The issue is more com‐ French Revolution and Maximilien Robespierre’s plex than she presents, since Ben Gurion’s leader‐ terror), harnessed their expertise in order to head ship entailed several, not just one, interpretations a public crusade against the founding father. Tal‐ of his goals as understood by Shapira. Although mon’s main concern was aimed at Ben-Gurion’s he did attach a major signifcance to the Bible, he adoption in the late 1950s of a “messianic vision,” simultaneously warned against drawing any actu‐ or dream, which was supposed to give traditional al political and territorial conclusions from it. The Jews, now a majority in a partitioned Palestine, a Holocaust, like previous disasters, should not sense of mission and some substance related to overshadow the present and the future, including their religious past. But this was not a political the vital economic and military aid rendered by program. It was a cultural vision, not connected in West Germany. Yet the link between Ben-Gurion’s any way to political issues, as the historian Israel Germany policy and opposition to it from both the Kolatt has pointed out. For Talmon “political mes‐ political Right and Left, isolated Ben-Gurion in the sianism” was the root of modern totalitarian democracies, all the way back to Robespierre.

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Shapira attached to Talmon’s anti Ben-Gurion cru‐ ational diferences. Also missing in the book is the sade the term “Totalitarian Democracy” when, ac‐ Shakespearian drama of Ben-Gurion’s (an opposi‐ cordingly, Ben-Gurion was trying to assume the tion leader at the time) potential return to the de‐ role of a prophet, on top of his role as a blood and fense ministry, and the decision of his protégées, fesh politician. About this, both Talmon and and , to desert him in Shapira were factually wrong. And on top of this, order to enhance their own careers in the grand as long as Ben Gurion was in power, most tradi‐ coalition and because of their concern over his tional Israelis supported him. Shapira avoids Ben- possible refusal to preempt, and later occupy and Gurion’s struggles for parliamentary reform and retain, the Arab-populated West Bank. for majority constituency ballot law, which would The author’s discussion of the Yom Kippur have given better representation to the non- War and its ramifcations is scanty and misses the Ashkenazi, in his opposition to the multiparty crucial change in Israeli society. Shapira concen‐ regime inherited from the prestate period. How‐ trates on the shocked Ashkenazi elite, without an ever, in this period, the “professors” came out vic‐ in-depth analysis of the non-Ashkenazi majority. torious, undermining Ben-Gurion’s position and However, the so-called Mizrahim, traditional Is‐ contributing to the ensuing vIacuum in the center raelis neglected by Eshkol’s and ’s po‐ of Israel’s polity that wasflled in due course by litical and economic machine rule, were ripe to the nationalist Right. This refected the traditional move away from Labor to the Right. The elite it‐ Jewish behavior that Ben-Gurion’s state was sup‐ self was divided as a result of the war and its posed to rise above. The reform of the multiparty enormous casualties, combined with other phe‐ system and adoption of British “rules of the politi‐ nomena--ethnic background, creed, class, genera‐ cal game” have remained unfulflled until today. tion, and income group--that began to appear as The strong, anarchic instincts of the Jews, as Ben- rents in the fabric of Israeli society. As the dream Gurion defned them, would receive political ex‐ of an egalitarian society faded, human values pression in the 1960s. showed signs of corruption in both Western and Ben-Gurion was forced to resign in the sum‐ oriental forms. The individual was more con‐ mer of 1963. , his successor, found cerned with his personal welfare than with the himself captivated by a “frst strike,” or preven‐ collective good. This led to a new mood of self- tive war, the conventional military doctrine pro‐ criticism, unfamiliar to those accustomed to Is‐ pounded by Allon (and Rabin), Eshkol’s domestic rael’s success story. Most refused, however, to pay political ally, as a conventional alternative to Ben- the price of appeasing the Arab Moloch. The Gurion’s security doctrine. Shapira makes no blame was not Israel’s solely, nor was all the in‐ mention of the road to the preventive war of 1967 transigence, according to the British ambassador and its domestic and foreign political ramifca‐ in . Yet a myth emerged, that still exists, to tions in light of the perspective gained since. More wit, that Meir rebufed President Anwar Sadat’s attention to recent scholarship could have al‐ alleged peace ofers on the eve of the Yom Kippur lowed for its inclusion. The issue of Israeli control War, as her political enemies and some of today’s over the West Bank (and Gaza) as a result of the Israeli historians claim. But this is not dealt with 1967 war was decided on by the grand coalition in this book by means of primary archival materi‐ created by Eshkol that included Begin, and thus al. The Arabs’ decision to launch a limited ofen‐ became an issue of political contention and ideo‐ sive against a nuclear-armed Israel received Sovi‐ logical dispute partially in response to the Arab et backing, inter alia, as compensation for Jewish positions and partially a result of the coalition’s immigration to Israel from the USSR (one of the dysfunction and its members’ political and gener‐ byproducts of the détente). and em‐

5 H-Net Reviews ployed Israel’s own conventional military doc‐ boundaries, Jerusalem, and mainly the Palestini‐ trine to infict heavy casualties on the Israel De‐ an refugees’ “Right of Return” to Israel proper, fense Forces (IDF), thus shattering Israel’s self- combined to drive many Israelis to despair over confdence (a trauma still felt forty years later). the chances of ever attaining peace and to see the The Israeli government and public did not under‐ future in terms of an impending doom. The “oth‐ stand the enemy’s motives and limited goals. The er” camp is motivated by religious and nationalis‐ Arab onslaught was described by some ministers tic beliefs and sectoral interests that have little in and the opposition leader, Begin, as a war of de‐ common with the old elite. Yet among the post- struction, as many believed but which it was not. Zionist youth, some see no way out, while others The Left argued, as they do today, that it could feel so alienated that they seek salvation in the Di‐ have been avoided if only Meir and Defense Min‐ aspora. A new-old talush has found refuge at ister Dayan had listened to Sadat’s peace propos‐ home and abroad, mainly in the United States, als, which however were unacceptable to any Is‐ London, and Berlin, of all places. rael government, and fnally given up by him in The criticism of Likud governments and its al‐ 1979 when President Jimmy Carter dictated a lies among the religious parties, which happened peace treaty to Sadat (now being put to the test by to command a persistent majority among Israelis the recently instated in in the period covered in Shapira’s last chapters, is Egypt). The old elite, already divorced from the voiced by Israeli writers, Left parties, and a great masses because of their sense of discrimination at number of intellectuals, and is based on liberal- its hands, saw its power bases increasingly shift‐ universal values, some that could be described as ing to Begin’s Likud, fnally bringing him to power multicultural. Yet the sociologist Nissim Mizrahi in 1977. Instead of the old, secular elite, a reli‐ has argued in an online discussion that those very gious alternative ofered itself among the settlers liberal values lead most Mizrahim to cling to their in the West Bank and Gaza, justifying settlements sociocultural values even more. As a matter of in Holocaust- and 1973-related terms that alienat‐ identity, they reject such ideas as equality to ed many Israelis. Arabs under law, which is interpreted by liberal The details of the , which courts rather than enacted by the parliamentary preceded the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty of majority. The rights of Arabs are emphasized by 1979, as described by the author are properly liberals rather than their duties to a “Jewish summarized, but not analyzed in terms of their Democratic State.” Peace has not proved itself to long-range validity, especially when based on a be a self-sustaining solution to the Palestinian- staged peace process whose fnal results were Jewish confict, and its failure to materialize was supposed to be negotiated in the future. The same not because of Israel’s refusal to make peace, but is true with regard to the Israeli-Palestine Libera‐ because of the daydreams of the liberals. This can tion Organization (PLO) Oslo Peace Accord negoti‐ be described as a strong, very infuential conser‐ ated by Foreign Minister Peres’s aides and adopt‐ vative syndrome, magnifed by the multiparty sys‐ ed by the prime minister, Rabin, under the unique tem which gives it several political outlets that circumstances of the First Gulf War. Shortly there‐ dominate the Likud’s coalitions. The inquiry into after, Rabin was assassinated by a religious fanat‐ the historical roots of this reality is almost entire‐ ic. ly absent from Shapira’s work. The immediate rise of and its suicide Readers interested in the pre-state roots of Is‐ bombers, and Yasser Arafat’s that rael’s foreign policy and wars, in their connection replaced negotiations on core issues, such as to Israel’s domestic polity, and in the evolution of

6 H-Net Reviews this polity from the demise of Ben-Gurion’s rule until Netanyahu’s third coalition of 2013 will be disappointed with this book. Note [1]. Anita Shapira, Mi-piturei ha-rama ad pe‐ ruq ha-palmah: Sugiyot ba-ma'avaq al ha-han‐ haga ha-bit'honit [From the dismissal of the chief of national staf to the dissolving of the : Issues in the struggles over defense leadership] (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz hameuchad, 1984).

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Citation: Shlomo Aronson. Review of Shapira, Anita. Israel: A History. H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews. March, 2013.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37141

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