and annexation beyond the adriatic 79

Hegemony and Annexation beyond the Adriatic, 230–146 BC

arthur eckstein

1. Introduction: , Hegemony, Sphere of Influence

Did the Roman Republic establish an empire in the Greek East from the 180s BC, with the defeat of the great Hellenistic monarchies of Macedon and —or, on the contrary, did empire take long to develop? For hun- dreds of years, the ancient Mediterranean was a world of multipolar anar- chy, the prevalent form of international life since organized polities first came into existence. Polybius, the Greek historian of the rise of Rome, as- serted that with the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy in 168/167 the entire Mediterranean came under Rome’s universal rule (arché), for this removal of its last serious competitor radically changed the distribu- tion of power in Rome’s favour (cf. Pol. 1.1.5). Cato the Elder said something similar in a public speech in 167: the destruction of Macedon had trans- formed a situation where Rome was predominant among other large pow- ers into a situation where there was only one overwhelming power—Rome. Yet in 167, and when Polybius was writing ca. 150, there existed not a single Roman-administered province in the East, not a single Roman army—not even any Roman diplomats. Polybius’ Roman arché consisted entirely of legally independent states. And with the vast majority Rome had only in- formal ‘friendship’ (philia in Greek; amicitia in ), not even treaties.1 Unlike in the West, Rome clearly had no formal empire in the East in this period; but did it have an ‘informal empire’? So modern scholars claim, some of whom push its creation-date back into the early 180s or even 190s. The basic elements of ‘informal empire’ are clear: annexations and direct political control are avoided; power is extended subtly—via prestige, influ- ence, persuasion, intimidation (backed by the occasional military expedi- tion). In this manner weaker states are drawn into what Robinson and

1 Multipolar anarchy: Waltz 1979. Cato’s speech: Gellius 6.1.3 = Cato, ORF, frg. 164; Kallet-Marx 1995, 26-7. Situation in 150; Gruen 1984, ch. 2. 80 arthur eckstein Gallagher call ‘an invisible empire of informal sway.’ A striking phrase: but what exactly is meant by it? 2 Michael Doyle defines ‘empire’ as one state’s effective political control over both a subordinate state’s external and internal policies. anything less is not empire, but something less. Thus when a metropole seeks to con- tinuously control weaker neighbors’ foreign relations but leaves their in- ternal policies and politics alone, Doyle argues that this should not be categorised as empire but as mere ‘hegemony’. And when a metropole merely sets occasional limits to the foreign relations of weaker neighbors, this should be categorised as mere ‘sphere of influence’. Doyle’s analytical distinctions are little known among modern students of antiquity, but have been very influential among theorists of international relations. Jack Don- nelly emphasises that: ‘The political life of a hegemonized state that con- trols its own internal policy is very different from that of an imperialized polity that does not.’ Moreover, ‘influence is simply not rule’, and it is ana- lytically misleading to confuse the two.3 Another interstate power-configuration is called ‘unipolarity’ by politi- cal scientists, in which ‘the sole remaining superpower’ has become the center of an interstate system. Rome had achieved this by 188, becoming the sole remaining Mediterranean superpower. But unipolarity, too, does not equal empire—and not necessarily even hegemony. It is both ambigu- ous and fragile. ‘The essence of empire is control.’ But as a description of relationships in the real world, the meaning of ‘control’ is not always clear. The situation becomes especially complex if such ‘control’ is said to be exercised only informally. Yet modern scholars of antiquity use the term as if its meaning is obvious, uniform, and all-encompassing. We will need to be more care- ful.4

2 Mandell 1989 and 1991 (creation-date of 196 bc); Derow 2003 (188); Robinson and Gallagher 1961, 9 (on Britain’s ‘informal empire’ in the mid-19th Century. 3 Doyle 1986, 30-47, with chart on p. 44. Doyle’s impact: Watson 1992, 16-18, 27-8, 122-8; Donnelly 2006, 156, 158 (quoted, with my emphases). 4 Unipolarity theory: Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; Ikenberry 2002; Mowle and Sacko 2007. Unipolar Rome: Eckstein 2008, ch. 9. ‘Empire is control’: Thornton 1965, 36; cf. Doyle 1986, 30; Miles 1990, 639-40. Assertions of Roman direct or indirect ‘control’ over other states (total control is implied): Badian 1968, 11; Dahlheim 1977, 122; Harris 1979, 162; Will 1982, 421; cf. Derow 2003, 65-6.