Notes

1 Introduction: Economic Sanctions and Freezing Assets

1. Trade embargoes are included in sanctions here. 2. Executive Order No. 12170,3 C.F.R. 457(1980). 3. In his message of 14 , to the US Congress, immediately after the freeze, President Carter stated: 'Blocking property and property interests of the Government of , its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran will enable the to assure that these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities of the United States against the Government ofIran.' 4. See Blocked Foreign Assets in the United States, Summary Report of 1983-4 Census of Blocked Property, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC, May 1985. 5. The IEEPA, 50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1701 et seq. 6. Prejudgment attachment is an order to freeze the assets of a defendant pending the outcome of litigation. 7. See, e.g., G. Sick, All Fall Down, Random House, New York, 1985; W. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, Norton, New York, 1981; J. A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, Yale University Press, London, 1988. 8. For data on the changes in the international liquidity position of the United States see R. Triffin, 'The International Monetary Position of the United States', in S. E. Harris (ed.), The Dollar in Crisis, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., New York, 1961, pp. 228-9. 9. See B. J. Cohen, In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1986, chapter 2. 10. Ibid., p. 29. 11. For an indication of the degree of the interlock between the US banks and oil companies see M. Hulbert, Interlock, Richardson & Snyder, New York, 1982, pp. 39-46. 12. See, e.g., Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Senate Foreign Relation Committee, part 15, July-October 1975; International Debt, the Banks, and US Foreign Policy, Senate Cominittee on Foreign Relations, A Staff Report, 1917; The Operations 0/ Federal Agencies in Monitoring. Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States (Part 2-OPEC Investment in the United States), hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs, House Committee on Government Operations, July 1979. 13. Section 202 of the IEEPA. 14. See, e.g., A. F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls/or Political Ends, International Economic Law, vol. iii, 2nd ed., Mathew Bender, New York, 1983; R. D. Steel (ed.), The Iran Crisis and International Law, proceedings of the John

191 192 Notes

Busset Moore Society of International Law Symposium on Iran, University of Virginia School of Law, 1980; R. W. Edwards, 'Extra• territorial Application of the US Iranian Assets Control Regulations', American Journal of International Law, vol. 75, 1981, pp. 870-902. 15. See, e.g., W. Christopher et al., American in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, Councll on Foreign Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1985; P. Salinger, America Held : The Secret Negotiations, Doubleday, New York, 1981; H. Jordan, Crisis, the Last Year of the Carter Presidency, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982. 16. See, e.g., K. Lissakers, 'Money and Manipulation', Foreign Policy, no. 44, Fall 1980, pp. 107-26; B. J. Cohen, op. clt., note 9 supra; J. E. HofTman, 'The Bankers Channel', in W. Christopher, op. clt., pp. 235-280.

1 The IEEPA and the Freezing of Iranian Assets

I. The IEEPA, 50 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1701 et seq., was considered and passed by the US House of Representatives on 12 July 1977. It was considered, amended and passed by the Senate on 11 October 1977. The House concurred in certain Senate amendments, introducing new amendments on 30 November 1977. The Senate concurred in House amendments on 7 December 1977. See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 13, no. 53(1977): Presidential Statement, 28 December 1977. 2. According to the JEEPA the US President must declare a state of national emergency with respect to a foreign country before invoking the Act against that country, and that emergency must constitute: 'an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or the economy of the United States'. 3. 40 Stat. 415, Section 5(b). 4. See Memorandum of the Department of Justice for the Special Commit• tee on the Termination ofthe National Emergency, 21 May 1973, in US Congressional Records, Senate, 7 October 1974. 5. In a law that was passed for the termination of certain war powers in 1921, 41 stat. 1359 (the Knox Resolution), TWEA was specifically exempted. The reason was that at the time a large amount of property was held under the Act by the office of Alien Property Custodian. 6. Executive Proclamation No. 2039, 6 March 1933. 7. US Congress amended section 5(b) by passing , 48 Stat. 1, in the first day of its session on 9 March 1933. In the debates leading to the passage of the Act, Congress recognised that it was granting the President 'unusual powers which were justified by the gravity of the situation which the country faced, but which should not be available to Presidents in peacetime'. See US Congress, House, Trading with the Enemy Act: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of Declared National Emergency, prepared by the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the Committee on International Relations, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 242fT. Notes 193

8. US Congress, House, Report No. 95-459, Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation, Committee on International Relations, 95th Con• gress 1st Session, 23 June 1977, p. 2. The quotations are from US Congress, House, Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions, hearing before the Subcommittee on International Rela• tions, 95th Congress, Ist Session, 1977. 9. The TWEA in its original 19 sections provides 'general prohibitions against trading and other forms of intercourse with the'enemy; authorizes the President to regulate and prohibit international economic transactions except by license; provides for submission of lists of enemy officers, directors, or shareholders of US corporations; establishes the office of Alien Property Custodian to administer US-held foreign property; sets up procedures for claims to such property by non-enemy persons; specifies permitted acts in the patent, trademark, and copyright area; specifies prohibited importa (sic); and provides related regulatory authorities. Sections added subsequently deal generally with the administration of money and property seized during wartime', ibid., p. 10, note 22. 10. Executive Order 8389, 1939. 11. Executive Order 8389, 10 April 1940; Executive Order 8405, 10 May 1940; Executive Order 8446,17 June 1940; Executive Order 8484, 15 July 1940; Executive Order 8565, 10 October 1940; Executive Order 8701, 4 March 1941; Executive Order 8711, 13 March 1941; Executive Order 8721, 24 March 1941; Executive Order 8746, April 28, 1941; Executive Order 8785,14 June 1941; Executive Order 8832, 26 July 1941; Executive Order 8963, 9 December 1941; Executive Order 8998,26 December 1941. 12. Executive Order 8843, 9 August 1941. 13. Executive Order 11387, 1 January 1968 14. 31 CFR part 500. 15. On 11 May 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States came to an agreement over Chinese blocked assets whereby it was agreed that the assets be used for the claims of US nationals against China. See N. Lichtenstein, US Treasury Department, 'The Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China', China Law Reporter, vot. 1, no.1, Summer 19~0, pp. 25-30. 16. 31 CFR part 515. 17. 31 CFR part 505. 18. 31 CFR part 520. 19. Yoshida International. Inc., v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974); United States v. Yoshida International. Inc., 526 F. 2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 20. Article I, section 8, of the US Constitution states that it is Congress that 'makes all laws'. 21. Senate Report No. 93-549 Emergency Powers Statutes: Provisions of Federal Law now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National Emergency, Report of the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 19 November 1973, pp. 7-8, 184-188. 22. Senate Bill 93-3957, para. 101(a), 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974. 194 Notes

23. Sen. Bill 3957, paras. 401 & 601. See also Senate Report No. 93-1170, A Recommended National Emergencies Act, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974. 24. 120 Cong. Rec. S34012-21, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974. 25. Senate Report No. 94-1168, National Emergencies Act, Report of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, to accom• pany H.R. 3884, Terminating Certain Authorities with Respect to National Emergencies Still in Effect, and to Provide for Orderly Implementation and Termination of Future National Emergencies, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 August 1976. pp. 33-34. 26. Ibid., p. 31. 27. Ibid., p. 32. 28. The National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1601 et seq. 29. See Senate Committee on Government Operations, The National Emer• gencies Act: Source Book, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 9. 30. Chase Manhattan Bank, International Finance, 11 July 1977. 31. The following seven major oil companies dominate the international oil market: Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, SOCAL with their home bases in the United States, and BP and Shell with home bases in Britain and Holland. 32. See Mark Hulbert, Interlock: The Untold Story of American Banks, Oil Interests, the Shah's Money, Debts and Astounding Connections Between Them, Richardson & Snyder, New York, 1982, pp. 39-46. 33. A very small percentage, less than 10 per cent, might be in pounds sterling. 34. See, e.g., The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign Investments in the United States (Part 2 - OPEC Investment in the United States), hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, US House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 16, 17, ]8, and 26 July 1979; 'US Treasury Suppression of Sensitive Arab Official Investment Data', International Currency Review, vol. 12, no. 4, ]980, pp. 37-43. 35. See Karin Lissakers, International Oil Debt Financing and OPEC Cash Surplus Recycling by U.S. Banks, a staff report prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Committee for Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 1977, p. 7. 36. Ibid., p. 68. 37. Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, Part 15, hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinationa] Corporations of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 1st Session, July, September and October 1975. 38. Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions, hearings before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, 95th Congress, 1st Session, March, April, May and June ]977. 39. Ibid., p. 6. 40. Ibid., pp. 48, 50-1. 41. Ibid., p. 94. 42. Ibid., p. 118. Notes 195

43. Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act, hearings before the House Committee On International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977, p. 4. 44. Section 202 of the IEEPA. 45. US Congress, House, Report NO. 95-459 (23 July 1977), p. 16. 46. From the text of the IEEPA, as reprinted in A. F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends, International Economic Law, vol. Ill, 2nd ed.; Mathew Bender, New York, 1983, pp. OS-730-731. 47. US Congress, House, hearings, Op. cit., note 34 supra, 18 July 1979, pp. 270-1. 48. Ibid., p. 271. 49. Executive Order No. 12170 of 14 November 1979. 50. See Iran: The Financial Aspects of the Hostage Settlement Agreement, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Repre• sentatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, , p. 2. 51. Ibid., p. 2. 52. Ibid, pp. 2-7. 53. See 'New British Pressure', , 11 September 1951, p. 13; 'Iranians Shaken By British Action', ibid., 12 September 1951, p. 16; Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969, p. 55. 54. The oil market in 1979 was very different from 1951. The international community was worried about Iran boycotting the sale of oil to them in 1979, while in 1951 the oil cartels had boycotted the purchase of Iranian oil. The Iranian authorities were, therefore, more concerned about Iran's financial situation. 55. Op. cit., note 50 supra, p. 3. 56. See M. Hulbert, op. cit.; Robert Ball, 'The Unseemly Squabble over Iran's Assets', Fortune, 28 January 1980, pp. 60-4; Anthony Sampson, 'Iran's Threat To American Banks', and 'U.S. Banks React on Hostages', St Louis Post Dispatch, 11, 12 November 1980, pp. I3A, 15A; Jonathan M. Winer, 'The Iranian Assets Grab', Nation, 17 , pp. 43-6; L.J. Oavis, 'Hostages for Chase Manhattan', Penthouse, December 1980, p. 174; H. O. Taylor, 'Megabankers, Carter Schemed to Create Iran's Crisis, Freeze Funds', The Spotlight, 9 February 1981, p. 16; Claudia Wright, 'Buried Treasure at Chase Manhattan?', Inquiry, 7 April 1980, p. 15; Robert Shervil, 'Big Oil, Big Banks, Big Trouble', Penthouse, June 1980, p. 72; Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 26 , p. 23. The crux of the scenario painted by these writers is that Chase Manhattan Bank engineered a freeze by persuading the US government to permit the Shah to come to the United States, knowing that it would precipitate violent reaction in Iran that would make a freeze inevitable. 57. See James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American• Iranian Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988, pp. 320-3. 58. See R. Graham, Iran: the Illusion of Power, rev. ed., Croom Helm, London, 1979, pp. 157-62. 59. An operating account is a non-interest bearing demand deposit account which is like a current account. 60. Hulbert, op. cit., p. 86. 196 Notes

61. Calculated from various issues of BMI's Bulletin. 62. This is an underestimate because the data includes those of 1979 when BMI started diverting its funds from Chase. 63. See Alan M. Delsman - a Vice President in the International Department of the Chase Manhattan Bank - Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v. The State of Iran et al., United States District Court Southern District of New York, 79 Civ. 6644 (T.P.G.), paras. 29-30. 64. Ibid., para. 31. 65. United States Department of State Airgram, Iran's Gold and Foreign Exchange Holdings, CERP-0231, 8 April 1976. 66. United States Department of State Airgram, Iran's Balance of Payments• Nine Months, Year 2535,1976 and Forecast 2536, CERP-OI02, February 10, 1977. 67. See Tim McGirk and Nigel Ash, 'How the Shah Plundered Iran', 8 Days, 8 December 1979, p. 5. 68. See Euromoney, January 1980, p. 28. 69. There were four syndicated loans led by Chase for which the require• ments of Article 25 had not been met. The aggregate amount of these loans came to more than $1.3 billion. 70. See Paul Bill, 'Caveat Lender: Chase Bank and Others Face Challenge on Huge Loans to Iran', The Wall Street Journal, 28 March 1980. 71. The loan contracts were governed by English law. 72. For a detail breakdown of these deposits see Delsman's Affidavit, op. cit., paras. 51 & 52. 73. Ibid., paras. 46, 47. 74. The regulations and set-ofTs will be discussed in detail in this and following chapters. 75. See generally Carswell and Davis, 'The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions', in et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985, pp. 171. 76. Op. cit., note 50 supra. It should be noted that one member of the Committee, Congressman George Hansen of Idaho, subscribed to the theory that Chase was instrumental in bringing about the freeze. 77. Related to the author in interviews with Treasury officials. 78. See note 45 supra and the accompanying text. 79. Karin Lissakers, 'Money And ManipUlation', Foreign Policy, no. 44, fall 1981, pp. 111, 113. 80. See Roy Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, pp. 78, 80. 81. Ibid., p. 80. 82. Op. cit., note 50 supra, p. 13. 83. However, the said claims had not resulted from the hostage taking. There were two categories of claims that were taken against the Iranian government before the US courts after the freeze. The first category was the claims of US banks against Iran comprising mostly the loans given to Iranian entities. The repayments for these loans were up to date until the time of the freeze on 14 November 1979. The second category was claims of US non-bank corporations and individuals. These claims Notes 197

had come about as a result of the revolution during which US companies and individuals had to leave Iran and could not finish their contracts. At the time of the freeze there were only three such claims against Iranian entities pending before US courts. The two categories of claims will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters. 84. Op. cit., note 82 supra. 85. Related to the author in interviews with prominent US government and banking officials. 86. Op. cit., note 50 supra, p. iv. 87. The extraterritorial application of the freeze order will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 88. The entity within the US Treasury dealing with blocked foreign assets is the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the US Treasury. 89. For the complete text of the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, including Executive Order of 7 April 1980, and subsequent regulations imposing further , see Lowenfeld, op. cit., pp. DS745-78. 90. These set-ofTs will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 91. See A. Delsman, op. cit., para. 54. 92. This was despite the fact that the total OPEC holdings was a very small percentage of the daily volume of transactions in the world financial markets. 93. Emergency Economic Powers: Iran, hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign AfTairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 5 March 1981, p. 2.

3 Litigation in European Courts

1. 50 U.S.C. 1702 (a) (I). 2. US House of Representatives, Report No. 95-459, 95th Congress, Ist Session, 1975, p. 10. 3. See Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 2 May 1980, p. 641. 4. BMI took actions in London against Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Bankers Trust and Irving Trust. The docket numbers for these actions are respectively: 1979-B-No. 5873, I 979-B-No. 5903, I 979-B-No. 5907, I 979-B-No. 5908, 1979-B-No. 5955 and 1980-B-No. 549; in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court. 5. The status of BMI is set forth in the Monetary and Banking Law of Iran, passed on 9 July 1972. The statute establishes BMI as the Central Bank of Iran and provides that it 'shall be responsible for the formulation and implementation of the monetary and credit policies with due regard to the general economic policy of the country' (Article 100a». BMI is empow• ered to regulate the monetary and credit system of the country (Article 11) and to act as 'banker to the government' (Article 12). Accordingly, BMI has the function of maintaining custody of the country's foreign exchange and gold reserves (Article 12(c», and formulating regulations pertaining to and for the control of foreign exchange transactions (Article 198 Notes

II(c». In most instances, therefore, the government ministries, corpora• tions and organisations were required to 'deposit their funds exclusively with and conduct their banking transactions through Bank Markazi' (Article 11, n.l). See Affidavit of Leonard B. Boudin, The Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran. Bank Markazi. et al., US District Court, Southern District of New York, 79 Civ. 6644, pp. 1-3 and Exhibit 1. 6. 31 CFR 535, chapter v. 7. Chase's Points of Defence and Counterclaim, in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, 1979-B-No. 5873, Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 7 March 1980, p. 266. 8. Ibid., at 4.(2) and 4.(3) pp. 266-7. . 9. Ibid., at 5.(1), p. 268. 10. 31 CFR 535.902. 11. 44 Fed. Register 65988, 16 November 1979. 12. 12 U.S.C. paras. 601-4 governs the establishment by banks of foreign branches; para. 604 provides: 'Every national banking association operating foreign branches shall conduct the accounts of each foreign branch independently of the accounts of other foreign branches estab• lished by it and of its home office, and shall at the end of each fiscal period transfer to its general ledger the profit or loss accrued at each branch as a separate item.' The United States courts have also treated branches separately from the head office and each other. See, e.g., Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 744 (N.Y. City Court, 1931) in which it was stated: 'A branch is a separate and distinct business entity. Not only are branch banks separate entities, but deposits made in a branch bank are payable there and there only. A branch bank being separately indebted to its depositor, the existing obligation lies primarily between such branch bank and its depositor, the conclusion follows as a necessary corollary that the debt owed by a branch finds its situs within the territorial jurisdiction of such branch.' 13. In English law right of set-off resulting in extinction of debts may arise in the case of banks, through their rights as bankers to combine accounts, set off or exercise a lien in the case of two parties presently liable to each other, i.e. the debt should be mature, in respect of debts owed each way to each other on the same right', International Business Lawyer, vo1.9(vi), 1981, p. 252. 14. See Chase's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 79 civ 6644 (TPG) US District Court, Southern District of New York. 15. See the writ issued against BMI in Chemical Bank v. The State of Iran and Bank Markazi Iran, in the High Court of Justice, London, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, 1979 C. No. 8489, points of claim, paragraph 3. 16. The European bankers claimed that because of the time difference between them and New York, Chase's telex requesting a vote on default declaration arrived after they had gone home for the evening. When they Notes 199

first saw the telex, they say, they had little time to decide how to vote. See 'Why Did Chase Move so FastT, Euromoney, January 1980, p. 20. 17. Early in 1979 Chase had polled the US banks that were participants in four syndicated loans managed by Chase, on calling the Iranian loans in default. The said US banks refused to consider the declaration of default. See Iran: The Financial Aspects of the Hostage Agreement, hearings, US House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session, July 1981, p. 3. 18. It must be noted that Chase and other US banks made set-offs against Iranian offshore assets on 15 November, that is, four days before the declaration of default and acceleration of Iranian public debts. The same is true with other US banks. In the case of Citibank, they made set-offs before the Treasury amended the regulations allowing them. 19. National Westminster Bank, one of the participants i~ the $500 million syndicated loan, was especially outraged by Chase's actions. On 22 November, Nat West sent the Iranian government a telex which is very remarkable. Nat West telexed to say that it, for one, had opposed Chase's action in calling the loan in default. Nat West wanted Iran to realise that the default occurred despite their opposition because Chase, as agent, was able to 'pre-empt' them. Telex to Organisation for Investment and Economic and Technical Assistance of Iran from Eric Crouch, Regional Manager, African and Middle East Region, International Westminster Bank of London, 22 November 1979. 20. See R. Carswell, 'Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience', Foreign Affairs, 60, Winter 1981/2, pp. 250-1. 21. See R. Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, pp. 86-7. 22. See Chase's telex of 12 December 1979, no. 1537JK, to BMI, Boudin's affidavit, op. cit., Exhibit 9. 23. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, effective 1 April 1978,29 UST 2230, TIAS No. 8937. 24. For a discussion of cases in which the courts in different countries have adopted this view of the term 'exchange contracts' see J. S. Williams, 'Extraterritorial Enforcement of Exchange Control Regulations Under the International Monetary Fund Agreement', Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 15 no. 2, 1975, pp. 333-6. 25. For the cases in which this view has been adopted by courts, see ibid., pp. 338-42. Scholars like Sir Joseph Gold, F. A. Mann, Ellias Krispis and others have advocated a liberal view of the meaning of 'exchange contracts' in section 2(b). See Sir Joseph Gold, The Fund Agreements in the Courts, IMF Staff Papers 193 (1977), pp. 216-17, 219; F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money, 3rd. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, pp. 439-42; E. Krispis, Money in Private International Law, 120 Recueil Des Cours 191, (1967 I), pp. 286-290. 26. See A. Nussbaum, Money in the Law, National and International (rev. ed., 1950), Foundation Press, Brooklyn, pp. 543-4; and 'Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund', Yale Law Journal, vol. 59, 1950, pp. 426-7. 27. See F.A. Mann, op. cit., pp. 442-4; J. Gold, The Cuban Insurance Cases and the Articles of the Fund, 46 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 8, 1966), pp. 27, 200 Notes

34; and The Fund Agreements in the Courts, in IMF Staff Papers, Part XIV (1979), pp. 590-1 & 608-9; Williams, op. cit., pp. 345-51; and F. Gianviti, 'Le blocage des avoir officiels Iraniens par les Etats-Unis (executive order du 14 novembre 1979)" Revue Critique de Droit International Prive, no. 2, April-June 1980, pp. 283-6. 28. See Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 2 May 1980, pp. 639-50; 16 May 1980, pp. 790-802; 6 June 1980, pp. 968-75. 29. Gianviti, op. cit., p. 287. 30. See G. Delaume, Legal Aspect of International Lending and Economic Development Financing, Oceana, New York, 1967, p. 294; Williams, op. cit., p. 353; Mann, op. cit., p. 444. 31. See Chapter 2 for more details. 32. Unpublished draft of a US Department of Treasury position paper on 'Bretton Woods Defence', draft 3/5/80, p. 1. 33. See note 23 supra. 34. The IMF uses a weighted voting system based on quotas. See J. Gold, Voting Majority in the Fund (IMF Pamphlet Series No.20, 1977). 35. E. B. Decision No.I44-(52/51), 1952, Selected Decisions of the Interna• tional Monetary Fund and Selected Documents, 133, 8th. issue, 1976. 36. See R. W. Edwards, 'Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations', American Journal of International Law, vot. 75, 1981, p. 875, note 24. 37. N.A. Simon has argued: 'The Fund's approval of these regulations, tacit or otherwise, does not make the regulations consistent with the spirit and letter of the Fund's Agreement.' N. A. Simon, 'The Iranian Assets Control Regulations and the International Monetary Fund: Are the Regulations "Exchange Control Regulations"?', Boston College Interna• tional and Comparative Law Review, vot. iv, no. I, 1981, p. 221. 38. See Edwards, op. cit., p. 901. 39. Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 7 March 1980, pp. 266-316. 40. See Chase's Complaint, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Markazi, et al., US District Court, Southern District of New York, 79 civ. 6644, p. 16 at 29. 41. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 42. Order to show cause for preliminary injunction with temporary restrain• ing order, ibid., 6 December 1979, p. 3. 43. Ibid., IS February 1980,484 F. Supp. 832. 44. Iran made an agreement with the United States in January 1981 as a result of which the hostages were released and the cases were withdrawn. The terms of the said agreement will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 45. In Citibank case, decision of 21 December 1979, 107 J. Droit In!'1 (1980), p. 330, and decision of 11 February 1980, in Bank of America case. 46. See Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 3 , p. 1561. 47. Order of 23 April 1980, Tribunal de Orande Instance, Paris (1st, chamber). See Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 6 June 1980, pp. 968-75. 48. Related to the author in an interview. 49. Executive Order 12544 of 8 January 1986; 51 FR 1235, 10 January 1986. 50. Executive Order 12543 of 7 January 1986; 51 FR 875, 9 January 1986. Notes 201

51. Related to the author in interviews with US government officials. 52. The freeze did not apply to non-dollar deposits of Libya held with overseas branches of US banks; 31 CFR paragraph 550.516. 53. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Company, and Same v. Same, in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, 1986 L. No. 1567 & 1986 L. No. 4048. 54. The details of the case that follows are from the notes taken by the author who attended the hearings. See M. Alerassool, 'Extraterritorial Powers: Libya's Foreign Assets and the Question of the External Application of the Freeze Order', International Cu"ency Review, vol. 18, no. 4, August 1987, pp. 12-20. 55. LAFB first agreed to maintain a minimum balance of $50 million on thirty-day notice in London that would earn a fractionally higher rate of interest than the rest of the balance of the account which would be on call. The $50 million minimum balance and preferential interest arrange• ments were terminated in January 1982. From then on the total balance of the London account was kept on call. 56. The Summary Judgment of 17 October 1986, p. 35. 57. The regulations provided: '550.209 (a) Except as authorized by regula• tions, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, no property or interests in property of the Government of Libya that are in the United States that hereafter come within the United States or that are or hearafter [sic] come within the possession or control of US persons, including their overseas branches, may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in'; and '550.420 Indirect payments to the Government of Libya. The prohibition in 550.209 on payments or transfers to the Government of Libya applies to indirect payments (including reimbursement of a non• US person for payment, as, for example, on a guarantee) made after 4:10 p.m. e.s.t. January 8, 1986'. 58. 31 CFR paragraph 550.421. 59. The Judgment in the case of Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Company and Same v. Same, in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, 1986 L. No. 1567 & 1986 L. No. 4048, before Mr Justice Staughton, Wednesday 2 September 1987, p. 3. 60. Ibid., p. 19. 61. Ibid., pp. 25--6. 62. Ibid., pp. 3S-9. 63. Ibid., p. 39. 64. Ibid., pp. 39-40. 65. Ibid., p. 42. 66. Ibid., p. 43. 67. Mann, op. cit., pp. 193-5. 68. R. M. Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1983, p. 120. 69. The Judgment, op. cit., pp. 45--6. 70. Ibid., p. 51. 71. Ibid., p. 54. 72. Ibid., p. 15. 202 Notes

4 The Hostage Crisis

I. For an analysis of the litigation in US courts, with respect to the in the banks in the United States, the legal problems faced by the US claimants and the way these problems were resolved, see Chapter 6. 2. The Algerian agreements consisted of the folllowing documents: (i) Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of (the General Declaration). (ii) Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (the Claims Settlement Declara• tion). (iii) Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (the Undertakings). (iv) The Escrow Agreement; between the Government of the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York acting as fiscal agent of the United States, Bank Markazi Iran as interested party and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie acting as escrow agent. (v) Technical Arrangement; between Banque Centrale d'Algerie as escrow agent and the Governor and Company of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as fiscal agent of the United States. All the documents are referred to hereinafter as the Accords. 3. See K. Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979. 4. However, for a brief period he did have problems with the administration of President Kennedy, see J. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988, pp. 132-41. 5. See P. Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations, Andre Deutsch, London, 1981, pp. 3-5. 6. See ibid., pp. 4-5. For Carter's assessment of the Shah, during the last year prior to the , see US Policy toward Iran, January 1979, hearing before the Subcommittee on and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 17 January 1979, p. 28. 7. This is the official estimate but, as there were also secret budgets for military purposes under the Shah's personal supervision, the real figures on arms purchases must be much higher. 8. See F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 94-5. 9. Ibid., p. 101. 10. According to President Carter a CIA report issued in August 1978 stated: 'Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary situation'. The report went on to state that the opposition, both violent and non-violent, Notes 203

did not have the capaclty to be more than troublesome in any transition to a new regime. See J. Carter, note 11 infra, p. 438. 11. See, e.g. W. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, W. W. Norton, New York, London, 1981; A. Parsons, The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974-1979, Cape, London, 1984; G. W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs, Norton, New York, 1982, pp. 455-62; G. Sick, All Fall Down: America's Fateful Encounter with Iran, Tauris, London, 1985; Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1983, pp. 354-98; C. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983, pp. 314-48; J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, Collins, London, 1982, pp. 433-51; R. E. Huyser, Mission to , Deutsch, London, 1986. 12. Sullivan, op. clt., pp. 171-2. 13. Ibid., p. 194. 14. Ibid., pp. 201-04. 15. According to President Carter: 'On October 28, 1978, Sullivan sent a cable to Washington stating that 'The Shah is the unique element which can, on the one hand, restrain the military and, on the other hand, lead a controlled transition ... I would strongly oppose any overture to Khomeini', Carter, op. clt., p. 439. 16. Sullivan, op. cit., p. 204. 17. Ibid., p. 226. 18. Brzezinski, op. clt., p. 381. 19. Carter, op. clt., p. 446. 20. Believing that he would be returning soon, the Shah was following the procedures according to the letter of the constitution.. 21. Brzezinski, op. clt., p. 380. 22. In his book, Answer to History, which was written in exile, the Shah accuses the United States of plotting to get rid of him. His evidence being the fact that Huyser was sent to Iran without the prior knowledge of the Shah and he went to the palace only to discuss the Shah's departure. 23. Sullivan, op. clt., p. 241. 24. Ibid., p. 253. 25. Roosevelt, op. clt., pp. 186-97. 26. According to Huyser: 'The media could certainly not be called inefficlent. I had been on the move in Tehran for only one day under what I believed to be highly secret conditions, but obviously they had me well covered', Huyser, op. clt., p. 44. 27. R. Falk, Hunum Rights and State Sovereignty, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1980, p. 219. 28. For an indication of the extent of the Carter administration's preoccupa• tion with the hostage question see H. Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, Putnam, New York, 1982. Jordan was White House Chief of Staff and one of President Carter's closest advisers. 29. As the former head of Amnesty International, Sean McBride had been involved in the investigation of the use ofsystematic torture against political prisoners in different countries. He believed that the use of torture had been started by the Shah's government before spreading to Greece, South 204 Notes

America, and East Asia, and that the CIA had helped to train and supervise SA VAK torturers. When he went to Iran to investigate the use oftorture, he was told by the Shah's Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveida: 'All right, yes, it is true we are using torture, but you don't have to worry, it's being done under the supervision of the Americans.' Salinger, op. cit., p. 117. See also J. Bill, op. cit., pp. 186-7. 30. See R. Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, pp. 105-7. 31. Ibid., p. 108. 32. For the full text of Waldheim's speech see Salinger, op. cit., pp. 111-16. 33. For the background of Bourguet and Villalon, see Jordan, op. cit., pp. 130-1. 34. Ibid., p. 118. 35. Salinger, op. cit., p. 148. 36. Ibid., p. 166. 37. For an account of Commission's treatment of SA VAK victims see Salinger, op. cit., pp. 177-80. 38. Brzezinski was in favour of military attack against Iran from the very beginning of the crisis. In his view such an attack was a matter of honour as well as 'a moral and political obligation to the prisoners'. See Z. Brzezinski, 'The Failed Mission', Time Magazine, 18 October 1982, pp. 28-40. 39. Vance, op. cit., pp. 409-11. 40. Salinger, op. cit., p. 238. 41. Some of the clergy had also been in contact with the US Embassy. But influential figures like Beheshti and Rafsanjani made sure that they were not named to avoid adverse pUblicity. 42. Carter, op. cit., pp. 524-5. 43. See, e.g. R. E. Huyser, op. cit. 44. See, e.g. Sullivan, op. cit. 45. See, e.g. Z. Brzezinski, 'The Failed Mission', Time Magazine, 18 October 1982, pp. 28-40. 46. See generally O. R. Holsti and J. N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown. of Consensus, Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1984. 47. See A. K. Samii, Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran, State University Press, University Park: and London, 1987, p. x.

5 The

1. A chronological account of the actions taken by the United States against Iran in response to the hostage crisis is as follows: 1979 12 November President Carter bans US oil imports from Iran. 20 November Naval task: force, headed by aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk: is ordered into Indian Ocean from the Phillippines. Iran is threatened with military action if the hostages are put on trial. Notes 205

25 November Emergency session of UN Security Council is called by Secretary-General Waldheim at the request of the United States. 29 November United States petitions the International Court of Justice at The Hague for speedy legal judgment ordering Iran to release the hostages.

1980 13 January At the request of the United States UN Security Council votes on economic sanctions against Iran. There are 10-2 votes in favour of economic sanctions. and South Yemen vote against and the Soviets apply the veto. 17 January US aircraft carrier Nimitz enters the Indian Ocean. 17 April New economic sanctions are imposed against Iran by the US President. 25 April A US military mission enters Iran to rescue the hostages. The mission is aborted after a series of technical failures. 17 May At the reqest of the United States EC countries agree to impose trade embargo on Iran.

2. By early 1980, US officials had listed twenty-two individuals or channels, some of them strictly for purposes of information, others very specifically engaged in the process of negotiation or communicating positions or mediation'. See Iran's Seizure of the United States Embassy, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Congress, House, 97th Congress 1st Session, 17, 19,25 February and 11 March 1981, p. 6. 3. See chapter 3. 4. Morgan Guaranty Trust had obtained court permission to attach Iranian shares in the German firm of Fried Krupp Gmbh., the parent of the steel and industrial giant in which Iran owned a 25 per cent interest. The bank also obtained a similar attachment on Iran's share stake in the Deutsche Babcock industrial giant. See R. Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, p. 95. In Britain, US banks tried to secure attachments on debts owed by British Water Authorities to Iran, see Robert Carswell and Richard J. Davis, 'Economic and Financial Pressures', in Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, a Council on Foreign Relations Book, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985, p. 192, note 33. 5. See J. E. Hoffman, 'The Bankers' Channel', in W. Christopher, op. cit., pp. 235-80. 6. See Chapter 3 for more details. 7. See R. Carswell and R.J. Davis, op. cit., p. 200. 8. The US authorities were well aware that even the application of the freeze to offshore assets would not be recognised by the European courts let alone taking possession of those assets by the US government; interview source. 206 Notes

9. See Blocked Foreign Assets in the United States, Summary Report of 1983-4, Census of Blocked Property, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, Washington DC, 1985. 10. J. E. HofTman, op. cit., p. 242. 11. Ibid., p. 242. 12. See Assersohn, op. cit., p. 138. 13. Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. para. 953, is a criminal statute and provides: 953. Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign govern• ment or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. 14. Interview source. 15. See Robert B. Owen, 'Final Negotiations and Release in Algiers', in W. Christopher, op. cit., p. 306. 16. Ibid., p. 307. 17. For a detailed account of these negotiations see R. Carswell and R.J. Davis, op. cit., pp. 209-16. 18. An escrow account is: 'A bank account kept by a third party on behalf of two others in dispute over its rightful ownership. The disputing parties try to set out conditions under which they will agree to let the money be released. When these conditions are met, the third party releases the funds', T. Hindle, The Economist Pocket Banker, Basil Blackwell and The Economist, Oxford & London, 1985, p. 62. 19. Robert Carswell, the US Deputy Treasury Secretary, had met the officials of the Deutsche Bundesbank in September 1980, during the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, to find out if they were prepared to help in transferring Iran's assets in case of a settlement. See Assersohn, op. cit., p. 217. 20. Ernest T. Patrikis was the Deputy General Counsel at the New York Fed who had been working closely with the Fed's General Counsel, James Oltman, on the legal problems of the freeze and a possible settlement. Robert Mundheim had been a senior lawyer at the Treasury and been working with Carswell on the mechanisms of implementing the freeze. 21. See Assersohn, op. cit., pp. 86, 87. 22. Ibid., p. 268. 23. Ibid., pp. 269-73. 24. R. B. Owen, op. cit., pp. 314-15. 25. R. Carswell and R. J. Davis, op. cit., p. 211, note 2. 26. Interview source. 27. The major US banks involved were: Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Chemical Bank, Continental Illinois, European American Bank, First National Bank of Chicago, Irving Trust Co., Notes 207

Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Marine Midland Bank and Morgan Guaranty. 28. See Declaration of the GOl'ernment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, reprinted in W. Christopher, op. cit., p. 405. 29. It is true that the students had taken the hostages without any authorisation from the Iranian government. However, Iran was in violation of international law, not on the basis of direct responsibility but on violations of the 'categorical obligations' of protection. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment of 24 May 1980, I.CJ. Reports 1980, International Court of Justice, The Hague, at 30, para. 61. 30. See US Congress hearings, op. cit., note 2 supra, pp. 72-3. 31. See paras. 2(A) & 2(B) of the Undertakings, W. Christopher, op. cit., p.415. 32. Related to the author in interviews with lawyers representing the government of Iran and BMI in the final negotiations. 33. See 'The Iran Agreements', hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 97th Congress, 1st. Session, 17, 18 February and 4 March 1981, pp. 40-1. 34. For months after the Algiers Accords were signed the Iranian entities that were defendants in many cases and were supposed to work according to the Algiers Accords did not have access to the agreements. 35. Interview source. 36. Plan D 23/12/80(B), Horrman, op. cit., p. 263. 37. As a result of the Algiers Accords Iran recovered only S4 billion out of $14 billion of its blocked assets. 38. The litigation in the United States' courts will be discussed in the next chapter.

6 Litigation against Iranian Entities in US Courts

1. Discovery is 'the process by which the parties may, within limits, obtain information of the existence and contents of all documents relevant to the matters in dispute between them'. D. M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 363. 2. There were three such cases: (i) , Inc. v. Social Security Organisation of the GOl'ernment of Iran, 610 F. 2d. (2d. cir. 1979), (EDS v. SSO). EDS had a contract with SSO to design and install data processing equipment. Alleging that the SSO failed to pay monthly invoices beginning in June 1978, EDS terminated the contract in January 1979 and filed suit against SSO in in the Northern District of Texas. (ii) Behring International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. (D.N.J. 1979). Behring had provided freight forwarding services for the Iranian Air Force. Behring alleged that beginning in early 1979 it was not paid for services provided and that it was unable to reach its contractors in Iran. Behring took action in February 1979. 208 Notes

(iii) Reading cl Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 478 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Reading & Bates sued the NIOC for the unlawful taking of an oil rig. 3. The only US bank that suffered as a result of the Iranian revolution was Chase Manhattan Bank. Chase had been chosen by the Shah as his and Iran's banker, and all Iranian oil revenues went first to accounts with different branches of Chase. After the revolution the new Iranian authorities stopped this arrangement and deposited the oil revenues with the other US banks. Even so, on 14 November 1979, at the time of the freezing of the Iranian assets, BMI had more deposits with Chase than the total amount of all the outstanding Iranian debts to that bank. 4. At the time of the Bakhtiar government, Iran had contracts worth over 56 billion with US companies for the purchase of military equipment. The contracts were made on a government to government basis whereby if Iran failed to purchase the arms the US government was obliged to buy them from the American arms manufacturers. In the last days of the Bakhtiar government a statement of understanding was signed, at the suggestion of the US Embassy in Tehran, for the cancellation of these agreements. This was in anticipation that a new revolutionary govern• ment would not have purchased the arms and the US government would have had to pick up the bill. See W. H. SuIlivan, Mission To Iran, W. W. Norton, New York, 1981, pp. 245-7. 5. On 8 June 1979, the Iranian government nationalised all private banks. See 'The Act Concerning the Nationalisation of Banks', Iranian Official Gazette, no. 10012, dated 17/4/1358 (8 July 1979). 6. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, US Department of State Publication 8350, 1968, vot. 6, p. 553. 7. Ibid., p. 582. 8. Tate Letter, XXVI Bulletin, Department of State, No. 678, 23 June 1952, pp. 984-9. 9. In personam jurisdiction is: 'Power which a court has over the defendant himself in contrast to the court's power over the defendant's interest in property (quasi in rem) or power over the property itself (in rem). A court which lacks personal jurisdiction is without power to issue an in personam judgment', Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., St Paul, Minn., 1979, p. 711. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is: 'Type of jurisdiction of a court based on a person's interest in property within the jurisdiction of the court. There must be a connection involving minimum contact between the property and the subject matter of the action for a state to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction', Ibid., p. 1121. 10. See Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, US Congress, House, Report no. 94-1487, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 September 1976, p. 8. 11. FSIA, 28 U.S.C., para. 1605(a). 12. The most well known modem American cases are: Banco Nacional de v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 NY 2d. 46, 295 NYS 2d. 433, 242 NE 2d. 704 (1968); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F. 2d. 68, 434 US 984 (1977). Notes 209

13. New York and Cuba MaU Steamship Company v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684,685 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 14. The legal adviser (Becker) of the Department of State to the Attorney General (Rogers), letter, 9 March 1959, MS. Department of State, file 262.1141 Weilaman, Elizabeth R./J-259. Pursuant to this letter, the US Attorney General filed a suggestion of immunity from execution on behalf of the US State Department. Honouring this suggestion, the New York Supreme Court, West Chester County, held that the funds of the State Bank ofthe USSR and of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR held in the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York that had been attached by the plaintiffs were not subject to 'execution or action analogous to execution'. 15. FSIA, para. 161O(a), (1) & (2). Subsections (3), (4) & (5) of para. 1610(a) are not relevant to our discussion of the Iranian litigation. 16. From para. 161O(b) of the FSIA, for the reference to section 1605(a): (2) & (3) see the text accompanying note 11 supra. 17. FSIA, para. 1611. 18. English courts accept in the main foreign judgments as conclusive provided that certain conditions ... are satisfied, these conditions are as follows: (i) The foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in the country in which it was pronounced. (ii) The foreign court in question must have been competent to adjudicate upon the matter in question. (iii) The judgment must not have been obtained by fraud. (iv) The judgment must not have been obtained by proceedings contrary to natural justice. (v) The judgment must not have been based upon a cause of action contrary to English public policy: Whiteman, op. cit., p. 226. 19. See C.M. Schmitthof, Export Trade. the Law and Practice of Interna• tional Trade, 8th ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1986, pp. 620-1. 20. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran [1955], 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853. 21. Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. The Social Security Organisation of the State of Iran and Marine Midland Bank, 610 F. 2d. 94(2d. cir. 1979), brief for the United States as amicus curiae. 22. 475 F. Supp. 383(D.N.J. 1979). 23. Ibid., at 388-94. 24. 478 F. Supp. 724(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 25. Ibid., at 728. 26. Ibid., at 729. 27. 15 Weekly Comp. Pres. Does. 2117(14 November 1979). 28. IEEPA Pub. L. 95-223, 91 stat. 1625 (28 December 1977), Section 203(a)(I )(B). 29. 31 C.F.R. paras. 535.504(a), (b) & (c). 30. 31 C.F.R. para. 535.418. 31. The regulations at all relevant times expressly provided that any licence 'may be amended, modified or revoked at any time', (31 C.F.R. para. 535.508), and that without such a licence any attachment is 'null and void', (31 C.F.R., para. 535.203(e». 210 Notes

32. See, e.g. Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F. 2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963). 33. See Lowendahl v. B cl O.R.R. Co., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 NY Supp. 62(lst Dept 1936), afT'd, 272 NY 360 (1936). 34. According to para. 47 of the statement of claim in the case of Wells Fargo Bank. NA v. PolyacrylIran Corp. et al., 79 civ. 6475 (WIC):

On information and belief, all defendants other than Iran are business conduits and mere instrumentalities of Iran who possess a unity of interest such that they are no longer separate and distinct personalities, their assets are subject to the complete control of Iran without regard to any fraudulent pretentions that these are separate entities. There• fore, Iran and all other defendants are jointly and severally liable to plaintiff for any and all damages assessed pursuant to any of the claims for relief asserted above.

Also, according to para. 13 of the complaint in the case of Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. The State of Iran et al., 79 civ. 6644 (TPG): 'The defendants other than Iran are all parts of the same single entity, Iran. None of them have an independent existence separate and apart from the others or from Iran. Each is, in effect, a division of Iran and is jointly and severally liable for the claims asserted herein.' Another example is para. 13 of the complaint in the case of Irving Trust Co. v. The State of Iran. et al., 79 civ. 6369 (LFM): 'Defendants Central Bank, IMDBI, Polyacryl, Hamadan, ICB, Bank Saderat, Bank Melli, Iranians' Bank, IBIJ and International Bank are named as separate defendants in this complaint for reasons of convenience only and are considered by plaintiff to be the same entity as Iran itself.' 35. See generally, Brief of Defendant Bank Markazi Iran in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion to Confirm Orders of Attachments, 21 April 1980, in eighty-two cases before the US District Court, Southern District of New York. 36. Memorandum of defendant Bank Saderat Iran, in opposition to motions to confirm orders of attachment in New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Company et al., U.S.C.D. 79 civ. 6380 (KID), pp. 1-2. 37. Neither Judge Fischer in Behring, nor Judge Brient in EDS, had the benefit of knowing the US government's interpretation of the treaty, which was submitted to the courts after the decisions in these cases. 38. USG's amicus brief in EDS, civ. 79-7696, (2d cir. 1979) at 25. 39. Ibid., at 25. 40. US House of Representatives Report No. 94-1487, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 9 September 1976, pp. 29-30. 41. Letter from Alice Daniel, Acting Assistent Attorney General, 15 November 1979, in EDS v. SSO, civ. 79-7696 (2d civ. 1979). 42. See R. B. Owen, 'The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers', in W. Christopher, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985, pp. 303-4. Notes 211

43. A letter from US Attorney, Robert Fisk, dated 4 January 1980, together with a letter from Robert B. Owen, the Legal Adviser, US Department of State, read into the record by Judge Duffy, on 7 January 1980, stated whatever the Judge might rule could: 'have serious repercussions for the conduct of foreign policy and could complicate the effort to resolve the crisis in Iran'. On that basis, the Judge granted a sixty-day stay of proceedings. 44. New England Merchant National Bank v. Iran Generation and Transmis- sion Co., 502 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 26 September 1980), at 120. 45. Ibid., at 127. 46. Ibid., at 129. 47. Although US courts had granted attachments on assets belonging mostly to BMI for claims against other Iranian entities, no discussion or rulings on the 'alter ego' arguments of the US claimants was made by the courts. The attachments were, however, at the preliminary stage and BMI was challenging them in Appeal Courts. 48. See R. Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, pp. 219-22. 49. According to committee reports, by both the US House of Representa• tives and Senate, on the FSIA:

Section 1611(bXi) provides for the immunity of central bank funds from attachment or execution. It applies to funds of a foreign central bank or monetary authority which are deposited in the United States and 'held' for bank's or authority's own account ... If execution could be levied on such funds without an explicit waiver, deposits of foreign funds in the United States might be discouraged.

Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign States, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 94-1310, 94th Con• gress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 30; House Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 31. 50. Statement of the interest of the United States, explaining US-Iran Agreements, filed with the US District Court for Southern New York in NL Industries, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 January 1981, No. 80, civ. 6250. 51. Some of these internal documents had been given to US claimants and were later produced by them in the Iran-US Tribunal as evidence against the Iranian defendants. 52. Letter to President Carter from Attorney General setting out his opinion on the legality of US-Iran Hostage Release Agreement, dated 19 January 1981, as reprinted in Lawyers of the Americas, the University of Miami Journal of International Law, vot. 13, no. I, Spring 1981, pp. A-87 & A-88. 53. The Iran Agreement, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Rela• tions, US Senate, 97th Congress, Ist Session, 17, 18 February and 4 March 1981, p. 188. 54. It also resolved the dilemma of the US government. Namely, the dilemma that, on the one hand, they supported the US claimants against Iran and, 212 Notes

on the other hand, they had to go before US courts pleading sovereign immunity for Iran in an effort to stop the courts taking decisions that would not be in the long tenn interest of the United States. 55. Tribunal's decision in case A/2, see Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports, Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 1983, vol. I, p. 101. 56. The Iranian government challenged ten final awards rendered by the Tribunal by filing suits in the District Court of The Hague between 8 April 1983 and 2 December 1983. In these law suits Iran requested the court to set aside the Tribunal awards or declare it null and void. Iran's challenge was based on the allegation that the Iranian arbitrators had not participated in the final delibrations and had not signed the awards. However, the filing of these suits did not prevent payment of the awards because of the payment mechanism in the Claims Settlement Declartion. The proceedings in the Dutch Court moved slowly. When Iran withdrew its cases more than one year after the first one were filed, none had progressed to the filing of a fonnal answer. Iran withdrew the cases after the Dutch government proposed that the Parliament enact a 'Bill regarding the applicability of Dutch Law to the Awards of the Tribunal Sitting in The Hague to Hear Claims between Iran and the United States', reprinted in I.A.L.R. 6899 (15 July 1983). 57. According to Article 11 of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal also has jurisdiction over official claims of the United States and Iran against each other arising out of contractual arrangement between them and any dispute as to the interpretation or perfonnance of the Accords. 58. In the last three months of the Carter administration, during the intense negotiations that led to the signing of the Accords, President-elect Reagan declared that he would not negotiate with the Iranian authorities before the release of the hostages. After the signing of the Algiers Accords and the release of the hostages, there were discussions in the United States as to whether the US government was obliged to implement the Accords. It should be noted that a part of the Accords - i.e. the part that involved the unblocking and trasfer of Iran's assets in the offshore branches of the US banks, and those with the Fed, together with the repayment of Iran's syndicated loans - had already been implemented simultaneously with the release of the hostages. The question before President Reagan's administration was if they should honour the part of the agreement that dealt with the transfer of Iran's blocked assets in the United States. According to the Accords, the transfer of the said assets required the termination of litigation against Iran in the US courts and the submission of the cases to the Tribunal. In a statement by the US Department of State issued on 18 February 198], the new administration announced its decision to honour the Accords: 'We are proceeding because we believe it is in the overall interest of the United States to carry out ·the Agreement', 2048 Depart• ment of State Bull. ]7 {l98]}. 59. President's message to Congress, Suspension of Litigation Against Iran, 17 weekly comp. Presidential Documents, ]89 (24 February ]981). 60. 31 C.F.R. part 535. Notes 213

61. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Organisation of Iran, CV-4918, LEW(PX), (DC,CA). 62. Supreme Court opinion in Dames & Moore v. Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al., argued 24 June 1981, decided 2 July 1981, 49 U.S.L.W. 4969, reprinted in Lawyers of the Americas, op. cit., note 52 supra, p. A·12. 63. Ibid., p. A·23. 64. US Senate Report no. 97-71, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981, p. 5. 65. NV Settlement Bank of the Netherlands, a subsidiary of the central bank of the Netherlands, was especially established for this purpose. 66. The first set of third-country judges were Gunar Lagergren and Nils Mangard from Sweden and Pierre Bellet from France. Judge Lagergren was appointed as the first president of the Tribunal. 67. Private claims are the claims of nationals of one state against the government of the other. Article 11(2) of the Claims Settlement Declara· tion provided that: 'The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the United States and Iran against each other.' In addition, according to Article 11(3) of the Claims Settlement declaration: 'The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction ... over any dispute as to the interpreta· tion or performance of any provision of that Declaration.' There is no time limit for the submission of interpretative, 'A', claims, and official, 'B' claims, by each government to the Tribunal. 68. The small claims were brought before the Tribunal by the US government on behalf of the claimants. 69. Case A/16 was brought by the US government before the full Tribunal. The United States argued that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the claims of Iranian banks against US banks arising out of non payment of standby letters of credit, basically on the basis of the Tribunal's decision in case A/2 where it declared its lack of jurisdiction over the claims of the nationals of one country against the nationals of another. See the Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 10 February 1984, p. 7976. 70. Case A/18, ibid., 13 April 1984, p. 8258. Reprinted in 23 lL.M. 489. 71. Memorial of the United States on the issue of dual nationality, 19 November 1982, Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 3 December 1982, p. 5711. 72. According to the International Court of Justice dominant and effective nationality is defined as that which is 'based on stronger ties between the person concerned and one of the states whose notionality is involved'. See Nettebohm case, Lichtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955, le.J. at 22. 73. In determining the effective nationality of a claimant, the Tribunal would consider all relevant factors, including 'habitual residence, centre of interest, family ties, participation in public life and other evidence of attachment'. See Tribunal's decision in case A/18, Iranian Assets Control Reporter, 13 April 1984, p. 8264. 74. During the negotiations that followed the signing of the Algiers Accords, US officials asked the representatives of the Iranian government for a lump sum of $ 180 million for the settlement of all the claims with the face value of less than $250 000. The claims of dual nationals would comprise only a fraction of this amount. See ibid., 20 November 1981, p. 3846. 214 Notes

75. The Iranian government declared that it would boycott proceedings in dual national cases and threatened to leave the Tribunal completely if it continued to arbitrate those claims, but to no avail. See remarks by Prime Minister Mousavi, ibid., 11 May 1984, pp. 8384-5. 76. Ibid., 24 January 1986, p. 11810. 77. Ibid., 26 September 1986, p. 12979; and 28 November 1986, p. 13381. 78. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Soviet Socialist Repub• lic, DSP (528) passim. 79. The US courts in two separate cases, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), upheld the Litvinov agreement and gave extraterritorial effect to the decrees of nationalisation by the government of the USSR. See M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 14, US Department of State Publication 8547, 1970, pp. 243-5; and W. McClure, International Executive Agreements, Columbia University Press, New York, 1941, pp. 140-4. 80. 22 U.S.C. para. 1623(a). 81. These agreements are as follows: 30 U.S.T. 1975(1979), People's Republic of China. 27 U.S.T. 3993(1976), Peru. 27 U.S.T. 4214(1976), . 25 U.S.T. 227(1974), Peru. 24 U.S.T. 522(1973), Hungary. 20 U.S.T. 2654(1969), Japan. 16 U.S.T. 1(1965), Yugoslavia. 14 U.S.T. 969(1963), Bulgaria. 11 U.S.T. 1953(1960), Poland. 11 U.S.T. 317(1960), Romania. 82. In the case of Cuba the US claimants have not received a cent yet, after nearly thirty years since the Cuban revolution. In the case of Vietnam, the US Congress made recommendations in 1981 for the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to gather information on the claims of US nationals, arising as a result of the Vietnamese revolution. See US House of Representatives documents, HI81-53.5, 27 March 1981, 97th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 483-504. 83. See Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, 8 August 1986, p. 12732. 84. See US Treaty Series, No. 678. 85. See A. H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commission 1923-1934: A Study in the Law and Procedure of International Tribunals, Macmillan, New York, 1935, p. 60. 86. Oaims Convention between the United States and Mexico, signed 19 November 1941, US Treaty Series No. 980. 87. See Agreement with Mexico, US Department of State Bulletin, vol. v, no. 126,22 November 1941, pp. 399-403. 88. W. H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, New York, 1981, p. 31. 89. See, 'Goodrich Sells Interest in Iran Tire Affiliate', Wall Street Journal, 28 May 1976, p. 10; 'Rank Xerox Ltd Sells 25% ofIranian Unit', ibid., 9 February 1977, p. 4; 'Citi Bank Sells Interests of 30% in Bank in Iran', Ibid., May 16, 1978, p. 17; 'IBM Halts New Business in Iran', Electronic News, 14 November 1977, p. 2. Notes 215

90. Article 11(1) provides jurisdiction for the Tribunal, inter alia, over claims arising out of 'debts, contracts . . . expropriations or other measures affecting property rights' (Emphasis added). 91. See note 3 supra.

7 1be Aftermath of Iran

I. Executive Order 12544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235 (1986). 2. Interview source. 3. Interview source. 4. M. Alerassool, PhD thesis, London University, February 1989. 5. Executive Order 12722 of2 August 1990; FR Doc. 90-18381, Filed 8-2- 90; 9.44 a.m. Executive Order 12723 of 2 August 1990; FR Doc. 90- 18382, Filed 8-2-90; 9.45 a.m. 6. According to para. 6 of the UN Secretary General's Note of 30 May 1991, pursuant to para. 13 of his Report of2 May 1991, (S/22559), Iraq's total external debt and obligations, as have been reported by the Government of Iraq, amounted to 542 097 million as of December 1990. 7. 1990 No. 1591, Emergency Powers, the Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits (Kuwait) Directions 1990, 2 August 1990. 1990 NO. 1616, Emergency Powers, the Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits (Republic of Iraq) Directions 1990, 4 August 1990. 8. Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L213/1, 9 August 1990. 9. Official Journal ofthe European Communities, No. L213/3, 9 August 1990. 10. has always consistently opposed the extraterritorial application of foreign, especially US, law.

8 Conclusion

I. For an assessment of the freeze and the Algiers Accords from the US point of view see Iran: The Financial Aspect of the Hostage Settlement Agreement, hearing before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives 97th Congress ,1st Session, July 1981; The Iran Agreements, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 97th Congress, 1st Session, February and March 1981. 2. The annual economic impact of the freeze during the two-year period 1979-81 came to over $3.3 billion loss to the Iranian' economy. This is according to a study by G.C. Hufbauer and J.J. Schott, &onomic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy, Institute for Inter• national Economics, Washington DC, 1985. However, this is just an estimate and only for two years. The real economic impact of the freeze and its consequent political impact for Iran have yet to be evaluated. 3. R. Carswell, 'Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience', Foreign Affairs, 60, 1981, pp. 247-65. 4. Carswell contrasts the success of the Iranian assets freeze with the failure of the Cuban one in 1962. One of the aims of the Cuban assets freeze was to change 'the politics or policies of Cuba', ibid" p. 259. 216 Notes

5. The different legal aspects of the litigation have been discussed by many authors. However, none of them has considered the effect of the litigation in shaping the terms of the Algiers Accords. 6. According to one of the US Treasury officials who was directly involved in the implementation of the freeze, 'there was nothing inappropriate with the way US allies cooperated in making sure that their courts did not make any decisions as far as the independence of the judiciary is concerned. There are always ways of appropriately postponing courts procedures' (Interview source). 7. According to para. (A) of the General Principles of the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria the United States undertook to: 'restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979'. This meant the termination of all legal proceedings in US courts and nullification of all attachments, set-offs and judgments concerning the frozen assets. 8. The most well-known of these 'suspected' loans were a $500 million loan given to the government of Iran by a syndication of banks led by Chase Manhattan Bank, and loans given to the members of the Shah's family and his bank, Bank Omran. 9. None of the loans or other contracts had a provision for compensation of US parties in case of a revolution. On the contrary, there were force majeur clauses that allowed the parties to terminate or abandon most contracts. As a result of the Algiers Accords US claimants were able to claim and obtain compensation for having left Iran and abandoned their contracts after the revolution. 10. Case 1986L N01567 and 1986L N04048, in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division in London. 11. Before the crisis many US claimants had approached the Iranian authorities for a negotiated settlement. They were offering to accept a fraction of their claims for final settlement. 12. The linkage was originally suggested by John Hoffman, from the law firm of Shearman &; Stirling representing Citibank, in February 1980. See J. E. Hoffman, 'The Bankers' Channel', American Hostages in Iran: the Conduct of a Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, p. 242. 13. As quoted in the American Banker, 16 March 1988, p. 4. 14. F. D. Logan and C. C. Lichtenstein, 'Political Dams Across Financial Flows', Private InYestors Abroad Problems and Solutions in International Business, 1986, chapter 13, pp. 13-27. Logan is a partner in the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &; McOoy that represent Chase Manhattan Bank. He was Chase's chief legal representative in the Iranian assets litigation and played a major role in drafting the Algiers Accords. Lichtenstein is a law professor in Boston College Law School and consultant to Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &; McCloy. 15. See B. J. Cohen, Inte17Ultional Banking and American Foreign Policy: In Whose Interest 7, Council on Foreign Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven &; London, 1986, chapter 4. 16. The IEEPA was invoked in 1979, 1986, 1988 and 1990 to freeze the Iranian, Libyan, Panamanian, Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, respectively. In Notes 217

1985 it was invoked to impose trade sanctions against Nicaragua, see 50 Fed. Reg. 19890 (1985), and 31 C.F.R. para. 540. The IEEPA was also invoked for the imposition of sanctions against South Mrica. However, the South African sanctions did not impose an asset freeze, but prohibited future loans and restricted export-import of particular goods and technology thought to be useful to the government of South Africa. See, 50 Fed. Reg. 41682 (1985), 31 C.F.R. para. 545. Bibliography

Primary Sources

(a) Official Documents LISSAKERS, K., 'International Oil Debt Financing and OPEC Cash Surplus Recycling by US Banks', Staff Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Committee for Foreign Relations, US Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, August 1977. STaCKER, John, 'Amphibious Assault and the Crisis in Iran', Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 1979. 'The Iran Hostage Crisis: A Chronology of Daily Developments', a report prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 97th Congress, I st Session, 1981. US Congress, House, 'Claims against Vietnam', Report no. 96-915, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1979 and 1980. US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriation, Subcommittee on Depart• ment of Defense, hearing by joint Subcommittees on Department of Defense appropriation for 1981, 'Situation in Iran', 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1979 and 1980. US Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 'Iran: The Financial Aspects of the Hostage Settlement Agreement', 97th Congress, 1st Session, July 1981. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 'Iran's Seizure of the United States Embassy', hearings, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 17 February and II March 1981. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Central Amer• ican economic assistance; compensation for hostages in Iran, 1980. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 'Iranian Assets Controls', hearing, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 8 May 1980. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 'US Policy toward Iran, January 1979', hearing, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 17 January 1979. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 'General Huyser's Mission to Iran, January 1979', hearing, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 9 June 1981. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, 'Emergency Economic Powers: Iran', 97th Congress, 1st Session, 5 March 1981. US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, 'Emergency Controls on Interna• tional Economic Transactions', hearings, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977.

218 Bibliography 219

US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, 'Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation', Report no. 95-459, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 23 June 1977. US Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, 'The Operation of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign Investment in the United States (part 2 - OPEC Investments in the United States)', hearings, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 16, 17, 18 and 26 July 1979. US Congress, House, Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Evaluation, 'Iran: Evaluation of US Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978', staff report, January 1979. US Congress, House, 'Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign States', Report no. 94-1487, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, September 1976. US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 'Economic Consequences of the Revolution in Iran: a compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, 1980. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 'International Emergency Economic Powers Legislation', Report no. 95- 466, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 'Iranian Asset Settlement', hearing, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 19 February 1981. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Finance, 'International Financial Condi• tions', hearings, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 12 and 14 December 1979. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 'Iran and the World Oil Supply', hearings on the impact of turmoil in Iran and OPEC price increases on the US energy situation, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 12 March 1979. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, 'American Foreign Economic Policy: An Over• view', hearings, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 14, 18,28 March and 4 April 1977 . US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 'The Iran Agree• ments', hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Con• gress, 1st Session, 17, 18 February and 4 March 1981. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 'The Situation in Iran, 1980'. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 'National Emergencies Act', Report no. 93-1193, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 30 September 1974. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 'National Emergencies Act', Report no. 94-1168, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 'The Operation of Federal Agencies on Monitoring, Reporting on and Analyzing Foreign Investment in the United States', hearings, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 16, 17, 18 and 26 July 1979. US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 'Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign States', Report no. 94-1310, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976. 220 Bibliography

US Congress, Senate, Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, Final Report, no. 94-922, 94th congress, 2nd Session, 28 May 1976. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Termination of the National Emergen• cies, 'Emergency Powers Statutes: Provision of Federal Law now in Effect Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in time of National Emergency', Report no. 93-549, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 19 November 1973. US President, 1977-81 (Carter), Blocking Iranian government property; message, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, House Document no. 96-226. US President, 1977-81 (Carter), Further prohibitions on transactions with Iran; message, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1980, House Document no. 96-302. US President, 1977-81 (Carter), Semiannual Report: sanctions against Iran; message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on actions taken since 17 April 1980, and changes in previously reported information, with respect to executive orders 12170, 12205, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1980. US President, 1977-81 (Carter), Suspensions of certain litigations against Iran; message, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981, House Document no. 97-25. US Presidents, various Executive Orders. Various bilateral treaties between the United States and other states, including the Algiers Accords and FCN treaties. Various documents and Bulletins of US Departments of State, Justice and the Treasury. Various Iranian official documents. Various issues of the Iranian Assets Litigation Reporter, Andrews Publications Inc., Pennsylvania.

(b) Court Cases Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 416 US 981 (1974), restored to calendar for reargument with additional question, 422 US 1005 (1975), US Supreme Court Reports ]] L ed 2d, pp. 804-48. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Peter L. F. Sabbatino, etc., et al., 376 US398, ] I L ed 2d 804, 84 S Ct 923. Bank Markazi Iran v. Chase Manhattan Bank; Bank of America; Citibank; Manufacturers Hanover Trust; Bankers Trust; Irving Trust. The Docket numbers for these cases are respectively: ] 979-B-No. 5873, 1979 B-No. 5903, ]979-B-No. 5907, 1979-B-No. 5908, ]979-B-No. 5955 and 1980-B-No. 549, in the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, in London. Behring International. Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. ]979). The Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A. v. The State of Iran et al., United States District Court Southern District of New York, 79 civ. 6644 (T.P.G.). Dames & Moore v. Dona/d T. Regan. Secretary of the Treasury. et al., 453 US 654 (]981). E-Systems. Inc. v.lslamic Republic of Iran and Bank Melli Iran, CA-3-79-1487- G, us District Court, Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. Bibliography 221

First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 US 0759, 763 (1971). Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Company, and Same v. Same, the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, London, 1986 L. No. 1567 & 1986 L. No. 4048. New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation cl Transmis• sion Co., 502 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Reading cl Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Company, 478 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, cases A/2, A/16, A/17 and A/18 in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.

(c) Interviews BALDWIN, D., Professor of International Relations, Director, Institute of War and Peace Studies, University of Columbia; on the importance of the international activities of US banks in American foreign policy decisions, the impact of the hostage crisis in the United States and the effect of American defeat in Vietnam on US foreign policy; interviewed on 5 May 1988, New York. BROWN, R., Lawyer representing BMI, London law firm of Stephenson Harwood; on the litigation in English courts, negotiations that led to the signing of the Algiers Accords and the terms of the settlement; interviewed in February 1986, London. CARSWELL, ROBERT, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury during the Carter administration; New York law firm of Shearman & Stirling, on objectives and effectiveness of the freeze, the effect of frequent invocation of the IEEPA on the international standing of US banks, the negotiations that led to the settlement agreement and the Tribunal in The Hague; interviewed on 26 May 1988, New York. DAVIS, RICHARD J., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Operations during the freeze; on the legal and financial implications of the freeze, the existence of a plan to freeze assets before the hostages were taken and the long-term effect of the freeze; interviewed on 27 May 1988, New York. GRIEVES, PEGGIE, Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank, she was in charge of processing data on Iranian loans and assets during and after the freeze; interviewed on the actions taken by US banks vis-a-vis Iranian frozen assets, the legal problems and the settlement agreement; interviewed on 2 June 1988, New York. HOFFMAN, JOHN R., New York law firm of Shearman & Stirling, representing Citibank; on the legal problems arising as a result of the freeze, the role of banks in shaping the terms of the Algiers Accords, the secret negotiations with Iran, the London High Court judgment in the Libyan assets freeze and the effect of the freeze on the competitive position of the US banks; interviewed on 26 May 1988, New York. JERVIS, ROBERT, University Professor, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, New York; on Iran-United States relations; inter• viewed on 27 May 1988, New York. JUNEK, JOHN, General Counsel, American Express; on the legal issues with respect to the freeze; interviewed on 23 May 1988, New York. 222 Bibliography

LEVITT, D., New York law fonn of Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Frankel; representing BMI and various Iranian entities, on the litigation in US courts and prejudgment attachments and the working of the Tribunal; interviewed on 16 May 1988. LISSAKERS, K., Columbia University, deputy director of the State Depart• ment's policy planning staff, 1979-80, senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment; on the IEEPA, extraterritorial application of the freeze order, the judgment in the Libyan case and the effect of the freeze on the international standing of US banks; interviewed on 19 May 1988, New York. LOGAN, FRANK, New York law finn of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, representing Chase Manhattan Bank, played a major role in the drafting of the Algiers Accords; on the set-offs, the litigation in the US courts and in Europe, and the tenns of the Algiers Accords; interviewed on 2 June 1988, New York. MUNK, R., General Counsel, US Treasury; on the plans to freeze the assets before the hostage crisis, Treasury regulations governing the frozen assets and the judgment in the Libyan assets freeze; interviewed on 14 June 1988, Washington. OWEN, R. B., was Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State and a participant in the final negotiations in Algeria; on the political implications of the freeze in the United States and the tenns of the Algiers Accords; interviewed on 13 June 1988, Washington. PATRIKIS, E., General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; on the immunity of central banks' assets, the litigation in Europe and the use of private banks' activities in US foreign policy; interviewed on 3 June 1988, New York. SANTOS, L., counsel, was working for the US Treasury during the revolution and the hostage crisis and was involved in drafting the IEEPA; on the plans that were made to freeze the assets before the hostage crisis, the purpose of the IEEPA and the effect of its frequent invocation; interviewed on 15 June 1988, Washington. SHACK, T. G., law fonn of Abourezk, Shack and Mendenhall, represented various Iranian entities; on the final negotiations and the settlement agreements; interviewed on 16 June 1988, Washington. SICK, G., US National Security Council staff member for Iran during the hostage crisis; on Iran-US relations; interviewed on 1 and 7 June 1988, New York.

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(a) Books ABRAHAMIAN, ERVAND, Iran between the Revolutions, Princeton Uni• versity Press, Princeton, 1982. ALEXANDER, Y., and NANES, A. (eds) The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, University Publications of America, Maryland, 1980. ASSERSOHN, ROY, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982. A YUBI, SHAHEEN, Economic Sanctions in US Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 1982. Bibliography 223

BAKHASH, SHAUL, The Reign of the : Iran and the Islamic Revolution, Basic Books, New York, 1984. BALDWIN, D., Economic Statecraft, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985. BALL, G. W., The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs, Norton, New York, 1982. BILL, JAMES A., The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of Americ~Iranian Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988. BRZEZINSKI, Z., Power and Principles: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1983. CAMPBELL, B. R. and NEWCOMB, D. (eds), The Impact of the Freeze of Kuwaiti and Iraqi Assets on Financial Institutions and Financial Transactions, Graham & Trotman and International Bar Association, London, 1990. CARTER, B. E., International Economic Sanctions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988. CARTER, J. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, Collins, London, 1982. CHRISTOPHER, E., et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985. COHEN, B. J., In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1986. DELAUM, G., Legal Aspects of International Lending and Economic Devel• opment Financing, Oceana, New York, 1967. DORMAN, WILLIAM A. and FARHANG, MANSOUR, The US Press and Iran, University of California Press, Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1987. DOXEY, MARGARET P., Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 2nd edn, Macmillan, London, 1980. FALK, R., Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1980. FELLER, A. H., The Mexican Claims Commission 1923-1934: A Study in the Law and Procedure of International Tribunals, Macmillan, New York, 1935. FOLLET, KEN, On Wings of Eagles, W. Morrow, New York, 1983. FORBIS, WILLIAM H., Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran, Harper & Row, New York, 1980. FRlEDEN, J.A., Banking on the World: The Politics of American International Finance, Harper & Row, New York, 1987. GILPIN, R., The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987. GOLD, J., Voting Majority in the Fund, IMF pamphlet series no. 20, 1977. GOODE, R. M., Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1983. GRAHAM, ROBERT,lran: The Illusion ofPower, Croom Helm, London, 1978. GRAYSON, BENSON LEE, United States-Iranian Relations, University Press of America, Washington, DC, 1981. HALLIDAY, FRED, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguin, Har• mondsworth, 1979. HEIKAL, M., The Return of the Ayatol1ah: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini, Deutsch, 1981. HELLEINER, E.N., 'American Hegemony and Global Economic Structure', PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1991. 224 Bibliography

HOLSTI, O. R. and ROSENAU, J. N., American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the breakdown of consensus, AlIen & Unwin, London, 1984. HOVEYDA, FEREYDOUN, The Fall of the Shah, Wyndham Books, New York,1980. HUFBAUER, G. C. and SCHOTI, J. J., &onomic Sanctions Reconsidered; History and Current Policy, Institute for International Economics, Wa• shington, DC, 1985. HULBERT, M., Interlock: The Untold Story of American Banks, Oil Interests, the Shah's Money, Debts and Astounding Connections between Them, Richardson & Snyder, New York, 1982. HUYSER, ROBERT E., Mission to Tehran, Harper & Row, New York, 1986. IOANNIDES, CHRISTOS P., America's Iran, University Press of America, Lanham, 1984. JORDAN, H., Crisis, the Last Year of the Carter Presidency, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982. KORANY, BAHGAT, NOBLE, PAUL and BRYNEN, REX, (eds), The Many Faces of National Security in the Middle East, MacmilIan, London, 1992. LEDEEN, M. and LEWIS, W., Debacle, the American Failure in Iran, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1981. LEVER, H. and HUHNE, C., Debt and Danger, the World Financial Crisis, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1985. LILLICH, R. B. (ed.), The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983, University Press of Virginia, CharlottesvilIe, 1984. LOONEY, R. E., Economic Origin of the Iranian Revolution, Pergamon Press, New York, 1982. LOWENFELD, A. F., Trade Controls for Political Ends, International Economic Law, vol. iii, 2nd edn, Mathew Bender, New York, 1983. MANN, F. A., The Legal Aspects of Money, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971. McFADDEN, ROBERT D., No Hiding Place: The New York Times Inside Report on the Hostage Crisis, Times Books, New York, 1981. NIRUMAND, B., Iran: The New Imperialism in Action, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969. NUSSBAUM, A., Money in the Law, National and International, rev. edn, Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1950. PAHLAVI, M. R., The Shah's Story, translated from French by Teresa Waugh, Michael Joseph, London, 1980. PARSONS, A., The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974-1979, Cape, London, 1984. RAMAZANI, ROUHOLLAH K., The United States and Iran, Praeger, New York,1982. ROOSEVELT, KERMIT, Countercoup, the struggle for the control of Iran, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979. RUBIN, BARRY M., Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980. RYAN, PAUL B., The Iranian Rescue Mission, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1985. SALINGER, PIERRE, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1981. Bibliography 225

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(b) Articles ABBOTT, FREDERICK M., 'Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba: International Law Redivivus', International Lawyer, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 471- 91. ABRAHAMIAN, ERVAND, 'Iran in Revolution: The opposition forces', MERIP Reports, no. 75-76, March-April 1979, pp. 3-8. --'Structural causes of the Iranian revolution', MERIP Reports, Series 10, no. 4, 1980, pp. 2Hi. AHMAD, EQBAL, 'The Iranian revolution: A landmark for the future', Race & Class, vol. xxi, 1(1979), pp. 3-11. ALERASSOOL, MAHVASH, 'Libyan assets: Judgement', Middle East Currency Reports, col. 10, no. 2, February 1988, pp. 25-9. -- 'The extraterritorial powers: Libya's foreign assets and the question of the external application of the freeze order', International Currency Review, vol. 18, no. 4, August 1987, pp. 12-20. ALIBER, R. Z., 'Monetary Aspects of Offshore Markets', Columbia Journal of World Business, Fall 1979, pp. 8-16. 'America in captivity', New York Times Magazine, special issue, 17 April 1981. 'An analysis of President Carter's Iranian hostage agreement', International Currency Review, vol. 13,6 March 1981, pp. 24-34. 226 Bibliography

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DREW, ELIZABETH, '1980: division', New Yorker, vol. 55, January 1980, pp. 41-2, 47-50, 52-6. EDWARDS, R. W., 'Extraterritorial application of the US Iranian assets control regulations', American Journal of International LAw, vol. 75, 1981, pp. 870-902. ELWELL-SUTTON, LAURENCE PAUL, 'The Iranian revolution', Interna• tional Journal, vol. 34, no. 3, 1979, pp. 391--407. ESKRIDGE, W. M., 'The Iranian nationalization cases: Toward a general theory of jurisdiction over foreign states', Harvard International LAw Journal, vol. 22, no. 3, Fall 1981, pp. 525--91. FALK, RICHARD, 'Iran and American Geopolitics in the Gulr, Race & Class, vol. xxi, 1(1979), pp. 41-55. -- 'The Iran hostage crisis: Easy answers and hard questions', American Journal of International LAw, vol. 74, Apri11980, pp. 411-17. FATEMI, KHOSROW, 'The Iranian revolution: Its impact on economic relations with the United States', International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 12, November 1980, pp. 307-17. FEARON, RICHARD, 'Asset freeze', Harvard International LAw Journal, vol. 21, 1980, pp. 523-8. FELDMAN, M. B., 'Implementation of the Iranian claims settlement agree• ment - status, issues, and lessons: View from government's perspective', Private Investors Abroad - Problems and Solutions in International Business in 1981, 1981, pp. 75--155. 'Finally, fire in his eye: But Carter's actions are not likely to free the hostages', Time, vol. 115,21 April 1980, pp. 14-17. GABLE, CARL I., 'Standby letters of credit: Nomenclature has confounded analysis', LAw and Policy in International Business, vol. 12, no. 3, 1980, pp. 903-45 GETZ, HERBERT A., 'Enjoining the international standby letters of credit: The Iranian letter of credit cases', Harvard International LAw Journal, vol. 21, 1980, pp. 189-247. GIANVITI, F., 'Le blocage des avoir officiels iraniens par les Etats-Unis (executive order du 14 novembre 1979)" Revue Critique de Droit Interna• tional Prive, no. 2, April-June 1980, pp. 279-303. 'Giscard's bid to free the hostages', Foreign Report, 21 May 1980, pp. 1-2. HAENDEL, DAN, 'Prodigal dollars: The extraterritorial effect of the frozen assets order', Middle East Executive Reports, vol. 3, September 1980, p. 4. HALLIDAY, FRED, 'Iran: The economic contradictions', MERIP Reports, no. 69, 1978, pp. 9-18, 23. -- 'Thesis on the Iranian revolution', Race & Class, vol. xxi, no. 1 (1979), pp. 81-96. HOFFMAN, J. E., 'Iranian assets litigation', Private Investors Abroad - Problems and Solutions in International Business in 1980, 1980, pp. 329-65. 'Hostages as soap opera', Time, vol. 116, 17 November 1980, p. 57 'How Chase Manhattan Bank managed Iranian funds under the Shah', International Currency Review, vol. 12, no. 6, 1980, pp. 31-5. 'How the bankers did it; from three continents, the $12 billion deal that freed the hostages', Time, 2 February 1981, pp. 56-9. 228 Bibliography

'How the bargain was struck: Eventually the reality of a deadline paid off', Time, vol. 117,2 February 1981, pp. 37-8. IOANNIDES, CHRISTOS P., 'The hostages of Iran: A discussion with the militants', Washington Quarterly, vol. 3, Summer 1980, pp. 12-35. KALETA, PAUL J., 'Recent decisions: Prejudgement attachment of Iranian assets', Law and Policy in International Business, vol. 12, no. 3, 1980, pp. 1001-22. KEDDI, NIKKI R., 'Oil, economic policy and social conflict in Iran', Race & Class, vol. xxi, no. 1 (1979), pp. 13-29. KELLY, JOHN B., 'CIA in Iran', Counterspy, vol. 3,April-May 1979, pp. 24-36. LAKE, W. T. and DANA, J. T., 'Judicial review of awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Are the Tribunal's awards dutch?', Law and Policy in International Business, vol. 16, no. 3, 1984, pp. 755-812. 'Legal repercussions of the freezing of Iranian assets and loans', International Currency Review, vol. 12, no. 1, 1980, pp. 25-39. LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE, 'The arc of crisis: Its central sector', Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, Spring 1979, pp. 796-820. LlCHTENSTEIN, N., 'The claims settlement agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China', China Law Reporter, vol. I, no. 1, Summer 1980, pp. 25-30. LlSSAKERS, KARIN, 'Money and manipulation', Foreign Policy, no. 44, Fall 1980, pp. 107-26. LOGAN, F. and LlCHTENSTEIN, C., 'Political dams across financial flows', Private Investors Abroad - Problems and Solutions in International Business in 1986, 1986, chapter 13, p. 29. LOWENFELD, F., 'International law and the hostage agreement', Wall Street Journal, 27 January 1981, p. 30. McGEEHAM, ROBERT, 'Carter's crisis: Iran, Afghanistan and presidential policies', World Today, vol. 36, May 1980, pp. 163-71. McGREEVEY, ROBERT M., 'The Iranian crisis and US law', Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol. 2, Fall 1980, pp. 384-454. 'Mixed signals from Iran, and it is hard to keep the hostages ofT the hustings', Times, vol. 116,29 September 1980, p. 22. NEAT, F. W., 'Sctoff', International Business Lawyer, vol. 9(vi), 1981, pp. 247-53. NICKEL, HERMAN, 'Battling for Iran's frozen billions', Fortune, vol. 102, 15 December 1980, pp. 117-20. -- 'The Iran deal doesn't look bad', Fortune, 23 February 1981, pp. 57-9. --'The US failure in Iran', Fortune, vol. 99, 12 March 1979,pp. 94-9,102,106. 'Out with them all', Economist, (London), 5 , pp. 36-7. PATRIKIS, E. T., 'Foreign central banks' property: Immunity from attach- ment in the United States', Unillersity of Illinois Law Review, vol. 1984, pp. 265-87. RAMAZANI, ROUHOLLAH K., 'Iran's revolution: Patterns, problems and prospects', International Affairs, (London) vol. 56, 1980, pp. 443-57. 'Relationship with the US: Has Tehran gained by holding hostages?', Middle East Reporter, 1 November 1980, pp. 10-12. ROBERTS, STEVEN V., 'The year of the hostages', New York Times Magazine, 2 November 1980, pp. 26-30, 60, 63-4, 66, 68-9, 72, 74. Bibliography 229

ROOT, ANTHONY, 'Settlement of the Iranian hostage crisis: An exercise of constitutional and statutory executive prerogative in foreign affairs', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 13, Spring 1981, pp. 993-1048. ROULEAU, ERIC, 'K.homeini's Iran', Foreign A.ffairs, vol. 59, Fall 1980, pp. 1-20. RUSSET, B. 'The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain really dead?', International Organization, vol. 39, no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 207-31. 'Saudi-American finances, that secret agreement: Final confirmations and assessment of its long-term importance', International Currency Review, vol. 12, no. 1, 1980, pp. 7-20. SCHACHTER, M., 'Prejudgment attachment of Iranian assets in the United Sates: Waiving sovereign immunity', International Law and Politics, vol. 13, no. 2, Fall 1980, pp. 675--703. SIMON, NATALI, 'The Iranian assets control regulations and the Interna• tional Monetary Fund: Are the regulations "exchange control regula• tions"?', Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 4, Spring 1981, pp. 203-23. 'Special Report: Iran and the press in retrospect', Washington Journalism Review, vol. 3, May 1981, pp. 23-38. STEWART, D.P., 'The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: A review of developments 1983-1984', Law and Policy in International Business, The International Law Journal of Georgetown University Law Center, vol. 16, no. 3, 1984, pp. 677-753. SULLIVAN, WILLIAM H. 'Dateline Iran: The road not taken', Foreign Policy, vol. 40, Fall 1980, pp. 175--86. 'The management of blocked foreign assets in the United States', International Cu"ency RevieW, vol. 12, no. 6, 1980, pp. 37-44. 'The Settlement with Iran', Transcript of a Conference held at the University of Miami School of Law, 6 and 7 March 1981, Lawyers of The A.mericas, the University of Miami Journal of International Law, vol. 13, no. I, spring 1981. 'The UN's five wise men', Time, vol. lIS, 3 March 1980, p. 14. 'The United States and Iran's revolution', Foreign Policy, no. 34, S[ring 1979, pp. 3-34. 'The United States' International Emergency Economic Powers Act', Interna• tional Currency Review, vol. 11, no. 5, 1979, pp. 5--9. 'The US failure in Iran', Fortune, vot. 99, 12 March 1979, pp. 94-9, 102, 106 'US Treasury regulations governing blocked Iranian assets', International Cu"ency Review, vot. 12, no. 4, 1980, pp. 26-36, 38. WESTRlCK., KLAUSE, 'The legality of freeze orders and the extraterritorial effect of foreign freeze orders in Germany in the light of Iranian events', International Business Lawyer, vot. 9, no. 3, 1981, pp. 105--8. 'Who helped the Shah how much?; Pinning down the role of Kissinger and Rockefeller', Time, vot. 114, 10 December 1979. WILLIAMS, J. S., 'Extraterritorial enforcement of exchange control regula• tions under the International Monetary Fund agreement', Virginia Journal of International Law, vot. 15, no. 2, 1975, pp. 319-96. Index

acceleration (loans), 44, 45, 118, Bani-Sadr, Abol Hassan, 27-9, 52, 125--6 92, 94, 96-8, 101-2, 109, 127-8, act of state doctrine, 137, 158 129 agrarian claims, 167 Bank Act, 175 Albrecht, Richard, 13 Bank of America, 24, 54, 109, 119 Algiers Accords, 7, 74-5, 105 Bank of England, 113-17, 119, 120, Algerian connection, 111-13 124, 153 Bank of England, 113-17 Bank for International Settlements, banking connection, 106-10 113 conclusion, 131 Bank Markazi Iran, 186 diplomatic connection, 106-10 Algiers Accords, 106-7, 109-10, extraterritoriality, 123-6 113-15, 118, 120, 123-6, final negotiations, 117-20 128-31 impact (on litigation), 133, 152-63 Chase and, 21-6, 35-7 Iran's agreement explained, 126-31 IEEPA and, 20-26, 29, 169 Iranian demands, 120-3 litigation in US courts, 133, 146-8, terms (conclusions), 183-7 passim 152-4, 156, 159, 162, 169 'alter ego' liability, 146-52, 159 Bank Markazi Iran (litigation in American International Group Inc. v. Europe), 7, 73, 106 Islamic Republic of Iran, 152 blocking order and regulations, Amnesty International, 92 37-8 Angermueller, Hans, 108-9 counterclaims, 51-2 Arab-Israeli war (1973), 5 IMF defence, 46-51 Arab League, 172 LAFB case (comparison), 58, 62-3, Arab money weapon, 14-17,20 72 Arafat, Yasser, 91 New York action, 52-4 Arbitral Tribunal, 132 set-offs, 40-46 arms industry, 20, 75-7, 133-4, 177 US clearing house, 38-40 military assets, 30-1, 139-40, 153 Bank Melli Iran, 31, 36, 37, 39-40 Articles of Agreement (IMF), 46, Bank Omran, 25 49-51 Bank Saderat, 148 Assersohn, Roy, 27-8 Bank of Tokyo, 36 assets banker's draft (LAFB), 61, 69-70 categories, 30-1, 153 banker's payment (LAFB), 70 military, 30-1, 139-40, 153 Bankers Trust Company (BT), 55-71, Shah's, 110, 121-3, 131, 185--6 125, 186 see also freezing assets; offshore banking connection (Algiers assets; onshore assets Accords), 106-10 Azhari, General Gholam-Reza, 82 banks commercial, 115-17, 153, 154, 159 Bakhtiar,Shahpour, 82-3,84,85 obligations of (LAFB), 68-9 balance of payments, 4 5, 11, 49 US (and the freeze), 187-9

230 Index 231

US (international activities), 4-5, counterclaims, 51-2 12, 15, 16, 133 IMF defence, 46-51 see also individual banks Iran and, 21-6, 32 Banque Centrale d'Algerie, 113-15, New York action, 52-4 117, 118, 120, 124, 162 set-ofTs, 40-6 Barclays Bank, 116 US clearing house, 38-40 Bazargan, Mehdi, 80, 81, 84, 87, 89, Chase Nassau, 41, 44 90, 101 Chase New York, 25-6 41 Beheshti, , 81, 85, 87,101-2 Chemical Bank, 125 Behring International Inc. v. Imperial China, 10-11, 13, 107, 166 Iranian Air Force, 142 CHIPS, 67, 68, 69 Benyahi, Mohannnad, 112 Christopher, Warren, 111, 112, 117, Bergsten, C. F., 18, 19 CIA, 21, 27, 75, 77, 79-80, 86, 99, blocking order (BMI litigation), 37-8, 104, 120 45, Citibank, 24-5, 54, 108-9, 119, Blumenthal, Michael, 80 142-3 BMI, see Bank Markazi Iran citizenship (of Iran), 164 Bourguet, Christian, 94-5, 96, 98 Civiletti, B. R., 156 Bowie, Bob, 80 claims Bretton Woods defence, 45-51 compensation, 134, 137, 164, 172-3, Brieant, Judge, 148 185 Britain (freeze orders), 174 merits/evaluation, 137-8 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 78, 80, 81, 85, tribunal, 132, 157, 159--68, 181-2, 92 186 Bundesbank, 113 Claims Settlement Agreements, 163, Byrd, R. C., 80 166 Claims Settlement Declaration (Algiers Accords), 119, 133, Cambodia, 10-11 157-9, 163-4, 168 Camp David Agreement, 86, 98 Clark, Ramsey, 91 Canada/Canadian measures, 175-6 Clearing House Interbank Payment, Carswell, Robert, 27, 108, 109, 183-4 67,68,69 Carter, Billy, 92 clearing systems (New York), 39, 48, Algiers Accords, 107, 111-12, 114- 59--63,66-7 15, 118, 128-9, 131, 153, 160, clergy (power/influence), 101-2, 127, 186 128, 168 freeze order, 27-9, 34-5, 37, 144 (aftermath), 177 hostage crisis, 75-6, 79-86, 88, 92, connnercial banks, 115-17, 153, 154, 94, 97-9, 102-4 159 cash~ollar bills, 70-1 compensation claims, 134, 137, 164, cash-sterling, 71 172-3, 185 cash connector, 58, 59 Compensation Commission, 177-82 cash payments (LAFB demands), 60 conflict of laws (LAFB case), 64-8 Central Bank of Iraq, 173 consumer credit, 10 Certificate of Deposit, 61, 70 contracts, 42-3, 47-8, 58-9, 64-6 Chase Beirut, 41 correspondent bank transfer, 69 Chase Manama (Bahrain), 41 Corse, Thorn, 119 Chase Manhattan Bank, 77, 119 Council of Ministers (EC), 174 BMI's accounts with, 21-6, 35-7 counterclaims (BMI litigation), 51-2 232 Index courts, see European courts (litigation Eliot, Theodore, 81 in); United States courts Elizabeth R. Weilaman v. The Union (litigation against Iranian of Soviet Socialist Republics, 138 entities) Emergency Laws (Re-enactment and Coward Chance, 119 Repeal) Act, 174 credit, 10, 21 Emergency Statutory Powers, 174 contracts, 42-3 Enghelah-i Ealami (newspaper), 128, set-ofTs, 32, 40-46, 72 Escrow accounts, 113-15, 117, 120, cross section default clauses, 45 124, 162-3 Cuba, 11, 107, 108 Escrow Agreement (Algiers Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 11 Accords), 120 currency reserves, 37, 115 Euroclear, 61-2, 70 CutIler, L1oyd, 33 Eurocurrency market, 67, 188 Eurodollars, 3-4, 7,34-5,39-40,45-8, Dames and Moore v. Atomic 51,54-5,60,63,66-9,72, 114, Organisation of Iran, 161, 169 170,171,188-9 Daneshjouian-e Payro-e Khat-e Europe, 13, 174-5, 177, 189, 190 Emam, 100 European Coal and Steel Debtor and Creditor Law of New Community, 174 York, 43, 45 European Community, 174-5 debts European courts (litigation in), 34 Iranian (to US), 20, 27 BMI's accounts with Chase, 35-7 servicing requirements, 181 BMI's litigation, 37-52 set-ofTs, 32, 40-46, 72 conclusion, 71-3 default (BMI's litigation), 43-46, 125 judgment (LAFB case), 63-71 deposit contracts, 47-8 Libyan assets freeze, 55-63 Deutsche Bundesbank, 113 New York action, 52-4 diplomatic contacts, 110--111 Evans, MrJustice, 57 , 90 exchange contracts, 46, 47, 51, 63 discovery process, 132-3, 140, 158 exchange control regulations, 46, Doshan Tappeh Air Force Base, 84 48-9,50--1 dual nationality, 164-5 Executive Orders, 10, 50, 63, 67, 114 Duffy, District Court Judge, 142, 12170, 155 1245, 147-8, 150--2, 154-6, 162, 12270, 155 169 12277, 153 12294, 160 E-Systems. Inc. v. Islamic Republic of 12543,55 Iran, 152 12544, 55, 170 Eastern Europe, 13 12722, 172, 173 EC Directives, 174 12723, 171 EC freeze orders, 174-5 Exim Bank, 126, 167 economic sanctions, freezing assets Export Act, 34 and, 1-7 exports, 174, 178, 181, 182 Egypt, 86, 102 extraterritoriality, 3, 7, 32, 63-4, el-Houderi, Ali, 92 176-7 Electronic Data Systems. Inc. v. Algerian Accords, 123-6 Social Security Organisation of BMI's accounts with Chase, 35-7 the Government ofIran, 142, 143, BMl's litigation in Europe, 37-52 148, ISO, 152 conclusion, 71-3 Index 233

judgment (LAFB case), 63-71 General Reinsurance Corpn. v. Libyan assets freeze, 55-63 Forstakringsaktiebolaget Fennia New York action, 52~ Patria,66 Genscher, Hans Dietrich, 111 Germany, 111, 175 Falk, Richard,90 Gheraieb, Abdelkarim, 112, 117 FCN Treaties, 135, 148, 150 Ghotbzadeh, Sadeq, 92-8 passim, 101 Fed Wire, 69 Gianviti, F., 48 Federal Register, 42 gold reserves, 9, 114, 115, 153 Federal Reserve, 48 Goode, R. M., 67-8 Bank, 16, 20, 30-1, 60, 106-7, Governing Council, 179, 180-1 113-17, 120, 124, 153-5, 161, Government of Iran, 124, 130, 144, 186 157-8, 163, 164, 165, 169 Bank of St Louis, 188 'alter ego' of, 14fr52, 159 Board,23 Regulations, 23, 38, 59, 71 Hart, District Judge, 152 First War Powers Act (1941), 10 Hassan 11, King of Morocco, 86 Fisher, District Judge, 142 Heinemann, Peter, 109 Foreign Assets Control Program, 13 Higginbotham, Judge, 152 Foreign Assets Control High Contracting Party, 141 Regulations, 10 HoiTman, John E., 108-10, 113, Foreign Claims Settlement 118-19 Commission, 165-6 hostage crisis, 3-4, 20, 29-30, 33, 74 foreign currency reserves, 37, 115 conclusion, I 02~ foreign direct investment, 10, 167 Iran and USA (1978-9), 75-85 foreign exchange, 49 Iran's internal affairs, 100-2 Foreign Funds Control military attack, 98-100 Regulations, 11 negotiations, 90-8 foreign policy, 5-6, 18,27 resolution, see Algiers Accords Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Shah's entry to USA, 85--7 13fr7, 139-42, 145-6, 150, 152, House Committee on International 154, 15fr7 Relations, 18 freedom of expression/speech, 78 human rights, 75, 76 freezing assets Hussein, Saddam, 172 economic sanctions and, 1-7 Huyser, General Robert, 82~, 87-8 IEEPA and, 20-2 impact of (on litigation), 144-52 Ibex project, 77 litigation in US courts IMF defence, 4fr51, 63, 72 before, 133--44 'immunity from execution', 138-40, see also extraterritoriality 149 Friendship, Commerce and 'immunity from jurisdiction', 138-43, Navigation (FCN Treaties), 135, 145--6, 150-1, 160 148, 150 implied term and usage, 66-8 imports, 11, 174 in personam jurisdiction, 135, 142 Gaddafi, Colonel, 55, 170-1 interbank transfer (LAFB), 62 Gast, General, 84 interest rates, 23, 38, 59, 61, 166 General Oairn Commission, 166-7 International Oaims Settlement General Declaration, 119-23, 153-5 Commission, 165 234 Index

International Emergency Economic frozen assets, 3{}-31 Powers Act, 2, 4, 5--6, 8, 107 IEEPA and, 2{}-2 Canadian measures, 175--6 impact/effectiveness, 183-90 conclusion, 32-3 justification for freeze, 26-30 EC freeze orders, 174-5 US Treasury regulations, 31-2 extraterritoriality, 34-5, 49, 55, Iranian Assets Freeze Regulations, 49 71-2, 176-7 Iranian entities, litigation against, see frozen assets, 3{}-1 United States courts (litigation IEEPA, 17-20 against Iranian entities) Iran and Chase, 22--6 Iraq, Ill, 112, 131, 183 Iranian assets freeze, 2{}-2 assets freeze, 171-8, 18{}-2, 189 Iraqi freeze, 176 Islamic Consultative Assembly of Japanese freeze, 176 Iran, 121 justification for freeze, 26-30 Islamic Republic, 100--2, 127, 128, Kuwaiti freeze, 172 130 Libyan assets freeze, 7, 17{}-1 Islamic Republic Party, 98, 101-2, litigation in US courts, 144, 151, 127-8, 129, 152 154, 156, 161-2, 169 Israel,77 National Emergencies Act, 12-14 Italy, 175 OPEC surpluses, 14-17 Panamanian freeze, 171 Japan, 177, 188, 189, 190 prejudgment attachments, 145--6 freeze order, 176 rest of the world and, 189-90 Johnson administration, 10,91 Swiss Decrees, 175 joint ventures, 167 Trading with the Enemy Act, 9-11 Jordan, Hamilton, 94-5, 96, 98, Treasury regulations, 31-2 159--62 UK freeze orders, 174 judgments UN and, 173, 177-82 execution of(USA), 138-44, 149, International Monetary Fund, 46-51, 159--62 63,72 LAFB case, 63-71 internationalisation of crisis, see jure gestionis, 134 extraterritoriality jure imperii, 134 intra-branch transfers, 6O-{jl, 69 jurisdiction (US courts), 134-7, 157-8 Iran agreement (explanation), 126-31 Khomeini, AyatoIIah RuhoIIa hostages, see hostage crisis hostage crisis, 29, 8{}-1, 83-5, 88, internal affairs, 100--2 91, 95, 97-102 -Iraq war, 131, 183 hostage release political demands, 12{}-23 (conditions), lI{}-lI, 128, 155 Revolution, 2, 3-4, 78-85, 103-4, Kissenger, Henry, 21, 86, 88,94 133, 183 Korea, 1{}-11, 12, 13 -US Claims Tribunal, 132, 157, Korean War, 10, 12, 159--68, 181-2, 186 Kreisky, Bruno, 91 Iranian Assets Control Regulations, Krupp shares, 109 38,41,46,49-51, 52, 154 Kuwait, 14-15 Iranian assets freeze assets freeze, 171-8, 18{}-I, 189 aftermath, 170-82 Chase Manhattan Bank, 22--6 Lackland Air Force Base, 94 conclusion, 32-3 Laingen, Bruce, 87, 88, 90, 91 Index 235 liberalisation policies, 78, 79 assets, 110, 121-3, 131, 185-6 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, 7, 55-66, Carter and (1978-9), 75-85 68-72, 125, 186 death, 102, 121, 128, 185 Libyan assets entry to USA, 85-7 contract (1980), 58-9 hostage crisis, 87-90, 92-6, 102-4 f~ng, 55-63, 170-1 Pahlavi Foundation, 22, 23-4, 25 judgment, 63-71 Rockefeller and, 21, 22, 26 usage and clearing systems, 59-63 Morgan Guaranty, 109 Lichtenstein, C. C., 189 Morocco, 86 litigation, see European courts Mossadegh, Dr Mohammed, 21, 87, (litigation in); United States 89, 101 courts (litigation against Iranian Mousavi-Khoeinyha, 88 entities) Mullahs' theory, 42, 46, 126, 146-52, Litvinov agreement, 165 159 Lloyds Bank, 69, 116 Mundheim, Robert, 108, 114, 117, loans, 26, 29-30, 185 118-19 acceleration, 44, 45, 118, 125-6 default, 43-6, 125 Nabavi, Behzad, 112, 117, 128, 129, syndicated, 25,43-6, 74, 124, 125, 130-1 187-8 National Consultative Assembly, 25 see also debts national emergencies, 9-11, 18-19, Logan, F. D., 119, 189 27,50, 161 Logan Act, 109 National Emergencies Act, 12-14, 17, London Dollar Clearing, 61, 70 18 Lowenfeld, A., 17-18 , 101 lump sum agreements, 166 National Iranian Oil Company, 22-4, 26,40-1,43, 52, 133-4, 142-3, MacBride, Scan, 92 145, 149-51, 164 McMahon, Kit, 119 national security, 5-6, 18, 27, 50 Majlis (Iranian parliament), 99, 102, National Westminster Bank, 116 111, 112, 127-8, 131 nationalisation, 21, 134, 137, 145, Malek, Redha, 111, 112, 117 155, 158, 164, 165 managed account agreement, 56, 62-3, nationality, dual, 164-5 65-6 Netherlands, 162-3 Mann, F.A., 67, 68 New England Merchants National Marine Midland Bank, 143 Bank v. Iran Power Generation Marshall Aid, 4 and Transmission Co., 151, 154, merits and discovery (Algiers 156, 162 Accords), 158 New York Mexico, 86, 93, 166-7 BMI litigation, 52-4 Midland Bank, 39-40, 116 clearing systems, 39, 48,59-63,66-7 military assets, 30-1, 139-40, 153 Federal Reserve, see Federal see also arms industry Reserve Military Assistance and Advisory Newsom, Under-Secretary of State, 85 Group, 84 Nicaragua, 171 Miller, William, 27, 28, 31 Nicoletopoulos, G. P., 50-1 modernisation policies, 103 Nixon administration, 11, 12, 75, 76 Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah, 20, Nobari, Ali Reza, 109, 128, 129, 131 120, 126, 127 non-dollar deposits, 45-6 236 Index

Noriega regime, 171 property interests, 18,29, 35, 38, , 175 136--9, 141, 144-5, 153, 173 NV Settlement Bank (Netherlands), Propper v. Clark, 161 162-3 quasi in rem jurisdiction, 135 offshore assets, 30, 32, 35, 42-3, 45, Rafsanjani, AIi Akbar, 102 47, 106--8, 119-20, 124, 153, 159, Rajai, Mohammad Ali, 102, 112 188 Raphel, Arnold, 117 oil industry, 21, 153 Reading and Bates Corporation v. claims, 133-4, 163-4, 181-2, 189-90 National Iranian Oil Company, prices, 4-5, 14, 15,22,76 142-3, 145, 150 revenue, 20, 22-4, 77, 181, 189-90 Reagan administration, 55, Ill, 115, see also OPEC 118, 160, 170 onshore accounts, 43, 124, 159 'Reagan Card', 129 onshore assets, 30, 32, 38, 106--7 Regency Council, 82 unblocking, see United States reserve requirements, 38, 59, 71 courts (litigation against Revolutionary Council, 29, 88, 93, Iranian entities) 96,97,98 OPEC, 4, 19,20,27-8, 33, 169, 171, Rockefeller, David, 21, 22, 26, 86, 88, 190 94 surpluses, 14-17 Roosevelt administration, 9-10, 12, Owen, Robert, 108, 109, 117 165 Royo, President (panama), 95 Paddie, Peter, 119 Russian revolution, 165 Pahlavi, Mohammed , see Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Shah Sadat, Anwar, 86 Pahlavi Foundation, 22, 23-4, 25 Saghir, Mostefai, 112, 117, 118 Palestine Liberation Organisation, Sandinistas, 171 91,93 Saudi Arabia, 14-15,27, 177, 189 Panama, 94-6, 171 Saunders, Harold, 117 Panama Canal Treaties, 94 SAVAK, 77, 88, 93, 97 Panamanian Constitution, 95 securities, 153 Parsons, Anthony, 78 security accounts, 159, 162, 165 Patrikis, Ernest, 114, 117, 118-19 Senate Committee on Foreign petrodollars, 5-6, 15-17, 20, 133, 173 Relations, 16 petroleum industry, 167, 178, 181 Senate Committee on Government Plan A, 108, 118 Operations, 13 Plan C, 118 Senate Committee on International Plan D, 118, 130-1 Relations, 17 Polisario, 93 set-offs, 32 political prisoners, 78 Algerian Accords, 106, 108-9, 123, Popular Front, 77 125, 130 postjudgment attachment, 154 BM!'s litigation, 40-6,52-3, 63, 72 prejudgment attachments, 3, 32 Shah of Iran, see Mohammed Reza Algiers Accords, 106--7, 123, 130 Pahlavi, Shah litigation (US courts), 132-3, 135-6, Shahi, Agha, 92, 93 139-46,148,150-7,161-2,169, Shearman and Stirling, 119 171 Socialist International, 91 Index 237

Somerset, David, 119 UK freeze orders, 174 South Africa, 77 Undertakings (Algiers Accords), sovereign assets, 189 119-20 sovereign immunity, 122, l30, l32, UNESCO,92 l34-5, 138, 149, 151, 158, 169 Union Bank of Switzerland, 36 FSIA, 136-7, 139-42, 145-6, 150, United Arab Emirates, 14-15 152, 154, 156-7 United Nations, 96, 105 Soviet Union, 165 Compensation Spain, 175 Commission, 177-82 Standard Chartered Bank, 116 Commission, 93, 97-8 Staughton, Mr Justice, 63-71, 72 Security Council, 78 sterling transfer, 62-3 Security Council Resolutions, 173-9 Students' Day (Iran), 88 United Nations Act (Canada), 175-6 Subcommittee on International United States Economic Policy and banks (and freeze), 187-9 Trade, 17-18 CIA, 21, 27, 75, 77, 79-80, 86, 99, Subcommittee on Multinational 104, 120 Corporations, 16 Oearing House, 38-40 Sullivan, W.H., 78, 79, 80-5, 167 Congress, 12, 14-16, 18-19, 26, SWAPO,93 28-30,33 Swiss Decrees, 175 economic sanctions (role), 1-7 syndicated loans, 25, 43-6, 74, 124, Iran and (1978-9), 75-85 125, 187-8 Justice Department, ISO MAAG,84 -Mexican General Claims Tabatabai Sadegh, 110-11, 128 Commission, 166-7 Tate, J. B., 135 military operation 'Tate letter', l35, l38 attempted, 98-100 Tavakoli, Mehran, 25 National Security Council, 99,103, Technical Arrangement (Algiers 112 Accords), 120 Shah's entry, 85-7 Tehran State Department, 13-14, 16-17, University, 88 20,78, 86, 103, 135, ISO US Embassy, 2, 20, 52, 77,87,88-90, Treasury,S, 13-14, 16-17,20,26-7, 120,127 29-30,41,45, 106, 109-10, Thatcher, Margaret, 114, 118 117, 119, 160-1 Tokyo Dollar Oearing, 61, 70 Treasury regulations, 3, 31-3, trade embargoes, 174 37-8,45,49-51,63, 132-3, Trading with the Enemy Act, 9-11, 145, 150-1, 156, 171 12, 13-14, 17, 18,49 United States courts (litigation Transaction Control Regulations, 11 against Iranian entities), 132 transfer, forms of (LAFB), 69-71 before freeze, l33-44 Treaty of Amity, 141, 142, 145-6, conclusion, 168-9 148, 151-2 impact of Algiers Accords, 153-62 Tribunal, Iran-US, l32, 157, 159-68 impact of freeze, 144-52 ~sUn, 181-2, 186 Iran-US Oaims Tribunal, 162-8 Tribunal de Grande Instance, usage and implied term, 66-8 Paris, 54 Truman administration, 10, 12 Vance, Cyrus, 27, 99 238 Index

Vienna Convention, 89 Williams and Glyn's, 116 Vietnam, 10-11, 12, 13, 77, 103 Wriston, WaIter, 109 Vietnam War, 12, 77, 103 Villa1on, Hector, 94-5,96,98 Yahia, Ben, 117 Yazdi, Or Ibrahim, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92 Wagendorf, Herbert, 109 Yeo, E.H., 17 Waldheim, Kurt, 92, 93, 96-7 Yoshida International, II weighted voting system (IMF), 49 Weiss, P., 18 Zahedi, Ardeshir, 79-80 wholesale transactions, interbank, 61 Zahedi, General Fazlollah, 79