CHAPTER THREE

DECLARING WAR

During the propaganda campaign to appoint the prince of Orange as army leader, pamphleteers promised a large audience that England would honour its commitment to the Triple Alliance because of the strong bond between the House of Stuart and the House of Orange. Nonetheless, on 23 and 24 March, the Dutch Smyrna fleet was attacked by English battleships near the Isle of Wight.1 The English had planned to get as big a trophy as possible. The Smyrna fleet was supposedly worth 180 tons of gold.2 Three Dutch merchant ships were eventually conquered, but one of them sank before it reached England. The Dutch captain Van Nes went down with the ship and Captain Dubois lost a hand after being hit by a cannonball. Apart from these personal tragedies, the Dutch fleet, much to its own surprise, stayed mostly unharmed. It fled the battle scene and the largest part of the fleet, 62 of the 66 ships, reached the Dutch coast safely. The English had failed in their attempt to reduce the financial burden of the coming war.3 For the Dutch the safe arrival of the Smyrna fleet was fortunate in more than one way. It delivered a considerable fortune, but moreover, England had now been exposed as “an open enemy, instead of a feigned friend”.4 In a letter to his brother Cornelis, articulated similar feelings when he wrote “that England had finally taken down its mask”.5 The English declaration of war against the was drafted on 25 and 26 March, immediately following the attack on the Smyrna fleet. Charles II waited to declare war, however, until after the French declara- tion had reached the Dutch Republic on 7 April. This delay had a lot to do with the fact that Charles simultaneously published the Act of Indulgence,

1 Roorda, Het 1672, 32. 2 Cambier, De jaren 1672 en 1673, 15–26. 3 Haley, William of Orange and the English Opposition 1672–4, 32. 4 Cf. Bondigh Verhael van ’tgeen voorgevallen is tusschen ’s Lands Oorloghs Schepen, Smirnisvaerders (1672), Van der Wulp 4713; ’t Samen-spraeck, Knuttel 9975; Veel Honden was de Haes sijn Doodt (1672), Knuttel 9977; Verhael van ’t Zee-gevecht (1672), Tiele 5811; Verhael van de Zee-slagh (1672), Van der Wulp 4712; P. de Groot, Edele Groot Mogende Heeren (1672), Knuttel 9979; Pertinent Rapport (1672), Knuttel 9972; Mosterman, Omstandigh verhael hoe ’t zich toe-gedragen heeft met ’s Landts Vloot (1672), Knuttel 9973. 5 Japikse, Brieven van Johan de Witt. Vierde Deel, 303. 86 chapter three

Fig 4. Rioters in Dordrecht ritually destroy a painting of Cornelis de Witt. Jan Luycken, Oploop te Dordrecht, Museum A 48517. which gave extensive rights to Catholics in England. A war against the Dutch could perhaps distract attention from this remarkable initiative. As a consequence of these events, April saw the first massive peak in the number of popular political publications in 1672: fifty-one pamphlets were published, twice the normal monthly count.6

Works of Propaganda

The English – and to a lesser extent the French – war declarations were more than just justification of an upcoming attack; they were works of propaganda, although different in their level of sophistication. In terms of the Dutch market for popular political publications, the French propa- ganda effort was rather limited. Louis felt little obligation to win the hearts of the Dutch, although he did make some effort to scare them into submis- sion and he explained to his own subjects his reasons for waging war

6 50 pamphlets was a large enough number for Pieter Geyl to speak of a “pamphlet war”. See Geyl, “De Witten-oorlog, een pennestrijd in 1757.”