The Effect of Plea Bargaining Vs. Trial Conviction on the Sentencing of Offenders Charged with a Drug Offense in Cook County, Illinois
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2010 The Effect of Plea Bargaining Vs. Trial Conviction on the Sentencing of Offenders Charged with a Drug Offense in Cook County, Illinois Joseph George Dusek Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Criminology Commons Recommended Citation Dusek, Joseph George, "The Effect of Plea Bargaining Vs. Trial Conviction on the Sentencing of Offenders Charged with a Drug Offense in Cook County, Illinois" (2010). Dissertations. 269. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/269 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2010 Joseph George Dusek LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO THE EFFECT OF PLEA BARGAINING VS. TRIAL CONVICTION ON THE SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS CHARGED WITH A DRUG OFFENSE IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN RESEARCH METHODOLOGY BY JOE DUSEK CHICAGO, IL AUGUST 2010 Copyright by Joe Dusek, 2010 All rights reserved. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My gratitude could never be expressed in words for what I owe so many individuals. My parents, their love, their encouragement for all things academic and their inspirational example of perseverance are the foundation for whatever accomplishments I have in my life. To Dave Thomas and Dan Makowski I owe the deepest debt for staying with me during the best and worst of times. Terri Pigott, Ph.D., showed infinite patience and helped so much with my numerous rewrites. Whatever scholarly value this work may have would not be but for her knowledge and skill as a teacher. I will always be grateful for her work as my advisor, perhaps even more for her patience. I thank Meng-Jia Wu, Ph.D. of Loyola University Chicago and Jacqueline Mullany, Ph.D. of Triton College for their guidance as committee members. I offer a special thank you to Lesa Hildebrand for acting as my copy editor for the final version and filling in the missing pieces. The absence of split infinitives and dangling participles in this document is due to her diligence. iii To my parents, Joe and Georgeann Dusek TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii LIST OF TABLES vii LIST OF FIGURES ix ABSTRACT x CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 3 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 24 Data Description 24 Data Permissions 25 Variables in Dataset 25 Dependent Variables 25 Independent Variables 26 Analyses Performed 29 Coding 31 Schemes for Codes 32 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 36 Dominant Statutes 36 Probation vs. Prison 38 Conviction Mode 39 Offense Seriousness 41 Gender 43 Gender and Conviction Mode Compared to Sentence 44 Ethnicity 48 Ethnicity and Conviction Mode Compared to Sentence 49 Ethnicity and Offense Seriousness 50 Summary 57 General Linear Models 59 Research Question 59 Grand Summary 65 v CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 75 Introduction 75 Data and Analyses 76 Discussion of Findings Related to Trial Tax Existence 77 Discussion of Findings Related to Contextual Variables 78 Discussion of Findings Related to Measuring Associations 79 Limitations 79 Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 81 Conclusion 81 APPENDIX A 82 REFERENCE LIST 88 VITA 90 vi LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Independent Variables 27 2. Statutes and Their Descriptions 28 3. Example of a Contingency Table 30 4. Summary of Independent Variable Coding Schemes 33 5. Frequency Distribution of Statutes Violated 37 6. Comparison of Probation vs. Prison 38 7. Comparison of Plea Bargain vs. Trial Conviction 39 8. Prison Time by Conviction Mode 39 9. Conviction Mode Compared to Probation or Prison 40 10. Comparison of Sentence and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months) 40 11. Convictions for Quantity Compared to Offense Seriousness 41 12. Mean Sentence (in Months) for Seriousness Factors 42 13. Analysis of Variance for Sentence Length 43 14. Comparison of Gender and Conviction Mode 44 15. Comparison of Conviction Mode and Mean Sentence (in Months) 45 16. Analysis of Variance for Gender and Conviction Mode Regarding Sentence 46 vii 17. Comparison of Ethnicity and Conviction Mode 48 18. Comparison of Ethnicity and Conviction Mode for Mean Sentence (in Months) 49 19. Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity and Conviction Mode Regarding Sentence 50 20. Comparison of Ethnicity and Offense Seriousness 51 21. Comparison of Ethnicity and Quantity 51 22. Comparison of Ethnicity and Possession vs. Sales Seriousness for Mean Sentence (in Months) 52 23. Comparison of Ethnicity and Quantity for Mean Sentence (in Months) 53 24. Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity and Quantity and Seriousness Regarding Sentence 54 25. Independent Variables 60 26. Summary of Independent Variable Coding Schemes 62 27. Summary of Linear Model Analysis to Predict Sentence Using All Independent Variables 63 28. Predicting Sentence Summary 67 29. Predicting Sentence by Gender for Possession Crimes Considering Quantity 68 30. Predicting Sentence by Gender for Sales Crimes Considering Quantity 70 31. Predicting Sentence by Ethnicity for Possession Crimes Considering Quantity 72 32. Predicting Sentence by Ethnicity for Sales Crimes Considering Quantity 73 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Comparison of sentence means considering conviction mode and gender 47 2. Comparison of sentence means considering ethnicity and possess vs. sell 55 3. Comparison of sentence means considering ethnicity and quantity 56 ix ABSTRACT Traditional wisdom suggests those who lose at trial for a criminal charge receive a heftier prison sentence than those who plea bargain. Plea bargaining reduces strain on the courts, expedites adjudication and may indicate the defendant’s propensity for rehabilitation as they accept responsibility for their actions. Some ask why two people charged with the same crime should receive different sentences based on the adjudication method. The Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial. Innocent defendants may decide to plead guilty for a sure short sentence rather than risk a trial conviction’s lengthier one. This study using statistical procedures examined 12,786 adjudicated drug crime cases between 2004 and 2007 from the Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois. It sought to determine if adjudication method, plea bargain vs. trial conviction, predicted prison sentence while controlling for independent variables such as ethnicity, gender, statute violated, offense seriousness, quantity and interaction effects. x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION For years, criminal justice experts have debated the existence of a trial tax with regards to sentencing. Many believe that in the case of two defendants charged with the same offense, all other conditions being equal, if one pleads guilty and the other goes to trial and is found guilty, the latter will receive a stiffer sentence than the former. Ulmer and Bradley (2006) define trial tax as occurring when, “. defendants are substantially penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and then lose.” Bogira (2005) defines trial tax as, “. the extra punishment a defendant may face merely by virtue of exercising his right to trial.” The term trial tax has even found its way into official court publications. Illinois appellate courts have acknowledged its existence. The Alabama Sentencing Commission has debated its constitutionality. Bogira (2005) claims the use of trial tax for means of judicial efficiency declaring, “A guilty plea can be wrapped up in approximately 20 minutes, where a jury trial usually takes anywhere from two days to a week.” Does the trial tax actually exist? Controlling for other factors, are defendants who plead guilty more likely to receive leniency than those who go to trial? Among offenders who plead guilty or go to trial for a drug offense, does a disparity exist in their sentences? Assuming we find a disparity, does it remain if we control for other variables such as specific crimes, offense severity, ethnicity or gender? 1 2 This study will examine adjudication data from the Circuit Court of Cook County. The arrest, charge and disposition records of almost 13,000 defendants adjudicated for drug related offenses will be analyzed. Statistical analyses will be run to check for differences between groups based on the above noted variables. The results of this dissertation may be used for policy development related to the alleged penalization of the constitutional right to a jury trial. It may also serve as the foundation for a future, more encompassing study of the same topic – perhaps Illinois wide or including other states. This project will be performed in conjunction with and receive assistance from the Institute for Metropolitan Affairs, a public policy institute operating within Roosevelt University. CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW The primary issue for this research relates to whether a trial tax exists, or not. Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that, everything else being equal, those who plead guilty for crime x will receive a lighter sentence than those who got to trial and are then convicted of crime x, hence the term trial tax. The defendant is enticed to accept the pact – plead guilty and receive a great bargain, hence, plea bargain. However, if the criminally charged all have a constitutional right to trial why should they be penalized for exercising that right versus accepting a plea bargain? This dissertation will examine the difference, if any, between convicts who went to trial to those who plea bargained. The importance of this dissertation lies with the question of disparity in sentencing between trial and plea bargain convicts. If no inequality is found, the concerns over the use of a trial tax disappear. If those who plea bargain receive a statistically significant lesser sentence, however, then innocents may be far more likely to plead guilty to avoid a lengthy prison term.