Corso di Laurea magistrale (ordinamento ex D.M. 270/2004) in Lingue e Istituzioni Economiche e Giuridiche dell’Asia e dell’Africa Mediterranea
Tesi di Laurea
Shifting dynamics of power inside Ḥamās in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Between moderation and militarization.
Relatore Ch. Prof. Barbara De Poli
Laureando Mabel Grossi Matricola 987053
Anno Accademico 2012 / 2013
1
Sommario Introduction ...... 4 Transliteration table ...... 9 I.Roots of Political Islam in Palestine ...... 10 The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and the Nakba ...... 10 The Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip after 1948 ...... 14 The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank after 1948 ...... 18 The Six Day War and its aftermath...... 21 1980s: From Daʿwa to Ğihād. Domestic, regional and international determinants...... 27 1987 and the First Intifāḍah: Ḥamās is born ...... 32 II: Ḥamās from Resistance to Government: Between Opposition and co-existence 34 Ideology, structure and strategies ...... 35 Ḥamās Charter ...... 35 Historical development of Ḥamās’s organizational structure ...... 37 The External Leadership and foreign relations ...... 41 The internal leadership ...... 44 Between violence and co-existence. Oslo and its aftermath ...... 47 Ḥamās and the PLO ...... 48 The Oslo Accords and signs of internal divisions ...... 51 Failed peace, Islamic social welfare and the al-Aqṣā Intifāḍah...... 56 Towards political pragmatism ...... 61 Ḥamās’s electoral campaign ...... 63 III. After Fitna. The Growing power of the Gaza Leadership (2007-2010) ...... 67 Ḥamās state building in Gaza: A one-party state...... 67 Fitna ...... 67 Gaining security, political and judicial control ...... 72 Facing internal opposition: Ḥamās and the Salafists in Gaza ...... 76 Internal economy ...... 80 The authoritarian Ḥamās ...... 84 Ḥamās in the West Bank ...... 86 Shifting internal dynamics ...... 90 Conclusive remarks ...... 92 IV. What will the Arab Spring deliver for Ḥamās? ...... 93 The Arab Revolts and Palestine. Repercussions and Implications ...... 93 Geopolitical reorientation: Challenges and Opportunities ...... 98 Ḥamās-Mursī relation ...... 104 Reconciliation Process: managing the challenges of the Arab Spring ...... 112 Internal divisions: Between moderation and militarization ...... 117 Conclusions ...... 127 References ...... 134 BOOKS ...... 134 ARTICLES ...... 137 REPORTS and WEBSITE SOURCES ...... 140 POLLS & DOCUMENTS ...... 143 ḤAMĀS STATEMENTS & PRESS: ...... 144 LIST OF INTERVIEWS: ...... 152
2 3 Introduction
This study aims to shed light on the repercussions of the Arab Spring on Ḥamās’s internal structure of power, by providing an in-depth historical analysis of Ḥamās’ political thought since its establishment, with major focus on the 2011-2013 framework of time. Specifically, the thesis aims at answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the Arab Spring on the Islamic Resistance Movement (Ḥamās)? Are internal divisions between the internal and external leaderships new and unprecedented, or do they belong to a long-standing historical tension along the politico-military lines? Will the Arab Spring finally force Ḥamās to engage in non-violent/popular resistance, or will it highlight the militarization of the Gaza Strip? The study makes an important contribution into the existing academic literature about the history of Ḥamās’s political thought, as it provides a careful attempt to read regional events between 2011 and July 2013 from a historical perspective, so as to analyze Ḥamās decisional mechanisms in the framework of a punctual historical heritage and new geopolitical dynamics. In fact, after the Arab Spring, academic literature has been focused on the geo-political repercussions of the Arab Spring at a regional level, focusing on countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya – where the Arab Spring had its most profound consequences, but also on new “emerging” regional powers such as Qatar. For this reason, we believe that this study proves to be extremely useful in assessing the impact of the revolts on “secondary” actors, as it focuses on the analysis of the political behavior of a Muslim Brotherhood’s offspring, Ḥamās, under the direct impact of regional events. Also, the study proves highly relevant for it provides political and historical analysis of contemporary Palestinian politics, and represents a useful tool for the understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Palestinian reconciliation. Methodology used during the research combined primary and secondary sources, and draw its major bulk of information from newspapers and Ḥamās’s official statements. We relied on interviews with Ḥamās PLC speakers and Palestinian political analysts that were carried out between November 2012 and April 2013 throughout the West Bank. Importantly, because Ḥamās is a grassroots organization with a hierarchical structure, statements and official documents often provide only a partial picture of the complexity of the movement. In fact, during our fieldwork, we assessed the constant discrepancies between Ḥamās official statements in the press, and allegations provided during behind- doors interviews. As a matter of fact, we have widely used Ḥamās’s official webpages,
4 such as its Facebook and Twitter accounts, however we contend that less official media outlets, such as Ḥamās-controlled in Gaza Filasṭīn and Al-Risālah- but also Filasṭīn Al- Muslima published in Britain- have often provided more reliable information regarding Ḥamās true political position. Regarding the interviews, we spoke with Ḥamās PLC speakers in Ramallah and Nablus, as well as one ex Ḥamās member in the 2007 government, and the Kutla al- Islāmīyyah in the Birzeit, Bethlehem and Al-Quds Universities. Also, our interviewees had direct access to key institutions in the West Bank, such as Ministry of Awqāf in Ramallah and Bethelem, Ministry of Detainees, as well as local NGOs and social welfare institutions. Moreover, we relied our analysis on interviews with Palestinian and international political analysts experts in Palestinian politics, and people directly involved in political negotiations. There is extensive academic secondary literature about Ḥamās’s early years, with a peak in publications dealing with the 2006-2009 years. In this regard, we have combined and compared information between Ḥamās-close publications (Al-Zaytūna Center for Studies and Consultations) and Western-associated authors that use different methods of analysis. In this regard, authors such as Milton-Edwards, Šadīd, Ḥammāmi and Cohen tend to address Palestine’s westernized elite, while others such as Levitt only consider Ḥamās’s use of violence and base its work primarily on Israeli’s intelligence sources. Therefore, we gave priority to authors that made extensive use of primary sources and combined theoretical discourse and practice such as ‘Abū ʿAmr, Mishaul and Sela, Sara Roy and Geroen Gunning, as well as Ḫālid Ḥrūb and ‘Azzām Tamīmī. Arabic academic secondary sources tend to privilege theoretical discourse (Al-‘Asʿāl, ʿAdwān, Al-Hoūt and ‘Abū Al-Namal), therefore we used them as a general theoretical framework of reference to explain Ḥamās’s historical political thought. For the 2007-2013 years, we made wide use of interviews-based policy-oriented reports such as those produced by the International Crisis Group, and other think tanks such as Crown Center for Middle East Studies, the Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding in Geneva and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to quote a few. Moreover, we made extensive use of primary Arabic sources from Arabic press, as well as official texts of agreements and public speeches of Ḥamās and Egyptian leaders. This thesis is structured in four chapters covering the whole historical life of Ḥamās, until July 2013. The first chapter provides an introductory historical background of the roots of political Islam in Palestine, addressing the coupling of national, regional and international determinants in triggering the revival of political Islam in Palestine and the
5 reasons behind the establishment of Ḥamās: the Nakba, the 1967 war and the development of political Islam through the 1970s and 1980s until the first Intifāḍah. Importantly, in this section we set the historical basis for the institutional development of Ḥamās in the Gaza Strip, with a careful eye to its relation with the Egyptian government and the Egyptian Brotherhood, alongside the origins of the geographical and institutional division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The second chapter aims at providing an in-depth analysis of the development of Ḥamās’s internal structure of power, highlighting the growing moderation and pragmatism of Ḥamās’s leadership from the 1990s stemming from its early relation with the PLO. In this context, this section highlights Ḥamās’s “dual policy” vis-à-vis the PLO in negotiating pragmatic co-existence and rejectionism. Moreover, in this chapter we assess the dialectical tension along the politico-military line triggered by such “dual policy”, as well as between the “hardliner” external leadership and “pragmatic” Gaza leadership. The third chapter addresses the framework of time between the 2006 electoral victory and 2010, providing a complete analysis of Ḥamās state-building in Gaza. In this context, we crucially analyze Ḥamās’s growing resemblance with the post-Oslo PA during the state-building phase and its growing authoritarian institutional grip. In fact, this section contends that international boycott and the siege have strengthened the Gaza’s leadership rule over the Strip and has switched the Ḥamās’s internal balance of power from the “outside” towards the “inside”. The last chapter aims at providing an assessment of the impact of the Arab Spring over Ḥamās’ internal structure of power. Here we analyze the reconciliation process as one of the major effects of the Arab Spring on Ḥamās, and the factors hindering its actual and effective implementation stemming from internal polarization within Ḥamās. In fact, the major observation of this chapter is the growing militarization of Gaza and of Ḥamās politburo after the 2012 Šūrā elections, and the attitude of the Gaza leadership to resist any change brought about by the Arab Spring, both at the regional and national level. Moreover, the chapter analyzes Miš’al’s approach to the Arab Spring, and reconciliation proposal in the light of a strategic effort to undermine the growing power of the Gaza leadership. Finally, in fact, the thesis concludes that the Arab Spring has highlighted long-standing historical trends that had characterized Ḥamās internal structure of power since its establishment. If it is premature to experience internal splits within Ḥamās, the Arab Spring has definitely increased the political weight of the military wing in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, we conclude that between 2011 and 2013 the Gaza and external leaderships
6 have progressively engaged in internal competition that resulted in the common attitude to preserve the status quo: the Gaza leadership has resisted reconciliation processes fearing that this might undermine its political and security control over the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, Miš’al has engaged in regional negotiations and reconciliation with the primary purpose of upgrading its political power within Ḥamās’ internal structure of power.
اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺔ
ﺗﮭدف ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ إﻟﻘﺎء اﻟﺿوء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗداﻋﯾﺎت اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ھﯾﻛل اﻟﺳﻠطﺔ داﺧل ﺣﻣﺎس ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﺗوﻓﯾر ﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺧﻲ ﻟﻠﻔﻛر اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻣﻧذ إﻧﺷﺎﺋﮭﺎ ، ﻣﻊ اﻟﺗرﻛﯾز ﺑﺷﻛل رﺋﯾﺳﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﺗرة 2011 ـ 2013.ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﮫ اﻟﺗﺣدﯾد، ﺗﮭدف اﻟدراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ أن ﺗﺟﯾب ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ اﻟﺗﺎﻟﯾﺔ: ﻣﺎذا ﻛﺎن ﺗﺄﺛﯾر اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ - ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣرﻛﺔ اﻟﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ (ﺣﻣﺎس)؟ ھل اﻻﻧﻘﺳﺎﻣﺎت ﺑﯾن اﻟﻘﯾﺎدات اﻟداﺧﻠﯾﺔ واﻟﺧﺎرﺟﯾﺔ ﻟﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس ھﻲ ﺧﻼﻓﺎت ﺟدﯾدة وﻏﯾر ﻣﺳﺑوﻗﺔ، أم أﻧﮭﺎ ﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ ﻣن ﺗوﺗر اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺧﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺳﺗوﯾﯾن اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ و اﻟﻌﺳﻛري؟ ھل ﺳﯾﺟﺑر اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ ﺣﻣﺎس أن ﺗﺗﺑﺗﻰ اﻟﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺔ ﺳﻠﻣﯾﺔ أم أﻧﮫ ﺳﯾؤدي أﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﺳﻛرة اﻟﻣﺗزاﯾدة ﻓﻲ ﻗطﺎع ﻏزة
ﺗﻣﺛل ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻣﺳﺎھﻣﺔ ھﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﯾدان اﻟدراﺳﺎت اﻷﻛﺎدﯾﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﻣوﺟودة ﺣول اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اﻟﻔﻛر اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس، ﻓﺈن ﺗوﻓر اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﺟﮭدا ﺣﻘﯾﻘﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﺗﻐﯾﯾرات اﻹﻗﻠﯾﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ أﺛﺎرھﺎ اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ ﺑﯾن 2011 2013 و ﻟﮭذه اﻟطرﯾﻘﺔ، ﻧﺳﺗطﯾﻊ أن ﻧﺣﻠل اﻟﻘرارات اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﻣن وﺟﮫ اﻟﻧظر ﺧﺑرﺗﮭﺎ اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺧﯾﺔ - واﻟدﯾﻧﺎﻣﯾﺎت اﻟﺟﯾوﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺗﻐﯾرة. ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﻘﯾﻘﺔ، ﻗد ﺗرﻛز ﻣﻌظم اﻟدراﺳﺎت اﻷﻛﺎدﯾﻣﯾﺔ ﺣول اﻹﻧﻌﻛﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﺟﯾوﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ ﻟﻠرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺳﺗوى اﻹﻗﻠﯾﻣﻲ، و ﺧﺻوﺻﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ دول ﻣﺛل ﻣﺻر، ﺗوﻧس و ﻟﯾﺑﯾﺎ ـ ﺣﯾث ﻛﺎن اﻟﺗﺄﺛﯾر اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ اﻷﻛﺛر ﻋﻣﻘﺎ ـ و أﯾﺿﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗوى اﻹﻗﻠﯾﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﺟدﯾدة “اﻟﻧﺎﺷﺋﺔ” ﻣﺛل ﻗطر. ﻟﮭذا اﻟﺳﺑب، ﻧﻌﺗﻘد ﺑﺄن ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻣﻔﯾدة ﺟدا ﻟﻠﺗﻘﯾﯾم أﺛر اﻟﺛورات اﻟﻌرﺑﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﯾن “اﻟﺛﺎﻧوﯾﺔ” ﻛﺣﻣﺎس، ﻛﻣﺎ ﺑﺄن ﺗرﻛز اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﺳﻠوك اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﻛﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﺧوان اﻟﻣﺳﻠﻣﯾن ﺗﺣت اﻟﺗﺄﺛﯾر اﻟﻣﺑﺎﺷر اﻷﺣداث اﻹﻗﻠﯾﻣﯾﺔ.
ﻓﻲ إطﺎر أﺳﺎﻟﯾب اﻟﺑﺣث، اﺳﺗﺧدﻣﻧﺎ ﻣﺻﺎدر أوﻟﯾﺔ و ﺛﺎﻧوﯾﺔ و أﯾﺿﺎ ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻣن اﻟﺻﺣف و ﺗﺻرﯾﺣﺎت اﻟرﺳﻣﯾﺔ ﻟﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس. ﺗﻌﺗﻣد اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﺑﺎﻷﺳﺎس ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت ﻣﺗﻌددة أﺟرﯾﻧﺎھﺎ ﻣﻊ أﻋﺿﺎء ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺟﻠس اﻟﺗﺷرﯾﻌﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺿﻔﺔ اﻟﻐرﺑﯾﺔ و أﯾﺿﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺣﻠﻠﯾن ﻓﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﯾن ﺧﻼل ﻋﻣل ﻣﯾداﻧﻲ ﻗﻣﻧﺎ ﺑﮫ ﺑﯾن ﺗﺷرﯾن اﻟﺛﺎﻟﻲ 2012 و ﻧﯾﺳﺎن 2013. ﻣن اﻟﻣﮭم اﻹﻧﺗﺑﺎه، أن ﻟدى ﺣﻣﺎس ﺗدرج ھﯾﻛﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﺳﻠطﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻧظﻣﺔ ﺷﻌﺑﯾﺔ ﻗوﯾﺔ و ﻟﮭذا اﻟﺳﺑب ﻓﺈن اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت و اﻟوﺛﺎﺋق اﻟرﺳﻣﯾﺔ ﻻ ﯾوﻣﻛن أن ﺗﻣﺛل اﻷطﯾﺎف اﻟﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ ﻟﻠﺣرﻛﺔ أوأن ﺗﻌﻛس اﻟﺗﻌﻘﯾد اﻟﺑﺎﻟﻎ داﺧﻠﮭﺎ. ﻓﻲ اﻟواﻗﻊ، ﻟﻘد ﻗﻣﻧﺎ ﺧﻼل اﻟﻌﻣل اﻟﻣﯾداﻧﻲ، ﻗﻣﻧﺎ ﺑﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﻟﺗﻧﺎﻗﺿﺎت ﺑﯾن اﻟﺗﺻرﯾﺣﺎت اﻟرﺳﻣﯾﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ اﻟﺻﺣﺎﻓﺔ وادﻋﺎءات أﺧرى ﺧﻼل اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت. ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﻘﯾﻘﺔ، ﻟﻘد اﺳﺗﺧدﻣﻧﺎ ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻣن اﻟﺻﻔﺣﺎت اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﯾﺔ اﻟرﺳﻣﯾﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس، ﻣﺛل اﻟﻔﯾس ﺑوك (Facebook) و اﻟﺗوﯾﺗر (Twitter)، و ﻟﻛن أﯾﺿﺎ اﻟﺟراﺋد اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﯾطر ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻣﺛل "ﻓﻠﺳطﯾن" و "اﻟرﺳﺎﻟﺔ"، و اﻟﺻﺣﯾﻔﺔ "ﻓﻠﺳطﯾن اﻟﻣﺳﻠﻣﺔ" اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻧﺷرھﺎ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ ﺑرﯾطﺎﻧﯾﺎ و ھﻲ اﻟﺻﺣﯾﻔﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺗﻘدم اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت اﻷﻛﺛر ﻣﺻداﻗﯾﺔ ﺑﺷﺄن اﻟﻣوﻗف اﻟﺣرﻛﺔ ﻣن ﻧﺎﺣﯾﺔ ﻓﻛرھﺎ اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ.
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺟﺎل اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت، ﺗﺣدﺛﻧﺎ ﻣﻊ أﻋﺿﺎء ﻟﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺟﻠس اﻟﺗﺷرﯾﻌﻲ ﻓﻲ رام ﷲ وﻧﺎﺑﻠس و أﯾﺿﺎ ﻣﻊ 7 ﻋﺿو ﺳﺎﺑق ﻓﻲ ﺣﻛوﻣﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎم 2007، وﻛذﻟك ﻣﻊ طﻼب اﻟﻛﺗﻠﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺎت ﺑﯾت ﻟﺣم، رام ﷲ و اﻟﻘدس. ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ذاﻟك، ﺟرﯾﻧﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت ﻣﻊ اﺷﺧﺎص داﺧل ﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت ﺣﻛوﻣﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺿﻔﺔ اﻟﻐرﺑﯾﺔ، ﻣﺛل وزارة اﻷوﻗﺎف ﻓﻲ رام ﷲ و ﺑﯾت ﻟﺣم، وزارة اﻷﺳرى وأﯾﺿﺎ اﻟﻣﻧظﻣﺎت ﻏﯾر ﺣﻛوﻣﯾﺔ و ﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت اﻟرﻋﺎﯾﺔ اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﺔ. و أﯾﺿﺎ اﺳﺗﺷﺎرﻧﺎ ﻣﺣﻠﻠﯾن ﻓﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﯾن و دوﻟﯾﯾن، و ﺧﺑراء ﻓﻲ ﺳﯾﺎق اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻔﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﺔ ﺷﺧﺻﯾﺎت ﻗد ﺷﺎرﻛت ﺑﺷﻛل ﻣﺑﺎﺷر ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻔﺎوﺿﺎت اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ.
ھﻨﺎك اﻟﻌﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر اﻷﻛﺎدﯾﻤﯿﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﯾﺔ ﺣﻮل ﺳﻨﻮات اﻷوﻟﻰ ﻟﺤﻤﺎس ﻛﺤﺮﻛﺔ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯿﺔ . و ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺣدﯾد ﺗﺗﻧﺎول أﻏﻠب ھذه اﻟﻣﻧﺷورات ﻓﺗرة ﻣﺎ ﺑﯾن 2006 2009. ﻓﻲ ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻗﻣﻧﺎ ﺑﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﺻﺎدراﻟﻣرﺗﺑطﺔ ﺑﺣﻣﺎس - (ﻣﺛل ﻣرﻛز اﻟزﯾﺗوﻧﺔ ﻟﻠدراﺳﺎت و اﻹﺳﺗﺷﺎرات) ﻣﻊ اﻟﻣﺻﺎدر اﻟﻐرﺑﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺳﺗﺧدم طرق اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ.و ﻓﻲ ﻋذا اﻟﺻدد، ﻗﺎم ﺑﻌض اﻟﻣﺣﻠﻠﯾن ﻣﺛل Šadīd, Cohen, Hamīmī ,Edwards Milton ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ - اﻟﻧﺧﺑﺔ اﻟﻐرﺑﯾﺔ اﻟﻔﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﺔ. ﺑﯾﻣﺎ اﻟﺑﻌض اﻵﺧر ﻣﺛل Levitt اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻌﺗﻣد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺻﺎدر اﻟﻣﺧﺎﺑرات اﻹﺳراﺋﯾﻠﯾﺔ اﻟذﯾن ﯾﻌﺗﺑرون ﺣﻣﺎس ﻛﺗﮭدﯾد أﻣﻧﻲ و ﯾﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠون ﻣﻌﮭﺎ ﻣن وﺟﮭﺔ ﻧظر اﻟﻘوة و اﻟﻌﻧف ﻓﻘط. ﻟﮭذا اﻟﺳﺑب، أﻋطﯾﻧﺎ أوﻟوﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺣﻠﻠﯾن اﻟذﯾن اﺳﺗﺧدﻣوا ﻣﺻﺎدر أوﻟﯾﺔ و ﻣوارد ﻧظرﯾﺔ و ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﻣﺛل ,Roy, Tamimi, Mishaul .Sela, Gunning, Abu Amr
ﺑﺻﻔﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ، ﻓﺈن اﻟﻣﺻﺎدراﻟﻌرﺑﯾﺔ ﺗﻣﺗﺎز ﺑطﺑﯾﻌﺔ ﻧظرﯾﺔ ﻣﺛل Al-‘Ash’al, Adwan, Al-Hout and Abu Al-Namal, ﻟذﻟك ﻓﺈﻧﻧﺎ اﺳﺗﺧدﻣﻧﺎھﺎ ﻣن أﺟل ﺷرح اﻟﻔﻛر اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺧﻲ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس. ﻓﯾﻣﺎ ﯾﺗﻌﻠق اﻟﻔﺗرة ﺑﯾن 2007 ـ 2013، اﺳﺗﺧدﻣﻧﺎ ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﺛل Crown ,International Crisis Group - Center for Middle East Studies, Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding وWashington Institute for Near East Policy و ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ذاﻟك، ﺗﻌﺗﻣد اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺻﺎدر أوﻟﯾﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻠﻐﺔ اﻟﻌرﺑﯾﺔ ﻣن اﻟﺻﺣﺎﻓﺔ، وﺗﺻرﯾﺣﺎت اﻟرﺳﻣﯾﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس وﻧﺻوص اﻹﺗﻔﺎﻗﯾﺎت اﻟﻣﺗﻌددة.
و ﺗﺗﻛوم ھذه اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ أرﺑﻌﺔ ﻓﺻول. ﯾﺑدأ اﻟﻔﺻل اﻷول ﻓﮭﺎ ﺑﻧﺑذة ﺗﺎرﯾﺧﯾﺔ، ﺣﯾث ﯾﺗﻧﺎول وﻻدة اﻹﺳﻼم اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻓﻠﺳطﯾن ﺑﺳﺑب أﺣداث وطﻧﯾﺔ، إﻗﻠﯾﻣﯾﺔ و دوﻟﯾﺔ ﻣﺛل اﻟﻧﻛﺑﺔ، اﻟﺣرب 1967 و ﻣن ﺛم ﺗطور اﻹﺳﻼم اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺳﺑﻌﺑﯾﻧﯾﺎت و اﻟﺛﻣﺎﻧﯾﻧﯾﺎت ﻣن اﻟﻘرن اﻟﻣﺎﺿﻲ وﺻوﻻ ﻟﻼﻧﺗﻔﺎﺿﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ. ﻛﻣﺎ وﺳﻧﺗﻧﺎول ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻘﺳم اﻷﺳﺎس اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺧﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺳﺎھﻣت ﻓﻲ ﺗطور ﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت ﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ ﻗطﺎع ﻏزة، ﻣﻊ اﻟﺗرﻛﯾز ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻼﻗﺗﮭﺎ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﺻرﯾﺔ و ﺗﻧظﯾم اﻹﺧوان ﻓﻲ ﻣﺻر، إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧب اﻷﺳﺑﺎب ﻟﻠﺗﻘﺳﯾم اﻟﺟﻐراﻓﻲ ﺑﯾن اﻟﺿﻔﺔ وﻏزة.
وﯾﮭدف اﻟﻔﺻل اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘدﯾم ﺗﺣﻠﯾل ﻣﻌﻣق ﻟﺗطوراﻟﮭﯾﻛل اﻟداﺧﻠﻲ اﻻداري ﻟﺣﻣﺎس, و ﯾﻠﻘﻰ اﻟﺿوء ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﻋﺗدال اﻟﺑراﻏﻣﺎﺗﻲ اﻟﻣﺗﻧﺎﻣﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻗﯾﺎدة ﺣﻣﺎس ﺧﻼل اﻟﺗﺳﻌﯾﻧﯾﺎت اﻟﻧﺎﺟﻣﺔ ﻋن ﻋﻼﻗﺗﮭﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻧظﻣﺔ اﻟﺗﺣرﯾر اﻟﻔﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﺔ ﺧﻼل ﻓﺗرة اﻻﺑﺗداﺋﯾﺔ. ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﺳﯾﺎق، ﯾﺑرز ھذا اﻟﻘﺳم اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻣزدوﺟﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﺗﺟﺎه ﻣﻧظﻣﺔ اﻟﺗﺣرﯾر اﻟﻔﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﺔ ﻓﯾﻣﺎ ﯾﺗﻌﻠق اﻟﺗﻌﺎﯾش ﺑﯾن اﻟواﻗﻌﯾﺔ واﻟرﻓض. و ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ذﻟك، ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻔﺻل ﻧﻘﯾﯾم اﻟﺗوﺗر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺳﺗوﯾﯾن اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ و اﻟﻌﺳﻛري اﻟﻧﺎﺟم ﻋن ھذه اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻣزدوﺟﺔ، وﻛذﻟك اﻟﺗوﺗر ﺑﯾن اﻟﻘﯾﺎدة اﻟﺧﺎرﺟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺗﺷددة واﻟﻘﯾﺎدة ﻓﻲ ﻏزة اﻟواﻗﻌﯾﺔ.
وﯾﺗﻧﺎول اﻟﻔﺻل اﻟﺛﺎﻟث ﻋن اﻟﻔﺗرة ﺑﯾن 2006 و2010 ، و ﯾﻘدم ﺗﺣﻠﯾل ﻛﺎﻣل ﻋن ﻓﺗرة ﺑﻧﺎء "دوﻟﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس" ﻓﻲ ﻏزة. ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﺳﯾﺎق، ﻧﻘوم ﺑﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﺗﺷﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﻣﺗزاﯾد ﺑﯾن ﺣﻣﺎس و اﻟﺳﻠطﺔ اﻟﻔﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﺔ ﺑﻌد أوﺳﻠو ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺗﮭﺎ اﻻﺳﺗﺑداد اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﻲ و ﻣرﺣﻠﺔ ﺑﻧﺎء اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت اﻟﺣﻛوﻣﯾﺔ. و ﯾؤﻛد ھذا اﻟﻘﺳم ﺑﺄن اﻟﻣﻘﺎطﻌﺔ اﻟدوﻟﯾﺔ واﻟﺣﺻﺎر ﻗﺎم ﺑﺗﻌزﯾز ﻗوة اﻟﻘﯾﺎدة اﻟداﺧﻠﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗطﺎع ، و ﺗﺣول اﻟﺗوازن اﻟداﺧﻠﻲ ﻟﻘﯾﺎدة ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﻣن "اﻟﺧﺎرج" 8 إﻟﻰ "اﻟداﺧل".
وﯾﮭدف اﻟﻔﺻل اﻷﺧﯾر إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﯾﯾم آﺛﺎر اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﮭﯾﻛل اﻟداﺧﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﺳﻠطﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣرﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس. ﻧﺣن ھﻧﺎ ﻧﺣﻠل ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺗﺑﺎرھﺎ واﺣدة ﻣن اﻟﺗﺄﺛﯾرات اﻟرﺋﯾﺳﯾﺔ ﻟﻠرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻣﺎس وأﯾﺿﺎ ﻧرى أن اﻷﺳﺗﻘطﺎب اﻟﻧﺎﺟم داﺧل ﺣزﻛﺔ ﺣﻣﺎس ﯾﺷﻛل اﻟﺣﺎﺟز اﻟرﺋﯾﺳﻲ ﻟﺗﻧﻔﯾذ اﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺣﻘﯾﻘﻲ وﻓﻌﻠﻲ. و ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻔﺻل ﻧﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﻌﺳﻛرة اﻟﻣﺗزاﯾدة ﻓﻲ ﻏزة و داﺧل اﻟﻣﻛﺗب اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﺑﻌد اﻧﺗﺧﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺟﻠس اﻟﺷوري ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎم 2012. و أﯾﺿﺎ ﻧﺗﻧﺎول ﻣوﻗف اﻟﻘﯾﺎدة ﻓﻲ ﻏزة ﻟﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺔ أي ﺗﻐﯾﯾرات ﻧﺎﺟﻣﺔ ﻋن اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ، ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺳﺗوى اﻹﻗﻠﯾﻣﻲ واﻟوطﻧﻲ .و ﻛﻣﺎ ﯾﺣﻠل ھذا اﻟﻔﺻل ﻧﮭﺞ ﺧﺎﻟد ﻣﺷﻌل اﺗﺟﺎه اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ و اﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ اﻟﻔﻠﺳطﯾﻧﯾﺔ ﻛﺟﮭد اﺳﺗراﺗﯾﺟﻲ ﻟﺗﻘوﯾض اﻟﻘوة اﻟﻣﺗﻧﺎﻣﯾﺔ ﻟﻘﯾﺎدة ﺣﻣﺎس ﻓﻲ ﻏزة.
و أﺧﯾرا، ﻧﺧﺗم ھذا اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﻗﺗراح ﺑﺄن اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ اﺑرز ﻧزﻋﺎت ﺗﺎرﯾﺧﯾﺔ داﺧل ھﯾﻛل اﻟﺳﻠطﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس ﻣﻧذ إﻧﺷﺎﺋﮭﺎ. ﻓﺈﻧﻧﺎ ﻧﻘﯾم ﺑﺄن ﻻ ﯾﻣﻛن أن ﻧﺷﺎھد اﻧﻘﺳﺎﻣﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺣﻣﺎس ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣدى اﻟﻣدى اﻟﻘﺻﯾر و ﻟﻛن ﻓﻲ ﺗﻔس اﻟوﻗت زاد اﻟﺛﻘل اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻸﺟﻧﺣﺔ اﻟﻌﺳﻛرﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗطﺎع ﻏزة ﺧﻼل اﻟرﺑﯾﻊ اﻟﻌرﺑﻲ، ﻓﺑﯾن ﻋﺎﻣﻲ 2011 و 2013 ﻛﺎﻧت زﯾﺎدة ﺗدرﯾﺟﯾﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻧﺎﻓﺳﺔ اﻟداﺧﻠﯾﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس و اﻟﺗﻲ أﺳﻔرت ﻋن اﻟﺣﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟوﺿﻊ اﻟراھن: ﻣن ﻧﺎﺣﯾﺔ، ﻗﺎﻣت اﻟﻘﯾﺎدة ﻓﻲ ﻏزة ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺔ ﺿد ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺎت اﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ ﺧوﻓﺎ ﻣن أﻧﮭﺎ ﻗد ﺗﻘوض ﺳﯾطرﺗﮭﺎ اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ واﻷﻣﻧﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗطﺎع ﻏزة، و ﻣن ﻧﺎﺣﯾﺔ أﺧرى، ﻗرر ﻣﺷﻌل ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻔﺎوﺿﺎت اﻹﻗﻠﯾﻣﯾﺔ واﻟﻣﺻﺎﻟﺣﺔ ﻣن أﺟل زﯾﺎدة اﻟﺗﻘوﯾﺔ ﻗوﺗﮫ اﻟﺳﯾﺎﺳﯾﺔ داﺧل ھﯾﻛل اﻟﺳﻠطﺔ ﻟﺣﻣﺎس.
Transliteration table
Q q ق Z z ز Ā ā ا
K k ك S s س B b ب
L l ل Š š ش T t ت
M m م Ṣ ṣ ص Ṯṯ ث
N n ن Ḍḍ ض Ğ ğ ج
H h ه Ṭ ṭ ط Ḥ ḥ ح
W ū و Ż ż ظ Ḫḫ خ
Y ī ي ʿ ع D d د
h ة Ġ ġ غ ḏ Ḏ ذ
F f ف R r ر
9 I.Roots of Political Islam in Palestine
Ḥamās is an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood and considers itself as the Palestinian branch of the mother organization1. Due to the analogies between Ḥamās’s ideology, political discourse and characteristics, a deeper analysis into the development and history of the origins of Ḥamās must entail the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. This chapter will address the early developments of political Islam in Palestine, from the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Palestine, to the establishment of Israel in 1948, all through the outcome of the 1967 war and the dynamics that led to the spark of the 1st Intifāḍah. In particular, this chapter argues that the peculiar and specific political events that took place in the occupied territories between 1948 and 1987 had a significant impact on the development of political Islam in Palestine, as they caused the partition of the occupied territories that paved the way for the current geographical and political division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the two different varieties of political Islam that characterize the two areas. Secondly, this chapter will argue that the resurgence of political Islam in Palestine was the result of the coupling of domestic and regional determinants, starting from the decline of nationalism in with the1967 defeat. On the one hand, the 1967 highlighted the bankruptcy of nationalist ideology in the wider region, but it also paved the way for new inter-Arab politics that were increasingly influenced by the Palestinian cause, thereby the Arab states sought to exploit and manipulate the Palestinian nationalist dimension in order to gain control of the newborn PLO, and achieving legitimacy in the region2. The regional determinants include Israeli divide and rule policy in the early ‘70s aimed at weakening the PLO, decline in PLO standing after Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, but also more regional events as the Iranian Revolution, the Gulf War and the Muğāhidīn in Afghanistan.
The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and the Nakba
The Muslim Brotherhood had been founded in Egypt by Ḥassan al-Banna in 1928 and was committed to a reformist approach. Its main goal was to tackle the overall declining
1 Ḥamās Charter: http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/1734.pdf 2 The author agrees with Beverly Milton-Edwards in asserting that the 1967 war did represent a hard blow for Arab nationalism in the region, however, it did not cause the end of Palestinian nationalism that, on the contrary, represented the major ideological force throughout the ‘70s. Accordingly, political Islam was weak in Palestine in these years, and re-emerged as a powerful political force only at the end 1970s with the Iranian revolution, and developed through the 1980s and 1990s. See Milton-Edwards B., Islamic Politics in Palestine, Tauris, London 1996. 10 morality in the Egyptian society and to revive the Islamic doctrine by dint of promoting an Islamic daʿwa that would bring the Islamic values close to the hearts and minds of the people, with the aim of eventually transforming society as close as possible to that established by Prophet Mohammed3. This would entail the establishment an Islamic state based on Islamic law (šarīʿah) and values. Despite the worldwide consensus among the Islamic community to adopt the Prophet’s ideals as well as the call to return to the “Righteous Ancestors” (Al-Ṣalāf al-Ṣalīḥ), the modern Islamic movements show significant differences within the determined boundaries, communities, national identities, political parties and social movements. Namely, there are two main distinguished schools of thoughts and practice within the Islamic reformism: one is the revolutionary approach that aims at Islamize society by seizing power and adopting a top-down approach on society. On the other pole there is the reformist approach, which implements a long-term, continuous work of Islamization of society through social and educational activities, and prioritizes the bottom-up strategy4. The early years of the Brotherhood in Egypt strived to perform this second form of reformist Islam focused on education and social activities. The idea of establishing a Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood stemmed from the attentions that the Egyptians Iḫwān were paying to the current development of the Palestinian cause, and for the symbolic importance of Jerusalem in the world Islamic heritage. The first connection between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine dates back to 1935, when Ḥassan Al-Banna’s brother, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Banna, was sent to Palestine to spread the Brotherhood’s message. In that occasion, al-Banna’s brother met with Hağ Amīn al-Ḥusseīnī, Muftī of Jerusalem and head of the Higher Islamic Council, to discuss the most crucial issues of the moment and to show the Muslim Brotherhood’s support with the Palestinian cause, but there is no evidence that this visit resulted in the official/formal establishment of a Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood5. During the years of Jewish immigration to Palestine under the British mandate, the Muslim Brotherhood delayed the establishment of local branches but actively participated during the anti-British and anti-Zionist revolts in 1936-39, by materially supporting the revolts through the “General Committee to Aid Palestine”, and morally by the “Palestine
3 Ziād Munson. "Islamic Mobilization. Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood". The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 42, No.4 (2011), p. 488. 4 Mishaul &Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, Columbia University Press, New York 2000, p. 28. 5 Ḫālid Ḥrūb,Ḥamās. Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies 2000, pp.14-15. 11 Piaster” campaign, that was aimed at raising awareness about the revolt via pamphlets and other propaganda declarations6. It is also relevant to note the political ambiguity of the Muftī of Jerusalem al-Ḥusseīnī in brokering with the British authorities in Palestine and in promoting a moderate form of institutional Islam that was mainly addressed to members of his own class and that, more than once, contributed to the detriment of the local peasant population. Similarly, Hāğ al- Ḥusseīnī, did not play an active role prior the spark of the 1936 revolts and kept a moderate profile that allowed him not to be deported or arrested, as many other leaders of the revolt7. Therefore, the establishment of the Palestine Muslim Brotherhood at the end of the Second World War gathered overall support from the local Muslim community and from the leaderless ʻUlamāʾ. There is not complete agreement concerning the exact date of the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Some argue that the first branch was established in Jerusalem in 19458, while others claim that it dates to 19469. However Ḫālid Ḥrūb argues that the Palestine branch of the Iḫwān was inaugurated in Gaza under the leadership of Šaīḫ Zāfer al-Šawwā, at the end of the Second World War, and soon expanded to the cities of Ḥarāt al-Zaytūna, Ḥarāt al-Darağ, Ḫān Yūnis and Rafaḥ. According to his version, the Muslim Brotherhood further opened their official central office in Jerusalem, in Šaīḫ Jarrāḥ on 6 May 194610. The years prior to the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 represented a fertile period for the Brotherhood, which could flourish through new branches and had the strength to mobilize local population by disseminating anti-Zionist propaganda. Significantly, between 1946 and 1947, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine held conventions in Haifa with delegations from Trans-Jordan and Lebanon, with the aim of discussing issues of political and national concerns, such as the British mandate and the illegitimacy of Jewish immigration to Palestine11. According to Ziad ‘Abū ʿAmr, and confirmed by Milton Edwards, by 1947
6 For a detailed account of the 1936 revolt in Palestine and the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood see Šihadā' Musā, Ṯawrat ʻām 1936 fī Filasṭīn: dirāsah sūsiūlūğīyah, Beirut: Bāḥiṯ lil-Dirāsāt, 2004. For further information about the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian question see: Ziyyād ‘Abū Ġanīmah, Al- Ḥarakat al-Islāmīyyah wa Qaḍīyyah Filasṭīn [The Islamic Movement and The Palestine Question], Amman: Furqan House, 1985 and ʿAbd el-Fattāḥ el-Awaīsī, Taṣwwūr al-Iḫwān al-Muslimīn lil-Qaḍīyyah al- Filasṭīnīyya, Cairo: Dār al-tawzī‘ wa al-našr al-Islāmīyyah 1989. 7 Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics...op. cit., p.28-29. 8 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Ğihād. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994, p.3; Mishaul & Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās.. op.cit., p.16. 9 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Reigme: 1949-1967, Cornell University Press 1982,p.144; Muḥammad Šadīd, "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988), p. 659. 10 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās....op.cit, p.15. 11 Al-Hoūt, Bayān Nuwayḥīd, Qīyyadāt wa Mu'assasāt al-sīyyāsīyyah fī Filasṭīn, Beirut, Institute of Palestine Studies 1981, p.503. 12 there were 25 branches in Palestine and membership ranging from 10,000 to 20,00012, drawn from both ruling elite and lower classes13. The consensus for the Iḫwān was further enhanced by their participation in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, when Brotherhood members volunteered to fight against Israel. The 1948, the Nakba, as the Palestinian refers to the establishment of Israel, represents a watershed in the history of the Middle East that not only paved the way for future rounds of conflict in the region, but also significantly shaped a new historical phase for the development of political Islam in Palestine, and gave birth to the geographical division of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Gaza and in the West Bank. It is estimated that following the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, 80% of the Palestinians who lived in major areas of Palestine, upon which Israel was established, became refugees, reaching up to 700,000 the number of Palestinian who left their homes between 1947 and 194914. Refugees became a fundamental part of the Brotherhood constituency, especially in the Gaza Strip, where they could establish a strong presence in the refugee camps, where the traditional elite could not reach out15. The Muslim Brothers participated in huge numbers in the 194816 war against Israel, with evidence that hundreds of members of the Brotherhood volunteered from neighboring countries, mainly Egypt, Jordan and Syria. According to Ḫālid Ḥrūb, quoting ‘Aref al- ‘Aref’s detailed account of the events, the Brotherhood joined the Ğihād al-Muqaddas and also formed their own fighting squadron. The involvement of the Brotherhood in military actions during the war is of significant importance as it highlights the Brotherhood’s commitment to the Palestinian cause and, more importantly, the great popularity that they gathered among the refugee population. Also, the physical presence of volunteers along the Egyptian-Gazan border increased the contacts between the Brotherhood and the Palestinians in the Gaza area and, after 1949, many of the Brotherhood members who had fought the 1948 war in the Egyptian troops, moved to Palestine and contributed to the establishment of new branches in Hebron, Jenin, Qalqilya, Jerico and other villages17. At the political level, the 1948 war saw the division of Palestine in two separately controlled territories: the West Bank, under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip under
12 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit. p.3, Milton Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit, p.33. 13 Jeroen Gunning, Ḥamās in Politics. London: Hurst Publishers Ltd 2007, p.27. 14 For a detailed analysis of the Nakba, see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University press 2004; For details about the UN General Assembly for the Commission of Palestine see official records: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/93037e3b939746de8525610200567 883 15 Gunning, Ḥamās in politics...op.cit., p.27. 16 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit., p.3. 17 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit.,p.16. 13 the Egyptian administration18, deeply affecting the subsequent course of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. As Milton-Edwards writes in her detailed analysis of the evolution of political Islam in Palestine, “the political framework of both the Jordanian and Egyptian administrations were each other a reflection, not of the needs of the Palestinian community, but of the respective political orientations and agendas of King Farūq and Ğamāl ʿAbd Al-Nāṣir in Egypt, and King ʿAbdullāh of Jordan”19. Significantly, the links between the two Brotherhoods weakened and the two entities acquired distinctive and characteristic traits that still distinguish them today: while the Brotherhood in Cairo, under the influence of the Egyptian administration acquired more revolutionary and military traits, the West Bank’s counterpart took on a more political and quietist approach 20.
The Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip after 1948
The Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in 1949 officially ratified the inclusion of 200,000 refugees on a territory of 360 squared kilometers, with an existing population of 60-80,00021. As stated before, the refugee population in Gaza allowed the Muslim Brotherhood in this area to provide welfare and community services, highlighting the weaknesses of institutional Islam, and especially of government institutions. The Egyptian authorities in Gaza pursued a policy that generally reflected the overall government’s attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood22. Therefore when in December 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was banned, the Brotherhood in Gaza had to face the same destiny and tried to re-assemble the group under a different façade. Namely, on May 18 1949, Zāfer al-Šawwā established the “Unification Association” (Ğamʿīat Tawḥīd), that was aimed at re-assembling the former Brotherhood’s secretariat23. Significantly, after 1948 war, the Muslim Brotherhood, under the Association’s activities in Gaza, saw a fertile development phase as the new refugee camps were a fruitful ground for the expansion of the Brotherhood’s values, and it is no coincidence that it is precisely in Gaza where Ḥamās found its stronghold in 1987. Indeed, it is exactly in the refugees that we should read the success of the Muslim Brotherhood’s particular form of political Islam that
18 Ibid., p.19. 19 Milton Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.36. See also: Muṣṭafā al-Ḥammārina, al-ʻAlāqāt al-Urdunīyah- al-Filasṭīnīyah: ilā ayn? : arbaʻat sīnaryūhāt lil-mustaqbal, Markaz al-dirāsāt al-Istirātīğīyah, Amman 1998. 20 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 20. 21 Ivi. 22 Muḥammad Šadīd (1988). "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza", Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, No. 2 (1988), p.660. 23 Jean-Pierre Filiu,"The origins of Ḥamās: militant legacy or Israeli tool?", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.41, No.3 (2012), p.58. 14 characterized the Gaza Strip and that paved the ground for the subsequent establishment of Ḥamās24. By concentrating its activities in the refugee camps, the Association sponsored social and cultural activities, building a strong base of popular support and stepping into the gap left by the Waqf authorities. As a matter of fact, prior to 1948, the Gaza district was relatively neglected by the British mandate administration and with the transfer of leadership to the Egyptian authorities, the course of the development of the Waqf in Gaza did not significantly improved. Unlike the West Bank that was directly incorporated into the Jordanian administration, the Gaza Strip was kept a separate administration from the Egyptian one, but was never able to achieve total independence25. Due to this relative independence, the Gaza leadership remained at the forefront of the military confrontation against the Israeli occupation and emerged as the leading political movement in the Gaza Strip until 195526, while the West Bank’s branch adopted a policy of acquiescence and compromise with the Hashemite government in Jordan. By 1954, the Brotherhood in Gaza was one of the largest organizations, with membership ranging around more than 1000, especially among the school students in the refugee camps27. The Brotherhood in Gaza could set up a network of social and political activities thank to the support of the Brotherhood in Egypt and to other donations from international Brotherhood’s members or sympathizers in the Gulf28. These activities were severely affected by the military coup of the Free Officers who seized power in Egypt in 1952 and that, in a couple of years, sought to control and limit the Brotherhood’s political influence, that was perceived as a threat to their nationalist political plans. At the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood wholeheartedly welcomed the military coup, but supported General Neguib to Colonel Nāṣir29. The relationship with the Egyptian authorities worsened in 1954 with the presumed attempt to Nāṣir’s life that also provided Nāṣir with the scapegoat for launching a fierce and repressive military campaign against members of the Brotherhood. Following Nāṣir’s repression, the movement was banned or kept underground, membership dropped and many leaders fled the country30. It is precisely Nāṣir’s outlaw of the Brothers in Gaza that gave to the Islamic activists in the Gaza Strip the green light for the establishment of decentralized and clandestine
24 Paola Caridi, Ḥamās: from Resistance to Government. New York: Seven Stories Press 2012, p.41. Al- Hoūt, Al-Qīyyādāt at Wal-Mu’assasāt...op.cit., p.523. 25 Michael Dumper, "Forty Years without slumbering: Waqf Politics and administration in the Gaza strip 1948-1987", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993), p.177. 26 Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, interview with author.Beyt Saḥūr, March 2013 27 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit., p.8. 28 Ibid. 29 Filiu, The origins of Ḥamās...op.cit, p.59. 30 Ḥrūb , Ḥamās...op.cit., p.23. 15 organizations, characterized by revolutionary and military actions in the name of national anti-Zionist struggle31. Following the Egyptian revolution, large numbers of Palestinian activists were arrested, especially those who were suspected to be Islamic militants. Among them, there was a young Aḥmad Yāsīn, mastermind and founder of The Islamic Resistance Movement in 1987, who was accused of trying to topple the regime in Egypt32. Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn was born in 1938 in the southern Palestinian village of Al-Ğoūrah, near the town of Al-Mağdel that is now the Israeli city of Aškelon. During the 1948 conflict, Yāsīn with his family was forced to flee the village and became refugee in Al-Shati refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. After the accident that left him quadriplegic, he spent most of his young age studying at home, where he read widely on religious and philosophical matters. Through his job as an Arabic Language teacher, he significantly contributed to the growth of the Islamic movement in Palestine, which –during the early years- mainly focused on the central importance of Islamic education prior to engaging in any form of Ğihād33. Yāsīn’s vision advocated intifāḍah change as a powerful tool to bring about change in the whole society. He’s role has an inspiring educator been pivotal in paving the way for the subsequent appeal of the Islamic movement among university students. The Gaza Brotherhood’s active and direct involvement in the demonstrations that took place between 1954-55 against a proposed plan to resettle Palestinian refugees in the Sinai desert in Egypt marks the most successful visible political activity of the Brotherhood in the ‘50s34. After Nāṣir outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, also the Palestinian branch in Gaza was severely compromised, membership drastically dropped and activities went underground. In this regard, ‘Abū ‘Azza, in his complete analysis about the early relationship between the Brotherhood and the newly established Fataḥ, mentions that Šaīḫ zafer al-Shawwa, leader of the Brotherhood in Gaza, declared its support for the Cairo government and its punitive measures against the Egyptian Muslim Brothers35. Specifically, the 1956 Suez war represented a major shift in the regional balance of power, because on the one hand it demonstrated the limits of Arab military, and at the same time it opened a new window of opportunity for the brotherhood to re-organize itself,
31 Robinson, Ḥamās as a Social Movement...op.cit, p.120. 32 ʿAṭif ʿAdwān, “Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn: Ḥayātihi wa Ğihādihi: P.III [‘Uns ʿAbd al-Raḥmān], al-Qaḍīyyah al- Filasṭīnīyya Bayn Miṯāqayn: al Miṯāq al-waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī wa a-Miṯāq Ḥarakat al-Muqāwwama al-Islāmīyyah (Ḥamās). Kuwait: Maktab Dar al-Bayān.p 43. 33 Ivi 34 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit.,pp. 9-10. 35 ‘Abū ‘Azza, Ma’a al-Ḥarakat al-Islāmīyyah fil-aqtār al-‘arabīyya. Kuwait: al-Qalam publishing house (1992), p.19. 16 but more importantly, for the underground activists to gather around a new movement which was established to openly confront Israel for the sake of national liberation36. Therefore, with the 1956 Suez war, the Brotherhood became openly involved in the Palestinian national military struggle as they could reorganize themselves under the Israeli occupation and far from Nāṣir’s tight control. Specifically, when the Brotherhood advocated armed struggle against the 1956 invasion, membership extensively increased, widening the gap with the Communist and Ba’athist constituencies, which advocated non- armed struggle37. However, when Gaza was returned to Nāṣir, the Brotherhood had to face a new wave of secularism and nationalism that turned against religious-political activists38. Consequently, since late ‘50s until 1967, the Gaza Brotherhood membership was highly weakened, with most of its leaders finding asylum in the Gulf region. It is noteworthy to underline that some Brotherhood’s members established certain military cells in the Gaza Strip in the early ‘50s that had a significant impact on the further development of the Gaza Brotherhood in the following years. These paramilitary organizations, namely The Youth for Vengeance and The Battallion of Justice (Katibāt al- Ḥaq)39, were formed with the purpose of engaging in armed struggle against Israel and, due to their lack of ideological discourse, they managed to shield away the animosities that affected the Muslim Brotherhood and the Regime. Therefore, being bypassed by Nāṣir’s crackdown, later on most of their leaders joined Fataḥ40. The establishment of Fataḥ movement between 1957-1958 represented a hard blow for the Islamic movement in Palestine, which was severely and definitely weakened following the execution of Islamic leader Saʿīd Qutb in 1966 that led the way to Nāṣir’s final repression of the Islamic movement in Gaza41. In the late ‘60s the Iḫwān had begun to lose some of its members to the newly established Fataḥ movement that was overly committed to the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, in immediate period before the 1967 war, Nāṣir’s hostile propaganda and rise in Arab nationalism produced a significant spark of anti-brotherhood feeling in Gaza and criticism towards the relative passive policies of the Brotherhood vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation42. Therefore, when the Six Day War erupted, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza
36 Anat Kurz, Fataḥ and the Politics of Violence. The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle. The Jaffee Center for strategic Studies 2005, p. 17. 37 Aḥmad Hišām, interview with author. September 2013. 38 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., pp. 53-54. 39 ‘AbūʿAmr, Usūl al-Ḥarakat al-sīyāsīyyah, p.77. 40 Ḥrūb , Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 25. 41 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.54. 42 Robinson, Ḥamās as a Social Movement...op.cit.,p.121. 17 held no political power on those institutions that they had established in the ‘40s and that had represented the flouring base of their success.
The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank after 1948
Following the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950, Palestinians were granted full Jordanian citizenship, significantly altering the social balance and political equilibrium of the Jordanian society. The development of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank was rather different because of the different evolution of that area prior to 1948. Specifically, the West Bank socio-political landscape significantly differed from Gaza’s, showing a patronage that included notable families that gathered around the main newly urbanized centers of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus, and Bethlehem43. Within this context, the Islamic politics in the West Bank during the Jordanian rule moved along the official institutional Islam embodied by the Waqf authorities, and the parallel organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Liberation Party. With regard to socio-political groups and political elites, the Amman government ensured to adopt a co-optative policy and quickly established a direct dialogue with the Brotherhood’s leading cadres in the West Bank. Also, the Amman government sought to incorporate notable local leaders, and members of prominent local famlies- Našāšībī, Ṣalāḥ, al-Dağğānī- into the Jordanian economic and political life. Many West Bank politicians thought that this transitional relationship with the Hashemite would represent an intermediate step towards a more comprehensive Arab unity, which eventually would entail the opportunity to reconstruct greater Arab Palestine44. However, the Jordanian monarchy did not strive to effectively and completely integrate the Palestinians into their political system, but rather preferred to co-opt and fragment them45. The Hashemite sought to fragment the West Bank political society by dividing its territory in seven autonomous administrative districts, so that the Monarchy could control and prevent the emergence of a unified political leadership46. Despite the vigilant control of the Waqf authorities over the Islamic movement’s activities, the Brotherhood offices in the West Bank and Transjordan succeeded in merging into one single entity that was named The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan47. Between the ‘50s and ‘60s, while the Gaza brotherhood had to face Nāṣir’s violent crackdown that weakened their political influence, the West Bankers Iḫwān acted as a loyal opposition to the Hashemite regime and
43 Ibid, p.55 44 Emile Saḥlīyyeh, The West Bank Policies since 1967. Washington: Brookings Intitution 1988,p. 3. 45 Ivi... 46 Ibid, p.15. 47 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.20. 18 adopted a strategy that implied acquiescence and non-direct confrontation with Amman48, in exchange for providing legitimacy to the Hāšimī monarchy through the support of the presumed direct linkage between the Hashemite and Prophet Muḥammad. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood did not advocate military activities in the West Bank apparently provided it with benefits that other political parties could not enjoy49. Precisely, the Brotherhood succeeded in surviving the political turmoil of the ’50 and resulted as one of the most influential political groups in Jordan, growing significantly and establishing new branches throughout the ’50s. If the Brotherhood’s avoidance of real military activities in the West Bank brought about criticism, it also allowed them to consolidate their position and to be supported by the Hashemite government with the purpose of counterbalancing nationalist and leftist trends50. Despite this mutual understanding and compromise was never altered, there have been some divergences during the ‘50s, especially regarding the British presence in Jordan and pro-Western policies of the Hashemite monarchy in providing anti-soviet support to the U.S51. Significantly, unlike the troublesome Gaza counterpart, the Iḫwān in the Jordan- controlled West Bank distanced themselves from the nationalist dimension and focused on educational, pro-šarīʿah program that allowed them to remain lawful and also indulged by the Israeli authorities. One of the most important activities of the Brothers in the West Bank was the organization of the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem, in 1953, which gathered Islamic supporters to the Palestinian cause form all over the Arab and Islamic world. The conference allowed the Brothers to establish a permanent office (Isrāʿ wal Mi’rāğ) with delegated from other Muslim countries52. The conference represented a powerful tool of political mobilization worldwide, and the Jordanian authorities were forced to restrict its activities in 1955. However, despite the overall control of the Monarchy over the Islamic movement’s activities, the Brotherhood was the only political party to be allowed lawful during the turmoil caused by the Suez war in 1957, when the King outlawed all other political parties. In the ‘50s and ‘60s the West Bank Brotherhood refused to boycott the Jordanian elections, under nationalist call, and also successfully participated in the Jordanian elections, succeeding in maintaining close ties with the Monarchy53. The Brotherhood won seats in Jordanian Parliament for the cities of Hebron and Nablus in 1954, 1956 and
48 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.57. 49 Aḥmad, Ḥamās: From religious Salvation to Political Transformation-The rise of Ḥamās in Palestinian Society, Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 1994, p.73. 50 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.20. 51 Caridi, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.46. 52 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit, p.21. 53 Cohen, Political parties...op.cit, p.149. 19 196254, describing its relationship with the Jordanian monarchy in the period prior to 1967 as “ loyal opposition”. It was precisely this tacit alliance with the Hashemite that let to the split of the movement in 1952, which eventually resulted in the establishment of a militant anti-Western movement under the leadership of Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabḥānī, who established the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb at-taḥrīr al-Islāmī)55. At the organizational level, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was the leading organization that set down the movement’s guidelines, upon which the West Bank branch set up its decision-making framework and social and educational activities. The Jordanian brotherhood was highly modeled on the reformist approach that characterized the Brotherhood’s founder Ḥassan al-Banna, and it utterly avoided any form of revolutionary role in national politics. This strong inter-dependence with the Jordan branch and the Hashemite government was also highly reflected in the growing importance of Amman over Jerusalem and in the diminishing importance and autonomy of the West Bank branches at the decision-making level and high-ranking role56. Unlike in the Gaza Strip, where the Brotherhood gathered major support among the refugees, school students and with social activities in Mosques and hospitals, in the West Bank the Brothers were mostly popular among the self-employed merchants and property owners57. Perhaps due to the different social strata of members in the West Bank and Gaza, the two Brotherhoods adopted almost-opposing strategies vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation and national struggle. In fact, The Brotherhood under the Jordanian administration kept their activities mostly focused on internal politics and put the quest for national struggle aside, thus centering their activities on the East Bank and West Bank rather than towards Greater Palestine58. It is mainly because of these two very different historical and political developments that the two branches undertook after 1948 – one more militant standing in the national struggle, while the other more reformist and politically lenient toward maintaining status-quo with Jordan- that the Muslim Brotherhood branches in Gaza and the West Bank could not develop as a unified and commonly- organized movement59. Significantly, with the 1967 war- which resulted in bringing back the two parts of Palestine together under the Israeli occupation- the two organizations continued to proceed in parallel and to be linked with their precedent forms of patronage. The
54 Ibid: 147 55 Mishal &Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit, p.17. 56 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.61. 57 Cohen, Political parties...op.cit., pp.158-165. 58 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., pp.61-62. 59 Robinson, Ḥamās as a Social Movement...op.cit., p.120. 20 geographic distance between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank after 1967, highly contributed to the detachment of the Palestinians in Gaza to those on the other side of the Green Line, and the Palestinian in the Diaspora, further paving the way for the development of a divided leadership within Ḥamās. As Paola Caridi writes in her analytical overview of the development of political Islam in Palestine, “the 1967 marked the divide between two phases of Palestine’s social and political history: one in which the West Bank existed within the patronage of Arab regimes, and the subsequent phase marked by a dialectic between the Palestinians inside the territories controlled by Israel and the wider Islamist movement60. Therefore, the division between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is rooted in history and is further nourished by the “politics” of clans that have always dominated Palestinian political lives, and significantly contributed to worsen the internal strife between Ḥamās and Fataḥ in the following years61. For example, in Gaza there are six confederations of tribes that include the stronger and more powerful families, such as the Doġmoš, Šawwā, Šafeī and Middeīn. Similarly, in the West Bank there are the Našišībī, Ğaʿbarī, Maṣrī families. Also, due to the absence of intermarriage between clan families from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the gap between the two areas has progressively become wider62.
The Six Day War and its aftermath.
The Six Day War of 1967 represents a second watershed in the history of Islamic movements in Palestine, and more broadly in the Middle East. In six days the Israeli army won the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, marking the framework of future negotiations with the Palestinians and other Arab countries. Secondly, although the 1967 defeat was mainly rooted in nationalism, this event did not abruptly imply the disappearance of nationalist struggle. On the other hand, it triggered years of militant armed struggle under nationalist leftist propaganda, which significantly nourished Palestinian national identity in the ‘70s. The 1967 war, however, did mark the starting phase of the decline of pan-Arab nationalism and freed Palestinian politics form the strong hold of Nasirism. Therefore the “return to Islam” definitely finds its roots in this event, which represented a new opportunity for the Palestinian Islamic
60 Caridi, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.48. 61 Ph.D graduate at Istituto Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa, Ṭarīq Dana. Interview with author. Beyt Saḥūr. December 2012. 62 “Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families,” Middle East Report, No. 71, December 20, 2007.
21 movement to re-organize itself63. As previously suggested, the 1967 defeat did not however produce an immediate return of the masses to political Islam. On the one hand, the Islamic resistance movement itself began to find new opportunities to reorganize itself far from Nāṣir’s control, but the mainstream of Palestinian political attitudes was still highly influenced by the nationalist discourse. As explained above, prior to 1967 and given the massive crackdown on the Brotherhood in Palestine, new militant cells were established and eventually many of its members and ex-Brotherhood’s joined the National Liberation Movement (Fataḥ) in 1958- 59. This shift inside the Brotherhood is notably important because it describes a behavioral pattern that will mark the establishment of Ḥamās during the first Intifāḍah, and it sets the foundation for the strategic divide that still affects Ḥamās and Fataḥ and the reconciliation process. Significantly, the launch of Palestinian armed struggle in 1965 reasserted Palestinian national identity that became embodied in the PLO and Fataḥ. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 with Nāṣir’s support, and it aimed at carrying out armed struggle against Israel, under the ideological framework that set the Arab unity as a prerequisite for the liberation of Palestine64. Conversely Fataḥ’s approach to fighting the occupation focused on immediate popular armed struggle against Israel as a prerequisite for Arab Unity, thus disengaging the Palestinian cause from Nāṣir’s pan-Arab unity65. The Fataḥ split from the Brotherhood’s cadres marks the divide between two political and national strategies that eventually turned the Palestinians’ national aspirations closer to Fataḥ’s armed militancy. This eventually triggered Israeli repression against the armed secularist guerrilla, and fostered the development of the Brotherhood in Gaza thank to a wide network of social activities, charities and significant influence on the university students all through the ‘70s. Therefore, although the 1967 defeat highlighted the first signs of bankruptcy of nationalism, it also opened up a new historical phase of inter-state politics in the Arab world that were mainly addressed at controlling or counterbalancing the challenges set forward by the PLO. For this reason, and because the first decade of Israeli occupation sparked a new wave of nationalism, the resurgence of Islam in Palestine cannot be directly associated with the 1967 defeat.66 The take over of the PLO in 1968 gave institutionalization to this Palestinian secular national identity through the guerrilla
63 Milton-Edwards B., Islamic politics… op. cit., p. 38. 64 Ivi. 65 Mishal & Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., p.38. 66 Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics…op. cit, p. 75. And Muṣṭafā al-Ḥammārina, al-ʻAlāqāt al-Urdunīyah, p. 20. 22 movement, it allowed a discrete margin of freedom from Arab government control, and eventually served as an important channel of political participation and mass mobilization67. It is important to note that Islam did not play a political role in politics in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it could develop silently and quietly in the shadows of the armed struggle carried out by the secular nationalist armed movements. As explained before, between 1948 and 1967 the Islamic movement had developed in an uneven manner, divided between different strategic patronage and geographical areas, and when the 1967 war sparked, it lacked of unified leadership and strength to commit to an armed struggle against Israel. Paradoxically, during the first decade of the Israeli occupation, the Palestinians in Gaza could benefit from a more relative easy cross into Israel for working reasons, and Gaza became accessible from the West Bank, helping the two geographical areas to partially re-connect, and to enjoy a relative economic improvement68. It is necessary to highlight that although these relative economic benefits that accrued to the Palestinians, Israel deliberately continued to prevent the emergence of an autonomous political economy, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which eventually resulted tin the “de- development” of Palestinian political and economic institutions69. At the same time, during the first decade of Israeli occupation, the West Bank saw the emergence of a new power struggle between pro-Jordanian conservative elites, and the secular nationalist movement, and the Iḫwān experienced a significant disruption with its branches in the East Bank70. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, during the first decade of Israeli occupation, focused on what is called the “cadres formation and social institutions -building” phase, therefore it did not join the armed struggle against Israel but set up charitable organizations, established religious schools and kindergartens annexed to the Mosques71. The increasing number of mosques that were established between 1967 and 1987- namely from 400 to 750 in the West Bank and from 200 to 600 in Gaza- denotes the rising importance and political mobilization of the Islamic movement, and the increasing appeal
67 Saḥlīyyeh , "Armed Struggle and State Formation". Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 26, No.4 (1997), pp. 20-21. 68 Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit., p. 11. 69 Roy, Failing peace...op.cit., pp.32-35. 70 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., pp.84-85. 71 Šihāb, Z., Inside Ḥamās: The untold story of the Militant Islamic Movement. London: Tauris & Co 2007, p. 19; Robinson, Ḥamās as a social movement... op. cit, p.136; Barġūṯī, Iyād, "Religion and Politics among the students of the Najah National University", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1991), p. 208. And Šadīd, "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No.2 (1988), pp.662-3. 23 of religion especially among students, vis-à-vis the decreasing influence and appeal of the secular leftist movement72. The organizations connected with the Islamic movement represented an impressive tool of religious proselytism, and the Iḫwān used zakat to help the needy and also helped poor families with university scholarships for their sons73. As Ḫālid Ḥrūb explains, the years between 1967 and 1975 represented the “mosque- building phase”, and the late ‘70s to the early ’80 represent the period of social institution building, when the student bloc in the universities took shape, and the Islamic charities grew in importance and social influence74. In 1967, the Iḫwān in Gaza decided to establish their first public institution, the Islamic Society (Ğamʿīat Islāmīyyah)75 with the purpose of carrying out religious, educational and social activities. Interestingly, Israel has a share of responsibility in co-opting the early Islamic movement in order to contrast and control the PLO, describing what is perceived as a divide and rule policy. After 1967, the Israeli authorities re-introduced certain legal aspects of the ottoman Law that permitted the establishment of non-governmental organizations, which allowed the Iḫwān to flourish with their charitable activities76. Encouraged by the weakness of the leftist nationalist front in the ‘70s and by the acquiescence of the Israeli authorities, the Brotherhood in Gaza established another more powerful institution, the Islamic Center (Muğammaʿ al-Islāmī). Therefore, when between 1968-1972, 380 Palestinians were deported from Gaza to Jordan, as a consequence of the massive Israeli repression against the nationalist guerrilla movement, the Iḫwān were paving the ground for the establishment of the center of their networking activities, the Muğammaʿ al-Islāmī, in 1973 in Gaza77. Through this institution, the Muslim Brotherhood gave official institutionalization to the Islamic movement in Gaza, and also the central importance of the Muğammaʿ was reinforced by the unification of the Islamic societies of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jordan, into one unified organization that was called “The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan and Palestine”78. Within this context, the establishment of the Muğammaʿ, with its social penetration and mobilization, was intended to oppose and confront the PLO-dominated political arena. This competition significantly heightened in the ‘80s, setting the framework of the rivalry
72 Interview with Munṯer and Muḥammad Dağğāni. Jerusalem, April 2013. 73 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit.,p.15. 74 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.31. 75 ʿAṭīf ʿAdwān, “Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn...op.cit., p.73. 76 Azzām Tamīmī, Ḥamās: Unwritten Chapters. Hurst &Co, London 2007, p.37. 77 Filiu, The origins of Ḥamās...op.cit, p.63. 78 ‘Abū ʿAmr, "Ḥamās: A Historical and Political Background”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer 1993), p. 7. See also: Bilāl Muḥammad ed., Ilà al-muāğiha. Ḏikrāt dr. ‘Adnān maswādī ‘an al- Iḫwān al-muslimīn fī Ḍiffa al- Ġarbīyya wa tā’sīs Ḥamās, markzaz al-dirāsāt wal-istišārāt, Beirut 2013, p.43. 24 between the Brotherhood and Fataḥ, years before the establishment of Ḥamās79. The Muğammaʿ organizational structure included an “executive committee” of 7 members taken from the Mağlis al-Šūrā (Consultative council) that represented the 5 districts of the Gaza Strip80. The Muğammaʿ of the mid’70s did not advocate in armed struggle against Israel, but gave priority to internal Ğihād over an external Ğihād. This approach found its premise on the idea that the external Ğihād should come after the establishment of the Islamic state through a bottom-up strategy of Islamization of society81. For this reason, the early activities of the Iḫwān in Gaza were not perceived as threatening, and Israel’s official approval of the Muğammaʿ in 1979 was aimed at opposing the Palestinian national movement, and eventually came to offer a powerful organizational tool for the Islamic movement, in terms of political activities and financial mobilization82. In 1970, the position of the PLO in Jordan dramatically worsened, following the hijacking of four passengers planes, by members of the PFLP. In the past 3 years before this event, the PLO and its guerrilla factions had been increasing their military capacity in Jordan, thus mounting tensions with the Hashemite government. The subsequent ouster of the PLO from Jordan and its relocation to Lebanon – which is referred to as “Black September”- represented a hard blow for the nationalist camp, which in reverse, was promptly exploited by the Islamic movement by promoting its educational activities and religious values83. In the same year, the dedicate efforts to build a new Islamic generation bore its fruit and the Islamic movement gathered support among university students, especially after the Egyptian authorities resumed the permission to intake Palestinian students into Egyptian universities. Significantly, Aḥmad Yāsīn considered sending one of his students to Egypt, and recruited a young Zaytūna ‘Abū Marzūq, now a senior member and leading figure of Ḥamās. Following Nāṣir’s death in 1970, his successor Anwar al-Sādāt opened up to Islamic trends and allowed a growing Islamic activism inside universities, and released many political prisoners that were affiliated to the Brotherhood84. In these years the Islamic association inside Egyptian universities, known as Ğāmaʿat al-Islāmīyyah, began to emerge, and many current leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – including ‘Abū al Futūḥ- gathered around this group.
79 Mishal &Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., p.40-41. 80 Interview with Palestinian scholar Bašīr Bašīr. Jerusalem, April 2013; ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit.,p.35. 81 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit, p.33. 82 Filiu, The origins of Ḥamās...op.cit.p.64. 83 Interview with former PFLP militant Walid Salem. East Jerusalem, March 2013. 84 Dalāl B.,Al-Ḥarakat al-ṭullābīyyah al-'Īslāmīyyah fī Filasṭīn. Al-Kutla al-'Īslāmīyyah namūḏağān, Muwaṭin Al- mu'assasāt al-Filasṭīnīyyah li-dirāsat ad-dīmuqrāṭīyyah, Ramallah 2012. 25 The Iḫwān in the Egyptian universities discussed practical issues that related to their internal organizations inside the student council, but also wider matters such the Palestinian question and the role of Islam. In particular, a student member, Fathi al- Shiqaqi- future founder of Palestinian Islamic Ğihād- emerged as leader of the student movement in the Egyptian university, and promoted a revolution in Islamic thinking based on a paper titled “Al-Ḥal al-Islāmī ma baʿda al-nakbatayn"85, written by a Syrian phD student Tawfīq al-Ṭayyeb, in Germany86. Between the late ’60s and late ‘70s, university students played a pivotal role in setting up the framework of the discussion about the role of political Islam in the Palestinian cause. They started questioning the legitimacy of Ğihād under a nationalist leadership, and commenced to underline the necessity of an Islamic state as a priority for the liberation of Palestine87. Another crucial student movement that proved essential to the subsequent establishment of Ḥamās was the Islamic Association of Palestinian students in Kuwait. As Tamīmī explains, during Nāṣir’s crackdown on the Iḫwān, numbers of Egyptian scholars found a safe haven in Kuwait universities, and started recruiting new young Iḫwān. Among them, there was a young Ḫālid Miš’al, who today is the leader of Ḥamās’s Political Bureau88. The Kuwaiti connection is peculiar of the emergence of a new trend in Islamic politics, which sees the development of a wider regional Islamic movement nourished by Palestinians in diaspora. Importantly, during the’80s the Palestinian cause had become extremely popular, and many Kuwaiti NGOs raised funds that were subsequently channeled through the West Bank and Gaza Strip via Islamic charities and Zakat committees. Moreover, many Palestinian refugees living in the diaspora were particularly reliant on remittances of their family members working in Kuwait89. The Yom Kippur War of 1973, which returned importance to the Arab armies, was highly exploited by the Islamist propaganda and used as a powerful tool of religious mobilization. Accordingly, the Egyptian heroic stance against Israel during the war was explained in terms of religious devotion of the troops and in religious motivation behind resistance and struggle for liberation90. More importantly, the 1973 war represented the shifting point from a militant to a political approach in the PLO standing against Israel. When in 1974 the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the organization began to consider a political settlement with Israel
85 "The Islamic solution after the two catastrophes". 86 Ibid,p.27. 87 Ibid,p.28. 88 Ibid, p.33. 89 See: ‘Abū ‘Azza, Muḥammad, Ma’a al-Ḥarakat al-Islāmīyyah fil-aqṭār al-‘arabīyya. Kuwait: al-Qalam publishing house 1992. 90 ‘AbūʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit.p.11. 26 based on political negotiations that would bring to the establishment of a national identity in the land left unoccupied by Israel91. Therefore in the late ‘70s the Islamic discourse was on the rise, however this was not a consequence of the direct relationship/confrontation between the PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood, rather it was the result of a coupling of domestic and international determinants that took shape in the ‘80s92.
1980s: From Daʿwa to Ğihād. Domestic, regional and international determinants.
The 1980s represented the shifting point from the social/educational approach that had characterized the Brotherhood in the first decade of the Israeli occupation, to the militant and “external Ğihād” strategy that is rooted in the coupling of domestic and regional dynamics. Moreover, in this period the Gaza leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood became to be considered the leading force of the Islamic movement, and was financially supported by the external/diaspora Brotherhood leadership. In the local context, an important landmark in the history of the Islamic movement in Palestine is the establishment of the Islamic University of Gaza in 1978, which was funded by members of the Iḫwān who were actively involved in the activities of the Muğammaʿ93. Moreover, Yāsir ʿArafāt, leader of Fataḥ and chairman of the PLO, approved the establishment of the University in the hopes of setting up a dialogue with the Islamic camp in Gaza, but mainly because after 1977 Egypt had begun to deny access to Palestinian students, and after Camp David the rift between the PLO and the Egyptian government became wider. Therefore, until 1985 the PLO also financially contributed to the Islamic University of Gaza, thanks to the petro-funding it received from the Gulf Monarchies. However, a progressive decrease in financial aid to the PLO reflected a parallel increase in Islamic funding from Jordan, the Muslim’s League and the Islamic Conference Organization94. The Islamic University of Gaza played a fundamental role in the ‘80s as it rallied support from the Palestinian diaspora, which set up a project of unification- namely the Tanżīm Bilād al-Šam- to provide a unified support to the Palestinian cause.95 Since 1980, at the Islamic University of Gaza, a student council was
91 Yezīd Ṣāīġ, "Armed Struggle and State Formation". Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 26, No.4 (1997), p.195-216; 92 Phone Interview with Prof. Hišām Aḥmad. September 2013 93 ʿAdwān, Al Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn, P.III [‘Uns ‘ʿAbd al-Raḥmān], al-Qaḍīyyah al-Filasṭīnīyya Bayn Miṯāqain: al Miṯāq al-waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī wa- Miṯāq Ḥarakat al-Muqāwwama al-Islāmīyyah (Ḥamās). Kuwait: Maktab Dar al-Bayān. 94 Mishal &Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 23-4. 95 Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit., p.40-1 27 established, and during regular student election the Muğammaʿ-backed Islamic block won the majority of seats. By showing a solid majority, the pro-Islamic administration of the university did not grant the same freedom to the secular/nationalist forces, and the Israeli authorities tacitly agreed upon this compromise96. At the regional level, the outstanding increase in oil prices following the 1973 oil boycott enabled Gulf countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, to fund Islamist- including Palestinian Brotherhood- with the purpose of influencing – and contrasting- the more “secular” leaderships of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and the PLO97. The event that triggered the Islamic awakening throughout the region was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the Muslim response to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The removal of the pro-American and pro-Israel government of the Shah inflamed religious sentiments all over the region, and propped up the Islamic morale98. The Islamic revolution in Iran represented the strong propelling force for the establishment of the Islamic Ğihād organization in Gaza, in the early ‘80s. This movement was founded by Fatḥī al-Šiqāqī and gathered ex-Brotherhood leaders that were particularly critical about the Brotherhood’s weak stance against Israel, and in the lack of armed struggle99. At the same time, another organization- Sarāyah al-Ğihād al-Islāmī- that was shaped around the Islamic-oriented members of Fataḥ, embarked in armed actions against Israel. Islamic Ğihād embodied the new way of engaging with armed resistance under the banner of Islamic identity, however it did not show a clear ideological or theoretical framework. These movements enjoyed widespread support among the younger members of the Iḫwān and by the Palestinian members of the Brotherhood in the diaspora, who called for military action against Israel. Within this context, in 1983 representatives of the Iḫwān attended a historic conference in Amman for setting up a global project for Palestine, namely in financial assistance and logistic support for Palestinian Ğihād100. Significantly, on the eve of the Intifāḍah, Fataḥ and Islamic Ğihād were gaining political influence inside the Brotherhood’s stronghold- the Islamic University of Gaza- by gaining 650 and 200 votes in the 1987 elections, thus posing a serious threat to the Brotherhood to effectively become more marginalized101. Always in the regional context, the event that increasingly boosted the political appeal and influence of the Islamic movement in the ‘80s was the PLO’s expulsion from
96 Dalāl B.,Al-Ḥarakat al-ṭullābīyyah...op.cit., p.102. 97 William Cleveland, A history of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, Westview Press.1994, p.383. 98 Aḥmad, The Evolution of Ḥamās... in Gernmani...op.cit., p.80; Saḥliyyeh, The West Bank policies...op.cit.,p.141. 99 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit.,p.32.
101 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit.,p.17; Saḥliyyeh, The West Bank policies...op.cit., p.133. 28 Lebanon in 1982. This event constituted a hard blow for the PLO political leadership, which was severely weakened after the Syrian-backed revolt of Fataḥ against the PLO, and significant ground ideological differences that eventually brought to the disintegration of the movement. Significantly, it is precisely the perception that the PLO was militarily and politically inoffensive that convinced the Brotherhood in Gaza – through the Muğammaʿ- that they could represent an effective political alternative102. Crucial was the PLO dialogue with Jordan regarding the possible acceptance of the UN resolution 242- which based the status of the negotiation on a two-states solution on the 1967 borders- that eventually convinced Šaīḫ Yāsīn to establish an armed body to start military struggle against Israel103. Crucially, the Lebanon War led the PLO towards the diplomatic route, and this resulted in the historic decision in November 1988 to accept a two-states solution according to UN resolution 181, 242 and 338. Moreover, in the same occasion, the PLO declared that it would renounce terrorism as a means of national struggle104. These regional political developments fostered fervent political debates among students in the universities that started to criticize the disparity between thought and practice of the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood, and found more appealing the military actions carried out by groups like Islamic Ğihād. In the ‘80s the Islamist movement began to divide along ideological lines, and a younger more militant stratum of Muslim activists began to oppose the conservative old elite. This ideological divide mainly stemmed from the recruiting strategies in the universities, and that targeted college students, teachers, and youth in small towns that were primarily based in refugee camps105. Also, part of the debate focused on the question of what ought to be the Brotherhood’s role in fighting the occupation, and whether priority should be given to Islamic reform or to liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. In these years, Islamic Ğihād’s armed struggle against Israel was gaining credibility and respect and gaining more ground inside the universities, vis-à-vis the old guard of the Brotherhood. Many students came from lower classes and had been raised in conservative urban areas or in the refugee camps, and were extremely deceived by the lack of any concrete political achievement by the PLO, especially after the doubtful outcome of the Camp David Accords in 1978-9, which granted Egypt peace treaty with Israel, leaving the PLO on the sidelines106. Therefore, the Islamic movement could positively exploit the
102 Mishal&Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 33. 103 ʿAdwān, Al Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn...op.cit., pp.69-70. 104 Ivi. 105 Glenn Robinson, Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997, pp.121-122. 106 Gunning, Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 33. 29 emergence of growing political activism among university students, as it capitalized on the Islamic solution to social and community needs. In particular, the Islamic movement had been highly critical towards the PLO’s search for a diplomatic solution under the light of a secular political orientation, which is willing to negotiate a Palestinian state with Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.107 Because of these regional and international determinants, there is not tangible evidence that the victory of the right-wing Likud party in the 1977 elections, sparked a correspondent wave of Islamic resurgence108, however the impact of continuous Israeli occupation, as well as the establishment of the Gush Emonim movement in 1974- that initiated the national-religious project of settlement in the West Bank109- did significantly impact the Islamic discourse. Also, the majority of settlements in Gaza was built in the 1980s, and reflected Israel’s initial uncertainty over what to do of Gaza, after the Egyptian authorities refused to take Gaza back, during Camp David.110 Moved by these considerations, and by the decline in PLO’s political and military strength, some Iḫwān members in Gaza decided to amass arms and weapons, in order to join the armed struggle. The arrest of Aḥmad Yāsīn in 1984 with the charge of possessing arms can be seen as tangible evidence that the ideological debate within the Brotherhood had resulted in favor of armed struggle111. Two years before, Yāsīn had started to look for weapons to arm the Islamic Compound’s military wing- the Muğāhidīn Filasṭīn- however their lack of experience made them an easy target of the Shabak, the Israeli intelligence. Therefore, after Yāsīn’s release he decided to commission Yaḥyā al Sinwār and Rawḥī Muštaḥā to establish a security apparatus- the Mağd (Munażżamāt al-Ğihād wal-daʿwa)- with the purpose of carrying out violent actions against Israel, and to collect information about collaborators and eventually execute informers112. It is worth noting that the leaders of the Brotherhood in these years, became later the founders of Ḥamās in 1987. Namely, Šaīḫ Yāsīn, who was the head of the Brotherhood’s political bureau in the Gaza strip, was the mastermind and spiritual leader of Ḥamās, and Šaīḫ Ṣalāḥ Šihādah, another prominent figure in the Political Bureau, became the leader of Ḥamās’s military wing. Therefore, after a period of social/educational mobilization in the universities in the local and international context,
107 Saḥlīyyeh, The West Bank policies...op.cit, pp.148-51. 108 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 32. 109 Saḥlīyyeh, The West Bank policies...op.cit, pp.40-1; Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., p.26. 110 http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/settlements-in-the-gaza-strip- 1/ (accessed October 10th, 2013) 111 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 33. 112 Mishal &Sela, The Palestininian Ḥamās...op.cit., p.34; Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit., p.50 30 followed by a phase in the early ‘80s of passive resistance- namely the Islamic participation to mass demonstrations and strikes in Gaza and in the West Bank- the Islamic movement undertook the path of military action. In the early ‘80s, there started to be communication coordination between the Gaza and the West Bank branches of the Muslim Brotherhoods, just a few years before the arrest of Šaīḫ Yāsīn. Although there is no evidence that this meeting resulted in playing a crucial role for the subsequent foundation of Ḥamās, a few years later, it still shows the will to overcome internal fragmentation and disconnection that had affected the two branches since 1948113. In 1987, when the incident in the Ğabalīyya refugee camp sparked mass demonstrations, which eventually metastasized in a popular uprising, soon to be called the Intifāḍah, the Palestinian Islamic movement had established a network of institutions that enabled them to seize the moment. In particular, the leaders of the Muğammaʿ were concerned that the PLO would try to exploit the uprising to restore its political influence, which had been on the declining lines since the 1982 expulsion. Therefore, when the youngest leaders of the Muğammaʿ sought to adopt a “Ğihād now” strategy, they sparked an internal debate within the conservative cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership. The establishment of Ḥamās in December 1987 was the result of an internal/ideological coup within the Brotherhood’s strategic approach, which dialectically divided between the reformist camp and the combatant activist approach of the armed struggle114. The shift from a pan-Islamic strategy to a Palestinian national focus and armed struggle was made possible by the past ten years expansion of the Brotherhood within universities, as well as exploitation of regional political events that marked the resurgence of political Islam in the region. Therefore, when Ḥamās was established, its leaders soon sought to build alliances and gather support among the more militant cadres of the “old guard”- among them Šaīḫ Yāsīn- which could work in coalition with the younger and more radical leadership, which had been fundamental in boosting the Brotherhood popularity since mid ‘70s onwards115. Since its creation, Ḥamās was conceived to be separate from the Brotherhood so as to gain the adequate ideological freedom to join the intifāḍah. In this sense, Ḥamās’s self-identification with the Brotherhood was representative of the shifting transition from a
113 Bilāl Muḥammad ed., Ilā al-muāğiha...op.cit., p.97 According to this in-depth analysis, the establishment of Ḥamās is highly connected with the growing communication between the General Office of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1980s-1990s. 114 Interviews with Iyād Barġūti. West Bank. March-April 2013; Mishal &Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., p.35 115 Gunning, Ḥamās in Politics...op.cit., p 38; Robinson, Building a Palestinian State...op.cit., pp.144-50. 31 social movement with ideological roots in the wider Brotherhood movement, to a leading Palestinian nationalist movement engaged in armed resistance116.
1987 and the First Intifāḍah: Ḥamās is born
According to a detailed account of the founding of Ḥamās, Zakī Šihāb reports Šaīḫ Yāsīn’s narration of the birth of the movement during an Israeli questioning. In the two months before the spark of the Intifāḍah, Šaīḫ Yāsīn and Ṣalāḥ al-Šihādah decided to establish a separate movement with a security and military wing, aimed at amassing weapons to use in the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. Sources of literature close to the Brotherhood that were published after Ḥamās’s establishment, indicate that since the second half of the ‘80s the Brotherhood in Gaza had acquired the military capabilities to engage in armed struggle against Israel117. In early December 1987, Yāsīn gathered a group of people to discuss the framework for establishing a separate movement. The group included Ṣalāḥ Šehāda, Issa al Naššār, Ibrahīm al Yazūrī, ʿAbdul Azīz Al-Rantīsī, ʿAbdul Fattāḥ Doḫān, Muḥammad Šāmeḥ, and they agreed to call the movement ḤAMĀS, acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, and meaning “zeal”118. The temporal coincidence between the establishment of Ḥamās and the spark of the first Intifāḍah indicates a high degree of causal interconnection between these two events. Therefore, the discourse whether Ḥamās started or reacted to the Intifāḍah is of crucial importance in order to understand Ḥamās’s future stance towards regional events, and the exploitation of political circumstances. On 6 December 1987 an Israeli Settler was stabbed in Gaza, and two days later, an Israeli civilian drove a truck onto another vehicle packed with Arab workers, killing four and injuring more, sparking mass-protests that became known as the First Palestinian Intifāḍah. The stabbing accident was consequently attributed to a member of Islamic Ğihād, who could have acted in retaliation for the Israeli army’s decision to deport members of Islamic Ğihād119. At this moment, the Iḫwān were ready to reap the fruits of decades of social and political mobilization in Palestine, therefore after the Jabalia accident, an emergency meeting of the General Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip was held to ensure effective management and coordination of the
116 Benedetta Berti, Ḥamās and Ḥizbu’llāh: A comparative Study, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2011, p.119. 117 Nāsir, Ḥarakat al-Muqāwwama al-Islāmīyyah (Ḥamās): al-Intilāq wa mo’ādalīt al- Ṣirāʿ. London: Muslim Palestine Publications 1990, pp. 3-4. 118 Šihāb, The untold story...op.cit.,p. 23. 119 Ibid., pp.24-5. 32 Brotherhood’s actions in the territories120. Accordingly, ʿAbdul Azīz Al-Rantīsī, confirmed that this meeting, held in Yāsīn’s house on 9 December 1987, constituted the founding of Ḥamās, and that the movement’s first official communiqué was issued on 14 December, implying that until that date there was not a unified coordination on how to manage the Intifāḍah, from the Islamic front121. Interestingly, Yāsīn wanted to give the impression that Ḥamās had started the intifāḍah by issuing this statement one week after the start of the uprising122. Between December 1987 and December 1988, Ḥamās released about 33 leaflets (the exact number is not known) that drew on religious slogans123 and that did not simply advocate the Palestinian intifāḍah, but also the establishment of an Islamic state, and left no room of dialogue with the Israeli authorities. However, the organization did not identify itself as Ḥamās, until 1988, when it issued the first pamphlet with the signature “Ḥamās”124. In a matter of a few days, the Intifāḍah spread to the neighboring cities of Ḫān Yūnis, Al-Šāṭy refugee camp and then from here, to other refugee camps in the southern part of the Gaza Strip. Eventually, Ḥamās and the Intifāḍah became inextricably intertwined so that Ḥamās found popular legitimacy and political influence in the ongoing violations of the Israeli army during the Intifāḍah, and at the same time, the Intifāḍah became increasingly associated with the military branch of the Brotherhood, namely Ḥamās. Ḥamās’ identification with the Intifāḍah served the more important purpose of clearly shifting away from a purely religious movement, still full-fledged dependent on the conservative and politically quietist cadres of the Brotherhood, towards a nationalist movement with a precise nationalist objective, the liberation of Palestine form occupation, and that implies Islamic rhetoric. Hence, it must be stressed that the legitimacy that Ḥamās gained during the intifāḍah, and in the following years, is the result of their nationalist agenda, rather than a greater religiosity among Palestinian people.
120 Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit., pp.54-5. 121 Šihāb, The untold story...op.cit., p.25. 122 H. Aḥmad in Germani & Kaarthikeyan, pp.74-5. 123 H.Aḥmad, 1994: http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/Ḥamās- Text/chapter3new.htm#_ftn43 124 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit., p.101. 33 II: Ḥamās from Resistance to Government: Between Opposition and co-existence
To make sense of Ḥamās political practice from its establishment with the first Palestinian Intifāḍah, until its sweeping victory in the 2006 elections, it is necessary to understand its self-conscious ideological organization and organizational structure. Ḥamās proved to have become more pragmatic since its election, however its ideological and political theory is still very much affected by circumstances of necessity and opportunity, thus making it a multi-faceted and multi-layered movement. Therefore, Ḥamās’s utopian view of Palestinian society and of the future Palestinian state, characterized by religious and nationalist discourse, often contradicts day-to-day statements and/or decisions. This chapter is addressed to draw an outline of Ḥamās ideological framework and political thought, considering the limits of Ḥamās’s Charter (al-Miṯāq) as well as the relevance of official statements by Ḥamās’s leaders. The methodology used in this section relies in the analysis of the primary sources- the Charter, official statements and communiqués, and will contextualize these sources with historical events. Importantly, this chapter will argue that Ḥamās’s political thought and practice during the first years of the Intifāḍah and until 1993- marked by resistance and rejectionism under Islamic banner - have launched Ḥamās as an independent political player in the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and greatly contributed to the Islamization of such conflict for ideological purposes that aimed at confronting the competing secular PLO. However, the major conclusion of this chapter maintains that Ḥamās’s has shown signs of pragmatism since its inception, altering moments of violence to more pragmatic political considerations, marked more by a clear nationalist agenda to detriment of the religious rhetoric. Secondly, this chapter will provide a detailed examination of Ḥamās’s developing structure and organization, so as to define the historical roots behind the dialectical tensions along the politico-military lines that have affected the movement’s policy since its establishment. This last theme is particularly relevant to the whole purpose of this thesis, as it highlights the continuous internal struggle within Ḥamās at the political-military level, but also internal/external leadership, thus paving the way for the further divisions that were exacerbated during the Arab Spring. Therefore, this chapter strives to set the basis for a clear and brief representation of Ḥamās self-representation at the ideological level, and how it came to be structured in a specific way. However, since ideologies are not static, and Ḥamās is not monolithic, this chapter wants to portrait the ideological aspects that have remained the same, but also
34 wants to underline the transitional process that have characterized the movement in the period from 1987 until 2006.
Ideology, structure and strategies Ḥamās Charter
Ḥamās’s self-conscious representation and religious, ideological and political beliefs can be traced in its Charter (al-Mitāq), that was issued on August 18,1988, in the form of a leaflet and that represents Ḥamās’s ideological and political manifesto. This Charter is the first official attempt of Ḥamās to produce an ideological document that could explain to others what Ḥamās stood for, in terms of ideological references, political purposes and means of action. The Charter was drafted less than six months since the establishment of the movement and without an adequate internal consultation among the different wings of the movement. In fact, the Charter was written by the confident of Ḥamās’s founder Aḥmad Yassīn, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Doḫān, without any official mandate, and Ḥamās’s institutions inside and outside were not adequately consulted over its content125. The Charter as a historical document gives a precious insight into Ḥamās’s original philosophy at the time of its establishment, and accordingly, Ḥamās today bears very little resemblance with the Charter, and since then Ḥamās’s members rarely quoted it. However, this document has often been referred to by critics of the movement, as a tangible evidence of the inflexibility of Ḥamās and as a justification for condemning its use of violence and terror. It is mainly quoted among the US and Israeli lobby, and as a matter of fact it is the only document related with Ḥamās that can be widely found full-text in Western countries, especially after 9/11 in correlation with al-Qāʿida126. The Charter, when if first appeared, was also the reflection of how the ‘Iḫwān perceived the conflict in Palestine, and it reiterated the Brotherhood slogan “Allah is the goal, the Messenger is its leader, the Quran is its constitution, Ğihād its methodology and death for the sake of Allah its most coveted desire” (article 9). In the introduction of the Mițāq there is a reference to the Father of the Brotherhood, Ḥassan al-Banna that quotes “Israel will be created and will continue to exist until Islam sweeps it away, just as it swept away what came before it”. This concept is further explained in following articles concerning the Palestinian homeland that is considered, in accordance with Islamic
125 Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit., pp. 148-9. 126 Michael Broening, The politics of change in Palestine: State Building and non-violent resistance, London: Pluto Press 2011, p.11. 35 jurisprudence, an Islamic waqf (endowment) “upon all Muslim generations and it is not right to give it up nor any part of it” (article 11). Therefore neither the Arab states, nor a king or a president, be they Palestinian or Arab, have such authority because the land of Palestine is an Islamic trust. Accordingly, Ḥamās firmly and undoubtedly stated that the only mean to achieve the complete liberation of all Palestine is through ğihād, and it directly correlates the Islamic ğiħād with the nationalist cause by stating “there is not a higher peak in nationalism or depth in devotion than Ğihād, when an enemy lands on Muslim territories” (article 13). This passage is vitally important to understand Ḥamās’s ideology that seeks to provide a solution to the contradiction between the nationalist idea -and its principle of state-sovereignty- with the divine law, that instead grants the sovereignty only to Allāh. Therefore, article 12 correlates territorial nationalism with the religious creed, by adopting the concept of territorial-state nationalism (waṭanīyyah) under the banner of Islam (Article 12 and 15). Although article 9 clearly refers to the establishment of the Islamic state as the ultimate purpose for the liberation of Palestine, the covenant is silent on about issues of internal governances and it only vaguely refers to the establishment of Islamic institution under the Quran law. One crucial aspect of the Ḥamās Charter that reflects the movement’s political aims in the first years of the Intifāḍah is the ideological opposition to the PLO. The charter of the PLO was issued in 1968 and was clearly formulated in national, civil and legal terms as it allows amendments approved by 2/3 of the PNC (article 33). Therefore, although the national purposes and strategies of both Ḥamās and the PLO in their charters are very similar, Ḥamās charter is characterized by a strong and vehement religious tone, that does not admit amendments127. In particular, the use of anti-Semitic language and the reference to historic examples of clashes between Western and Islamic civilizations based on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion128 is used by Ḥamās within the Charter to characterize the Palestinian problem as a religious strife between the Jews and the Muslim129. Articles 17, 22, 28 and 32 of the Ḥamās Charter address the idea that the Jews are engaged in a conspiracy against the Muslims, thus resembling the Palestinian
127 Mishaul and Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit. p.45 and, ‘Uns ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, al-Qaḍīyyah al- Filasṭīnīyya Bayn Miṯāqayn: al-Miṯāq al-waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī wa Miṯāq Ḥarakat al-Muqāwwama al-Islāmīyyah (Ḥamās). Kuwait: Maktab Dar al-Bayān. 128 The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is a false document that purports the plan of a supposed secret group of Jews with aims of seeking global domination. It started circulating in Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century and it is assumed to be linked with Nazi-backed anti-Semitic propaganda. In this context see B. De Poli The Judeo-Masonic Conspiracy: The Path from the Cemetery of Prague to Arab Anti-Zionist Propaganda, in M. Butter, M. Reinkowski (eds.) Conspiracy Theories in the Middle East and the United States: A Comparative Approach, FRIAS (Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies, Albert-Ludwigs- Universität Freiburg), De Gruyter, Forthcoming, February 2014. 129 Tamīmī, Unwritten chapters...op.cit., p.154. 36 conflict as an ideological/religious divide between Zionist/Muslims130. This idea of the correspondence between Israel and the Jews continues to be dominant in many parts of the Muslim countries, and it has strengthened the conviction that the Israeli/Palestinian conflict stems from purely religious causes131. Undoubtedly, the Ḥamās Charter has to be read and studied today as a historical document that reflected the prevailing political though of Ḥamās in early stage of its establishment, and it must be critically read in contraposition with the secular nationalist PLO. The copious references to religious moral, the importance of education of the younger Muslim generations, the importance of culture and literature are all examples of Ḥamās’s strife to counterbalance the PLO’s secularism with a new Islamic nationalist identity. As a matter of fact the Charter reads “when the Palestine Liberation Organization adopts Islam as its system of life, we will be its soldiers […] until this happens, the position of the Islamic Resistance Movement toward the Palestine Liberation Organization, is the position of a son toward his father” (Article 22). Ḥamās’s leaders have shown willingness to revise and reform the founding covenant already in the mid 1990s, when the Politburo in Jordan was starting having the first contacts with Western diplomats. Later on, after 9/11, the idea of addressing the reform of the covenant became more urgent and necessary in order not to be directly associated with al-Qāʿida132. Also, a series of consultations among the external leadership in Beirut and Damascus are reported between 2003-2005 in order to reform the covenant with a new and more representative one. This might also be read under the light of the decision of Ḥamās to participate in the local municipal elections in 2005, and in the aftermath of the 2003 and 2005 ceasefires. However, the project of modernizing the covenant was never implemented, as Ḥamās won the parliamentary elections in 2006- thus gaining popular legitimacy- and engaged in the civil war with rival Fataḥ, and eventually established its government in the Gaza strip.
Historical development of Ḥamās’s organizational structure
Ḥamās’s organizational structure was inherited from the existing institutions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine that were developed during the ‘70s and ‘80s thank to the Gulf-
130 Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the Case of Ḥamās”, Middle East Policy 34 (June 25, 2008), pp.148–163. 131 Tamīmī, Unwritten chapters...op.cit., p.155; Litvak, The Islamization...op.cit., pp.153-54. 132 Ḥamās PLC member in Ramallah. Interview with author. March 2013. See also: “Ḥamās leader says Charter Is not the Koran”, Reuters, September 2005. Also, Maḥmūd Zahar, stated in June 2005 that if Ḥamās becomes part of the PA, it would participate in negotiations with Israel, Middle East International, 23 June 2005 reported in "Enter Ḥamās: the challenges of Political Integration”, International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 49 (18 January 2006). 37 sponsored funding and social/educational activities, and that gravitated around the Muğamma and the security/military apparatus Mağd. When the intifāḍah broke out, the newly established Ḥamās needed a new more consistent organizational structure that could take the lead in carrying out military attacks during the intifāḍah, but also coordinate popular strikes, and promoted the religious propaganda linked with the movement. In the early days of the Intifāḍah, the re-adaptation of pre-existing organizations is extremely important in defining the development of Ḥamās’s structure, as it highlights the connection between the pre-Ḥamās and post-Ḥamās institutions, noting as Ḥamās was built on an intricate network of religious/educational institutions and local cells that were affiliated to the Brotherhood133. In this respect, because of the historical development of the Muslim brotherhood in Palestine (see chapter 1), marked by continuous shifts from open involvement at the institutional level, and periods of underground activities, Ḥamās resulted as the development of a network of traditional affiliation, blood ties and personal affiliation with a particular mosque134. In this context, Ḥamās roots in informal and interpersonal relations between its leaders in Gaza and in the West Bank but also the Egyptian and Kuwaiti connections in the universities, and the relations with Gulf countries, shaped Ḥamās’s organizational anatomy as a multi-leveled hierarchical structure with separated and interconnected wings that operate vertically and horizontally135. In the early months of the Intifāḍah, Ḥamās operated around different channels that had specific tools to coordinate the uprising. Accordingly, the main clusters of Ḥamās’s activities were the political wing, which gathered members close to Yassīn and previously involved in the Muǧamma including Ābu Šannab, Ibrahīm al-Yazūri, ʿAbd al-Rantīsī, Maḥmūd Zahār, the daʿwa unit, and an internal security wing that later in 1990 was merged into the military wing of the ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Qassām Brigades136. Accordingly, the political wing in Gaza, run by ʿAbd al-Rantīsī after Yassīn’s arrest in 1989, was dedicated to activities such writing publications, dissemination of leaflets, fundraising, political decisions at the local level over mosques management and strikes organizations during the Intifāḍah. The internal intelligence apparatus of Ḥamās, the Mağd, had been established in 1984 before the creation of Ḥamās itself by Yaḥyā al-Sinwār and Rawḥī al-Muštaḥa. It had a policing role aimed at fighting Israeli informers and collecting weapons137. The
133 Ḥrūb , Ḥamās...op.cit., p.40. 134 Mishaul Shaul, The Pragmatic Dimension...op.cit., pp.572-4. 135 Ivi. 136 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics...op.cit, pp.148-49; Šihāb,The untold story...op.cit., pp. 30-1. 137 http://www.alQassām .ps/’Arabī c/about.php and confirmed by ʿAzīzDweīk, Ḥamās’s PLC member in interview with author. 38 network grew in importance with the increased militarization of the Intifāḍah, and in 1991 Šaīḫ Ṣalāḥ Šeḥāda founded the official military wing of Ḥamās, the ʿIzz ad-Dīn al-Qassām Brigade. In order to ensure the continuity of the military operations against Israel and for security reasons, the Qassām Brigades were organized into separate small command units, each responsible for different functions, with local self-contained cells that were financially and militarily independent and autonomous, and that obeyed the directives of local commanders138. As the security apparatus was established in pre-Ḥamās period, and prior to the Intifāḍah, also the military arm of Ḥamās was the result of the development of pre-existing military secret cells of the Muğamma, known as “The Islamic Holy Warrior”, which was subsequently associated with the Qassām Brigades in 1992139. The most important concept in order to understand Ḥamās’s formal authority is that of Šūrā (consultation). The principle of Šūrā derives from the Quran and it refers to the legitimate authority of Ḥamās as a leader that consults the people. The principle of Šūrā is highly debated within the Arab-Islamic world, as many Islamic scholars view it as the translation of democratic principles in the “Islamic” state. According to Ḥamās, its consultative process, based on the Quranic principle of Šūrā, guarantees the freedom of opinion of each member inside the movement, but it also urges governors to practice consultation with population, thus proving the democratic character of Ḥamās140. At the top of Ḥamās’s hierarchical leadership are two organs based outside Palestine: The Advisory Council (Mağlis aš-Šūrā) and the Political Bureau or Executive Council (Maktab as-Sīyyāsī). A degree below are the Regional Šūrā Councils, which consist of Ḥamās-elected members at the regional level for a biennial mandate that elect representatives to the National Šūrā Council, and at the lowest level of the pyramid are the local cells, also called “’Usrāt” (families)141. Also, given the growing amount of Ḥamās’s prisoners during the Intifāḍah, the prisoners’ wing established an equivalent Šūrā council that has reached crucial political weight since 2006142. The Šūrā Council is the main decision-making body of Ḥamās, and the exact number of its members is unknown, also their identity is kept secret but it is assumed that it includes representatives from the movement’s four centers, the West Bank, Gaza, external and prisoner branch143. The Political Bureau is the de facto center of power and
138 Edwards, Islamic politics...op.cit., p.149; Šihāb, The Untold Story...op.cit., p. 32 139 Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit,p. 156 140 ʿAzīz Dweik in interview with author, April 2013, Ramallah. However, the democratic nature of Šūrā in Islamic doctrine is highly debated in contemporary history. 141 Jeroen Gunning, Ḥamās in politics...op.cit., p.98. 142 Addameer and Ministry of Detainees during interview with author in Ramallah, April 2013. 143 There is not complete agreement about the member’s number of the Šūrā Council, as Ḥamās has released conflicting figures in order not to reveal the exact number and functioning of its top institution. 39 functions as Ḥamās’s executive organ. It has an administrative unit, which controls the Daʿwa unit, the internal security unit, fundraising, military unit and foreign affairs144. Also, the Political Bureau controls the West Bank and Gaza Office, which is responsible for coordinating Ḥamās’s activities at the regional and district level145. Importantly, Ḥamās’s military wing is integrated into this structure, as the Political Bureau provides the funding for military operations and weaponry. However, the military wing detains a degree of autonomy that allows it major room of maneuver and flexibility, but that at the same time causes internal conflicts and divergences between the local cell and the top political leadership146. Also, there are relevant social and professional differences of background between the “inside” and “outside” military members, highlighting this discrepancy that affect the internal structure of power of Ḥamās147. The Muğāhidīn do not join the military wing of Ḥamās by registering through an official recruitment channel, but they are directly and intifāḍah chosen by the leader/commander of the local cell of the Qassām Brigade148. Moreover, Ḥamās’s hierarchy has progressively changed following its electoral victory and the take over of the Gaza Strip in 2007. In this context, Ḥamās created a new special internal security forces, known as the Executive Force (Tanfīḏīyyah) that has been built up around the Interior Ministry, led by Fatḥī Ḥammād, in order to gain more control over the internal security in Gaza149. Accordingly, the Executive Forces were divided into three separate branches, the Civil Police, the Internal Security Forces and the National Security Forces and Ḥamās sought to keep them separate from the Qassām Brigades, and non-political. The Daʿwa unit of the movement is aimed at promoting Islamization of society through social mobilization and religious education. In this regard, Ḥamās could exploit the extensive network of charities, mosques and educational infrastructures that had been built by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. This unit is also vitally dependent from the external leadership funding and the Politburo, as prior to 2006-2007
According to a senior Palestinian analyst, shadow leadership inside Ḥamās can on the one hand guarantee survival of the movement, at the same time it hinders prospects for reconciliation, since it often triggers internal divisions that can postpone internal elections and create a climate of distrust among the Fataḥ counterparts. Hāni al-Maṣrī during PASSIA conference “Contemporary Islam in Palestine.Repercussions from the Arab Spring”, 24th April 2013, Ramallah. 144 Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., pp.160-1; Benedetta Berti, Ḥamās and Ḥizbu’llāh ...op.cit., pp.144-145. 145 The Gaza Strip is divided into seven districts and the West Bank into five districts. 146 Mattew Levitt disagrees with Ḥamās having separate wings. He claims that Ḥamās’s wings and units are interconnected and interrelated, see Mattew Levit, Ḥamās: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of Ğihād (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), pp. 2-3, 9-10. 147 Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 159. 148 “Ḥamās behind the Mask” (2005) available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2IE_RzOEU9M. 149 Berti, Ḥamās and Ḥizbu’llāh...op.cit., p.146; Jonathan Spyer,“The Growing Power of Ḥamās's Gaza Leadership”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 16, No 2 (June 2012), pp.45-46. 40 Ḥamās has consistently funded its social and educational activities and wider social welfare through charity associations based in western countries. The most known organizations are the UK-based International Palestine Relief and Development Fund, the International Al-Aqṣā Foundation, the Holy Land Foundation in the Unites States, the Saudi-based Unions of Good. Moreover, Ḥamās continues to raise funds through its network of affiliated charities, zakat committees, and private donations from intifāḍah or contribution from Gulf States150. Under the Daʿwa unit, there are administrative bodies that provide medical and educational services and contribute to Ḥamās’s core infrastructures, such as The Scientific Medical Association, the Islamic Union Workers, the Association for the Islamic Scholars of Palestine, Al-Ṣalāḥ association, the Islamic society, Islamic committees and Women’s Islamic association. The role of faith-based charities associated with Ḥamās represents one of the most debated and discussed topics, and it is widely analyzed in relation with terrorism and counterterrorism practice. In this context, the Unites States has declared Ḥamās a terrorist organization in 2001, after accusing the Islamic Resistance Movement of channeling money to Gaza and the West Bank through the Holy Land Foundation and the Al-Aqṣā International Foundation, for terrorist recruitment activities151. However, the controversial role of Ḥamās-affiliated charities will be extensively discussed in chapter III as of vital importance to understand the development of Ḥamās’s leadership in the West Bank before and after 2006.
The External Leadership and foreign relations
The massive detention campaign started in August 1988 aimed at targeting Ḥamās’s leaders represented a hard blow for the top leadership of Ḥamās. In less than two months nearly 120 Ḥamās senior figures were incarcerated, thus decapitating the top leadership of the movement. On 4th December 1990 another massive crackdown throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip saw the arrest of nearly 1.700 suspected members or accused of any affiliation with the movement. These fugitives established diaspora Ḥamās’s clusters in Amman, Jordan and the United States. Those who remained in the territories had to set up a “shadow leadership” to prevent a leadership vacuum in the
150 Berti, Ḥamās and Ḥizbu’llāh ...op.cit, p.155. 151 “Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A legitimate target?”, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No 13, (2 April 2003), p.6; United States Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Al-Aqṣā International Foundation as Financier of Terror Charity linked to Funding of the Ḥamās Terrorist Organization” (accessed 21 October, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/press- center/press-releases/Pages/js439.aspx. 41 event of Israeli detention152. This shadow leadership was responsible for kidnapping and killing two Israeli soldiers, Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa’don in 1989, which caused Israeli retaliation with mass arrest of 300 Ḥamās activists and key leaders in Gaza and the West Bank153. It is only after this episode that the IDF declared Ḥamās illegal, nearly after two years since the outbreak of the Intifāḍah, and one year since the heavy crackdown on nationalist popular committees154. Following these arrests, and the deportation of Ḥamās members to southern Lebanon in 1992, Ḥamās sought to devise a mechanism to establish a more decentralized and flexible leadership that could continue to operate also in case of decapitation of its internal leadership. For this reason, the political, social and military wing were separated, so as to grant continuity and flexibility to the different leadership centers based outside155. The most well-known leaders of the “outside” leadership in this period are Mūssa ‘Abū al-Marzūq, head of the Political Bureau until his expulsion from the U.S to Jordan in early 1990s, Muḥammad Nazzāl in Jordan, and ‘Imād al-Alamī in Teheran until 1998156. In these regard, leaders of the outside leadership worked to create regional and international connections and to give institutionalization to the movement abroad, by operating through Arab and Palestinian communities across Europe, the United States, and organizing activities such as writing pamphlets and communiqués, but mainly to rise funds for supposed humanitarian assistance to the Intifāḍah157. It is important to highlight that the outside leadership had a wider room of maneuver from western urbanized center such as Dallas in Texas, where Ḥamās affiliates published periodicals associated with the Palestinian Islamic Movement in North America158. Also, it is noteworthy to underline that the external leadership is divided into two main groups, one of members originally from Gaza headed by Mūssa ‘‘Abū Marzūq, and the other one including members originally from the West Bank who have studied and worked in Kuwait, led by Ĥālid Mišʿal159. Mūssa ‘Abū Marzūq directed external operations from Springfield in Virginia, where he established the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and the Islamic Association of Palestine in 1990s in order to fundraise resistance activities in Palestine, until when he was deported to Jordan160. The ability of the outside leadership to fundraise
152 Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit.,pp. 56-7. 153 Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.152. 154 Graham Usher, “What Kind of a nation? The rise of Ḥamās in the occupied Palestinian Territories”, Race & Class, Vol.37, No. 2 (1995), p.69. 155 Gunning, Ḥamās in Politics...op.cit., p.40. 156 Ziad ‘Abū ʿAmr, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.14. 157 Mishal, The pragmatic dimension...op.cit., p.581. 158 Ibid. 159 Levitt, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.10. 160 Schanzer, Ḥamās vs. Fataḥ. The Struggle for Palestine, (Palgrave: Macmillan, 2008), p. 32. 42 the resistance activities of the inside leadership, and the growing militarization of the Intifāḍah resulted in raising the political influence of the external leadership vis-à-vis the internal. In return, this increased tensions between the two leaderships, as a consequence of the fact that the outside leaders had effectively stronger power over the military wing, by controlling funding161. The deportation of Ḥamās members to southern Lebanon in 1992 represents a turning point for Ḥamās organizational build-up and for gaining worldwide popularity162 and boosting its foreign relations with other Arab countries. Ḥamās’s foreign relations were actually enhanced already in1989 with the first heavy Israeli crackdown on Ḥamās’s cadres, and in November 1989 Ḥamās had formed an alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran that by-passed their Sunnī/Shīʿah religious divergences and aimed at the common goal of liberating whole Palestine163. This alliance was extremely important because it inaugurated a new phase in Ḥamās’s history of international relations based on patronage relationship that gave Ḥamās ideological, military, logistic support and funding. The deportation to south Lebanon increased the international visibility of the movement in the Arab Countries, and it allowed the re-organization of the movement’s structure. ‘Imād al- ʿĀlami became the Ḥamās’s appointed representative in Teheran, and Muṣṭafā al- Qānūwwa became the chief of Ḥamās’s political bureau in Lebanon164. The Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese connection were very important for Ḥamās’s military strategy, as it had the opportunity to learn about Ḥizbu'llāh experience in fighting against the Israelis, as well as suicide attacks and bombs manufacturing165. Also, the first Gulf War positively affected Ḥamās’s foreign relations. Therefore, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Arab states punished the ʿArafāt-led PLO for supporting Iraq, by cutting funding and transferring much of these to other Palestinian factions, and also Ḥamās166. Although Ḥamās lost its Kuwaiti connection167 that had dated back since 1980s and represented an important source of support especially in the universities, Arab funding were re-channeled to Ḥamās, thus weakening the PLO at the logistic level but also in terms of international recognition.
161 Gunning, Ḥamās in politics...op.cit., pp.40-1; Mishal & Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 161. 162 Following the expulsion, opinion polls show that 16,6% of Palestinians in Gaza and 10,5 &in the West Bank said that Ḥamās represented them rather than the PLO: Jerusalem Media and communication Center, January 1993, datas provided to author (Dec 2012) 163 Schanzer, Ḥamās vs. Fataḥ...op.cit,p. 34. 164 Šihāb, The Untold story ...op.cit, pp. 130-1. 165 Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās ...op.cit, pp. 66-7. 166 Šihāb, The untold story...op.cit,p.130; Tamīmī, Unwritten chapters...op.cit, pp.73-8. 167 Kuwait had the third largest Palestinian population after Palestine and Jordan. Kuwait raised large amount of funds for the Palestinian cause in the 1980s. With the first Gulf War, the Kuwaiti government suspected Palestinian residents to support Saddam Hussein, therefore life for Palestinians became impossible, and Ḥamās too had to relocate away from Kuwait. 43 At this stage, Ḥamās established a clandestine foothold in Jordan, which became later official, and lasted until 1999 when the Jordanian authorities ordered Ḥamās’s leaders to flee the country, after discovering a plan for military operation carried in the OPT from Amman. The relations between Ḥamās and the Hashemite government had already become strained after the signing of the Oslo Accords, when Jordan was subjected to pressures from the United States and the PLO for allowing Ḥamās to operate on its soil168. Despite its ouster in 1999, Ḥamās’s sojourn in Jordan represents a major achievement for the movement’s first attempts at building foreign relations, as it marked the transition form secrecy to openness, opening new channels of communication with Sudan, Yemen, Saudi ‘Arabī a but also North Africa States. It is reported that Yassīn between February 19 and 24 1999, visited Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi ‘Arabī a, Sudan, Syria, Arab Emirates, and Yemen169.
The internal leadership
As described above, the Political Bureau has a West Bank and Gaza office that coordinates Ḥamās’s activities in the two areas. The West Bank and Gaza Šūrā Councils are composed by an unknown number of elected representatives for a 2-years mandate170. The Gaza branch represents the stronghold of Ḥamās membership, where also is the majority of the movement’s infrastructures. The West Bank branch represents a difficult field of study because of its geographical separation and historical development (see chapter 1), however, despite the lack of detailed information in this domain, the West Bank branch has significantly grown from a few local cells in the 1990s to a more capillary network of charities and faith-based institutions171. Today, Ḥamās has branches in every governorate (up to 11172) and is showing rising influence in areas and cities that had once been mainly controlled by Fataḥ such as Ramallah and Nablus173. Also, Ḥamās’s activities in the West Bank have mainly focused at the grassroots level, mainly through schools, youth clubs and charity associations. Given the crucial influence of such infrastructures during the pre-elections propaganda in 2005-2006, after Ḥamās’s victory in the elections, the Fayyād-led PA government in Ramallah, started a heavy crackdown on Ḥamās’s charity infrastructure in
168 al-ʻAlāqāt al-Urdunīyah-al-Filasṭīnīyah...op.cit, p.57. 169 Wendi Kristiansen, “Challenge and Counterchallenge: Ḥamās’s response to Oslo”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3. (Spring 1999), p.31. 170 Ibid. 171 Ḥamās cell in the West Bank in interview with author, April 2013. 172 According to interviews, Ḥamās’s Mağlis aš-Šūrā in the West Bank controls local cells in Tubas, Tulkarem, Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah, Jenin, Qalqiliya, Jerico and Salfit. 173 ‘Iyād Barġūṯi, General Director of Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies, in interview with author, March 2013. 44 the West Bank, posing a serious threat to its activities (see chapter III). Moreover, the presence of important university centers in Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem and Hebron, made the West Bank particularly appealing for Ḥamās, as it could influence student council elections that have always considered a political barometer for the population’s political preferences174. The founder of the Qassām Brigades in the west bank was Šaīḫ Ṣāliḥ al-Arūri, from a village near Ramallah. As the network of the Brigades in the west bank grew rapidly, the first southern cell in the West Bank was established by Šaīḫ Muḥammad ‘Abū al-Ṭaīr in 1990, and gathered members from local cells in Hebron, Ramallah and Jerusalem175. A crucial aspect to understand the development of Ḥamās’s branch in the West Bank is that when members of the local cells were arrested and sent into Israeli prisons, they kept contacts with the movement outside by communication through capsules, smuggled mobile phones or visits from relatives176. The most important Ḥamās cadres in the West Bank are Ğamīl Ḥamāmi, ʿAzīz Dweīk, Ğamāl Manṣūr, Maḥmūd Musliḥ. Importantly, it is believed that in every Israeli prison there is the equivalent of the Mağlis aš-Šūrā, through which Ḥamās’s prisoners coordinate their activities within the prison but also try to reach out to the outside movement. The prisoners’ committee has increased its political influence in the West Bank since the heavy crackdown on Ḥamās by the PA, and will be further discussed in chapter III. The political influence and ideological background of the internal and external leadership has switched according to political events. It is widely assumed that since the early stage of Ḥamās development, until 2005-2006, the external leadership showed a more militant and intransigent ideology toward armed resistance and the Israeli government, as the result of not being directly affected by Israeli occupation and not being concerned about Ḥamās’s wider constituency and public support177. Moreover, although Mūssa ‘Abū Marzūq in early 1990s was re-structuring Ḥamās’s decapitated structure in the diaspora, paving the way for the increased power of this leadership within Ḥamās, the organization’s main membership remained rooted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rather than in the diaspora178
174 Ibid. 175 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrel, Ḥamās (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp.120-1. 176Interview with Ministry of Detainees to the Palestinian Authority and Addameer (Prisoners Support and Human Rights Association), 15 and 25 April 2013. 177 Ibid. 178 Kristiansen, Challenge and counterchallenge...op.cit.,pp., 21-22. 45 Figure1. Ḥamās Leadership Structure. Based on Mishal and Sela (2000), Benedetta Berti (2012) and interviews with Ḥamās cell in the West Bank, March 2013
46
Given the network and grassroots nature of Ḥamās’s structure of power, a consensual model rooted in the principle of Šūrā characterizes its formal authority. On the one hand, this enhances internal consultation and pluralism, but it also fosters internal discrepancies and the inability of the top leadership to exercise thorough control over local cells. In fact, the Šūrā Council lacks of a direct mechanism for ensuring coercive abidance by the rules, therefore making more likely the rising of power of local leaders. This is extremely important at the politico-military level, as for example when the Šūrā Council denounced the suicide operation that ended the 2003 ceasefire179, showing growing conflicting statements within Ḥamās’s authority and the observed practice of the military leaders. Moreover, geographical separation has definitely highlighted different developments at the political and military level, thus posing a serious threat to Ḥamās’s power unity and cohesion. Ḥamās’s sweeping victory in the election in 2006 and the subsequent geographical division between Gaza and the West bank posed a further threat to internal cohesion. Also, the clandestine nature of Ḥamās before 2006 and also after the election in the West Bank exacerbated to possibility to develop informal structures of power that could contradict the top official leadership180.
Between violence and co-existence. Oslo and its aftermath
Since the outset, Ḥamās establishment with the Intifāḍah represented a challenge to the PLO political leadership in the OPT and soon the two factions started to enter a full- fledged competition in order to gain a hegemonic role in the uprising. Despite ideological differences underlined by Ḥamās in its covenant, and therefore the clear objective of Ḥamās to be considered as ambivalent or a viable alternative to the PLO, Ḥamās’s behavior vis-à-vis the PLO is characterized by ambiguity. In fact, if on the one hand, Ḥamās sought to fight the hegemony of the PLO in the first year of the Intifāḍah, it also proved highly pragmatic in assessing the cost/benefit of such behavior. Therefore since the very beginning, and more evidently after the Oslo Accords, Ḥamās sought to oppose the PLO and later the PA, but also to ensure coexistence with the opposing faction181.
179 Gunning, Ḥamās in politics...op.cit.,p.114.Interview with former Ḥamās member ʿAzīz Kayd, Ramallah. March 2013 180 The discourse about the factor that undermine Ḥamās’s power cohesion are confirmed by all my interlocutors during interviews, except for Ḥamās’ members who underline only the positive aspects of Šūrā pluralism, and geographical dispersion as “tactical and strategic”. 181 Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit,p. 83. 47
Ḥamās and the PLO
The Intifāḍah showed lack of a unified command between the different political factions. As a matter fact, Ḥamās refused to subject to the ʿArafāt- led PLO’s Intifāḍah committees, and marked the origins for the divide that still affects Ḥamās and Fataḥ. In this regard, Ḥamās issued rival and opposing communiqués to those issued by the PLO, as well as sought to call different strike days and demonstrations182. Although the national objective of the PLO and Ḥamās is to liberate all Palestine, Ḥamās’s efforts in picturing itself as an embodiment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, brought the movement to underline the religious discourse of its practice. In this regard, Ḥamās’s ideological and practical opposition to the PLO has to be read also as a tentative to distinguish itself in the Palestinian political scene. Also, thank to the network of grassroots institutions that gravitated around the Muğamma, Ḥamās was able to quickly establish an organizational framework of activities that competed with those of the UNLU, making it very hard for the PLO’s Intifāḍah institutions to challenge it183. Ḥamās understood that the leadership of the Intifāḍah stood in the organization, control and enforcement of strikes and it soon came to call for its own separate strikes, thus challenging unity and cohesion of the Intifāḍah184. Mishal and Sela offer a complete analysis of Ḥamās leaflets during the Intifāḍah, discussing Ḥamās’s power to control the revolt, and highlighting the high degree of political pragmatism behind Ḥamās’s leaflets. Both Ḥamās and the PLO issued violent and non-violent leaflets that were aimed at propelling the revolt. The violent activities included throwing stones, burning tires and clashing with the Israeli forces, while the non- violent activities mainly focused on boycott of economic relations with Israel. Interestingly, according to this analysis, the level of violence was high since the outset of the Intifāḍah and remained high throughout the revolt, whereas the number of leaflets calling for economic boycott of Israeli products significantly fell. This practice reflect Ḥamās’s pragmatic consideration of its limits, as it realized that severing economic ties with Israel would mean growing economic hardships for Palestinians that were to be added to the
182 Edwards and Farrel, Ḥamās...op.cit., pp.54-5. 183 Ibid. 184 Israeli Department of State’s archive of Ḥamās’s leaflets detects discrepancies with PLO’s leaflets: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/Ḥamāsintifada.pdf (accessed, September 2013); For a comprehensive analysis of leaflets and political coordination during the Intifāḍah, see Mishal, Shaul, “ The Intifāḍah Discourse: Ḥamās and UNL Leaflets”, The Truman Institute, International Conference on Israel and the PLO, April 1994, available at http://www.shaulmishal.com/pdf/sm_lectEN_06.pdf (accessed on October 2013). 48 social cost of the uprising, and would likely reduce Ḥamās’s appeal on the people and power of controlling the revolt.185 Since the outset of the Intifāḍah, and before the establishment of the PA, Ḥamās had sought somehow to coexist with the PLO during the Intifāḍah, despite ideological and tactical differences186. As a matter of fact, it was clear for Ḥamās that despite its rising importance with the Intifāḍah, it could not boast the military capability of the PLO, and its popularity at the mainstream level. Therefore, according to a cost/benefit calculation, Ḥamās never sought open and direct conflict with the PLO, and later the PA, and despite official discourse marked by violence and rejection187, it tacitly advocated coexistence and compromise, highlighting Ḥamās’s early attitude towards pragmatism and flexibility. In this regard, Šaīḫ ‘Aḥmad Yassīn has issued ambiguous statements during the intifāḍah that point out Ḥamās’s pragmatic calculations and strategic concessions. Significantly, he affirmed acceptance of the 1967 borders under condition that is a temporary phase, provided that final aim is to return to Greater Palestine. Also, referring to recognizing Israel, Yassīn stated “Our recognition of an Israeli state is conditioned on their recognition of our rights. Since we still don't have a state -- I don't have a home to settle on -- that means we're not in a position to recognize Israel”188, thus using more docile discourse than what expressed in the Charter. Moreover, Yassīn’s allegations suggested that Ḥamās might be willing to accept international supervision after Israeli’s withdrawal, and also that negotiations with Israel were excluded as long as the occupation continued189. Also Maḥmūd Zahār talked about the opposition to the PLO in terms of ideological differences, stressing the fact that Ḥamās does not seek to undermine the PLO’s activities in the effort of liberating Palestine, explaining “For Ḥamās, it has never been a question of weakening the PLO. This was not in our interests, since to weaken the PLO is to weaken one of the important Palestinian actors. We have always believed that for people to become convinced to join Ḥamās, the PLO should fail by virtue of its own policies”190. Zahārunveils Ḥamās’s strategy of controlled violence and tacit co-existence with the PLO,
185 Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 60-4. 186 Ḥamās-affiliated members reject the notion of “co-existence” and call for “opposition” to the PLO. However, the majority of non-Ḥamās affiliated analysts contended that Ḥamās’s early behaviour vis-a-vis the PLO was indeed a mixed balance between coexistence and opposition. Fiedlwork March-April 2013, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron. 187 Ibid. 188 Interview available on official website of Qassām Brigades: http://www.Qassām .ps/specialfile-348- Interview_with_the_Sheikh.html (accessed October 2013). 189 Yedioth Ahronoth, 16th September 1988, quoted in Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Ḥamās, p.70. 190 Maḥmūd Zahār and Ḥusseīn Ḥiğāzī, “Ḥamās: Waiting for Nationalism to self-destruct. An interview with Maḥmūd Zahār”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Spring 1995), p.83. 49 stressing the concept of “Ṣabr” 191(patience), that will allow Ḥamās to pursue a strategic policy of rejectionism and acceptance at the same time: “Civil war is a "red line" for Ḥamās that cannot be crossed at any price. But this policy of self-control has another aim- to allow time for the internal contradictions of the Palestinian Authority to come out. We believe that the coming contradictions will center on the authority and Fātaħ, and that the result will be catastrophic for both of them192. Significantly, the more the PLO sought to demonstrate that it could engage in diplomatic and political negotiations and renounce armed struggle (after December 1988 when ‘Ārafāt declared that the PLO accepted Israel’s right to exist, and that will participate in peace conferences based on the UN resolutions 242 and 338, committing to halt terrorism in all its forms), the more Ḥamās advocated armed struggle e rejection of any dialogue with Israel. In this context, after 1989 Ḥamās started the round of armed attacks against Israeli soldiers, known as “the war of the knives”, but also terrorist actions against civilians, which later in the 2000s came to identify Ḥamās’s particular form of resistance. In 1991, to oppose the Madrid- sponsored peace process endorsed by the PLO, Ḥamās mounted a series of actions against the Madrid conference, calling for three consecutive days of strike in Gaza, reaching a climax of tensions in July 1992 when Ḥamās and Fataḥ supporters clashed, leaving over hundred injured193. Considering the threat that Ḥamās posed to the PLO’s leadership, ‘Arafāt invited Ḥamās’s leaders to have talks with the PLO and invited them to officially join the PLO. Convinced by the growing success of the Islamic bloc inside student council elections in al-Nağāħ University, and in the Chambers of Commerce in Ramallah, Hebron and Nablus in 1992194, Ḥamās’s response to join the PLO demanded 40 to 50 seats of the PNC as a precondition for joining the body195. As a matter of fact, an Islamic control of 40% of the seats of the United National Command of the Intifāḍah in the PNC, would allow Ḥamās to
191 Ṣabr (patience) refers to a religious concept that allows justification of certain current policies for the sake of Maṣlaḥa (common interest). This way, Ṣabr justify policies that deviate from their ideological framework in order to adjust to political changed environments. 192 Zahār and Hiğāzī, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.86. See also Zahār autobiographical piece: Maḥmūd Zahār, Beyond Intifāḍah: Narratives of Freedom Fighters in the Gaza Strip, ed. Haim Gordon, Rivca Gordon and Taher Shriteh (Westport, CT and London: Prager 2003), p.116. 193 Usher, What kind of nation?...op.cit., p.68. 194 According to ‘Iyād Barġūti, Pro-Ḥamās bloc won 45% of total votes in Nablus Chamber of Commerce in 1992 and more than 40% in the al-Najāħ university elections. However the majority of the institutions are dominated by the PLO and Ḥamās did not actually win many seats, but the percentage of votes for Ḥamās won over Fataḥ. For further details about student elections in 1990s see: ‘Iyād Barġūti, ”Religion and Politics among the students of the Najāħ National University”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1991), pp. 203-18. See also: Dalāl, al-Ḥarakat al-ṭullābīyyah al-Islāmīyyah fī Filasṭīn. Al-Kutla al-Islāmīyyah namūḏağān, Muwatin Al-mu'assasat al-Filasṭīnīyyah li-dirāsat ad-dīmuqrāṭīyyah, Ramallah 2012, pp.32- 37. 195 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Ḥamās...op.cit., pp.15-16; ‘Iyād Barġūti in interview with author, Ramallah 25 April 2013; Menachem Klein, “Competing Brothers: The web of Ḥamās-PLO relations”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1996), p.118. 50 control the PLO from within. However, despite the agreed efforts to unify in the struggle against Israel, Ḥamās’s denial of the PLO’s program made impossible for ‘Ārafāt to include Ḥamās in the PNC. The conclusion of the Oslo Agreements, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993, and the establishment of the PA represented a strategic threat to Ḥamās’s political power196. First of all, the Oslo Accords put an end to the first Palestinian Intifāḍah, which had allowed Ḥamās to raise its power and to become a full-fledged alternative to the PLO. Secondly, it attributed political legitimacy to the PA as the self-governing authority of the future Palestinian State, enjoying American support and recognition with copious foreign aid197. Moreover, the renounce to armed struggle, posed a serious threat to Ḥamās’s hegemony in carrying out military attacks. Thereby, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, Ḥamās was challenged on two fronts. On the one hand, it could not relinquish its rejectionist rhetoric by entering into political negotiation with the PA and Israel, as this would be considered an ideological betrayal, at the same time Ḥamās realized that it could not blatantly oppose the newly established PA or be accused of dividing the Palestinian people, given the widespread popularity of the Oslo Accords and the Peace Process among the Palestinians198. As, Usama Ḥamdān, Ḥamās “foreign minister” puts it: “our decision in Ḥamās was not to fight the PA—despite the suggestions from some Palestinian factions that we impose our position by force. Our decision was to deal with the PA as our own people. Some of our members even formed a political party to facilitate dealings with the PA199”.
The Oslo Accords and signs of internal divisions
In the period going from Oslo and the eruption of the second Intifāḍah in September 2000, Ḥamās was at a crossroads. On the one hand, it perceived its marginalization vis-à-vis the PA in the framework of political influence, to which it sought to respond through continued armed struggle and politics of rejection, on the other Ḥamās had to face the necessity of negotiations, adopting a multi-track conduct that allowed it to adapt to shifting
196 According to a September 1993 survey from the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, the majority of the Palestinians positively welcomed the preliminary agreement (Declaration of principles on the transitional arrangements), and agreed upon continuation of negotiations between the PLO and Israel. Although the majority expressed doubts regarding the ability of the PA to administer Palestinian affairs in the transitional phase: http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=503 197 For more details about U.S funding to Palestinian Authority see: Jim Zanotti, “U.S Foreign Aid to the Palestinians”, CRS Report for Congress, January 18, 2013. 198 ʻImād Ğād. Filasṭīn. al-arḍ wa-al-shaʻb min al-nakbah ilá Ūslū. al-Qāhirah: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Siyāsīyah wa-al-Istirātījīyah, al-Ahrām 1999, p.45. 199 Ḥamās “Foreign Minister” Usama Ḥamdān Talks About National Reconciliation, ʿArafāt, Reform, and Ḥamās's Presence in Lebanon, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Spring 2011), p.60.
51 political environments. Therefore, Ḥamās’s stance in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo Accords was aimed at destabilizing the newly acquired political supremacy of the PA by dint of continuing armed attacks, so as to put pressures on the PA and to test its capability to co-opt Ḥamās, but making sure that this would not result into an all-out war with the PA. In the wake of the DOP, Ḥamās senior leaders officially discussed their stance towards the shifting pragmatic interests along the politico-military line. On the one hand, in 1994 Ḥamās officially joined the Palestinian Force Alliance (PFA), a Damascus-based anti-Oslo coalitions, which included also the PLO’s PFLP and PDFLP, showing continuity and coherence with its strategy of opposition and rejection, but also political pragmatism to collaborate with secular leftist factions200. On the other hand, Ḥamās senior political leader Maḥmūd Zahār stated “Military activity is a permanent strategy that will not change. The modus operandi, the tactics, means and timing are conditional on their benefit. They will change from time to time in order to inflict the heaviest damage on the occupation” and also “We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. . . . We will never recognize Israel but it might be possible that a truce (muhādana) would prevail between us for days, months or years”201. The concept of muhādana or hudna (ceasefire) equally embodies the ability of Ḥamās to adapt to changing political environments. As a matter of fact, ceasefire talks allowed, and still do, Ḥamās to de facto recognize the political reality of Israel, all the while continuing to deny the moral and religious principle of its right to exist. In history of Islam, Hudna refers to the treaties that the Prophet Muħammad signed with his enemies in Medina in Hudaībīyyah, under justification of temporary pause from carrying out Ğihād against the infidels for preserving the common interest (Maṣlaḥa)202. Therefore, despite a violent and vehement religious rhetoric marked by non- compromise and total denial of negotiations, since its first confrontation with the Israeli authority in the outbreak of the intifāḍah, and all through the 1990s, Ḥamās has de-facto pragmatically shown its willingness to abide by the rules of hudna in dealing with Israel. For example, according to a detailed report about the evolution of Ḥamās-Israeli ceasefire, in 1988, Mamḥūd Zahār secretly met Shimon Peres in order to address a temporary solution to violence, including a ceasefire. According to the same report, Ḥamās leader ‘Ismaʿīl Hanīyah stated: ‘We’ve offered hudna on two occasions – a major
200 Usher,What kind of nation...op.cit., p.71. 201 Maḥmūd Zahār statements in press, quoted in Mishal, The Pragmatic dimension, p.577. 202 ‘Abū Sway, "The concept of Hudna (truce) in Islamic sources" in "Ḥamās and Kadima: Are they up to challenge?", The Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006). 52 hudna and interim hudna – and [the Israelis] rejected both. . . . Israel continued its war against us and didn’t respect the major or interim hudna, which we offered. What, then, do they want from us?”203. Likewise, in early 1990s Yasīn had offered a fixed ceasefire between 20 to 50 years, in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied during 1967 war, and if Israel allowed free elections204. However, Ḥamās’s members in the Gaza Strip and in the diaspora were divided regarding the continued use of armed struggle against Israel and on political participation with the PA. On the one hand, the Gaza leadership seemed more lenient towards a possible political dialogue that could bridge the discrepancies between Ḥamās and the PA, with the goal of finding an agreement, which could eventually result in a political Islamic party, while the external leadership took a more militant and hard-liner stance. Accordingly, the debate over whether to participate in the Palestinian political arena, opened a rift within the movement, with reports of members in the military wing pressured by the external leaders- threatening the Gaza leaders205. More likely, the moderate traits of the Gaza leadership were the result of a new generation of Ḥamās’s politicians that Kristiansen defines as “the Intifāḍah graduates”, for being educated in Palestinian universities and having shared prison cells with Fataḥ’s counterparts206. This new generations of Gaza leaders was characterized by a younger age (most of them in their thirties and forties) and more familiarity and greater appeal to nationalist and secular agenda, and because of their pragmatism, they were often used by Ḥamās to dialogue with the PA. Among them were ‘Aḥmad Bahhār, Ġāzi Ḥamad, Ismaʿīl Hanīyyah, Ḫalīl al-Hindī207. Importantly, Mishaul and Sela have provide a 1992-dated full text original document of an internal debate within Ḥamās, whereby the movement seeks to scrutinize pros and cons of a possible participation in elections, and one of the options is to run in the elections under a different name, showing the growing possibility to establish a full- fledged political party208. Significantly, possible moderation and pragmatism was calculated according to undergoing events. Therefore, when on 25 February 1994 Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler, killed around forty Palestinian people in the ‘Ibrahīmi Mosque in Hebron, Ḥamās
203 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Alaistar Crooke, “Waiving not Drowning: Strategic dimension of ceasefire s and Islamic movements”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 2004), p. 229. 204 Ibid. 205 Al-Wațan al-‘Arabī, Novermber 4, 1994, p.27.(accessed in Birzeit University, March 2013) 206 Kristiansen, Challenge and Counterchallenge.op.cit., 25. 207 Ibid. 208 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās…op.cit, p. 122-30 53 officially resumed its armed attacks and committed five suicide attacks in retaliation209. Internal divergences along the politico-military line continued and in October 1994, a week after the murder of kidnapped IDF soldier, senior Ḥamās leader ʿImād al-Falūği declared that Ḥamās's military wing would pursue their military activities. However, days later a conflicting statement was issued by Ḥamās political bureau, which offered Israel a ceasefire, occasioned by the first Palestinian Authority (PA) effort to clamp down on Ḥamās military activity, as well as the PA's own efforts to reach an internal accord with 210 Ḥamās . As a matter of fact, despite the attacks, Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yassīn and Musā ‘Abū Marzūq issued official statements whereby they reiterated the moderate orientation of the Resistance Movement, by discussing the possibility of a truce if Israel withdrew from the territories occupied in 1967. According to the same statement, Yassīn agreed to a possible mediation or international supervision in securing free elections in the territories211. These tensions became more acute during the 1995-6 attempts at rapprochement between Ḥamās and the newly established PA, in the internal debate over whether or not to participate in the 1996 legislative elections212. Ḥamās records an internal debate about whether or not taking part in the legislative elections in 1996. Even one year before the signing of the Oslo Accords, Ḥamās circulated a document among its members to “voice their opinion” about the participation in the elections213. Accordingly, the external bureau based in Amman and the Qassām Brigades strongly opposed Ḥamās participation in the elections, claiming that participation would mean recognition of the Oslo Accords and consequently recognition of Israel. Moreover, despite the ideological justification for advocating boycott, the military wing of Ḥamās feared that engaging in political negotiations would reduce participation in armed resistance, with risk of marginalize their influence within the movement214. The PA sought to include Ḥamās in the political process in 1994 in order to boost the legitimacy of Oslo, to increase its own legitimacy and to prevent escalation of violence into civil war. There are reports of a 16-points unsigned agreement between Ḥamās and the PA regarding elections, whereby the PA would treat Ḥamās as “systemic opposition” and would pressure Israel for lessening the crackdown on Ḥamās’s activities. Accordingly,
209 The attacks took place in Afula (7 April), Hadera (14 April), Ramla (26 August), West Jerusalem (9 October) and Tel Aviv (19 October). 210 Seth Wikas, “The Ḥamās Ceasefire: Historical Background, Future Foretold?”, The Washington Institute, January 3 2002, Accessed August 2013, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/the-Ḥamās-ceasefire-historical-background-future-foretold 211 Al-Sabīl, 19 April 1994, confirmed and reported in Kristiansen, Challenge and Counterchallenge, 23. 212 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit, pp. 75-81; Klein, Competing Brothers...op.cit, pp.124-5. 213 Ḥamās document reproduced in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās...op.cit, pp.122-30. 214 Løvlie,"Explaining Ḥamās’s changing electoral strategy 1996-2006”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 2013), p.580; ICG, 2004, p.6; Klein, Competing Brothers...op.cit., p.125. 54 ʿArafāt had three reasons for co-opting Ḥamās: preventing civil war, gaining recognition of the PA and of its police forces, and exploit Ḥamās’s terrorist attacks to expand the PA jurisdiction vis-à-vis Israel. The two movements agreed upon the coordination of demonstrations that were also to be licensed by the PA. Moreover, a reconciliation committee was established in order to avoid bloodshed and conflicting provocative leaflets215. However, the agreement did not formalize or define all the aspects of the Ḥamās-PA relations, and Ḥamās officially denied the accord with the PA216. Regarding moderation, it is noteworthy to stress the overt pragmatism of the Gaza leadership in these years. In fact, Gaza leaders’ main concern was to establish a politics of co-existence with the PA in order to preserve the Ḥamās institutions in Gaza, namely the Islamic University of Gaza, but also the numerous charitable, social, youth and health institutions, whereby Ḥamās could preserve its political strength in the Gaza Strip. Yassīn declared, “Islamists are divided among those supporting the elections and those opposing it… But I consider it better to participate than to abstain… participation would reassert the strength of the Islamist presence, and prevent it losing ground because of its isolation”217. In accordance with their support in participating in the elections, members from the Gaza leadership met in Khartoum with leaders from the external leadership, however this meeting could not culminate in a common agreement218. Divisions between the Gaza and external leadership became public also after the round of suicide attacks that followed the killing of Yaḥyā ʿAyyāš in 1996, when Maḥmūd Zahār blamed the external leadership for the operations, and Amman-based Muḥammad Nazzāl denied Ḥamās had taken a consensual political decision to halt the suicide attacks219. Also, the Ḥamās leaders in the West Bank, who had been historically, geographically and ideologically closer to the Jordan’s branch, were highly divided in these years due to heavy Israeli crackdown on their activities, and because of their internal fragmentation into small enclaves of self-rule that made impossible the development of a clear and common stance regarding participation in the elections. However, divisions within the movement were never a simple question of the dichotomy between hardliners and political pragmatists, but also the result of cost/benefit calculations and the outcome of an internal democratic process of consultation220.
215 Klein, Competing Brothers...op.cit, pp. 123; Usher, What Kind of Nation...op.cit., pp.73-4. 216 Kristiansen, Challenge and Counterchallenge...op.cit., pp.21-3. 217 Usher, What kind of Nation...op.cit.,p. 73. 218 Kristiansen, Challenge and Counterchallenge...op.cit.,p. 23. 219 Ivi. 220 Ḥamās leader and PLC member ‘Azīz Dweīk stresses that, despite Ḥamās enjoyed support, it could not compete with Fataḥ, and at that time Ḥamās knew it could not win many seats. Also, ‘Azīz Dweīk underlined the fact that the decision to boycott the 1996 elections was the result of an internal democratic consultation 55 Therefore, the Oslo years and the dilemmas related with participation in the elections, showed Ḥamās’s political pragmatism of opposition and tacit co-existence with the PA, but also growing internal frictions along the politico-military lines. If on the one hand Ḥamās’ official stance was the overall condemnation of Oslo and boycott of the elections, on the other hand it formed an alliance with Hizb al-Ḫalās al-Waṭanī al-Islāmī. Through this alliance Ḥamās could officially maintain its hardliner position of rejection all the while consolidating its position in the internal political arena, without giving the impression of accepting the Oslo Accords221.
Failed peace, Islamic social welfare and the al-Aqṣā Intifāḍah.
The spark of the second Intifāḍah was the result of the long-term frustration of the Palestinians for the stalemate of the Oslo peace process and the rejection of the Camp David summit in 2000. The interregnum going from the signing of the Oslo Accords to the spark of the second intifāḍah is marked by growing disappointment with the PA’s governance, in terms of corruption, and a general worsening of every day living conditions for Palestinians, heightened by massive expansion of Israeli settlements inside the West Bank. ʿArafāt’s position in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo Accords was marked by contradictory behavior that brought him to collaborate with Israel in terms of security (as the major condition of Oslo), thereby insuring control and co-option of armed attacks against Israel by Ḥamās and Islamic Ğihād, and at the same the challenges posed by being the father of the Palestinian state in the making222. At the same time, Ḥamās re- expanded its network of social institutions in order to maintain its popular support on the ground. According to a notable scholar, the Oslo Accords were doomed to fail since the outset. The main reason for that was that the Accord did not stipulate the shape of the permanent and final settlement of the negotiations, and was completely silent on vital issues to the end of the conflict such as the status of Jerusalem, the return of the refugees, borders, and the future of Jewish settlements in the West Bank223. Significantly, the Oslo Accord transferred new powers to the newly established Palestinian Authority in the spheres of education, health, social welfare, taxation and tourism, with Israel still within Ḥamās and not a superimposition from the Outside leadership and the military wing. Interview with author, Ramallah, 10 April 2013. 221 James Piscatori, “Islam, Islamist and the Electoral principle in the Middle East”, available at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/10070/paper_piscatori.pdf, p.37. 222 Kristen E. Schulze, “Camp David and the al-Aqşa Intifāḍah: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli- Palestinian Peace Process”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2001), pp.217-218. 223 Avi Shlaim, The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process, in Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.241-61. 56 being in control of the security and foreign affairs. Also, the Oslo Accords partitioned the West Bank’s territory into different areas of control, namely area A under total and exclusive Palestinian control, area C under exclusive Israeli control and area B with co- existed coordination between Palestinian civilian authority and Israel in control of security. This territorial partition meant that the Palestinians were actually in control of nearly only one third of the West Bank. One other crucial barrier on the road to peace was the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, with records of influx of nearly 100,000 new Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1993. In this period, the Israeli government seized over 40,000 acres of Palestinian land, significantly reducing Palestinian agricultural worth224. The growing expansion of settlements, added to the partition of the West Bank in separate areas (ABC) under different jurisdiction, resulted in the detrimental fragmentation of the Palestinian territory, which became composed of small non-contiguous islands under the complete jurisdiction of Israel. Since Barak’s government took office in July 1999, 1,924 residential settlement units were built units in the settlements (1,384 in the Jerusalem district and 540 in other areas), as opposed to 1,845 in 1998 and 1,160 in 1997225. The policy of closure triggered by the Oslo Accords had a heavy impact on the economy, and severely affected the living conditions of the Palestinians. Between 1993 and 1996, there have been 342 days of closure in the Gaza Strip and 291 in the West Bank226. As a matter of fact, the UN estimated the loss of income resulting from the 82 working days of total closure in 1996 at $1.8 billion, and an aggregate of some $6.4 billion since 1993227. This had devastating consequences on employment, which were worsened by IDF’s decision in 1995 to prevent Palestinians aged from 28-30 to enter Israel for work228. Besides a progressive impoverishment of the Palestinian population in the post- Oslo period, another crucial feature to understand the causes behind the spark of the second Intifāḍah, and the renewed importance of the Islamist on the social activism sphere, is the overall de-politicization of the Palestinian political life229. The Oslo Accords
224UN Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56428.pdf. 225 Schulze, Camp David...op.cit., p. 220. 226 Sara Roy, Failing Peace...op.cit.,p.242. 227 Arafāt’s Palestine: Closure, Corruption and Povery”, Swiss Review of World Affairs, September 1, 1997. 228 Sara Roy, “Report from Gaza: Alienation or Accommodation?”,Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 73-7. 229 Before Oslo, Palestinian civil society was very active, providing up to 60% of health care and 30% of education. After the establishment of the PA, its centralized government channeled all major funding 57 in effect contributed to the emergence of a one-party authoritarian state, marked by state- controlled bureaucracy, growing militarization and spreading institutional corruption230. Similarly, a main reason for loss of faith in the Peace Process was the spectrum of ‘Arafāt’s murky appointments to intifāḍah that lacked credibility or legitimacy among the population. Accordingly, polls show that the majority of the Palestinians in 2000 believed that wasta (family tie/connection) was needed in order to find a job231. Importantly, the Oslo Accords triggered a wave of international funding aimed at sponsoring the newly established PA and to allow the functioning of its bureaucratic machine. This resulted in increased corruption, as much of the donors’ money served ʿArafāt to expand his patronage network232. Within this context of rising poverty and spread political corruption, during the Oslo years and up towards the second Intifāḍah, Ḥamās heavily continued the expansion of its network of social welfare activities, through its Islamic institutions, thereby providing support to the needy population where the PA could not reach out, because of its efforts in consolidating its power in government. Therefore, although its political and military capabilities were refrained and controlled in the post-Oslo era, Ḥamās successfully filled the gap where the PA was weaker: delivering basic services for a growing impoverished population233. Significantly, this shift/ or return to social welfare must be considered within Ḥamās’s strive to adapt to the status quo, and to co-exist within the political establishment. In the 2-3 years period before the second Intifāḍah, Ḥamās reduced its calls to resist the occupation via armed struggle, but instead called for moral and religious struggle, stressing the aspects of the occupation that are detriment to the Palestinian culture, habits and beliefs234. Also, thank to its long-standing reputation for honesty and integrity that was rooted in the pre-Oslo period- where social action was based on towards its own controlled ministries, which were still unable to provide adequate services. See Graham Usher, Palestine in Crisis, (London: Pluto Press, 1995): 46 and Sara Roy, “Gaza: New dynamics of civic disintegration”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 24-6. 230 Interview with Dr. Nassār ‘Ibrahīm, director of the Alternative Information Center in Bayt Saḥūr, West Bank, April 2013. 231 Ben Yishay, “Palestinian Economy, society and the second intifāḍah”, Gloria Center (2002); For a detailed account of ‘Arafāt’s appointed man and ministers see: ‘Issām ‘Abū Issā, “ ʿArafāt Swiss Bank Account”, Middle East Quarterly, (Fall 2004), pp.15-23. 232 Ğāsem Sulṭān, “Taqīīm barnāmağ siyyāsī lī- Ḥamās fī Intiḫābāt sana 2006, in Ṣāleḥ M. M., Qirā’āt naqdīyyah fī tağriba Ḥamās wa ḥukūmatiha, Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirāsāt wal-Istišārāt, Beirut 2007, pp.163- 4. According to figures provided by this scholar, the PNA received 800 million dollars yearly, and according to the Yearly Arab Economic Report for the year 2005, 7% of the economic aid received between 1994 nd 2005, came from Arab Countries (mainly Saudi Arabia and the Emirates), and that funding increate to 63,5% during the Intifāḍah years. The same source maintains that the American aid not exceed the 10% of the overall International aid. 233 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Alaistar Crooke, “Elusive ingredient: Ḥamās and the peace process”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Summer 2004), p. 41. 234 Roy, Failing peace...op.cit.,p. 298. 58 religious education through charitable societies and zakat committees- Ḥamās managed to picture itself as uncorrupted and transparent, vis-à-vis the corrupt Palestinian Authority. Crucial to the political resurgence of Ḥamās, was the exploitation of the PA’s need to control Islamic institutions under pressure of Israel and the United States. As a matter of fact, a major watershed in the development of the Islamic camp during and post-Oslo, was the institutionalization/normalization of the Islamic sector into the mainstream235. As ‘Arafāt took power, he started a heavy crackdown of political and military wings of Ḥamās with the aim of asserting its hegemony in government. However, an attack against the social Islamic institutions would be hardly tolerated by the population, given the progressive worsening of the economic, living conditions, and rising unemployment rate. Therefore, exploiting the PA’s need to control, Ḥamās was able to carve out a space for the Islamic sector within the public sphere236. This resembled the movement’s wider attitude described above, marked by significant dialectical tensions between opposition, extremism, violence, and more pragmatic and likely moderate movement that wants to be considered a political alternative to the PA. With the establishment of the PA, many organizations shut down, either because the PA set up new infrastructure or diverted funding. For example, the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, a health NGO linked to the Communist Party, significantly reduced its clinics after Oslo, and the same happened to the Union of Health Work Committees, linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Also, health clinics affiliated with Fataḥ merged with the nascent PA, and many staff gained a job in the PA administration237. This vacuum was filled by the Islamic camp, which had a more capillary presence at the grassroots level, and served in the most neglected areas of Palestine, thus enjoying increased popularity238. The second intifāḍah represented for Ḥamās a new opportunity to reassert its control at the political, military level and to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the needy Palestinians. According to figures provided by the Palestinians Ministry of Social Affairs, the second intifāḍah significantly worsened the humanitarian conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with 200,000 people in need of emergency assistance, rise of poverty levels up to 60%, half population unemployed, and over half a million
235 ibid. 236 However, the growing expansion of areas of the Islamic sector (not just to education, health but also banks), did not translate automatically a direct control of Ḥamās on such institutions. In fact, because of numerous restrictions on its activities, Ḥamās most likely did not have ay kind of control on these economic/financial institutions. 237 Benôit Challand, “A Nahḍa of Chritable Organizations? Health Service provision and the Politics of aid in Palestine”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 40 (2008), p.230. 238 ICG, Enter Ḥamās...op.cit., p.6. 59 Palestinians reliant on food aid239. Accordingly, the shortage of funding of UNRWA, the decreased economic capacity of secular NGOs, added to the growing decentralization and dispersion of these organizations, made the role of Islamic organizations vital if not irreplaceable240. Moreover, the fact that the second Intifāḍah was soon characterized by strong militarization and marginalization of civil society, produced internal splits inside the PA security forces, with a chaotic spectrum of overlapping and conflicting militias fighting each other to exploit the outcome of the intifāḍah and seize political gains241. This newly militarized environment and lack of a unified and centralized leadership created the opportunity for Ḥamās to re-organize its political-military infrastructure and pursue military attacks against Israeli civilians. Regarding PA internal divisions, growing polarization stemmed bwteen the so-called "internal leadership" of Fataḥ, under the direction of Ḫalīl al Wazīr who advocated for popular struggle rather than armed resistance, and the "outside leadership" that returned to the West Bank after 1994. In this regard, rapprochement between the two factions became highly tense during the intifāḍah, and ʿArafāt often used the tanzim militias to curb opposition, but also to enhance its negotiation capabilities vis-a-vis Israel242. Significantly, in this context of PA internal polarization, every time that Ḥamās attacked Israel it gained benefit on two fronts: on the one hand it boosted popularity among the Palestinian population, and at the same time, it knew that this action would trigger Israeli retaliation, which would surely damage the PA infrastructures, thus enhancing internal disintegration among its rival faction,243. Also, according to the polls, by the end of the intifāḍah, people seemed to have lost faith in the Oslo peace process, while support escalated in favor of suicide operations244. This strategy that has been often referred to as “spoiler strategy”, was aimed at weakening and polarizing the PA, so as to gain monopoly of power in Gaza. As a matter of fact, while the PA was building its security apparatus in the West Bank in the post-Oslo era, and controlling deviances within its internal militias, Ḥamās started expanding its own
239 “Islamic Social welfare activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A legitimate target?”, International Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 13 (2 April 2003), p.14; “Two Years of Intifāḍah. Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis”, World Bank Report, (5 March 2003). 240 ICG, Islamic Social welfare...op.cit., p.17. 241 Graham Usher, “Facing defeat: The intifāḍah two years on”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 32, No.2 (Winter 2003), pp. 25-6; Rīma Ḥammāmi and Salīm Tamāri, “The second uprising: End or new beginning?”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No.2 (Winter 2001), pp.21-3. 242 See: Graham Usher, "The politics of Internal security: The PA's new intelligence services", in Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process, London Pluto Press, 1999. 243 Schanzer, Ḥamās vs. Fataḥ,...op.cit. p.72. 244 Gunning, Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 217 quoting polls from JMCC in December 2000, records a rise in support for suicide operations from 26%in 1999 to 66% in December 2000. 60 weapon arsenal by digging tunnels to carry out its smuggling activities in Gaza245. In this regard, the resumed suicide attacks committed by Ḥamās in the aftermath of Camp David, served as scapegoat for Sharon to pursue Israel’s territorial and military conquest of the West Bank- called upon the return to Judea and Samaria- thereby weakening the PA’s power and legitimacy in the West Bank, and increasing Ḥamās’s control of the Gaza Strip246. However, the policy of co-existence with the PA outlined above, and the ability to abide by the rules of hudna, are a suggestion that Ḥamās cannot be considered as a total spoiler247.
Towards political pragmatism
The 2003 and 2005 ceasefire talks won Ḥamās enormous political visibility and reflected its overall embracement of political overture and pragmatism. Accordingly, many Arab scholars consider the 2005 ceasefire as the starting point for Israel unilateral withdrawal form the Gaza strip in 2005, and somehow declared the end of the “open war” between Israel and Gaza, opening the way for Ḥamās towards parliamentary elections in 2006248. When ‘Arafāt was forced by the international community to nominate a Prime Minister (Maḥmūd ‘Abbās) in 2003, his central authority became weaker while the tensions with the Fatāħ leadership grew and became more explicit. Accordingly, elements within Fataḥ (mainly Marwān al-Barġūṯi and Maḥmūd ‘Abbās) started considering how to integrate Ḥamās into the PLO. From its side, Ḥamās understood that if it had gained political boost but without participation in the political system, its strength has little relevance. A few days after Ḥamās officially declared to participate in the 2005 municipal elections, the Palestinian Authority called for rounds of talk that were mediated in Cairo by the Egyptian Government, and that eventually produced the “Cairo Declaration”. This document agreed to a period of non-belligerence (tahdi’yyah), and was considered as a major achievement for Ḥamās, since by endorsing the declaration, the PA was recognizing the legitimacy of resistance249.
245 Edwards and Crooke, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.77. 246 Usher, Facing defeat...op.cit., pp.27-8. 247 Gunning, Ḥamās in Politics...op.cit,,p.220; Jeroen Gunning,”Peace with Ḥamās? The transforming potential of political participation”, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2004), p. 233; Zahār, Beyond Intifāḍah...op.cit.,. p.118. 248 Hussein ‘Abū al-Namal, Ḥamās wa al-Mu’āraḍa ‘ilā as-Sulṭa. Aw min al-‘Aīdīūlūğīyya ilā as-sīyyāsa, in Ṣāleḥ M., Qirā’āt naqdīyyahh fī tağribat Ḥamās wa ḥukūmatiha, Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirāsāt wa al-Istišārāt, Beirut 2007, pp. 25-6. 249 Tamīmī, Unwritten Chapters...op.cit, pp. 210-11; However, some scholars point out to the failures doomed in the Cairo Declaration that paved the way for further divisions between Ḥamās and Fataḥ after the 2006 elections. As a matter of fact, during Cairo talks, Egypt did not stop over questions such as Rafaḥ crossing, see ‘Abd allāh al-‘Aš’āl, Muḫāiṭr al-šiqāq ‘ala al-Qaḍīyyah al-Filasṭīnīyyah, al-Qāhira: Maktab Ğazīra al-Ward, 2010. 61 Significantly, the return of Šaīḫ Yassīn from prison, coupled with the expulsion of the external leadership from Amman, reasserted the dominance of the Gaza leadership within the Ḥamās’ internal structure of power. As this faction was considered the more pragmatic and lenient towards political pragmatism, its rise to power in the aftermath of the second intifāḍah can be seen as a vital step towards the participation of Ḥamās in the 2006 elections250. Also, the heavy assassination campaign against Ḥamās leaders and members carried out by Israel – in the framework of the security coordination accords with the PA envisioned in Oslo251- throughout the intifāḍah, posed a serious threat to Ḥamās’s military capabilities, and persuaded its leaders to design an alternative practice to survive in the future. These considerations were further exacerbated after the assassinations of Ḥamās’s top leaders Yassīn and al-Rantīsī, and ‘Abū Šannāb, pragmatic leader of Ḥamās in Gaza stated to the press: “Forget about rhetoric, we cannot destroy Israel…The reality is that Palestinians can create a state that would live by Israel. We will respect any American effort that will stop Israeli settlements and settlers, and bring the Israelis to withdraw up to the 1967 borders252. Also, Maḥmūd Zahār in a round of interviews before parliamentary elections, stated” "Some Israelis think that when we talk of the West Bank and Gaza it means we have given up our historic war”, trying to explain that the group sees no connection between the elections and the Oslo process-which was at a stalemate-and that any ceasefire along the 1967 borders would not come with a recognition of Israel or relations with it, but would be merely a step in the continued struggle253. Another significant change on the road up towards the elections was the moderation of the external leadership due to a changed regional environment, in which Ḥamās’s long-standing allies (Syria, Iran and Gulf States) put pressure on Ḥamās to accept the ceasefire, and also by tactical considerations of the external leadership that did not want to be identified with al-Qā’ida after 9/11254. Finally, another key factor in determining Ḥamās’s shift towards official political participation was a shift in Palestinian public opinion. In fact, JMCC opinion poll n°47 in December 2002, prior to the 2003 ceasefire- showed that a significant majority (69,3%) of
250 Frode Løvlie, “Explaining Ḥamās’s changing electoral strategy”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 48, No. 4 (October 2013), p.583. 251“Bilāl Maḥmūd al-Šūbakī, at-taġaīr as-sīyyāsī min manżūr ḥarakat al-Islām as-sīyyāsī: “ḥamās” namūḏağān, Muwatin Al-mu'assasat al-Filasṭīnīyyah li-dirāsat ad-dīmuqrāṭīyyah, Ramallah 2008., pp. 80- 120. 252 Herzog Michael, “Can Ḥamās Be Tamed?”, Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No.2 (April 4, 2008), p.85. 253 Ibid. 254 ʿAbd allāh Hišām, “The long hard road to truce passes through Israeli prisons”, Agence France Presse, 30 June 2003 (accessed December 2013) 62 Palestinians still supported armed resistance, and 49.7%, believe that the continuation of the Intifāḍah and negotiations together is the best path to achieve Palestinian national goals and end the occupation255. However, opinion polls after the 2003 ceasefire registered an increased support for political negotiations vis-à-vis armed resistance256. Even more significant was the opinion of Ḥamās’ constituency, which, according the other poll, supported the Arab Peace Initiative257. The same logic applied to the 2005 ceasefire, when the polls registered a significant drop in popular support for suicide attacks and increased support for ceasefire258, showing also a sound drop of support for armed struggle among Ḥamās’ supporters themselves259. Significantly, Ḥamās would have not declared a ceasefire without prospects of a political future offered by Fataḥ and the PA, and because this political future was participation in elections, Ḥamās’ interest in recording public opinion- and molding its behavior by opinion polls’ results- increased dramatically. Therefore, the crucial reason for Ḥamās agreed ceasefire was the changed balance of power between Ḥamās and Fatāħ, meaning that intra-Palestinian rivalry and shifts in new political opportunities were the key factors for Ḥamās’ decision to suspend attacks and to engage in political elections260.
Ḥamās’s electoral campaign
In the light of Ḥamās participation in the 2006 parliamentary elections, it is vitally important to closely analyze Ḥamās’ electoral program and propaganda under its political arm of the “Change and Reform” party, followed by a discussion of the draft document for the Cabinet platform for the coalition government, so as to underline Ḥamās’ pragmatism in the run-up to the elections. The electoral platform of “Change and Reform” significantly opens with a preamble that includes a sort of justification/explanation for Ḥamās’ changed strategy of non- participation in the 1996 elections and participation in 2006: “The Change and Reform List believes that its participation in the legislative elections at this time and in the current situation confronting the Palestine cause falls within its comprehensive program for the liberation of Palestine, the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. This
255 JMCC poll n°47, December 2002 available at http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=452, (accessed September 2013) 256 JMCC poll n° 49, October 2003 available at http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=450, accessed on September 2013; other relevant figures are issued by the http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p8ejoint.html 257 Ivi. 258 PSR poll n°13 &15, 2004 & 2005. 259 Poll reported in Gunning, Ḥamās in politics, p.231, figure 6. 260 Ibid.,p. 235. 63 participation [in the elections] will be a means of supporting the resistance and the intifāḍah program, which the Palestinian people have approved as its strategic option to end the occupation261. The punctual reference to the changed political environment since Oslo and the al-Aqṣā Intifāḍah becomes direct at the end of the document where it reads: “The al-Aqṣā intifāḍah has created new realities on the ground. It has made the Oslo program a thing of the past. All parties, including the Zionist occupiers, now refer to the demise Oslo. Our people today are more united, more aware, and stronger than before. Ḥamās is entering these elections after having succeeded, with God’s help, in affirming its line of resistance and in ingraining it deep in the hearts of our people”262. Following the explanation of the decision for participating in the elections, the Change and Reform electoral program addresses 17 points that mostly refers to administrative reforms and civil rights, in the areas of: domestic policy, foreign relations, combating corruption and administrative reforms, legislative policy and judicial reform, public freedom and citizen rights, educational and pedagogical policy, preaching and guidance, social policy, cultural and media policy, woman child and family issues, youth issues, housing policy, health and environment policy, agricultural policy, economic financial and monetary policy, labor and workers’ issues, transportations and crossings263. Another important aspect of the electoral program is the almost absence of references to armed struggle, and the use of the more general term “resistance”, both in the preamble and in the 17 points. As an example, the only reference to armed resistance in the program, occurs in the 4th paragraph of the section “Our Principles”: “Our Palestinian people are still living a stage of national liberation, they have the right to work for regaining their rights as well as ending the occupation by using all available means including armed resistance. We have to exploit all our energy to support the resistance of our people and to provide all abilities to end occupation and establishing the Palestinian state whose Jerusalem is its capital”264. This lack of a clear program on Israel and the peace process enabled also Ḥamās to attract voters from a wider ideological background. According to many interviewees, Ḥamās’s victory in the elections does not point to an “Islamic turn” of Palestinians political conscience, but the majority of the votes were the
261 Translation of Change and Reform electoral platform provided by Ḫālid Ḥrūb, “A new Ḥamās through its new documents”, Journal of Palestine studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (July 2006), pp. 6-27. 262 Ibid. This point is also reiterated by Ḥamās Politburo member Sāmī Ĥātir in “Taqīm al-Masār as-Sīyyāsī lī- ḥaraka Ḥamās (2006-2007)”, in Moḥsen M. Ṣāleḥ, Qirā’āt naqdiyya fī Tağriba Ḥamās wa ḥukūmatiha Beirut: Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirāsāt wal-Istišārāt, 2007, p.19. 263 Ḥrūb, A new Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 9;‘Abū al-Namal, Ḥamās wal-Mu’ārađa ‘ilā as-Sulţa. Aw min al- ‘aīdīūlūğīyyaa ‘ilā as-sīyyāsa, in Moḥsen M. Ṣāleḥ, Qirā’āt naqdiyya fī Tajğriba Ḥamās wa ḥukūmatiha (Beirut: Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirāsāt wal-Istišārāt, 2007), p. 6. 264 Ḥrūb, A new Ḥamās...op.cit,p. 8, and now also available from the Ḥamās-affiliated website http://www.Ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4921 (accessed September 2013). 64 reflection of a total lack of trust in the political performance of the Palestinian Authority and came as a “punishment” for the failure of the peace process265. This view is further confirmed by the fact, according to the polls, Ḥamās won larger votes in larger towns. Therefore, despite the importance of its social activities in the peripheral villages of Palestine, Ḥamās’ success in towns can be attributed to Ḥamās’ strong institutional presence there. An important detail to understand Ḥamās’ sweeping victory in the elections is the stressed reference to fighting corruption. In this regard, it is not surprising that Ḥamās devised to participate in the elections under the name of “Change and Reform”, so as to underline the contraposition with the PA corruption266. As a matter of fact, Ḥamās was aware of the importance of lifting the flag of anti-corruption since its success in the 2005 municipal elections267. Accordingly, polls records that Ḥamās’ success in the municipal elections was the result of the movement’s perception among the Palestinians as uncorrupt268in opposition to Fatāħ-dominated PA. The electoral platform reads: “fighting corruption in all forms as well as considering it a main reason behind weakening the domestic Palestinian front and undermining foundations of national unity […] Enhancing transparency, censorship and inquiries in dealing with public balance sheet in all its stages […] Reforming public employment policy in a way that guarantees equal opportunities for Palestinians depending on competence. Fighting nepotism, factions, party preference in appointments and promotions in all public institutions and state circles”. Ḥamās’s pragmatism in winning the elections can also be traced in its ability to build cross-religious alliances and to exploit the dynamics of clans in Palestinian politics, which also explains why Ḥamās succeeded in gaining votes in towns historically associated with Fataḥ. In this regard, in Gaza Ḥamās made an alliance with the Christian candidate, and in Bethlehem Ḥamās sided up with the PFLP candidate who shared the same battle for corruption269. Regarding reference to Islamic values, the electoral platform refers to Islam generally in the areas of education, social policies, legislative policy (“Islamic šarī‘ah law
265 Nassār Ibrahīm, Muḥammad Dağğāni, Sam’ān Ḫūrī, Walīd Ladādweh in interviews with author, Jerusalem-Ramallah, April 2013. 266 ‘Abū al-Namal, Ḥamās wa l-Mu’āraḍa ‘ilā as-Sulṭa. Aw min al-‘Aīdīūlūğīyya ilā as-sīyyāsa, in Ṣāleḥ M., Qirā’āt naqdīyyahh fī tağriba Ḥamās wa ḥukūmatiha, Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirāsāt wal-Istišārāt, Beirut 2007, pp.25-6. 267 In all the four rounds of the Municipal elections, Ḥamās’ victories occurred in the highly populated urban districts, winning one third of the seats. 268 PRS Polls in December 2004 and January 2005 available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/exit05.html. 269 Gunning Ḥamās in politics...op.cit.,p. 159 and ICG, Enter Ḥamās, pp.10-11.
65 should be the principal source of legislation in Palestine”, followed by a description of reform to establish a legal system with separation of powers), and women and family issues. The other areas of internal politics, external relations, public freedom and citizen rights do not mention Islam, and read more like any other “secular” political party, addressing housing, health, agriculture issues. In this regard, there is a visible difference from the religious rhetoric that characterized the founding Charter of Ḥamās, which was characterized by continuous references to Quran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Conversely, the “Change and Reform” program directly quotes the Quran only in the epigraph, and it is historically tied to the present age, trying to focus on pragmatic challenges, while the Charter was set in a a-historical environment and eternal religious dimension. Following the victory in the elections, Ismaʿīl Hanīyyah, Gaza Prime Minister, declared that Ḥamās would not join a Ḥamās-led government, and issued a document that appointed a cabinet platform to form a coalition government in march 2006, after rounds of consultation with the other factions. Importantly, this 40-articles document provides a demonstrated attempt of Ḥamās to engage in pragmatic state building, and it includes references to support development of civil society, strengthen trade unions and professional associations, discusses economic issues of free market, and address the concept of “citizen”.270 However, the document was rejected by the other parties, especially Fatāħ, because of considerations that Ḥamās’s government was to be short- lived, and also because Ḥamās’s insisted in refusing to acknowledge the PLO’s role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people271.
270 Ḥrūb, A new Ḥamās...op.cit.,p. 15. 271 Ibid. p. 16. 66
III. After Fitna. The Growing power of the Gaza Leadership (2007-2010)
Ḥamās’s sweeping victory of the 2006 elections represents a major turning point for the history of the movement and for the future development of Palestinian politics and of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This chapter will examine the political turmoil that followed the elections’ results, and that sparked the internecine battle between Ḥamās and Fataḥ, which eventually ended with the geographical split of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in two different, separate and competing governments, one led by Ḥamās in Gaza and the other led by Maḥmūd ‘Abbās and Prime Minister Salām Fayyād in the West Bank. Also, this chapter maintains that the Ḥamās’s takeover in the Gaza Strip and its consolidation of power and state building has significantly strengthened the political weight of the Gaza leadership within the balance of power of Ḥamās. In this regard, the internecine battle against the PA, the European and US economic sanctions and the Israeli policies of closure eventually resulted in shifting the center of power of the movement from “outside” to the “inside”, thus increasing the political power of the internal leadership in Gaza. Moreover, this chapter contends that Ḥamās’s political behavior in the state building phase in Gaza shows clear similarities with Fataḥ political and economic behavior, when it originally built around the PA in the early 1990s. This behavioral similarity extends to centralist-authoritarian grip over local institutions, and to the degree whereby the Ḥamās and Fataḥ governments deal with political opponents. Also, by dint of institutional continuity with pre-existing PA institutions in Gaza, Ḥamās eventually set up a one-party state that highly recalls the centralist turn taken by the Fayyād -led government in the West bank. Importantly, this political and institutional continuity also contributed to emphasize the internal contradictions between Ḥamās the movement and Ḥamās the government, thus explaining some apparent uncoordinated political decisions.
Ḥamās state building in Gaza: A one-party state. Fitna
In the immediate aftermath of the elections’ results, Ḫālid Miš’al sought to reassure the Arab and international community that Ḥamās would seek to serve the interest of the Palestinian people, and further reiterated this idea in a press conference in Damascus on
67 28 January 2006, when he declared that Ḥamās remained committed to a partnership government with Fataḥ and other factions272. In the same occasion, he assured that Ḥamās would not adopt an authoritarian form of government and that it will seek to integrate all military organizations, included the Qassām Brigades, into a unified army273. Also, Miš’al underlined Ḥamās pragmatism by saying that Ḥamās is aware that the PA is based on the foundation of the Oslo Accords, and that Ḥamās is willing to abide by the accords signed by the PA, as long as this does not contradict its principles and does not violate the Palestinians' rights. He also repeated that non-recognition of Israel is primarily related with occupation, suggesting that if occupation ends, resistance would come to an end too, entailing recognition of Israel274. In this regard, since its victory, Ḥamās stressed its willingness to work through the PLC to set up a legal framework for the re-organization of the security apparatus, presumably with the aim of building a bridge of cooperation between the new government and the existing security sector that was politically controlled by Fataḥ275. During a round of consultations with members of the Arab League in Cairo, Ḥamās reiterated its willingness to have a coalition government with shared portfolios, or to set up a technocratic government in which ministries would not have any party affiliation, in addition to proceed to reforming the PLO with the aim of eventually joining it276. In this context, Ḥamās’s intention to join a reformed PLO remain the main reason behind the movement's decision to participate in the 2005 and 2006 elections, for which it been preparing throughout the previous years of co-existence with the PA in the political arena. If in 1996 the external leadership had imposed its will over the Gaza leadership not to participate in the elections, in 2006 the will of the internal leadership prevailed, paving the ground for the first time to the rapprochement of all Palestinian factions277. However, prospects for a unified government were severely hindered by the outgoing Fataḥ legislators who just a few days before Ḥamās took over the PLC passed a
272 Ḥamās communiqué, 26 January 2006 : http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/Ḥamās/statements/2006/26_1_06.htm 273 Ivi. 274 Al-Ayyām, January 29, 2006: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/29-1-2006/p01.pdf
275 Moḥsen M. Ṣāleḥ, Ṣirā’ al- Irādāt 2006-2007, Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirasāt wa al-Istišārāt (Beirut: 2008), p.110. 276 "Abraz nuqāṭ al-mu'tamar al-saḥāfī li-ra'īs al-maktab al-sīyyāsī li-Ḥamās”, al-Jazeera, 28 January 2006: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/0b7506d2-4dfd-4b86-a1f8-74b513af0309 ; See also: Usher G., “Ḥamās is risen”, Middle East Report, No. 238 (Spring 2006), p. 10.
277 Dag Tuasdag, “Ḥamās-PLO relations before and after the Arab Spring”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Fall 2013), p.4. In the runing-up to the elections, Zahār stated “We want to join the PLO- but on the basis of a new program, not of the Oslo program and the Agreements. A program that will enable true representation for Ḥamās in the PLO” quoted in Ze’evi Dror “The decline of the PLO and the rise of PNA”, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, No.8 (June 2008), p.6. 68 bill that granted ‘Abbās greater powers over legislation, such as the possibility to annul a law claiming it unconstitutional, and appointing Fataḥ's members to key positions278. Also, Fataḥ spokesmen insisted that they would enter a unity government only if Ḥamās had agreed upon accepting the Quartet’s conditions: renounce to the use of violence, acceptance of Israel’s right to exist, and recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate of the Palestinian people. Accordingly, on February 1st 2006, Maḥmūd ‘Abbās met with Mubārak and Egyptian intelligent chief, Omar Suleiman in a sessions that resulted in an official statement whereby ‘Abbās refuses to enter a coalition government with Ḥamās, as long as it renounces to the use of violence279. The last two conditions were particularly unacceptable for Ḥamās, under the basis that Ḥamās was prevented from joining the PLO, and that in any case it advocated for a reform within the PLO that overcame the Oslo flaws. In the effort to persuade the international community not to boycott the results of the elections, Ḥamās sent a letter to the Quartet Committee, whereby expresses its desire to implement what was exposed in the “Change and Reform” electoral program, and it also stresses that, due to the current situation of occupation and violence, the new government will not renounce to the rights of the Palestinian people to defend themselves, thus refusing to renounce to armed struggle280. However, the main reason behind Fataḥ's reluctance to enter a coalition government with Ḥamās was due to its refusal to cede its capillary network of privileges, patronage that it had been building around the PA for over 12 years281. Moreover, with the diplomatic, political and financial support of the U.S, ‘Abbās succeeded in establishing a parallel government in the West Bank, whose policies showed very little willingness to engage in genuine government unification. These included taking over police force, media outlets and the establishment of the Presidential Guards. In this regard, ‘Abbās, in his capacity as “supreme commander of the security services,” ordered the commanders of the main security branches to report to him personally, rather than the prime minister or the interior minister. These posts, and that of defense minister, would otherwise be controlled by loyalists of the Ḥamās-led government, thus showing a clear attempt to preclude Ḥamās interference in the Fataḥ
278 13 February, 2006 Al-Quds al-‘Arabī: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2006/02Feb/13FebMon/qds05.pdf 279 Al-Jazeera, 2 February 2006: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/98bbcb90-8506-436e-88df- 8e7ce0e78dc1. And al-Jazeera, 1 February 2006: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/d9e78c18-54c6- 4704-82d8-11e366b13e24
280 Ḥamās statement, 30 January 2006: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/30_1_06_1.htm 281 Usher G., “Ḥamās is risen”, Middle East Report, No. 238 (Spring 2006), p. 3. 69 security structure282. In order to overcome internal divisions and to sign a unity agreement, on February 8th 2007 the two factions met in Mecca. According to the Saudi-brokered agreement283, the coalition government was led by Prime Minister Ismaʻīl Hanīyyah, and 9 out of 24 ministers belonged to other political movements, mainly Fataḥ and also independents. Key portfolios such as finance and foreign affairs, were assigned to independents in accordance with the Quartet’s conditions, such as Salām Fayyād who received the finance portfolio -since he had been in charge of the International Monetary Fund mission to Palestine from 2002-2006- and Ziād ‘Abū ʿAmr, renown independent Palestinian analyst and academic received the Foreign Affairs portfolio284. In May 15th 2007, Hanīyyah sent a letter to ‘Abbās with a proposal of the names of the ministers to be included in the new Unity Government285. However, despite Hanīyyah’s acceptance of ‘Abbās’s letter of commission to implement the unity agreement286, the Mecca Agreement was doomed to fail since the outset, because it did not address the two major sources of the divide: who would be in charge of the security sector, and whether Ḥamās would be allowed to join the reformed-PLO. Moreover, the Mecca Agreement did not completely embrace the Quartet’s conditions287 and, despite pledging to honor the achievements made by the PLO, it also asserted the legitimation of “ all means of resistance, including armed struggle, against the occupation”288. Moreover, after Mecca, the U.S and Israel continued to call for boycotting the new unity government: on 17 February 2007 the Al-Quds newspaper reads that Condoleeza Rice refuses to deal with the National Unity Government289. Moreover, other Arabic media outlets report that the US government will put pressure on Fataḥ to boycott the government unless it meets international conditions290. Further obstacles to the effective implementation of the agreement were the
282 Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, Iyād Barġūti, Dağğāni, interview with author, Ramallah. March 2013 283 See Mecca Agreement arabic full text: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/8-2-2007.pdf 284 See original letter: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/15-3-2007.pdf 285 Ibid, Mecca Agreement ...op.cit. 286 The letter called Hanīyyah to “work towards achieving their [Palestinian] national goals asʿ rʿAṭīf ied by the resolutions of the Palestine National Council, the [PA] Basic Law, the National Conciliation Document and the resolutions of the Arab summits. Accordingly, I call on you to respect legitimate Arab and international resolutions and agreements signed by the PLO”, Ivi. See: Al-Ayyām 9 February 2007: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/9-2-2007/p01.pdf 287 Ḥamās’ rejection of the Quartet’s conditions gave Israel the pretext to oppose the Mecca Agreement: See al-Quds, 8 February 2007: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2007/02/08FebThu/qds05.pdf 288 Manā’ M., Barnāmağ al-Muqāwwama ba’da duḫūl Ḥamās ilā ḥukūma as-sulṭa, p.196 289 Al-Quds, 17 February 2007: http://dl.alquds.com:8080/pdf/19972b4da254f50eaf0045d4d343c6c2/52e3a626/pdf- docs/2007/2/17/page1.pdf 290 Al-Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda, 18 February 2007: http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2007/2/18/page1.pdf
70 growing disintegration of Fataḥ in multiple decentralized centers of power that behaved in discordance with ‘Abbās’s stance, and Ḥamās categorical refusal to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people on the bases of the Oslo Accords. Moreover, while Ḥamās remained ambiguous towards its position over a two-state solutions and the Arab Peace Initiative291, Fayyād convinced the international community to resume financial aid to the West Bank292. This proved to be the final stroke of the failure of the Mecca Agreement. As a matter of fact, period after the Mecca Agreement, despite the alleged efforts aimed at creating a unified security apparatus, saw the increase growing of the Presidential Guards in Gaza, that, accordingly, received equipment, training and other support by the US Security coordinator in Jerusalem, General Dayton. Ḥamās began to refer to the Presidential Guards as the ‘Dayton Militia’ and embarked on a propaganda campaign in Gaza against them, and eventually took over National Security Force positions293. Therefore, the June takeover was triggered by Ḥamās’ belief that the Fataḥ members of the Presidential Guard -which the US government had visibly helped build up- was ready to seize control from Ḥamās. Tensions eventually erupted in intense armed clashes in June 2007 that produced significant casualties on both sides that engaged in serious violation of humanitarian law, such as summarily executions and tortures, until June 13 when the Executive Forces and the Qassām Brigades seized control of the Gaza Strip and all major security institutions of the PA. In the aftermath of the takeover, on June 14th, ‘Abbās issued a decree that dissolved Hanīyyah’s government and declared the state of emergency, and appointed an emergency cabinet headed by Prime Minister Salām Fayyād294 calling Ḥamās’s takeover as a “coup”295. At the end of June 2007, Hanīyyah gave a public speech in Gaza in which he
291 Ḥamās had rejected the Arab Peace Initiative when it was first proposed in 2002. In 2006, after its electoral victory Mišʿal stated” We do not oppose the Arab position. The recognition of Israel is perhaps possible in the future where Israel recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people. When that happens, I am sure there will be Palestinian and Arab cooperation to deal positively with such step”. Quoted in Usher G., Ḥamās is risen...op.cit, p.10. 292 In June, Condoleeza Rice announced that the 86 million dollars that the U.S government had given to the PA to use against Ḥamās, were going to be redirected to the Fataḥ-controlled government in the West Bank, to create viable institutions and security. See: Schanzer J., Ḥamās vs. Fataḥ...op.cit, p. 122. 293 Alvaro Da Soto, End of Mission Report, May 2007 : http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys- files/Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf (accessed November 2012). In this context, ‘Abbās's security advisor, Daḥlān, was responsible for the PA-sponsored campaign against Ḥamās's government in Gaza, and the first in Fataḥ calling Ḥamās's takeover a "coup". 294 http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/14-7-2007.pdf 295 14 June 2007, see original text here: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/14-6-2007.pdf. The action was officially supported by the U.S government and the Quartet as in the following declaration: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/16-6-2007.pdf 71 addressed to form a unity government on the basis of the Mecca agreement296. According to this speech, Hanīyyah denied what circulated in the local and western press about the intention of Ḥamās to establish an emirate in the Gaza Strip after its military control over the security apparatus. Also Hanīyyah underlined that the problems "were not between us and President Maḥmūd ‘Abbās, or between Ḥamās and Fataḥ, especially after the Mecca agreement, but between us and a particular stream within Fataḥ that seeks to control the reins of Fataḥ and the PA, and the coup against legitimacy bullying agendas and external parties.297"
Gaining security, political and judicial control
As described above, the struggle for security monopoly and control was key to the rivalry between Fataḥ and Ḥamās, as was the reason behind the latter’s decision to pursue with the military take over of the Gaza Strip. After the split, Ḥamās inherited the PA sophisticate apparatus that had been developed since 1994 with the help of international funds, thus showing early institutional continuity with pre-existing PA institutions. In this regard, crucial to Ḥamās’s institutional consolidation, was Fayyād’s decision to order the 70,000 PA employees in the Gaza Strip to boycott the Ḥamās’s government, thus enabling Ḥamās to replace them with Ḥamās’ employees298. The same logic applied to the civil servants and security sector personnel who refused to abide by Ḥamās’s orders. In this context, through a “no-show” policy- as Īezīd Şāīġ refers to- sponsored by the Ramallah PA, Ḥamās managed to expand its pre- existing network of social and political institutions into the vacuum left by the PA employees in Gaza. This approach won Ḥamās a complete monopoly in Gaza in key state institutions, considering also that after Israeli withdrawal form the Gaza Strip in 2005 left Hanīyyah in full control over the whole territory and population in Gaza, enabling him to develop political and administrative cohesion299. This way, parallel structures merged into the Ministry of Interior while the pre-existing security personnel in the police and national security forces have being replaced by Ḥamās’s cadres and members300.
296 Ḥamās statement: http://www.palestineinfo.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s70M5KNl2 FCuDLYnzwW1hlY43ksc45W2vJ7CA3FCZSvYcu4xkXzQoLgiIdeFbSQSZD8nZ9Usd1U7OCJvNjpi4sPNR2 Bj0RzgqVzj6XEvqUJ7g%3d 297 Ivi. 298 Yezīd Ṣāīġ, “Ḥamās Rule in Gaza: Three Years on,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies (March 29, 2010), p. 3 299 Ivi. 300 Milton-Edwards, “The Ascendance of Political Islam: Ḥamās and Consolidation in the Gaza Strip,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 8 (December 2008), p.1594. 72 Stemming from the security competition with Fataħ, in the months preceding the takeover, Ḥamās created a structured and functioning rival security structure, and had placed key members in the Ministry of Interior. As a matter of fact, immediately after seizing power, parallel to the Qassām Brigades- that remained engaged in the main purpose of resistance- Ḥamās built the Executive Forces around the Ministry of Interior, led by Fatḥī Ḥammād. The Executive Forces were further divided into three branches, the Civil Police, the Internal Security Forces and the National Security Forces – a border guard. Ḥamās sought to present these as non-political, non-factional and independent form the Qassām Brigades and Hanīyyah stated “We are concerned that the Security Apparatus work form a Palestinian point of view, so as not to interfere with people’s affairs and every day life. We intend to reform this apparatus, but no one will lose salary301”. However, it is highly doubtful that a real and clear-cut division can be made between the Ḥamās movement and civil structures.302 Security services remain to government and not movement control. To complicate things further, the PA forces that returned to work despite the boycott order from the Fayyād-led Ramallah cabinet, were subsequently integrated into this new structure, and accordingly, two non-Ḥamās members were appointed at the head of the three branches303. For example, Tawfīq Ğaber was a former member of Fataħ and, according to a report, in 1990s he was accused to be accepting bribes for helping Gazans crossing into Egypt. He was appointed as a Ḥamās police chief. The same report contends that, given the amalgamation of the Executive Forces into the Police Forces, police and Qassām members are often interchangeable304. Still, the attempt to establish different, parallel security institutions whereby one remain more loyal to the government, while the other is nominally non- political, but in the end subordinated to the government, is a practice that recalls many other authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes305. Indeed, Gaza’s internecine war against Fataḥ that culminated with Ḥamās’s takeover, represented an enormous boost also for the Qassām Brigades, that could transform from an underground guerrilla organization into a uniformed military force designed to carry out resistance activities, but also exert control over other armed groups, and to curb political opposition. Boosted by an arsenal captured from the PA’s security
301 Moḥsen M. Ṣāleḥ, Ṣirāʿ al-Irādāt 2006-2007, Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirasāt wa al-Istišārāt (Beirut 2008), pp. 107-8 302 Spyer J., “The Growing Power of Ḥamās's Gaza Leadership,” Meria (June 19, 2013), p. 45. 303 “Ruling Palestine I: Gaza under Ḥamās”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No.73 (19 March 2008), p. 9. 304 Ivi. 305 Despite claims of non-politicization, the Ḥamās government divided the security apparatus in five bodies all under complete jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, which directly follows the Prime Minister: National Security Force, Civil Defense, Security and Protection, Homeland Security and Medical Services. Mukhimer T., The rise of Ḥamās…op.cit, p.29. 73 bases, Ḥamās’s military wing took the shape of a quasi- army306. However, the influence of the military wing remained relevant to the takeover, while the internal law and order security campaign was instead implemented by the internal security forces and by the EF. According to an analyst, because of the increased fear among the cadres of the Qassām Brigades of seeing their military and political power reduced, there has been a growing interference of the Qassām Brigades with the EF work at the internal security level307. This emphasis for internal territorial control can be especially seen in the military wing’s opinion regarding a possible separate ceasefire between Gaza and the West Bank. Accordingly, there are reports that the military wing in Gaza, in the aftermath of the takeover was more interested in securing a ceasefire only in Gaza, so as to retain control over the territory in the Gaza Strip, thus highlighting the increased political and geographical division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip308. The overall goal to achieve law and order represented an opportunity for Ḥamās to crack down on political opponents, mainly Fataḥ. After raiding many Fataḥ’s offices and confiscating its equipment, Ḥamās took charge of previously-run Fataḥ’s institutions, such as hospitals, courts and confiscated PA-cars, occupied party headquarters, offices and police stations309. Ḥamās was especially careful to curb family-based and clan-affiliated Fataħ groups that presented a serious threat to Ḥamās political control. In this regard, in 2008 Ḥamās carried out harsh repressive campaigns against members of the Ḥillīs and Doġmoš families that had turned into de facto warlords and controlled significant areas of Gaza310. At the political and legislative level, the cabinet of Prime Minister Ismaʻīl Hanīyyah consisted initially of the five Ḥamās ministers from Gaza in the preceding National Unity Government (NUG). Six other Ḥamās ministers of the NUG, who could not retain any role in the Gaza government as they were living in the West Bank, were subsequently replaced by Ḥamās figures in Gaza. The remaining ministries of the NUG, which had been led by non-Ḥamās leaders, were distributed among the eleven ministers of the new cabinet, making most of the ministers in charge of two or three portfolios each. ‘Isma’īl Hanīyyah, for instance, was responsible for the two key portfolios of Finance and Foreign Affairs, in addition to being the prime minister. Most ministries have undergone a
306 “Ruling Palestine I: Gaza under Ḥamās”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No.73 (19 March 2008), p.6. 307 Mo’īm Manā’, Barnāmağ al-Muqāwwama ba’da duḫūl Ḥamās Ilā ḥukūma as-Sulṭa in Moḥsen M. Ṣāleḥ, Qirā’āt naqdīyyahh fī tağriba Ḥamās wa ḥukūmatiha, Beirut: Markaz al-Zaytūna līl-Dirast wal-Istišārāt, 2007, pp. 93-4. 308 “Ruling Palestine”, op. cit, p.27 309 Analysts in interview with author, Ramallah. April 2013 310 “Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 71 (20 December 2007), pp. 18-19. And “The status of Human-Rights in the Palestinian-Controlled Territory”, Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), (1 January-31 December 2008). 74 complete transformation, as the previous staff has been replaced with new, Ḥamās- appointed employees. At the same time, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has been severely paralyzed since the 2007 takeover, after Israel detained around 40 Ḥamās legislators, thus depriving Ḥamās of an effective legislative-capability311. After the takeover, the institution that has undergone the most profound transformation, and that is less affected by institutional continuity with previous PA institutions, is the judiciary312. As the PA suspended its operations in the criminal courts in the immediate aftermath of the takeover, Ḥamās responded by devising a mechanism that allowed it to bypass these courts. Interestingly, unlike for the ministries – whereby Ḥamās took over existing institutions of the PA in accordance with the prerogatives of an elected government rather than establishing parallel institutions- Ḥamās behave differently regarding the judiciary system. In this context, in 2007 Ḥamās dismissed attorney general ‘Aḥmad al-Muġanī, and formed its own parallel Higher Justice Council and appointed its own judges313. Also, Ḥamās revived ad-hoc Islamic Conciliation Committees (Liğān al-‘Iṣlāḥ al- Islāmīyyah) that enabled Ḥamās to render quicker judgments bypassing the formal sector. Informal arbitration and dispute resolution mechanisms that had always existed in parallel with the formal justice system, and these Conciliation Committees mainly drew on Islamic law and on various forms of customary law (‘urf), including tribal or clan arbitration, and after the takeover started to play an pivotal role in dispensing justice in the context of the greatly weakened statutory system of the PA. Also, these committees have reached an increased territorial capillarity, with committees in every neighborhood, and most of the committees are headed by a religious scholar of the Association of Palestine ‘Ulamā’, that ensured conformity of judgments to Šarī’ah314. According to one analyst, through the Conciliation Committees, Ḥamās sought to control the power of clans and extended families within the judicial system. Accordingly, the replacement of many of the 638 family headmen already registered under the previous, Fataḥ-led administration, and the appointment of 75 new muḫtar by the end of 2009, helped Ḥamās co-opt and contain family representatives315
311 “The Public Service under Ḥamās in Gaza: Islamic Revolution or Crisis Management?”, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2010. 312 Amira Hass “Ḥamās tightens control on state Institutions in Gaza” http://www.haaretz.com/news/Ḥamās- tightens-control-on-state-institutions-in-gaza-1.234978 313 For an in-depth analysis of Ḥamās transformation of the judicial system in Gaza see: Hani Albasoos, “The Judicial Sector” in Halvor Beggrav, “The Public Service under Ḥamās in Gaza: Islamic Revolution or Crisis Management?”, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2010. 314 Yezīd Ṣāīġh, “‘We Serve the People’ Ḥamās Policing in Gaza,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies (April 1, 2011), pp. 77-78. 315 Ṣāīġ, We serve the people op. cit, p. 80. 75 The most important feature of the 2007 split is the serious obstacle is posed for any development of a common Palestinian Law. Accordingly, laws passed in Gaza are ignored in the West Bank, and even the Palestinian Bar Association that was developed since 2000 in order to unite lawyers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, reflected the geographical and political division, as members of the board in the West Bank remained loyal to the provisions of the Fayyād government in Ramallah. Also, in the framework of the criminal code, the West Bank is still ruled according to the Jordanian-inherited criminal code, while Gaza relies on a criminal code from the British mandate.
Caption 1. Ḥamās structure of power after 2006316.
Facing internal opposition: Ḥamās and the Salafists in Gaza
With clear similarities with the PA during he 1990s317, Ḥamās sought to crash political oppositions and to co-opt other groups. Beyond the Salafists-Ğihādists, Ḥamās is attempting to force the intricate spectrum of all of Gaza's radical groups to accept the quiet status quo with Israel318. While never completely disarming these paramilitary groups, Ḥamās has co-opted them by making them accepting its rule, sometimes
316 This figure is provided by Bröning M., The Politics of Change in Palestine...op.cit., p. 43. 317 During the 1980s, when political Islam was on the rise in Palestine, Salafists were intially co-opted by Fataḥ that appointed them to the PA so as to compete with Ḥamās. See: “Radical Islam in Gaza”, Crisis Group Middle East Report N°104 (29 March, 2011), pp. 1-42. 318 Brown N. J., The Ḥamās-Fataḥ conflict...op. cit., p.5. 76 refraining from firing rockets inside Israel, while other times, Ḥamās participated in joint violent actions against Israel, on the bases of a cost/benefit calculations319. In general, Ḥamās preferred to allow groups like Islamic Ğihād to maintain their military capabilities, as this could allow Ḥamās to continue to put pressure on Israel, while maintaining the status quo. Also, co-option of radical groups allows Ḥamās to ease the contradictions of its behavior as a resistance movement and as a government. Therefore, on the one hand Ḥamās allows these paramilitary groups to advocate for armed resistance, but at the same time Ḥamās proved able to tackle them with iron fist, when they challenged its authority. This happened for example between 2008 and early 2010, when Ḥamās’s monopoly of power was challenged by the newly established network of “Ğalğalat”320. This clandestine group is believed to include around 2,500-3,000 intifāḍah, most of them ex-Qassām members, but also from other groups such as Ğund ‘Ānṣār Allāh, Ğāma’āt Ğaīš Al-‘Islām, At-Tawḥīd al-Ğihād and Ğund Allāh321. Other local groups that claimed responsibility for military attacks in the post-election turmoil are: Suyūf al-haq, Ğaīš al- Quds al-Islāmī, Tanżīm Al-Qā'ida, 'Arḍ al-Ribāt, Jund Muḥammad and 'Ānṣār bayt al- Maqdīsī. According to Israeli intelligence, the reasons behind the appearance of such phenomenon could be traced in the internal disagreements between the military wing of Ḥamās following the Lull Agreement with Israel (June-December 2008), or maybe even before, during the 2007 take over, when some Ḥamās renegades were brutally tortured and jailed, and when freed joined these new radical groups rather than Ḥamās.322 Importantly, after the 2007 take over, Ḥamās had to deal with radical groups that were already present in Gaza, and that had the chance to significantly grow given the vacuum of power left by Ḥamās and Fataḥ forces, and the security chaos derived form the internecine confrontation. In this regard, Ḥamās made use of groups like Ğaīš al-Islām - which gained international notoriety by participating, together with Ḥamās’ Qassām Brigades and the Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Brigades, in the kidnapping of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldier Gilad Šalīṭ in June 2006- to confront Fataḥ. However, after the group claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Foxnews and BBC journalists, and the increased association of this group with Al-Qā’ida, Ḥamās had to take serious measures and tackle the group. Importantly, Salafists have also been used by ‘Abbās to undermine Ḥamās
319 Milton-Edwards, The Ascendance…op.cit.,p. 1592. 320 Hasan Ğabr, al-Ayyām July 11, 2009: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/11-7-2009/p01.pdf 321 Ṣāīġ, Ḥamās Rule in Gaza…op.cit. ,p.4. And “Exclusive: New Gaza Salafist faction numbers 11,000”: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=277513 (accessed on 13/09/2013). 322 “ The Jaljalat Phenomenon in the Gaza Strip” http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reviews/Pages/Jaljalat_en.aspx (accessed on 25/09/2013 77 reputation in the aftermath of the 2006 victory and, more vehemently, after the 2007 takeover. In fact, when Israeli Prime Minister Sharon had declared that Qā’ida is skeaking through Gaza323, ‘Abbās had denied allegations324, after Ḥamās takeover he reversed his previous allegations by confirming ties between Qā’ida and Ḥamās325. Another group posing a threat to Ḥamās’ monopoly of power is Ğund ‘Ānṣār Allāh that emerged in Rafaḥ at the end of 2008, and is composed by former Ḥamās and Fataħ members, but also Pakistanis and intifāḍah from Afghanistan326. The group was heavily curbed in 2009, after it had announced the establishment of an Islamic emirate in southern Gaza327. Also the more recent kidnapping and assassination of Italian activist Vittorio Arrigoni in Gaza was claimed as a Tawḥīd wal-Ğihād retaliation for Ḥamās’s arrest of Salafits members, thus highlighting the growing tension between Ḥamās and radical groups. These Salafist groups represent a threat to Ḥamās’ monopoly of power in Gaza not much in terms of their military capabilities, but especially at the ideological level. As a matter of fact, they pressure Ḥamās for imposing higher Islamic costumes and habits in Gaza and to engage more actively in armed ğihād against Israel328. Therefore, these groups can seriously undermine security stability in the Gaza Strip when Ḥamās’s is engaged in maintaining a ceasefire. Also, and more importantly, they challenge Ḥamās’s internal cohesion, as different analysts have reported cases of double memberships in Ḥamās’s military wing and Salafist cells, as was the case of Faḥd Zaytūna, a former Qassām member who joined the group Ğund ‘Ānṣār Allāh329. In order to prevent defection, according to Ḥamās Interior Minister Fatḥī Ḥammād, the group has revised its recruiting and training procedures, while “freezing” the membership of all Ḥamās members suspected of being active in Salafist-Ğihādist circles330. Proving the increased threat of defections among members of the Qassām, is a letter ‘Aḥmad al-Ğa’barī whereby he accused the Minister of Interior Fatḥī Ḥammād of losing control over internal
323 “Israel says Qā’ida active in Gaza” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2546863.stm 324 “Israel faked Qā’ida presence” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2550513.stm 325 “http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3511880,00.html 326 According to a report, his leader is thought to have fought in Afghanistan with Bin Laden, and that he had been sent to Gaza by Ḥamās external leadership. See: Radical Islam in Gaza... op. citi, p. 11. 327 Šarq al-Awsaṭ, 6 September 2009: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11240&article=534766&search=%CC%E1%CC%E 1%CA&state=true#.UuRkm2Q1igQ 328 These groups are mostly apolitical and focus on daʿwa activities aimed at promoting islamization of costumes. 329 Benedetta Berti, “Ḥamās’ Internal Challenge: the Political and Ideological Impact of Violent Salafist Groups in Gaza”, INSS Strategic Assessment, Vol. 14, No. 2 (July 21, 2011), pp. 73-84; See also “Radical Islam in Gaza”, p. 11. 330 Ibid.p. 80. 78 security, and of building a personal “executive force” by co-opting Qassām members in northern Gaza331. Indeed, due to Ḥamās reluctance in providing accurate figures about the subject, and conflicting reports issued by the Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Service) –whereby in 2011 counted around 500 Qā’ida affiliated militants in Gaza332, other reports- with more questionable sources- count bigger figures333. What is more striking about the Ḥamās-Salafist relation, is the similar strategy used by Yāsir ʿArafāt in the 1990s, who committed the PLO in agreements to preserve ceasefires, but was always careful to retain his ties with extremist organizations that would continue their terrorist activities against Israel334. However, Ḥamās relations with the şalāf and ‘Arafāt’s Fataḥ opposition to Ḥamās in the early 1990s differ in terms of logistic capabilities. In fact, at that time, ‘Arafāt had no effective control over area A – despite this was designated full PNA territory under the Oslo Accords- while Ḥamās since 2007 has enjoyed a wider and thorough authority over the Gaza territory, making it easier for Ḥamās to control and suppress Salafist organizations and groups.335 This policy of co-option and containment has characterized Ḥamās’s decision to somehow subordinate resistance to a joint command with these paramilitary groups. In this context, Ḥamās often confiscated weapons from groups associated with Fataħ and other factions, and sought to monopolize tunnel’s trafficking to exert control over weapons smuggling336. Also, in September 2007, Ḥamās clashed with Islamic Ğihād forces for throwing unauthorized rockets into Israel, and reached a mutual agreement the same November, successfully committing Islamic Ğihād from refraining rockets attacks337. However, according to Israeli security sources, in 2007 Ḥamās has also secretelyarmed
331 Ṣāīġ, Ḥamās rule in Gaza...op.cit, p.4; The same author reports growing internal tension within Ḥamās recalling the arrest of a Ğalğalat leader on February 10, 2010, on suspicion of responsibility for a dozen bombing attacks on Ḥamās vehicles and security offices over the previous weeks. 332 “Shin Bet chief: Qā’ida affiliated groups behind Gaza violence”, 18 January 2011: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/shin-bet-chief-al-qaida-affiliated-groups-behind-gaza- violence-1.337819 333 See: Yoram Shweitzer, “The Terrorism Threat against Israel from Qā’ida and Global Ğihād”, Military and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2010), p.25. 334 Nathann J. Brown, “The Ḥamās-Fataḥ conflict: Shallow but Wide", The Fletcher Forum for World Affairs, (July 1, 2013), p.6. 335 Bröning, The politics of change...op.cit.p. 35. 336 According to Palestinian analyst ‘Umar Ša’bān, head of the Gaza-based Think-Tank PalThink, the Hanīyyah’s government has put heavier taxes over products being smuggled through tunnels. In this way the government can control illicit traffic and curb illegal investments that had been on the rise since 2007 and, especially after 2008. According to the analyst, this move had granted Ḥamās greater control over the economic resources of Gaza, since all the tax revenues from smuggling now directly accrue to Ḥamās. Phone interview with author, November 2013. 337 “Islamic Ğihād sayis Ḥamās stopping their rockets crew in Gaza”, Haaretz, 10 October 2009: http://www.haaretz.com/news/islamic-jihad-says-hamas-stopping-their-rocket-crews-in-gaza-1.6358
79 groups like Islamic Ğihād with Qassām rockets, while maintaining a front of abiding by the cease-fire with Israel in the Gaza Strip338. Finally, Ḥamās hard stance especially vis-a-vis Islamic Ğihād stems from its purported origins in ex-Fataḥ’s fighters. Accordingly, there have been joint operations against Israel from Al-Aqṣā Brigades and Islamic Ğihād, and at the end of 2007, Islamic Ğihād declared that around 1,000 Fataħ members had joined. The above-mentioned rhetoric is further reported in an International Crisis Group Report’s interview with Al-Aqṣā militant that reported: “Ḥamās launched attacks against Israel to undermine Yasir ʿArafāt in 1995, we can do the same to Ḥamās […] Ḥamās was a resistance organization; now it’s suppressing the resistance. Ḥamās is caught on the horns of the same dilemma they posed for ‘Abū Māzin”339.
Internal economy
The Hanīyyah’s government had to face terrible economic constraints in the aftermath of the takeover as a consequence of the closure and the heavy sanctions imposed by Israel and the international community. Immediately after the elections, Ḥamās underline the government’s priority to enhance the local private sector in Gaza with the purpose of attracting foreign investments340. In this regard, Israel imposed a tight siege on Gaza and significantly restricted Palestinian goods, travel and finance. Movement restrictions of products and people had a severe impact on the local economy, as it is reported that around 59% of Gaza’s electrical power and 95% of raw goods came from Israel341. These measures included cutting fuel shipments that caused continuous blackouts with heavy repercussions on Gaza’s ability to properly run hospitals, clinics, and schools342. The siege on Gaza triggered the increase in informal/illicit traffic through underground tunnels that have constituted, since 2008, the main source of economic activity343. Initially, the tunnels economy was allowed by the Mubārak regime that tacitly
338 “Security sources: Ḥamās is arming Islamic Ğihād with Qassāms” http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=33845 (accessed on September 2012) 339 Ruling Palestine I...op.cit…, p.23 340 Ḥamās communiqué, 26 January 2006: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/30_1_06.htm 341“Internal fight: Palestinian abuses in Gaza and the West Bank”, Human Rights Watch Report, 2008: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/iopt0708/iopt0708web.pdf (accessed October 2013). 342 Indeed international sanctions had a devastating socio-economic impact on the population in Gaza, with reports of 1/3 of Palestinians in Gaza living under poverty line “Poverty in Palestine: the human cost of financial boycott” http://www.miftah.org/Doc/Reports/2007/PalestinianAidCrisis_note_FINAL_050307.pdf (accessed march 2013) 343 “Ḥamās levies a value-added tax of 14.5 percent on every item that comes through, local shop owners say,” Christian Science Monitor, August 17, 2009 80 agreed upon allowing mass smuggling operations to take place along the border between the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza, this way Ḥamās could overturn the impact of the sanctions344. Accordingly, Egyptian border policemen received bribes to keep the tunnels open. However, under pressure from Israel, the U.S. agreed in 2008 to pass a bill whereby they would withhold part of the annual foreign aid to Egypt (1.3 billion $) if Egypt would not undertake concrete action to stop the smuggling activities of Ḥamās345. The situation in the Sinai after the “Gaza War” (Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009) is tantamount to understand the dynamics of bilateral relations between Mubārak ’s Egypt and Ḥamās. As a matter of fact, since the 2007 takeover, local strength of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was increased due to Ḥamās’s purported close association with the Egyptian brothers. In this regard, many analysts contend that the 2008-2009 military operation “Cast Lead” against Gaza primarily targeted Ḥamās weaponry arsenal in order to strengthen deterrent, but it was also a message to Egypt, in order to halt tunnel smuggling.346 Accordingly, after the war – and especially after the 2008 Rafaḥ crossing breach - when the United Nations estimated that around half of the 1.5 million population of the Gaza Strip crossed into Egypt to seek food and supplies- Egypt started to construct an underground steel wall to prevent any more braches and tunnel smuggling347, while at the same time, Mubārak engaged in mediation for reconciliation talks between Ḥamās and Fataḥ that resulted in the “Egyptian Reconciliation Document” issued in October 2009348. The Egyptian Document encompassed provisions of the 2005 Cairo agreement and 2006 National Agreement document regarding the development and elections of the PLO, PNC elections and security issues. Importantly, Ḥamās rejected the accord due to disagreements regarding the security committee that the accord envisioned349. Crucial to understand the weight of the Gaza leadership within the movement balance of power, is the attempt of the Hanīyyah government to impose control over the tunnel economy. The informal economy accounted for an estimated 80 % of Gaza’s imports by 2009 and directly employed up to 15,000 people, a number that by the spring of 2010 reached 30,000 people. With estimated 5,000 tunnel owners and partners as well
344 Jonathan Schanzer, Ḥamās vs. Fataḥ...op.cit, p. 167 345 Ibid., p.168. 346 “Gaza’s Unfinished Business”, Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 83 (23 April 2009), p.43. 347 Tally Helfont, “Egypt’s Wall with Gaza and the Emergence of a new Middle East Alignment”, Orbis (Summer 2010), pp .426-440 348 Full text text http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/503583b8-d00f-46e3-95c2-b4dd2bedec37. English summary available at: http://www.mesi.org.uk/ViewNews.aspx?ArticleId=3577 349 Ibid. In fact, the accord was ambiguous regarding the leadership of such committee. Also, Ḥamās rejected t the accord on the basis that it granted major scrutinizing power to Egyptian security forces in reforming PASF, thus raising concerns that Mubārak would support Fataḥ security cadres over Ḥamās’s. 81 as wholesale traders, the number involved in the tunnel economy probably reached 40,000–50,000350. According to economic researcher and political analyst, ‘Umar Šaʿbān, as a result of these economic activities, money has moved from the traditionally wealthy families that live in or near the city of Gaza to Rafaḥ, where new partnerships have been set up involving cooperation between the business class with knowledge in economics, and a new class that has experience in digging tunnels, and shows family connections with the tribes in Sinai351. This new class of wealthy businessmen speculates in land and real estate, and since 2008 has established new ties with the government to seek protection. According to the analyst, this new business class is composed by a wide spectrum of different social and political actors. They include Ḥamās members and supporters- including government ministers, members of Parliament, and key administrative or political personnel- Gaza citizens and also foreign investors. However, given the tight control over the Palestinian Banking system by the Palestinian Monetary Authority, it is almost impossible for Ḥamās to launder the tunnel revenues that mostly accrue in dollars and Jordanian dinars352. Last year Ḥamās sought to formalize the informal economy by imposing heavier taxes over the flux of products that pass through the tunnels, and these taxes accrue directly to Ḥamās’s pockets, thus strengthening its control over the Gaza strip, by controlling local banks, contracting companies, supermarkets, commercial centers, thus strengthening the hypothesis whereby Ḥamās became stronger with the siege353. Even in this respect, Ḥamās’ actions reflect those of Fataħ in the economic field in the 1990s. In fact, the Oslo Accords created a new system of PA monopolies and border crossings that were controlled by top PA officials. S Similarly, the sanctions and restrictions imposed by Israel and the international community against Ḥamās created a similar scenario in which everything that passes in and out of Gaza is controlled and monitored, licensed and taxed by the Ḥamās authorities.354 The same analyst contends that despite the fact that the closure has significantly boosted illicit traffic and smuggling through tunnels, and therefore increased the amount of tax revenues for the movement, Ḥamās is still more committed to maintain
350 Ṣāīġh, We Serve the people...op.cit., p.12-13. 351 Omar Ša’bān during phone interview with author, November 2013. 352 Ṣāīġ, Ḥamās Rule in Gaza...op.cit , p.6. 353 Muḥammad Darāġma, “At-Tarīq ila Dawla Ḥamās”, Mağalla Ad-Dirāsāt Al-Filasṭīnīyyah, No. 93 (Winter2013), p. 177. 354 Nathann J. Brown, “The Ḥamās-Fataḥ conflict: Shallow but Wide", The Fletcher Forum for World Affairs, (July 1, 2013), p.6. The same author reports that Ḥamās behavior of following up on the PA steps can also be evidenced Hanīyyah’s offer jobs in government administration for graduates in šarī'ah, despite advanced economic decay and electoral promises to not overload the government’s state apparatus. 82 the borders open and to allow more transparent and formal economic activities355. However, there is room to think that the economic revenues from illicit traffic will boost hardliners within Gaza, or will create a new group of people, encompassing Ḥamās politicians, local and international businessmen who will resist any serious effort aimed at breaking the status-quo, since the status-quo is the major source of their source of political and economic power. A significant part of Ḥamās’s income bulk in Gaza comes from external sources, mainly international Muslim donors from the Muslim Brotherhood International, collection of zakat, and funding from Iran. Despite there are not exact figures available that assess the amount of Iranian support for Ḥamās, it is estimated that since October 2000 (see chapter I), Ḥamās could enjoy Iranian support that came in form of more advanced weaponry, military knowledge and fighting techniques356. Also, the sanctions imposed by the U.S, the E.U and Israel did not prevent Ḥamās from finding some other forms of protection within other Arab countries. As a matter of fact, immediately after the elections, Turkey expressed willingness to provide political and financial help, and Russia also invited Meš’āl, thinking that this could bring Russia with a new foothold in the Middle East. Ḥamās’s leaders also travelled to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Algeria and Libya357. Importantly, in order to understand and apparent contradictory policies and statements that have characterized Ḥamās since its inception in government, it is essential to recall that Ḥamās is a movement in transition form movement to state actor and institution-building, struggling between old structures and adjustments to new political developments. Only in this light it is possible to understand the compatibility between extra-judicial executions and intimidation of political opponents and formalized attempts to foster rule of law in Gaza, enhancing formalized economic activities and at the same time establishing tunnel economy, the juxtaposition of official PNA institutions and ad-hoc Ḥamās structures in legal and security sectors358
355 ‘Umar Ša’bān during phone interview with author, November 2013. However, there are conflicting reports in this regard, and according to ICG interviews, at times Israeli crossings were shelled in order to keep them closed, so as to ensure that tunnels could retain their strategic, military and economic importance. See: “Ruling Palestine”...op.cit., p.7. 356Accordingly, there are reports whereby Iranian weapons transit to Gaza through Eritrea and Somalia, then to Sudan and Egypt. See: Council of Foreign relations Media Conference, http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/media-conference-call-clintons-trip-middle-east/p18645 And: Muḥammad Darāġma, “At-Tarīq ila Dawla Ḥamās”...op.cit.,p.177. 357 Tamīmī, Ḥamās… op. cit., pp. 226-7. 358 Bröning, The politics of change....op.cit, pp. 41-42. 83
The authoritarian Ḥamās
Once established political, institutional and judicial control in Gaza, Ḥamās could manage to establish control over those municipalities that it had failed to win control of during the 2005 and 2006 elections, because Fataħ mainly controlled them, by appointing a Director of the Municipality in authority above the elected Fataḥ mayor359. Also, Ḥamās has succeeded in restricting the room of intervention for some Gaza- based NGOs especially those affiliated with Fataḥ. In this context, the repressive policy adopted by the Hanīyyah’s government in Gaza against Fataḥ’s- affiliated NGOs corresponds to the same approach adopted by the Fayyād government in the West Bank against purportedly Ḥamās-affiliated NGOs360. As a matter of fact, the Ḥamās government imposed that NGOs had to re-register to the Ministry of Interior according to Law N°.1 (that refers to PA legislation), thus following the path of the Fayyād government in the West Bank, and showing institutional continuity even in this field361. Also, Ḥamās sought to control media and freedom of expression, by allowing the circulation of only two newspapers since 2007: Filasṭīn, published by Ḥamās, and Al-Istiqlāl, published by Islamic Ğihād. Other West Bank or East Jerusalem journals –such as Al-Ayyām and Al- Quds were not allowed inside the Gaza Strip, and all pro-PA/Fataḥ media institutions in the Gaza Strip were closed and replaced with ideologically-allied other media channels such as Al-Aqṣā TV, and Sawt al-Aqṣā radio channel362. In many cases, under the pretext of containing Fataḥ elements that seek to overthrow the Ḥamās authority, Ḥamās has repeatedly infringed Public Meetings Law No. 12 of 1988 that guarantees right to public peaceful assembly by severely limiting freedom of expression in public space, and using coercive measures on a wide spectrum of political opponents and civil society such as public executions of purported Israeli “collaborators”, extra-judicial executions, political intimidations through the muḫābarāt363. Accordingly, Ḥamās’s military and security forces have repeatedly raided supposed pro-Fataḥ organizations or institutions that run medical centers and kindergartens, without an official
359 Milton-Edwards, The Ascendance of Political Islam...op.cit., pp.1585–1599. 360 http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781 361 In 2009 Ḥamās introduced a further restriction that prohibited all NGOs from opening bank accounts without previous official approval from the Ministry of Interior, this way subjecting the issue under total indiscriminate control of the Ḥamās authority. Mukhimer T., Ḥamās rule…op.cit., p. 94. 362 “Media diversity danger in Gaza Strip and West Bank”, Reporters no Borders, July 27, 2007, available from http://en.rsf.org/palestinian-territories-media-diversity-in-danger-in-gaza-27-07-2007,23081 (accessed November 2013) 363 Mukhimer T., Ḥamās rule…op.cit., p. 83. 84 judicial order, resulting in the shutting down of 171 associations364. However, later the Ministry of Interior reopened them because no evidence of threat was founded. Significantly, this event underline how shadow institutions of Ḥamās like the ā Brigades, continue supporting the Ḥamās’ formal institutions, especially the Ministry of Interior in dealing with human rights violations and in asserting authoritarian control over society365. Regarding Islamization of society, Ḥamās has behaved inconsistently caught between electoral promises, internal pressures from more radical Salafist groups, and fear of triggering further international sanctions against Gaza. Also, it is noteworthy to remind that Islamization in the Gaza Strip became before the 2006 elections, and due to the heavy presence of refugees and the dire economic conditions and overall poverty, the Gaza Strip has always been characterized by more religious conservatism. Still, it is reported that between 2006 and 2008, there have been growing attacks against the Christian community in Gaza366. Focused in asserting its political control over Gaza, but also willing to maintain its peculiar character of Islamic Resistance Movement, Ḥamās had to face the dilemmas triggered by state building and how to conciliate the alleged long-term Islamization of society. For these reason, the Ḥamās government sees the co-existence of apparently conflicting institutions, such as Hanīyyah government that nominally upholds existing laws that assure freedoms, and other bodies, such as the Daʿwa section, that strives to promote Islamist social and religious agenda367. On the one hand, in 2009 the Interior Ministry launched a campaign to advocate “proper” clothes code for women, separated men and women on the beach, prohibited the use of chewing gum, prevented women from riding motorcycles, and just more recently in April 2013 the Gaza PLC voted an educational law stipulating that boys and girls must be in separate classrooms after the age of 9368. While reports of the prohibition of female drivers, the banning of male hairdresser for women widely circulated, they might be over-exaggerated by western media, and are the result of strong pressure for Islamization from Salafist-militant local cells. In this context, Ihab al-Ghussein, head of the Media Office of Ḥamās, stated that there has been a heavy western campaign aimed at discrediting Ḥamās governmental policies in Gaza,
364 “Freedom of Association in the Palestinian-Controlled territory during 2008”, ICHR special report No. 66 (December 2008), available from http://www.ichr.ps/pdfs/eSP66.pdf 365 Mukhimer T., Ḥamās rule…op. cit., p.85. 366 Ḫālid ‘Abū Toameh, “Muslim Gunmen Target Christian in Gaza,” Jerusalem Post, December 2007, www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1196847287392&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter 367 Ṣāīġ, We Serve the People...op.cit., p. 4. 368 “Ḥamās patrols beaches in Gaza to enforce conservative dress code”, The Guardian, 18 October 2009: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/18/Ḥamās-gaza-islamist-dress-code; 85 however, she claims, the penal code is still under discussion (since 7 years), showing that Ḥamās primary intention in Gaza is not to create an Islamic emirate369. Therefore, the appointment of secularly trained judges provides evidence of Ḥamās tendency to avoid strong and total Islamization. Accordingly, the government has maintained one woman judge, and the role of the conciliation committees is also declining as secularly trained judges take on higher case loads, and event the Šarī’ah Courts have not experienced a significant expansion of power as it could be expected from an Islamic government. The curriculum in schools is another example, as Ḥamās had started to prepare Ḥamās-affiliated intellectuals for developing the national curriculum for the PNA schools. Accordingly, the curriculum has been agreed upon by a wide range of Ḥamās leaders in Gaza and the West Bank, including more “pragmatic” Azīz Dweīk and Nāsir al-Šāʿer, professor of the Najah university, and PLC speaker after the 2006 elections370.
Ḥamās in the West Bank
The peculiar historical and political developments in the West Bank as described in chapter I, shed light on the specific form of political Islam that could develop in this area, and its co-existence with the local authorities, be the Jordanian, the Israeli rule or the Palestinian Authority. There are some claims, especially among Western scholars371, that throughout the period between the two Intifāḍah, and on the running up to the 2006 elections, Ḥamās could take advantage of a capillary network of grassroots charities, that were linked to the mosques, to engage in social, educational and philanthropic activities that won Ḥamās many votes. More importantly, there is widespread knowledge that Ḥamās used zakat funds for activities that were not directly associated with zakat. If one the hand, it is true that Ḥamās found fertile ground in the domain of zakat Committees because of its long-standing bottom-up reformist approach towards the education of society, a clear-cut political affiliation between Ḥamās and many charities and zakat represents an overstatement and a narrow reduction of the complexity of the phenomenon of charities in the Palestinian context.
369 Ihāb al- Ġusseīn for al-Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/Ḥamās-islamization- gaza-ghussein.html 370 See: Zahār, Beyond Intifāḍah, op.cit…, p. 120-121 and Nathan J. Brown, “Are the Palestinians Building a State?”, Carnegie paper, June 2010, p.8. 371 Among the scholars who see Islamic charities in the West Bank as the major tool for military recruitment of Ḥamās is Levitt that mainly relies on Israeli and intelligence material. Other scholars, such as Benthall, Challand, Roy and Gunning portrait the Islamic charities phenomenon in Palestine in all its complexity, confuting Levitt’s view. 86 First of all, the establishment of zakat committees precedes the creation of Ḥamās, and there have been also many charities officially run by Fataḥ-affiliated members372. Also, during the two Intifāḍah, the major channel to send foreign funds to the West Bank for aid was through the zakat Committees that provided basic services that were affected by the Intifāḍah, such as schools, nurseries, kindergartens. Therefore, because of its religious ideology and also strategic implication, Ḥamās sought to integrate its members into the zakat Committees since early 1990s - in the framework of its competition with the PLO- in the same way that other political factions were trying to gain influence within the same domain373. According to interviewees, Ḥamās’ presence became very strong within the zakat Committees during 1990s and 2000s, and there have been many cases of membership overlapping among Ḥamās members and personnel running the zakat or the affiliated institutions374. However, this institutional interrelationship is not always assured, and there are institutions that have not political links at all, while others are more aligned with a particular party, and finally others that used to receive direct funds from Ḥamās. Importantly, people involved in the zakat Committees and other Islamic charities insist that there is a clear divide between political ideology and social/religious work, claiming that even if had happened that a zakat worker is also a Ḥamās-affiliated, there is not a clear- cut political affiliation because the zakat works with international and private donations and not with party-sponsored money375. Also, as previously explained in chapter II, Ḥamās did manage to carve out space within the Institutional framework of normalized religious institutions in the West Bank in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, and despite the establishment of an Islamic banking network, there is not evidence of Ḥamās effective control over such institutions and their links with the social welfare institutions376. However, other considerations seem to claim that the significant financial capabilities of the movement in the 2000s have eventually influenced grassroots organizations, asserting that political ties made funding for social activities easier377. As many interviewees linked with these institutions have reported, Ḥamās had always managed to maintain a balance between its active involvement within zakat Committees for religious
372 Emmanuel Schäublin, “The West Bank Zakat Committees in the local context (1977-2009)”, Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Geneva, 2009, p.56. 373Ivi. 374 Ramallah and Bethlehem, Ministry of Awqāf, Daʿwa Department, interview with author March 2013. 375 Interview with personnel from Islamic-affiliated orphanage Dar al-yatīm in Bethlehem. April 2013. 376 Sara Roy, Failing peace, p. 299. 377 Schäublin E., The West Bank Zakat...op.cit, p. 57. 87 and social purposes, and the link of such activities with its Daʿwa unit and political unit378. In fact, both zakat and other social and political activities of Ḥamās are rooted in and legitimized by religion, but this does not directly imply that Ḥamās makes proactive use of these institutions as a means of recruitment. Since the 2007 split, and in the framework of the overall internationally backed policy of boycott of the Ḥamās-led coalition government, Ḥamās received a serious blow in the West Bank especially in the field of religious/ zakat institutions. In this regard, the Fayyād cabinet issued a law in 2007 aimed at “reforming “ the status of NGOs in the Opt, calling for a re-registration of existing charities and NGOs to the Ramallah-based Palestinian authority inside the Ministry of Awqāf. This, according to most analysts, constituted a major move to tackle Ḥamās’s political influence in the West Bank, based on the premises of such affiliation. This has significantly weakened the weight of the political influence of the West Bank’s branch within Ḥamās’s broader structure of power. Importantly, according to a relevant report, the 2007 split and the subsequent NGOs reform sponsored by the Fayyād government in the West Bank highly contributed to the politicization of zakat committees and Islamic charities in the context of the internecine war between Ḥamās and Fataḥ, while before Ḥamās’s victory in the elections there was little sensitivity over this issue379. In this regard, many local analysts contend that this reform brought the control over zakat and other charities under total control of the Fataḥ-led PA, de facto dissolving any Ḥamās connection with such institutions. Other analyst seem to maintain that despite this assessment is true, Ḥamās still manages contacts with zakat committees through informal relations, mainly associated with local mosques380. Speaking with personnel from the Daʿwa department of the Ministry of Awqāf in Ramallah, they utterly denied the assessment of a politicization of zakat after the 2007 reform, claiming that the reform enhanced transparency and that these social institutions target all Palestinian people, regarding their political outlook, insisting that there is no interference between the Fayyād-led government and their work381.
378 In general there is the tendency among the interviewees linked with these institutions to claim a separation between Ḥamās the government and the zakat Committees and Islamic charities, while other independent or presumably leftist analysts tend to recognize a relative degree of interference between Ḥamās and such institutions, highlighting their significant influence during the 2005-2006 electoral campaign. 379 Schäublin E., The West Bank Zakat op.cit, pp.64-6. This reform saw the establishment of a Central Zakat Fund that controlled local newly established zakat committees. Also, the reform called for the dissolution of existing 92 zakat committees and re-registration of pre-2007 NGOs to the Ministry of Awqaf. 380 Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, Muḥammad Dağğānī, Iyād Barġūṯi, Samʿān Ḫūrī, Walīd Ladādweh in interviews with author. Jerusalem, April 2013. ʿAzīz Dweīk, Ḥamās PLC leader in the West Bank highlighted the weaknesses of Ḥamās institutional power in the West Bank after the 2007 reform and due to “Fataḥ authoritarian grip on the West Bank”. 381 Interview with Daʿwa Department in Ministry of Awqāf, Ramallah. April 2013. In this regard, analyst report that during the one year and a half in government, Ḥamās sought to appoint as many Šaīḫ and 88 Despite the institutional blow suffered by Ḥamās in the West Bank in the field of Islamic charities and zakat, the West Bank branch still retains a degree of influence within the overall authority of the movement, because of the presence of a Šūrā council in every Israeli prison, and for the influence played by student council elections in Universities across the West Bank. In this regard, Ḥamās has boycotted student council elections in the West Bank’s universities in the past 3 years, claiming that Fataḥ does not allow for fair elections and put pressures on students through PA-associated muḫābarāt. At the same time, in the years between 2007 and the spark of the Arab Spring, due to heavy PA crackdown on Ḥamās members and PA- Israeli security coordination in this domain, the amount of Ḥamās prisoners inside Israel exceeded that of Fataḥ, thus increasing the political influence of Ḥamās prisoners’ leadership 382. The political influence of the prisoners inside Israeli prisons has become public with the so-called Prisoners Initiative, whereby a number of reknown Palaestinian prisoners on May 2006 published a National Conciliation Document383 with the aim of overcoming the internecine dispute between Fataḥ and Ḥamās, and to actively engage in unity government384. The 18-points document was signed by Marwān Barġūṯi from Fataḥ, Šaīḫ ʿAbdul Ḫāleq al-Natšeh from Ḥamās, Šaīḫ Bassām al-Saʿdī, from Islamic Ğihād, Muṣṭafā Badārneh from DFLP, and ʿAbdul Rahīm Mallūḥ from PFLP385. The document represents a compromise between Fataḥ and Ḥamās positions, calling for an independent state within the '67 borders, right of return for the refugees, it still accepts "all means of resistance" within the '67 borders against the Israeli occupation, but it also calls for "political and diplomatic activities including negotiations", and it never explicitly recongnizes Israel. The document was included and debated upon during the National Dialogue, thus showing the great degree of its political influence, however due to disputes regarding a popular referendum, the Prisoners Initiative did not achieve concrete results386. Moreover, the link existing between the Ḥamās political leadership outside and inside the prisons
Imams to local mosques throughout the West Bank and other Islamic organizations, thus making Ḥamās informal presence in the West Bank capillary strong. Therefore, even after the “re-registration” of 2007, there might still be some Ḥamās figures inside the zakat committees. 382 There are not exact figures about the numbers of Ḥamās prisoners, but according Addameer’s sources, Ḥamās prisoners are around 2000. Interview with Addameer. Ramallah, April 2013. 383 Ḥamās Communiqué, 25 May 2006: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/25_5_06_1.htm 384 Addameer, Ramallah. April 2013 385 “Naṣ waṯīqa al-'Asrā al-Filasṭīniyīn lil- wafāq al-waṭanī http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/5583e506- 50a3-4368-8a08-4f995c783141 Translation available “Going it alone? Unilateralism vs. Negotiations”, The Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006): http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=828 (accessed March 2013) 386 “Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling back from the brink”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 54 (13 June 2006), pp. 16-7. 89 was further boosted during the Gilad Šalīṭ prisoners swap, whereby it is reported that one Ḥamās prisoner, Yaḥyā al-Sinwār – original from Gaza and founder of the Qassām brigades- was among the major prisoners leader and sent a letter to Ḥamās's political leadership asking to be included in the prisoners swap, otherwise he would order the Qassām brigades not to proceede with the prisoners exchange387.
Shifting internal dynamics
In the months following the June takeover in Gaza the Ḥamās leadership in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and outside failed to communicate with one voice. Radical elements within Gaza, including the “hardline” ex Ḥamās foreign minister and minister of interior, Maḥmūd Zaḥār and Saʿīd Ṣiyyām, undertook internal policies that did not completely reflect those publicly advocated by the Damascus-based leadership, and with other so far considerate “moderates” such as Ismaʻīl Hanīyyah388. Internal debate and frictions had already existed and became public before and, after 2006, shifting dynamics inside Ḥamās and growing internal frictions became especially acute especially during the Prisoners initiative and the prisoners-Šalīṭ exchange. As a matter of fact, the first event, sparked a diverse and confused reaction among the Ḥamās political leadership, highlighting conflicting opinions regarding the endorsement or rejection of such document, or whether to accept ‘Abbās’s referendum proposal. Accordingly, PLC speaker Azīz Dweīk appeared to accept a referendum on the grounds that “returning to the people is one of the most important principles in democracy”, while PLC member Mušīr Maṣrī denounced it as a “coup against the democratic choice of the Palestinian people”, and outside leader Muḥammad Nazzāl called it “blackmail” and “a tool of pressure on Ḥamās”389. The same Initiative was not even supported by the whole prisoners community of Ḥamās, as following the publishing of the Prisoners Document, an explanatory letter was issued on behalf of other prisoners, stating that despite they support a unity government, statements issued in the document reflected the positions of signatories, insisting that despite the prisoners leadership of Ḥamās communicates with the political leadership, the latter one is authorized to give the final say over political decisions and actions390.
387 Interview with Addameer. Ramallah, April 2013. 388 Milton-Edwards, The Ascendance of Political Islam...op.cit., p.1593. 389“Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling back from the brink”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 54 (13 June 2006): 26-7. Divisions forced Ḥamās to publish an official statement on its webpage, explaining the reasons for refusing the ‘Abbās-sponsored referendum: Ḥamās official website, 14/06/2006 reported here: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/14_6_06_1.htm 390 “Risālah at-tawḍīḥiyyah ḥawwal waṯīqa al-wafāq al-waṭanī”: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/documents/2006/27_5_06.htm (accessed September 2013). 90 Secondly, the Šalīṭ-prisoners swap and the interference of Qassām leader al-Sinwār points to strong political influence of the prisoners and military wings over the political leadership. As a matter of fact, Ḥamās political leadership might have preferred the release of Fataḥ leader Marwān Barghouthi, due to his widespread popularity among the Palestinian population, and the strategic/political implications of building a strong alliance with a key Fataḥ leader391. As outlined in chapter II, Ḥamās’s structure of power has been geographically and politically divided since its early establishment, with power-ratio shifting between “inside” and “outside” according to national and international events, and ideological differences ranging from more moderates inside Gaza and hardliners in the diaspora392. However, as also outlined in chapter II and III, multiple internal conflicting centers of power have emerged with growing interference along the politico-military line, therefore making highly difficult to define a paradigm whereby there could be a clear-cut division “Damascus/external leadership vs. Gaza”, or “all-powerful/hardline Miš’al vs. moderate Hanīyyah”. This be true, it is still essential to underline that during the 2007-2010 frame of time, there has been a significant shift of power from the “outside” towards the “inside” as a consequence of the military takeover in 2007, the siege and international boycott mainly targeting the Gaza-based Ḥamās leadership. As a matter of fact, economic sanctions against Ḥamās backfired, as they turned into a new opportunity for Ḥamās to boost an informal economic sector based on illicit traffic through underground tunnels, thus increasing the economic power of the Gaza leadership, which, until then, had mainly relied on the external leadership for funding. Regarding the degree of the interaction between the Gaza and external leaderships, Usama Ḥamdān, Ḥamās public relations official from Lebanon, talks about “freedom of maneuver” for the Gaza leadership due to policy-adjustments to every day situations, with external leadership “corrections”: The government is making the decisions by itself, and sometimes there are suggestions from the leadership when this or that is not right or acceptable393”. Still, even if tensions along the politico-military had previously erupted in the period following the Oslo Accords, the policy of “co-existence and armed resistance” allowed Ḥamās to keep its ranks united and to overcome ideological divisions that peaked with participation in the 2005 and 2006 elections. However, since the 2006
391 Interview with Addameer. Ramallah, April 2013. 392 See chapter II. 393 “Ḥamās “Foreign Minister” Usama Ḥamdān Talks About National Reconciliation, ʿArafāt, Reform, and Ḥamās's Presence in Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Spring 2011), p.6.
91 victory and the 2007 takeover, the military wing of Ḥamās became increasingly stronger, due to its more direct access to weapons, and the lobbying role vis-à-vis the political leadership through its relations with Salafists and its heavy influence through the prisoners leadership.
Conclusive remarks
The 2007 internecine war between Ḥamās and Fataḥ, which ended with Ḥamās takeover of the Gaza Strip, produced a profound and irreversible division of Palestine in two parallel and competing political entities that came to acquire very similar authoritarian traits. Ḥamās political power in Gaza was strengthened by international sanctions and siege, which allowed it to exert major authoritarian grip over institutions, public space, media, education and economy, thus de facto creating a one-party state in Gaza that had, at times, infringed human rights and basic freedoms in Gaza. Also, despite increased pressure and interference from the military wing, Ḥamās institutional authority managed to exert high degree of coordination over shadow institutions such as the Qassām Brigades, succeeding until 2010 to prevent serious defection and internal splits. Parallel to this, internationally sponsored Fayyād reform plan aimed at institution building in the West Bank succeeded in achieving higher institutional transparency and rule of law but with very low degree of democracy. In this regard, a senior analyst contends that since 2007, the Fayyād-led government did not built new significant institutions, but mainly expanded or regulated pre-existing institutions that had been developed under ʿArafāt394. Also, between 2007 and 2010, the Fayyād-led government became increasingly characterized by an entrenched oligarchy encompassing Fataḥ, with increased concentration of power in the authority and poor legislative branch395. These elements resemble the familiar version of Arab authoritarianism that triggered the Arab Uprisings in 2011, and that affects both governments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Under the banner of the internecine war over security control, both Ḥamās and Fataḥ have managed to entrench in an all-controlling authoritarian one-party state that “institutionalizes itself in multiple forms, in politics and society, so that its continuation seems almost inevitable”396.
394 Brown, “Are Palestinians building a State”, Carnegie Commentary, June 2010. 395 Interview inside Ministry of Awqāf. Ramallah, April 2013. 396 Brown, The Ḥamās-Fataḥ conflict...op.cit.,p.7. 92
IV. What will the Arab Spring deliver for Ḥamās?
The waves of popular protests that have swept across the Arab region, and brought to an end entrenched authoritarian regimes, have had a profound impact on Ḥamās at the geo- strategic and ideological level. In this context, this chapter wants to shed light on the mutual implications and repercussions of the Arab Spring and the Palestinian question, so as to assess the implications of the Arab Spring on Ḥamās’s political leadership, by analyzing its political decisions vis-à-vis geo-political re-orientation and the reconciliation process under altered regional dynamics. In particular, this chapter contends that, despite initial optimism regarding the positive short-term implications of the Arab spring for Ḥamās, a more detailed analysis of historical and political events that took place between January 2011 and July 2013 suggest that the Arab spring did not deliver positive long-term outcomes for Ḥamās. If on the one hand the Arab Spring represented an opportunity to engage in reconciliation talks with Fataḥ and in non-violent resistance, facts on the ground point to a miscalculated exploitation of reconciliation process for strategic political purposes and lip service for the local population. Paradoxically, the Arab Spring resulted in bringing to the table new competing goals: for Ḥamās, the temporary opportunity to a de facto statehood in Gaza, and for ‘Abbās, UN bid and statehood recognition. Moreover, the chapter maintains that reconciliation process was severely hindered by internal competition between Ḥamās external and internal leaders, whereby internal polarization between moderation and radicalization peaked during 2012 internal Šūrā elections. In this context, although it is premature to speak about a definitive split inside Ḥamās, this chapter assesses serious internal threats at the grassroots level.
The Arab Revolts and Palestine. Repercussions and Implications
The popular revolts that have sparked throughout the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and toppled entrenched regimes reverberated throughout the region with direct and indirect implications for Palestine. Accordingly, since the spark of the revolts, there has been a significant increase in literature aimed at analyzing the impact of the Arab revolt over the Palestinian question, especially with emphasis on the supposed renewed relation between Egypt and Gaza. However, literature in Arabic language points also to
93 considerable influence of the Palestinian question as a source of “guide” and “inspiration” for the 2011 Arab revolts397. Although national popular demands that triggered the Arab revolts were essentially a-religious and a-ideological- calling for dignity, reform, and democracy- and thus essentially free from slogans associated with liberation of Palestine and boycott of dialogue with Israel, indeed the Palestinian resistance against the occupation, the long- standing acquiescence of Arab regimes in dealing with Israel, and the accumulated experience of the Palestinians in fighting for dignity, basic rights have represented a source of inspiration for the Arab demonstrators in 2011. If on the one hand, this interrelation is indirect and secondary, at the same time the Arab spring has definitely changed the regional balance of power, creating new regional and political actors, with significant major implications on the Palestinian question. Therefore, because of this mutual interrelation, Arab analysts talked about both “Tā’ṯīr” and “Ta’āṯur”398 to describe the interrelation between the Arab revolts and Palestine, emphasizing the degree of mutual interaction and influence between the two399. In this context, analyst emphasize that national ferment among Palestinians preceded the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, as the post-Oslo era had experienced the emergence of a vibrant civil society, that especially after 2007 had started to confront Israel more directly and the internal Palestinian divide400. Despite its doubtful effectiveness, Palestinian civil society proposed the so-called BDS movement aimed at boycotting Israeli occupation, showing a pro-active approach vis-à-vis the occupation and the peace process401. Technically, the Arab Spring highlighted the international marginalization of the Palestinian question in 2011, with the stalemate of the peace process, and the status quo of the geographically divided Palestinian Authority. In the context of regional turmoil, Palestine did not represent the priority for demanding regime change. However, the Palestine question was resumed and reused by Islamic parties in the second phase of the revolts, when they saw an opportunity to mobilize popular demands to gain political benefits. Likewise, Ḥamās sought to exploit the Arab Spring narrative in order to reduce the international marginalization of Palestine at the regional level. In this context, it is crucially important to recall this interrelation in order to assess the Palestinian influence in
397 Ibrahīm Ibrāš, “At-ṯawra al-’Arabīyya wa Filasṭīn: Istiʿāda al-baʿd al-qawmī Am- taʿzīz al-baʿd al-Islāmī”, Mağalla al-dirāsāt al-Filasṭīnīyyah, No. 87 (Summer 2011), p.7. 398 the two terms respectively mean “to influence” and “to be influenced by”. 399 Ibid., p.8 400 Samʿān Ḫūrī in interview with author. Jerusalem, March 2013. 401 See Hillel Schenker, “What’s wrong with BDS?”, The Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 & 3 Civil Societies Challenges, 2012. 94 providing the source of inspiration for the Arab revolts, and the interrelated “exploitation” of the Palestine question from new emerging Islamic parties. A related example is the Islamic movement in Algeria that added to its name the tag of “hms”, referring to the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine, or when one leader of the Egyptian revolution stated “Palestine, and the practices of the Mubārak regime against the Palestinian population in Gaza in particular, was one of the incentives for the revolt”402. Moreover, in Morocco on 26 March 2012, thousands of Islamist marched to show solidarity with Palestine and chanting slogans that referred to Aḥmad Yāsīn403. Likewise, Ḥamās sought to exploit- and appropriate of- the narrative of the Arab Spring, with the aim of portraying it as an extension of the fight for the liberation of Palestine in order to boost its reputation at the national level (in Gaza) and to undermine the reputation of Maḥmūd ‘Abbās and the Ramallah-based PA404. In this regard, Ḥamās leaders have positively welcomed the election of the Muslim Brotherhood government of Muḥammad Mursī in Egypt, and portrayed it as a victory for the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza: “ Any victory of the Iḫwān in Cairo equals a victory for Ḥamās here in Gaza”, and also “Islam is on the rise, the period of international isolation comes to an end”405. Miš’al also commented “The Arab Spring was also a major strategic development in the path to liberating Palestine and confronting the Zionist project”406. Ḥamās Prime Minister, Ismaʻīl Hanīyyah officially stated that “the Arab revolts had a positive impact on the Palestinian question, as the Palestinians were the major beneficiaries of such revolts- especially the Egyptian revolution- that brought to an end an entrenched regime that conspired against its own people and against the Palestinians in Gaza”407. Also Maḥmūd Zahār during his speech at the eight session of the National Conference in Beirut reaffirmed the mutual implication of the Palestinian cause for the Arab revolutions: “We feel that during these days, the seeds of the resistance and Intifāḍah that began in Palestine during the eighties […] significantly contributed to this change is that we live in the shadows these days”408.
402 Mustaqbal Ḥamās fī żill al- Rabīʿ al-ʿarabī...op.cit., p.22. 403 “At least 11,000 join pro- Palestine March in Morocco”, Reuters, 26 March 2011, available at: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=471098 (accessed October 2013) 404 Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, Bašīr Bašīr, Hišām Aḥmed in interview with author. March and September 2013. 405 Ḥamās PLC member in Ramallah, interview with author. April 2013. 406 “Waṯīqa sīyyāsīyyah bi-qalam Ḫālid Mišʿal: al-fikr as-sīyyāsī li-Ḥarakat Ḥamās fī żill aḫir at-taṭāwwūrāt”, Zaytūna Center for Studies and Consultations, 19 March 2013 http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/38590.html 407 Mustaqbal Ḥamās fī żill al- Rabīʿ al-ʿarabī...op.cit., p.53. 408 See also Marzūq Statement: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7B6%2Bs6M DXypLInhlpJvyBT95EXqF3KvCy12QoNae8Mhn8teS6RuWzB12vtcDQautuqKNFLxpksWIAM%2BFHwsLnKl 98b4iwMoIzuRUqPzrL%2B2M%3D#.Ttn3MVrHKi0.twitter 95 The same logic applies to Ḥamās’s attempt to re-integrate within the Global Muslim Brotherhood409. Despite Ḥamās sources assured that Ḥamās bid for membership in the Muslim international organization is not related to the recent developments in the region sparked by the Arab revolts410, it is assumed that this move was indeed triggered by Ḥamās’s calculations of future co-optation with the wider Muslim Brotherhood movement, so as to increase international recognition and to show moderate face and willingness to engage in transformation from a resistance to a social movement411. Ḥamās’s sudden re- exploitation of the Muslim Brotherhood narrative in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 revolt hides more strategic implications than ideological reasons. As a matter of fact, despite being considered the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in its Charter, Ḥamās establishment in 1987 represented more an internal “coup” of the younger and more militant activists in the Gaza Strip, in contrast with the old guard of the mother organization. When the Arab revolts reached out to Palestine, both the Ramallah and Gaza governments were consolidating their power through institutions-controlling, social, political and economic control amidst growing poverty and starvation, especially in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority412. According to the polls, when the revolution started, trust in local government was at the lowest minimum, and the majority of Palestinians demanded for regime change both in the West Bank and in Gaza, calling for resumption and effective implementation of reconciliation accords. In the West Bank, demand for regime change was linked to the PA’s failure to pursue reunification and reconciliation, to continued violations of human rights by PA security services, and to the cooperative relationship the PA security services enjoyed with the Israeli security services despite the diplomatic stalemate. Importantly, Fataḥ’s lack of legitimacy in the West Bank – since it had technically lost the 2006 elections- and ‘Abbās mandate as President had expired in January 2010, in the context of the deadlock of the Peace process, made the risk of popular uprising increasingly high in the West Bank. In Gaza, there has been increasing dissatisfaction for the Ḥamās government stemming from economic hardships, political authoritarianism, and parallel rise in grassroots support for more radical groups such as Islamic Ğihād413. In 2011 demand for regime change in the West Bank was especially high among the youth, with more than
409 “Inḍimām Ḥamās lil-tanżīm al-‘ālamī lil-‘iḫwān al-muslimīn”, 11 December 2011: http://islamtoday.net/albasheer/artshow-12-159971.htm 410 Ivi. 411 Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, interview with author. Bethlehem, April 2013. 412 Ibrāš... ṯawra al-ʿarabīyyah...op.cit., p.,12. 413 Datas provided by PCRS to author. Ramallah. April 2013. 96 one-third of West Bankers believed that there was a need to demonstrate regime change, and one-quarter indicated a willingness to participate in popular demonstrations414. In Gaza, popularity had dramatically dropped since Ḥamās’s take over and worsened due to the government inability to pay salaries to the public sector, and by the overall perception of political continuity with the previous PA government, as well as spread perception that Ḥamās policies are the main obstacle to reconciliation415. Palestinian popular activism gathered around the Palestinian “Ṯawra wal-Karāma”, the 15 March Movement, Sharek Youth Forum, the Independent Youth Movement, the Palestinian Youth Parliament and the Jerusalem Youth Parliament416, and under the slogan “aš-Šaʿb yurīd inhā' al-Inqisām417”, called for a definitive end to geographical and political split of the Palestinian Authority and effective implementation of reconciliation with integration of civil and military apparatus in one unified representative government, reform of the PLO with inclusion of Ḥamās and Islamic Ğihād, and a unified strategy to fight occupation418. According to a member of the Palestinian Youth Parliament, both Ḥamās and Fataḥ attempted to co-opt these movements so as to contain their revolutionary impact and threat to their authority by infiltrating in demonstrations so as to control them419. For example, the repressive measures adopted against pro-national unity assemblies in March 2011 in Gaza, highlight Ḥamās repressive policy towards society. Accordingly, when popular assemblies took place in Gaza between March 15th-19th 2011, Ḥamās understood that banning them would undermine its political position, especially considering the newly altered regional environment with Egypt’s Brotherhood on the rise, and prospects to ease blockade in the Gaza Strip420. On march 14th Ḥamās issued a permit for holding a public assembly, providing slogans and banners with a Ḥamās “tilt”, while the day after, when Palestinian youth changed the place of the demonstration in order to keep it a-political, Ḥamās security forces raided the assembly leaving 50 people wounded421.
414 Ibid. 415 PSRC datas given to author. June 2013. 416 Passia Conference in Ramallah, 24 April 2013. Se also: Jacob Høiglit “The Palestinian Spring that was not: The Youth and Political Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 2013), pp. 343-359. 417 "the population demands the end of the division" 418 Interviews with Palestinian Youth activists, East Jerusalem, December 2012. 419 Palestinian member of Youth Parliament, author interview. East Jerusalem. April 2013. 420 Mukhimer T., The rise of Ḥamās as a Non-State actor resembling government, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2013, p. 81. 421 Addameer interview with author. Ramallah. March 2013 and HRW “Gaza, Stop suppressing peaceful protests", march 19 2011: http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/19/gaza-stop-suppressing-peaceful-protests
97 Despite the long-standing history of national movement in Palestine that took shape during the two Intifāḍah422, the older guard of the Palestinian National movement saw with skepticism the renewed activism in the West Bank and Gaza strip in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring423. In fact, because of the youth’s refusal to become affiliated with one particular party, their agenda did not attract a broad consensus among the older generations, resulting in a weakly organized and unified movement that was easily co-opted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Geopolitical reorientation: Challenges and Opportunities
The Arab spring represented a major watershed in the history of the Middle East, with repercussions and long-term implications still blurred. For Ḥamās, the geo-political regional re-orientation produced by the Arab spring presented both an opportunity and a challenge at the strategic and ideological level. Retrospectively, after almost three years since the spark of the revolts, it is fair to assert that the Arab spring have produced short- term positive outcomes for Ḥamās, but numerous setbacks in the long run at the strategic level. Short-term Opportunities stemmed from the idea that the toppling of Fataḥ’s strong Arab ally, the Egyptian president Ḥusnī Mubārak parallel to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, would represent a major benefit for Ḥamās. Therefore, Mubārak ’s fall and victory of Mursī in the 2011 elections (and empowerment of other Islamic parties in Tunisia and Libya) persuaded Ḥamās that it could finally achieve the goal of formally governing the Gaza Strip and ending its diplomatic isolation424. In this regard, and in relation to what is described above, Ḥamās sought to exploit the Arab spring narrative, and the victory of Islamic parties in order to boost the Palestinian question at the international level425. According to Ḥamās logic, Palestine had to benefit from the Arab revolts, in same degree that the Palestine question had contributed to their occurrence: the war, the siege and the steadfastness and the victory of Ḥamās represented all key elements that lightened up the Arab revolts throughout the Middle East in 2011426. Also, positive calculations stemmed from Ḥamās idea that the Muslim Brotherhood parties in Egypt and Tunisia would share the same vision of Ḥamās about the Palestine
422 In this regards see: Ibrāš, At-ṯawra al-ʿarabīyya....op.cit., pp.7-11. 423 Sam’an Khoury, former militant in the Palesitnian national movement during the First Intifāḍah, interview with author. Jerusalem, March 2013 424 Mustaqbal Ḥamās fī żill al- Rabīʿ al-ʿarabī...op.cit. pp.43-4. 425 Ivi. 426 Ivi. 98 question and its central and priority role in the region427. Therefore, seeking international recognition, immediately after the electoral victory in the elections in Tunisia of Islamic Party an-Nahḍa, Ḥamās was allowed to hold a political rally in Tunisia for the first time in history, where it praised “The liberation of Tunisia will, God willing, bring about the liberation of Jerusalem”428. Later on, Miš’al attended a conference of the an-Nahḍa party where he re-insisted, “liberation of Palestine must be addressed through a new Muslim- Arab strategy”429. Similarly, in January 2012, Miš’al travelled to Jordan for the first time since the movement’s expulsion in 1999, after King of Jordan’s move to try to appease increasing pressures coming from the local Muslim community. This event is remarkable, as Miš’al went to Amman accompanied by Qatar’s Prince Šaīḫ Tamīm bin Ḥamad Al-Ṯānī, pointing to the new hegemonic regional role as an international mediator, played by Qatar in the aftermath of the Arab Spring430. The role of Qatar in sponsoring Ḥamās was crucial in boosting Ḥamās positive media presence through Al-Ğazīra channel431. Moreover, Prime Miniser Hanīyyah in mid-late 2011 undertook an international tour across the Arab region, visiting Egypt, Sudan, Qatar, Tunisia, Kuwait, Turkey, Iran and the UAE432. Likewise, in 2012, Gaza received international delegations from Switzerland433, an official visit from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian salafist party An-Nūr434, and Turkey attempted to visit Gaza on a number of occasions, but had to refrain due to mounting U.S and Egyptian pressure (after military-backed “popular coup” that saw the fall of Mursī in July 2013), and pledged to provide Ḥamās with humanitarian aid aimed at the reconstruction of Gaza435. More importantly, for Ḥamās the Arab spring represented a major threat to Israeli regional ambitions and security concerns, with fears of an Islamist
427 Aḥmad Yūsif, Ḥamās senior adviser to the Prime Minister stated “the changes taking place in the Arab arena will come in favor of the Palestinian cause”. He said “The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt came to change the political reality that followed those systems by the use of repressive methods against the peoples or through a link to its policies of Western service to their personal interests”, 24 April 2011: إسرائيل-كيان-زوال-في-سيساعد-العربية-الأنظمة-سقوط-يوسف-أحمد/http://paltoday.ps/ar/post/107196 428 “Ḥamās representative addresses Tunisian political rally”: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/15/hamas-representative-addresses-tunisian-political-rally/ 429“Mešʿal yadʿū fī mu’tamar al-ʿām lī-ḥizb an-Nahḍa at-tūnisī ilā "ṭay ṣafḥa” al-mufawaḍāt maʿa ‘Isra’īl”, -العام-المؤتمر-في-يدعو-مشعلNaharnet, 13 July 2012, available: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/ar/46381- اسرائيل-مع-المفاوضات-صفحة-طي-الى-التونسي-النهضة-لحزب 430 “Al-’Arabī yya, 30 January 2012, available: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/30/191383.html 431 Ḫālid Ḥrūb, “How al-Jazeera’s Arab spring advanced Qatar’s foreign policies”, Europe’s World, autumn 2011: http://europesworld.org/2011/10/01/how-al-jazeeras-arab-spring-advanced-qatars-foreign-policies/ 432 https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=96586 433 Al-Ahrām, 29 October 2011: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/13/71/132061.aspx 434 “Egypt Salafist leader visit Gaza Strip”, Ma’an News Agency, 21 April 2012, available at http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=478305 435 In particular, Turkey denies providing Ḥamās with “direct” cash, and insists that Turkey aid to Gaza is exclusively confined to development projects and reconstruction. See: “Turkey denies promise of 300m $ aid to Ḥamās”, The Jerusalem Post, 30/1/2012, availble: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Turkey-denies- promise-of-300m-aid-to-hamas 99 takeover in the region. These fears were further enflamed by Iran’s media campaign for the spread of Islamic values in Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Tunisia and Libya436. Israel’s major concern regards the possible security threat posed by the post-Assād Syria, after the polarization of the Syrian opposition in a blurred spectrum of overlapping Ğihādist militias, and the purported chemical arsenal of the Syrian regime437. Crucial to Ḥamās’s assessments of the short-term opportunities of the Arab Spring is the regional rise of Islamic non-violent groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Ḥamās had already proved prior to the Arab Spring, to wisely switch from armed violence to non-armed struggle and social activism when needed. Also, during 1990s and up to the second Intifāḍah (see chapter II), Ḥamās’s learning curve showed a progressive integration within the normalized political system, de facto proving capable of holding a ceasefire with Israel and to contain armed radical groups in Gaza438. The above mentioned visit to Jordan represented indeed a shy attempt for Jordan to keep up with the increased regional influence of the Islamic parties, while for Ḥamās on the one hand, it showed Ḥamās’s sensibility to regional developments- especially in Syria, forcing it to reconsider new regional alliances, at the same time, the visit embodies Ḥamās perception of the Arab spring as an opportunity to exploit to seek international recognition and rapprochement to Western-liked Arab states439. Moreover, an official declaration of King ʿAbdullāh shows commitment in not allowing Ḥamās to re-open its external offices in Jordan, and highlights the need of negotiations as the sole possibility to resolve the Palestinian question440. Crucially, Ḥamās liaison with Qatar and Jordan, two countries with strong economic and political ties with the U.S, could imply for Ḥamās the need to engage more actively in moderation, in the light of seeking normalization and de facto recognition at the international level. Accordingly, Aḥmad Yūsif, Ḥamās’s political adviser declared: “Under Mursī’s leadership, the Ḥamās movement will adopt a more moderate course, and we have received during the last stage many pieces of advise, saying that we should adopt a moderate position”441.
436 See: Ali Parchami, “The Arab Spring: View from Teheran”, Contemporary Politics, Vol.18, No. 1 (March 2012), pp.35-52. 437 Ḫalīl Šahīn, "Al-muṣālaḥa al-Filasṭīnīyyah bayn naʿī ʿamalīyyah as-salām wa tağāhhul durūs al-rabīʿ al- ʿarabī”, Mağalla al-dirāsāt al-Filasṭīnīyyah No.87, (Summer 2011), pp.132-3. 438 Palestinian analysts. Interview with author. Jerusalem, April 2013. 439 According to one report, Jordanian rapprochement to Ḥamās started because of growing fears that ‘Abbās could make a deal with Israel without consulting Jordan about the refugees. See: “Light at the end of their Tunnels? Ḥamās & the Arab Uprisings, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 129 (14 August 2012): 2 440 “Interview with King ʿAbdullāh II”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4 (March 2012): 19-21 441 In this statement, Yūsif stated: “I am reassured that the West will deal with Ḥamās and removed from the terrorism list because the group in the past 4 years has shown moderate intellectual and political flexibility” http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=498685 100 However, despite immediate international boost and recognition, the new regional geopolitical dynamics came with a price, bringing about new significant challenges in the mid-long term. The most significant challenge of the Arab spring for Ḥamās has been how to deal with the worsening of the Syrian crisis, bringing Ḥamās before a strategic crossroads. On the one hand, the movement felt the pressure to show gratitude and political support to a long-standing political ally, which has welcomed Ḥamās’s external leadership after the expulsion from Jordan in 1999, and which had helped Gaza with 20 million dollars aid during Operation Cast Lead442. Moreover, the presence of the external leadership’s offices in Syria allowed Ḥamās to build a strong tie with Iran and Ḥizbu’llāh - the so-called “Axis of Refusal”, resulting in rich financial aid as well as military equipment, weaponry and fighting techniques. According to a report, Ḥamās’s strategic concerns about the consequences of leaving Syria stemmed from the fact the Assād regime still owned Ḥamās’s assets such as buildings, cars, camps and associations443. Also, despite Shi’a-Sunni ideological differences between Ḥizbu’llāh, the Alawīyyah of Assād, and Iran, Ḥamās shared the strategic and ideological total rejection and notion of armed resistance against the state of Israel, therefore Ḥamās represented for Iran a strategic foothold on the Mediterranean cost, posing a major security threat to Israel444. On the other hand, before taking the decision to leave Syria, Hamas was careful to seize the opportunity to strengthen its "biological" ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political parties were benefitting from the Arab Revolts, in Egypt and Tunisia. Secondly, Hamas had to take into account the hundreds of thousands of Palesitnian refugees living in Syria, that could be seriously and terribly afftected by Hamas's active interference into Syrian civil war445. Moreover, the uprising in Syria certainly presented Ḥamās with ideological concerns: standing as an Islamic resistance movement with the main goal of national liberation, siding against popular demands for freedom against a secular authoritarian state would mean damaging its ideological reputation among the Palestinian people, but also at the regional level446. Caught between a rock and a hard stone, throughout the year 2011 Ḥamās external leadership based in Damascus sought to engage in mediation between the Assād regime and the political oppositions, in order to keep all the options open until it
442 “Lights at the end of their tunnels? Ḥamās & the Arab Uprisings”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No.129 (14 August 2012), p.3. 443 Ibid., p. 5. 444 Interview with Dr. Aḥmad Hišām, Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, Muḥammad Dağğāni, Munṯer Dağğāni. Jerusalem and Bethehem. March- April 2013. 445 During the Gulf War, ʿArafāt had supported Saddām's invasion of Kuwait and opposed the US coalition to attack Iraq. This decision resulted in the harsh retaliation on the Palestinian population in Kuwait, and many Palestinians had the flee the country. 446 Ibid. 101 was necessary to take a decisive position. Accordingly, after Šaīḫ Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī ’s condemnation of the Assād regime in defense of the popular demands of the Syrian people, the Assād government called Ḥamās to publicly reject al-Qaraḍāwī ’s position, especially after Arabic media reported that Ḥamās did not criticize al-Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī ’s words447. In response, Ḥamās denied standing by al-Qaraḍāwī ’s positions, but simultaneously took a “conciliatory”- but ambiguous- official position by advocating an end to the conflict “in a way satisfy the aspirations of the Syrian people and maintains the stability of Syria and its internal integration. In the light of all this we reaffirm our standing besides our brothers in Syria, both its leadership and people”448. However, the Assād government urged Ḥamās to issue a more explicit statement regarding its position vis-à-vis the crisis and still in April 2011 Ḥamās re-attempted to engage in mediation – when it consulted with Iran and Ḥizbu’llāh in order to propose to Assād a number of political reforms to meet some of the opposition’ aspirations. However, tensions eventually mounted on Naksa Day, when Palestinian refugees in Yarmk camp in Damascus assaulted the pro-Assād PFLP-GC449 headquarters that sparked a violent reaction killing fourteen, and the Syrian Forces bombarded the Palestinian Yarmūk Refugee Camp, killing at least 20 people450. After these episodes, for Ḥamās it became increasingly hard to reassert communication with the Syrian opposition, which saw in all Palestinian factions- Ḥamās included- an exploitation of the Syrian crisis for achieving their national/resistance goals451. Facing the growing risk of a regional spillover, Ḥamās external representative in Lebanon, ʿAlī Barakat, held meetings with Deputy of Ḥarīrī in order to ensure the conditions in the Palestinian camps and to prevent any tension within the camp reflecting the ongoing crisis in Syria and Lebanon452. After the external leadership decided to leave Damascus453, tensions between the two governments reached their peak when Ḥizbu’llāh accused Ḥamās of sending
447 Maan News Agency: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=374955 448 2 April 2011: https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=769474 449 The PFLP-GC was established in 1968 from a split within the PFLP in Lebanon. During the Syrian conflict, they sided with the Assād regime. 450 “Syarian Army resumes shelling Yarmūk camp”, Ma’an News, 4 August 2012: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=509762 451 “Lights at the end of their tunnels? Ḥamās & the Arab Uprisings”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No.129 (14 August 2012), p.8, Note 68. 452 Ḥamās Communiqué, 31 August 2012: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7e2TftY40q1 QRw4YKqPzvHemInIxH41XGisjXSjRMYM2hpfhj8KAvddb4TCxKHKOHk0%2B48Cvp18cV57cd3bdt4zEICC M7Wuf7gHtVgxvS6do%3D#.UEHHrsUEjaY.twitter 453 According to a Ḥamās communiqué, the external leadership was forced to leave Damascus following a governmental raid at Ḥamās headquarters: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7PFnWXDJ C0UzEfIYsAP%2BbdzCN2%2BQExzO%2Bk3ZEVdU6nFW7afv2DFHu4pKCYDwiapoY7kUtbQBxUhdifFgE McJgvqdo9UhG8Dpq6hl2tfvVkus%3D#.UKTVHFruqPU.twitter 102 Palestinian fighters to support the Syrian opposition in Qusayr against the regime. Despite Ḥamās rejected any interference within the Syrian war454, Iran started to reduce its funding to Ḥamās, and a Ḥamās’s official Ḫalīl al-Ḥayya confirmed that Iranian support stopped before the 2012 November operation “Pillar of Defence”455. Accordingly, since the first war in Gaza in 2008-2009, Ḥamās had started to receive funding – around 250 million USD- from Qatar for reconstruction and development projects in Gaza456. Ḥamās insist that external funding does not compel Ḥamās to adapt to the donor foreign policy457, Qatar is not funding Ḥamās for charity: Qatar is not funding Ḥamās in isolation from its relationship with the United States –holding the U.S biggest military base in the region- therefore, Qatar is supporting Ḥamās to contain it and co-opt it458. Since the spark of the Arab Spring, the role of Qatar in Palestine has been welcomed with growing criticism, especially in the West Bank, and it sparked political embarrassment when Fataḥ-affiliated political groups in the University of Tulkarem set on fire the image of the Emir of Qatar during the student electoral campaign459. Accordingly, if on the one hand Qatar has sponsored Palestinian reconciliation in 2012, its early mediating role in 2011 has triggered fears that it might widening the existing gap between the two governments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as Ḥamās has perceived Qatar’s support as a strategic boost vis-à-vis ‘Abbās: if on the one hand during the visit the Emir of Qatar emphasized the need for reconciliation between Palestinian parties, he also did not plan to visit Maḥmūd ‘Abbās in the West Bank. Importantly, the change of leadership in Qatar sparked fears among Ḥamās external leaders that the new Qatar leader would adopt a different approach towards the Palestinian cause460. Similarly to the PLO expulsion from Lebanon in 1982 and its relocation to Tunis resulted in opening a new phase of “dialogue” with Israel, likewise,
454 Ḥamās statement: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7Gz%2BXvu %2Bt8g83BfJsIU4moaGehsQLdghLFLxYelnQQ0EdLJIpkRs8yhyCds1zoNVDWuSmN3HifH6PcMohb50w6r WbgkkG7BvytriBMqyq2x4%3D#.UFsYSHdiplk.twitter Also a Ḥamās PLC member in the West Bank: “Ḥamās in Syria tried to facilitate a political solution, but we couldn’t. Since we left Syria we haven’t interfered with Syria internal political situation in a way that would harm the Palestinian people”, Interview with author. Ramallah, April 2013 455 “Al-qiyyādī fī Ḥamās Ḫalīl al-Ḥayya fī muqābila ḥaṣrīyya maʿa “al-Monitor” nabḥaṯ ʿan daʿm badīl lil- 'Īrānī", Al-Monitor, 27 June 2013: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/06/hamas-interview-hayya-gaza-iran- hezbollah-support.html 456 “Qirā’a hādi’a fī ʿalāqa Ḥamās wa Qaṭar", Al-Monitor, 22 April 2013: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/04/hamas-qatar-relationship- independence.html 457 ʿAzīz Dweīk interview with author, Ramallah, March 2013. 458 Phone interview with Hišām Aḥmad. September 2013. 459 Ma’an News Agency, 2 April 2013 http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=581185 460 Ḥamās leader, Izzat al-Rišq called on Tamīm to follow his father’s steps in dealing with Palestine: html.والده-خطى-على-تميم-الشيخ-لسير-نتطلع-حماس/http://paltimes.net/details/news/42954 103 Ḥamās’s presence in Doha will likely require further moderation in the long run, and it will have to come to terms with Qatar relations with Israel and the United States.
Ḥamās-Mursī relation
Ḥamās warmly praised the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, calling for Mursī’s electoral victory as the new President of Egypt as an equal victory for Ḥamās in Gaza. According to Ḥamās’s external relations spokesperson Usama Ḥamdān, Mursī’s victory in Egypt is a major success for the Muslim Brotherhood resurgence in the region, the renewed international leading role of Egypt, and the positive influence that this will have in fostering Palestinian political reconciliation and end to Gaza blockade461. Optimism within Ḥamās was triggered by the natural “affinity” and common origins of both governments in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and in ideological opposition to Israel, however, during one year government, the Mursī-led government proved to be seriously counterbalanced by the pragmatic and strategic need to retain international consensus and a moderate foreign policy towards Israel with an ambiguous stance vis-à- vis Ḥamās462. In the immediate aftermath of the election of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Ḥamās leaders officially expressed their understanding for Egypt’s internal problems and governmental challenges, and the non-immediate relevance of the Palestine cause for the newly elected Egyptian government. Accordingly, Ḫālid Miš’al stated during a press conference in Cairo on May 2011 “Egyptian stability is necessary, and Palestinian would never be a cause of Egyptian strife”, highlighting Ḥamās’s willingness of not interfering with Egyptian internal affairs463. Also, on Nakba Day, he stated “As a Palestinian resistance movement, we cannot expose Egypt to the burden or to more that it can handle now”464, however Egypt’s stance vis-à-vis Palestine continued to remain ambiguous throughout its year in government. Important to assess relations with Egypt, is the impact of Gaza geographical isolation, which is highly dependent on the Rafaḥ border- the only one that is not under direct Israeli control. Therefore, any policy in opposition with Egypt would seriously undermine Ḥamās’s chance to accomplish its final goal of establishing de fact state in Gaza, by controlling the southern border.
461 “Ḥamdān: al-intiṣār al-ṯawra al-miṣrīyyah yaḥtāğ ilā Uḫrā Filasṭīnīyyah li-inhā’ al-inqisām wa ‘inğah al- Zaytūna lahā”, Ḥamās official website, 25/06/2012 (accessed December 2013) See also: http://shehab.ps/ar/index.php?act=post&id=15267 462 “Ḥamās and Mursī: Not so easy between brothers”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27/05/2013. 463 http://www.felesteen.ps/backup%20web/sub.php?page=details&nid=19981 464 Ibid. 104 Firstly, the 2010 electoral program of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt addressed also the “Palestinian Question” in chapter IV, and called for “recognition of resistance against occupation under Islamic principles”, and “resistance against all means of economic, political, security and cultural normalization with Israel” (the Zionist entity in the original ‘Arabī c), thus reiterating the ideological position of the Muslim Brotherhood against the Camp David Accord465. However, despite an initial short period of warming up with Arab states, when Mursī joined the African Union Summit in Addis Abeba stressing importance of African-Cairo relations, and historical participation in the Non-Aligned Movement summit with close-up to Iran, Mursī’s policy has shown significant continuity with Mubārak ’s foreign policy aimed at maintaining status-quo with Israel, so as to ensure U.S annual financial aid to Egypt466. In this context, following the formation of the new government, Foreign Minister Nabīl al-‘Arabī stated referring to Camp David “The agreement between the two countries is not sacred, and there are some commas that can be changed, however, we will not deal with those for the moment”467. Also in February 2011, couple of weeks before he was assigned the portfolio of Foreign Minister, Nabīl al- ‘Arabī stated, “It is time to review our foreign policy”468. However, foreign policy in Egypt has been linked with internal dynamics of political economy, whereby the Egypt of Mursī is still highly dependent on external financial assistance from the U.S, turning Egypt as the second largest recipient of bilateral foreign assistance after Israel469. Accordingly, more than 50% of Egyptian exports go to the U.S and Europe, where it also originates the majority of foreign direct investment470. Also, crucial to understand Mursī’s foreign policy continuity with Mubārak is the growing economic power of new Muslim businessmen that significantly enriched during the Infitah period of economic liberalization. In the 1990s an “Islam of the market” emerged around new young educated intifāḍah that are Muslim but not identified with any specific Muslim organization. Promoting Islamic economics is also the Sālim Kamīl center for Islamic Economics at al-Azhar University, and a construction company associated with the son of
465 “Al-Barnāmağ al-intiḫābī lil-Iḫwān al-muslimīn li-intiḫābāt mağlis aš-šaʿb 2010”, http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=10125 (accessed: September 2013) 466 Jannis Grimm and Stephan Roll, “Egyptian foreign policy under Mohamed Mursī”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs”, SWP Comments 35 (Novermber 2012): 2 467 Mohsen Muḥammad Ṣāleḥ ed., Azma al-Mašrūʿ al-waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī, Markaz Al-Zaytūna lil- dirāsāt wa al-istišārāt Beirut, 2013, p.101. 468 Al-Šurūq, 19 February 2011: http://www.shorouknews.com/mobile/columns/view.aspx?cdate=19022011&id=a9db0c89-8594-4df9-8e22- d10d52c13bc9 469 Accordingly, the U.S has provided Egypt with a total of 71.6 billion Dollars financial aid, with yearly 1.3 Billion dollars in military aid, since the signing of the the Camp David Accords in 1979. See: “Jeremy M.Sharp, Egypt: Background and U.R relations”, CRS Report for Congress (27 June 2013), pp. 8-9. 470 Ivi. 105 one of the Muslim brothers executed after the presumed attack on Nāṣir in 1954471. Moreover, the pattern of economic liberation as a form of patronage redistribution- though partial privatizations- was also a mean of Mubārak to contain and co-opt “systemic oppositions”, Muslim Brotherhood included, therefore making these oppositions event more intentioned to maintain the political and economic status-quo472. With all these strategic national considerations, Egypt’s foreign policy and stance towards Ḥamās proved to be more pragmatic and less “Islamist”, especially in the domain of movement and trade between Egypt and Gaza, security coordination in the Sinai and mediation in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Maḥmūd Zahār, after a 2011 visit of a Ḥamās delegation to the new Foreign Minister Nabīl Al-‘Arabī to Egypt reported that the status of Rafaḥ crossing is in a temporary phase, which reflects the transitional phase in Egypt between the military rule and the interim government, but that they agreed on some mechanism for not closing it completely, allowing the crossing of 300 passengers daily, with acceptance/rejection notification given after the 48 hours473. Regarding the status of the Rafaḥ crossing, the first point of contention is around the underground tunnels controlled by Ḥamās. As described in chapter III, Hanīyyah’s government had strived to formalize illicit traffic through underground tunnels by imposing heavier taxes and proposing to establish a free-trade zone along the common border with Egypt by expanding the Rafaḥ crossing. The move, which would possibly cut economic ties with Israel and the Palestinian Authority represents Ḥamās intention to declare full independence in the Gaza Strip474, despite Ḥamās leaders Zahār and Bardawīl have denied such reports475. However, Ḥamās intention to obtain direct control over its border with Egypt, through the free-trade zone around the Rafaḥ crossing, represents a significant threat to Egyptian security, political and economic interests476. In fact, according to the Agreement on Movement and Access signed in 2005 between Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the United States, the Rafaḥ crossing can only allow transit of people and humanitarian aid, while all other goods- including
471 See: Patrick Haenni, L’islam de marché, Paris, Editions de Seuil et la République des Idées (2005), and Laura Guazzone and Laura Pioppi ed., The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization. The Reconstructing of State power in the Middle East, Reading: Ithaca Press (2012). 472 Ulrich G. Wurzel in Laura Guazzone and Laura Pioppi ed., The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization. The Reconstructing of State power in the Middle East, Reading: Ithaca Press (2012), pp.105- 9. 473 ʿOmar Šaʿbān interview with author, Novermber 2013. 474 Ivi. 475 Qassām Communiqué, 24 July 2012: http://www.Qassam .ps/news-5953-Bardawil_No_Palestinian_state_in_or_without_Gaza.html and http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/Ḥamās-leader-says-no-plans-declare-gaza-liberated 476 Accordingly, Egyptian official have declined the Free Trade Zone as “ harmful to Palestinian cause”: http://www.palpress.co.uk/arabic/?action=detail&id=45592 106 goods, construction materials, medicines etc- have to pass through the Kerem Shalom crossing477. Effectively, since the Egyptian revolts in 2011, the Rafaḥ crossing has been opened up slightly more, with number of people crossing increasing from 60,000 in 2009 to 500,000 in 2012478. However, despite keeping the Rafaḥ crossing open, Mursī still showed to proceed in continuity with the 2005 agreement, with clear reservations about changing the status of the Rafaḥ crossing. In fact, a change in the status quo of the Rafaḥ crossing would imply the definitive abandonment of the Agreement (which had expired already in 2007 but Egypt had continued to abide by its rules for other 7 years), thus giving Israel the opportunity to claim that it does not control any of the Gaza borders, and that therefore it can no longer fall under the “occupier” category under international law479. Thus, Mursī is fully aware that the Free Trade Zone agreement in Rafaḥ would surely put Gaza under direct “administration” of Egypt, besides the fact that Egypt is also more interested in renegotiating the Industrial Qualifying Zone agreement with Israel and the United States that could be seriously undermined by a Mursī-Ḥamās trade collaboration in Rafaḥ. Therefore, reflecting these competing strategic assessments, in late May 2011 Cairo allowed women of all ages and boys under eighteen and men above forty to enter Egypt without security inspection, however in practice travel has become more difficult and the import/ export of goods remained blocked, thus showing significant continuity with the Mubārak era480. Also, Mursī strove to reduce the tunnel smuggling and according to Maḥmūd al-Šawwā, head of the Association of oil and gas companies in Gaza, there has been a significant decline in fuel provided to Gaza through smuggling tunnels with Egypt, claiming that fuel supply dropped more than 30% due to Egyptian tighter control on Egyptian gas stations and roads leading to Rafaḥ481. Secondly, Egypt-Israel security coordination in the Sinai in targeting Salafist groups highlights the rhetoric implied by the Muslim Brotherhood in their electoral program and the reality of pragmatic cost/benefits calculations. The Hanīyyah’s government has proved significantly effective in co-opting and controlling/tackling Gaza-based extremist groups, and especially after Mursī’s victory, it became vital for Ḥamās to prove that it can be
477 “Agreement on Movement and Access”, OCHA report, November 2006, Available: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/AMA_One_Year_On_Nov06_final.pdf (accessed December 2013); See also detailed map of Movement and Access in Gaza provided by Gisha NGO: http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/map-2013/map-english-2013.pdf (accessed December 2013). 478 ʿUmar Šaʿbān, “Ḥamās wa Miṣr...bi-ḥāğa lil-diblūmasiyyah aš-šaʿbīyyah”, Al-Monitor, 3 April 2013. 479 Phone Interview with ʿUmar Šaʿbān. November 2013. 480 “Palestinian reconciliation…Plus ça change”, Crisis Group Middle East Report No.110, (20 July 2011),p. 2 481 Al-wasaṭ, 13 february 2012: http://www.alwasatnews.com/3446/news/read/628553/1.html
107 considered a reliable partner in promoting security in the Sinai482. However, despite these attempts, there have been reports of members of the Qassām brigades cooperating informally with Salafist brothers in the Sinai to carry out military attacks in the Sinai. According to a Gaza-based journalist, there have been at least 14 attacks against Egypt- Israel-Jordan’s gas pipeline across 2011, as well as several small-scale attacks targeting Egyptian police in the Sinai483. Tensions further peaked by the 16 May and 5 August attacks in 2012 that eventually resulted in the formation of a joint security committee with Egypt, led by Ḥamās military commander Aḥmad al-Ğaʿbarī, to strengthen bilateral cooperation in security matters484. Also, following the attacks, a security Israeli delegation visited Cairo in order to establish a common security plan to tackle Salafist threat in the Sinai, highlighting the increased bilateral cooperation and common vision between Egypt and Israel vis-à-vis the Sinai question485. Importantly, Egypt is more interested in maintaining the security coordination with Israel so as to secure status quo in the Sinai and, paradoxically, Ḥamās too is interested in allowing these security operations, so as to keep the Al-Qāʿida threat under control- and retain governmental and territorial control over Gaza- thus indicating that Israel is also Ḥamās’s strategic partner in this domain486. This is also why many analysts commented the assassination of Aḥmad al-Ğaʿbarī during operation “Pillar of Defence” in November 2012 by saying that Israel had killed its “subcontractor in Gaza”487. Accordingly, Al- Ğaʿbarī, Ḥamās military commander, was responsible for maintaining security stability along the southern border with Egypt, co-opting the local militant armed groups posing a threat to Ḥamās’s authority in Gaza but also to its external relations with Egypt-and Israel. Importantly, Al-Ğaʿbarī had recently started to acquire new political importance after its active role in carrying out Ḥamās’s indirect negotiations with Israel for the Šalīṭ/prisoners exchange488. Some Arabic press started to talk about a Qatar-backed attempt to reassert
482 After the March 2011 escalation, Ḥamās agreed to offer a ceasefire and held meetings with local factions to halt attacks on Israel: See Ma’an news, 26 March 2011, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=372570. See also: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/19/227321.html 483 Phone Interview with ʿUmar Šaʿbān. November 2013. 484 “Ḥamās and Mursī: Not so easy between brothers”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27/05/201 485 “Maʿārīf: wafd ‘amnī ‘isra’iīlī zāra al-Qāhira baʿda al-‘inqilāb wa ʿazl al-ra’īs mursī lil-ta’kīd min tawāsul at- taʿāwūn al-‘amnī”, Al-Zaytūna Center for Studies and Consultations, 25/08/2013: http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/49405.html 486 Shlomi Eldar, “The Israel-Egypt-Ḥamās triangle in the Sinai”, Al Monitor, http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/israels-egypts-and-hamas-joined-interest-in-the-sinai.html 487 Phone Interview with Israel-based Political and Security Analyst, September 2013. 488 “Israel killed its subcontractor in Gaza”, Haaretz, 14 November 2012: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-killed-its-subcontractor-in-gaza.premium-1.477886 See also “Aḥmad Al-Ğaʿbarī before Kidnapping Šalīṭ: We Succeeded after Many Tryings,” Official Ḥamās Web site, May 5, 2007, www.alqassam .ps/english/?action=showinet&inid=12. 108 internal balance inside Ḥamās in favor of the leader Miš’al, in a moment where hardliners and leaders of the military wing were starting to gain more political power within the Gaza internal political leadership489. Thirdly, the Ḥamās-Mursī relation is marked by the purported international role played by Egypt after the 2011 revolution and, particularly, in mediating ceasefire between Ḥamās and Israel during November 2012 operation “Pillar of Defence”, and the Cairo Reconciliation Agreement in 2011, and the Gilad Šalīṭ490- prisoners exchange in 2011. Despite widespread opinion of Egypt’s renewed international leading role, the November 2012 ceasefire highlighted the limits of Egypt mediating capabilities between Israel and Ḥamās. In fact, contrary to Egypt’s complicit role in “Operation Cast Lead” in 2008-2009, President Mursī stated that until November 13th, Egypt was preoccupied in maintaining calm on both sides, saying that they had an Israeli commitment to uphold the ceasefire491, until when Israel decided to escalate by assassinating Aḥmad al-Ğaʿbarī - Egypt’s primary interlocutor in the Sinai. In this context, despite Israeli Defence managed to assess and destroy Ḥamās military capabilities and in strengthening deterrence492, some analysts contend that the second purpose for the military escalation was that of sending a clear message to Egypt, so as to determine the degree of strength of the new purported regional alliance “Mursī-Ḥamās” in terms of regional diplomacy but also military assets493. Significantly, at a first look, operation “Pillar of Defence” seemed to have strengthened the Ḥamās-Egypt relations, after Egypt’s former Prime Minister Hišām Qandīl travelled to Gaza on the third day of conflict, provided Gaza with medicines and withdrew Egyptian ambAssād or from Tel Aviv494. Also, the text of the November 2012 ceasefire495 brokered by Egypt seemed to have met many of Ḥamās demands such as opening of the crossings and improvement of movement and trade, while on the other side Ḥamās committed to prevent firing rockets inside Israel, while the agreement did not deal with tunnel smuggling and security coordination in the Sinai- Israel’s main concerns496. However, if on the one hand Mursī brokered a ceasefire that was regionally
489 Al- Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda, 2013/4/8, reported in Ma’an News: http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=583399 490 Gershon Barskin speaking at IPCRI Conference in Jerusalem: “The role of third parties in Israel and Palestine”, 18th April 2014. For a detailed account about the Gilad Šalīṭ operation see: “Šalīṭ: min ʿamalīyyah al-wahm al-mutabaddid ilà ṣafqa wafā' al-'Aḥrār”[Šalīṭ: From the “Dispelled Illusion” Operation till “Devotion fo the Free” Deal”], Information Report 22, Beirut: Al-Zaytūna Center (2012). 491 “Lights at the end of their tunnels? Ḥamās & the Arab Uprisings”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, No.129 (14 August 2012): 6 492492 Israel Hayom, 10 Novermber 2011, Further information about Netanyahu’s statements regarding the operation: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Arab/MediaCenter/Events/Pages/eventmate221112.aspx 493 Interview with Palestinian analyst. Jerusalem, March 2013 494 Al-Maṣrī al-yaūm, 15 Novermber 2012: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/243420 495 Details of the November 2012 ceasefire: http://alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?act=post&id=63237 496 Ḥamās stated that the end of the conflict represented a victory for Ḥamās, as it showed Israel’s 109 perceived as a victory for Ḥamās497, in the long-term it also highlighted the limits of the Egyptian diplomacy that lacks from real intentions of damaging relations with Israel by revoking the Camp David Accords, or losing U.S financial aid 498. Also, Ḥamās participation in the 2012 escalation is emblematic to understand Ḥamās’ self-assessment of its control over the Gaza Strip. In fact, contrary to operation “Cast Lead”, in 2012 Ḥamās actively cooperated with Salafist factions in the Gaza Strip in order to carry out military attacks against Israel499. In this context, Ḥamās participation in the conflict explains Ḥamās’s commitment to be included –albeit indirectly- in the final ceasefire agreement, showing its efforts to tackle and control radical militants in Gaza that would be otherwise empowered by the confrontation500. In this regard, Ḥamās is scared that after its external politburo moved away from Damascus, Iran would try to “punish” the movement by funding Gaza-based radical groups to act as “spoilers” within the Ḥamās- Mursī-Israel triangle501. At a first glance, it seemed highly unlikely that Iran would provoke confrontation between radical militant groups and Ḥamās as this would possibly provoke retaliation against its nuclear facilities. However, when reports started to circulate about an imminent nuclear deal between President Rouhani and the U.S, Ḥamās promptly proceeded to reach an agreement with Gaza Salafist, highlighting a new controversial phase in the in the post-Arab spring Middle East between the Salafists and Ḥamās, but also the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As previously noted in chapter III, salafist-Ğihādist groups represent a dire threat to Ḥamās authority in Gaza, as a large proportion of muğāhidīn comes from former Qassām members who left their ranks due to dissatisfaction with the Ḥamās government. In the context of the Arab Spring, the March 2011 escalation has shown Ḥamās vulnerability in the southern border, where the political concerns are the most at stake, given the political transition in Egypt502, therefore pointing that Gaza-based Ğihādi violence in the Sinai
impossibility to destroy Ḥamās: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MD146m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7kGi41O3iV nqzDLWFeriH9qrDRHCU%2bo4j8Zoow4d5zlv7M0bPq6ebSJE8%2fBx6Yj26d4LBNRmBId9wh96QC0tGI5P Sn3zxVQAI8mFgkHx24%3d.twitter
497 See Poll: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p46ejoint.html 498 Mursī to officially keep international treaties http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GztclXEAq7Y 499 Phone Interview with Gaza-based Palestinian journalist. October 2013. 500 “Israel and Ḥamās. Fire and Ceasefire in a new Middle East”, Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 133 (22 November 2012), p. 9. 501 Recently, since the beginning of 2012, reports circulated about weapons belonging to Islamic Ğihād that differ from those possessed by Ḥamās, suggesting that Iran might be sponsoring Islamic Ğihād with the purpose of helping the PLO in Gaza, thus undermining Ḥamās’s hegemony in the Strip. See Al- Ḥayāt al- Ğadīda, 2013/4/8: http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=583399 502 “GOC Southern Command: Ḥamās has lost control over the Gaza Strip”, IDF: http://www.idf.il/1283- 9915-en/Dover.aspx 110 could represent a tremendous hindrance to prevent implementation of Palestinian reconciliation503. According to a report, after the popular-backed military coup in Egypt against President Mursī in July 2013, Ḥamās had started negotiating an eight points agreement with the Gaza Salafist under mediation of Kuwaiti and Qatari Muslim clerics, and Yūsuf al- Qaraḍāwī 504. The final deal commits Ḥamās to stop persecutions against Salafist leaders and to allow for more political, social activities in exchange for ensured security stability and cessation of unilateral military activities against Israel505. These pressures from below that seriously undermine Ḥamās security stability, regional alliances and internal authority of power by fostering internal splits at the military level, recall the same pressures that in 1990s Ḥamās used to pose to Fataḥ and the PLO in the post-Oslo era. Crucially, Salafist groups will continue to employ ideological argumentations in order to gain political/strategic gains506. As a matter of fact, the Ḥamās-Salafist recent agreement did not cover the primary issue of contention between the two factions: the implementation of Šarīʿah law in the Gaza Strip507. Finally, the growing influence of the Salafist in Gaza and Egypt in the post- Mubārak era had a tremendous blow in undermining Ḥamās reputation in the Egyptian streets. As a matter of fact, after the July 2013 coup, there has been a media campaign aimed at discrediting Ḥamās in Egypt so as to exploit the purported Muslim Brotherhood- Ḥamās cooperation in order to crackdown on members of the Mursī political entourage. Qassām leaders have publicly denied their involvement in the recent circle of violence in Egypt, accusing the Ahram journal of providing false reports whereby, according to investigations top Muslim Brotherhood leaders- Ḫairat al-Šāṭer and Muḥammad Badīʿ had collaborated with Ḥamās to attack the army and the police508. In general, what Ḥamās failed to do in the post-Mubārak period- both in the transition phase under the SCAF government and during Mursī’s Presidency- was to establish a dialogue with the other elements of the Egyptian revolution, the nationalist and the leftist, by instead, communicating only with elements of the previous regime or
503 As a matter of fact, violence resurgence was likely linked with the purported invitation from Hanīyyah to ‘Abbās with the purpose of discussing prospects for reconciliation Al-Ayyām, 17 March 2011: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/17-3-2011/p01.pdf 504 “Ḥamās taḥakkama saiṭaratuha ʿalā Ġazza”: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/11/hamas-salafist-gaza- reconciliation.html 505 Ibid. 506 Phone interview with Security and Political Analyst, Benedetta Berti, Hišām Aḥmad,September 2013. 507 Ḥamās taḥakkama saiṭaratuha ʿalā Ġazza…op.cit. 508 Qassām Communiqué, 15 March 2013: http://www.alQassam.ps/arabic/statments.php?id=4769 ; “Taḥqiqāt Qaḍīyyahh al-taḫābur: Badīʿ wa Al-Šāṭer ittifāqan maʿ a Ḥamās ʿ alā muhāğamat al-ğaīš wa as- šurṭā”: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/News/Details/357572# 111 “systemic oppositions” such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, in the post-Mursī phase, Ḥamās was vehemently discredited and accused to interfere with internal Egyptian politics509.
Reconciliation Process: managing the challenges of the Arab Spring
The 2011 Reconciliation Agreement signed in Cairo between Ḥamās and Fataḥ is rooted in the regional changes brought about by the Arab Spring and in strategic national considerations stemming from Palestinian politics. Indeed, the 2011 reconciliation agreement was highly pressed for by the new administration in Egypt, as it was the most strategic option that Egypt had to regain a leading regional role in foreign policy, and it allowed the new government to “move away” from the impasse of the Mubārak - sponsored 2009 Reconciliation agreement510. The Muslim Brotherhood's involvement can also be seen as an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to restrain its Palestinian branch, Ḥamās, in order to improve its own image in advance of the Egyptian elections. Also, strategic considerations played their part: on the one hand, Ḥamās considered reconciliation as a “win-win” situation, as it would prove to the international community its ability to engage in political negotiations and it would not be considered the “spoiler”, and whereas the reconciliation agreement would be implemented, it would bring to the lift of the siege in Gaza. On the other hand, Fataḥ was mainly interested in “pleasing” the new Egyptian administration -after it had lost Mubārak as its ally against Ḥamās in Gaza- and take time before playing the card of the Palestinian bid at the UN.511 In this regard, immediately after Mubārak ’s fall, ‘Abbās travelled to Cairo where he met with General Al-Ṭanṭawī, Issām Šarāf and Foreign Minister Nabīl al-’Arabī, and stressed the utmost importance of Egyptian-Palestinian relations by stating “the bond that links Egypt and Palestine will overcome the current situation and restore its prominent regional role”512. Also, because of the peculiar nature of popular demands in the 2011 revolts, namely social justice, dignity and formal democracy, the new popular assemblies in the West Bank and Gaza represented a serious threat both to Ḥamās in Gaza and ‘Abbās in the West Bank. In the first case, popular unrest and demands for unification would compel Ḥamās with the need to address reconciliation, raising the risk of seeing Fataḥ security
509 “Kaīf taḥawwalat Ḥamās laʿban ra’īsīyyan fī al-wāqiʿ al-miṣrī?”: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/04/hamas-egypt-gaza-relations- change.html 510 “Palestinian Reconciliation... Plus ça change”, Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 110, (20 July 2011), p.7. 511 Ibid, p.7. 512 Al-Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda, 8 April 2011: http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2011/4/8/page1.pdf 112 forces going back to Gaza- and undermine Ḥamās total institutional control in Gaza. In the second case, social unrest in the West Bank-which would surely increase violent clashes with the Israeli authorities- would pose a threat to ‘Abbās security coordination with Israel, causing the risk of losing Washington economic support. Likewise the Gaza counterpart, ‘Abbās was highly distrustful of Ḥamās authorities and suspicious that reconciliation would mean losing control over Ḥamās-affiliated institutions in the West Bank 513. Under these premises, and in the light of regional and national strategic considerations, Ḥamās and Fataḥ in mid-2011 started to re-consider to engage in reconciliation talks in order to reduce the risks posed by the Arab Spring on both areas and governments, but without real intention to bring about long-term national goals514. Interestingly, both governments behaved alike in managing the risks posed by the Arab Spring and in engaging in reconciliation process. As a matter of fact, on the one hand Ḥamās used violence and repression to crackdown on demonstrators all the while providing lip-service and appeasement by publicly showing its commitment to reconciliation, at the same time, ‘Abbās similarly combined repression and co-optation of demonstrations, endorsing reconciliation while diverting international attention towards Palestinian bid at the U.N. as non-member state515. The 2011 Palestinian Reconciliation Agreement signed on May 4th, encompasses provisions of the 2009 Egyptian Reconciliation Document516 and the Understandings that modify or specify some provisions517. As the 2009 document, the 2011 Understanding refers to address Government, PLO, Security and Election committees in order to implement reconciliation agreement. Despite there has been a slight improvement in bridging the two factions’ aspirations- Ḥamās agreed to sign the 2009 Egyptian document and Fataḥ agreed upon choosing members the Election committee by consensus, the 2011 agreement shows clear resemblances with its 2009 predecessor, thus partially explaining the reason for its failure/non-implementation. For example, as in 2009, the 2011 agreement generally provisioned the formation of a unified government that could pave the way for elections- PLC and PNC elections to be held simultaneously- however it did not overcome the obstacles posed by the appointment of the ministers and the Prime Minister. Accordingly, as in 2009, the parties
513 Bašīr Bašīr, interview with author. Jerusalem. April 2013. 514 Ibid. 515 Ibid. 516 See chapter III, p.80: the paper was rejected by Ḥamās as it objected that ‘Abbās would appoint the election committee after consulting with the government and the factions, claiming that in this way ‘Abbās could potentially consult the factions and then appoint whomever it wanted. 517 Arabic text: http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/4978.html, English text: http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=828 113 were divided among the candidature of Salām Fayyād as Prime Minister: a nomination highly supported by ‘Abbās and the U.S, while totally rejected by Ḥamās, under the claim that he is a Western-ally and that can not be a super partes leader518. Also, ‘Abbās insisted that the new government had to adhere to its political program and not be objected to a consensus vote, a claim that Ḥamās utterly rejects. In this regard, Ḥamās leader Maḥmūd Zahār insisted that Ḥamās, nor any other party, should be subjected to ‘Abbās government, being the purpose of the Understanding that of creating a “government of national consensus”519. Also regarding the PLO, the 2011 Agreement re-addressed provisions that were included in the 2005 Cairo Declaration520, providing for the integration of all the parties – Ḥamās and Islamic Ğihād included- in the PLO. Accordingly, the 2011 agreement not only addressed the “development “of the PLO, but it also gave the PLO the capacity to address national and political issues, however without providing exact and precise guidelines for the implementation. As a matter of fact, the text reads “The political parties of both Fateh and Ḥamās agree that the tasks and decisions of the provisional interim leadership cannot be hindered or obstructed, but in a manner that is not conflicting with the authorities of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization”, leaving the PLO issue unsolved, as it is unclear which institutional body will head the supreme Palestinian authority521. Crucially, the security reform- which was the major reason behind the 2007 split and the subsequent failure of the Mecca Agreement, and therefore the most urgent issue hindering political unity- was addressed in a general fashion, under the pretext that such reform will be postponed until general elections take place. Accordingly, the agreement postulates the unification of the three branches of the security apparatus (national security, police, and intelligence), so as to reduce the number of security personnel and to prevent the formation of separate militias. Certainly, the prospect for unification of security forces represents a huge threat to the Israeli-PA security coordination in the West Bank, since the reconciliation process would compel Israel to abandon control over the West
-فتح-يرفض-عباس-و-نيفلسطي-شأن-هو-غزة-على-الحصار-من-جزء-مرزوق-أبو/http://paltoday.ps/ar/post/112107 518 رفح-معبر 519 Al-Quds Al-‘Arabī, 16 May 2011: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2011/05/05-16/All.pdf 520 http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=6938&CategoryId=5 521 http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=828. To know more about the reform of the PLO see Ğamīl Ḥilāl, “PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 149-152. Accordingly, The PNC (the PLO legislative body) relies on a quota system that appoints seats between the factions according to a set quota. This has served Fataḥ to maintain control over the PLO institutions, limiting political competition and democratic development. 114 Bank522. However, PA officials have made sure that coordination with Israel will continue, claiming the Oslo accords and strategic concerns as main reasons523. On the Ḥamās’ side, there is the idea that the Qassām Brigades lie outside the security sector and therefore will not be affected by reforms. Also, according to ICG’s interviews with Qassām leaders, they contend that until elections are postponed and security reform not implemented, they will retain their privileges, and also, they confirm that even in the case of the lifting of the blockade in Gaza, they would still not use the Rafaḥ crossing for their military activities, thus showing intentions to maintain status-quo524. Other strategic considerations hindering the implementation of the accords on Fataḥ’ side is the fear that Israel would hold tax revenues, preventing the PA from paying around 150,000 salaries- between the West Bank and Gaza- and also that Washington would stop providing aid, if the government members do not accept the Quartet’s conditions Obama speech before the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)“And I indicated on Thursday that the recent agreement between Fataḥ and Ḥamās poses an enormous obstacle to peace. No country can be expected to negotiate with a terrorist organization sworn to its destruction. We will continue to demand that Ḥamās accept the basic responsibilities of peace: recognizing Israel’s right to exist, rejecting violence, and adhering to all existing agreement” 525. In fact, the U.S still considers Ḥamās a terrorist organization and, according to the Palestinian Anti-Terrorist Act of 2006526, the U.S will not sponsor a Ḥamās-controlled government. Moreover, a April 2013 congress resolution reiterates the provisions of the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, whereby the Unite States is prohibited to “provide assistance to Ḥamās or any entity effectively controlled by Ḥamās, any power-sharing government of which Ḥamās is a member, or the results from an agreement with Ḥamās and over which
522 The reconciliation agreement has been vehemently rejected by Israel that sees in it an opportunity to pave the way for the re-crystallization of Arab deterrence forces, which in return will bring back the Palestinian cause of top of Arab States agendas. See Mohsen Muḥammad Ṣāleḥ ed., Azmah al-Mašrūʿ al- waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī, Markaz Al-Zaytūna lil- dirāsāt wa al-istišārāt. Beirut 2013, p.100. 523 Al-Ayyām, 22 February 2011:http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/22-2-2011/p21.pdf 524 "Palestinian Reconciliation... Plus ça change"...op.cit, p. 18. 525 Obama speech before the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)“And I indicated on Thursday that the recent agreement between Fataḥ and Ḥamās poses an enormous obstacle to peace. No country can be expected to negotiate with a terrorist organization sworn to its destruction. We will continue to demand that Ḥamās accept the basic responsibilities of peace: recognizing Israel’s right to exist, rejecting violence, and adhering to all existing agreements”, See: http://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-speech-to- aipac-prepared-text/article/145447 526 Full text: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2370/text 115 Ḥamās exercises undue influence”527, thus pointing out the “obstructionist policy” of the Unites States against the actual implementation of the reconciliation agreement528. Finally, the 2011 Cairo Reconciliation Agreement did not succeed in bridging the geographical and institutional divide between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as in 2012 both factions remained hegemonic in their respective areas of control, however it enhanced entrenched internal divisions within Ḥamās internal and external leaderships, and it highlighted the inclination of both factions towards the preservation of the status- quo529. Paradoxically, the 2011 agreement was signed with the same state of mind of the Oslo Accords, without the consideration to negotiate the “final status” of the accords530. In fact, crucial provisions- such as the reforms in the PLO and security measures- were to be implemented only at a later stage, once elections had taken place. Also, the ambiguous sentence about the “reforming” of the PLO reflects the deep controversy over the issue and it allows the two sides to strictly adhere to their respective positions. This inconsistency is reflected in the conflicting statements that followed the signature of the agreement: ʿAzzām al-Aḥmad from Fataḥ has declared that the leadership will be subjected to the PLO without conflicting with the PLO Executive Committee, while Ḥamās expressed that leadership is aimed at preventing undemocratic membership concessions within the PLO531. Moreover, another consideration relates to the ‘Abbās-led initiative for the Palestinian bid at the UN, in September 2011, as a tool to pressure the Obama administration to put leverage on Israel to resume peace talks. In fact, despite engaging in reconciliation talks with Ḥamās, the ‘Abbās government wants to ensure that by entering into reconciliation with Ḥamās, he will have the “upper hand” in the outcome of the agreement, so that he cant still pressure Obama to use leverage against Israel to resume the peace talks. In this regard, with recognition of the Palestinian state, as a non-member observer at the UN opens a new phase whereby the Palestinian Authority can fight Israel at the diplomatic level, by bringing Israel’s war crimes and human rights abuses before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Crucially, the PA negotiation team, in the wake of the UN bid, and throughout the year 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, has not taken
527Congress resolution n.177, 23 April 2013 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hres177ih/pdf/BILLS- 113hres177ih.pdf 528 Šahīn, "al-muṣālaḥa al-Filasṭīnīyyah...op.cit., pp.132-3. 529 Phone interview with Dr. Hišām Aḥmad, September 2013. 530 Moḥsen Muḥammad Ṣāleḥ ed., Azma al-Mašrūʿ al-waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī, Markaz Al-Zaytūna lil- dirāsāt wa al-istišārāt Beirut, 2013,p.103. 531 Ḥamās statement regarding Interim government’s program and PLO leadership: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7G9ug0%2B 90aF8sb7/qrrlctVCPMCZ21zbeUEh0vALenF1mi1CHZhq2GBxUP/wBalxRLMZyJA60b6R39NWhInrU2YVW 9qp4Dn8zfhnmR7iORhk%3D#.T0ONhA3NJuE.twitter ; Se also: “The Ḥamās-Fataḥ Reconciliation: Was there an agreement?”, MEMRI report No. 699 (24 June 2011). 116 active action to bring Israel before the ICC532. Therefore, ‘Abbās too is using a “wait-and- see” strategy, aimed at considering all the possible options, using the reconciliation agreement with Ḥamās as leverage against Israel and the U.S whereas Washington decided to cut financial aid to the PA. Miš’al, for its part has welcomed the ‘Abbās initiative at the UN from the Fifth International Conference in Support of the Intifāḍah in Teheran, calling for engagement in comprehensive national dialogue533. Conversely, Hanīyyah has commented the event by stating “The achievement of non-member observer state for the State of Palestine represents an achievement that was only possible due to the victory of resistance in the Gaza Strip […] we welcome the initiative at the UN with our firm strategy of liberation of all Palestine, from the river to the sea534”.
Internal divisions: Between moderation and militarization
The Arab Spring with its geostrategic implications, have posed a dire threat to Ḥamās internal authority cohesion, as pre-existing divisions between the internal and external leaderships were exacerbated due to strategic considerations regarding the geopolitical position of Ḥamās- after its relocation to Cairo and Doha, the reconciliation process and the role of armed resistance. The geopolitical re-orientation of Ḥamās highlighted Ḥamās typical political behavior of blaming internal divergences in order to keep room of maneuver and scrutinize all the strategic options available. In this context, after Miš’al relocation to Doha, Ḥamās Prime Minister Ismaʻīl Hanīyyah travelled to Teheran amidst general pressures from Syria535, Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood, to praise Iran for its long-standing support and protection, while a few days later, the same prime Minister delivered a speech at the core of the most remarkable Sunni Islamic Institution, the University of Al- Azhar in Cairo, where he praised the people’s revolution in Syria for freedom, democracy
532 Speaking with a member of the PA negotiation team about diplomatic options at the ICC, Xavier ‘Abū ʿEīd claimed that “the PA is still scrutinizing options before going to the ICC. We want to use the ICC weapon to negotiate peace proces with Israel, so we have to devise how to better spend this card, and this takes time”, Interview with author. Beit Saḥūr, December 4th, 2012. 533 http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7WEOYEhm xMlCsC/AM2/zfpaWjc6FmpkNqvpopiqfkEGUZiFgJssdGnzolI1JMMAhDR6CySHkqd5Qolj48h2AqjAYdoKr6Id pM7TPHICDL9R4%3D 534 Ḥamās Communiqué, 30 November 2011: http://hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7f7c0KfPVTNNO8 nrG3q4GaIjBDcuC0SQ4kvoAT0G7saFDubE2puaX4eBZ3bToUJSOj8NVqkeE%2BinUPd8hwf%2Ff7yBQJG 7rePmFVYJudAwFb64%3D#.UMsoCtA7h1I.twitter 535 Al- Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda, 2013/4/8: http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=583399 117 and reform536. Likewise, after Hanīyyah’s speech in Cairo, Maḥmūd Zahār travelled to Teheran in order to publicly thank Iran for its generous support537, and Zaytūna ‘Abū Marzūq met Nasrallāh- Ḥizbu’llāh leader- in order to devise a common strategy to address the current developments in Syria and the relations with the Muslim Brotherhood538. Ḥamās leaderships showed also opposite assessments regarding the outcome of the 2012 operation “Pillar of Defence”: in the perspective of the Gaza leadership, the 2012 military operation had strengthened Gaza centrality and underlined that the Gaza leadership is the core nucleus of power within Ḥamās. On the other hand, external leaders saw in the 2012 operation the confirmation of the necessity to have a de- centralized leadership, far from Israeli shelling. After the external leadership moved away from Damascus, most of its leaders were scattered throughout the Arab capitals, forging new forms of patronage or strengthening previous alliance that reflect the movement's recent leadership selection. Besides Politburo leader Ḫālid Miš’al, who relocated form Damascus to Doha, Ṣaleḥ al-Arūrī, West Bank leader is Ḥamās's Turkey-based emissary. Ḥamās leader ‘Abū Marzouk, who serves as a media spokesman, is based in Cairo, Egypt. Additionally, the movement maintains leadership figures in Jordan, Lebanon, while other leaders, such as Prime Minister Ismaʻīl Hanīyyah and the Ḥamās cabinet based in Gaza. The conflict of some Ḥamās external leaders with the Syrian regime has highlighted the internal fracture within Ḥamās with the other front, marked by more “hardliner” positions: Leaders such as Imād al-ʿĀlamī- former Ḥamās envoy to Teheran returned to Gaza and enjoys the support of military figures such as Muḥammad Deīf and Marwān Issā, and political leaders like Maḥmūd Zahār, insist for not losing the support of the “resistance axis”539. Importantly, there have been reports that some members of the Qassām Brigades opposed the political decision of Ḥamās Politburo to leave Damascus and to “break” the alliance with Ḥizbu’llāh and Iran540, however Qassām official spokesman has denied that the Qassām Brigades have taken positions different from those of the Politburo541. However, at the same time the official Qassām ’s website report an official statement of Ḥamās leader Musā ‘Abū Marzūq, where he denied that Ḥamās has moves away from the “axis of
536 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWX8d9ln8tk 537 “Top Ḥamās leaders visit Teheran”, the daily star, 15 March 2012: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Mar-15/166781-top-hamas-official-visits-tehran.ashx 538 15 March 2012, Zahār travels to Teheran: http://www.lebanese-forces.com/2012/03/15/200646/ 539 Ḥamās PLC member in Nablus speaking during Passia conference in Ramallah, 24 April 2013. 540 Al-Quds, 4 June 2013, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=50945 . According to this source, the military wing of the movement decided its stance in favor of the continuation of the alliance with Ḥizbu’llāh and Iran , as a way to liberate Palestine from the Israeli occupation by force of arms , after the failure of Arab money to edit any inch of the occupied Arab territories. 541 ‘Abū Ubāida states that the Qassām position is in line with that of the Political Bureau, Qassām Communiqué: http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=32640 118 resistance”542. Ḥamās has set up meetings in Doha and Istanbul in order to deal with these internal divisions and to pave the way for internal elections in 2012543. At a general level, internal divisions between the Gaza and external leaderships stem from the two conflicting approaches to the Arab Spring, and its regional challenges: on the one hand, the Gaza leadership seemed reluctant to make political decisions that could bring about long-term outcomes, and riskily alter balance of power in the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, the external leadership –terribly weakened by the Syrian crisis and the forced relocation to other Arab countries- felt the urge to engage in diplomatic action with new emerging regional actors in order to retain its political weight within Ḥamās’ internal structure of power, with the purpose of achieving long-term results. Under these premises, the 2011 and 2012 reconciliation agreements represent the point of contention where the two leaderships are the most at odds, showing worrying signs of internal divisions544. During the signing ceremony of the Cairo Agreement in May 2011, Miš’al declared that he agrees that ‘Abbās continues to negotiate with Israel545, a statement that sparked the criticism of the Gaza-based leader Maḥmūd Zahār “The movement's position regarding negotiation and resistance has not changed. We are in favor of resistance, while negotiation is a program at odds with the convictions of the majority of the Palestinian people who voted for Ḥamās in 2006. Today, there are those who say that we give ‘Abū Māzin a chance to hold new rounds of negotiation. But we are not given an opportunity to negotiate, and did not agree to negotiate, and did not encourage him to negotiate. So what happened on the day of celebration of the signing of the reconciliation was not agreed upon (with Ḥamās) and we did not know about it, and I think it does not represent the position of the resistance movement, which supports a resistance program and not negotiations”.546 Zahār especially objects Miš’al’s speech during the signing ceremony, as it seems to give ‘Abbās wider powers within the unity deal. In this regard, Zahār stated that “the
542 Qassām Communiqué: http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=32640 543 ‘Abū Marzūq official communiqué: http://hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s78z5vFB4ydBinJx RDY6mDo3oPWw67jUXd3E87NJUjZVWe%2BuVg2CpNUuPt6qEPxmglpYkVW/Bdv2XiGVjqL9/gYfw4CPvi GW5jHat2VMMtVTg%3D 544 See: Halevi J., “Power dynamics inside Hamas: The increasing weight of the Gaza Leadership”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 11, No.2 (16 June 2011). 545 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6zFDivGgCs 546 Al-Quds al-’Arabī, 17 May 2011: http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/266596 See also Ḥamās statement by Ḥamdān: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7N4hCbabq 6nXlR0wKCYa95YCI5%2BygVQTQZ5OxlrB204aJkuaVdU%2F%2BJrFy%2FpWF4Wbqqc1f%2FikFzPMkaL Osuh6OplT8UeD21ACM5DeXKBRDCN8%3D#.UKTU-6YWjUo.twitter 119 Unity Government must be a government chosen by consensus and it should not be subjected to ‘Abbās’s political program547”. The same leader insisted in the Lebanese newspaper: “The head of the political bureau Ḫālid Miš’al, in his speech at a ceremony of reconciliation, gave the authority a deadline to negotiate with Israel [...] We did not know his position, therefore it is incorrect. We never gave Fataḥ an opportunity or authorization to hold negotiations, because negotiating this way is a waste of time. An evidence of this can be seen in the Madrid Conference: twenty years ago and until now, we hear negotiations and negotiations - and the scandals of the negotiating team headed by Saeb Erekat. And everybody acknowledges it. So, anyone who says that we have authorized the PA for further negotiation does not represent the position of the movement.” 548 Regarding the approach to resistance and armed struggle, divergences between the two leaders reached new heights. Accordingly, during his speech at the signing ceremony, Miš’al stated “we are ready to pay any price, and have decided to pay any price, in order to achieve reconciliation and make the agreement a reality549”, raising fears within the movement that this implied recognition of Israel and rejection of armed struggle550. In fact, in the immediate period before the signing of the 2011 agreement, Miš’al and ‘Abbās had a meeting where the Ḥamās leader declared the need to devise a common framework of “popular resistance” between the two parties, adding however that this does not imply to abandon armed struggle, considering that armed resistance still represents a right under occupation, and noting that Ḥamās itself was born from the resistance of the Intifāḍah551. Despite the moderate words of Miš’al’s statement, Zahār called “popular resistance” as slogan, claiming that all types of resistance is popular resistance and that the term used by Miš’al is misleading552. Strategically, Miš’al is convinced that the Arab Spring will push Ḥamās to reconsider its ideological framework of armed resistance, and to engage in diplomatic action, thus sponsoring popular non-violent struggle. He especially insisted on this aspect when dealing with western-based media, where he affirmed, “when the occupation ends,
547 Al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 16 May 2011: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2011/05/05-16/All.pdf 548 Al- Aḫbār, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/13186 549 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6zFDivGgCs. 550 Al-Maṣrī al-yaūm published an article quoting an interview of Miš’al with “Foreign Policy” where he stated “Ḥamās is ready to have negotiations with Israel”. However, Mišʿal statement has been denied by other Ḥamās members. See: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/316940 and http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/14/exclusive_interview_khaled_meshaal_hamas_syria_israel _gaza#sthash.1dAy7n5d.dpbs 551 Al-Khaleej, 26 November 2011: http://www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/page/dba00119-f972-4a32-a92a- 9f4cc7394d9d 552 Also Marzūq called for “military action as the blackbone of the resistance, and that cannot be forgotten”: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7Yl%2BZbiO TzMHGe%2B2DpxoaGnYaqOV/ILnUzKB6a01Tdb/c6m24x/KrLnEsJRdKHgOt4x0C/l5fOuw%2BiDwXOIMQ V9r/j8tkiv9al2fVEIJUGAw%3D 120 resistance will end… If Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem, that will become the capital of the Palestinian state553”. Crucial to assess the growing internal/external divide are the words of Gaza Prime Minister Hanīyyah during his speech at the 24th anniversary of the movement, where he rhetorically stated: “Ḥamās will not renounce to armed struggle until it liberates Palestine, all Palestine- and it will conduct intifāḍah after intifāḍah […] we will not relinquish to any inch of Palestine”554. This speech was most likely the reflection of the rhetoric employed by the Gaza leadership to nourish their power within the Gaza strip, as it seemed an open effort to reject most external leadership’s positions, at a time where Miš’al was gaining growing regional audience555. Still, Ḥamās had already declared its positions in 1993, and later in the 2006 Prisoners Document, and that included: complete withdrawal along the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem and withdrawal of Jewish settlements in the West Bank556. In this regard, the Ḥamās- controlled daily newspaper in Gaza Filasṭīn has clarified that, contrary to Fataḥ- that sees the Palestinian state on the 1967 borders as a lasting goal, for Ḥamās the ’67 borders represent only an interim phase towards the liberation of all historical Palestine557. Also, the military wing of Ḥamās has promptly issued an official statement on their websites stating that Ḥamās will not make the same mistake of Fataḥ when it signed the Oslo Accords, by recognizing Israel558. In this sense, Ḥamās leaders have shown great ability to tiptoe around the recognition of Israel, formally accepting a two-states solution on the ’67 lines. According to a Ḥamās leader in the West Bank, accepting to have a sovereign Palestinian State on the ’67 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, does not directly imply recognition on Israel559 and, ‘Abū Marzūq during the press conference in
553 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8HOvmlD54ok , See also what reported by the Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/18/Ḥamās-moves-from-violence- palestinian?guni=Article:in%20body%20link 554 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqC-yvO5OHo 555 Interestingly, Hanīyyah had issued an official statement in the wake of the signing of the 2011 Cairo agreement, whereby the government in Gaza fully welcomes the agreement, insisting that the government in Gaza raised the banner of the reconciliation in the beginning. http://www.safa.ps/ara/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=43023 556 “Ḥamās “Foreign Minister” Usama Ḥamdān Talks About National Reconciliation, ʿArafāt, Reform, and Ḥamās's Presence in Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Spring 2011), p.66. 557 Filasṭīn, May 4, 2011: http://www.felesteen.ps/nd/releases/2011/052011/04/ A Ḥamās PLC member in Ramallah, Azīz Dweīk stated “many people today argue that Ḥamās now resembles Fataḥ and that reconciliation serves the purpose of perpetuating entrenched interests. However, Ḥamās is still different from Fataḥ in the fact that we will not sit at the negotiation table or make concessions without getting anything in return, as ʿArafāt did”. 558 Qassām Comuniqué: http://www.qassam.ps/opinion-6851-hamas_will_not_commit_suicide_by_recognizing_Israel.html 559 Interview with Ḥamās member Azīz Dweīk and former member Aziz Kayd. Ramallah, April 2013. When asked what he thinks the State on the other side of the ’67 border is, the Ḥamās member avoided to answer. 121 Cairo after the signing ceremony, clarified that the agreement does not make any reference to the Quartet conditions560. Moreover, while the 2011 reconciliation agreement stipulated Ḥamās’ integration within the PLO, a Ḥamās cadre stressed that, by joining the PLO, Ḥamās will not accept the state of Israel: "Ḥamās will join the PLO not in order to recognize Israel or the decisions of the Quartet, but to reform this organization and restore it.561" Additionally, Miš’al’ reference to the Madrid conference and the twenty years of turbulent negotiation process, by agreeing to give the PLO another extra year of interim authority to negotiate with Israel562 sparked even harsher reactions among Gazan leaders. The mounting competition between internal and external leaderships was better exposed by Gaza leader Zahār, by affirming that “the real center of the Ḥamās movement is located in the occupied land and its real weight is there. Blood was spilled there, the leadership is there, and the complementary part is outside. The issue of relocating Ḥamās external offices is being deliberated. Circumstances have divided the movement’s leadership into several locations and we have to discuss it”563. On the other hand, leaders in the West Bank are long believed to hold more flexible positions, because of the historical development of the Ḥamās branch in this area (see chapter 1-3), have recently shown reservations about reconciliation agreement. PLC speaker Azīz Dweīk insisted that Ḥamās truly seeks reconciliation so as to end the geographical and political division of Palestine, but he also expressed concerns regarding the actual “feasibility” of such agreement in the West Bank, if security coordination between the PA and Israel is to continue564. According to this perspective, it seems that leaders in the West Bank fear that reconciliation would come at their expenses, whether the agreement would only serve the purpose to perpetuate the status quo. The same leader had issued controversial comments regarding the Syrian conflict, by stating to the Algerian newspaper Elchorouk that “supporting the rebels in Syria has taken priority over Palestinian struggle against occupation565”, sparking further tensions within the movement stance in Syria. The dialectical tensions between the two leaderships were mostly exemplified by the Ḥamās leadership elections that took place between 2012 and April 2013, whose results embodied the fracture within the movement. Despite Ḫālid Miš’al was eventually re-elected as the head of the Politburo of Ḥamās, the elections point to a raising influence
560 Cairo Press Conference: http://www.al-ayyam.com/article.aspx?did=164852&date=4/28/2011 561 11 May 2011: https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=800570 562 Mišʿal speech in Cairo, op cit. 563 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/13186 564 Ḥamās PLC Speaker ʿAzīz Dweīk in interview with author. Ramallah, April 2013. 565 http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/169083.html 122 of military commanders in the Gaza Strip, thus showing the growing polarization of the movement between external and internal leadership, further complicating the implementation of the reconciliation agreements with the PA. It is highly difficult to know the details of Ḥamās elections, as the movement keeps names of candidates secret and in the majority of cases it creates a “shadow” leadership for security reasons, so that even when electoral results are published, it is not sure whether there is a “deep” secret leadership making the decisions566. The electoral process for the Political Bureau employed 14 months due to logistic and security difficulties especially in the West Bank and in the diaspora, whereby approximately 15 members are elected among the Šūrā Council districts in the West Bank, 15 from outside, 15 from Gaza Political Bureau and some members from the Islamic Brotherhood Council567. Ṣāleḥ al-Arūrī, founder of the Qassām Brigades in the West Bank and considered now to control membership for the PLC in the West Bank, has tried to re-organize elections for Ḥamās in the West Bank from its new Turkish base. The prisoners’ arm of Ḥamās in 2012 chose to nominate those members who are considered to be “leaders” in the prisons for dealing with Israeli Prison Service, to be “members-in- absentia” to the movement’s supreme bodies568. Among them are former Qassām Brigades commanders in the West Bank such as Ibrahim Hamed, Ğamāl ‘Abū Hağ and Ḥassān Salāmeh. The important outcome of the 2012 electoral result is the rise of military commanders within the Gaza Executive Committee: while moderates such as Aḥmad Yusef and Ghazi Ḥamās were defeated together with other loyalist in the Gaza Political Bureau, such as Ṣalāḥ al-Bardawīl and Muḥammad al-Ğumāsī. On the contrary, Imād al- ‘Ālamī, head of the military committee was elected deputy of Hanīyyah, Fatḥī Ḥammād- a political leader close to the military wing569- and other leaders of the Qassām Brigades made their way towards Ḥamās’ top political institutions: Aḥmad Al-Ğaʿbarī, Marwān Issa, Yaḥyā al-Sinwār and Rouḥī Muštaḥā, major leaders who were released during the Šalīṭ Deal570. Accordingly, the most noteworthy result of these elections is that more than one third of the seats of the Gaza political bureau are taken by military commanders linked with the Šalīṭ deal.
566 Ḥamās PLC member in Nablus, Passia Conference, Ramallah, 24 April 2013. 567 Hāni al-Maṣrī speaking during Passia conference. Ramallah, 24 April 2013. 568 Ehud Yaari, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 May 2012: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/secret-Ḥamās-elections-point-to-internal-struggle 569 Ibid. 570 List of prisoners released provided by Addameer to author. See complete list on Ḥamās website: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/DataFiles/Contents/Files/asra.pdf 123 Regarding the external leaders, competition was between Musā ‘Abū Marzūq who relocated to Cairo after the external bureau moved away from Damascus, and Miš’al. Internal competition reached unprecedented levels of conflict in the aftermath of the signing of the 2012 Doha Agreement that Miš’al had declared that he would not run for elections571. However, according to analysts, the re-election of Miš’al was partly due to pressures put from the Qatari and Egyptian governments, as they saw in Miš’al the ideal candidate for bringing forward the reconciliation agreement572. Eventually, ‘Abū Marzūq was given responsibility over the media relation’s portfolio and head of the reconciliation delegation, and Miš’al close ally Mohammad Nasr remained in charge of foreign affairs and international relations of the movement573. In the context of the internal/external competition, there have been reports that Hanīyyah wanted to compete for the position of Head of the Politburo of Ḥamās after he won an overwhelming victory in the Gaza-based Šūrā Council elections, that and for this purpose he conducted a cabinet reshuffle in Gaza in order to set a framework to compete for the leadership position.574 Crucially, ‘Abū Marzūq – original from Rafaḥ- has closer ties with Gaza than Miš’al, thus suggesting that these new elections will bring Gaza military and more “hardliner” political figures to control the top leadership institution of the Šūrā Council in Gaza, thus highlighting the shifting of political power from outside to inside that had already started with the 2006 elections and the consolidation of power after the 2007 takeover. On the other hand, Miš’al still enjoy most support of the international community and of West Bank leaders575, and his re-election – along with defeat of Maḥmūd Zahār-confirms that he is still in control of the movement. However, the recent ascendance of military commanders, among them Al-Arūrī, military and political leader in the West Bank reflects Ḥamās renewed interest for the West Bank and its strategic significance. The internal polarization between the internal and external leaderships of Ḥamās emerged with the internal elections has to be considered in relation to the impact of the Doha Agreement signed on February 6th in Doha576, as it represented the peak of tensions between the internal and external leaders. As a matter of fact, the agreement sparked anger among the Gaza-based leadership because Miš’al bypassed the internal Šūrā principle of consultation and signed the agreement overstepping the Palestinian
571 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/23/239760.html 572 Prof. Hišām Aḥmad, interview with author. April 2013. 573 Al-Ḥayāt : http://alhayat.com/Details/506404 574 Al-Rāy, 7 October 2012 http://www.alrai.com/article/543769.html 575 Ḥamās PLC speaker from Nablus speaking during Passia conference in Ramallah. 24 April 2013 576 Full text: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/3397-full-text-of-the-doha-declaration- signed-between-hamas-and-Fatah 124 Legislative Council577. In this regard, Maḥmūd Zahār accused Miš’al’s unilateralism and stated to al-Quds “Ḥamās leadership in Gaza was not consulted about ‘Abbās heading the interim cabinet, this is unacceptable”578. The main difference between the 2011 Cairo agreement and the 2012 Doha declaration is that, while the 2011 agreement stipulated elections for PLC and PNC, the 2012 agreement explicitly mentions only PLC elections, while it reads more ambiguous regarding the PNC elections: “Affirms the need to continue the steps of activating and developing the Palestinian Liberation Organization through the reformation of the Palestinian National Council simultaneously with the presidential and legislative elections”579. Importantly, the wording “reformation of the PNC”- instead of elections- could entail the admission of new members to the PNC without a structured electoral democratic process. Crucially, Gaza-based leaders of Ḥamās criticized this formulation, and called for PNC elections rather than reformation, however, interestingly, it was the Gaza leadership that hindered PNC elections’ registration in Gaza, claiming security concerns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip580. Already in March 2012, the Ḥamās information office issued a detailed report of “security violations” in the West Bank aimed at hindering reconciliation and national cohesion, accusing West Bank PASF to target Ḥamās cadres and members through administrative detentions and arrests for purported financial/corruption crimes581. The Doha agreement sparked tensions also within the top ranks of the leadership of the Qassām Brigades- which is the backbone of all security agencies operating in the Gaza Strip, as general commander Muḥammad Deīf supported the position of political leader Maḥmūd Zahār – opponent of the Doha agreement- while Aḥmad Al-Ğa‘barī publicly endorsed Miš’al’s position to give ‘Abbās presidency of the unity government in preparation for the PNC elections582. However, Ḥamās political leaders such as Al- Bardawil, and particularly Maḥmūd Zahār, have denied that the Doha agreement has
577 Al-Ayyām, 11 February 2012: http://www.al-ayyam.com/article.aspx?did=185275&date=2/12/2012 578 Ivi. 579 Doha agreement, full text, op cit... 580 Maan News Agency, 2/07/2012: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=500546 In June 2012 Hanīyyah suspended the works of the Central Elections Commission (CEC) after purportedly discovering a bomb at the CEC, by accusing the Ramallah government: Maan News Agency, 8 June 2012. Still, accusations have been denied by an official statement of Ḥamās leader Bardawīl: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7WLDuXwp VnVtDjdJNEcCOFQCqDxoDuAqnGDCaHoaUa4x3wCWG4sFjCJpwpMh06kwTNBiYWa98njnE%2BLF3/i/7t Q/Z4LSW2c2Ff9BgQTcA9nE%3D#.T0vnjRKK1tM.twitter 581 Ḥamās communiqué, 12 March 2012: http://hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7MOIDhmexj2nQl zh15ZapD8Iq0kEmfbDL4Gb4wIhW%2FbVKT1mT%2F2h5qVMEIJc4gq9GWKe21Is%2FFLF9Xg7kpCl6EVx Rsf6%2BnhOYak9QRsjIeC0%3D#.UMsqrCDZab4.twitter 582 Al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 12 February 2012: http://www.alqudsalarabi.info/index.asp?fname=data/2012/02/02-12/12z496.htm 125 produced a split within Ḥamās internal structure, but he criticized Miš’al’s unilateralism for not consulting the Gaza leadership before going to Doha, being the Gaza leadership the center of power of Ḥamās583. In an attempt to reassert control over the external leadership’s decision, a few weeks later the agreement was signed, leaders of Ḥamās met in Cairo to discuss ways to bridge the internal divisions and to find common stances between the 2011 and 2012 agreements584. However, efforts to implement the agreement were frozen for a couple of months after the Doha agreement585, until May 2012, when Ḥamās and Fataḥ reached a new understanding in Cairo: ‘Abbās would head the interim unity government for no longer than six months, after which PLC and PNC elections would be held simultaneously586”. What is more striking regarding the internal divisions exacerbated with the Arab Spring and the reconciliation process are the two contrasting assessments of the benefits of the reconciliation agreement by the two leaderships: On the one hand, Miš’al agreement to reform the PNC without holding elections stresses the fact that his priority is to join the PLO- rather than to work for democratizing it- while, on the other hand, the Gaza leadership had hampered PNC elections registration, showing that maintaining control over Gaza is a priority vis-à-vis implementing reconciliation and entering the PLO587. As a matter of fact, whereas the security measures provisioned by the agreement are implemented, Ḥamās in Gaza fear that Fataḥ-affiliated security forces might come back to the Gaza strip, undermining Ḥamās’ hold over the security sector. Importantly, Miš’al behavior in signing the 2012 Agreement without prior consultation within the Šūrā Council has to be read under the perspective of the progressive weakening of the external leadership after its relocation away from Damascus. As a matter of fact, the 2012 Doha Agreement was an attempt of Miš’al to undermine the growing power of the Gaza leadership- after it had gained significant political, security and economic power since the 2007 takeover, especially under pressure
583 See Ḥamās official Communiqué, 2 March 2012 http://www.alwasatnews.com/3446/news/read/628553/1.html Other Ḥamās leader al-Hayya has confirmed that Ḥamās will not disavows its accords, and that the movement accepts Mišʿal decision: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2Bi1s7QoC0c%2B njGhXubrAwPzZ4HlmgsvrIlu57KIw7NEABJHGXOZXZYitE%2Ba5O1dRibCEK5iylHRKOpiexPoNILRMMZW WdKFny80SlQGcs8XseJI0%3D 584 Al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 22 February 2012: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2012/02/02-22/All.pdf p. 6. 585 Maan News Agency, 28 April 2012 http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=480178 586 Al-Ayyām, 21 May 2012: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/21-5-2012/p21.pdf 587 See also: Dag Tuastad, “Ḥamās-PLO ReLations Before and after the arab spring”, Middle East Policy, Vol.20, No. 3 (Fall 2013), pp.86-98.
126 of the Qatari government, in an attempt to further “moderate” Ḥamās and in the effort to reassure its regional leading role. Therefore, the re-election of Miš’al as the head of Ḥamās politburo in April 2013 implies that the faction that wanted to prioritize the control of the Gaza strip over the PLO has been weakened588. Importantly, the intention of Ḥamās to democratize and to join the PLO anticipated the spark of the Arab Spring, and the reconciliation agreements. As a matter of fact, the intention of joining the PLO was the main purpose behind Ḥamās participation in the 2006 elections, however, after the 2007 split the Gaza leadership have started to prioritize institutional control over the PLO. At the same time, it seems that Miš’al’s rush in signing the Doha agreement without prior internal consultation is a strong indicator that his prioritization of the PLO can only be a strategic political instrument aimed at regaining control over the movement internal leadership in Gaza, and to forge new moderate entente with the Ramallah government589.
Conclusions
The aim of this thesis was to shed light on the repercussions of recent regional developments triggered by the wave of Arab protests started in January 2011 on the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine (Ḥamās). More specifically, through a deep historical analysis of Ḥamās, we engaged in assessing the shifting dynamics of power within Ḥamās’ structure before and after the Arab Spring. Firstly, we contend that the internal divisions within Ḥamās that were triggered by the Arab Spring and exacerbated with the 2011 and 2012 reconciliation process do not represent a new and unprecedented phenomenon, but they rather reflect a historical tension along the politico-military line that has characterized Ḥamās’s internal structure of power since its early establishment. In this regard, Ḥamās self-identification with the first Intifāḍah -as Ḥamās became the propelling force of the revolution- served the purpose of shifting away from a purely religious movement in the shadow of the Muslim Brotherhood, towards a full-fledged nationalist movement that implies Islamic rhetoric. Moreover because of the historical development of Ḥamās’s institutions from the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in Palestine- both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip- Ḥamās could enjoy relative “institutional continuity” with pre-existing Islamic institutions. Therefore, it is precisely this interconnected combination of armed resistance with Islamic
588 Tuastad, Ḥamās-PLO Relations…op.cit., p.96. 589 Ibid. 127 rhetoric, and institutional continuity with Islamic institutions that allowed Ḥamās to pursue the so-called “dual policy” that enabled the movement to undertake possibly conflicting decisions- such as suicide attacks in 1990s and 2000s and participation in political negotiations. This eventually resulted in open internal ideological divisions between military leaders -usually supported by the “hardliner” external leadership- and more pragmatic leaders in Gaza. As Mishal and Sela have reported in their detailed account of Ḥamās’s political behavior in 1990s, the dual policy of “rejectionism” and “co-existence” have characterized Ḥamās political decisions since the first Intifāḍah, all through the Oslo Accords until the 2006 participation in the elections, pointing to a progressive moderation of Ḥamās political thought vis-à-vis its ideological constituency590. As a matter of fact, Ḥamās competition with the PLO during the first Intifāḍah, the co-existence with the PA as a “systemic opposition” during Oslo in order to preserve Islamic social Institutions in Gaza, and the “spoiler strategy” during the Al-Aqṣā Intifāḍah is illustrative of Ḥamās pragmatic behavior that have triggered tensions between the political and military leaderships. The historical analysis of Ḥamās shifting dynamics underlines that, while Ḥamās could maintain overall internal balance within its different centers of power between 1987 and 2005 and act as a limited spoiler in the political arena for strategic purposes –with the external leadership taking important decisions and managing the movement’s funds and the military wing- the 2006 victory in the elections had altered this precarious balance. If in 1996, the external leadership could impose the electoral boycott over the internal leadership591, the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from the Strip has accelerated the process whereby the Gaza leadership started to consider strategic gains separately from the external leadership. Therefore, the Israeli withdrawal opened a new window of opportunity for the Gaza leadership to extend its full control over the Gaza strip through political participation. In fact, the thesis argues that the strengthening of the Gaza leadership preceded the spark of the Arab Spring that instead, only exacerbated the shifting balance of power in favor of the internal leadership. In fact, during the 5 years before the Arab Spring, Ḥamās had succeeded in establishing a de facto functioning state in the Gaza Strip by substituting itself to the pre-existing PA institutions, therefore exerting monopoly of power over the political, security and judicial sectors. We assess that in the period between 2007
590 An assessment confirmed by most interviewees after the Arab Spring. 591 Although some Ḥamās-affiliated intifāḍah were allowed to participate as “independents” so that Ḥamās could ensure an indirect presence within the political apparatus, even if it maintained distance with decision- making of the Palestinian Authority. 128 and 2010, the dialectical tensions between “hardliners” external leaders and “pragmatic “ Gaza leadership have gradually switched. In fact, we contend that the Arab Spring has further highlighted this historical trend within Ḥamās’ structure of power, as a consequence of the fact that many senior military commanders gained access to Ḥamās’ top political institutions after the 2012-2013 internal elections: the progressive “militarization” of the Politburo in Gaza was the major result of the Arab Spring, with major implications for the strategic considerations of the Gaza leadership vis-à-vis the reconciliation process. Therefore, since 2007, but mainly after the Arab Spring, it is no longer important to assess the internal divide of Ḥamās in terms of “hardliners” vs. “pragmatic”, since both factions have become highly pragmatic in their respect, therefore the internal divide after 2011 is between “external” vs. “internal” leadership in terms of their political control over Gaza. As a matter of fact, through our thesis, we highlight that the categories of “moderate”, “hardliner” no longer appoint to an Islamic or ideological framework of reference but, instead, they appoint to a less “Islamic” Ḥamās that exploits resistance narrative – for the Gaza leadership- or moderate discourse – in the case of Miš’al- and respond to strategic cost/benefit calculations. As a matter of fact, we assess that the Arab Spring exemplified the progressive “abandonment” of Islamic ideology, and the parallel growing exploitation of the “armed resistance” and “popular resistance” slogans for 592 strategic/political purposes . Accordingly, an evidence of the growing “secularization” of Ḥamās can be tested in the increased pressures posed by Gaza-based radical Islamist/Salafist groups towards Ḥamās asking for stricter implementation of Islamic codes. In this regard, Ḥamās is targeted by the same “spoiler strategy” that Ḥamās itself had employed against the PA and ʿArafāt after the Oslo Accords. Despite it is premature to experience splits within Ḥamās at the leadership level, the recent turmoil in Egypt, the uncertain future of the Syrian crisis and the restlessness of radical Ğihādi groups in the Sinai will pose a dire threat to Ḥamās monopoly of power in Gaza, with risks of major splits within Ḥamās’s military wing and at the grassroots level. According to interviews and primary sources, opinions regarding possible future splits belong to two opposite school of thoughts: Ḥamās leaders have repeatedly denied
592 See Ḫālid Ḥrūb, “Palestinian Islamism: Conflating National Liberation and Socio-political Change”, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No.4 (2008): 59-72. As noted in chapter II, p. 46, the Gaza leadership was believed to be more “moderate” in 1990s, as the result of a new generation of “intifāḍah” youger leaders that had been in contact with nationalist and secular agendas, therefore showing a more pragmatic ideological framework of reference. Similarly, the external leadership was ideologically more hardliners in its stance vis-a-vis Israel.
129 that the movement is on the verge of serious internal splits, and defend internal oppositions as a demonstration of Ḥamās pluralist and internally democratic consultation system. On the other side, many analysts have assessed the growing possibility to experience splits from the military ranks at the grassroots level, depending on the worsening of the Syrian crisis and the political situation in the post-Mursī period. More importantly, the Arab Spring has highlighted the general preference of the Gaza leadership to resist reconciliation or any sort of change that could diminish its rule over the Gaza Strip. In this regard, the political attitude of the external leader Miš’al and the Gaza leaders do not differ greatly: both have approached the reconciliation process with the purpose of undermining the other leadership’s power. In fact, it seems plausible that Miš’al sought to exploit regional changes in favor of non-violent struggle in order to sponsor a political deal with Fataḥ, with the major purpose of undermining the Gaza “fortress”. Similarly, the growing weight of military commanders within the Gaza leadership has contributed to the leadership’s obstructionist policy towards actual implementation of PNC elections in Gaza, as a political settlement with Fataḥ and a unity government would pose a serious blow to the military wing political and economic power. Likewise, Miš’al’s decision in Doha to agree to reform the PNC without holding elections suggests that Miš’al is prioritizing his political control on the Gaza leadership over the democratization of the PLO and the fulfillment of national goals. What has emerged in this study, is the strong commitment of both leaderships within Ḥamās to remain in power and to compete for power: for the Gaza leadership, it has become essential to exert control over the salafists in Gaza, while for the external leaders it is of vital interest to undermine the centrality of power of the Gaza leadership: internal differences have become strategic rather than ideological, and they do not essentially appoint to Ḥamās-Israel relations or armed resistance/political negotiations only, but they are now the zenith of Ḥamās internal competition for authority power. Furthermore, the Arab Spring highlighted Ḥamās’s “dual policy” approach transferred to foreign policy and geo-political orientation. As a matter of fact, the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis have challenged Ḥamās with political decisions that could bring short/long terms benefits. Also in this domain the strategic considerations of the two leaderships were at odds, further demonstrating internal polarization: on the one hand, the Gaza leadership seemed to prefer a “wait-and-see” policy aimed at keeping all possible options open, refusing to make immediate strategic decisions that could potentially undermine long-standing regional alliances. On the other hand, the precarious situation of the external leadership in Damascus forced Miš’al to exploit regional changes in order to
130 make immediate decisions that could bring about a new political settlement with Fataḥ so as to boost the international power of the external leadership. The “popular” coup that has toppled Mursī in July 2013 and has triggered a new wave of violence in Egypt, with dire threats of civil war, represented a tremendous blow for Ḥamās political calculations and regional aspirations. The defamatory media campaign that has targeted the Muslim Brotherhood- that has been labeled a “terrorist” organization- has also undermined Ḥamās’s reputation, after it has been accused of “terror conspiracy” and promoter of terrorism in the Sinai593. In this context, it is noteworthy to underline that since July 2013, some Ḥamās leaders in Gaza have re-started to publicly advocate for armed resistance. As a matter of fact, on September 2013, Musā ‘Abū Marzūq wrote on his Facebook profile: “the Ḥamās movement exercises resistance war against the aggressors, and cooperates with insurgents”, underlining that Ḥamās has not replaced resistance against Israel with negotiations594, in a moment where ‘Abbās is re-starting the Kerry-sponsored negotiation process between the PA and Israel595. Moreover, in the same post, the leader emphasizes that the 22 November ceasefire represented only a temporary cessation of military operations and that it does not represent a long-term truce596. Indeed, behind the 22 August military parade in Rafaḥ in opposition with ‘Abbās’s renewed negotiations, is the fear that the leadership in Gaza would be excluded, at a critical time where Egypt is on the verge of civil war and leaders in Gaza are having a hard time recovering damaged ties with Iran597. In this context, the recent June 2013 Gaza-sponsored visit of a Ḥamās delegation to Beirut has to be read under the perspective of re-building damaged ties with the “axis of resistance”, however, sources inside Gaza suggest that respective conflicting positions over Syria have not changed598. Importantly, we maintain that the Arab Spring possibly has created a point of no- return within Ḥamās structure of power, whereby internal polarization will most likely produce further tensions as a result of the ongoing turmoil in Egypt after the “popular” coup that toppled Mursī in July 2013, and the uncertain direction of the external
593 Qassām Communiqué, 15 March 2013, op cit... 594 Musā ‘Abū Marzūq statement, 7 September 2013: https://www.facebook.com/mousa.Abumarzook/posts/503682606390809 595 http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=628146 596 op cit. Same slogan was further reinforced on the Ḥamās-controlled newspaper Al-Risālah: http://pdf.alresalah.ps/ver.php?id=1130 597 In June 2013 Zahār travelled to Teheran to try to resume the old alliance. In that event, Zahār stated that the two countries had agreed that armed resistance against Israel should continue. See: Al-Quds al-‘Arabī : http://www.alqudsalarabi.info/index.asp?fname=today%5C15z495.htm&arc=data%5C2012%5C03%5C03- 15%5C15z495.htm 598 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/hamas-beirut-hezbollah-marzouk.html
131 leadership. In this scenario, it is likely that the Gaza leadership will resume armed resistance as first option, as a strategic weapon in order to entrench its rule over Gaza and control salafi groups and youth activism gathered around the “Tamarrod” movement. At the same time, at the moment of writing, it seems plausible that Miš’al will continue to sponsor reconciliation process and non-violent discourse in order to seek regional legitimacy and to strengthen his political power. Also, on the one hand, after the assassination of al-Ğaʿbarī in Novermber 2012, Gaza-based leader Zahār will have wider space to have closer contacts with the military wing in Gaza therefore presenting a new internal challenge to the “Miš’al camp” that defeated him during the 2013 elections. On the other hand, it is likely that Miš’al will engage in PLO reforms in order to avoid political isolation and regional marginalization. Moreover, the recent news issued by the Gaza-based leadership to allow some Fataḥ cadres to return to Gaza, in order to pave the way for actual implementation of the Reconciliation Agreement, could only represent another strategic move599. In fact, despite apparent intention to engage in unification efforts, another report sheds light on controversial strategic considerations of Hamas leaders in Gaza, suggesting that the move could hide an under-the-table accord with ex-Fataḥ leader and security advisor Muḥammad Daḥlān600. As previously explained in chapter III, immediately after Hamas's electory in 2006, Daḥlān had significantly cooperated with the U.S in the framework of the anti-Hamas campaign601, and after Hamas's takeover, he was forced to relocate to the West Bank. After his relocation, tensions with ‘Abbās mounted, with reports that ‘Abbās had to face pressures from the U.S in order to appoint Daḥlān as his deputy in order to avoid internal divisions within Fataḥ602. Because of long-standing rivalry between the two leaders, dating back to the years of the second Intifada603, and especially because of Daḥlān's still strong presence in Gaza after the 2011 revolution, its close contacts with Egyptian Defence Minister, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ, and connection in the Emirates, Gaza leaders are re-considering their position towards Daḥlān with anti-’Abbās purposes604. These considerations bring us to assess that the Hamas leadership in Gaza is hiddely building
599 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/9475-hamas-to-allow-return-of-fatah-members-to- push-reconciliation 600 http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=669061 601 Ibid. 602 http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/49677/abbas-resists-us-pressure-to-name-dahlan-his-deputy.html Tensions stemmed from long-standing rivalry dating back to second Intifada, when ‘Abbās and Daḥlān strategically cooperated against Arafat, when the U.S started to push for a change of leadership in the PA afer the failure of the Camp David Accords. 603 In the context of Fataḥ's militias during the second Intifada, see: Usher, Facing defeat...op.cit., pp.22-25. 604 http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=669061
132 new strategic alliance in order to exploit reconciliation talks, all the while entrenching its control over the Gaza strip. In fact, a new alliance with Daḥlān based on mutual antagonism towards ‘Abbās, might represent for the Gaza leadership a new "rescue" plan at the political, strategic and financial level.
133 References
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UN Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56428.pdf.
United States Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates Al-Aqṣā International Foundation as Financier of Terror Charity linked to Funding of the Ḥamās Terrorist Organization”, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press releases/Pages/js439.aspx
Wikas S., “The Ḥamās Ceasefire: Historical Background, Future Foretold?”, The Washington Institute (3 January 2002) at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy- analysis/view/the-Ḥamās-ceasefire-historical-background-future-foretold
Yaari R., “Intiḫābat Ḥamās al-sarīah tušīr ilā ṣirāʿ dāḫilī”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (16 May 2012): http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy- analysis/view/secret-hamas-elections-point-to-internal-struggle
Yishay B., “Palestinian Economy, society and the second intifāḍah”, Gloria Center (2002).
Zanotti J., “U.S Foreign Aid to the Palestinians”, CRS Report for Congress, (18 January 2013)
Ze’evi D., “The decline of the PLO and the rise of PNA”, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, No.8 (June 2008): http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications1/meb/MEB8.pdf
142 CONFERENCES
IPCRI Conference “The role of third parties in Israel and Palestine”, 18th April 2014, Jerusalem.
PASSIA conference “Contemporary Islam in Palestine. Repercussions from the Arab Spring”, 24th April 2013, Ramallah.
POLLS & DOCUMENTS
“Agreement on Movement and Access”, OCHA report, November 2006, Available: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/AMA_One_Year_On_Nov06_final.pdf
“Al-Barnāmağ al-intiḫābī lil-Iḫwān al-muslimīn li intiḫābāt mağlis aš-šaʿb 2010”, http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=10125
Arabic full text of 2011 Reconciliation agreement: http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/4978.html
Congress resolution n.177, 23 April 2013 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- 113hres177ih/pdf/BILLS-113hres177ih.pdf
Details of the November 2012 ceasefire: http://alresalah.ps/ar/index.php?act=post&id=63237
Doha Declaration, full text: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/3397-full-text-of-the-doha- declaration-signed-between-Ḥamās-and-Fataḥ
Egyptian Document, 2009: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/503583b8-d00f-46e3- 95c2-b4dd2bedec37
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p46ejoint.html
Israeli Department of State’s archive of Ḥamās’s leaflets detects discrepancies with PLO’s leaflets: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hamasintifada.pdf
JMCC poll n° 49, October 2003 http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=450
JMCC poll n°47, December 2002 http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=452, accessed September 2013.
List of Prisoners exchanged during the Šalīṭ deal on Ḥamās website: http://www.Ḥamāsinfo.net/ar/DataFiles/Contents/Files/asra.pdf
Mecca Agreement Arabic full text: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/8-2-2007.pdf
143 “Naṣ waṯīqa al-'asrā al-Filasṭīniyīn lil- wafāq al-waṭanī”: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/5583e506-50a3-4368-8a08-4f995c783141
Official records of UN General Assembly for the Commission of Palestine http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/93037e3b9397 46de8525610200567883
Poll No. 3, September 1993 - On Palestinian Attitudes to the PLO - Israel Agreement http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=503
Press Release, 30 June 2003: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p8ejoint.html
PRS Polls in December 2004 and January 2005 available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/exit05.html.
PSR poll n°13 &15, 2004 & 2005.
ḤAMĀS STATEMENTS & PRESS:
‘Abū Marzūq official communiqué: http://hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2B i1s78z5vFB4ydBinJxRDY6mDo3oPWw67jUXd3E87NJUjZVWe%2BuVg2CpNUuPt6q EPxmglpYkVW/Bdv2XiGVjqL9/gYfw4CPviGW5jHat2VMMtVTg%3D
‘Abū Ubāida states that the Qassām position is in line with that of the Political Bureau, Qassām Communiqué: http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=32640
"Abraz nuqāṭ al-mu'tamar al-saḥāfī li-ra'īs al-maktab al-sīyyāsī li-Ḥamās”, al-Ğazīra, 28 January 2006: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/0b7506d2-4dfd-4b86-a1f8-74b513af0309
"Al-Bardawīl: ʿamal Lağnah intiḫābāt fī Ġazza marhūn bi-tawāfuq al-iṭār al-qiyyādī ʿalā al-Alīyyāt al-munażżama li-ʿamal al-lağnah": http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7WLDuXwpVnVtDjdJNEcCOFQCqDxoDuAqnGDCaHoaUa4x3wCWG4sFjCJ pwpMh06kwTNBiYWa98njnE%2BLF3/i/7tQ/Z4LSW2c2Ff9BgQTcA9nE%3D#.T0vnjRK K1tM.twitter
“‘Abbās: Ḥamās allowed Qā’ida operatives”: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3511880,00.html
-يوسف-أحمد/Aḥmad Yūsif, statement, 24 April 2011: http://paltoday.ps/ar/post/107196 إسرائيل-كيان-زوال-في-سيساعد-العربية-الأنظمة-سقوط
“Hanīyyah fī al-Qāhira al-yaūm wa Marzūq mas’ūl al-Iʿlān" Al-Ḥayāt 23 April 2012: http://alhayat.com/Details/506404
“Hamas chief Meshal makes historic visit to Jordan”, Al-ʿArabīyyah, 30 January 2012:http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/30/191383.html
144 Al-Ahrām, 29 October 2011: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/13/71/132061.aspx
Al-Ayyām 9 February 2007: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/9-2-2007/p01.pdf
Al-Ayyām, 11 February 2012: http://www.al-ayyam.com/article.aspx?did=185275&date=2/12/2012
Al-Ayyām, 21 May 2012: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/21-5-2012/p21.pdf
Al-Ayyām, 22 February 2011: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/22-2-2011/p21.pdf
Al-Ayyām, January 29, 2006: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/29-1-2006/p01.pdf
“Exclusive: New Gaza Salafist faction numbers 11,000”: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=277513
Al-Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda, 18 February 2007: http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2007/2/18/page1.pdf
Al-Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda, 8 April 2011: http://www.alhayat-j.com/pdf/2011/4/8/page1.pdf
Al- Ğazīra, 2 February 2006: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/98bbcb90-8506- 436e-88df-8e7ce0e78dc1. And al- Ğazīra, 1 February 2006: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/d9e78c18-54c6-4704-82d8-11e366b13e24
Al-Maṣrī al-yaūm, 15 Novermber 2012: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/243420
"Al-qiyyādī fī Ḥamās Ḫalīl al-Ḥayyā fī muqābila ḥaṣrīyya maʿa “al-Monitor” nabḥaṯ ʿan daʿm badīl lil Irānī", Al-Monitor, 27 June 2013: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/06/hamas- interview-hayya-gaza-iran-hezbollah-support.html
Al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 12 February 2012: http://www.alqudsalarabi.info/index.asp?fname=data/2012/02/02-12/12z496.htm
Al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 16 May 2011: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2011/05/05-16/All.pdf
Al-Quds al-‘Arabī, 22 February 2012: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2012/02/02-22/All.pdf
Al-Quds al-‘Arabī: http://www.alqudsalarabi.info/index.asp?fname=today%5C15z495.htm&arc=data%5C 2012%5C03%5C03-15%5C15z495.htm
Al-Quds al-’Arabī, 17 May 2011: http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/266596
Al-Quds al-’Arabī, 17 February 2007: http://dl.alquds.com:8080/pdf/19972b4da254f50eaf0045d4d343c6c2/52e3a626/pdf- docs/2007/2/17/page1.pdf
145 Al-Quds, 4 June 2013, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=50945
Al-Rāy, 7 October 2012 http://www.alrai.com/article/543769.html
Al-Šurūq, 19 February 2011: http://www.shorouknews.com/mobile/columns/view.aspx?cdate=19022011&id=a9db0c 89-8594-4df9-8e22-d10d52c13bc9
"Al-taqārīb bayna Ḥamās wa Daḥlān: li- Ṣāleḥ man wa ʿalā ḥasab man? ": http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=669061
Al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī, November 4, 1994, p.27 (Birzeit Unieversity, newspapers archive)
Cairo Press Conference: http://www.al-ayyam.com/article.aspx?did=164852&date=4/28/2011
"Egypt Salafist leader visit Gaza Strip”, Ma’an News Agency, 21 April 2012: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=478305
Filasṭīn, May 4, 2011: http://www.felesteen.ps/nd/releases/2011/052011/04/
February, 2006 Al-Quds al-‘Arabī: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2006/02Feb/13FebMon/qds05.pdf
Ğalğalat in Gaza: Šarq al-Awsāṭ, 6 September 2009: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11240&article=534766&searc h=%CC%E1%CC%E1%CA&state=true#.UuRkm2Q1igQ
Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/18/Ḥamās-moves-from- violence-palestinian?guni=Article:in%20body%20link
Ḫālid ‘Abū Toāmeh, “Muslim Gunmen Targets Christian in Gaza,” Jerusalem Post, December 2007: http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=37162
Ḥamās call for stability in Egypt and patience: http://www.felesteen.ps/backup%20web/sub.php?page=details&nid=19981
Ḥamās Charter: http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/1734.pdf
Ḥamās’ communiqué, 12 March 2012: http://hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2B i1s7MOIDhmexj2nQlzh15ZapD8Iq0kEmfbDL4Gb4wIhW%2FbVKT1mT%2F2h5qVMEI Jc4gq9GWKe21Is%2FFLF9Xg7kpCl6EVxRsf6%2BnhOYak9QRsjIeC0%3D#.UMsqrC DZab4.twitter
Ḥamās’ Communiqué, 25 May 2006: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/25_5_06_1.htm
Ḥamās’ communiqué, 26 January 2006 : http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/26_1_06.htm
Ḥamās’ Communiqué, 30 November 2011: http://hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2B 146 i1s7f7c0KfPVTNNO8nrG3q4GaIjBDcuC0SQ4kvoAT0G7saFDubE2puaX4eBZ3bToUJ SOj8NVqkeE%2BinUPd8hwf%2Ff7yBQJG7rePmFVYJudAwFb64%3D#.UMsoCtA7h1I .twitter
Ḥamās’ Communiqué, 31 August 2012: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7e2TftY40q1QRw4YKqPzvHemInIxH41XGisjXSjRMYM2hpfhj8KAvddb4TCx KHKOHk0%2B48Cvp18cV57cd3bdt4zEICCM7Wuf7gHtVgxvS6do%3D#.UEHHrsUEja Y.twitter
Ḥamās condemnation of attack against Palestinians in Syria: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7Gz%2BXvu%2Bt8g83BfJsIU4moaGehsQLdghLFLxYelnQQ0EdLJIpkRs8yh yCds1zoNVDWuSmN3HifH6PcMohb50w6rWbgkkG7BvytriBMqyq2x4%3D#.UFsYSHd iplk.twitter
“Ḥamās is ready to have negotiations with Israel”: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/316940
“Ḥamās kidnapped more than 166 Fataḥ-affiliated cadres and shut down and confiscated 42 association and take over the provinces and political offices in the Gaza Strip”: http://www.alhayat-j.com/details.php?opt=3&id=70529&cid=1781
Ḥamās’ official Communiqué, 2 March 2012 http://www.alwasatnews.com/3446/news/read/628553/1.html
Ḥamās’ official statement, 14/06/2006: http://www.palestine-info.com/’Arabī c/hamas/statements/2006/14_6_06_1.htm
Ḥamās’ official statement, 17 February 2012: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7QoC0c%2BnjGhXubrAwPzZ4HlmgsvrIlu57KIw7NEABJHGXOZXZYitE%2B a5O1dRibCEK5iylHRKOpiexPoNILRMMZWWdKFny80SlQGcs8XseJI0%3D
Ḥamās official website, 14/06/2006 reported here: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/14_6_06_1.htm
Ḥamās’ position on Syria, 2 April 2011: https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=769474
Ḥamās’ statement regarding Interim government’s program and PLO leadership: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7G9ug0%2B90aF8sb7/qrrlctVCPMCZ21zbeUEh0vALenF1mi1CHZhq2GBxU P/wBalxRLMZyJA60b6R39NWhInrU2YVW9qp4Dn8zfhnmR7iORhk%3D#.T0ONhA3N JuE.twitter
Ḥamās’ statement, 30 January 2006: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabi c/hamas/statements/2006/30_1_06_1.htm
Ḥamās’ statement, May 5, 2007, www.alqassam.ps/english/?action=showinet&inid=12
Ḥamās’ slogans of resistance: http://pdf.alresalah.ps/ver.php?id=1130
147 Ḥamās’ statement about closing offices in Syria: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7PFnWXDJC0UzEfIYsAP%2BbdzCN2%2BQExzO%2Bk3ZEVdU6nFW7afv2 DFHu4pKCYDwiapoY7kUtbQBxUhdifFgEMcJgvqdo9UhG8Dpq6hl2tfvVkus%3D#.UKT VHFruqPU.twitter
Ḥamdān statement: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7N4hCbabq6nXlR0wKCYa95YCI5%2BygVQTQZ5OxlrB204aJkuaVdU%2F% 2BJrFy%2FpWF4Wbqqc1f%2FikFzPMkaLOsuh6OplT8UeD21ACM5DeXKBRDCN8% 3D#.UKTU-6YWjUo.twitter
"Hamas to allow return of Fatah members to push reconciliation": https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/9475-hamas-to-allow-return-of- fatah-members-to-push-reconciliation
Haniyah’s speech calling for a unity agreement based on the Mecca Accord, 24 June 2007: http://www.palestineinfo.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEp MO%2bi1s70M5KNl2FCuDLYnzwW1hlY43ksc45W2vJ7CA3FCZSvYcu4xkXzQoLgiId eFbSQSZD8nZ9Usd1U7OCJvNjpi4sPNR2Bj0RzgqVzj6XEvqUJ7g%3d
Hanīyyah invites ‘Abbās to Gaza to discuss reconciliation: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/17-3-2011/p01.pdf
Ḥasan Ğabr, al-Ayyām July 11, 2009: http://www.al-ayyam.com/pdfs/11-7-2009/p01.pdf
Ḥamās’ Communiqué: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MD146m9rUxJEpM O%2bi1s7kGi41O3iVnqzDLWFeriH9qrDRHCU%2bo4j8Zoow4d5zlv7M0bPq6ebSJE8 %2fBx6Yj26d4LBNRmBId9wh96QC0tGI5PSn3zxVQAI8mFgkHx24%3d http://www.safa.ps/ara/index.php?action=showdetail&seid=43023
“Ḥamās wa Ṣirāʿ Qaṭarī- Irānī”, Al-Ḥayāt al-Ğadīda: http://www.alhayat-j.com/newsite/details.php?opt=3&id=201956&cid=2911
Ḥroūb K.,”How al-Jazeera has advanced Qatar’s foreign policy” http://europesworld.org/2011/10/01/how-al-jazeeras-arab-spring-advanced-qatars- foreign-policies/
Ihab al-Ghussein for al-Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/hamas-islamization-gaza- ghussein.html
"Inḍimām Ḥamās lil-tanżīm al-‘ālamī lil-‘iḫwān al-muslimīn”: http://islamtoday.net/albasheer/artshow-12-159971.htm
Interview with Maḥmūd Zahār: http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/13186
148 "Is Ḥamās considering a move to Beirut?”: http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/hamas-beirut-hezbollah- marzouk.html
"Israeli delegation to Cairo to discuss security measures": Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 25/08/2013: http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/49405.html
“Israel faked Qā’ida presence” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2550513.stm
“Israel says Qā’ida active in Gaza” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2546863.stm
List of Ministers proposed by the Ḥamās government to ‘Abbās for unity government in 2007: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/15-3-2007.pdf
Maan News Agency, 2/07/2012: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=500546
Maan News Agency, 28 April 2012: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=480178
Maan News Agency: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=374955
Marzūq statement: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7B6%2Bs6MDXypLInhlpJvyBT95EXqF3KvCy12QoNae8Mhn8teS6RuWzB12 vtcDQautuqKNFLxpksWIAM%2BFHwsLnKl98b4iwMoIzuRUqPzrL%2B2M%3D#.Ttn3 MVrHKi0.twitter
Marzūq statement: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7Yl%2BZbiOTzMHGe%2B2DpxoaGnYaqOV/ILnUzKB6a01Tdb/c6m24x/KrLn EsJRdKHgOt4x0C/l5fOuw%2BiDwXOIMQV9r/j8tkiv9al2fVEIJUGAw%3D
Miš’al will not run in the elections: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/23/239760.html
Miš’al’s speech during fifth conference for the support of the First Intifāḍah: http://www.hamasinfo.net/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2BcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpM O%2Bi1s7WEOYEhmxMlCsC/AM2/zfpaWjc6FmpkNqvpopiqfkEGUZiFgJssdGnzolI1J MMAhDR6CySHkqd5Qolj48h2AqjAYdoKr6IdpM7TPHICDL9R4%3D
"Mišʿal yadʿū fī mu’tamar al-ʿām lī-ḥizb an-Nahḍa at-Tūnisī ilā "ṭay ṣafḥa” al- mufāwaḍāt maʿa ‘Isra’īl”, Naharnet, 13 July 2012, available: -النهضة-لحزب-العام-المؤتمر-في-يدعو-مشعلhttp://www.naharnet.com/stories/ar/46381- اسرائيل-مع-المفاوضات-صفحة-طي-الى-التونسي
Mursī’s speech http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GztclXEAq7Y
Musā ‘Abū Marzūq statement, 7 September 2013: https://www.facebook.com/mousa.abumarzook/posts/503682606390809
149 Obama speech before the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): http://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-speech-to-aipac-prepared-text/article/145447
Official interview with Šaīḫ Yāsīn: http://www.qassam.ps/specialfile-348-Interview_with_the_Sheikh.html
"ʿOmar Shaʿbān, “Ḥamās wa Miṣr...bi-ḥāğa lil-diblūmasīyyah aš-šaʿbīyyah”, Al- Monitor, 3 April 2013: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/04/Ḥamās-egypt- reconcile-differences.html
Qassām Communiqué, 15 March 2013: http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/statments.php?id=4769
Qassām Communiqué, 24 July 2012: http://www.qassam.ps/news- 5953%20Bardawil_No_Palestinian_state_in_or_without_Gaza.html
Qassām Communiqué: http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=32640
Qassām Comuniqué: http://www.qassam.ps/opinion6851hamas_will_not_commit_suicide_by_recognizing_I srael.html
“Qirā’a hādi’a fī ʿalāqa Ḥamās wa Qaṭar", Al-Monitor, 22 April 2013: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2013/04/hamas-qatar- relationship-independence.html
Reactions to Mecca Agreement, 8 Feburary 2007: http://81.144.208.20:9090/pdf/2007/02/08FebThu/qds05.pdf
“Risālah at-tawḍīḥiyyah ḥawwal waṯīqa al-wafāq al-waṭanī”: http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/documents/2006/27_5_06.htm
Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn al-Šaraḫ's statements about Hamas inclusion in the PLO and recognition of Israel: https://www.paldf.net/forum/showthread.php?t=800570
Security Forces transformed in regular army: نظامي-جيش-إلى-تنفيذية-قوة-من-الأمنية-الأجهزة/http://www.moi.gov.ps/news/46330
“Security sources: Ḥamās is arming Islamic Ğihād with Qassām” : http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=33845
“Shin Bet chief: al-Qā’ida affiliated groups behind Gaza violence”, 18 January 2011: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/shin-bet-chief-al-qaida-affiliated- groups-behind-gaza-violence-1.337819
Shlomi Eldar,“The Israel-Egypt-Ḥamās triangle in the Sinai”, Al Monitor: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/israels-egypts-and-Ḥamās-joined- interest-in-the-sinai.html
"Ṣirāʿ Irānī wa Qaṭarī", 18 February 2007: http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=583399 150
Speech Hanīyyah at al-Azhar University in Cairo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWX8d9ln8tk
Speech Hanīyyah during Ḥamās’s anniversary in Gaza: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqC-yvO5OHo
Speech Mišʿal at Charlie Rose Show: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8HOvmlD54ok
Speech Mišʿal during signing ceremony of Reconciliation Agreement: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6zFDivGgCs
Statement by Azīz Dweīk about Syria: http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/169083.html
Statement Ḥamdān about Arab revolutions, Ḥamās official website, 25/06/2012: http://shehab.ps/ar/index.php?act=post&id=15267
Statement issued by the Secretary General of the Palestinian Cabinet announcing the start of consultations to form the XIII government: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/14-7-2007.pdf
“Syarian Army resumes shelling Yarmouk camp”, Ma’an News, 4 August 2012 Text of Ḥamās electoral program: http://www.Ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=4921
"Taḥqiqāt Qaḍīyyahh al-taḫābur: Badīʿ wa Al-Šāṭer ittifāqan maʿa Ḥamās ʿalā muhāğamat al-ğaīš wa as-šurṭā”: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/News/Details/357572#
“The Jaljalat Phenomenon in the Gaza Strip”: http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reviews/Pages/Jaljalat_en.aspx
The Quartet Cabinet’s statement, 16 June 2006: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/16-6-2007.pdf
The text of the decrees of the Palestinian presidency requires dismissal of the Prime Minister Ismāʿīl Hanīyyah and the declaration of a state of emergency throughout the territory of the Palestinian National Authority: http://www.palestine-studies.org/gaza/behindscenes/14-6-2007.pdf
“Top Ḥamās leaders visit Teherān”, the daily star, 15 March 2012: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Mar-15/166781-top-hamas-official- visits-tehran.ashx
“Turkey denies promise of 300m $ aid to Ḥamās”, The Jerusalem Post, 30/1/2012, availble: http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Turkey-denies-promise-of-300m-aid-tohamas
"Waṯīqa sīyyāsīyyah bi-qalam Ḫālid Miš’al: al-fikr as-sīyyāsī li-Ḥarakat Ḥamās fī żill aḫir at-taṭāwūrāt”, Zaytūna Center for Studies and Consultations, 19 March 2013: http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/38590.html
151 “Zāra Zahār ilā Teherān”,15 March 2012: http://www.lebanese-forces.com/2012/03/15/200646/
LIST OF INTERVIEWS:
• ‘Omar Šaʿbān, Journalist and director of Gaza-based think tank “PalThink". • Addameer. Prisoners Support and Human rights association: http://www.addameer.org • Azīz Dweīk- Ḥamās PLC member West Bank. • Azīz Kayd, former member of Ḥamās in 2006-2007 Government. Ramallah. • Dār al-yatīm- Bethlehem. • Ḥamās activists and members Kutla al-Islāmīyyah in Ramallah, Bethlehem and Al- Quds University. • Hāni al-Maṣrī- Journalist and Palestinian political analyst. • Hillel Schenker & Ziad ‘Abū Zayyād. Palestine-Israel Journal, Jerusalem. • Iyād Barġūṯī- Palestinian political analyst and expert. Head of Ramallah Center for Human Rights Studies. • Ministry of Awqāf Ramallah. • Ministry of Awqāf - Da‘wa section Bethlehem. • Muḥammad Dağğānī- Founding Director of the Jerusalem Studies and Research Institute, and Founder of the Wasatia movement of moderate Islam. • Munṯer Dağğānī- Co-founder of , and Director of the Centre for the Advancement of Peace and Democracy. • Nassār Ibrahīm- Palestinian Political Analyst and Hear of the Alternative Information Center Beit Saḥūr. • Palestinian Youth Parliament member, Jerusalem. • Ph.D candidate Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa, Ṭarīq Dana. Ph.D thesis about elite formation in Palestine. • Prof. Bašīr Bašīr- Hebrew University of Jerusalem. • Prof. Benedetta Berti, political and security analyst. Expert of militarization in the Gaza Strip. • Prof. Hišām Aḥmad, Professor at Saint Mary's College, California. Expert in Islamic Movement in Palestine.
152 • Samʿān Ḫūrī- Director of Peace and Democracy Forum. Political expert of the Intifada period and 1990s. • Walīd Ladādweh- data and survey analyst at the Palestinian Survey and Research Center, Ramallah. • Walīd Sālem- Director of the Palestinian Center for Democracy and Community Development and former PFLP activist in 1970s and 1980s.
153